



# CRRF Case Study

Lessons learned from the CRRF and EUTF projects  
involved in refugee programming in the Horn of Africa

Altai Consulting for the European Union – July 2021



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Cover photo: Aerial image of Kalobeyei taken in 2017 prior to the cash for shelter project. Photo credit: UNHCR.

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# ABBREVIATIONS

\$ – USD

ARRA – Administration for Refugees and Returnee Affairs (Ethiopia)

CRRF – Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework

DANIDA – Danish International Development Agency

DEVCO – Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (now INTPA, see below)

DFID – UK Department for International Development (now UK FCDO – see below)

DRC – The Democratic Republic of the Congo or Danish Refugee Council

DRDIP – Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project

ECHO – European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations

EU – European Union

EUTF – European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTF for Africa)

FCDO – Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (UK)

GCR – Global Compact on Refugees

HoA – Horn of Africa

ICARA – International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa

IDA – International Development Association

IGAD – Intergovernmental Authority on Development

ILO – International Labour Organisation

INTPA, DG – EU Directorate-General for International Partnerships

IFC – International Finance Corporation

IP – Implementing Partner

KE – Kenya

KISEDIP – Kalobeyei Integrated Socioeconomic Development Plan

KKCF – Kakuma Kalobeyei Challenge Fund

MENFOP – *Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale et de la Formation Professionnelle* (Djiboutian Ministry of National Education and Vocational Training)

MoLG – Ministry of Local Government (Uganda)

MTR – Mid-term Review

NEMIS – National Education Management Information System

NHIF – National Health Insurance Fund

NDP – National Development Plan

NCO – National Coordination Office

NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation

NYD – New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants

ONARS – *Office National d'Assistance aux Réfugiés et Sinistrés* (Djiboutian National Office of Assistance to Refugees and Disaster Victims)

OPM – Office of the Prime Minister (Uganda)

PRM – Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration

RAS – Refugee Affairs Secretariat

RAP – Regional Action Plans

RDPP – Regional Development Protection Programme

SDG – Sustainable Development Goal

STA – Settlement Transformative Agenda

TPLF – Tigray People's Liberation Front

TVET – Technical and Vocational Education and Training

UN – United Nations

UNDP – United Nations Development Programme

UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

WB – World Bank



## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This case study explores how the European Union Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa has applied the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) principles and its precursor, the Regional Development Protection Programme (RDPP) – an EU programme, in its response to forced displacement in four countries (Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda) in the Horn of Africa (HoA).

The objectives of this case study are to provide an overview of progress on the CRRF approach in four countries of the Horn of Africa and how the EU can further advance the CRRF agenda; understand the role played by EUTF projects with regard to refugees and the CRRF in the four countries; collect feedback on key successes and lessons learnt from the interventions so far; suggest possible points for improvement based on lessons learnt and best practices in the projects; issue recommendations to ensure future EU programming can best support CRRF programming in the four countries as well as follow up on RDPP. The case study is based on extensive secondary research and more than 40 key informant interviews.

**Context:** The Horn of Africa region is characterised by large numbers of refugees (over 4.6 million), including over 2.8 million in study's four countries of focus, most of them in Uganda (1.5 million), with significant inflows to Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia continuing in the five last years.

**Evolution of the refugee response:** Responses to refugee crises have often been delivered through humanitarian assistance but development-based responses to refugee crises pre-date the CRRF approach. The RDPP Programme, for example, was conceived following the Valletta Summit on Migration, with RDPP programmes' design happening in parallel or prior to the countries' official endorsement of the CRRF. The RDPP also aims to bridge the humanitarian-development nexus, although the RDPP and CRRF largely differ in scope (project-based intervention versus whole of government and whole of society approach).

**The CRRF approach:** The four countries all formally announced they would apply the CRRF in 2017. Since the CRRF's third objective (expanding access to resettlement in third countries and other complementary pathways) has been slow and difficult to put in place and voluntary returns to countries of origin (fourth objective) are not considered feasible in most cases, in the HoA, the CRRF's application has largely focused on local integration and self-reliance. The approach builds on several themes:

- **Pledges and coordination structures:** Progress in setting up CRRF coordination structures has occurred mostly in Djibouti and Uganda, with mixed progress in Ethiopia (and a noticeable loss of momentum in the past year, in part because of the ongoing conflict). No formal structures, apart from a technical working group, have yet been set up in Kenya to steer the process.

- **National legislative changes:** Progress to enact legislation and operationalise accompanying changes has been uneven across the region, with Djibouti enacting the most sweeping changes (passing of the 2017 refugee laws and two decrees granting refugees the right to work and access to education and health). The effects of changes in national legislation must, however, be nuanced due to a number of factors including governments' limited enforcement capacity as well as bureaucratic and financial hurdles.

- **Burden sharing and additionality:** The CRRF promotes additional burden-sharing between donor and recipient countries which has largely failed to materialise, leading to an increasing North-South polarisation which has been at the heart of the breakdown of pledging conferences for refugees and represents a risk to the sustainability of the CRRF.

- **Whole of government approach:** The CRRF approach promotes the integration of refugees into national systems and development planning to ensure their inclusion in national and local budgets. Again, Djibouti has made important progress, integrating refugees in the national health systems and integrating them progressively in the education system. Uganda has launched several sectoral plans

including refugees but financing these plans remains a great issue. Ethiopia has made limited progress despite some promising initiatives. Kenya has made some timid progress, with the potential for a future refugee education polity and the on-going registration of refugees in the national health insurance fund.

- **Integration into development planning:** Integration of refugees in development planning is key to ensure that they can have access to similar benefits as nationals. Uganda stands out in this regard: refugees are included in the five-year National Development Plan III (2020-2025), which is also operationalised at district level. In Kenya, refugees are not integrated in national planning but are at county level in some counties, while in Ethiopia the level of integration is low and Djibouti has pledged to do it in its Vision 2025 framework.

- **Whole of society response** calls for broader participation from a wider range of non-traditional actors such as the private sector, civil society and refugee/host communities themselves. While there have been attempts at participatory approaches for the latter, preliminary evidence shows they have been the exception rather than the norm and for the most part not truly participative. Private sector engagement has been largely limited by a number of factors including lack of data and information, national policy and regulatory constraints, geographical barriers and risk-related concerns.

**IGAD has played an important role** in standard setting, learning and dialogue with regard to policy processes on education, jobs and livelihoods. Its influence is, however, limited by the fact that its action plans are non-binding and it has been criticised for its quick succession of action plans.

**CRRF funding:** Overall, humanitarian funding for refugees via UNHCR is declining across the four countries and key humanitarian needs remain chronically under-funded, leading to key protection gaps and limited human capital development. At the same time, development funding remains insufficient, with little donor coordination or transparency and key gaps, including in terms of geographic areas. In Uganda, contrary to other countries, there has been significant attention to basic services and infrastructure while in Kenya and Ethiopia, most of the funding has focused on jobs and livelihoods.

**Lessons learned on CRRF funding and implementation in the HoA overall:** Despite many donors' focus on jobs and livelihoods, failure to attract the private sector continues to be a persistent issue; refugee responses in the region still disproportionately focus on camps and settlements as opposed to urban and/or self-settled refugees; understanding the political economy of local areas is key to identifying entry points and designing strong CRRF interventions; increased environmental degradation and deforestation creates a risk to the CRRF agenda in many refugee hosting areas; and finally, momentum for the CRRF is diminishing, in part due to the lack of meaningful burden-sharing and to competing priorities for the national governments.

**The EUTF and the CRRF:** EUTF CRRF-related programming amounts to €158M and can be broadly divided into two 'waves' or generations of programming, the first generation consisting mainly of RDPP programmes (€64M) in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, *Alianza Shire* (Ethiopia) and *Solutions Pérennes* (Djibouti). The second generation includes mostly CRRF projects, the RISE programme in Uganda and the EUTF's support to the Kakuma Kalobeyi Challenge Fund (through the Piloting Private Sector IFC programme). While first generation programming tended to focus on basic services, livelihoods and protection, the second generation (€74M) has shifted towards more governance issues related to the implementation of the CRRF, with also a renewed interest in jobs and livelihoods programming. The geographical scope has increased in both Kenya and Uganda and focused on Jijiga in Ethiopia. While the EU possesses a 'CRRF in the HoA – Forward Strategy', its responses in the four countries have largely been led at the country level: there does not seem to have been guidance on whether to target protracted or new refugee situations and EUTF choices have mostly been aligned with the regions in which the international community is generally present.

**Best practices from RDPP programming:** EUTF programming is seen as bridging the humanitarian-development nexus (coordination between ECHO and DEVCO/now INTPA is praised); the targeting of host communities in addition to refugees was widely hailed as a best practice (although it is now widely used); working directly with local government institutions had mixed results and required complex coordination; transparent knowledge management was seen as facilitating subsequent projects.

**Lessons learned from RDPP programming:** Project design assumptions were not systematically evidence-based and affected programme / project design; in certain cases, key elements were missing from programme design (possibly due to rushed design phases); there was a high regional variation in the way CRRF programmes followed RDPP projects, with some significant gaps and lack of continuity; capacity building and learning issues linked to turnover in individuals affected institutions; availability of additional funding in response to refugee inflows varied significantly; livelihoods interventions were affected by lack of linkages with the private sector; choice of beneficiaries based on self-selection led to challenges; and several interventions should have made provisions to ensure continued humanitarian assistance when contexts were not ripe for development interventions.

**Opportunities and recommendations:**

- **High level:** Increase government ownership of the CRRF horizontally (line ministries) and vertically (at regional and sub-regional levels); encourage programmes that support refugee inclusion in national social safety net programmes; include funding and build programmes that support the transition from humanitarian to government-owned service delivery; adopt a framework to guide livelihoods investments building on existing efforts; increase research on and support to urban refugees; increase advocacy and support for national and regional government stakeholders.

- **Programme level:** invest in programme design phases (e.g. develop evidence-based assumptions, local level political economy analyses and livelihoods activities based on solid value chain analyses); encourage real refugee and host community participation, including in the design phase of programmes; learn from existing examples on private sector participation (and barriers to it) and encourage further active participation in programming; encourage programmes to include NGOs and CSOs to help increase adaptability and longer term sustainability; adopt more regional, cross-border programming as opposed to area/situation-specific programming; continue to encourage adoption of triple nexus approaches; consider making additional flexible funds available in response to possible large scale refugee inflows; base programmes in agreed upon theories of changes measurable through clear outcome indicators; consider using flexible monitoring, evaluation and learning tools (e.g. real time monitoring and learning) that can help the programme adapt to changing circumstances; consider including interventions that will reduce environmental degradation in programming.



# 1. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

This case study explores how the European Union Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa has applied the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) principles and its precursor, the Regional Development Protection Programme (RDPP) – a European Union (EU) programme, in its response to forced displacement in four countries (Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda) in the Horn of Africa (HoA).

This case study is produced within the Learning Component of the EUTF Horn of Africa Monitoring and Learning System (MLS), which was initiated in July 2017 and is being implemented by Altai Consulting. The overall objective of the MLS is to strengthen EUTF interventions in the HoA region through the creation of a monitoring and learning system which aims to provide an evidence-based approach for programming and implementing interventions. As part of its mandate, Altai Consulting produces biannual (previously quarterly) reports, which describe the quantitative – and as much as possible the qualitative – progress achieved by EUTF-funded projects in the region. Altai also produces in-depth research outputs such as case studies which provide analyses of specific programmes or approaches.

The objectives of this case study are to:

- Provide an overview of progress on the CRRF approach in four countries of the Horn of Africa and how the EU can further advance the CRRF agenda;
- Understand the role played by EUTF projects with regard to refugees and the CRRF in the four countries;
- Collect feedback on key successes and lessons learnt from the interventions so far;
- Suggest possible points for improvement based on lessons learnt and best practices in the projects;
- Issue recommendations to ensure future EU programming can best support CRRF programming in the four countries as well as follow up on RDPP.

To meet these objectives, the following activities were conducted:


- Project documents were reviewed, and additional secondary research on the CRRF and its accompanying efforts was conducted;
- More than 40 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) were conducted between the end of 2019 and the end of 2020 with a variety of stakeholders, including members of the EU Delegations (EUD) in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, EU Headquarters in Brussels, RDPP project staff in the four countries as well as academics and specialists from think tanks. These interviews were conducted in person in 2019 and remotely due to COVID-19-related adjustments in 2020. The consultant attended the 'Delivering the Global Compact on Refugees: Local approaches to Inclusion' conference in Addis Ababa in October-November 2019. Additional interviews were also conducted with key donors including the United States of America (Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration – PRM – and the United States Agency for International Development – USAID), World Bank, the erstwhile United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID), now Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) and the Dutch Embassy in Kenya.

## 2. CONTEXT

### 2.1 THE REFUGEE CONTEXT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

The Horn of Africa region is characterised by large numbers of refugees (over 4.6 million) most of whom stay in camps or settlements (the latter in the case of Uganda).<sup>1</sup> Relatively few refugees reside in urban areas or are directly integrated with adjacent host communities. Most refugees remain in situations of protracted displacement – the Somali regional situation is an illustrative example of the phenomena. Some Somalis arrived in the last five to ten years (especially during the 2011-2012 and 2017 droughts) while approximately 500,000 Somalis have been refugees for 28 years.<sup>2,3</sup> The past five years have seen a number of refugee influxes including the South Sudanese influx in Ethiopia (starting in 2013), Kenya (starting in 2013 and accelerating in 2016) and Uganda (674,033 arrivals between 2016 and March 2017).<sup>4</sup> Finally, as a result of the conflict occurring in Tigray Regional State (northern Ethiopia) between forces loyal to the regional administration of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian government, there have been over 60,000 refugees fleeing Ethiopia to go to Sudan.<sup>5</sup>

Figure 1: Refugee-hosting areas and camps/settlements in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda<sup>6</sup>



<sup>1</sup> UNHCR, Refugees and Asylum Seekers. For Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Rwanda and South Sudan numbers are from May 2021. For Kenya, numbers are from April 2021. For Djibouti, numbers are from March 2021, for Eritrea Dec 2020 and for Somalia April 2021.

<sup>2</sup> Protracted displacement according to UNHCR refers to situations in which 25,000 refugees or more from the same nationality have been in exile for five consecutive years or more in a given host country.

<sup>3</sup> World Bank, '2019 update: How long do refugees stay in exile? To find out beware of averages', 2019.

<sup>4</sup> UNHCR, Gov. of Uganda, 'Uganda: Humanitarian Needs Overview', 2017.

<sup>5</sup> UN OCHA, 'Sudan: Refugee influx from Tigray continues', March 2021.

<sup>6</sup> Numbers used in this map are from UNHCR for Djibouti (May 2020), Kenya (August 2020), Ethiopia (September 2020) and Uganda (September 2020). Some transit centres and other smaller non-camp areas are not captured in this map.

**Three countries in the region account for the majority of origin countries for refugees: South Sudan (2,253,168 refugees)** as a result of a civil war starting in 2013 and continued instability,<sup>7</sup> **Somalia (638,708 refugees)** as a result of repeated droughts, insecurity and civil war<sup>8</sup> and **the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), with 948,587 refugees**, which has been experiencing protracted conflict among several insurgent groups especially in its eastern provinces.<sup>9</sup> South Sudanese refugees principally reside in Uganda (921,013), Sudan (774,368), Ethiopia (372,067), Kenya (129,936) and the DRC (55,784).<sup>10</sup> Somali refugees principally reside in Kenya (268,396), Ethiopia (209,949), Yemen (112,865) and Uganda (47,418).<sup>11</sup> Finally, refugees from the DRC are present in twenty countries but have principally sought refuge in Uganda (432,390).<sup>12</sup>

**The four countries of focus in the case study possess particularities in regard to their refugee situations. Uganda** has the highest number of refugees in Africa (1,494,505) with caseloads mostly coming from South Sudan (62%), DRC (29%) followed by Burundi (3%), Somalia (3%) and other nationalities (3%).<sup>13</sup> The refugees are gathered in three broad regions: West Nile region as well as Kiryandongo and Lamwo Districts mostly host South Sudanese refugees; south-west Uganda hosts the DRC caseload and other nationalities originating primarily from the Great Lakes region; and, Kampala hosts refugees of various nationalities. Refugees in **Kenya** (518,029) are mostly Somali (54%), South Sudanese (25%), and from the DRC (9%).<sup>14</sup> They are hosted in three areas: the Dadaab camps (225,675) which mostly host Somali refugees; Kakuma and Kalobeyei (210,384) hosting mostly South Sudanese and Nairobi (81,970), which hosts an urban caseload of mixed nationalities.<sup>15</sup> **Ethiopia** (806,541) has six different refugee hosting areas (Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Dollo Ado, Gambella, Jijiga and Tigray), in addition to Addis Ababa, that are vastly different from each other but share the commonality of being situated in peripheral and often impoverished areas of the country. Most refugees in Ethiopia are from South Sudan (46%), Somalia (26%) and Eritrea (21%), with 43% of all refugees being hosted in Gambella alone.<sup>16</sup> Finally, **Djibouti** has the lowest absolute number of refugees (32,648) among the four HoA countries, but the highest per capita ratio when compared to the number of nationals.<sup>17</sup>

## 2.2 EVOLUTION OF DEVELOPMENT RESPONSES TO FORCED DISPLACEMENT

**Responses to refugee crisis have often been delivered through humanitarian assistance.** The global refugee regime was created in the aftermath of World War II, through the 1951 Convention. This regime was extended through the 1967 Protocol and has provided refugees with protection as the regime comprises two sets of obligations: asylum (including *non-refoulement*) and burden-sharing.<sup>18</sup> In practice, humanitarian aid has generally provided food, clothing, shelter, water and sanitation and other public goods during an emergency phase in which a crisis occurs as well as an ongoing safety net to support the most vulnerable.<sup>19</sup> These are delivered by a range of actors foremost among which is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in response to country refugee response plans or humanitarian needs assessments. The dominant 'approach to refugees has been to organise camps', especially since the 1980s.<sup>20</sup> These are often located in peripheral areas of countries of asylum and have been criticised for increasing dependency, high costs and their detrimental effects on human

<sup>7</sup> UNHCR, Refugees and Asylum-seekers from South Sudan, February 2021.

<sup>8</sup> UNHCR, Refugees and Asylum-seekers from Somalia, February, April and May 2021.

<sup>9</sup> UNHCR, Refugees and Asylum-seekers from DRC, May 2021.

<sup>10</sup> UNHCR, Refugees and Asylum-seekers from South Sudan, April and May 2021.

<sup>11</sup> UNHCR, Refugees and Asylum-seekers from Somalia, February, April and May 2021.

<sup>12</sup> UNHCR, Refugees and Asylum-seekers from DRC, May 2021.

<sup>13</sup> UNHCR, Refugees and Asylum-seekers in Uganda, May 2021.

<sup>14</sup> UNHCR, Registered refugees and asylum seekers in Kenya, April 2021.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> UNHCR, Operations Portal: Ethiopia, May 2021.

<sup>17</sup> UNHCR, Refugees and Asylum-seekers in Djibouti, March 2021.

<sup>18</sup> Alexander Betts, 'The normative Terrain of the Global Refugee Regime', October 2015.

<sup>19</sup> Alexander Betts, *Refugee Economies*, Chapter 1.

<sup>20</sup> Stephen Thompson, 'Emergency Humanitarian response to longer-term development in refugee crisis', IDS, June 2017.

dignity and rights.<sup>21</sup> This can notably be illustrated by the fact that over 50% of refugees currently find themselves in situations of protracted displacement (over five years).<sup>22</sup> In the absence of durable solutions, the camp system has become permanent by default.<sup>23</sup> There have been previous historical attempts to bridge the humanitarian-development nexus (e.g. the norm was for self-settled rural refugees in Africa in the 1960s and 1970s as opposed to encampment).<sup>24</sup>

**Responses to refugee crises based in development aid (as opposed to solely humanitarian-type responses) pre-date the current CRRF approach which tends to emulate past interventions.** At the outset, development responses were initiated during the decolonisation process of African countries in the 1960s. This is notably illustrated through the existence of International Labour Organisation (ILO) projects in Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania, which were conceived as integrated development projects between hosts and refugees.<sup>25</sup> In addition, policies in the 1960s such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa's 1967 Addis Ababa Conference recommendations bear resemblance to CRRF processes by promoting recommendations such as 'integrating refugees into national development plans'.<sup>26</sup>

Planning documents operationalising the CRRF recognise that they are building upon several past policy initiatives to respond to refugee crises using a development approach, such as the Brookings Process, the 4Rs (Repatriation, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction), Development Assistance for Refugees, Transitions Solutions Initiative and Solutions Alliance.<sup>27</sup>

In particular, the Solutions Alliance represents the latest attempt to try to bridge the humanitarian-development nexus, prior to the advent of the CRRF. The Solutions Alliance, which was launched in 2014 sought 'to promote and enable the transition for displaced people away from dependency towards increased self-reliance, resilience, and development'.<sup>28</sup> The Alliance had five board members (the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs – DANIDA, Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Rescue Committee – IRC, UNHCR and the United Nations Development Programme – UNDP). It worked through national groups (in Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia) and included thematic groups (on the rule of law, the private sector as well as a research, data and performance management group). Some of the objectives contained in the Alliance, such as including refugees in national development plans and supporting self-reliance closely, resemble CRRF objectives.<sup>29</sup> The Solutions Alliance was subsumed into a number of different initiatives including the CRRF in early 2017.<sup>30</sup>

The RDPP programme, conceived following the Valetta Summit on Migration (see [section 2.4](#)), has four basic pillars: capacity building, protection, integrated services and socio-economic development.<sup>31</sup> The programme fits into the logic of the CRRF particularly with regard to bridging the humanitarian-development nexus. RDPP and CRRF do, however, differ in scope (project-based intervention versus whole of government and whole of society approach). The multiplicity of layers, frameworks and coordination needs employed by the EU (e.g. RDPP, EU humanitarian-development nexus and CRRF) have been criticised as distracting rather than rallying behind the CRRF efforts.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Alexander Betts, *Refugee Economies*, Chapter 1.

<sup>23</sup> Stephen Thompson, Emergency Humanitarian response to longer-term development in refugee crisis, IDS, June 2017.

<sup>24</sup> Alexander Betts, *Refugee Economies*, Chapter 1.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> UNHCR, Developing the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework: Special Appeal, UNHCR.

<sup>28</sup> UNDP, The Solutions Alliance, 2014. Retrieved [here](#).

<sup>29</sup> Alexander Betts, 'A new approach to old problems: the Solutions Alliance', Forced Migration Review, May 2016.

<sup>30</sup> Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, 'Strengthening Humanitarian-Development Cooperation in Forced Displacement Situations', p. 5.

<sup>31</sup> Samuel Hall, 'RDPP Learning and Evaluation Trajectory: Regional Baseline Report', 2018.

<sup>32</sup> Samuel Hall, 'RDPP Learning and Evaluation Trajectory: Regional Baseline Report', 2018.

The CRRF therefore builds on previous initiatives in terms of its conceptual, intellectual and normative framework but differs from these in part due to its global scope and to the comprehensive nature of the changes that would result from the application of the framework's objectives.

## 2.3 THE CRRF APPROACH: A NEW FRAMEWORK

The CRRF constitutes an approach and framework for refugee situations contained in Annex I of the New York Declaration (NYD) for refugees and migrants which was endorsed by the 193 United Nations (UN) member states in 2016. The CRRF also called for the 'adoption in 2018 of a global compact on refugees' (GCR), which was successfully endorsed by all UN member states in 2018. The NYD can arguably be considered the 'instrument that encapsulates the high-level commitments of states and international organisations and the principles underpinning those commitments', with the GCR and CRRF acting as complementary instruments.<sup>33</sup> The GCR programme of action, for instance, offers tools to operationalise burden and responsibility sharing while the CRRF provides a template for combining such tools in response to particular refugee situations.<sup>34</sup> Interestingly, the CRRF and GCR share the same four objectives (see Figure 2 below) and GCR success is measured against these objectives.<sup>35</sup> Both of these frameworks have also been aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to better understand how achieving specific objectives contained in the GCR and CRRF can support SDG targets.<sup>36</sup>

The CRRF as an approach can be endorsed by refugee-hosting countries, preferably those with large-scale movements and protracted situations. The CRRF is not characterised 'by structured processes or defined standards of action'.<sup>37</sup> Furthermore, the decision of UN member states to apply the CRRF is non-binding. Indeed, the CRRF sets out guidance for host states and those assisting them. In practice, the implementation of the CRRF happens in three phases: (i) consultation with relevant stakeholders, (ii) practical application in a range of countries and situations and, (iii) assessment and refinement to inform the GCR.<sup>38</sup>

Figure 2: CRRF and GCR objectives



In the Horn of Africa, the following countries announced the framework's application with:

- **Djibouti** – announced its formal application in February 2017;
- **Ethiopia** – announced its formal application in February 2017;
- **Kenya** – announced its formal application in October 2017;
- **Uganda** – announced its formal application to the CRRF in March 2017. However, Uganda was the first CRRF country announced in September 2016 at the Leaders' Summit (one day after the NYD was adopted); and,

<sup>33</sup> Jean-Francois Durieux, 'Success under the GCR: Can it be measured?', Refugee Law Initiative (2019). Retrieved [here](#).

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid.

<sup>36</sup> UNHCR, The Sustainable Development Goals and the Global Compact on Refugees.

<sup>37</sup> Sergio Carciotto & Filippo Ferraro, 'Building Blocks and Challenges for the Implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees in Africa', Journal on Migration and Human Security, March 2020.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.



- **Somalia** – the case of Somalia slightly differs as the CRRF applies to the larger Somali refugee situation as opposed to being country-based (the case of the other countries). The CRRF is being implemented through a regional approach for Somali refugees ‘rooted in the regional process led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions adopted on 25 March 2017 by the seven IGAD member states’ and through a commitment to incorporating returnees into planning (as of 2017).<sup>39</sup>

**In practice, these countries have principally pursued the first two objectives of the CRRF framework.** Indeed, access to resettlement (the CRRF’s third objective) is now more difficult, with 126,291 refugees resettled worldwide in 2016 compared to 63,726 in 2019.<sup>40</sup> In other words ‘less than 1 in 500 refugees worldwide were resettled globally in 2019’.<sup>41</sup> Lower resettlements in recent years can be principally attributed to the curtailment in the refugee admission cap in the United States (which remains the largest country for resettlement) during the previous administration. The COVID-19 pandemic also significantly affected resettlement figures (only 22,800 refugees and/or asylum seekers were resettled in 2020) as many countries closed their borders and imposed travel restrictions.<sup>42,43</sup>

**At the same time, voluntary returns to countries of origin (the CRRF’s fourth objective) are not yet considered feasible** in many circumstances as origin countries remain in conflict or mired in situations of instability. In the case of South Sudanese refugees, intention surveys show that most refugees do not intend to return in the near future in large part due to persistent insecurity making voluntary returns difficult to implement on a large scale.<sup>44</sup> As a result some movements have been pendular in nature with refugees returning to South Sudan temporarily before coming back to their countries of asylum.<sup>45</sup> Despite the existence of a tripartite agreement between Kenya, Somalia and the UNHCR on the voluntary return of Somali refugees from Kenya to Somalia, the conditions are not yet ripe for large scale voluntary returns to Somalia. This is also illustrated by the secondary movement of returnees back to the Dadaab refugee camps in Kenya. Ultimately, achieving the fourth objective of the CRRF approach is and will be intimately linked to addressing the root causes of displacement in each of the countries of origin. Indeed, unless root causes are addressed through a regional perspective with high-level political dialogues and the operationalisation of the “peace” element of the humanitarian development peace nexus, challenges are likely to remain.

**As a result, the CRRF’s application has largely focused on local integration and the self-reliance agenda** at the country level in HoA countries. The CRRF approach builds upon several themes including a **whole of government approach, integration of refugees into national systems, a whole of society response, global responsibility and burden-sharing** and involves **integrated development programming benefitting refugees and host communities alike** (this is often achieved through targeting schemes of 50:50 or 30:70, in the case of Uganda, for host and refugee beneficiaries).

## 2.4 THE EU’S REFUGEE RESPONSE LEADING TO THE CRRF: RDPP

**Early European Union programming that now contributes to CRRF objectives in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, such as the RDPP programme, was conceived under different policy frameworks prior to the CRRF.** The genesis of the RDPP comes from the Valetta Summit on Migration which took place in November 2015. The Summit was organised in the context of the

<sup>39</sup> UNHCR, ‘Somalia: An overview of how the Global Compact on Refugees is being turned into action in Somalia’, March 2021.

<sup>40</sup> UNHCR, Resettlement Data.

<sup>41</sup> UNHCR, ‘Refugee Resettlement Facts’, March 2020.

<sup>42</sup> UNHCR, ‘Pandemic threatens progress on refugee admissions through family, work, study permits’, May 2021.

<sup>43</sup> UNHCR, ‘Resettlement at a glance’, January-December 2020.

<sup>44</sup> UNHCR, ‘South Sudan 2020-2021: Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRRP)’, p.11. Lack of data due to persistent insecurity also hampers UNHCR’s monitoring of many areas of return in South Sudan. It is worth noting that many South Sudanese did not reach their intended areas of return.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.



European refugee crisis with 2015 seeing a higher number of new arrivals than in preceding years.<sup>46</sup> The summit, which convened EU and African Union leaders led to the creation of the Joint Valetta Action Plan which calls to implement RDPP programmes in the Horn of Africa and North Africa.<sup>47</sup> The Action Plan is focused on addressing 'protection and developmental needs of people suffering long-term displacement and their host communities' with programmes focusing on 'areas such as income-generation, jobs and education'.<sup>48</sup> The RDPP, led by the Netherlands in the Horn of Africa, was operationalised through the EUTF, which was a new financial instrument at the time, also created as a result of the same Summit and Action Plan.

The RDPP approach was conceived prior to the CRRF through different policy frameworks, with many RDPP projects' design happening in parallel or prior to countries' official endorsement of the CRRF approach. Many aspects of the RDPP, including its emphasis on promoting refugee self-reliance and promoting integrated services between hosts and refugees, serve as precursors to the CRRF approach. In other ways, second generation EUTF programmes differ from earlier RDPP projects, most notably through their direct policy and programming support to capacity building of local and national institutions.

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<sup>46</sup> Reuters, 'EU gets one million migrants in 2015, smugglers seen making \$1billion', December 2015.

<sup>47</sup> Joint Valetta Summit Action Plan, November 2015.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

### 3. CRRF PROGRESS IN DJIBOUTI, KENYA, ETHIOPIA AND UGANDA<sup>49</sup>

The HoA countries' progress in implementing the CRRF is asymmetrical. Djibouti and Uganda have experienced important legislative changes and have made progress focusing on sectoral plans. Progress is mixed in Ethiopia with a loss of momentum recently observed which is likely to persist due to the current conflict in Tigray Regional State. Limited engagement has been witnessed in Kenya, particularly at the national level, as shown by the lack of progress in legislative changes.

#### 3.1 CRRF PLEDGES AND COORDINATION STRUCTURES: DJIBOUTI, ETHIOPIA, KENYA AND UGANDA

##### Summary Box 1: CRRF pledges and coordination structures

- **Djibouti:** CRRF national action plan and coordination structures have been set up. Operationally working with and through line ministries are some of the next steps.
- **Ethiopia:** A draft ten-year comprehensive strategy was finalised and regional action plans are now in development. However, an inactive NCO, changes in ARRA's leadership and current conflict in Tigray and COVID-19 suggest a lack of momentum for CRRF at present.
- **Kenya:** A draft national action plan, a CRRF roadmap and a technical working group were set up but there is little evidence of progress at the national level. Most CRRF initiatives are occurring at county level, in Turkana and Garissa.
- **Uganda:** A CRRF Secretariat, Steering Group, updated Road Map for 2021-2022 and GCR/CRRF Strategic Direction 2021-2025 have been finalised but coordination between the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) is required to delineate roles and responsibilities.

**Progress in setting up CRRF coordination structures has occurred mostly in Djibouti and Uganda, with mixed progress in Ethiopia. No formal structures, apart from the technical working group, have yet been set up in Kenya to steer the CRRF process.**

**Djibouti has validated directional policy documents and created coordination structures.** A CRRF national action plan (2017-2022) was finalised in December 2017, organised around four axes: (i) maintaining protection and the asylum space; (ii) ensuring access to services for refugees and host communities (with sub-themes in education, health/nutrition, water and livelihoods); (iii) reinforcing regional cooperation on finding durable solutions for Somali refugees, and (iv) relieving the pressure on the host country by increasing international solidarity and burden sharing.<sup>50</sup> CRRF coordination structures, including a steering committee, an expanded working group and sectoral cluster groups, with relevant sectoral ministries, have been set up.<sup>51</sup>

**In Uganda, CRRF-centric policy documents and coordination structures have been adopted.** The CRRF in Uganda focuses on five themes including: (i) admission and rights, (ii) emergency response and ongoing needs, (iii) resilience and self-reliance, (iv) expanded solutions and (v) voluntary repatriation.<sup>52</sup> A CRRF Secretariat, Steering Group and Road Map up to 2020 have also been launched. The GCR was incorporated into Uganda's National Plan of Action 2018-2020 (in April 2019, referred to

<sup>49</sup> A summary table of all developments on a thematic and per country basis are available in Annex II.

<sup>50</sup> Djibouti, National Action Plan (2017).

<sup>51</sup> EUTF HoA REF, 'Comprehensive Refugee Responses in the Horn of Africa: Regional Leadership on Education, Livelihoods and Durable Solutions', p. 11, December 2019.

<sup>52</sup> OPM, The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework: Uganda.

as a revised CRRF Road Map) replacing Uganda's CRRF Roadmap. More recently, the expiration of the Plan and adoption of the GCR/CRRF Strategic Direction 2021-2025 in December 2020 led to the development of a new National Plan of Action 2021-2022 which was developed by the CRRF Secretariat in consultation with national and sub-national stakeholders. The new National Plan of Action 2021-2022 is a tool to operationalize the Strategic Direction and guide the practical application of the GCR/CRRF in Uganda. The CRRF Steering Group is co-chaired by the OPM and the MoLG and is the decision-making body for the CRRF in the country (it consists of 35 members).<sup>53</sup> The Secretariat supports coordinated planning, programming and resourcing while the road map sets key objectives and milestones.<sup>54</sup> Coordination between different stakeholders is key to realising CRRF objectives. With regards to implementation, there needs to be a clarification of the link between the refugee acting guidelines (under the purview of the OPM) and the local governments acts and guidelines (under the purview of MoLG).<sup>55</sup>

**In Ethiopia, there was ongoing progress in terms of adopting CRRF governance and planning structures.** The Government of Ethiopia's engagement is built upon the nine pledges made at the Leaders' Summit in 2016.<sup>56,57</sup> A draft ten-year National Comprehensive Refugee Response Strategy (NCRRS) was formulated in 2018 but has not yet been formally adopted. In addition, a Secretariat of the Steering Committee and National Coordination Office (NCO) were established, although the latter reportedly never became fully functional.<sup>58</sup> In addition, the CRRF was rolled out at the regional level in Ethiopia with Regional Action Plans (RAPs) now being developed.<sup>59</sup> Three trends stand out in the Ethiopian context: **a loss of momentum to implement the CRRF at national level** due to: (i) the emergency humanitarian situation as a result of COVID-19, (ii) changes in the Administration for Refugees and Returnee Affairs (ARRA)'s leadership structure and (iii) ongoing conflict in Tigray State.<sup>60</sup> Equally, there is a need to **clarify the roles and responsibilities of all actors**, including what the future responsibilities of ARRA will be.<sup>61</sup>

**In Kenya, a draft national action plan has been developed, a CRRF roadmap was presented in February 2021 and a technical working group was created to develop the national CRRF framework.** The CRRF roadmap is a comprehensive document organised around three pillars: (i) enhancing the protection space for asylum seekers and refugees; (ii) support for immediate and ongoing needs for host communities, asylum seekers and refugees;<sup>62</sup> (iii) promoting regional cooperation and international responsibility sharing in realization of durable solutions for refugees. The roadmap also contains the grounds for coordination structures (in the form of a National Steering Committee, a CRRF Secretariat and CRRF Sector Working Groups which would be subordinated to the Ministry of Interior) and implementation arrangements (through a two-year action plan from 2020 to 2022).<sup>63</sup> However, little progress in terms of policy or legislation has occurred at national level demonstrating a lack of political will at the national level, especially in light of the announcement by the Government of Kenya of their intention to close the Dadaab and Kakuma camps by 30 June 2022.<sup>64</sup> In

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

<sup>55</sup> KII with IFI staff member.

<sup>56</sup> Four pledges on jobs and livelihoods, one on the out of camp policy, one on access to documentation, one on social and basic services and one on local integration.

<sup>57</sup> UNHCR, 'Ethiopia: Summary Pledge Progress Report 2019', p. 12.

<sup>58</sup> Internal project document.

<sup>59</sup> UNHCR, 'Ethiopia: Summary Pledge Progress Report 2019', p. 9.

<sup>60</sup> KIIs with members of think tank and IP.

<sup>61</sup> ReDSS, 'Towards a Common Research Agenda: A synthesis paper to inform implementation of the Global Refugee Compact – 2019', p. 18.

<sup>62</sup> The second pillar is organised around nine themes including education; water, sanitation and hygiene; health and nutrition; livelihoods and self-reliance; environmental management and energy; agriculture and social protection. These sections include several strategic responses in response to each theme – for example to mainstream refugee learners in the National Integrated Education Management Information System (NEMIS).

<sup>63</sup> Government of Kenya, 'Support for Host Community and Refugee Empowerment (SHARE): Kenya's Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF)', October 2020.

<sup>64</sup> UNHCR, 'Joint Statement by the Government of Kenya and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee Camps Roadmap', 29 April 2021.

clear contrast to the national level, there has been more progress at county-level in Turkana and Garissa Counties, notably through the inclusion of refugees in county development planning processes and through the launch of the Kalobeyei Integrated Socio-Economic Development Plan – KISEDIP – (see below sections for greater detail).

## 3.2 NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

### Summary Box 2: National legislative changes

- **Djibouti:** Refugee laws were passed in 2017 granting refugees the right to work, access to health and education services as well as social security.
- **Ethiopia:** A Refugee Proclamation (January 2019) was passed granting refugees several rights but secondary legislation is needed for its operationalisation. Three directives on the right to work, freedom of residence and movement outside of camps, and grievance and appeals mechanisms were also passed by ARRA.<sup>65</sup>
- **Kenya:** A draft Refugee Bill is sitting in Parliament but it does not contain any significant expansion of refugee rights although it constitutes an important step in ensuring the right to asylum can be efficiently managed.
- **Uganda:** No significant new laws have been passed as refugees already have access to an expansive set of rights (e.g. right to work, own a business, freedom of movement etc.). However, despite this progressive legislation there are practical impediments to the full application of these rights.
- **Enjoyment of rights** by refugees may be limited by weak enforcement capacity of governments to implement these measures in peripheral areas of the country (where many refugees reside), bureaucratic hurdles and the fact that many of these measures are not 'silver bullets' (e.g. most refugees work in the informal sector where being granted the right to work may have limited impact).

**Progress to enact legislation and operationalise accompanying changes has been uneven across the region, with Djibouti enacting the most sweeping changes.** Legislative changes are directly relevant to granting refugees rights they did not previously benefit from (e.g. economic rights and freedom of movement among others). These are also key to unlocking the self-reliance agenda, as limitations in economic rights hamper refugee autonomy from dependency on humanitarian aid.

**Djibouti is the country that has undertaken the most progress on the legislative front with the passing of the 2017 refugee laws and two accompanying decrees.** These decrees grant refugees the right to work, access to education, social security, vocational training and health services on par with nationals, with the caveat of resources being available.<sup>66</sup>

**Ethiopia has passed a Refugee Proclamation in January 2019** which theoretically grants refugees some rights, including the right to access education, health, vocational training and social security on par with nationals. Ambiguity remains around the right to work which is granted only according to the most favourable treatment available for foreign nationals.<sup>67</sup> However, in practice, secondary legislation as well as successful coordination between government actors and development agencies will be required to operationalise its provisions.<sup>68</sup> Three directives have been finalised by the ARRA, including a directive on the right to work, out of camp settlements and appealing filing processes/dispute

<sup>65</sup> UNHCR, Ethiopia Country Refugee Response Plan: 1 Jan- 30 June 2020, page 4.

<sup>66</sup> *République de Djibouti, Décret N° 2017-410/PR/MI fixant les modalités d'exercice des droits fondamentaux des réfugiés et demandeurs d'asile en République de Djibouti.* Retrieved [here](#).

<sup>67</sup> Government of Ethiopia, Refugee Proclamation, 2019.

<sup>68</sup> World Bank, Impact of Refugees on Hosting Communities in Ethiopia: A social analysis (2020), p. 33.

resolution mechanisms.<sup>69</sup> With the exception of the Out of Camp policy for Eritreans, most refugees are not able to enjoy these rights. Moreover, in practice, refugees do end up working or accessing certain services regardless of their formal 'right' to do so (with a high contextual and regional variation). For instance, there is a high level of refugee-host integration around Aysaita camp in Afar, with a *de facto* acceptance of out of camp refugees working among host communities (this can be attributed in part to shared cultural affinity).<sup>70</sup>

**Kenya has not experienced any changes in legislation despite the fact that a draft Refugees Bill (from 2019) is now sitting in Parliament.**<sup>71</sup> A previous iteration of the Refugees Bill was rejected in 2017 by 'President Kenyatta on the grounds of insufficient public participation'.<sup>72</sup> The new version of the Bill does not contain any significant expansion of rights for refugees but is more likely to be ratified due to stronger government buy-in.<sup>73</sup> In addition, while the draft Bill can be seen as an important step to ensure the right to asylum can be properly handled (as the Bill focuses largely on refugee status determination and reception), it has been criticised for retaining 'Kenya's encampment approach and [focusing] largely on refugee registration'.<sup>74</sup> Finally, persistent delays in ratification risk blocking the operationalisation of several aspects of the CRRF in the country.<sup>75</sup>

**Uganda has not experienced any significant legislative changes in refugee rights:** the right to work, own a business, freedom of movement and land ownership existed prior to the country's endorsement of the CRRF (2006 Refugee Act and accompanying 2010 regulations). However, the actual realisation of these rights varies. In the case of the right to work, for example, there is an inconsistency in interpretation, with OPM asserting that refugees are *de facto* granted the right to work while the Immigration Department argues that refugees require work permits.<sup>76</sup> This lack of clarity results in employers being wary of hiring refugees.<sup>77</sup> In addition, in the case of Kampala, the Kampala Capital City Association requires any vendor to purchase a license to set up a business thereby excluding many refugees due to high costs.<sup>78</sup> Similarly, freedom of movement exists in theory in the Ugandan situation but refugees' reception of food assistance is linked to camp residency thereby excluding urban refugees (except for those who periodically travel back to the settlements) and disincentivising mobility.<sup>79</sup> While land ownership is possible in theory, many refugees have limited access to land, no land or access to infertile land<sup>80</sup> and refugees in many settlements illegally 'sell' their land as a negative coping strategy to limit food insecurity and poverty.<sup>81</sup>

**However, the effects of changes in national legislation on refugee situations in these four countries must be nuanced.** The granting of rights usually passes through a process of enactment of legislation, acknowledgement of the existence of these rights (for their attended targets and the government entities which enforce these rights) and finally full enjoyment of rights. Due to the limited governance capacity in peripheral areas of these countries, bureaucratic hurdles and the location of many refugee hosting areas in isolated and impoverished areas, the enjoyment of these rights are limited. For instance, the right to work for refugees in Uganda could be best described as 'in progress',

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<sup>69</sup> KII with UN Agency.

<sup>70</sup> Freddie Carver, 'Refugee and host communities in Ethiopia: 2018-2019 integrated national study', p. 12 and 26.

<sup>71</sup> Several draft Refugees Bills have been sitting in Parliament but the 2006 Refugee Bill is still the national law for refugee-related matters.

<sup>72</sup> REF SOAS, 'Comprehensive Refugee Response in the Horn of Africa: Regional leadership on education, livelihoods and durable solutions', p. 13, December 2019.

<sup>73</sup> KII with informant from EU.

<sup>74</sup> REF SOAS, 'Comprehensive Refugee Response in the Horn of Africa: Regional leadership on education, livelihoods and durable solutions', p. 13, December 2019.

<sup>75</sup> REF SOAS, 'Comprehensive Refugee Response in the Horn of Africa: Regional leadership on education, livelihoods and durable solutions', p. 13, December 2019.

<sup>76</sup> Alexander Betts, Louise Bloom, Josiah Kaplan and Naohiko Omata, *Refugee Economies: Forced Displacement and Development*, 2017. Chapter 5 Urban Refugees.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> ReDSS, 'Are Integrated Services a Step Towards Integration? Uganda Case Study – 2018', p. 26, 2018.

<sup>80</sup> Development Pathways/WFP, 'Analysis of Refugee Vulnerability in Uganda', p. 71, January 2020.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid, p.126.

because enjoyment of this right is limited by certain factors:<sup>82</sup> for instance, joining the formal sector requires obtaining a work permit online, thereby barring non-computer literate refugees or those who are unable to access computers. In addition, the current lack of recognition of foreign education certificates complicates the issuance of work permits.<sup>83</sup> Obtaining employment in the informal sector, which constitutes the majority of available employment in the four countries, can also be challenging due to language barriers,<sup>84</sup> restrictions on refugee mobility (e.g. especially in Kenya and Ethiopia, and Uganda to some extent)<sup>85</sup> and lack of livelihood opportunities (e.g. lack of access to land and equipment for mechanised agriculture in Uganda) among other factors.<sup>86</sup> As a result, many refugees work 'informally as casual labourers with low wages',<sup>87</sup> as incentive workers or are unemployed.<sup>88</sup> The situation is even worse for women refugees: in Uganda, for example, they tend to earn less than their male counterparts for the same jobs<sup>89</sup> and female-headed households tend to have more chances of being severely food insecure than those headed by men.<sup>90</sup>

### 3.3 BURDEN SHARING BETWEEN DONORS AND RECIPIENT COUNTRIES

#### Summary Box 3: Burden sharing and additionality

- **Large-scale donor additionality**, which is crucial to ensure the operationalisation of the CRRF and the move away from a humanitarian towards a development and eventually government-led response, **has largely failed to materialise** (with the exception of contributions by the EUTF, the World Bank and the Dutch).
- **North-South polarisation** around additional burden sharing (for recipient countries) and expectations to realise durable solutions (for donors) **has been at the heart of the breakdown of past pledging conferences for refugees and represents a risk to the sustainability of the CRRF.**

**The CRRF promotes additional burden sharing between donor and recipient countries which has largely failed to materialise.** This constitutes a key aspect of CRRF operationalisation. Indeed, the transition from humanitarian to development response for refugees involves integrating refugees in national systems and putting them 'on budget'. The 'on budget' aspect of the CRRF involves an implicit agreement between donors who commit to providing additional donor funding to ensure transfer of responsibilities from traditional refugee actors to line ministries and relevant regional, area or district ministries and/or authorities. Countries of asylum who host refugees expect in turn to receive enough donor funding to attain these objectives. The alternative would be to put refugees 'on budget' without receiving additional funding (this is likely to diminish the quality of systems for nationals). At present, additional donor funds exist in the form of the IDA18 and IDA19 sub-windows from the World Bank, offering a mixture of grants and loans to refugee-hosting countries as well as through the EUTF and Dutch contributions. However, there has generally been scant large-scale donor additionality and the

<sup>82</sup> IIED, Urban Refugee Economies: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, p. 13.

<sup>83</sup> REF SOAS, Comprehensive Refugee Response in the Horn of Africa: Regional leadership on education, livelihoods and durable solutions, p. 52.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid.

<sup>85</sup> Refugees have freedom of movement in Uganda but their reception of humanitarian aid is linked to their residence in a settlement.

<sup>86</sup> REF SOAS, Comprehensive Refugee Response in the Horn of Africa: Regional leadership on education, livelihoods and durable solutions, p. 55.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid, p. 52.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid, p. 54.

<sup>89</sup> Alexander Betts, Louise Bloom, Josiah David Kaplan, Naohiko Omata, 'Refugee Economies: Forced Displacement and Development', 2016.

<sup>90</sup> OPM, UNHCR, WFP, Development Pathways, 'Analysis of Refugee Vulnerability in Uganda, January 2020.



scale of additional development funds pales in comparison to annual humanitarian budgets'.<sup>91</sup> For instance, as of September 2019, the sector plans for health and education in Uganda had not attracted significant funding pledges or commitments.<sup>92</sup> This is problematic especially with regard to funding the transition towards nationally-led refugee responses as envisioned by the CRRF.<sup>93</sup> In the case of Kenya, the National Treasury was negotiating with the World Bank to access funding under the host community/refugee window IDA-19. However, this process is now stalled following the announcement by the Government of Kenya of their intention to close Dadaab and Kakuma by 30 June 2022.<sup>94</sup>

**Lack of donor funding is problematic as it is often seen as the principle reason for the breakdown of pledging conferences that were trying to operationalise the humanitarian-development nexus.** For instance, the International Conference for Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA) (1981) and ICARA II (1984) pledging conferences held to obtain additional funds for development projects targeting refugees failed in large part on account of North-South polarisation around burden sharing (for recipient countries) and expectations to realise durable solutions (for donor disbursing countries).<sup>95</sup> More recently, the withdrawal of Tanzania from the CRRF in 2018 serves as a prescient warning about the lack of burden sharing. Tanzania withdrew from the process, in part, because it refused to borrow money from the World Bank to 'host refugees on behalf of the international community'.<sup>96</sup> While Tanzania has traditionally supported refugees,<sup>97</sup> it disagreed on having to borrow money to host them.<sup>98</sup> Other relevant factors to explain Tanzania's withdrawal are the 'perceived contradiction between the goals of the CRRF and domestic policies', a lack of clarity in the dialogue about the basis and goals of the CRRF in the country and a disillusion on the Tanzanian side related to the history of international cooperation on refugee issues.<sup>99</sup> In a context of declining humanitarian funding and limited donor additionality, the perception from hosting countries that burden sharing is inequitable risks fuelling further distrust.<sup>100</sup>

### 3.4 WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH – INTEGRATION INTO NATIONAL SYSTEMS

#### Summary Box 4: Whole of government approach

- **Djibouti:** important progress, including integrating refugees in the national health system (with some challenges) and integrating them progressively in the education system.
- **Ethiopia:** limited progress in relation to basic services although there have been promising initiatives at the local level to enhance joint services (e.g. Itang water supply scheme in Gambella).
- **Kenya:** some timid progress has been made, with the potential for a future refugee education policy (discussions with the Ministry of Education were at an advanced stage prior to the announcement on camp closure) and through the on-going registration of refugees in the national health insurance fund (NHIF).

<sup>91</sup> Nicholas Crawford, Sorcha O'Callaghan, 'The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework: Responsibility-sharing and self-reliance in East Africa', ODI, p. 5, September 2019.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid, p. 11.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> UNHCR, 'Joint Statement by the Government of Kenya and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee Camps Roadmap', 29 April 2021.

<sup>95</sup> Alexander Betts, Louise Bloom, Josiah Kaplan and Naohiko Omata, 'Refugee Economies: Forced Displacement and Development', 2016.

<sup>96</sup> Alexander Betts, 'Don't Make African Nations Borrow Money to Support Refugees', Foreign Policy, December 2018.

<sup>97</sup> NRC, '6 things to know about refugees in Tanzania', March 2019.

<sup>98</sup> Alexander Betts, 'Don't Make African Nations Borrow Money to Support Refugees', Foreign Policy, December 2018.

<sup>99</sup> Markus Rudolf, 'Share the Burden or Pass it on?', *International Migration*, October 2019. Domestic policies focusing on national sovereignty and emancipation from international paternalism were not perceived as compatible with the CRRF.

<sup>100</sup> KII with informant from international NGO.

- **Uganda:** The country has seen the launch of sectoral plans in education (2018), health (2019), water and environment (2019), jobs and livelihoods (December 2020) and future draft plans (sustainable energy response plan expected by mid-2021). These sectoral plans highlight where the international community can channel support for a comprehensive and people-centred response involving 'local solutions'. Financing these plans remains challenging as their total indicative budget is estimated at \$2.3 billion (excluding the sustainable energy response plan). Implementing these plans, which is partly underway, is also challenged by the inability - across sectors - to make investments made by the international community visible and to identify funding gaps.

**The CRRF approach promotes the integration of refugees into national systems and development planning in order to ensure their inclusion in local and national budgets in the longer term.** This also explains why many projects focus on area-based planning as use of services including health, education, water and electricity is shared between host and refugee communities.

### 3.4.1 HEALTH

**In addition to its 2017 refugee laws, Djibouti has operationalised the inclusion of refugees in national health systems.** Despite this progress, the initial transition to the national system of health delivery was widely perceived as having more deficiencies than the parallel humanitarian system for refugees. This illustrates the importance of the humanitarian to development transition phase and ensuring the adequate strength of national systems.<sup>101</sup>

**The inclusion of refugees in the national health system is equally being pursued in Kenya through their inclusion in the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) in part through the EUTF-funded CRRF Kenya Enhancing Self-Reliance project** (this also constitutes one of Kenya's pledges at the Global Refugee Forum).<sup>102</sup> In addition, several health facilities are being registered as county health facilities (in Turkana) with the long-term idea of phasing out humanitarian funds.<sup>103</sup> Most health care centres and clinics in the Kakuma and Kalobeyei camps have been registered with the NHIF with the process of enrolling refugee families on-going.<sup>104</sup>

**In Uganda, there has been the creation of a Health Sector Integrated Refugee Response Plan (2019-2024) costed at \$500M that will integrate refugees and host communities in practice as refugees in Uganda already have access to health services on par with nationals.**<sup>105</sup>

### 3.4.2 EDUCATION

**Djibouti has made important progress in the area of education with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between the MENFOP (Djiboutian Ministry of Education) and UNHCR in 2017 to include refugees in national education systems.**<sup>106</sup> This has been operationalised in 2020 through the use of the Kenyan curriculum in English for refugees being recognised by the government as a result of a decree.<sup>107</sup> However, challenges remain, including

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<sup>101</sup> KIIs with informant from donor and EU.

<sup>102</sup> UNHCR, 'Global Refugee Forum: Pledges and Contributions' dashboard.

<sup>103</sup> KII with UN Agency.

<sup>104</sup> KIIs with informant from donor and EU.

<sup>105</sup> Ugandan Ministry of Health, 'Health Sector Integrated Refugee Response Plan (2019-2024)'.

<sup>106</sup> REF SOAS, 'Comprehensive Refugee Response in the Horn of Africa: Regional leadership on education, livelihoods and durable solutions', p. 12, December 2019.

<sup>107</sup> KII with informant from IGAD.

language barriers as many of the refugees in Djibouti use an English or Arabic curriculum despite the fact that the country's working language is French.

**In Ethiopia, all refugee schools have adopted the national curriculum since 2016** and have been included in the Education Management Information System<sup>108</sup> with modest increases in pre-primary, primary and secondary enrolment occurring since 2016.<sup>109</sup>

**Kenya is in the process of developing a refugee education policy that is being costed, with negotiations at an advanced stage prior to the announcement on camp closures.** This process has been ongoing for several years and its success is in large part dependent on donors' willingness to finance the plan as explicitly indicated in Kenya's pledges to the Global Refugee Forum.<sup>110</sup>

**In Uganda, an education response plan for refugees and host communities was launched in 2018** and was costed at \$395M for a three and a half year period.<sup>111</sup> This response plan intends to improve access to learning opportunities; improve the delivery of quality education services and training; and, strengthen systems for service delivery.<sup>112</sup>

### 3.4.3 WATER

Water in refugee settings is usually provided via water trucking to refugee camps/settlements after which more complex humanitarian projects often build boreholes or provide water through pipes free of charge.<sup>113</sup> The inclusion of refugees into national, local or regional water systems requires a complex coordination between humanitarian actors, development actors and the national and/or regional entities responsible for refugees and water service delivery respectively. In addition, a successful water service delivery system must ensure that refugees and host communities are able to pay user fees (this requires estimating the willingness and ability of beneficiaries to pay) for the operations and maintenance of the system. **The four countries are at very different stages in this regard** with promising projects in Ethiopia (Itang Water Supply in Gambella) and in Uganda (Rwamwanja settlement connection to the national water supply and sewerage).<sup>114</sup>

At national level, **Uganda has launched a national Water and Environment Sector Response Plan** for refugees and host communities costed at \$916M of which about 23% is funded through various projects.<sup>115</sup>

Focus Box 1: CRRF best practices: Uganda and Ethiopia water supply projects<sup>116,117,118,119</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> ReDSS, 'Towards a Common Research Agenda: A synthesis paper to inform implementation of the Global Refugee Compact – 2019', p. 33, March 2020.

<sup>109</sup> UNHCR, 'Ethiopia: Summary Pledge Progress Report 2019', p. 12, September 2020.

<sup>110</sup> 'The adoption and implementation of this policy is subject to the provision of funding by the international community'.

<sup>111</sup> Ugandan, Ministry of Education and Sports, Education Response Plan for Refugees and Host Communities in Uganda, p. 28.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> ReDSS, 'Towards a Common Research Agenda: A synthesis paper to inform implementation of the Global Refugee Compact', p. 34, March 2020.

<sup>114</sup> See focus box 2.

<sup>115</sup> Ministry of Water and Environment, Water and Environmental Refugee Response Plan (2019-2022).

<sup>116</sup> KII with UN Agency.

<sup>117</sup> Global Refugee Forum: Best Practices.

<sup>118</sup> Freddie Carver, 'Refugee and host communities in Ethiopia: 2018-2019 integrated national study', p. 26, 2020.

<sup>119</sup> Freddie Carver, Fana Gebresenbet and Dominic Naish, 'Gambella regional report: 2018-2019 refugee and host community context analysis', p. 19, December 2020.

The Itang Water Supply project in Gambella (Ethiopia) and the inclusion of Rwamwanja settlement in the national water and sewerage corporation system in Uganda stand out as emerging good practices.

In the case of Rwamwanja, the government has taken over the management of water supply from the OPM and UNHCR with the objective of providing 20L per day to refugees. Refugees' ability to pay is currently being taken care of by UNHCR through a cash for work programme. This is trying to instill a shift in mentalities, from assuming that water is provided for free towards the payment of a user fee.

The Itang Water Supply project in Gambella is another example of best practice in the area of WASH. The project led to the creation of a water utility in Itang that benefits over 250,000 people (refugees and surrounding host communities) with high efficiency gains as the average cost per produced m<sup>3</sup> has passed from over \$9 (water trucking) to \$0.7 (local utility).<sup>1</sup> This has led to an increase in the average per capita consumption from 10 to 15L per day. A study is being undertaken to assess the potential for replicating this model in other contexts. However, the governance system has 'faced challenges in determining appropriate roles and responsibilities for ARRA and the woreda and regional governments'.

Finally, it is worth highlighting that developing governance models for utilities is complex and requires sustained political, technical and financial efforts to be sustainable in the long-term.

### 3.5 INTEGRATION IN NATIONAL AND LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING

#### Summary Box 5: Integration into development planning

- **Djibouti:** refugees are not currently integrated in development planning but Djibouti intends to do so through its Vision 2025.
- **Kenya:** refugees are not thoroughly integrated at national level, although there are some initiatives for their future inclusion in a National Integrated Identity Management System, but there is a high level of integration at county level (e.g. KISED in Turkana County is part of the County Development Planning process).
- **Uganda:** refugees are currently integrated in the National Development Plan III which is also operationalised at district level (i.e. district development plans).
- **Ethiopia:** the level of integration of refugees in planning is low with the NCO being largely inactive (except for select regions). A future challenge will be to align roles and responsibilities given the fact that ARRA is a federal agency whereas Ethiopia's service delivery structures are largely decentralised.

**Integration of refugees in national development planning is key to ensure that they can have access to similar benefits as nationals by being included in long-term planning systems.**

**Uganda stands out in relation to including refugees in development planning.** Refugees were included in the five year National Development Plan (NDP) II (2015-2020) through the creation of a Settlement Transformative Agenda (STA) while the Refugee and Host Empowerment (ReHoPE) strategy was integrated in the UN Development Assistance Framework for Uganda (2016-2020).<sup>120</sup> Refugee-hosting districts were prioritised under the NDP II for development interventions providing an opportunity to engage various actors to comprehensively respond to the humanitarian and development needs of both refugees and host communities in these districts. Similarly, refugees are entirely integrated in the NDP III (2020-2025) which explicitly calls for operationalising the national refugee policy, targeted agricultural Local Economic Development interventions for refugees and host communities and integrating refugee planning in national, sectoral and local government plans.<sup>121</sup> The NDP III also emphasizes the fact that Uganda's resources could be overwhelmed by the high number of refugees and future influxes. The NDP III has also been operationalised at the district level with the creation of district development plans notably in the districts of Moyo and Obongi (in West Nile) with the launch of local economic development plans (developed through the EUTF-funded RISE GIZ project).<sup>122</sup>

**In Kenya, there is a disconnect between national policy-level processes and county-level processes.** There are some limited initiatives at national level that include the offer by the Ministry of Interior to include refugees in the next round of registration for *Huduma Namba* cards<sup>123</sup> which are part of a new National Integrated Identity Management System. These cards will subsequently be used by state agencies to gain identity-related information on individuals seeking government services.<sup>124</sup> There is overall limited impetus to include refugees in national planning mechanisms while refugees are somewhat included at county level. For example, in Turkana County (hosting Kakuma and Kalobeyei camps) the creation of the KISED is an integral part of the County Integrated Development Plan (CIDP II) for Turkana. The launch of the Garissa Integrated Socio Economic Development Plan (GISED) has, for its part, been delayed, potentially due to corruption allegations involving the governor.<sup>125</sup> There are

<sup>120</sup> These approaches precede Uganda's endorsement of the CRRF approach.

<sup>121</sup> Government of Uganda, Third National Development Plan (NDP III) 2020/2021- 2024/25.

<sup>122</sup> UNHCR, Moyo District and Obongi District Local Economic Development Strategy Launch, November 2020.

<sup>123</sup> A Huduma card is a digital multipurpose identity card issued to an individual upon registration.

<sup>124</sup> Business Daily Africa, 'New regulations pave way for Huduma Namba cards', October 2020.

<sup>125</sup> KII with member of EU.

however clear limits to this process as the devolution of functions to Kenyan Counties, as a result of the 2010 Constitution, curtails decision-making in key sectors such as education. Primary education is entrusted to Counties, while secondary and tertiary education are not.<sup>126</sup> This therefore limits the ability of change occurring only as a result of impetus at the county level. Refugees were also included in the 2019 housing and population census of the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics.

**In Ethiopia, the level of integration of refugees in planning is low with the NCO being largely inactive.** They are, however, integrated in the Education Information Management System and appear to begin to be included in government systems and local development plans in Jijiga.<sup>127</sup> Integrating refugees in planning will be made more difficult by the disconnect between ARRA, a federal agency, and the highly decentralised service delivery structures in Ethiopia which go down to *woreda*<sup>128</sup> level.<sup>129</sup> This means ARRA has to negotiate multiple relationships with different administrative levels with the capacity and resources of these local bodies affecting the nature and strength of the partnership.<sup>130</sup>

**Djibouti has not yet included refugees in development planning.** However, the country intends to include refugees in the Djibouti National Development Plan within its Vision 2025 framework (one of the government's pledges at the Global Refugee Forum).<sup>131</sup>

### 3.6 WHOLE OF SOCIETY RESPONSE

**An important component of the CRRF is the whole of society approach which calls for broader participation from a wide range of non-traditional actors in refugee policy-making.**

#### Summary Box 6: Whole of society response

- **The CRRF's whole of society** response involves non-traditional actors such as the private sector, civil society and refugees/host communities themselves.
- **Participatory approaches:** preliminary evidence suggests that participation is mostly tokenistic (to fulfil donor requirements) and that many refugees are unaware of the CRRF with information not always reaching the local level.
- **Private sector:** the private sector is present in many refugee-hosting areas and is key to engage given its role in large scale job creation in the four countries. Increasing private sector investments requires de-risking investments as many barriers currently prevent these from happening.

#### 3.6.1 REFUGEE AND HOST COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

**Preliminary evidence suggests that refugees and host communities have limited capacity to influence policy and decision-making in the HoA.** In Ethiopia, many refugees feel like passive participants<sup>132</sup> while in the case of Kenya, research suggests that 'the objective of participation has tended to be to inform displacement-affected communities about decisions already made rather than to involve them in planning and decision making'.<sup>133</sup> This is often a tokenistic exercise made to satisfy certain donor requirements rather than a truly participatory approach.<sup>134</sup> Indeed, many refugees and

<sup>126</sup> Government of Kenya, 2010 Constitution.

<sup>127</sup> UNHCR, 'Fafan Zone (Jijiga) – Somali Regional State Ethiopia: 2019 Pledge Progress Report', p. 8.

<sup>128</sup> *Woredas* are the third-level of administrative division of Ethiopia corresponding to districts.

<sup>129</sup> Freddie Carver, 'Refugee and host communities in Ethiopia: 2018-2019 integrated national study', p. 15, 2020.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> UNHCR, Global Refugee Forum: Pledges and Contributions.

<sup>132</sup> ReDSS, 'Towards a Common Research Agenda: A synthesis paper to inform implementation of the Global Refugee Compact – 2019', p. 16, March 2020.

<sup>133</sup> REF SOAS, 'Localisation and participation within the rollout of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework in Kenya', p. 9, September 2020.

<sup>134</sup> REF, 'Comprehensive Refugee Responses in the Horn of Africa: Regional Leadership on Education, Livelihoods and Durable Solutions', p. 37, December 2019.



hosts are unaware of the CRRF and of its application and modalities.<sup>135</sup> This is problematic as this suggests that decisions around the CRRF are implemented from the top, that the CRRF's impact on refugees' daily lives is unclear and the lack of awareness about the CRRF can lead to the emergence of misinformation and misunderstanding among refugees.<sup>136</sup> Nevertheless, there have been some inclusion of refugees, most notably in Uganda through the Refugee Engagement Forum which ensures refugee participation in the CRRF Steering Group through refugee representatives (it is unclear if this participation has translated into meaningful policy influence and outcomes).<sup>137</sup> Lack of refugee participation can be perceived as problematic as decisions taken for refugees might not be aligned with their preferences and perceived needs.

### 3.6.2 PRIVATE SECTOR ENGAGEMENT

**Engaging the private sector is key to realising the objectives of the CRRF approach and constitutes a major challenge.** A number of private sector actors are already engaged in refugee settings including Equity Bank, which has opened branches in Kakuma and Dadaab camps in Kenya. However, the level of private sector engagement varies according to different refugee areas as well as the level of development of the 'local' private sector in the areas<sup>138</sup> – for instance the private sector in Ethiopia is perceived as weak by humanitarian and development actors alike.<sup>139</sup>

Private sector engagement is key as the private sector is the major job creator in the four countries of study. However, there are many inhibiting factors that limit private sector investments in these contexts including lack of relevant data and information; national policy and regulatory constraints; cultural and social context; and, physical and geographical barriers (e.g. isolation) among other factors.<sup>140</sup> Encouraging private sector investment requires de-risking investments. This can be achieved through an increase in available information, such as that illustrated by the recent DRDIP-led markets and value chains assessment for the Ugandan districts of Kyegegwa and Adjumani.<sup>141</sup> De-risking can also be achieved through flexible funding modalities that are 'more venture capital-like approaches in order to assess and scale [...] often early-stage, innovative, but still unproven initiatives'<sup>142</sup> and cross-sector partnerships.<sup>143</sup> The role of the private sector as an alternative source of financing to humanitarian budgets and development financing is also recognised in CRRF planning documents (e.g. CRRF Secretariat strategic orientation in Uganda). The Kalobeyei Kakuma Challenge Fund (KKCF) which is partly financed by the EUTF is an example of an innovative approach to attract private sector investment (see Figure 6). The recent announcement by the Government of Kenya on the future closure of Dadaab and Kakuma camps prompted several private sector companies working with the KKCF to note that the current environment is too risky to invest.<sup>144</sup> This reinforces the key role of government support in attracting private investments.

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<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid, p. 35-36. Some of these findings are based on refugee interviews done for the above REF report.

<sup>137</sup> UNHCR, 'Good Practices: Enhancing Refugees' Voices in the Refugee Response Process in Uganda', March 2020.

<sup>138</sup> The private sector encompasses a wide variety of actors of different sizes and capabilities from international foundations or MNOs to local MSMEs and informal businesses that are part of the shadow economy. The level of development of the private sector is different between big cities (e.g. Addis Ababa) which concentrate large amounts of capital and labour and more geographically isolated and less developed areas (e.g. Gambella).

<sup>139</sup> ReDSS, 'Local Integration Focus: Refugees in Ethiopia – Gaps and opportunities for refugees who have lived in Ethiopia for 20 years or more, Chapter 3. p. 13, 2018.

<sup>140</sup> IFC, Private Sector & Refugees: Pathways to Scale, p. 9, May 2019.

<sup>141</sup> World Bank, 'Markets and Value Chains Assessment: Kyegegwa', October 2020.

<sup>142</sup> IFC, Private Sector & Refugees: Pathways to Scale, p. 9, May 2019.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid, p. 13.

<sup>144</sup> KII with informant from donor and EU.

### 3.7 REGIONAL LEVEL IGAD POLICY PROCESSES

#### Summary Box 7: IGAD policy processes

- IGAD, a regional organisation, has played an important role in standard setting, learning and dialogue with regard to policy processes on education, jobs and livelihoods although the action plans agreed by IGAD member states are non-binding.

**The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) policy processes focusing on solutions and more recently on education and jobs, and livelihoods are playing an important role to support CRRF delivery.** The Nairobi Declaration on Somali Refugees and the accompanying action plan in 2017 were extended to all refugees in the region and accompanied by two technical meetings and ministerial summits on education (leading to the Djibouti Declaration and action plan of 2017) and jobs and livelihoods (leading to the Kampala Declaration and action plan in 2019).<sup>145</sup> These processes are important to incentivise policy changes through standard setting, cross-learning, and supporting regional dialogues on good practices.<sup>146</sup> IGAD's convening power with regional governments is considered instrumental in the development of the Nairobi Declaration.<sup>147</sup> IGAD has also been praised for its advocacy in sensitising governments on the need to respond to refugees' needs and the latter's contributions to host economies and on their lobbying of a range of actors, including non-traditional government line ministries.<sup>148</sup> An IGAD support platform consisting of a wide variety of stakeholders (including members of the private sector as well as development and humanitarian organisations) has been launched thanks to the Global Refugee Forum.<sup>149</sup> The platform will aim among other objectives to galvanise political commitment; mobilise political, material and technical assistance; maintain a high-level overview; ensure coherence of triple nexus initiatives; and play a convening role. Some initiatives have already been launched with the platform's support, including the solutions initiative for displacement situations in Sudan and South Sudan, which aimed to validate and adopt national durable solutions strategies for the two countries and a Joint Regional Comprehensive Plan of Action by mid-May 2021.<sup>150</sup> IGAD processes are, however, limited by the fact that its action plans are non-binding, thereby requiring IGAD member states to implement them based on willingness alone.<sup>151</sup> IGAD has also been criticised for the quick succession of adoptions of action plans which reportedly did not allow stakeholders the 'time to absorb, consult and get on board with each Declaration'.<sup>152</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> Ibid, p. 5.

<sup>146</sup> ReDSS, 'Advancing Multi-Stakeholder Engagement to Sustain Solutions', p. 26, January 2020.

<sup>147</sup> Olabisi Dare and Allehone M. Abebe, 'Regional Solutions and the Global Compact on Refugees: The Experience from Africa' in *International Journal of Refugee Law*, 30: 4, December 2018.

<sup>148</sup> REF EUTF HoA, 'Comprehensive Refugee Responses in the Horn of Africa: Regional Leadership on Education, Livelihoods and Durable Solutions', p. 24, December 2019.

<sup>149</sup> UNHCR, Outcomes of the Global Refugee Forum: 2019, p. 33.

<sup>150</sup> IGAD, 'IGAD Convenes Ministerial Follow-Up Meeting on the Solutions Initiative for the Displacement Situation in Sudan and South Sudan', April 2021.


<sup>151</sup> REF EUTF HoA, 'Comprehensive Refugee Responses in the Horn of Africa: Regional Leadership on Education, Livelihoods and Durable Solutions', p. 25, December 2019.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid, p. 26.

# 4. CRRF FUNDING

## 4.1 DECLINING HUMANITARIAN FUNDING

Figure 3: Snapshot of Refugee Response Plans, WFP ration cuts, historical UNHCR funding and UNHCR funding in 2020, as of December 2020<sup>153,154</sup>



**Overall, humanitarian funding for refugees via UNHCR is declining across the four countries and key humanitarian needs remain chronically underfunded.** In the case of Djibouti and Kenya, UNHCR funding requirements and amounts funded have diminished between 2016-2019 with both situations remaining chronically underfunded. However, the percentage of funds received from the total requested has increased between 2016-2019 for Djibouti and Kenya. In the case of Uganda, there is a trend of declining UNHCR funding after the peak reached in 2017 due to the South Sudanese influx. Finally, UNHCR funding in the case of Ethiopia is slowly declining despite increasing yearly needs (except for a slight increase in 2020). These trends persist in 2020 when over 60% of humanitarian funding needs are unfunded. The chronic lack of funding is likely to affect some of UNHCR’s activities, including support to new arrivals in Gambella (Ethiopia) and child protection and mental health services

<sup>153</sup> UNHCR funding for 2020 is complete except for Djibouti where numbers are from October 2020 and show only a partial image. ‘Average amount required and share of operations funded between 2016-2020’ shows the average amount funded and the percentage funded on a yearly basis.

<sup>154</sup> KII with informant from WFP.

in Uganda among others.<sup>155</sup> This decrease in humanitarian funding is partially being compensated by additional development funding. However, these funds are on one hand not necessarily used for the same purposes and, on the other hand, they pale in comparison with total humanitarian budgets, which are already insufficient to meet existing needs.

**Declining humanitarian funding creates key protection gaps and limits the human capital development of refugees.** The decline in humanitarian funding to the World Food Programme (WFP) has led to ration cuts in Uganda (-40%), Kenya (-40%) and Ethiopia (-16%). The ration cut instigated by WFP in Uganda due to funding shortfalls alongside the restrictive effects of COVID-19 has led to an increase in negative coping mechanisms (e.g. attempted and completed suicides have reportedly significantly increased in 2020). Similarly, humanitarian aid, which often intends to build the human capital of refugees in health and education, is insufficient. This lack of humanitarian aid poses key risks for refugees suffering from food insecurity which is prevalent in many refugee settings. This is particularly problematic as food insecurity can harm the development of early childhood cognitive capabilities (thereby affecting future educational attainment) while also adversely affecting the health of refugees.

**Many development programmes trying to bridge the humanitarian-development nexus have not systematically made linkages between development areas of programming (in health, education, and livelihoods) and humanitarian needs of refugee populations (e.g. mental health and food security).** Indeed, ensuring appropriate food security and nutrition alike is key to ensure successful livelihood and education programming since many of these programmes require daily attendance and sustained attention from participants.<sup>156</sup> Lack of appropriate nutrition can reinforce lack of attention in livelihoods and education programmes as a study conducted by the Research Technical Assistance Center of USAID in the Kalobeyei and Kakuma refugee camps demonstrates.<sup>157</sup> Similarly, the effects of trauma, shocks and stressors can adversely affect refugee resilience making them less likely in turn to become self-reliant.<sup>158</sup> Food security risks are likely to be compounded in the 2021-2 horizon as lack of funding for WFP risks leading to additional ration cuts.<sup>159</sup>

**Development funding and humanitarian aid cannot be entirely separated as part of a sequenced approach.** Evidence from certain contexts including Kakuma and southwest Uganda suggest that many refugees in protracted situations continue to require access to humanitarian aid long after their arrival in hosting countries. For instance, in Uganda, refugee households having arrived six years or more ago (most of whom reside in settlements in the south west) have a higher food insecurity prevalence (three times higher) than those 'who arrived in the last two years'.<sup>160</sup>

**The transition phase from humanitarian parallel systems, that are run by the international community, to government run programmes is costly, complex and time-consuming.** The setting up of national systems requires building the capacity of the relevant authorities and ensuring that their budget is sufficient to cover new refugee beneficiaries. In addition, it requires dismantling the parallel humanitarian systems all the while ensuring that the quality of services delivered does not diminish. This is likely to require a transition phase where key humanitarian needs are met all the while providing financial and technical assistance for long-term development support and capacity building.<sup>161</sup> This must also be envisaged as a long-term process with a transfer of roles and responsibilities from traditional refugee actors (e.g. UNHCR and national agencies such as OPM, ARRA and RAS) to relevant line ministries and regional actors. This will necessarily involve trade-offs with traditional refugee actors likely losing parts of their mandate while non-traditional actors will expand their areas of

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<sup>155</sup> UNHCR, 'Consequences of Underfunding in 2020', September 2020.

<sup>156</sup> USAID, 'Policy Recommendations for Strengthening Resilience and Self-Sufficiency Among Refugees in Protracted Camps and Their Hosts', p. 5, 2020.

<sup>157</sup> Rahul Oka and Rieti Gengo, 'The Political Economy of Refugee-Host Integration in Kenya: A comparative Case Study of Barriers to Self-Sufficiency and Resilience in the Northern Kenya counties of Turkana and Garissa', p. 67, February 2020.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

<sup>159</sup> KII with staff from UN Agency.

<sup>160</sup> WFP, OPM, UNHCR, WFP, 'Analysis of Refugee Vulnerability in Uganda', p. xiv, May 2020.

<sup>161</sup> KII with staff from UN Agency.

responsibilities and capabilities to new beneficiaries and non-traditional settings (e.g. refugee camps/settlements). Certain risks associated with this process include coordination challenges, potential in-fighting among different government entities to decide ‘who does what’ and limited capacities of government entities for effective service delivery in peripheral and isolated regions of respective countries.

Furthermore, development funding remains insufficient to fully operationalise a CRRF approach despite persistent needs and declining humanitarian funding.

## 4.2 DEVELOPMENT FUNDING REMAINS INSUFFICIENT

### 4.2.1 FUNDING OVERVIEW IN THE FOUR COUNTRIES

**Overall CRRF-related funding in the region focuses on jobs and livelihoods especially in Ethiopia and in Kenya (in Kakuma/Kalobeyei) while there are many service delivery initiatives in Uganda.** There are relatively few programmes operating at the regional level, however two examples are relevant: the Prospects Partnership financed by the Netherlands (in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda) and the World Bank’s Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project (DRDIP) which is implemented in the four countries of study and directly works with government institutions as counterparts (most activities by the DRDIP have been implemented in refugee-hosting districts rather than directly in camps or settlements).

**Donor coordination remains a challenge in many contexts.** While there are donor coordination groups in several countries as well as positive initiatives such as the creation of a development digest listing development donors in Ethiopia (EUTF-funded), problems remain with regard to donor coordination. For instance, in Djibouti, many stakeholders do not share their level of funding and what activities they are implementing with UNHCR. This in turn creates difficulties for UNHCR to assess the needs situation in Djibouti.<sup>162</sup> Similar trends have been noted in Jijiga (Ethiopia) where multiple studies of the labour market have been conducted.<sup>163</sup> In Uganda, where several attempts were made at mapping CRRF interventions, similar problems were encountered resulting in limited success.<sup>164</sup> There were also reportedly over 70 studies conducted by similar consultancies sometimes using identical approaches thereby showing the problems linked to duplication of effort.<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>162</sup> KII with informant from UN Agency.

<sup>163</sup> ReDSS, ‘Towards a Common Research Agenda: A synthesis paper to inform implementation of the Global Refugee Compact – 2019’, p. 9, March 2020.

<sup>164</sup> KII with EUD.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

## Focus Box 2: IKEA Foundation in Dollo Ado (Ethiopia): An innovative approach<sup>166</sup>

Over the 2012-2019 period, the IKEA Foundation invested \$100M in the Dollo Ado area (five camps with around 160,000 people) of the Somali Regional State of Ethiopia. This constitutes the largest private sector investment into a refugee-hosting area. These investments occurred in several phases illustrating a sequenced approach from humanitarian to development programming:

- Emergency response in 2011-2012 addressing the Somali influx
- Building an enabling environment (2012-2016)
- Launch of livelihood projects (cooperatives) between 2016-2019
- Consolidation of livelihood projects post-2019

One of the programme learnings for livelihoods is that ‘the main determinant of variation in success to date seems to be the degree of market integration of the activities’. This explains the variation of success in the cooperatives with the livestock value chain finding greater success than the *prosopis* firewood cooperatives in part due to the cultural familiarity of hosts and refugees alike to livestock-related value chains. Another important programme learning concerns the importance of partnering with UNHCR and carefully choosing local partners. Indeed, the Dollo Ado evaluation notes that 2015 marks a turning point with the appointment of a new head of sub-office from UNHCR who gave fresh momentum to refugee work in the area and established relations of trust with ARRA, the local king and the *woreda* leading to enhanced political will and access to land for irrigation.

One of the gaps in programming is that no clear framework for building a sustainable economy in remote refugee-hosting areas existed prior to IKEA’s intervention. In this vein, the Oxford Refugee Studies Centre proposed the creation of a framework organised around five criteria (politics and willingness; physical capital and public goods; adapting interventions to socio-cultural context; comparative advantages of people and place; securing external investments).

However, the report notes that several challenges remain in Dollo Ado as most refugees remain poor and dependent on aid (only 21% of refugees have an income generating activity).

**An overview of funding shows that key gaps remain in terms of regions of focus and interest from the international community.** The international community has been more present in some regions than others:

- **In Kenya:** Kakuma and Kalobeyei are the focus of the international community with Dadaab being of lesser interest, partly due the securitisation of the Somali refugee issue in Kenya (e.g. the government of Kenya has repeatedly tried to close Dadaab or threatened to do so). Recently, Kenya’s Interior Ministry asked UNHCR to present a road map with a deadline on 6 April 2021 to detail how the evacuation of refugees from Dadaab as well as Kakuma can proceed.<sup>167,168</sup> The Government of Kenya subsequently issued a fourteen-day ultimatum for the closure of the camps on 24 March with a Kenyan high court injunction temporarily halting the closure for 30 days.<sup>169</sup> The latest reversal is the announcement by the Ministry of Interior in April 2021 to formally close Dadaab and Kakuma camps by 30 June 2022.<sup>170</sup> This will be finalised through the production of a roadmap by a joint Government-UNHCR team on the next steps ‘towards a humane management of refugees in both camps’.<sup>171</sup>

<sup>166</sup> Oxford Refugee Studies Centre, ‘Building Refugee Economies: An evaluation of the IKEA Foundation’s programmes in Dollo Ado’, 2019.

<sup>167</sup> VOA News, ‘Kenya Orders Closure of Two Refugee Camps, Gives UNHCR Deadline for Instructions’, March 2021.

<sup>168</sup> At the time of finalising this case study, the Government of Kenya had issued a fourteen-day ultimatum on 24 March to close both the Dadaab and Kakuma camps. It had been followed by Kenyan high court injunction temporarily halting the closure for 30 days.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

<sup>170</sup> UNHCR, ‘Joint Statement by the Government of Kenya and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee Camps Roadmap’, 29 April 2021.

<sup>171</sup> Ibid.

- **In Ethiopia:** Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella remain underfunded regions as compared to Somali and Tigray Regions.<sup>172</sup>
- **In Uganda:** most funding appears to be directed towards West Nile and the South Sudanese refugee situation as opposed to the more protracted situations in the south west.

The following three figures provide an overview of development funding in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. In the case of Djibouti, most funding for refugees comes from the US Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and the EUTF (with €12.55 million).<sup>173</sup>

Figure 4 presents a snapshot of the main development actors and programming in Uganda, including EUTF programmes. There is a high focus on basic services and infrastructure in the case of Uganda. AVSI's Graduating to Resilience project, funded by USAID in Kamwenge District in south-western Uganda, for example, is an innovative project which will implement a graduation approach for livelihoods to tackle the underlying causes of food insecurity in tandem with building an evidence base to assess the effectiveness of the same (an impact evaluation is currently being conducted by Innovations for Poverty Action).

Figure 4: Snapshot of the main development actors and programming in Uganda<sup>174</sup>




Figure 5 presents the main development funding programmes in Ethiopia which have an important focus on jobs and livelihoods. For instance, the IKEA Foundation programmes in Dollo Ado (see focus box 2) have an important focus on livelihoods. The economic opportunities programme (EOP), which is part of the Jobs Compact that is financed in part by the EUTF, aims to create 100,000 jobs in Ethiopia including 30,000 for refugees focusing on the establishment of industrial parks as part of Ethiopia's

<sup>172</sup> KII with staff from UN Agency.

<sup>173</sup> KII with staff from UN Agency.

<sup>174</sup> Amounts for the Danida NURI project were converted from DKK to euros using xe.com with rates from 28 March. Amounts for the Prospect Partnership are amounts for the eight countries rather than Uganda-specific numbers.



larger economic agenda of structural transformation. One of the principle achievements of the project has been to ensure passage of the January 2019 Refugee Proclamation which includes the right to work. This occurred as a result of policy dialogue components in the project's results framework. The Building Self-Reliance Programme (BSRP) focused on the provision of WASH services, health, education and school protection in refugee-impacted woredas in Afar, Tigray, Somali, Gambella and Benishangul Gumuz with some promising results including the establishment of the Itang water board (see focus box 1).

Figure 5: Snapshot of the main development actors and programming in Ethiopia<sup>175</sup>





Figure 6 presents the main development funding programmes in Kenya where there is also an important focus on jobs and livelihoods especially in the context of Kalobeyei. The Kakuma Kalobeyei Challenge Fund which is partly financed by the EUTF (Piloting Private Sector IFC) stands out in terms of employing an innovative approach in refugee contexts. The project aims to support the entry of new businesses, provide opportunities to scale up the operations of existing companies, develop new businesses owned by refugees and host community members and reduce the time and cost to obtain specific business permits and licenses. This will notably be achieved through a rolling competitive business challenge, investment climate and policy advisory as well as facilitating the entry of larger companies into Kakuma.

Figure 6: Snapshot of the main development actors and programming in Kenya<sup>176</sup>

<sup>175</sup> UNHCR, 'R3D Ethiopia: Refugee Displacement Development Digest: Compilation of GCR/CRRF-related Development Partner Projects and Programmes', Issue 1, December 2019. Amounts for the Prospects Partnership are amounts for the eight countries rather than Ethiopia-specific numbers.

<sup>176</sup> Amounts for the Swiss cooperation project were taken in ChF and converted to euros using xe.com with rates from 28 March 2021. Amounts for the Prospect Partnership are amounts for the eight countries rather than Kenya-specific numbers.



## 4.2.2 LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES

**Despite a focus on jobs and livelihoods, failure to attract the private sector continues to be a persistent problem to successfully realise the self-reliance agenda of the CRRF.** The creation of employment is linked to reduced dependence on humanitarian aid yet the private sector continues to be ‘unconvinced about the business case for engaging in refugee and host communities’.<sup>177</sup> This is likely to continue unless an enabling environment that removes structural barriers (including lack of access to finance, poor infrastructure and limited market information) is created (this will spur labour demand). Examples of the creation of an enabling environment in West Nile (Uganda) include the future construction of road upgrading works along the 105 km long Koboko-Yumbe-Moyo road corridor with the Koboko-Yumbe-Moyo road project (World Bank) as well as detailed district investment profiles and district market value chain analysis.

**Geographically, refugee responses in the region still disproportionately focus on camps and settlements leaving urban or self-settled refugees particularly vulnerable.** In many countries, refugees cannot receive humanitarian aid if they are not officially residents in camps or settlements. This limits their ability to find employment in urban centres and further marginalises refugees already residing in urban centres. In addition, even in countries such as Uganda which allow freedom of movement, refugees residing in urban areas are not officially taken into account in municipal data and planning processes (except for those in Kampala). This results in an increased pressure on shared basic services and difficulties to plan for future refugee influxes. The issue of urban refugees is sensitive in the Ugandan context as it is feared that advocating for urban refugees could lead to additional rural to urban migration. At present, there is relatively little research conducted on urban refugees<sup>178</sup> and they remain a gap in programming although recent programming funded by the Swiss Development Cooperation, IKEA Foundation and EUTF is now operating in a number of cities including Asosa (Ethiopia), Arua (Uganda) and Koboko (Uganda).

**Understanding the political economy of an area is key to identifying entry points and designing effective interventions.** Many of the refugee hosting areas have different characteristics which will

<sup>177</sup> Nicholas Crawford, Sorcha O’Callaghan, ‘The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework: responsibility-sharing and self-reliance in East Africa’, ODI, p.11, Sept. 2019.

<sup>178</sup> There is some research on Addis Abeba conducted by IIED and the Refugee Studies Centre.

impact the way in which the CRRF is localised. An important illustration of this can be taken in the case of Gambella. In the Gambella State of Ethiopia, there has been a perception of marginalisation of the erstwhile dominant Anywaa ethnic group as a result of demographic changes, educational disparities and increased insecurity due to large scale displacement from South Sudan.<sup>179</sup> The region has also been the scene of increasing conflict mostly between the Nuer and Anywaa ethnic groups accelerating since 2016 over resource competition (land) and due to environmental degradation. In addition, in certain camps in Gambella (e.g. Pinyudo 1), host community members would prefer seeing refugees resettled over local integration for fear that this could lead to further violence.<sup>180</sup> In this context, ensuring that benefits accrue to host communities and conflict sensitive programming could be entry points for a localised CRRF approach.

**Increased environmental degradation is another developmental challenge occurring due to the refugee presence which creates a key risk to the CRRF agenda in many refugee hosting areas.**

Indeed, many refugee-hosting areas are subject to environmental degradation and deforestation (e.g. Gambella and Benishangul-Gumuz). This occurs in some cases due to constrained livelihood opportunities as well as due to lack of access to clean energy sources leading refugees to use alternatives such as firewood and charcoal.<sup>181</sup> The collection of firewood is at the centre of tensions with host communities in some settings (e.g. Gambella and northern Uganda).<sup>182,183</sup> Firewood collection is an often gendered activity, with collection being predominantly led by women (who are at risk of gender-based violence and are burdened by time poverty), and can serve as a source of supplementary income for refugees and host community members alike.

**Momentum for the CRRF is diminishing in most countries due in part to the lack of meaningful burden-sharing on one hand and competing priorities (e.g. conflict, COVID-19) on the other hand.**

In Ethiopia, there is a loss of momentum which coincides with the arrival of the new ARRA leadership.<sup>184</sup> This is notably illustrated by limited advancements with the new directives as well as the fact that the Shimelba and Hitsats camps in Tigray were completely destroyed, with refugees scattered in the surrounding area.<sup>185</sup> The conflict in Tigray Regional State between the TPLF and the national government is likely to further strain CRRF progress at the national level while making progress at the regional level extremely unlikely as humanitarian needs are likely to predominate.<sup>186</sup> Ethiopia's involvement in the CRRF process is also perceived by some stakeholders as occurring as a result of the Jobs Compact project (partly EUTF funded) which would provide employment in industrial parks for Ethiopian nationals and refugees alike.<sup>187</sup> In Kenya, lack of participation has been palpable from the beginning at the national level and there are very weak coordination structures between development partners making it harder to engage the government on relevant policy matters (e.g. Refugees Bill and Education Policy). Notwithstanding, the importance of sub-national government it remains crucial to engage the national government as a number of rights and functions are not devolved to respective counties.<sup>188</sup> In Uganda, there is still some distrust between donors and the government in part due to past corruption scandals involving the OPM and the UNHCR.<sup>189</sup> In addition, the Ugandan government wants to ensure that root causes of displacement are addressed and that continued financing will accrue for the country's sectoral plans.<sup>190</sup> At the same time, there are also positive signs such as the development of the strategic orientation of the CRRF for 2021-2025, the related action plan for 2021-

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<sup>179</sup> World Bank, 'Impact of Refugees on Hosting Communities in Ethiopia: A Social Analysis', Chapter 3. p. 15-16, July 2020. Educational disparities have occurred as refugees have often benefitted from better education opportunities than hosts.

<sup>180</sup> Ibid. II-127

<sup>181</sup> Ibid, p.36.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid.

<sup>183</sup> IRRI, 'Understanding conflict dynamics around refugee settlements in Northern Uganda', p.1, August 2019.

<sup>184</sup> KII with researcher.

<sup>185</sup> 'UNHCR, 'UNHCR reaches destroyed camps in northern Tigray', March 2021.

<sup>186</sup> Despite the capital of Tigray State – Mekelle – falling to the forces of the federal government, fighting continues with the erstwhile president of the State vowing to continue fighting. More research is needed on the effects of the conflict on the CRRF.

<sup>187</sup> KII with researcher.

<sup>188</sup> KII with IFI.

<sup>189</sup> ISS, 'How Uganda and UNHCR failed refugees', 2019.


<sup>190</sup> Ugandan officials attending the 'Delivering the Global Compact on Refugees: Local approaches to Inclusion' conference.

2022 and the increasing attention given to localisation of the CRRF at district level. In Djibouti, the CRRF remains a key framework to enact changes in refugee policy. The current focus is on ensuring ownership and commitment from line ministries with policies being incorporated into national policies and action plans.

# 5. THE EU AND THE CRRF

## 5.1 EUTF – EVOLUTION OF REFUGEE PROGRAMMING IN THE HOA

Figure 7: EUTF refugee-relevant contracted projects by budget & implementation status, Dec. 2020<sup>191</sup>



**EUTF programming can be broadly divided into first and second generation programming with regard to RDPP and CRRF.**

**The first generation of programming includes most RDPP projects, *Alianza Shire* (Ethiopia) and *Solutions Pérennes* in Djibouti.** In Kenya, RDPP focuses on health, livelihoods, education, child protection and conflict prevention (€14.7M) – targeting about 38,000 refugees in Kalobeyei. In Uganda, the SPRS-NU programme (€19.8M) with Enabel (TVET), ADA (water infrastructure) and an NGO consortium led by DRC (livelihoods, conflict prevention, education and knowledge management) is intervening in West Nile. In Ethiopia, the RDPP programme (€30M) is in five lots: Lot 1 in Tigray; Lot 2 (Dollo Ado in Somali Region); Lot 3 (Jijiga area in Somali Region); Lot 4 (Afar) and Lot 5 (Tigray and Addis Ababa). There are four components to RDPP in Ethiopia: basic services, livelihoods, protection and knowledge management/coordination. The *Alianza Shire* (€3M) project focuses on improving access to energy and livelihoods in Tigray. In Djibouti, the *Solutions Pérennes* programme has two projects: *Solutions Pérennes WFP* focuses on social safety nets (PNSF and PASS on health) while *Solutions Pérennes IOM* focuses principally on migrants in transit and unaccompanied children with capacity building and basic services.

**The second generation of programming includes most CRRF projects, the RISE programme in Uganda and the Piloting Private Sector IFC programme.** In Kenya, there are three projects: (i) ABLI-G (€5M) focuses on livelihoods in Dadaab, (ii) CRRF Enhancing Self-Reliance (€19.9M) is a phase II project following RDPP Kenya focusing on the same themes as well as urban development and policy advocacy in relation to the CRRF, with an expansion of the geographic scope to activities in Dadaab and, (iii) Piloting private sector IFC (€4.85M) – (see description above Figure 6 in the previous section). In Uganda, the RISE programme (€20M) has started with two projects in northern Uganda and one in western Uganda focusing on strengthening local authorities' coordination and development contingency planning, local authority-led service delivery and increasing the economic self-reliance of refugees and hosts. In Ethiopia, the CRRF programme (€14.2M) has two projects: CRRF ET Job Creation Mercy Corps (MC) focuses on livelihoods programming in Jijiga while CRRF ET UNHCR focuses on CRRF

<sup>191</sup> 'Reg.' stands for Regional projects. Certain projects benefiting refugees to a limited extent among the total beneficiaries (less than 50%) such as SSCoS IOM and the Jobs Compact in Ethiopia have been excluded from the above analysis.

governance, enhanced capacity of regional line ministries, operational research to inform evidence-based programming and policies with the launch of a pilot in Jijiga. In Djibouti, the CRRF DJ UNHCR project (€5.5M) focuses on CRRF governance, education and livelihoods.

Table 1: EUTF HoA projects included in the analysis, December 2020

Country	Programme Name	EUTF ID	Project Name	Lead IP	EUTF Budget
<b>First Generation of Programming</b>					
Djibouti	Solutions pérennes	T05-EUTF-HOA-DJ-41-02	Solutions pérennes pour les populations hôtes, les réfugiés et les migrants les plus vulnérables sur le territoire djiboutien (Solutions Pérennes IOM)	IOM	€8,000,000
		T05-EUTF-HOA-DJ-41-01	Solutions pérennes pour les populations hôtes, les réfugiés et les migrants les plus vulnérables sur le territoire djiboutien (Solutions Pérennes WFP)	WFP	€9,070,000
Ethiopia	Regional Development Protection Programme (RDPP)	T05-EUTF-HOA-ET-15-01	Regional Development and Protection Programme in Ethiopia-Shire Area (RDPP ET IRC)	IRC	€8,500,000
		T05-EUTF-HOA-ET-15-02	Regional Development and Protection Programme in Ethiopia-Dollo Ado Area (RDPP ET NRC)	NRC	€8,000,000
		T05-EUTF-HOA-ET-15-03	Regional Development and Protection Programme in Ethiopia-Jijiga Area (RDPP ET SC)	Save the Children	€5,300,000
		T05-EUTF-HOA-ET-15-04	Regional Development and Protection Programme in Ethiopia-Bahrale and Aysaita Areas (RDPP ET DCA)	DCA	€4,000,000
		T05-EUTF-HOA-ET-15-05	Regional Development and Protection Programme in Ethiopia in Urban Areas of Addis Ababa and Shire (RDPP ET PLAN)	Plan Intern.	€3,500,000
	Shire Alliance	T05-EUTF-HOA-ET-51-01	Shire alliance: energy access for host communities and refugees in Ethiopia (Alianza Shire)	AECID	€3,050,000
Kenya	Regional Development Protection Programme: Support to the Kalobeyei Development Programme (RDPP Kenya)	T05-EUTF-HOA-KE-17-01	Regional Development and Protection Programme in Kenya: Support to the Kalobeyei Development Programme - UNHCR (RDPP KE UNHCR)	UNHCR	€14,700,000
Uganda	Regional Development Protection Programme (RDPP): Support Programme to the Refugee Settlements and Host Uganda (SPRS-NU)	T05-EUTF-HOA-UG-07-02	Support Programme to the Refugee Settlements and Host Communities in Northern Uganda (SPRS-NU) - NGO Consortium (SPRS-NU DRC)	DRC	€10,000,000
		T05-EUTF-HOA-UG-07-01	Support Programme to the Refugee Settlements and Host Communities in Northern Uganda (SPRS-NU Enabel)	Enabel	€4,900,000
		T05-EUTF-HOA-UG-07-03	Support Programme to the Refugee Settlements and Host Communities in Northern Uganda - WASH component led by ADA (SPRS-NU ADA)	ADA	€4,900,000
<b>Second Generation of Programming</b>					
Djibouti	Autonomisation et épanouissement des réfugiés via l'éducation, l'accès aux services de protection sociale et les opportunités économiques (CRRF DJ UNHCR)	T05-EUTF-HOA-DJ-70-01	Autonomisation et épanouissement des réfugiés via l'éducation, l'accès aux services de protection sociale et les opportunités économiques (CRRF DJ UNHCR)	UNHCR	€5,500,000
Ethiopia	Stimulating economic opportunities and job creation for refugees and host communities in Ethiopia in support of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF)	T05-EUTF-HOA-ET-40-01	Capacity building and technical assistance to CRRF structure and Ethiopian government institutions (CRRF ET UNHCR)	UNHCR	€4,200,000
		T05-EUTF-HOA-ET-40-02	Strengthened Socio-Economic Development and Better Employment Opportunities for Refugees and Host Communities in the Jijiga area (CRRF ET Job Creation MC)	Mercy Corps	€10,000,000
Kenya	Enhancing self-reliance for refugees and host communities in Kenya (CRRF Kenya)	T05-EUTF-HOA-KE-69-02	Enhancing self-reliance for refugees and host communities in Kenya (CRRF KE Self Reliance)	UNHCR	€19,900,000
		T05-EUTF-HOA-KE-69-01	Area-based Livelihoods Initiative Garissa (ABLI-G): enhancing self-reliance for refugees and host	DRC	€5,000,000



			communities in Garissa County (CRRF KE ABLI-G)		
	Piloting Private Sector Solutions for Refugees and Host Communities in North-West Kenya (Piloting Private Sector IFC)	T05-EUTF-HOA-KE-58-01	Piloting Private Sector Solutions for Refugees and Host Communities in North-West Kenya (Piloting Private Sector IFC)	IFC	€4,850,000
Uganda	Response to increased demand on government service and creation of economic opportunities in Uganda (RISE)	T05-EUTF-HOA-UG-39-01	Response to increased demand on government service and creation of economic opportunities in Uganda (RISE GIZ)	GIZ	€10,000,000
		T05-EUTF-HOA-UG-39-02	Response to Increased Demand on Government Service and creation of economic opportunities Emergency Preparedness - (RISE CARE)	CARE	€1,000,000
		T05-EUTF-HOA-UG-39-03	Response to increased demand on Government service and creation of economic opportunities in Uganda (RISE ACF)	ACF	€9,000,000
Regional	CRRF Urban Development and Mobility	T05-EUTF-HOA-REG-67-01	CRRF Urban Displacement and Mobility: Promoting Inclusive Urban Development in Asosa town, Ethiopia	IRC	€3,800,000
		T05-EUTF-HOA-REG-67-02	Technical assistance to Koboko Municipality to implement 'CRRF Inclusive Urban Development and Mobility' Action in Koboko, Uganda	ACAV	€1,000,042
		T05-EUTF-HOA-REG-67-03	CRRF: Inclusive Urban Development and Mobility – Regional Network and Dialogue	Cities Alliance	€600,000
		T05-EUTF-HOA-REG-67-04	CRRF: Inclusive Urban Development and Mobility in the Municipality of Koboko – Koboko Municipality Council	Koboko Municip.	€2,799,958

**The second generation of EUTF programming experienced a shift by being more focused on governance issues related to the implementation of the CRRF.** Projects such as CRRF Enhancing Self-Reliance in Kenya, CRRF Ethiopia UNHCR, CRRF Djibouti UNCHR and RISE GIZ have incorporated governance components to enhance the efficiency of CRRF implementation. In the case of the CRRF Enhancing Self-Reliance in Kenya (now in implementation) several activities are dedicated to policy support including supporting CRRF implementation at county level in Turkana and Garissa, improving the refugee status determination capacities of the Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS) and passing the refugee education policy nationally. The CRRF Ethiopia UNHCR project is one of the projects with the most visible help to CRRF governance through its support to national CRRF structures in Addis Ababa and by supporting CRRF structures in the Jijiga area of Somali Regional State.<sup>192</sup> The RISE GIZ project focuses on capacity building of five districts (Obongi, Arua, Moyo, Adjumani and Terego) for local development planning and service delivery in West Nile in close partnership with the MoLG.<sup>193</sup> Finally, the CRRF Djibouti project focuses on capacity building of relevant ministries by ensuring that the new legal instruments from 2017-2018 are mainstreamed in ministry plans and budgets as well as ensuring that the transition period in the education area from humanitarian actors to the national ministry of education (MENFOP) is successfully accomplished.

**Second generation programming also reflects a renewed interest in jobs and livelihoods programming which corresponds to objective two of the CRRF on attaining refugee self-reliance.** These are being realised through projects that focus exclusively on livelihoods such as CRRF ET MC in Jijiga (Ethiopia), CRRF Kenya ABLI-G in Dadaab and RISE ACF in three districts of West Nile in Uganda. In addition, certain projects such as CRRF Kenya Enhancing Self-Reliance and RISE GIZ dedicate a significant proportion of their activities and budgets to livelihoods programming (> 50%).

**Second generation programming has focused largely on the same refugee situations and areas with the exception of Kenya.** In Ethiopia, there is a clear focus on the Jijiga area which reflects other donors' active engagement in the area as well as strong political will from the Somali Region BOFED

<sup>192</sup> Support to the NCO has been discontinued in February 2020 by UNHCR as a result of the lack of involvement of ARRA who has not staffed the NGO manager and Secretariat Head. The NCO is in effect non-functional.

<sup>193</sup> Moyo and Obongi district local economic development plans were launched in November 2020.

(Regional Bureau of Finance and Economic Development) to implement the CRRF, including through the existence of CRRF coordination structures at *woreda* level.<sup>194</sup> In Kenya, programming which focused exclusively on Kalobeyei and to a limited extent on Kakuma has been extended to Kakuma and Dadaab in the second phase of programming. Finally, in Uganda there has been some extension of geographic scope to Moyo and Obongi Districts (hosting the Palorinya settlement, RISE GIZ project) and to Kikuube District (RISE CARE project). However, the south-west of the country is less of an area of focus than districts in the West Nile region although several more recent projects are now being implemented there, including RISE CARE and the upcoming CRRF Direct programme (one project with CARE and one with Oxfam). These projects build on the ECHO portfolio in the area and are implementing humanitarian-development nexus approaches.

## 5.2 EUTF FUNDING FOR CRRF SITUATIONS AND REFUGEES IN DJIBOUTI, ETHIOPIA, KENYA AND UGANDA: THE RDPP AND CRRF PROGRAMMES

**EUTF funding for refugee situations and the CRRF process amounts to €158M for the four countries of focus and has principally been led by RDPP programmes in the first phase. The second generation of programming includes programmes more explicitly aligned with country CRRF processes.**<sup>195</sup> This corresponds to approximately 16% of the portfolio covered by the EUTF MLS S1 2020 report with a high variation in each of the different countries: Djibouti (68%), Ethiopia (19%), Kenya (69%) and Uganda (91%). RDPP programming accounts for €64M, other first generation programming account for €20M<sup>196</sup> while second generation programming accounts for €74M. Of these funds, 43% are allocated to EUTF Strategic Objective 2 (SO2; Strengthening resilience), 38% to SO1 (greater economic and employment opportunities) followed by 11% to SO3 (improved migration management) and 6% to SO4 (improved governance and conflict prevention). The delivery modalities in the first phase vary by country: projects in Djibouti and Kenya were delivered mostly by UN agencies while projects in Uganda and Ethiopia were principally implemented by NGO consortia.

**The EU possesses a ‘Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework in the Horn of Africa – Forward Strategy’ (Forward Strategy) organised around four objectives: (i) delivery of a set of successful country programs; (ii) reinforced regional dialogue; (iii) transformed strategic partnerships with key actors, notably UNHCR and the World Bank and (iv) increased evidence and communication through systematic and country-level data and analysis.** EU strategies for the CRRF are largely being coordinated at country level according to national needs and legislation as detailed through objective 1 which focuses on country action and priorities. At present, there are also two regional programmes: CRRF Mobility, a regional programme, with four projects, including one project focusing on urban refugees in the city of Asosa (Benishangul-Gumuz Region in Ethiopia), two projects focusing on Koboko (Koboko District in Uganda) and one project focusing on a regional network and dialogue, which is being implemented by Cities Alliance. The other regional programme is CRRF Direct, which focuses on displacement responses through regional cooperation and technical exchange in the Great Lakes region, with two projects being implemented in Uganda.<sup>197</sup>

One challenge of the Forward Strategy is that it does not provide great precision on geographic locations or on criteria for EUTF projects to be designed. This method however does allow for greater flexibility in adapting to country contexts and degrees of CRRF operationalisation. At the same time,

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<sup>194</sup> *Woreda* refers to the third-level administrative division in Ethiopia.

<sup>195</sup> This monetary estimate was calculated based on the projects in Table 1. This is based on an analysis of projects included in the portfolio analysis for the Learning Lessons from the EUTF report. Only projects focusing almost exclusively on refugees in the four countries were analysed above, explaining why programmes focusing on IDPs and/or returnees were excluded from the analysis. The Jobs Compact programme referenced in Figure 6 was also excluded from this analysis. Nevertheless, the programme, with €56M from the EU, was key to passing the January 2019 Refugee Proclamation as explained in the previous section. The Supreme project was excluded from the analysis as it was contracted in late November/early December 2020, thus not implementing in time for inclusion.

<sup>196</sup> These include *Alianza Shire* in Ethiopia and *Solutions Pérennes* in Djibouti.

<sup>197</sup> This project has not been included in the analysis as it was contracted in 2021 and was in its inception phase during writing.

the principal drawback of lacking standard criteria for choosing area/refugee situations is that certain geographic or thematic areas may be 'forgotten' (see lessons learned and best practices section below). Another drawback of employing country-level strategies is that programmes may miss opportunities for cross-border programming, particularly in areas where refugees regularly cross borders (e.g. West Nile) or are situated in proximity to multiple border areas (e.g. Dollo Ado in Ethiopia). Finally, it is worth highlighting that EUTF projects in Djibouti and Uganda are particularly well aligned with national-level CRRF thematic priorities, with EUTF projects in Uganda in particular aiming to contribute to sectoral response plans.

**A rapid analysis of different refugee situations and areas shows that there is no guidance on whether protracted situations or new refugee influxes are targeted.** The case of RDPP is illuminating in this regard. For RDPP Ethiopia, the South Sudanese refugee situation is not focused upon as 'more humanitarian support is currently provided for those refugees'.<sup>198</sup> In stark contrast, RDPP programmes in Uganda and Kenya alike focused on situations in which refugees continued arriving in large numbers (e.g. the SPRS-NU *fiche action* mentions that the settlements of focus 'host the majority of South Sudanese refugees [...] and continue to receive those arriving in large numbers')<sup>199</sup>. The main criticism of this approach is that refugee situations are by definition transnational in nature and could be approached through regional responses. More recent programming however has been extended to refugee-hosting regions where there were no previous EUTF presence (e.g. ABLI-G in Dadaab, RISE CARE in Kikuube District). In particular, the CRRF Inclusive Urban Development and Mobility and CRRF Direct programmes stand out. The first programme adopts a thematic approach with a focus on pilot project in cities. CRRF Direct also stands out for employing a regional response to the refugee situation in the Great Lakes region, which is characterised by high refugee inflows from the DRC primarily and Burundi (secondarily) which affect several countries in the Horn of Africa window (most notably Uganda). The programme will notably aim to improve displacement-related policies through regional learning and coordination on development responses to forced development and roll out a number of pilot projects in individual countries.


**Refugee situations targeted by the EUTF are mostly aligned with regions in which the international community is most present and invested:** Kalobeyei/Kakuma camps in Kenya, West Nile region in Uganda and Jijiga area of Somali Regional State and Tigray Regional State in Ethiopia. These regions often demonstrate significant political will to integrate refugees in CRRF processes at local levels (e.g. Jijiga in Ethiopia and Turkana in Kenya), have received high refugee influxes (e.g. West Nile in Uganda) or are often the origin point of secondary migrant movements towards Europe (e.g. Tigray). Other regions such as Gambella have received little EUTF funding although an upcoming programme worth €7.84M in the area of health service delivery and peace-building/conflict prevention will remedy this.

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<sup>198</sup> EUTF, RDPP Fiche Action, p.3.

<sup>199</sup> EUTF, SPRS-NU Fiche Action, p. 1-2.

Figure 8: EUTF funding amount per region in Djibouti, region and woredas in Ethiopia, counties (sub-counties) in Kenya and districts in Uganda with the highest areas of funding, December 2020<sup>200</sup>



<sup>200</sup> The lack of operational presence is based on data from early November 2020 taking into account all contracted projects.

Figure 9: Highest areas of EUTF funding and refugee caseloads in Djibouti, Uganda, Ethiopia and Sudan, December 2020

Highest areas of funding (EUTF) and refugee caseload	
Area (Country) Amount/ programs	Area (Refugee Population)
1 <b>West Nile (Uganda)</b> €38M – SPRS-NU, RISE ACF & GIZ, CRRF Urban Development	<b>West Nile</b> (772,968)
2 <b>Turkana (Kenya)</b> €35M – RDPP KE, CRRF KE	<b>Kakuma/Kalobeyei</b> (206,458)
3 <b>Jijiga (Ethiopia)</b> €16M – RDPP ET SC, CRRF ET UNHCR & MC	<b>Aw Shedder, Barre &amp; Kebribeyah</b> (39,471)
4 <b>Tigray (Ethiopia)</b> €14M – RDPP ET (PLAN, IRC), Alianza Shire	<b>Four camps</b> (94,275)

## 5.3 BEST PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM RDPP PROGRAMMING

### 5.3.1 BEST PRACTICES FROM RDPP PROGRAMMING

**EUTF programming is widely seen as bridging the humanitarian-development nexus with many suggesting it is a precursor to the CRRF approach.**

**The targeting of host communities in addition to refugees on a 50:50 basis was widely hailed as a best practice.**<sup>201</sup> This aspect of RDPP programmes is considered fairly innovative (although it is now widely used in most CRRF-related programmes), especially for the creation of joint livelihoods groups. For instance, mixed host and refugee livelihood groups in Uganda often gained access to additional land for cultivation thanks to increased bargaining power (mostly in the case of land being held customarily).<sup>202</sup> Similarly, in Ethiopia, the RDPP ET DCA (in Afar) project was able to create employment close to the Aysaita camp for refugees thanks to a sharecropping arrangement, with refugees providing labour and the host communities providing irrigable land (for cotton and maize).<sup>203</sup>

**Working directly with government institutions had mixed results varying by country.** In the case of RDPP Ethiopia, integrated service delivery has remained challenging with the mid-term review (MTR) of the programme observing that 'linkages to government socio-economic development plans' are lacking while 'host communities and local government officials do not have the capacities, resources

<sup>201</sup> Some interviewees suggested targeting host communities above the 50:50 threshold while another interviewee suggested ensuring that host communities constitute 50% of all beneficiaries as they only constitute 30% currently.

<sup>202</sup> Sorcha O' Callaghan and Annie Hurlstone, 'Mid-term review (MTR) report: Support Programme to the Refugee Settlements and Host Communities in northern Uganda (SPRS-NU)', p. 14, December 2018.

<sup>203</sup> Sankofa Consultancy Service, 'Mid-term evaluation of Integrated Protection and Development Assistance for Eritrean Refugees and their Host Communities in Afar Region Project IPDA/RDPP', p.30, June 2019.

and vision to effectively develop integrated service delivery strategies and result oriented action plans'.<sup>204</sup> This could also be due to the fact that RDPP programmes were delivered by NGO consortia which have less political capital to negotiate with government institutions.<sup>205</sup> However, in the case of SPRS-NU ADA in Uganda, implementing WASH programming through government agencies made it easier to transfer to a sustainable management approach. For example, context specific tariffs are already being applied for water use in Nyumanzi Settlement in Adjumani, where refugees are able and willing to pay user fees.<sup>206</sup> However, one of the project's learnings is that there are complex coordination requirements to take decisions in refugee contexts.<sup>207</sup> In addition, the contracting process for the building of some of the water systems was lengthy due to burdensome government contracting processes.<sup>208</sup>

**Coordination between European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) and the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO – now Directorate-General for International Partnerships – INTPA) was also highlighted as a best practice particularly in the case of Uganda.** Indeed, in the context of Uganda, ECHO and DEVCO/INTPA often worked in complementary manners. One example that was highlighted in the area of education is that ECHO would provide beneficiaries with accelerated education while EUTF would redirect these beneficiaries to vocational centres.<sup>209</sup> In the case of Uganda, EUTF programmes on disaster preparedness, improved natural resource management and early warning systems (e.g. RISE CARE and the upcoming CRRF DIRECT with Oxfam and CARE) build upon previous work done by ECHO while implementing a nexus approach as recognised in the EU Triple Nexus framework (ECHO had supported disaster contingency plans in several districts while EUTF is building on this to institutionalise this process).<sup>210</sup> In the case of Kenya, EUTF was highlighted as positive in making different EU institutions come together especially with regard to nexus approaches.

**The knowledge management component of the CRRF Ethiopia UNHCR project can also be highlighted as a best practice which could be replicated in different countries with complex refugee situations (e.g. in Uganda).** Indeed, the project created an online library and repository which included research, assessments and new learnings that were made publicly available.<sup>211</sup> The project also created pledge reports for each Ethiopian refugee-hosting area as a preparation for the Global Refugee Forum. The centralisation of information ensured by these products also facilitates work conducted by subsequent projects and creates an understanding of where the gaps in research and programming lie in Ethiopia.

### 5.3.2 LESSONS LEARNED FROM RDPP PROGRAMMING

**Project design assumptions on host community behaviour, on host community-refugee relations and on intra-refugee dynamics were not systematically evidence-based.** This led to erroneous assumptions that sometimes affected project design. In the case of SPRS-NU, the programme intervention logic was to 'reduce the risks of violence between host communities and refugees in the refugee-hosting districts of northern Uganda', based on the assumption that most conflicts were due to land disputes.<sup>212</sup> However, findings from the SPRS-NU baseline study revealed

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<sup>204</sup> RDPP Programme, Mid-term evaluation, p.41-42.

<sup>205</sup> KII with IFI.

<sup>206</sup> KII with implementing partner.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid.

<sup>208</sup> Mid-term report for SPRS-NU ADA.

<sup>209</sup> KII with EU staff member.

<sup>210</sup> These projects build resilience and coping abilities of refugees in the face of challenges like the scarcity of natural resources which can affect peaceful coexistence between refugees and hosts.

<sup>211</sup> Interim Report for UNHCR CRRF Ethiopia Project "Capacity Building and Technical Assistance to CRRF Structure and Ethiopian Government Institutions".

<sup>212</sup> Fiche Action for SPRS-NU, p.5.



that only one in ten households reported having had land disputes in the year prior to the survey.<sup>213</sup> In addition, the assumptions overlooked the substantial amount of intra-refugee conflict occurring in the settlements on one hand<sup>214</sup> and the grievances of local communities against the OPM on the other hand. The results were however incorporated as project learnings: it conducted quarterly conflict analyses identifying the specific conflict sources in different settlements (e.g. more focused on water in Kiryandongo). In the case of Kalobeyi, there was an erroneous assumption that host communities and refugees would live together in an integrated settlement (see RDPP Kenya Focus Box). Members of the host community's lack of interest in abandoning their pastoral lifestyle could most likely have been foreseen through a prior ethnographic study. This led to certain activities (e.g. education) being designed principally for refugees as opposed to host community pastoralists, explaining the low enrolment of host community children who had to travel longer distances.

**Several key elements were missing from the design of certain programmes despite important needs in these thematic areas.** This is most visible in the case of RDPP Ethiopia, as the projects are not involved in the provision of health services despite the identification of important needs in this area in the five lots by several interviewees.<sup>215</sup>

**High regional variation on CRRF programmes follow-up to RDPP projects.** In the case of Kenya, the second generation of programming – the CRRF Kenya Enhancing Self-Reliance project – directly builds on the earlier RDPP Kenya project, most notably through activities conducted by WFP and FAO on agricultural infrastructure and mechanisation as well as developing livestock-related value chains. However, there was a gap of approximately five months between the end of one project and the contracting of the follow-up project. In the case of Ethiopia, several interviewees<sup>216</sup> (including RDPP implementing partners) were preoccupied with the lack of follow-up programming in the second phase which focuses on the Jijiga area to the detriment of some of the other lots. Even in Jijiga, the new Mercy Corps project does not seem to build directly on work implemented by RDPP ET SC.<sup>217</sup> This was particularly said to be the case for the Afar lot, where DCA (consortium lead)<sup>218</sup> was looking for additional funds at the time of our interview. Several interviewees also mentioned ECHO's disengagement from Afar Region.<sup>219</sup> Lastly, this was compounded by a certain loss of political involvement and interest in RDPP after the beginning of CRRF projects.<sup>220</sup>

**Projects often focused on individuals rather than ensuring that the processes of capacity building and learning were embedded through an organisational lens.** Indeed, while learning is often transmitted through individuals, the major challenge and objective of sustainable capacity building is to ensure that learnings is embedded in institutional memory. In the case of the RDPP ET SC project, the 2018 change of government and the end of the ten-year rule of Adbi Mohamoud Omar in the Somali Regional State<sup>221</sup> led to changes in personnel at many levels of government. This created several challenges in terms of continuity leading to the project re-training several government counterparts.<sup>222</sup> In the case of the SPRS-NU DRC project in Uganda, the same challenge was highlighted with regard to Refugee Welfare Councils whose members were re-elected and changed every three to four years. The SPRS-NU DRC project subsequently adaptively incorporated these lessons by training traditional religious and community leaders to ensure sustainability.<sup>223</sup>

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<sup>213</sup> Midline Evaluation Report for the Support Programmed to Refugee Settlements and Host Communities in Northern Uganda (SPRS-NU), p.58.

<sup>214</sup> Intra-refugee conflict between South Sudanese ethnic groups has erupted on several occasions leading notably to the separation of ethnic Dinka and Nuer in many Ugandan refugee settlements.

<sup>215</sup> KII with implementing partner and EU.

<sup>216</sup> KII with implementing partners and EU.

<sup>217</sup> KII with implementing partner.

<sup>218</sup> KII with implementing partner.

<sup>219</sup> KII with donor.

<sup>220</sup> KII with EU.

<sup>221</sup> Freddie Carver, Ahmed Ali Gedi and Dominic Naish, 'Somali regional report: 2018-2019 refugee and host community context analysis', p. 16, October 2020.

<sup>222</sup> KII with implementing partner.

<sup>223</sup> KII with implementing partner.

**Availability of additional funding in response to refugee inflows in the regions was made available only in the case of Uganda.** During the 2016-2020 period, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda received several refugee inflows, including South Sudanese in West Nile (Uganda), Turkana (Kenya) and Eritreans in Tigray and Afar Regional States (after the opening of the Ethiopian-Eritrean border). Refugee inflows tend to stress the provision of basic services and often require additional humanitarian aid. The SPRS-NU programme's budget amount was doubled to 20 million euros. This seems to have limited effects for livelihood programming but was important particularly for the education and water service delivery components. However, in the cases of RDPP KE UNHCR and RDPP ET IRC the influx affected the quality of service delivery most notably in the case of water infrastructure projects (RDPP ET IRC) and of education (RDPP KE UNHCR).

**Many livelihood interventions promoted under earlier EUTF programming have encountered challenges with regard to their sustainability and the lack of linkages with the private sector.** For instance, in the case of RDPP KE UNHCR no value chain or macroeconomic analysis was conducted for the project's Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) activities, leading to poor employment outcomes.<sup>224</sup> In the case of SPRS-NU DRC (Uganda), stakeholders highlighted the need to establish more private sector linkages, access to agro-processing facilities as well as infrastructure in the case of more isolated settlements (e.g. Rhino camp).<sup>225</sup> Notwithstanding the above, certain projects such as SPRS-NU Enabel stood out as having more promising approaches to livelihoods programming with a focus on the building of sustainable systems. The differential aspects of their approach include: (i) a focus on quality over quantity,<sup>226</sup> (ii) focus on linkages with the private sector and (iii) embedding the programme in the larger Skilling Uganda strategic plan using the Skills Development Fund as a financing modality.<sup>227</sup>

**Many EUTF-funded programmes chose beneficiaries based on self-selection, with accompanying challenges.** This approach is often favoured as it allows to train those who are most intrinsically motivated, those developing competitive business plans (e.g. in SPRS-NU DRC, through Activity 1.2.2.) and/or those who have the potential to become entrepreneurs.<sup>228</sup> However, such programming risks falling in the perennial cycle of 'programming efforts by relief agencies [that] acknowledge and try but fail to address the pre-existing gender, class, ethnic, and other inequities within refugee and host communities, ensuring that benefits of programming usually accrue to those with higher level of social, economic, political, or cultural capital, and that the general inequities persist as unmet needs or gaps'.<sup>229</sup> In practice more research and assessments need to be conducted by different projects to understand the effects of self-selection modalities on the political economy of refugee areas.

**Several interventions should have made special provisions to ensure continued humanitarian support when contexts were not yet ripe for development interventions.** For instance, in the case of SPRS-NU ADA (Uganda), having an emergency reservoir for new arrivals could have been useful: it would have allowed an emergency system to take root while more complex infrastructure projects were being built. Similarly, in the case of RDPP Kenya UNHCR, there were still important humanitarian needs that needed to be covered in the areas of health, food security and education.<sup>230</sup>

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<sup>224</sup> Samuel Hall, 'Mid-term report for RDPP KE UNHCR'.

<sup>225</sup> KII with implementing partner.

<sup>226</sup> KII with implementing partner.

<sup>227</sup> Samuel Hall, 'RDPP Learning and Evaluation Trajectory: Regional Baseline Report', p.10.

<sup>228</sup> KII with UN Agency.

<sup>229</sup> USAID - RTAC, 'Desk Review on Resilience Building and Self-Sufficiency among Refugees and Host Communities in CRRF Countries: With special focus on Turkana and Garissa Counties', Kenya, p. 44, Feb. 2020.

<sup>230</sup> Samuel Hall, Mid-term report for RDPP KE UNHCR.

Assumptions about the host community and their behavior were made during the design of the RDPP programme. These assumptions include:

- Willingness of host community members to live in the settlement areas with refugees **BUT most host community members only go to the settlements during the day, largely attracted by humanitarian aid, and are not living permanently in these areas.**
- Uptake of services by host community members of certain basic services (education and health facilities) **BUT most host community members use these services scantily, especially education.**
- Gender imbalance among host communities in livelihood activities **BUT** few men from the host community participate.

**Recommendations:**

- **Incorporate more ethnographic and contextual analysis of host community behavior(s) and preferences in the project design phase**
- **Adapt service delivery to the specific needs of the host community. For education, this was done to some extent (e.g. semi-mobile boarding schools)**

Unlike in Uganda, there was no additional funding for the RDPP programme after the influx of South Sudanese refugees to Kenya. Several areas including health, education and child protection were strained/stressed by the amount of new arrivals. The MTR and several interviewees indicated that several thematic areas are in need of larger amounts of humanitarian funding for basic service delivery.

**Recommendations:**

- **Strengthen risk and assumption section in the project matrix**
- **Consider humanitarian needs before moving towards funding development needs**

On livelihoods (as indicated in the MTR), there was no value chain or macroeconomic analysis of the Kalobeyei area. While interviewees' opinions differ on the reasons for the absence of this analysis, they seem to agree that the project design phase was rushed. Results show that there is a clear mismatch between the people undergoing TVET training and the creation of sustainable livelihoods.

**Recommendation:**

- **Spend more time on the project design phase, especially when projects are addressing development concerns rather than immediate humanitarian needs**

**Best practices:**

- **Kitchen gardens:** the promotion of kitchen gardens has been highlighted as a positive practice with a high uptake, especially among refugees. They allowed beneficiaries to diversify their livelihoods by sometimes selling surplus products. Secondary research notes that 'kitchen gardens are associated with improved food security outcomes'. Nevertheless, water availability appears to be an issue for their sustainability.
- **Long-term funding:** many interviewees reemphasized the positive aspects of multi-year funding allowing for more flexibility and longer term planning for their activities.
- **EUTF political value:** Political clout of EUTF funding which was one of the only earmarked development funds in Kalobeyei. This provided a catalyst to attract other donors (e.g. IFC and World Bank) that are principally working on jobs and livelihoods.

<sup>231</sup> Oxford Refugee Studies Centre, The Kalobeyei Model: Towards Self-Reliance for Refugees (2019).

## 6. OPPORTUNITIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### 6.1 HIGH-LEVEL

- 1) **Increase government ownership of the CRRF horizontally (line ministries) and vertically (at regional and sub-regional levels):** donors should continue to progressively ensure that disbursement modalities are directed towards line ministries, regional or district governments and move towards budget support modalities in the long run. A key step in this process will be to assess the capabilities of national and sub-national institutions for co-ordinated service delivery in regard to their resource base, technical expertise. Strengthening national service delivery systems for refugees as part of a CRRF approach requires a concerted effort to move towards including refugees in budgets. Ultimately, aid should be disbursed to the government via budget support modalities as opposed to project-based support once national systems are operational (using country systems) and based on governments' willingness and ability to cascade action plans and budgets accordingly. Further research could be conducted to assess how such a strategy could be operationalised on a ten- to fifteen-year horizon, including understanding the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of employing such a strategy.
- 2) **Refugee inclusion in national social safety net programmes:** this is an important component of integrating refugees in national systems as it will ensure that food and humanitarian aid are provided via government channels. The transition from humanitarian to more developmental and government-owned modalities is occurring amidst critical gaps in humanitarian funding creating key protection risks for refugees in terms of food security and psychosocial support. In the long-term, refugees would need to be included in national social protection mechanisms. Further research is warranted to better estimate the cost-effectiveness of the provision of national social protection mechanisms, their coverage and value for money.<sup>232</sup> Projects to initiate this transition have already begun via the World Bank which is including refugees in its upcoming urban safety net programming in Ethiopia and by the EUTF in Djibouti (through the WFP project with the National Programme of Family Solidarity).<sup>233</sup>
- 3) **Include funding and build programmes that support the transition from humanitarian to government-owned service delivery:** this phase will be the most costly and time-consuming as illustrated in the case of Djibouti, with criticism of the initial quality of the health services provided to refugees by national authorities. Programming should therefore plan for additional funds to accompany the transition alongside ensuring several aspects are covered by any future strategy: (i) ensuring that the quality of services provided does not diminish; (ii) install viable sustainability strategies to ensure on one hand that the government can effectively replace humanitarian aid while ensuring on the other hand that refugees beneficiaries are able to pay for basic utilities autonomously.
- 4) **Livelihoods investment framework:** adopting a framework to guide livelihoods investments in the cadre of the CRRF in different countries would offer a way to assess risks and rewards associated with investments in certain livelihood value chains as well as determine what investments are likely to become sustainable and the locations in which they are most likely to succeed. Creating such a framework could build upon current work being conducted by the Oxford Refugee Studies Centre (see focus box) and the IKEA Foundation. Another area where more research is needed is on the demand side of employment creation as most programmes have overtly focused on the supply side of the equation.

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<sup>232</sup> DANIDA, Joint Evaluation of the Integrated Solutions Model in and around Kalobeyei, Turkana, Kenya, 2019.

<sup>233</sup> Through an upcoming project as mentioned in the CRRF Forward Strategy document from 2018.

- 5) **Increase information on and support to urban refugees:** (i) more research could be conducted on different urban refugee populations, including those that are not registered, as well as their needs and current funding gaps; (ii) further advocacy with national-level governments to have a wider recognition of self-settled urban refugees and move away from a camp-based model; (iii) continue efforts in capacity building for local authorities and find a model to more widely diffuse learnings (e.g. through peer learning modalities between cities); (iv) explore possibilities for rural-urban linkages in programming and (v) move towards the mainstreaming of migration and refugees in existing urban development programmes.
- 6) **Increase advocacy and support for national and regional government stakeholders with the following context-specific advice:**
- a. **In Kenya:** donor coordination for forced displacement needs to be reinforced with political dialogue with key focal points in the Ministry of Interior and RAS as well as the Office of the President.
    - In light of recent events (announced closure of the Dadaab and Kakuma camps by 30 June 2022), the key priorities are to **ensure the protection of the asylum space** in Kenya and ensure the Government respects its international obligations (notably in terms of *non-refoulement* and other principles contained in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention to which Kenya is a signatory).
    - Support can also be provided by **advocating for the alternative stay options** for refugees in Kenya including the provision of work and residence permits (to which the Government remains open in theory).
    - In the longer term, it will be key to identify if this announcement is similar to past largely symbolic demands to close these camps or whether the Government intends to proceed with large-scale repatriations by 2022. **If the CRRF process resumes** in Kenya, stakeholders interested in passing the **Refugees Bill, the Education Bill and implementing the roadmap should be identified and engaged**. Engaging the Kenyan government is more likely to succeed if a **coalition of donors** present a unified strategy and way forward to ensure continued engagement.
  - b. **Uganda:** opportunities include supporting the CRRF Secretariat at national-level by financing long-term positions. This could be extended to finance technical positions at district level to localise the CRRF agenda and ensure that district development plans are effectively devised, implemented and budgeted for. Funding the CRRF sectoral plans which are currently facing funding gaps is also key to ensure sustainability and continuity. These activities are also likely to encompass capacity building of different government personnel.
  - c. **In Ethiopia:** engage with relevant government counterparts at regional level and try to find entry points in the different regions once RAPs have been finalised. This will also require donor coordination to ensure the proper division of roles and responsibilities between ARRA, regional line ministries and other entities at the *woreda* and *kebele* levels are ensured.
  - d. **In Djibouti:** continue supporting line ministries and other entities to incorporate provisions for refugees, including by financing key positions in ministries.

## 6.2 PROGRAMME LEVEL

- 1) **Invest in design phases:** several of the programmes/projects mentioned above had rushed design phases which led to some of the issues that will be described below: unproven assumptions based on insufficient political economy analysis, lack of value chain analyses when it comes to livelihoods activities and sometimes unclear theories of change and indicators. While the pressure to program is understandable, especially in a context of huge needs, the design phase should be given appropriate time and resources in order to build coherent programmes, based on solid, tested assumptions and with clear shared goals and

indicators that can truly track progress. This is even more important in the case of innovative programmes that are likely to exist given the relatively recent nature of the CRRF approach.

- 2) **Political economy analyses and ethnographic studies:** conducting political economy analyses and ethnographic studies to better understand the differences within refugee groups and host communities as well as between the two groups is likely to enhance the quality of programme design and can be continued during the programme lifecycle to respond to situation changes (e.g. tensions leading to violence between different South Sudanese refugee ethnic groups as has been common in northern Uganda). Indeed, 'host community' and 'refugees' should not be conceived as static labels and/or categories as there are differences among different refugees and host communities which need to be better understood to enhance targeted programming in different areas (especially with regard to livelihoods). The case of host communities in Kalobeyei and Kakuma is instructive with both the host communities and refugees having many intra-group differences. For instance, the host community label largely erases the distinction between *raiya* (groups relying on livestock husbandry as well as the sale of charcoal, firewood and other goods), urban host community groups<sup>234</sup> and Kenyans from other parts of the country living in Kakuma town. This has resulted in some *raiya* feeling left out of programming and consultations, with most perceived benefits going to the urbanites.<sup>235</sup> Understanding and mapping intra-group differences has important implications for adaptive programming as programmes should attempt to benefit and accommodate the needs and preferences of a wide variety of stakeholders rather than simply aiming for 50:50 or 30:70 splits between 'host community' and 'refugee' beneficiaries.
- 3) **Refugee and host community inclusion:** ensuring that programmes adequately reflect needs as well as preferences of refugees and host communities moving away from tokenistic participation. This could notably be achieved by modifying the programme selection process to ensure that refugees and host communities alike are involved in the conceptual design phase as well as regularly gathering their feedback during implementation.
- 4) **Increased involvement of the private sector, NGOs and CSOs:** the private sector (at local, national or international levels) is still very under-represented in refugee-related programming although, as the study shows, there are some interesting examples of its participation. It would be interesting to learn from those examples and encourage programmes to involve the private sector, based on solid economic and value chain analyses. Similarly, the involvement (and funding) of local NGOs and CSOs can help increase adaptability and sustainability.
- 5) **Cross-border programming:** certain refugee areas including West Nile in Uganda, Dollo Ado in the Somali State and Benishangul-Gumuz are situated close to international borders. This could be leveraged by the EU for future livelihoods programming by enhancing cross-border trading opportunities and labour mobility opportunities.
- 6) **Self-selection in livelihoods programmes:** more research is needed to understand the effects of self-selection modalities in livelihood programming in terms of their potential amplifying effects on existing power hierarchies and inequalities.
- 7) **Adoption of nexus approaches:** beyond ensuring the transition from humanitarian to government-operated programmes there is also a need to ensure:
  - a. the integration of conflict sensitive approaches in programming (many EUTF projects have successfully done this, including SPRS-NU DRC) and;
  - b. the integration of psycho-social support as well as its feeding into existing programmes and traditional activities such as livelihoods programming. This is crucial to reduce attrition rates while increasing the attention and interest of beneficiaries.

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<sup>234</sup> Cory Rodgers, 'The 'Host' Label: Forming and Transforming a Community Identity at the Kakuma Refugee Camp', p. 13, 2019.

<sup>235</sup> Ibid.



- 8) **Adaptability and flexibility of funding:** consider making additional flexible funds available in response to the immediate needs created by refugee influxes. Indeed, making flexible funding available to respond to influxes of additional beneficiaries as was done by SPRS-NU programme in Uganda should be extended to other programmes, especially to relieve the pressure on shared services such as WASH and education.
- 9) **Theories of changes and clear indicators:** given the amounts of funding being invested, the complexity of the issues at hand, the environment, stakeholders and the fact that programmes are also implemented by consortia of players, common theories of change with clear indicators not only of outputs but also of outcomes, and if possible impact, should be developed to ensure both donors and all implementers as well as key government partners are on the same page and have shared, realistic goals.
- 10) **Flexible and versatile monitoring, evaluation and learning tools:** flexibility could also be extended to the area of monitoring, evaluation and learning through the adoption of tools that are adapted to programming in changing and complex contexts (e.g. transition from dependency on humanitarian aid to government-owned services) – examples include the use of tools such as strategy testing through which projects discuss whether the assumptions of the initial project theory of change are still valid and subsequently make potential revisions to the theory of change every three to four months.<sup>236</sup> Similarly, the use of other iterative and adaptive tools such as the actor-based change frameworks that are organised around actor-based systems map, a change agenda and causal impact pathways could also be considered. These tools are likely to be particularly useful for programmes on CRRF governance as these will most likely require experimentation, real time monitoring and complex coordination requirements as they will involve capacity building as well as reallocating roles and responsibilities between different actors.
- 11) **Knowledge management:** consider implementing knowledge management components in countries beyond Ethiopia to better understand current gaps in programming, ensure improved stakeholder mappings and limit the future duplication of efforts. This will also help other donors and any future programming in this area.
- 12) **Managing environmental degradation:** limiting environmental degradation is likely to help improve host community-refugee relations, diminish gender-based violence and can also lead to the creation of more sustainable livelihoods. While environmental interventions are likely to be context-specific both in terms of the causes of environmental degradation as well as local ecosystems, some general types of interventions such as the development of agroforestry systems, upgrading of cooking systems and energy value chains as well as the establishment of private woodlots for energy and other purposes could be potential options at the intersection of programming in the areas of energy, environmental preservation and livelihoods.<sup>237</sup> For example, EUTF project RDPP KE UNHCR (by FAO) encouraged the development of the *prosopsis* firewood value chain by host communities who would subsequently sell the charcoal to refugees in Kakuma and Kalobeyi camps. In non-environmental projects, environmental concerns can also be included by mainstreaming the use of environment risk assessments.

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<sup>236</sup> Asia Foundation, 'Strategy Testing: An innovative approach to monitoring highly flexible aid programs', p.6, 2015.

<sup>237</sup> FAO, Assessment of Forest Resource Degradation and Intervention Options in Refugee-Hosting Areas of Western and South Western Uganda, p. 1.

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## 8. ANNEX II

	Djibouti	Ethiopia	Kenya	Uganda
Pre-CRRF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Encampment policy, no right to work or freedom of movement</li> <li>• Use of parallel systems</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Encampment policy, no right to work or freedom of movement</li> <li>• Use of parallel systems</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Encampment policy, no right to work or freedom of movement</li> <li>• Use of parallel systems</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Freedom of movement, right to work and other rights are granted</li> <li>• Still a humanitarian model in place</li> </ul>
Refugee agency (Ministry)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ONARS (Ministry of Interior)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ARRA (Ministry of Peace)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RAS (Ministry of Interior)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• OPM (Office of the Prime Minister)</li> </ul>
CRRF Coordination Structures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CRRF National Action Plan</li> <li>• CRRF Steering Committee, Sectoral Cluster Groups and Expanded Working Group</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NCRRS (DRAFT)</li> <li>• National Coordination Office (now disbanded)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• None officially in place</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CRRF Road Map</li> <li>• CRRF Secretariat</li> <li>• CRRF Steering Group</li> </ul>
National legislative changes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2017 Refugee law and accompanying decrees</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Refugee proclamation (Jan 2019) and three directives by ARRA</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Refugee Bill (in parliament)</li> <li>• Refugee education policy (DRAFT)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• None</li> </ul>
Right to work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Right to work 'in progress' (<i>de-jure</i> right)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Right to work not implemented</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No right to work</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Right to work 'in progress' (<i>de-facto</i> right)</li> </ul>
Freedom of movement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Yes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not in practice</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No with encampment policy still in place</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Yes but reception of humanitarian aid linked to settlement/Kampala residency</li> </ul>
Land ownership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Yes but very little of the land in Djibouti is suitable for agriculture (food is imported)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No but sharecropping arrangements in Afar and Dollo Ado</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No but access to land in Kalobeyei and sharecropping arrangements in Dadaab</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Yes but average land size diminishing due to new arrivals, thus many refugees having no land</li> </ul>
Integrated services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Refugees included in health systems + education</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Some examples of shared services (e.g. Itang, education) but not widespread</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inclusion in the NHIF is on-going (CRRF KE UNHCR) in Turkana</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Refugees already use national systems (financed by humanitarians)</li> </ul>
CRRF Sectoral plans	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• None at national level</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• None at national level</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• None at national level</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Education (2018), Health (2019), Water and Environment (2019), Jobs and Livelihoods (2020), Sustainable Energy Response Plan (draft)</li> </ul>
Integration in development planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Global Refugee Forum pledge to include them in Vision 2035</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• None currently</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Turkana KISEDIP aligned w/ CIDP II</li> <li>• GISEDIP (in future)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• STA and ReHOPE</li> <li>• NDP III &amp; DDP III</li> </ul>