Comprehensive Refugee Responses in the Horn of Africa:

Regional leadership on education, livelihoods and durable solutions

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
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Executive summary

Since 2017, countries in the Horn of Africa have been developing a coordinated and comprehensive, 'whole of society' approach to supporting areas affected by refugee displacement. This process has benefited from the soft political power of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which has brought heads of state, ministers, and technical staff together in a series of meetings that have culminated in the March 2017 Comprehensive Approach to Durable Solutions on the Somali Refugee Situation for Somali Refugees (referred to as the Nairobi Declaration or Nairobi Process), the December 2017 Djibouti Declaration on Refugee Education, and the March 2019 Kampala Declaration on Jobs and Livelihoods. Five countries in the region (Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda) have been designated participants in the global Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), which aims to support the incorporation of assistance to protracted refugee situations into national development plans and to ensure that refugees, returnees, hosts and others living in areas affected by displacement are given equal opportunities to achieve self reliance and well-being.

This report analyses the ways in which the Nairobi Process and CRRF are being implemented in four countries: Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda. Based on 130 interviews and focus group discussions with international and national aid actors, government officials, local administrators, and refugees and hosts in capital cities as well as refugee hosting areas, we consider:

- the role of IGAD, both in practice and as perceived by a wide range of stakeholders;
- the policy and legislative changes that have been made since 2017 towards improving refugee inclusion and extending a community-based approach to assistance;
- detailed sectoral analysis of progress made with respect to policy, legislative change, and implementation with respect to education, jobs and livelihoods, the involvement of the private sector in refugee hosting areas, and durable solutions.

Our analysis identifies clear areas where significant progress has been made, particularly at the central legislative and policy levels. Political commitment has been mobilised and maintained through the sustained leadership of IGAD. While each country's experience is a function of its own political economy and it is not reasonable to compare the countries to each other in a scoring exercise, clear progress can be seen in each of the four cases as compared with their position just three years ago.

That said, the analysis also identifies important areas where efforts need to be redoubled to achieve progress. This is particularly true with respect to localisation and participation processes. The roll-out of the Nairobi Process and the CRRF is still quite new, and while much has been done to create a policy environment that provides for greater inclusion with respect to, for example, education or the right to work, these efforts have limited impact at the local level. Greater attention needs to be given to consultation with refugees, hosts and local government, and to ensuring that policies and laws are effectively implemented to deliver real change to people living in refugee-affected areas. Each of the key areas of analysis in this report includes a short list of recommendations, located at the end of each chapter. The report provides ten main recommendations:

1. Support for IGAD is essential. IGAD's role as political broker is unique and it should be supported by donors and member states to continue to perform this important function. Its coordination and technical functions should also be supported by donors, member states and line ministries in CRRF countries. This can be done by establishing an independent monitoring system with reporting indicators for each country and for all partners and agencies

involved.

2. More donors should commit to multi-year funding, including direct budgetary support, to CRRF countries to foster the expansion of activities to the local level and to enable full incorporation of refugees into national development plans.

3. Participation of local level governments, civil society, refugees and host communities should be incorporated into planning, implementation and monitoring of all CRRF activities by member states. Development donors and implementing agencies should also work to integrate displacement-affected communities into their programming. Local action plans for implementation should be developed together with local government counterparts, civil society, and refugee and host communities.

4. The education sector needs urgent attention to make the transition from ad hoc projects to national systems. Financing from the international community will be key for the implementation of education inclusion policies (including secondary and tertiary education), as well as quality of education for refugees and host communities. Governments should work to ensure that coordination functions effectively to ensure that implementation and localisation have real impact.

5. Further policy formulation is needed on jobs and livelihoods, and where policy and legislation is not yet enacted these processes should be completed. Jobs and livelihoods interventions need to be better coordinated and guided by government policy that sets out procedures and standards for developing employment opportunities for refugees and hosts, based on market demand that facilitates mobility of refugees and encourages the engagement of private sector employers and trainers. IGAD should monitor and support these processes, and bring together member states to harmonise their efforts to develop effective jobs and livelihoods policies that benefit refugees, hosts and others affected by displacement.

6. Governments should incorporate commitments to protecting refugees' rights into livelihoods policy with respect to documentation, access to services and mobility, all of which maximise the impact of livelihoods initiatives. IGAD should provide technical support in this respect to enable learning from best practice.

7. Governments, IGAD and members of the private sector, in particular potential employers, should develop policy frameworks and partnership guidelines for the engagement of the private sector at the local level. This could include ownership, revenue sharing, intellectual property and procurement guidelines.

8. There is a need to consolidate and expand the gains made with respect to education and jobs and livelihoods, and to use the experiences gained from these sectors in the expansion of the approach to other sectors, particularly the health sector. IGAD should continue to coordinate and provide a forum for sharing monitoring information.

9. Durable solutions programming, promoting different solutions for different people, should be pursued through close coordination facilitated by IGAD and member states. This can be done at the political level by encouraging states to commit to pursuing all of the durable solutions (rather than, for instance, focusing solely on return) and integrating durable solutions programming into national development plans (by governments) and development programming (by donors and implementing partners).

10. Particular attention should be given by governments, donors, and implementing NGOs to the needs of women in displacement-affected areas, as well as vulnerable groups that are often side-lined in humanitarian and development programming. This is relevant for localisation and participation, education, jobs and livelihoods, private sector engagement, and durable solutions programmes and policies.

1 Introduction

The 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants with its Annex I – the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) – and the December 2018 affirmation by UN Member States of the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) set out a holistic agenda for addressing the needs of refugees and communities affected by displacement through international responsibility sharing and cooperation.[1] As the operational blueprint for the GCR, the CRRF's primary objectives are to ease the pressures on host countries, enhance self-reliance for refugees, expand access to third-country solutions, and support conditions in countries of origin for safe and dignified return. Several countries in the East and Horn of Africa, including Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda, have been engaged in rolling out the CRRF through national strategies and implementation plans.

In support of the delivery of the CRRF in the Horn of Africa, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been playing a central role. IGAD was created in 1996 to promote regional cooperation in the three priority areas of: (i) food security and environmental protection, (ii) economic cooperation, regional integration and social development, and (iii) peace and security. The member states of IGAD are: Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda.[2] In March 2017, IGAD brought together the heads of state of its members to agree a Comprehensive Approach to Durable Solutions on the Somali Refugee Situation, also known as the Nairobi Declaration. This agreement was subsequently expanded to encompass all refugees in the region, regardless of their country of origin (often referred to now as the Nairobi Process). Since the start of the Nairobi Process, two technical meetings and ministerial summits have brought member states together on the themes of Education (held in Djibouti in December 2017) and Jobs and Livelihoods (held in Kampala in March 2019).

The Declarations that resulted from these two summits establish principles of best practice and concrete commitments on the part of hosting countries to taking a common approach to supporting displacement-affected communities. The technical meetings were a first step in turning these political commitments into realities, first through the development of appropriate policy and legislation and then through the elaboration of action plans and localisation processes. These meetings, combined with regular stocktaking meetings on the Nairobi Declaration and the formulation of national action plans, have also helped to foster cross-regional sharing of best practice and provided member states with milestones to aim for. At the December 2019 Global Refugee Forum, IGAD's work in achieving visible results from the GCR was recognised as an example of best practice globally.

This report considers the implementation of the CRRF and the Nairobi process in four countries of the IGAD region: Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda.[3] We assess the progress that has been made with respect to education, jobs and livelihoods, and durable solutions. We also consider the progress made and challenges remaining with respect to localisation, participation and engagement of

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[1] For more information see http://www.globalcrrf.org.

[2] Eritrea suspended its membership in 2007. Efforts are now being made to bring the country back into the regional body.

[3] Ethiopia is also a CRRF country. However, the decision was taken not to include it in the study as there were several other studies being carried out concurrently on different aspects of CRRF implementation in Ethiopia. See, for instance, Crawford and O'Callaghan 2019.

the private sector.

The objectives of the research are:

1. To understand and document the extent to which the commitments made by the different IGAD member states in the context of the Nairobi, Djibouti and Kampala Declarations have been effectively followed up, both up in terms of (1) legal and regulatory frameworks and (2) operational interventions, such as funding allocations, revisions of national plans, coordination of aid and investments, etc, with a particular focus on education, jobs and livelihoods.

2. To understand, for selected refugee/host communities, whether the implementation of these commitments has already led to any socioeconomic improvements (focusing on education, and jobs and livelihoods) and what are the remaining challenges faced by these communities.

3. To understand how different stakeholders (in particular IGAD member countries and international organisations supporting the CRRF) perceive the role of IGAD and the regional processes in proposing durable solutions and burden sharing, and which aspects of this collaboration might be considered useful in other regional displacement contexts.

4. To identify the extent to which refugees and host communities have been informed and involved in the implementation of the Nairobi, Djibouti and Kampala Declarations. Also, to determine the extent to which non-traditional actors (such as ministries that do not traditionally deal with refugees, and the private sector) have been included in these processes and engaged in defining and delivering durable solutions.

> **What are the CRRF and the Global Compact on Refugees?**
>
> In September 2016 the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, reaffirming the importance of international refugee rights and committing to strengthen protection and support for people on the move. The Declaration called upon the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to apply the CRRF in specific situations that featured large-scale movements of refugees in order to:
>
> - Ease pressure on host countries.
> - Enhance refugee self-reliance.
> - Expand access to third-country solutions.
> - Support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.
>
> Two years later, the UNGA affirmed the GCR as a non-binding global framework for more predictable and equitable responsibility sharing in recognition that solutions to refugee situations require international cooperation. The CRRF is incorporated into the Global Compact and the two frameworks share the same four objectives.
>
> The CRRF has been rolled out in 15 countries in Africa, Asia and South America thus far.
>
> *Source: Crawford and O'Callaghan, 2019 p. 2*

We find that IGAD has been vital in garnering political attention and commitment to action on displacement issues; no other organisation in the region, or globally, has the ability to bring the countries of the region together around such an issue. We argue that the 'political peer pressure' that IGAD is able to exert through its regional diplomacy is a significant success story that is often overlooked in country-level or cross-country comparison assessments of CRRF implementation.

We look at the progress made in each of our study countries with respect to legislation and policy

changes, coordination structures, and localisation and participation processes, both in general as well as in terms of the education, jobs and livelihoods and durable solutions sectors. While giving credit where it is due, we also critically examine the challenges that have been encountered, what has not worked so well, and what remains to be done in the coming months and years.

2 Methodology

2.1 Fieldwork

Field research was conducted between August and October 2019 in Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda. In each country, the research focused on a number of refugee-hosting areas. In Djibouti, research took place in Djibouti City and Markazi and Ali Adeh refugee camps. In Kenya, the study areas were Nairobi, Garissa (Dadaab camp), and Turkana (Kakuma camp and Kalobeyei settlement). In Somalia, we worked in Mogadishu and Kismayo, although, depending on the location of the offices of agencies working in Somalia, some interviews were also conducted in Nairobi. In Uganda, the research centred on Kampala, Arua and Adjumani. These research locations can be found in Map 1.

Experienced researchers from each of the study countries were commissioned to carry out the fieldwork. The size and structure of the teams varied depending on the specific study area and the number of interviews and/or focus group discussions planned for each location – details of the interviews can be found in Table 1. In total, the research involved ten commissioned researchers, including one in Djibouti, two in Somalia, three in Kenya and four in Uganda. Members of the REF team also conducted additional interviews in Djibouti, Nairobi, Addis Ababa and the UK (the latter two locations at meetings where key actors from the region were present).

The research centred on qualitative primary data collection through 130 semi-structured interviews with key informants. The key informants included representatives from government (from a range of ministries), IGAD, international donors, UN agencies, international and national NGOs, civil society and the private sector. Within the 130 interviews, the teams also conducted 11 focus group discussions (FGDs) with refugees and host communities at district or community level. Host community and refugee representatives were identified by the researchers once in the field, often with the support of refugee-supporting organisations.[4] The research team followed the ethical guidelines prepared by SOAS (the Research and Evidence Facility's administrative host), which ensure that data is collected on the basis of informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality, and that data is kept securely.

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[4] In Kenya, for example, the UNHCR Sub-office in Kakuma and Dadaab helped the research team to set up the field interviews.

Map 1: Study sites – Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda

2.2   Data collection and analysis

In order to ensure comparability of findings, a set of common research questions was drafted by the REF team.[5] This initial set of questions was further developed during workshops with the research team to ensure that the questions were relevant to each specific country context. Once in the field, researchers adapted the questions according to the occupation (whether government, UN, NGO, private sector, etc.), seniority and location (whether central or local) of the interviewee. A modified version of the research guide was also used for the focus group discussions with hosts and communities.

Following the data collection, the qualitative data set was coded and analysed using NVivo software along themes guided by the research questions. Each country research team was also responsible for writing a field report that provided a first analysis of their findings. The present report represents a synthesis of both the coded transcripts and the findings and recommendations from across the four research teams.

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[5] The research guide was based on the original Terms of Reference agreed with the EU delegations in the study countries, as well as with the Development Cooperation (DEVCO) DG in the European Commission in Brussels.

Table 1: Interviews conducted (individual and focus group)

	Location	Government	NGOs/ International-al Orgs	Refugees and hosts	Private sec-tor	TOTAL
Djibouti	Djibouti City	7	10	2		19
	Markazi Camp			2		2
	Ali Adeh Camp			3		3
Kenya	Nairobi	2	15			17
	Garissa	1	11	4		16
	Turkana	2	7	3		12
Somalia	Mogadishu	5	2	2	2	11
	Kismayo	3	1	2	2	8
	Nairobi		16			16
Uganda	Kampala	2	4			6
	Arua	4	7			11
	Adjumani	1	8			9
TOTAL		**27**	**78**	**18**	**4**	**130**

In addition to collecting primary data, a desk review was carried out of existing literature, reports and data from academics, UN agencies, NGOs, government bodies and other sources. Findings and data from the desk review have been incorporated throughout the report. A full list of references is available at the end of this report.

2.3   Stakeholder engagement

The REF held an analysis workshop in Nairobi on 15 November 2019 to share initial findings with a select group of stakeholders, some of whom had been involved in the fieldwork either as a research-er or an interviewee. A key aim of the session was to test some of the emerging recommendations for policy and programmes and to build and improve on these through feedback from the group.

Before this workshop, members of the REF had also attended the IGAD Stocktaking meeting on 16–17 September 2019 in Addis Ababa, as well as the 'Global Compact for Refugees – Local Approaches to Inclusion' conference held from 31 October to 1 November, also in Addis Ababa. These meetings provided excellent opportunities to gather further information about the process of CRRF implemen-tation and IGAD's role in regional coordination. Finally, as mentioned above, a summary document of the initial findings was distributed at the Global Refugee Forum in Geneva on 16–18 December 2019, where the role of regional organisations in implementation of refugee response was a major theme.

2.4   Challenges

Delays to the start of fieldwork were a challenge during the research, particularly because of the rel-atively short timeframe of this project. Fieldwork delays occurred for a number of different reasons. In Kenya, for example, it took time to process the research permit to conduct research in Kakuma and Dadaab. As a result of scheduling difficulties, the Kenya team was unable to hold a meeting with the Governor of Turkana or the Ministry of Education (although a member of the latter did attend the November analysis workshop in Nairobi).

In Djibouti, field work was delayed because of the limited availability of the researcher and several

key informants, since many people leave the city during the hottest months of the year (August and September).

In Somalia, the timing of the Kismayo/Jubbaland presidential election (22 August 2019) was also a challenge, as the associated security measures made it difficult for the researcher to move about and meet government respondents, many of whom were focused on the election campaign.

Insecurity was also a challenge for the Mogadishu-based researcher, who struggled to obtain interviews with some government and aid agency staff. Fortunately, this was redressed by the opportunity to interview four key government staff who were attending meetings in Addis Ababa and at Wilton Park in the UK.

A final challenge experienced by the research teams was the often-limited awareness of some stakeholders, particularly nongovernmental actors and those outside national capitals, of the CRRF and accompanying Nairobi, Djibouti and Kampala Declarations. This is an important finding in itself, and the wider implications of this lack of CRRF awareness are elaborated in more detail in Chapter 5. However, in practical terms, it made conducting the interviews more complicated for the teams who, in some cases, had more information about the CRRF than the respondents themselves.

2.5   Structure of the report

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 consider cross-cutting or multi-sectoral issues related to implementation of the CRRF and Nairobi process. In Chapter 3, we consider the general legislation and policy changes related to refugees and durable solutions that have been instituted in each study country. These include laws passed or introduced concerning refugee protection, coordination structures, as well as CRRF policies and road maps for implementation. Chapter 4 looks at the perceptions of different stakeholders regarding the CRRF and the IGAD's role in the Nairobi Process. It considers IGAD's role as both a political broker and a coordinator between and within the countries where the CRRF is being implemented. Chapter 5 considers the extent to which strategies for localisation and participation have been developed and implemented. While it is in many cases too early for CRRF activities to have had a major impact at the local level, some important progress has been made. This is one of the key areas in which further work is needed to deliver results to refugee- and displacement-affected communities. Chapters 6, 7, 8 and 9 consider the specific themes of education, jobs and livelihoods, involvement of the private sector and durable solutions, respectively, considering both policy and implementation with respect to each. These are key areas where IGAD has been most involved, and where arguably the most progress may be seen. Key recommendations for each of these themes are included at the end of each chapter, so that they may be read together or in isolation. Chapter 10 provides the key recommendations from all of the chapters.

3 Country-specific legislation & policy changes

Displacement in the IGAD region is a chronic issue, and all the study countries have long experience with hosting refugees. In 2019 UNHCR estimated that there were more than 14 million persons of concern (including refugees, returnees, stateless people, IDPs and asylum-seekers) in the region. This represents more than 70 per cent of all displaced populations in Africa and more than one-fifth of those displaced globally. In recent years the resurgence of political crisis in South Sudan and the continued insecurity in Somalia have generated large numbers of refugees. Arrangements for hosting refugees have often been based on the assumption or hope that refugees would return to their countries of origin quickly, but this has proved to be impossible for many people. Local communities who have been cohabiting and sharing resources with the forcibly displaced for many years are finding it increasingly difficult to make ends meet.

This chapter provides a brief overview of the displacement and hosting situation in each of the four research countries. Particular attention is paid to the displacement dynamics in each country, as well as the situation of the CRRF, such as progress made in policy, legislation, funding and coordination.

It is important while reading this report not to try to compare one country with another. Each country came to the GCR and the CRRF process with a different history, a different approach to hosting refugees, and a different political and economic environment that has influenced their approach. Thus, we are careful not to try to present a scorecard for countries to be compared against each other; rather we consider the progress made by each country on its own terms.

3.1   Djibouti

Djibouti is one of the smallest states in Africa, with an area of 23,000 km² and an approximate population of 900,000. The refugee population that has settled in Djibouti in the last five years as a result of conflicts and climatic events in neighbouring countries is estimated by the Djiboutian authorities at about 150,000 people, of whom only 30,374 were actually registered with UNHCR as of 30 September 2019. The countries of origin of those who are registered are shown in Table 2.

The combination of conflict in Somalia over the past three decades, and more recently in Yemen, together with recurring droughts, ethnic conflicts and poverty in Ethiopia and Eritrea have increased the number of people displaced to Djibouti. The growing refugee population is settled in three camps at Ali Adeh, Holl Holl and Markazi, but increasingly refugees are also settling in Djibouti City and Ali Sabieh, the two main cities in the country. The refugee population is young: 49 per cent are under the age of 18.

Table 2: Countries of origin of refugees in Djibouti

Country	Registered refugees & asylum seekers
Somalia	13,342
Ethiopia	10,954
Yemen	5,230
Eritrea	891
Others	42
TOTAL	**30,374**

At the September 2016 New York Refugee and Migrant Summit, the Government of Djibouti made three commitments for the socioeconomic inclusion of refugees:

- To adopt a new law strengthening the protection of refugees.
- To include refugee children in the national education system in order to offer them a quality education.
- To make health insurance available to all refugees.

The new Refugee Law was adopted on 5 January 2017, and was brought into effect on 7 December 2017, when Djibouti President Ismail Omar Guelleh approved two decrees. This law guarantees refugees a favourable protection environment and allows them to enjoy their basic rights through access to key social services. The first decree reinforces eligibility procedures, while the second guarantees refugees access to vital socioeconomic services such as health care, education and employment opportunities.

To translate these commitments into concrete initiatives for the realisation of the CRRF the government, under the leadership of the Ministry of Interior, also validated a National Action Plan in December 2017 (see Government of Djibouti 2018). This National Action Plan focuses on priorities for protection, education, health, livelihoods, water and durable solutions. The Office National d'Assistance aux Réfugiés et Sinistrés (ONARS) is the principal office assigned to supporting refugees.

UNHCR and implementing partners support the government in developing refugee management policies aiming at self-sufficiency, while also addressing the needs of host communities. A number of coordination structures have also been put in place to support CRRF programme implementation, including:

- *Steering Committee:* led by the Ministry of Interior, ONARS and UNHCR, and with the support of key humanitarian and development actors, the Steering Committee provides strategic direction and recommendations for implementing the CRRF and National Action Plan in Djibouti.
- *Expanded Working Group:* this brings together all the implementing partners of the CRRF. Its role is to oversee cross-sectoral implementation of the government's commitments, as well as to support the Steering Committee with research, advocacy, capacity building, monitoring, evaluation and reports.
- *Sectoral Cluster Groups:* the purpose of these groups is to coordinate the response for refugees and host communities at the technical level and to ensure good communication between relevant sectors. The coordinating ministries and their cluster groups are:
  - Ministry of Education and Vocational Training: Education and Training
  - Ministry of Interior through ONARS: Protection
  - Ministry of Health: Health
  - State Secretary for Social Affairs: Livelihoods and Social Protection
  - Ministry of Agriculture: Water

In August 2017, the Ministry of National Education and UNHCR signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the gradual inclusion of refugees into the national education system (see Chapter 6 on Education). Since January 2018, the most vulnerable refugees have also been integrated into the subsidised national health system through an agreement between the Ministry of Social Affairs and Solidarity, the Ministry of Health and UNHCR.

A major source of finance for support to refugee-affected areas in Djibouti has been the World Bank-supported Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project (DRDIP), which aims to improve access to basic social services, expand economic opportunities, and enhance environmental management for communities hosting refugees. DRDIP funding in the region is also provided to Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia.

A livelihoods strategic plan, developed by UNHCR Djibouti (2018), has been put in place for the period from 2018 to 2022. However, refugees face challenges in finding employment, because most are situated in remote, underdeveloped areas, where opportunities are limited, and far away from private-sector actors. Jobs for Djiboutian nationals are also scarce, as is evidenced by the unemployment rate of 39 per cent (recorded by the World Bank for 2015, the latest date for which there are official figures) (See World Bank 2018c).

3.2   Kenya

Kenya has been hosting refugees from neighbouring countries for nearly four decades. At the time of writing, the country hosts 488,867 registered refugees and asylum seekers, the majority having fled Somalia and South Sudan (UNHCR Kenya, 2019a). The country's designated refugee complexes, Dadaab and Kakuma/Kalobeyei, located in Garissa and Turkana counties, respectively, are home to 84 per cent of the refugees, while 16 per cent reside in urban areas (Ibid.).

The refugee camps are located in relatively under-developed areas that are remote from Kenya's main cities. The areas are characterised by difficult socioeconomic conditions that include food insecurity, limited access to basic social services and economic infrastructure, harsh climatic conditions, and poor livelihood opportunities (Manji and de Berry, 2019). Most recent progress in promoting local integration for refugees has thus far been focused on the Kalobeyei Integrated Settlement, which was established in 2015 in Turkana West Sub-county to promote an integrated and local economic development (LED) approach. Kalobeyei is currently home to a young, predominantly South Sudanese refugee population (74 per cent), with 67 per cent of its population below the age of 18. As of February 2019, 36,025 refugees were living in the settlement (7.5 per cent of Kenya's total refugee population) (UNHCR Kenya, 2019b).

Under the Refugees Act 2006, the Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS) within the Ministry of Interior and Coordination has the overall responsibility for all administration, coordination and management of refugee matters. A national technical working group has been formed to develop the national CRRF framework and a National Action Plan has been drafted. This process was government-led (with support from UNHCR) with the Refugees Affairs Secretariat (RAS) acting as the focal point for the roll-out and coordination of the wide range of ministries included in the working group.[6] The draft National Action Plan (formally presented in March 2018) provides a roadmap for CRRF implementation for the country. It entails the legal facilitation of the refugees who lay claim to citizenship or residency through marriage or parentage, and seeks to promote the self-reliance of refugees. Refugee support has also been included in planning for Kenya's new UN Development Assistance

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[6] These include the Ministry of Interior and Coordination, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Devolution and Planning, Ministry of Environment, Water and Natural Resources, and Ministry of Agriculture.

Framework 2018–2022. The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) has also included refugees and stateless persons in its 2019 housing and population census for the first time.

However, despite being a signatory to the Nairobi, Djibouti and Kampala Declarations and being a CRRF pilot country, Kenya has not yet formally adopted the CRRF structure or process outlined in the National Action Plan. Some interviewees described a shrinking of space in terms of progressive policy and regulations since 2017. The 2017 Refugees Bill was rejected by President Kenyatta on the grounds of insufficient public participation (Owino 2017). The government has also declared its renewed intention to close the Dadaab camps as a result of security concerns and its preference for repatriation as a durable solution to the Somali refugee situation over local integration. The current national refugee policy limits refugees' ability to achieve self-reliance by limiting their ability to move freely, work, own property and enjoy other key rights.

A revised Refugees Bill, which provides for a modest expansion of some rights, has been drafted and tabled for a second reading in Parliament before being assented to by the president (see Government of Kenya, 2019). As long as the Refugees Bill is pending, operationalisation of many aspects of the CRRF may be blocked. The revised Refugees Bill is key to ensuring a measure of greater freedom for refugees and to realising the objectives of the CRRF. However, it is unlikely to change conditions for refugees dramatically, as it retains Kenya's encampment approach and focuses largely on refugee registration (O'Callaghan et al, 2019).

The slow progress at central level towards enacting national policy for inclusion of refugees stands in contrast to the approach of county governments, who are more enthusiastic about the integrated development approach, particularly as their populations stand to benefit more directly from it and have been the most heavily affected by the presence of refugees. Localisation efforts in Kenya have yielded some important results. Garissa and Turkana counties have both developed CRRF task forces and are implementing local County Integrated Development Plans (CIDPs) – the Kalobeyei Integrated Socio-Economic Development Plan in Turkana West (referred to as KISEDP) (UNHCR 2018b), and the Garissa Integrated Socio-Economic Development Plan (or GISEDP) – for fulfilling the objectives of the CRRF process (See Chapter 5 on localisation and participation).

3.3   Somalia

Somalia remains one of the top five refugee-producing countries in the world, with 756,601 Somali refugees seeking asylum in the Horn of Africa and Yemen (UNHCR, 2019a - as of 31 January 2020). Intermittent and widespread insecurity since the collapse of the former president of Somalia Mohamed Siad Barre's regime in 1991 have generated multiple waves of displacement. In addition to those seeking asylum within the region, Somalis are also among the largest groups of African migrants in Libya, where they are exposed to conditions of danger and deprivation in the detention centres. There were an estimated 2,475 Somali refugees and asylum seekers in Libya as of 31 January 2020 (UNHCR, 2019b).

Efforts to address refugee issues in Somalia are closely linked to the challenges of responding to internal displacement. Within Somalia, 2.6 million of the country's estimated population of 12.3 million are internally displaced (UNDP, 2019a).[7] Most IDPs have fled armed conflict and violence, drought, floods and forced evictions. The majority are located in Banadir (including Mogadishu), Bay, Sool, and Gedo and Bari regions (UNHCR, 2019c). More than half of the country's IDPs are estimated

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[7] In addition to the protracted displacement of around 1.1 million people, a further 1.5 million people have become internally displaced in Somalia since 2017. In early 2018, in light of additional data and analysis, humanitarian actors adopted a total IDP figure of 2.6 million, which was subsequently endorsed by the Federal Government of Somalia (OCHA, 2019).

to have been displaced since late 2016, when the fourth consecutive rainy season failed throughout much of the country. Most IDPs have moved from rural areas to informal sites in urban and peri-urban locations. Displaced communities face serious abuse, including indiscriminate killings, forced evictions, sexual violence and limited access to basic services (Human Rights Watch, 2018). Host communities and IDPs in Mogadishu and Baidoa have spoken of displacement lasting anywhere from six months to 13 years (Clayton et al, 2019).

According to UNHCR, in 2019 there were 33,270 registered refugees and asylum seekers (and many more unregistered), largely from Ethiopia and Yemen living in Somalia. They mainly live in the Woqooyi Galbeed (Somaliland), Bari (Puntland) and Banadir (Southeastern) regions (UNHCR, 2019c).[8] Although refugees represent a smaller caseload relative to IDPs, their needs intersect with those of poor IDPs and host communities and are addressed together through Somalia's government policies and action plans.

Finally, Somalia is also home to 91,531 refugee returnees who have repatriated from countries of asylum including Kenya, Yemen, Djibouti, Libya, Tunisia and Eritrea (UNHCR, 2019d). UNHCR has provided assistance to 84,974 voluntary returnees from Kenya since 2014 and 5,087 assisted spontaneous returns from Yemen in 2019, respectively (Ibid.). However, in the past two years, the number of people repatriating from Kenya has been falling. Returnees who are assisted through UNHCR's repatriation programmes receive a reintegration package that includes core relief items and cash assistance.[9] Although many returnees complain that the package is inadequate to facilitate effective and sustainable reintegration, there is also evidence that the lack of similar support for IDPs and destitute local community members is undermining social cohesion and contributing to tensions between the returnees, IDPs and hosts (REF, 2018a). This view was expressed by several key informants in the present study.

Although official figures are lacking, many informants acknowledged that there are cases of returnees becoming destitute and joining the IDP settlements or going back to their countries of asylum as a result of insecurity and a lack of opportunities in Somalia. Our analysis workshop identified a lack of affordable and quality educational opportunities as a major reason for repatriates returning to Kenya or registering for the first time in Ethiopia. According to a Daily Nation report, 3,300 Somalis who had agreed to return to Somalia had come back to Dadaab in the first half of 2019 and are now among the thousands of undocumented persons living there (Kelley, 2019).

Somalia's approach to supporting displaced populations has been complicated by a lack of coordination between different ministries at the federal level and by unclear lines of communication and responsibility between the federal and regional state levels. This is symptomatic of wider political dynamics involving the formation of the federal regional states, the uneven process of state building, and the fragile nature of public service and governance systems. For the Federal Government of Somalia and regional stakeholders, this fragility includes limited capacity in government, corruption, remnants of state predation and 'warlordism', armed groups, fragmented and contested authority, and political violence. Food insecurity is pervasive, and poverty is still high, affecting 60 per cent of IDPs in Mogadishu and 71 per cent of IDPs in settlements (World Bank, 2018a). In addition, climatic conditions – most notably recurrent drought and floods – increase economic and social vulnerability, further compounding displacement. What support there is for displaced communities, like support

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[8] Figures from UNHCR, 31 January 2019.

[9] This package includes an unconditional grant of US$200 per person, an unconditional monthly subsistence allowance ($200 per household) for six months, and an unconditional monthly grant for food rations for six months. In addition, an education grant (up to $25 per school-going child per month for one school year), a conditional grant for shelter (up to $1,000 per household), and conditional enrolment in livelihood projects are also offered (UNHCR, 2018a).

for most Somalis, tends to be in the form of humanitarian assistance rather than longer-term development assistance.

Over the past two years, refugee and IDP issues have been dealt with at the federal level through an overlapping administrative structure involving the office of the National Commissioner for Refugees and IDPs (NCRI), the Ministry of Planning (which has overall coordination responsibility for the National Development Plan), and the Special Envoy for Forced Migration. During 2018 and 2019 a great deal of effort was focused on developing a single coordination system and a National Policy on Refugees, Returnees and IDPs to set out the respective roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders. The National Policy, which came into effect in December 2019 (Federal Government of Somalia, 2019), is an ambitious instrument that also sets out the rights and entitlements of displacement-affected communities.

In the absence of a ratified policy, the IGAD Plan of Action for Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees and Reintegration of Returnees has in effect constituted the operationalisation of the CRRF for the Somali situation (both inside and outside Somalia).[10] In March 2017, IGAD members and Somalia committed to taking steps to improve the security context and to support activities in line with the Somalia National Development Plan (2017–19) (NDP) (see Federal Government of Somalia 2017), in which durable solutions were given priority. This focus has continued with the new National Development Plan (2020-2024) (see Federal Government of Somalia 2019b). Durable solutions for IDPs and returnees are explicitly recognised as a goal of the new NDP, and are broken down into three objectives:
- ensuring access to all rights through enhanced (local) governance and rule of law;
- political participation and influence in decision-making for IDPs and returnees;
- ensuring access to basic services, housing and land, and the labour market.

The NDP was underpinned by the Durable Solutions Initiative (DSI), launched in 2016, which is a state-led and community-focused initiative to support government at all levels to provide durable solutions for IDPs, returnees and hosts. The DSI was developed in collaboration with the UN, World Bank and national and international NGOs, and brings together humanitarian, development, peacebuilding and state-building partners to work across sectors in an area-based approach (Samuel Hall, 2016). In Somalia there were thus existing initiatives and frameworks in place when the CRRF was adopted for the Somali situation, and work since then has sought to build on these and support scalable interventions. Although UNHCR's position is that "the NDP is the overarching normative framework for the implementation of durable solutions and thereby guiding the application of the CRRF in Somalia" (UNHCR, 2018c), some see the CRRF as a parallel process, somewhat complicating the coordination of ongoing initiatives.

3.4   Uganda

Uganda presently hosts more than 1.3 million refugees, of whom 62 per cent are South Sudanese and 29 per cent are from the Democratic Republic of Congo (UNHCR, 2019e). Refugees from Burundi, Somalia, Rwanda, Eritrea, Sudan and Ethiopia are also hosted in smaller numbers. Twenty-eight per cent of the country's refugees live in the capital, Kampala. Refugee settlements are also located in 11 districts in the north, west and southwest of the country.[11]

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[10] The CRRF is applied to the Somalia refugee situation through a regional approach, which also involves Somalia's neighbouring countries. This is a two-pronged approach that includes: (1) stabilising Somalia through state- and peace-building and creating conditions for voluntary return; and (2) fostering burden-sharing among countries in the region hosting Somali refugees.
[11] These are Yumbe, Adjumani, Arua, Isingiro, Obongi, Kikuube, Kyegegwa, Kamwenge, Kiryandongo, Lamwo and Koboko.

Uganda arguably has one of the most progressive refugee protection policies in the world, with refugees afforded relative freedom of movement, the right to work, to establish businesses and access public services such as education, and the right to obtain identity cards and birth, marriage, and education certificates under the terms of the 2006 Refugees Act and the 2010 Refugees Regulations. Under Uganda's settlement approach, adopted in 1998, refugee families in gazetted settlements are entitled to be allocated small plots of land on which they can live and farm.

The CRRF and IGAD Declarations have provided Uganda with an opportunity to showcase to the rest of the region – and the world – its experience in hosting refugees, particularly since the passing of the 2006 Refugee Act, and to consolidate and deepen the efforts it has been making to promote comprehensive refugee hosting practices. Whereas other countries in the region are newer to refugee self-reliance programmes, Uganda has been engaged in this area for more than a decade. For instance, the EU-funded Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) provided over €20 million over four years and was aimed at reducing the risk of violent conflict between refugees and host communities in areas of Northern Uganda (see EUTF 2017). The World Bank–UN funded Refugee and Host Population Empowerment (ReHoPE) strategy, launched in 2016, was designed to provide a holistic and integrated framework of support for refugees and host populations and provided a stepping stone for developing and rolling out the CRRF process further on.[12] Refugees were also included in the 2015/16 national development plans through the Government's five-year Settlement Transformative Agenda (STA).[13]

In spite of these initiatives, our research shows that Uganda is now struggling to maintain its open approach because of the sheer numbers of refugees seeking asylum and the lack of availability of multi-year development funding. Indeed, the number of refugees entering Uganda surged just as the country was in the process of signing and ratifying the agreements discussed in this report, particularly since the resurgence in violence in South Sudan in 2015.

The CRRF in Uganda focuses on five pillars of support provided to refugees, host communities, the government and the countries of origin: (1) admission and rights; (2) emergency response and ongoing needs; (3) resilience and self-reliance; (4) expanded solutions; and (5) voluntary repatriation. These pillars are meant to ensure protection throughout the cycle of displacement and are aligned with the global objectives of the CRRF. Uganda's CRRF Road Map, launched on 31 January 2018 (see Government of Uganda, 2018a) and revised at the beginning of 2019, provides guidance for CRRF implementation until 2020 by clearly defining milestones and deliverables to advance key expected results. The government also launched its Education Response Plan in September 2018, a Health Response Plan in January 2019, and a Water and Environment Sector Plan in November 2019. A similar plan is being formulated for the jobs and livelihoods sector (see Chapter 7).

Since adopting the CRRF, Uganda has established a number of government-led national CRRF structures, including a CRRF Secretariat and Steering Group (established in December 2017). The Steering Group is co-chaired by the Office of the Prime Minister and Ministry of Local Government; it comprises 35 members representing key stakeholders in Uganda's refugee response, including represen-

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[12] The ReHoPE strategy seeks to explore opportunities that benefit both refugees and the communities that host them, by bridging the gap between humanitarian and development interventions. ReHoPE represents a key building block of a comprehensive response to displacement in Uganda and a critical component in the application of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, as stipulated in the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants (19 September 2016)

[13] The STA aims to support self-reliance and local settlement for refugees, and to promote social development in the refugee hosting areas as a durable solution to the refugees' problems, while protecting national and local interests.

tation from humanitarian and development actors and two members of the refugee community, and various national and district level-stakeholders. A Refugee Engagement Forum has also been set up to be linked to the Steering Group and provide a direct voice of refugees to the process.

With DRDIP funding, programme management and implementation structures have been adopted in each district. At the time of writing, 83 initial projects have been funded, mostly in the education and health sectors.

4 Perceptions of the Comprehensive refugee Response Framework & the IGAD-led Declarations on Education & Jobs & Livelihoods

4.1 Perceptions of the CRRF are influenced by the political economy

This chapter considers the range of views held by stakeholders on the intent, scope, achievements and challenges of the CRRF process, and of IGAD's role within it. Interviews show that understandings about the scope of the CRRF vary considerably depending on the personal perspective and identity, context and geography of the stakeholder. As a UN staff member in Mogadishu observed, "At a more granular country level, there is a lot of variance and discrepancies about how these principles have been incorporated."

Respondents' interpretations of the CRRF are often underpinned by their understanding of the political economy – the network of political and economic interests that shape a country's, an organisation's or a community's approach. Some view the CRRF from the perspective of national political agendas; as a way for governments to ensure that they maintain control of the process, consolidate their own agenda, and align refugee responses with national planning and priorities. For others, the CRRF is about regional political agendas – a tool for promoting returns to countries of origin: "I think the main focus and agenda of the CRRF is helping refugees to go back home rather than keeping them in host countries or pursuing resettlement to third countries," said a Mogadishu-based NGO worker. A similar perspective can be found in the literature, where some authors suggest that repatriation has increasingly become a central aim of refugee protection policies, many of which are associated with the CRRF (Hovil, 2018). It should, however, be noted that repatriation – with an emphasis on being 'voluntary' and undertaken 'at some point in the future' when physical and economic security can be assured – is an ambition held by many refugees.[14]

Other respondents see the CRRF as representing an international agenda set by Western governments to stem migration to their own countries. As evidence, some point to the recent reductions in the numbers of refugees being resettled in Western countries. Against a 15-year global trend of gradual and consistent increases in the numbers of individuals resettled, the number of refugees resettled in 2017 and 2018 was 60 per cent lower than in 2016, and 25 per cent lower than the preceding five-year average (UNHCR Evaluation Service, 2018, p 9).

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[14] Preliminary data from the 2019 return intention survey for South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma and Kalobeyei show that the majority (70 per cent) intend to return to South Sudan, though the timeframe for return varied (35 per cent within a year, 13 per cent after a year, and the rest did not specify a timeframe) (UNHCR and NRC, 2019). Similarly, when it comes to IDPs, research by the REF in Somalia found that, while most IDPs expected to remain in cities, just under half (and particularly those living in Mogadishu) expressed a desire to return to their place of origin at some point and under the right conditions (REF, 2018a).

As these examples suggest, the major factor influencing perceptions about approaches to supporting refugee-affected communities is the political economy. As one donor respondent put it, the "CRRF is not the determinant factor. The determinant will always be political economy." Kenya provides a good example of how the political economy has shaped refugee policy. Somali refugee issues are highly politicised in Kenya, in large part because of concerns that Al Shabaab has infiltrated the refugee communities and thus that they represent a security threat. These fears have been heightened following attacks at Nairobi's Westgate Mall (2013), and Dusit Hotel (2019) and Garissa University College (2015) despite the fact that the perpetrators have included Kenyan nationals of non-Somali descent. The Government of Kenya's determination to protect the public has led it to be reluctant to grant new freedoms to refugees (the majority of whom are from Somalia). At the same time, an escalating dispute between the Kenyan and Somali governments over their respective maritime borders, as well as continued tensions over Kenya's involvement in the African Union-led peacekeeping force, AMISOM, and its interests vis-à-vis southwestern Somalia, has eroded relations and coordination between the two countries on a range of issues, including on comprehensive responses that grant wider rights that would benefit Somali refugees in Kenya.

From an economic perspective, there is growing recognition among hosts and governments that refugees can bring about social and economic benefits to their host countries and communities (UNHCR Evaluation Service, 2018, p 11). For example, a World Bank study found that in Turkana, which hosts the Kakuma refugee camp, the gross regional product was found to have increased by 3.4 per cent as a result of the refugee presence (Sanghi et al, 2016). Nevertheless, high national unemployment and a slowing economy have undermined the political will to improve refugees' access to jobs and livelihoods for fear of angering potential voters. With this challenging context in mind, it is perhaps not surprising that, as one international agency staff member put it, "at the national political level, the [CRRF] discourse has to be conservative."

With these competing priorities in mind, it is often necessary to read between the lines of government rhetoric and action when seeking to interpret the CRRF in Kenya. For example, Rodgers (2019) identifies the co-existence of opposing public narratives on asylum policies in Kenya. On the one hand, when talking about Kakuma or Kalobeyei, Kenya is "opening its doors to refugees and attempting to implement new models of aid that can benefit both refugees and their host communities." On the other hand, in the context of Dadaab, "the country is closing its doors for fear that refugee populations harbour religious extremists and terror cells" (Rodgers, 2019).

What should the CRRF entail?

Many respondents define the CRRF in terms of a range of actions. In these interviews, the CRRF was seen as 'thematic', 'multi-sectoral' or 'area-based', incorporating elements of security, health, education, skills, protection, legal status, livelihoods and identity. This was summed up by a Somali NGO respondent who defined the CRRF as a "comprehensive plan to touch all aspects of the lives of refugees, all sectors, and covering areas where refugees are located to areas of return or resettlement." Moving beyond specific sectors, others interpreted the CRRF in terms of its operational purpose, in most cases as a coordination tool. As a government official in Kampala noted, "The CRRF is a Steering Group. It advocates solutions and aid in coordinating collectively with all stakeholders."

Perceptions about what the CRRF should entail often vary depending on the respondents' particular role in refugee responses. Broadly speaking, government respondents tend to focus on burden-sharing and coordination; refugee responders tend to see the CRRF in terms of durable solutions and protection; and implementing partners tend to prioritise multi-sectoral approaches that span the humanitarian–development nexus.

Other respondents from across the four countries suggest that the CRRF should focus on 'vulnerability'. Given the gradual shift in refugee responses from a humanitarian towards a more development approach, this group of respondents is concerned about what this shift means for the most vulnerable groups, who may lack the ability to achieve self-reliance as easily as others. Within the context of vulnerability, the issue of mental health also emerged in a handful of interviews. One of the refugee respondents from a focus group discussion in Adjumani, Uganda said: "Implementing partners should integrate psychosocial support with education. Refugees are still traumatised and mentally unstable and this has resulted in some cases of mental illness, depression and even suicide."

These examples support the idea that the CRRF is part of a broad-based approach with space for a wide array of different actions and activities. This can be seen as a positive, in that the CRRF consequently holds relevance for a variety of stakeholders in spite of their differing viewpoints and priorities, making them more likely to sign up to the CRRF concept. However, it can also be seen as a negative, in that key goals and aspirations become diluted as stakeholders subsequently pick and choose the elements that best suit their interests, ignoring those that may come with a greater cost – whether political or economic.

Who should be involved in the CRRF?

While many respondents identified the CRRF in terms of actions, others define it in terms of actors, whether people, groups, entities or organisations. When asked who they think the CRRF applies to, some focused on the inclusion of both refugees and hosts, while others cited a whole-of-government perspective that focuses on a mix of ministries, as well as local government actors. Adopting a whole-of-society approach (that goes beyond refugees, hosts and government) some respondents also linked the CRRF to humanitarian and development actors, and also included other non-traditional actors, such as the private sector.

Others adopted a narrower approach. They suggested that the CRRF is (or should be) about targeting specific groups of refugees. For example, most Djibouti respondents (including donors, NGOs and government) recommend prioritising urban refugees as a result of the significant proportion of refugees residing in Djibouti City – often in peri-urban areas like Balbala or in the central district of Arhiba. A similar concern for urban refugees is echoed in the wider literature on the CRRF (see, for example, Gilbert, 2019; Monteith et al., 2017; IIED, 2017).

Many respondents in Somalia viewed the CRRF in terms of its implications for IDPs, even though IDPs are not specifically targeted by the CRRF.[15] "Even if CRRF doesn't explicitly mention IDPs, the fact that the Somalia situation includes these populations means it should take them into account," argued a respondent from a Somali NGO. This reflects the particular displacement scenario in Somalia, which at the time of writing is dealing with an estimated 2,648,000 IDPs and a comparatively modest number of refugees (16,741) (UNHCR, 2019f).

The trends outlined in Djibouti and Somalia suggest that context and geography influence interpretations of the CRRF. Indeed, according to a UN respondent interviewed in Garissa, a Kenyan will have a different perspective of the CRRF from that of a Ugandan because of the two countries' different approaches to encampment and movement of refugees. What this means for the implementation of

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[15] The focus on refugees in the CRRF reflects a general reluctance in the international community and in international law to include IDPs in international conventions and treaties. Signatory countries are often unwilling to commit themselves to international scrutiny regarding people who may have been displaced as a result of government actions (or inactions). There are also arguments that refugees, because they are unable to access citizenship rights of any kind, are in a different situation in terms of protection than IDPs are (see Hathaway 2007).

the CRRF across the region is that different countries have entered that process with very different displacement experiences, and with different policy and implementation arrangements. If the CRRF is to hold relevance for each of them, it should be seen as a guide or a framework to be adapted to the contextual specificities of each country. As one UN agency staff member in Kenya said, "We have to mould the CRRF to contexts."

4.2   It is too early for the full results of the CRRF to be seen

This broad array of differing interpretations and definitions helps to explain the difficulty in fully describing the achievements of the CRRF at regional, national and local levels. The window between the launch of the CRRF in 2017, its roll-out in Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda, and this research has been relatively short.[16] Indeed, when asked about the impact of the CRRF, most respondents replied that "it is too early to say" or "it is too early to talk about impact."

Linking cause and consequence with the CRRF

It is difficult to establish a clear causal connection between CRRF activities and specific outcomes, for a number of reasons. First, the CRRF recycles and in some cases builds upon many pre-existing ideas. This was a perception shared by many of our respondents; for instance, a Nairobi-based Kenyan government official said: "It is a repackaging of how we have been working all along since the 1969 Convention."[17] Indeed, a wide array of ideas and 'ways of working' have arguably been absorbed by the CRRF, including the humanitarian–development nexus, private sector engagement, self-reliance, socioeconomic inclusion, out of camps policies, area-based approaches, and so on. Given the protracted nature of many refugee situations, it is perhaps not surprising to see a resurgence of earlier ideas. Interviewees expressed their views that the recycling of ideas in itself is not a bad thing; it helps to refocus attention and maintain momentum, thereby reinforcing these principles, giving them structure and pushing the initiatives to another level.

At the same time, several activities and events have been taking place over recent years and even decades that are likely to have contributed (in conjunction with the CRRF) to the shift towards thinking about more comprehensive and long-term support for refugees and affected communities. As one respondent based in Garissa summed up, "We can say it is as a result of the CRRF and other factors." These factors may include, but are by no means limited to ongoing efforts by refugees, hosts and civil society to lobby for change; the work led by the Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS), for instance, was credited by one donor for doing "a good job in pushing all actors to come together and guiding them on what needs to be put in place in terms of durable solutions." ReDSS was credited by other donors and by implementing partners with providing key coordination and facilitation of the durable solutions agenda in Somalia.

Another factor contributing to the general direction of change in several countries is related to the national processes of devolution that have seen local government counterparts taking on more significant roles. Kenya's devolution process has also seen the Turkana and Garissa counties stepping up to develop local integrated development programmes that include both refugee and host populations. Another contributing factor is Uganda's long-term progressive approach in the region to hosting refugees, particularly when it comes to promoting the concepts of self-reliance, refugee mobility, humanitarian–development linkages, and to investing in national and local systems that benefit both refugees and hosts (Siegfried, 2017). This experience has been valuable to other countries in setting

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[16] Uganda launched the CRRF in March 2017, Djibouti in February 2017 and Kenya in October 2017. The Somalia Situation was declared a CRRF pilot in February 2017.

[17] This relates to the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, also called the AU Refugee Convention, or the 1969 Refugee Convention.

a model for integrated approaches to refugee-hosting areas and communities. The new development funding made available from 2017 by the World Bank through its International Development Assistance (IDA) refugee and local community sub-window (IDA 18) has also brought significant attention to the need for more comprehensive approaches to refugee hosting and local development.[18] And there is a growing body of evidence, and with it increasing awareness and acceptance, of the potentially positive impact that refugees can have on the local economy (see Betts et al, 2019a; REF, 2018a; Sanghi et al, 2016). Finally, pressure from donors to look for joint outcomes and more sustainable, better-value initiatives, whether tied directly to the CRRF and IGAD initiatives or not, has contributed to a more comprehensive and long-term focus on the issues.

Somalia is a good example of how various activities and events have contributed in conjunction with the CRRF to outcomes. When asked to identify policy or legislative change that could be associated with the CRRF, respondents mentioned a total of six policies or laws (many of which are still in draft form or have yet to be formalised and operationalised): the National Policy for Refugees, Returnees and IDPs (Federal Government of Somalia, 2019); the Interim Protocol on Housing, Land and Property (HLP) (Federal Government of Somalia, 2019c); National Eviction Guidelines (Federal Government of Somalia, 2019d); Social Protection Policy (Federal Government of Somalia, 2019e); Banadir Regional Administration (BRA) Internally Displaced Person and Refugee Returnees Policy (BRA 2019); and Land Law for South West State. In each case, there was broad consensus that the CRRF was not necessarily the determinant factor leading to these policy developments, but that these developments could be interpreted as embodying the spirit of the CRRF. The exigencies surrounding the surge in the number of IDPs, compounded by the evictions in cities such as Mogadishu, as well as longstanding donor-driven initiatives and increased government interest have been driving these policy-related developments.

A range of activities, some of which pre-date the CRRF and Nairobi Process, therefore generates momentum and progress. This makes it difficult (perhaps even impossible) to attribute specific outcomes only to these policy instruments. This ambiguity leads to subjectivity, as it creates the opportunity to choose 'what' and 'how much' to attribute to the CRRF, depending on particular outlooks and interests. IGAD itself has tended to downplay the role of the CRRF in the Nairobi, Kampala and Djibouti Declarations, perhaps to create a greater sense of regional ownership. On the other hand, UNHCR tends to brand many activities and outcomes as emanating from the CRRF, possibly, as one NGO staff member observed, in an effort to demonstrate that progress is being made in the global CRRF initiative. With this highly subjective context in mind, except where the link is absolutely clear, this research refrains from trying to identify direct linear cause-and-effect impacts of the CRRF or the IGAD Declarations. Instead, we identify more general shifts that can be linked to the change in approach that the CRRF and IGAD initiatives are part of.

An example of where these impacts can be seen to be directly attributable to the CRRF and the IGAD Djibouti Declaration can be found in Djibouti, where respondents were more likely than in other countries to directly attribute progress to the CRRF. This may be because (in contrast to Kenya, Somalia and Uganda) Djibouti does not have a long history of dealing with refugees. In this absence of pre-existing refugee-related policies and initiatives, it is easier to associate outcomes directly with the CRRF.

When it comes to legislative change in Djibouti, an NGO interviewee said that, "Yes, we believe that the country has introduced these policies or frameworks as a result of CRRF commitments." The

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[18] IDA 18 has $2 billion in financing for countries with significant refugee populations, with a focus on improving health and education outcomes, as well as economic opportunities for refugees and local communities. In this context, while IDA 18 is not directly tied to the CRRF, its focus on similar actors and aims means that it nonetheless represents a significant funding opportunity for CRRF pilot countries.

same connections were made in relation to wider ministerial participation, improved coordination structures and a more inclusive approach to refugees and hosts. A UN staff member reported that, "The coordination has been enhanced following the CRRF commitment both at the national level with the government institutions, but also between donors to align their development strategies and programmes." A Government of Djibouti staff member observed that "since CRRF commitments, the Government has engaged in an inclusive approach that contributed to refugee and host participation." Another government respondent went as far as to say that, "All of these actions are in perfect harmony with and are the result of the new approach of the CRRF, which aims to implement joint efforts to enable the socioeconomic inclusion of refugees and their empowerment through sustainable solutions." While this interviewee may have had an incentive to be positive, it nonetheless illustrates the importance of the CRRF to many respondents in Djibouti.

In sum, given the ambitious nature of the CRRF, coupled with the complex political, social and economic context within which it is implemented, we argue that it is not realistic to expect substantial progress in just a couple of years. As described up by a UN staff member based in Mogadishu, "We are now two years down the line. 2017 and 2018 were really about getting past major stumbling blocks and introducing the CRRF." The CRRF is only just emerging from its 'inception phase', involving establishment of Action Plans, coordinating structures and, in some cases, legislation and policy that govern the delivery of CRRF activities. For the most part these processes have been limited to the national level, and localisation efforts are only beginning to get underway. Tangible impacts and achievements, particularly at the local level, may only start to become apparent over the course of the coming years.

The CRRF as an approach and a mindset rather than a fixed programme

CRRF pilot countries, such as Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti and Somalia, sign up to a checklist of activities and steps that include planning, monitoring, consultation and legislation, which, while ambitious, may sound relatively straightforward.[19] And yet, as we argue here, the reality of the CRRF is more complex and depends on the people, organisations, context and timeframes involved. Assessing progress requires moving the analysis beyond the parameters of official CRRF-specific structures or architecture, and instead contextualising it within a wider geographic and temporal environment.

After all, in Uganda, while the CRRF Secretariat has arguably been "prolific in terms of the development of strategies and plans," more substantive progress has been undermined by a range of structural issues linked to planning, funding and capacity (Crawford et al, 2019). This suggests that progress is not found in a 'generic document', but is about "political leadership and finding pragmatic and principled agreements based not just on political interest, but also on reciprocity" (Betts, 2019, p 626). It also suggests that when it comes to monitoring and evaluating the CRRF, conventional stocktaking exercises and specific indicators are unlikely to capture wider and less quantifiable progress occurring under the surface. As one UN staff member suggested, "the CRRF does not give a specific path to follow but gives an indication. It has placed something on the table for people to start talking about and chart a way forward."

With this in mind, respondents alluded to a gradual change in mindset and perspective, and a shift in

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[19] According to UNHCR (2017, p 3), countries that sign up to the CRRF should implement many or all of the following policy or legal elements: (1) development of a road map, a strategy, and an action plan; (2) consultations with national and regional stakeholders; (3) mapping of the needs, responses, gaps and stakeholders; (4) development of national and regional CRRF monitoring mechanisms; (5) adoption or reform of policies or laws, as related to CRRF approaches and national objectives; (6) a government-led facilitation mechanism, with expanded and diversified partnerships; and (7) alignment of the response with the Sustainable Development Goals, national development plans and the UN Development Assistance Framework.

the accepted status quo. "What the CRRF has done is to change the debate," suggested a donor representative, while an NGO staff member based in Nairobi described it "as an approach rather than a programme, that signifies a new way of working." Another donor representative in Nairobi said "the CRRF is the realisation that no one can go it alone." For others, the CRRF has succeeded in bringing people together around a more certain discourse, as a UN staff member based in Mogadishu said, by "generating a space for discussion when things got tense." A similar perspective is shared by Thomas (2017, p 69) who argues that, "Fundamentally, the CRRF is about changing cultures, mind-sets and the ways we do business." This idea of shifting mindsets can also be found in recent ODI research, which found that one of the most significant contributions of the CRRF was to shift thinking and consensus away from seeing refugee assistance as simply a humanitarian concern towards one of inclusion in national systems (Crawford and O'Callaghan, 2019, p 4). This can be heralded as a significant achievement in itself.

By alluding to some of these more elusive dynamics, we do not argue that the CRRF is necessarily working as it should be. Indeed, respondents raised a number of concerns, relating to funding shortfalls, too-limited burden sharing, faltering legislation, weak monitoring mechanisms and a lack of meaningful participation and consultation, among others. Instead, we seek to highlight that the CRRF is a work in progress, and that some achievements may not be immediately visible, yet are working towards delivering the outcomes around which the Framework is focused. At this early stage it will be important therefore to look beyond specific activities or official rhetoric and legislation, and consider instead some of the less tangible, more fluid factors that provide a more nuanced picture of the CRRF and its impact.

4.3   Perceptions about the role of IGAD in refugee programmes

IGAD as convenor and advocate on behalf of the CRRF

The majority of respondents who are familiar with IGAD's work are optimistic about its role in convening and coordinating comprehensive refugee responses. They acknowledge that IGAD has created the political space to build consensus around refugee issues and put the CRRF on the regional political agenda. The process is seen as a big win for the institution and has enhanced its political capital. This was underscored at the Global Refugee Forum, at which IGAD was given a high profile as a major regional institution, prompting UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, to say "this region and the countries in it are at the forefront of adopting new approaches to dealing with refugee situations" (IGAD and UNHCR, 2019).

The convening of the Nairobi, Djibouti and Kampala Declarations all within a two-year period is an impressive achievement, which one Nairobi-based donor respondent argued, "wouldn't have happened without IGAD pushing this forward." This sentiment is echoed in the literature, with Dare and Abebe (2019) acknowledging that IGAD played a particularly critical role in bringing about the Nairobi Declaration.

Beyond convening the Nairobi, Djibouti and Kampala Declarations, IGAD is also praised for sensitising governments at the national level on the need to respond to refugee issues and take stock of the contribution refugees make to host economies. In the words of a UN staff member "you don't have another inter-governmental entity that has pushed for such a liberal approach for refugee management." The advocacy component of the IGAD process is seen as particularly beneficial in raising awareness of refugee needs and lobbying different actors, including non-traditional government line ministries, to adopt a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach. In this regard, IGAD has made more progress than other regional bodies (both within Africa and further afield), or indeed than international donors or organisations when it comes to putting comprehensive refugee responses on the political agenda in the Horn of Africa.

IGAD's ability and mandate to enforce or implement the CRRF is limited

In spite of these positive overall findings, several criticisms were expressed. Some of these revealed a lack of understanding of IGAD's mandate and ways of working. For instance, a number of respondents expressed frustration that IGAD-sponsored declarations are not legally binding – when in fact it is up to member states to codify at the national level commitments made in IGAD declarations at the regional level. The lack of legal adoption of these commitments, however, limits their effectiveness. Some respondents suggested that IGAD's role should go beyond one of convening to one of implementing. They voiced frustration that they feel nothing substantial seems to happen between the Ministerial or Heads of State summits and the stocktaking meetings, and that there is a need for IGAD to play a more facilitative role and have regular engagement with countries. "There has to be someone who can follow up. We are not using IGAD's full potential," complained one UN respondent based in Garissa. While these comments seem to reflect a partial misunderstanding of IGAD's role, and of the significant work that often goes on behind the scenes on a regular basis, it also points to IGAD's limited capacity to facilitate experience sharing, monitoring and evaluation in a sustained manner.

Efforts to promote the Nairobi, Djibouti and Kampala Declarations can be "underpinned by binding rules of international law," such as international refugee law, human rights law and humanitarian law (Gilbert, 2019, p 12). Regional legal instruments, such as the 1969 AU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, the 2009 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (also known as the Kampala Convention), and the recently adopted 2018 AU Protocol on Free Movement (which calls for the development of procedures to facilitate the movement of refugees) may also serve as powerful regional tools for protection of displaced populations (Dare and Abebe, 2019, p 704).

Beyond international and regional legal frameworks, IGAD's lack of what one Nairobi-based civil society representative called "biting power" can also be attributed to some extent to capacity gaps within the organisation, in particular insufficient resources, staff shortages, over-reliance on consultants, inadequate communications and limited consultation, and dependence on international donor funding.

A Support Platform to guide the process of strengthening and implementing the IGAD GCR process was launched at the Global Refugee Forum in December 2019. The platform will work to galvanise political commitment and advocate solutions, and to mobilise financial, material and technical assistance. It will also help build IGAD's capacity to support the operationalisation of the Djibouti and Kampala Declarations, and will also support a major summit on health as well as a process of mainstreaming of GCR activities across IGAD's other activities. The platform has received funding from the EU, Germany, Switzerland and the World Bank.

Even with enhanced capacity, some respondents recognised that there is only so much that IGAD can do. Member states must determine their own legislation, which limits the role that IGAD can play at the country level. What is more, its ability to influence varies depending on the nature of its relationship with particular member states. For example, interviews suggest that IGAD may have less traction in Somalia than in Kenya, Uganda and Djibouti, with which it has historically had a closer relationship (Somalia was not an active member of IGAD).

Our interviews in Somalia support this finding. At all levels, there was a sense that IGAD's role has been peripheral in the country and has had less relevance to work on the ground with respect to displacement-affected communities. Most key informants in government and among the donor community have heard about some of the IGAD declarations, but they said they do not know much

about the resulting process. There appears to have been a lack of consistent engagement with do-nors, implementing partners and other UN agencies since the Nairobi Declaration was agreed. "IGAD is more interested on the Kenya side perhaps. We don't really engage [with] IGAD in Somalia" said a donor representative. In Kismayo, representatives from the Ministries of Education and Labour and Social Affairs explained that they were unfamiliar with the role of IGAD towards the CRRF. This may, an NGO respondent explained, be partly a result of the fragile relationship between the Federal Government of Somalia and Jubbaland State, which undermines coordination between the different levels of government on a range of issues. More broadly, it may also be related to the fact that So-malia has only recently re-joined IGAD as a full member, after many years of not being engaged with the institution, that in Somalia the CRRF is newer and its relevance for IDPs is not as clear, as well as the fact that national social service systems are still not functional.

IGAD's comparative advantage comes from its ability to mobilise political support from member states to adhere to the CRRF and the Declarations at the highest level, rather than from enforcing their implementation, and respondents' expectations that it do so may be unfair or unrealistic. In-stead, it could be argued that IGAD's success stems from its use of 'political peer pressure' between member states to ensure that all member states remain committed to the GCR and the Nairobi Pro-cess. When states come together to discuss commitment to displaced populations, no single country wants to refrain from collaborating, and there is greater possibility of best practices being adopted across the region. The direct benefit of IGAD's stewardship is clearer at the regional level than at the member-state level. As one NGO staff member observed, "IGAD can't do much more at the country level. Donors and implementing partners are there and they should do their stocktaking. IGAD was key to bringing heads of states together, and it has done its job. Donors [now] need to have a com-mon voice. You can push governments to make changes and it's not being done enough."

IGAD enjoys a level of political legitimacy and regional credibility not shared by most of the other actors engaged in the CRRF, and in particular international organisations and donors. With this in mind, IGAD should continue to use this political leverage to convene, sponsor and lobby for (rather than attempt to implement or police) the declarations that it spearheaded in Nairobi, Djibouti and Kampala.

Some stakeholders feel that IGAD is moving too fast and there is not enough con-sultation or engagement

In addition to citing a lack of implementation, a second criticism of IGAD that emerged from the re-search relates to the idea of 'quantity over quality'. While acknowledging the progress that IGAD has made, several respondents said they thought that it was moving too fast. One Nairobi-based donor suggested that the quick succession of ambitious declarations on Somali refugees (March 2017 – see IGAD, 2017b), Education (December 2017 – see IGAD, 2017a) and Jobs and Livelihoods (March 2019 – see IGAD, 2019) was distracting member states from fully acting on their commitments as, in their words, "one Declaration clouds the other." According to a UN respondent in Nairobi, "IGAD needs to decide where in the value chain it wants to be. You cannot be everywhere and in everything."

This sense of haste was echoed by respondents in Somalia, who felt that IGAD had not sufficiently consulted or aligned with the National Development Plan and other priorities when it came to the Nairobi Declaration. Likewise, the Kampala Declaration was criticised by a number of respondents for being rushed through, without adequate time and opportunity for member states to absorb the implications of the commitments they were signing up to. There was a sense that governments were not presented with all the facts and as such did not fully understand that, by signing up to the Kam-pala Declaration, they were in essence promoting freedom of movement for refugees. "The owner-ship is problematic. The process was not right," explained a donor in Uganda, who went on to argue

that "If they had prepared [the Kampala Declaration] differently, we would have a more conservative declaration but one that was perhaps better owned."

This suggests that IGAD would arguably have a greater impact by moving at a more gradual pace and in a more targeted way, which might give stakeholders the time to absorb, consult and get on board with each Declaration. Clearly one of the key challenges going forward will be building awareness and support at the local level for comprehensive responses to displacement. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. Moving forwards, and according to an NGO respondent based in Kenya and Somalia, IGAD should provide the overall framework, but then let individual partners tailor this to their particular context and needs. This mirrors the viewpoint expressed above (see Section 4.2) that, if the CRRF is to hold relevance in the Horn of Africa, it should be seen as a guide or a framework to be adapted to the contextual specificities of each country.

4.4   The cyclical relationship between funding, legislation and policy change

It is widely reported in interviews and the broader literature that donor funding for the CRRF has fallen short of expectations. This is supported by research conducted by ODI, which argues that "while donors have signed up to the CRRF principles, predictable funding paths for the CRRF are still not clear," and thus far donors have shown little appetite to sustainably finance greater refugee inclusion into national systems (Crawford and O'Callaghan, 2019, p 4). However, at IGAD meetings and other stakeholder gatherings, some donors expressed frustration that countries are either not as far ahead in formalising the necessary policy instruments to ensure that implementation of the CRRF and Declarations take place, or that they have not adequately 'made a case' for additional funding by demonstrating what has been done with the funds so far directed to supporting refugee- and displacement-affected communities. With the exception of Uganda, none of the study countries has developed a costing for their Action Plan yet either, which donors say prevents them from making pledges.

Donor hesitance to fund leads to government reluctance to legislate and vice versa, resulting in a cycle of delay and inaction as both sides adopt a 'wait-and-see' approach. This represents something of an unwinnable argument, where each side depends on the other side delivering more (funding or policy and implementation) before they will act. It is important that governments of the region build a strong case to justify the programming of further funds. At the same time, they find it nearly impossible to build plans and policies based on an expectation of long-term robust funding when such financial commitments have not been made.

Increased donor funding is needed to meet CRRF commitments

Concerns about lack of longer-term funding commitments were illustrated in Garissa (Kenya), where one NGO staff member worried that "CRRF is focusing on development and it means funding should go up, yet it has not. Since the CRRF, funds have been going down." Indeed, in spite of the language of the CRRF and IGAD-led Declarations emphasising the need for development-based support for refugee-affected communities, most refugee assistance continues to be dominated by humanitarian programmes and short-term projects, and the majority of implementing partners are still from a humanitarian, rather than development, background (Forichon, 2018; Krause, 2016).[20]

Respondents from a range of backgrounds (governments, donors, NGOs, refugees and hosts) across all four study countries expressed concern that funding streams were insufficient. In Djibouti we

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[20] Between 2015 and 17, 70 per cent of overseas development aid to refugee-hosting contexts was humanitarian assistance (Forichon, 2018, p 9).

were told by a government official: "There is support from the EU, World Bank and UNHCR, but it is not enough … lack of financial resources remains the biggest challenge [when it comes to implementing refugee responses]." In Kenya, government staff in Garissa complained that donor commitments had not been followed up with actual financing, making longer-term planning extremely challenging. In Uganda, donors also voiced concern about the lack of funding. According to one donor: "The biggest challenge in implementing these response plans is under-funding. The refugee operation is severely under-funded." Indeed, the Ugandan Refugee Response Plan was only 57 per cent funded in 2018, and the 2019 Plan had only received 20 per cent of its requested funding by June 2019 (Crawford et al, 2019).

Somalia is arguably a different case from the other countries. There, a UN official said that the protracted nature of the refugee situation (particularly in Kenya) has undermined the donor response in the country of origin, and that the UNHCR Somalia programme is only 20 per cent funded. Nevertheless, interviews suggest that the challenges related to durable solutions funding (often implemented by organisations other than UNHCR) are not necessarily related to lack of donor commitment, but rather are to the result of logistical and operational difficulties of implementing projects in a fragile security context. A UN staff member said: "Yes, money is there and donor disbursement isn't a problem. [The] only delays are related to the difficulties of implementation in Somalia. Implementing on time is difficult as you have to negotiate land, access, etc."

Overall funding in Somalia has increased significantly over the years, by up to six times in real terms since the early 2000s, according to some estimates (ODI, 2017). The number of funding initiatives for durable solutions in Somalia has increased from two in 2016 to at least six in 2018. These include the RE-INTEG programme funded by the EU, Danwadaag Solutions Consortia funded by DFID, Durable Solutions Programme funded by Danida (the Danish development agency), the Building Resilience of Communities in Somalia programme (BRCiS) funded by DFID and the EU, Inclusive Local Economic Development (ILED) funded by the EU, and Midnimo funded by the UN Peacebuilding Fund (ReDSS, 2018).[21] The World Bank is also providing additional funding for inclusive urban development. Steps to implement debt relief for Somalia have begun; these are key to unlocking development funding.

There are concerns, however, that funding for numerous durable solutions initiatives has brought about duplication in certain locations and sectors, while other areas remain under-funded. "DFID is funding durable solutions, Danida is funding durable solutions in the same location, and Baidoa is

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[21] EU RE-INTEG (2017–19), which is in its second phase, focuses on durable solutions for IDPs and returnees across Somalia and Somaliland through enhanced governance, employment opportunities and access to basic and protective services. Danwadaag Solutions Consortia (2018–22) is funded by DFID and aims to promote enhanced social cohesion and greater self-reliance and access to economic opportunities for targeted IDPs, returnees and hosts, along with increasing the capacity of federal and district governments to lead and coordinate durable solutions processes. The Durable Solutions Programme (DSP) (2017–20), is funded by Danida and seeks to addresses the protection and livelihood needs of IDPs, returnees and host communities by ensuring community approaches and government ownership in identifying and promoting durable solutions. The second phase of the Building Resilience of Communities in Somalia programme (BRCiS) (2018–22) is financed by DFID and the EU and includes IDPs as a target group, the aim being to ensure that they are better able to resist and recover from the cyclical shocks and stresses of conflict and environmental and economic crises. Though not explicitly targeting Development Assistance Countries (DACs), in 2018 the EU Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) also began funding a programme on inclusive economic development (ILED), which covers social safety nets, economic development and skills development for vulnerable populations, given that it is increasingly recognised in Somalia that building household resilience to shocks is critical to overcoming repeated humanitarian and displacement crises. And in December 2018, the second phase of the Midnimo project, developed to support the government in addressing the challenges of mass displacement and returns in urban and peri-urban settings, began. It focuses on the states of Galmadug and Hirshabelle, and is funded by the UN Peacebuilding Fund and implemented by UNDP, the Institute for Migration (IOM) and UN-Habitat (UNDP, 2019b).

over-funded," said an NGO staff member. Coordination therefore needs to be strengthened in the face of the increasing number of efforts, institutions and ministries involved.

Levels of funding are uneven within and across countries and sectors

In order to develop a more detailed picture of the gap in funding across the different study countries, further analysis is required that considers how funding is distributed within a country. In the case of Kenya, for instance, funding trends are not consistent across the country or even within counties. For example, Kakuma (Turkana County) and Dadaab (Garissa County) have been described as a 'tale of two camps' (Rodgers, 2019), where the former attracts interest and new funding, and the latter remains "chronically under-funded due to uncertainty surrounding the future of the camp's residents" (O'Callaghan et al, 2019, p 11). It should be noted that Dadaab has been receiving longer-term financing from the International Finance Corporation (IFC), World Bank, UNICEF, ILO, UNHCR and DFID, among others. Within Turkana County, there is a further need to differentiate between Kakuma and Kalobeyei when it comes to funding. During a focus group discussion, refugee respondents complained that Kakuma has been 'forgotten' by donors as funding is increasingly directed in favour of the 'newer' and more 'attractive' Kalobeyei.

Second, funding seems to have increased for some sectors and decreased or stagnated for others, although exactly which sectors are better funded than others is a matter of disagreement. One donor respondent in Kenya explained that funding for livelihoods had increased, while it has gone down for education programmes. In Uganda, a contrasting picture emerged, as an NGO respondent suggested that, while funding for education has increased, jobs and livelihoods programmes remain under-funded. This view was contradicted by a UN staff member in Uganda who stated that "there is little funding for refugees' education."

These kinds of discrepancies in funding knowledge were not uncommon among interviewees, and allude to a lack of clarity and transparency around CRRF funding in the absence of an effective or accessible monitoring system. The lack of an embedded monitoring framework to track the progress of member states is seen as undermining the impact of the IGAD process. Stakeholders who have participated in the process highlight the need for an independent monitoring system that has reporting indicators for each country, and for all partners and agencies involved. As an NGO respondent in Kampala noted, "It's difficult to give definite accounts of the funding by the different donors, because of the different funding streams and varying systems or mechanisms for tracking finances and disbursement." A lack of clarity over funding has also been echoed in the wider literature, which acknowledges that the "financing picture is muddled" in the absence of a system for tracking funds (Crawford and O'Callaghan, 2019, p 5). An effective monitoring system would better support agencies implementing durable solutions programmes.

Worryingly, the resulting lack of transparency allows different stakeholders (whether government, donors or UNHCR) to shift the responsibility for the lack of funding elsewhere. Some respondents blamed donors for not providing funds in the first place. Others placed the responsibility on central government – this was particularly the case among local NGO respondents, one of whom in Garissa complained that "Donors have provided funding. Government has not provided any funding. It only provides technical support like school assessment, administration of national exams and certification." Meanwhile, government officials suggested that development and humanitarian partners were at fault for not aligning their funding to the government response plans, or even informing their government counterparts of current funding streams or future investments.

With this in mind, there have been calls from central government to channel CRRF funding through the national budget, rather than through implementing partners. This would also help to align refugee responses with national services, rather than creating parallel support structures. According to a

representative of the Djiboutian government, "For this new way of working to be effective, donors must commit to supporting the government in the implementation of the CRRF. The funds will no longer be required by UNHCR for refugee-related issues but will be directed to the ministries concerned so that they can fully integrate the refugees into their development plans." Nevertheless, such a transition is unlikely to occur as long as donors remain reluctant to provide direct funding to governments, particularly in the form of budget support, because of continuing concerns around corruption (Crawford and O'Callaghan, 2019, p 5).

Insufficient and unpredictable funding is eroding political will

Clearly, insufficient funding has a negative impact on programmes, and a number of respondents complained that projects were being scaled back or discontinued. Beyond this immediate impact on programme implementation, there is also the wider and longer-term impact on political will. "It [lack of funding] erodes the progressive will," argued a respondent, who highlighted the Government of Uganda reconsidering its commitments in the wake of a disappointing Solidarity Summit (held in June 2017), which raised only US$350 million of the requested $2 billion in pledges.

A similar perspective is found in the literature, which argues that a lack of funding is undermining the sustainability of Uganda's refugee-hosting model (Coggio, 2018). Under pressure to accommodate one million new refugees in 2016 and 2017, the government has pulled back on its generous land allocation policy and in some cases reclaimed land allocated to long-established refugees (Coggio, 2018). What is more, the disappointing outcome of the summit has "raised questions about the future of the CRRF," in particular in countries with "less progressive refugee policies than Uganda's that attract even less funding" (Siegfried, 2017).

A similar scenario emerges in Kenya. It is argued, both by respondents and in the wider literature, that a lack of funding and political guidance are the main reasons that progress on CRRF-related policy and legislative reform has been so slow. After all, a government respondent in Kenya asked: "How will you respond comprehensively when you have no resources?" This has created a 'wait and see' scenario whereby the Government of Kenya is reluctant to move forwards on key policy or legislation on education, jobs and livelihoods until donors move forwards on their funding commitments. At the same time, donors are hesitant to release these funds in the absence of a policy framework that spells out how and under what conditions this funding will be spent. County governments, meanwhile, are more enthusiastic about integrated development programmes, as their populations stand to benefit more directly.

This hesitance on both sides is understandable. On the one hand, the government has a legitimate concern that it will be left to bear the significant costs of including refugees within national systems. According to a donor respondent this is why, in spite of the initial progress made, the Refugee Education Inclusion Policy has been held back by the government. On the other hand, "Donors are apprehensive about the policy environment," said an NGO respondent in Kenya. This point was also elaborated by a UN respondent in Nairobi who argued that, "International donors have to fulfil a lot of requirements when transferring funds, and one of these is the national buy-in and commitment. If the commitments are not binding, then donors will look to national plans – if the national plans are not sure, then donors will not want to release their funds."

Some donors are also hesitant to commit funds through the UN in the wake of corruption scandals that have involved countries and stakeholders in the region. In Uganda, Germany and the UK both suspended support for UNHCR's country programme after an audit report showed that UNHCR had critically mismanaged funds in 2016–17 (Okiror, 2019).

CRRF implementation progress is likely to remain stifled as long as both sides remain fixed on their

current course. While improved engagement and compromise on both sides will be key, most respondents put the onus on donors to, in the words of one UN agency respondent in Nairobi, "put their money where their mouths are [and] show governments that they will support them." These recommendations are echoed by ODI research, which calls for the "predictable, long-term funding" that will give hosting governments the confirmation they need to integrate refugees in national systems (Crawford and O'Callaghan, 2019, p 12).

Coordination

The CRRF has succeeded in bringing together a wide array of different stakeholders, including international donors and UN agencies, regional authorities such as IGAD, national governments and NGOs, local government and civil society, refugees, hosts and the private sector. While this should be welcomed, it does raise questions about how best to coordinate different actors around a common goal, especially given their different interests and agendas. "There are too many stakeholders right now – you can barely keep up," complained a UN respondent interviewed in Nairobi.

Improved coordination mechanisms can help to bring the various stakeholders together. In Djibouti, there is a general consensus that coordination under ONARS has progressed, and that, while there is still room for improvement and capacity building, the "CRRF has provided a clear framework that forms the basis of coordination and planning of work between the government, donors and NGOs," as suggested by a Djiboutian government respondent. A similar picture emerges from Uganda where, according to a donor respondent, the establishment of a CRRF Secretariat and Steering Group has reportedly expanded participation beyond the Office of the Prime Minister and UNHCR, to include other ministries, local government, humanitarian/development actors and refugee leaders. Furthermore, the CRRF Steering Group has developed a Communications and Outreach Strategy to build a common understanding and vision of the CRRF at all levels.

Despite (and maybe even because of) these efforts, respondents in Uganda suggested that the various refugee coordination mechanisms – including Sector Working Groups, the Local Development Partners' Group, Humanitarian Donor Partners Group, CRRF Development Partners Group and the National Partnership Forum – can feel like a complex maze that is difficult to navigate, and it is not always clear who is doing what or how these different structures link up.

Respondents tended to be more critical of coordination structures in Somalia and Kenya. In Kenya, coordination mechanisms remain dominated by UNHCR and the Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS) at the expense of other partners, thanks in large part to the absence of either a CRRF Secretariat or Steering Group. According to an NGO respondent in Kenya, "There is no change in terms of the coordination architecture in Kenya. It's just about UNHCR and RAS." In Somalia, there is a sense that coordination structures, while still fragile and fragmented, have improved over the past few years. Some respondents felt that this was thanks to efforts beyond the scope of the CRRF; in particular, one NGO staff member in Mogadishu attributed it to the concerted effort to see forums and meetings chaired "by Somalis in Somalia." Coordination has also been improved by the coming together of the different ministries around the National Development Plan. An NGO respondent in Mogadishu observed: "Despite the initial hiccups with the CRRF National Action Plan," relations between partners and the NCRI appear to have improved, and the establishment of an inter-ministerial committee has been beneficial. Nevertheless, a combination of "federal–regional dynamics, political affiliations, clan relations and power struggles" continues to undermine closer coordination on a whole range of issues in Somalia, including on the CRRF (REF, 2018a, p 46).

Wider ministerial participation

Perhaps the most significant impact of the CRRF and its coordination structures is that it has legiti-

mised the wider participation of different government actors and, in particular, ministries not traditionally associated with refugee responses. Conventionally, refugee affairs fall under the mandate of a Refugee Commissioner or a particular ministry, often with a security focus. However, the inclusion of refugees in national services (such as health, education and jobs) logically demands an expansion of this traditional mandate to the much wider range of ministries responsible for these services. With this in mind, the CRRF Steering Group in Uganda includes representatives from the Office of Prime Minister (as the lead partner in refugee responses) and ten other ministries (Government of Uganda, 2018).[22]

While wider inter-ministerial participation should be welcomed, some respondents doubted the ability of so many different ministries to actively participate in such a crowded arena. There was a general sense across all four study countries that only a handful of ministries had actually taken on additional responsibilities, with the Ministries of Education at the forefront of this trend. Most of the other 'non-traditional' ministries, with the exception perhaps of health, labour and agriculture, continue to play a peripheral role on CRRF matters. There are also concerns that the new responsibilities associated with the CRRF are putting a strain on the capacity and resources of these ministries. In Djibouti, for example, a UN respondent suggested that ONARS has been stretched in so many different directions that it is becoming ineffective, and that other ministries have been tasked with ambitious action plans without sufficient planning and budgeting. This viewpoint was shared by another Djibouti respondent from an NGO, who suggested that coordination is "more about quantity than quality" and is not necessarily leading to better outcomes.

At the same time, greater inter-ministerial participation does not mean that government has a shared or unified vision when it comes to the CRRF. Interviews reveal a disconnect between the ambitions and aims of different line ministries, which is often underpinned by the perception that whoever takes the lead will gain access to significant potential resources associated with refugee responses. Interviewees reported that progress on the CRRF in Kenya has been undermined by inter-ministerial tensions over the security implications associated with granting greater freedoms to refugees, with the Ministry of Education in support and the Ministry of Interior against. Indeed, some respondents suggested that the CRRF plan of action collapsed because of the overemphasis on the security angle, which resulted in certain ministries and agencies remaining peripheral in decision making, thereby making it difficult to achieve results. However, intra- as well as inter-ministerial tensions have also contributed as, even within ministries, there is often a lack of consensus. For example, some staff within the Kenyan Ministry of Education are reportedly supportive of refugee education as a priority, while others remain against it.

4.5 Conclusion

Perceptions in this analysis are important because they help to explain how the Nairobi Process and CRRF are engaged with by a range of actors. The different views and opinions about that the CRRF is, what IGAD's role is or should be, and what steps should be taken going forward to deliver meaningful support to refugee-affected communities help to explain some of the strengths and weaknesses of the Process thus far. They also show areas where IGAD and the individual countries can engage more effectively to promote participation and localisation, through consultation and sharing of information and best practice to create a more inclusive environment for supporting refugee-affected communities.

Moving beyond short-term humanitarian models towards longer-term developmental approaches

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[22] These include the Ministries of: Foreign Affairs; Finance, Planning and Economic Development; Local Government; Internal Affairs; Works and Transport; Lands, Housing and Urban Development; Health; Education and Sports; Water and Environment; and Gender, Labour and Social Development.

brings new actors into the Process and requires new ways of working, many of which have not yet been fully developed. This becomes evident in the next chapter, as the challenges of effective localisation and participation come into focus.

5 Localisation & participation

The 'whole-of-society' approach (bringing together communities, government, civil society, implementing partners and the private sector) is central to the CRRF philosophy. Ownership is key to the success of the CRRF: if stakeholders at all levels do not feel a sense of ownership over the process, they are unlikely to adhere to its principles or promote them among others. The research suggests a mixed picture when it comes to ownership. So far there has been a focus at the central government level and a relatively 'top-down' approach (among donors, the UN and national ministries) that has resulted in a low level of ownership at the local level, particularly among the civil society and local government actors responsible for implementing the CRRF on the ground. This picture results in large part from the need to develop a central legal and policy environment to guide implementation. While funding and legislation are being worked out, the CRRF remains a matter of discussion at high-level meetings, and there is an absence of meaningful participation and dialogue between the different actors at the top and bottom.

This chapter considers the challenges of localisation and participation, which in many ways are the major challenges facing CRRF implementation in the region.

5.1 Localisation and the role of civil society and local government

The extent to which CRRF implementation can be successfully extended to local levels, engaging local government and civil society, has serious implications for the reach and sustainability of the CRRF in the future. Much of the practical application of the CRRF approach and principles will depend on the support of local actors and partners (Plan International, 2017; UNHCR Evaluation Service, 2018).

In our interviews, civil society respondents were particularly concerned by what they saw as a lack of local engagement and consultation. With this in mind, a number of respondents called for efforts to 'localise' the CRRF through greater involvement of local NGOs and community-based organisations that work directly with communities. In Djibouti, several NGOs complained that they had been excluded from the CRRF process in spite of their years of experience of working with refugees and hosts and their knowledge of the local context. This viewpoint was shared by an NGO respondent in Kenya who said, "The CRRF is global. It needs to be domesticated, 'Kenyanised' and localised in this area." "Localisation is the way to go," explained another NGO staff member interviewed in Garissa.

This call for greater 'localisation' was echoed by county government representatives in Turkana and Garissa, counties that have been credited with taking the largest strides on the CRRF in Kenya. For example, both have developed integrated development plans that include refugees, and their respective governors have been widely recognised for driving the CRRF forward. In spite of this, county representatives expressed frustration at being excluded from national-level decision-making processes. "We are not giving much interest to the whole thing because we are not the owners. It is managed from State House [i.e. the Office of the President], and it is like we are being told that it will go on without us," complained a government representative interviewed in Garissa.

5.2   Challenges of a fully 'bottom-up' approach

As well as demanding greater inclusion in CRRF decision-making, local government respondents also called for more direct budgetary support from the national budget. They argued that as they were in a better position to engage with and articulate the needs of refugees and hosts than their national counterparts, the CRRF should be negotiated, implemented and funded from the local level. This viewpoint has gained some traction with donors who, during interviews, suggested a similar strategy of devolved funding.

Nevertheless, it is not clear that a decidedly bottom-up approach will be more successful than one that is top-down. First, local government capacity is undermined by a host of challenges, which limit its ability to absorb the significant additional funding and workload associated with the CRRF. In Uganda, for example, district capacity is weakened by poor planning, lack of human resources and pressure from local politicians (Crawford et al, 2019). Because of this, while some donor respondents said they were open to the idea of devolved funding, most would be unwilling to fund local government directly – not least because this would also be resisted by national government opposed to missing out on much-needed funding for central government functions.

Successful rollout of the CRRF ultimately requires buy-in from both national and local stakeholders. Just as national government relies on local actors for practical implementation, progress by local government will ultimately be limited without support from the national government. According to a UN respondent interviewed in Kenya, "The county government will not get anywhere with talk of inclusiveness and development without national level buy-in." This suggests that, while there is a need to rebalance the current 'top-down' approach of the CRRF in order to improve ownership among local government and civil society, shifting towards a purely 'bottom-up' scenario is also not the answer and risks alienating critical central government buy-in.

5.3   Promoting meaningful participation of refugees and hosts

The CRRF's current top-down approach has implications for refugees and hosts when it comes to participation. Of all the groups interviewed, refugees and hosts exhibited the lowest awareness and understanding of the CRRF. In all eight FGDs conducted with refugee and host community leaders in Turkana and Garissa, none of the leaders were aware of the CRRF and what it actually represents: "We have not heard about it. If it exists, it is with the NGOs and UNHCR. We are hearing about it from you." A similar response emerged during FGDs in Uganda, where refugee respondents interviewed in Adjumani revealed that "the CRRF has never come down here to sensitise us and our leaders, so we don't know what's in it or how it works."

It remains unclear from the research whether it is the CRRF policies themselves or the entire whole-of-society approach that local communities are unfamiliar with. The latter is more important than the former, since it is not necessary for someone to know about a specific policy if the spirit in which it is developed is well communicated and understood.

However, the lack of awareness and understanding of the CRRF is problematic for a number of reasons. First, it sends a message that decisions around the CRRF approach are decided by those at the top, and that refugees and hosts are only informed of these decisions once they have been made, giving them little chance to advocate change or provide their own perspective. Second, interviews with refugees and hosts suggest that communities have not necessarily seen a difference in how they engage with support in their daily and practical lives. For example, community-level interviewees did not seem aware that the transition towards a development approach would necessitate greater agency and ownership from them as well as from other actors, notably the government, and that this transition might be an unfamiliar one. The shift from a humanitarian aid model to more in-

tegrated, national systems may mean that refugees must forfeit services of a higher quality than those available to local communities. The role of traditional humanitarian actors will also necessarily be reconfigured. Interviewees did not indicate that they were aware of such changes and trade-offs.

Third, a lack of awareness about the CRRF approach has resulted in widespread misinformation and misunderstanding at the local level. In Kalobeyei, for example, refugee leaders believed that living in the integrated settlement means they are now entitled to become Kenyan citizens. Furthermore, suspicions around how biometric data are collected, stored and used are deterring some refugees from registering with national data systems. While not specifically linked to the CRRF, refugees in Kalobeyei and Kakuma explained that fear and mistrust around registering for the National Integrated Identity Management System (NIIMS), also referred to as the *Huduma Namba*, had led some to leave and come back once the exercise was completed.[23]

These gaps in awareness and understanding suggest that refugee and host participation in the CRRF process has not been strong and that there is significant room for improvement. This was a perspective shared by many of our informants as well as the wider literature (Hovil, 2018; IRC, 2017; NRC, 2017; O'Callaghan, 2018). Such lack of consultation with target communities can have a long-lasting impact on relations between communities and government or aid agency staff.

On the other hand, some respondents suggested that participation had improved as a result of the CRRF. According to an NGO staff member interviewed in Turkana, "Refugee leaders are participating a lot. UNHCR has expanded their participation and they participate in the planning of programmes, the planning of the CRRF, and even in national and international forums and conferences." Uganda has established a Refugee Engagement Forum (REF) to improve refugee representation at the CRRF Steering Group. Likewise, during the Djibouti Declaration, refugee representatives were involved in validating the draft policy alongside government and other stakeholders. In Kenya, devolution has also helped, as there are now more discussions taking place at the local level, which creates an opportunity for refugees and hosts.

While the number of refugee and host interactions may have increased, we need to ask how meaningful this participation is. What wider impact does it have? At what points is participation strongest and where is it weakest? UNHCR and implementing partners note that participation takes place from the inception, in the form of needs assessments, community feedback sessions and invitation to planning meetings, but our interviews suggest that there is a gap between policy and practice. An NGO respondent in Djibouti observed: "If we were to talk frankly, there is huge gap between the official [narratives] on refugee and host participation, and the reality." This sentiment is shared by hosts interviewed in Turkana, who explained their frustration: "We were invited when KISEDP was launched. We were given a booklet to read about it. We are told we are given this programme as the hosts. But how is it approved? You can't bring policy from Nairobi to Turkana." A similar finding was identified in a 2018 evaluation of Kalobeyei, which found that community involvement in KISEDP was activity-based rather than from the bottom-up in decision making and project design (Samuel Hall, 2018). Refugees in Garissa County shared the same perception, who said: "We are not involved in decision-making. We are just informed of projects. They do not understand us. Our interest does not count."

In these cases, while participation is in theory occurring, it has more to do with information sharing and awareness of programmes that have already been designed than with meaningful engagement that considers refugee and host perspectives from the beginning and adapts policy and programmes accordingly. This was confirmed by a Kenyan UN respondent who, when asked how local-level partic-

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[23] The *Huduma Namba* in Kenya was a mass registration exercise that would see the issuance of new digital identity cards for all Kenyan residents – citizens and foreigners alike (Mungai, 2019).

ipation informed high-level policy making replied: 'At this point I cannot exactly say how this will happen. Basically, their concerns have been taken note of and how this will influence high level planning remains to be seen." Refugee leaders in Kakuma explained that, although they were involved in discussions and gave their feedback, they felt that this had little impact on the decision-making process, as partners came with their own agenda, which "even if we disagree, we have to accept." In this context, many respondents saw refugee and host participation as largely 'tokenistic', a box-ticking exercise to demonstrate to donors that participation was occurring.

A key obstacle to participation goes back to the lack of knowledge and understanding of the CRRF, as this undermines refugees' and hosts' ability to actively engage in discussions when they are invited. But many of the barriers to participation go beyond the CRRF. For example, as an NGO respondent in Kenya commented, refugees are still widely seen as "passive recipients and beneficiaries rather than free actors or agents." This contrasts with the reality on the ground. The refugees we interviewed are aware of their rights and are calling for greater participation. In Uganda, cultural diversity and the absence of a common language are also obstacles to meaningful participation among refugees. In Somalia, participation is complicated by widespread insecurity and systematic exclusion, which continue to disconnect Somali citizens from decision-making processes. A recent survey suggests that 96 per cent of Somali aid recipients (not only including refugees and displaced populations) do not feel consulted about the aid they receive (ReDSS, 2019b). IDPs, in particular, face social stigmatisation and exclusion as a result of perceived social, cultural or language differences, which reduces their access to rights and freedoms and denies them active participation (REF, 2018b).

Another obstacle to meaningful participation relates to representation and the process by which refugee and host representatives are selected. As indicated by the example of Uganda, refugees are not a homogeneous group with a uniform agenda. In Adjumani, ongoing tension between the Dinka and Nuer has led to camps being segregated along ethnic lines, and undermined cohesion and a common agenda among refugees (IRRI, 2014). In this context, the participation of a handful of elected representatives at fora or events cannot reflect the diversity of refugee relations on the ground. What is more, there is no guarantee that leaders are interested in representing the hosts and refugees that elected them. Respondents complained that their representatives did not always consult them, often did not share their interests, and were sometimes swayed by incentives from the implementing partners. This problem was recognised by an NGO staff member in Garissa, who said, "The challenge is that we go through the leaders such as the chiefs. The chief makes decisions on behalf of the people. They can be selfish and make decisions that favour themselves." Some interviewees suggested that problems with local governance and corruption meant that those elected to represent them were not even the actual leaders of refugees and hosts.

In many cases, it is those with the most social, economic and political capital who are selected to represent refugees, which makes it even more challenging for vulnerable groups to make their voices heard. In particular, men are much better represented in workshops than women, despite the important role the latter play when it comes to education and livelihoods of the household. This was clearly highlighted at one of the FGDs, where no women were invited to attend because, the refugees participating explained, they saw women's role as managing household affairs rather than engaging in discussions affecting the wider community.

Given the scale and complexity of refugee situations in the Horn of Africa, it will be impossible to represent the needs, voices and interests of everyone. "We have 23 nationalities in this area plus the local community, and balancing all of these communities is difficult," explained an NGO respondent in Turkana. Nevertheless, interviews suggest that this is a gap that needs to be addressed to ensure greater ownership, fairer implementation and greater sustainability of the CRRF process.

While engaging in localisation and participation may not be straightforward, these elements are crucial to translating the CRRF and Nairobi Process from ambitious policy goals into concrete results. This is the next great challenge of the CRRF implementation process, and it is one that IGAD and national governments can play an important role in, through sharing their experiences of best practice across the different implementing countries and learning from both successes and failures. The example of engaging with refugee teachers, discussed in the next chapter, is but one instance of how such information sharing can be facilitated across the region.

The main recommendation that emerges from the analysis of localisation and participation is that there is a need for the participation of local level governments, civil society, refugees and host communities to be incorporated into planning, implementation and monitoring of all CRRF activities by member states. Development donors and implementing agencies should also work to integrate displacement-affected communities into their programming. Local action plans for implementation should be developed together with local government counterparts, civil society, and refugee and host communities.

In the following four chapters we look in depth at legislation, policies, coordination mechanisms and activities implemented with respect to education, jobs and livelihoods, the private sector, and durable solutions. Localisation and participation are themes that emerge in each of these chapters, as we consider how CRRF activities are being implemented in refugee-affected communities. Our interest is to determine the extent to which these areas, which have been the focus of IGAD's political mobilisation and coordination, have developed. In our analysis we discuss these activities and initiatives thematically, rather than comparing countries with each other or attempting comprehensive accounts of each of the countries.

6 Education

6.1 The Djibouti Declaration in brief

Education is one of the principal areas of IGAD's work on refugees in the Nairobi Process, through coordination, information sharing and mobilisation of high-level political commitment to ensuring access to education for all refugees in the region. The Nairobi Declaration of March 2017 committed IGAD member states to "enhance education, training and skills development for refugees to reduce their dependence on humanitarian assistance, and to prepare them for gainful employment in host communities and upon return." Furthering this commitment, the Djibouti Declaration on Refugee Education (IGAD, 2017a) and its associated Plan of Action was approved by IGAD member states in December 2017. Among the key features of the Djibouti Declaration are commitments to:

- take collective responsibility to ensure that every refugee, returnee and host community member has access to quality education;
- integrate refugees into national education policies, strategies, programmes and plans of action in their respective countries;
- establish an IGAD Regional Experts and Ministerial Committee of Education to oversee implementation of all agreed standards, policy instruments and frameworks for education for all, including refugees, returnees and members of host communities;
- adopt and implement an Action Plan on education of refugees, returnees and members of host communities in the IGAD region.

At the December 2018 Addis Ababa Call for Action, ministers from each of the IGAD member states reiterated their commitment to uphold the Djibouti Declaration, as well as the IGAD Regional Education Policy Framework, the IGAD Regional Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Strategy, and the Consultative Process on the IGAD Regional Education Qualification Framework (based on a preliminary draft initiated by IGAD). Each member state also committed to developing a costed National Education Response Plan to guide implementation, establish procedures for tracking progress, generate data for national and regional lessons learned, and to serve as a basis for securing multi-year, predictable funding.

A follow-up technical experts meeting was held in July 2019 to report on progress made in the implementation of the Djibouti Declaration. Unusually for such a technical meeting, this event was attended by refugee teachers from the member states, who were able to speak about on-the-ground implementation of the Declaration, and more broadly about making national education systems more inclusive of refugee and returnee communities.

6.2 Policy changes have been implemented throughout the region

Throughout the sub-region, considerable steps have been taken towards promoting refugee inclusion and a whole-of-society approach to education. Given that, at the time the Djibouti Declaration was agreed, the individual countries of the IGAD region had quite different policies regarding refugee education, it is perhaps not surprising that progress has been somewhat uneven. Nonetheless, each country has reported legislative and/or policy changes in the education sector that have been

made or are in the process of being finalised.

Whereas in Djibouti refugees had previously not been included in national education plans, the passage of the National Refugee Law in January 2017, and the subsequent decree guaranteeing access to social services including education, have for the first time made education available to all. The National Action Plan also lays out the government's commitments in terms of education. Under this plan, an Education and Training cluster has been established with the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training as the lead. Moreover, in August 2017, the Ministry of National Education and UNHCR signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the gradual inclusion of refugees in the national education system.

In Kenya, there have been intensified efforts by the Ministry of Education, supported by UNHCR and other partners, to develop a Refugee Education Inclusion Policy – one of the first globally – seeking to include refugees and asylum seekers in the national education system. Accelerated by the Djibouti Declaration, the Refugee Education Inclusion Policy is often mentioned as a positive example of the CRRF in practice in Kenya. There is recognition among those involved with the policy process, both government and UNHCR, that the IGAD summits have contributed to the pace of policy formulation. However, this policy has yet to be launched and is currently with the Principal Secretary of Education. Crucial details of the policy's implementation, including the level of financial support from donors, remain to be agreed upon.

A limited degree of refugee inclusion in the Kenyan education system existed before the Djibouti Declaration, with some refugee children able to attend schools either in the camps or in public schools. The Kenyan national curriculum was already being used in the camp schools, with registered refugee children sitting Kenyan national examinations for all levels of education. In the urban areas, many refugee children have access to the same learning institutions, public or private, as their Kenyan counterparts in the same locations (although in most cases the school fees are covered by NGOs or private sources rather than by the Government of Kenya). Yet the Refugee Education Inclusion Policy seeks to roll out these practices systematically, laying out arrangements for all refugees to be able to access all levels of education. The policy also takes into account the training and accreditation needs of refugee teachers, who currently make up the majority of teachers in the camp schools. However, concerns were raised by our research participants that refugee teachers were paid on an incentive basis rather than being fully salaried, which does not fairly compensate them nor does it encourage them to take on extra shifts or large classes.

Part of the delay in formalising the policy in Kenya is the realisation by government of the logistical complexities of implementation. For instance, teachers will need to be registered with the Teachers Service Commission (TSC) but many refugee teachers lack the necessary recognised teacher training certificates. These challenges have slowed the pace of government roll-out of the policy. Financing is also crucial, as one Nairobi-based key informant pointed out: "In terms of education, if the policy in Kenya comes through, the challenge will be institutional shift and assurances of donor funding. There is a clear pathway but changes and shifts need to be identified and then a coalition of willing donors need[s] to be put together to make it happen."

In Somalia, no education-specific policy has been introduced in response to the Djibouti Declaration. Donors and implementing partners pointed out that the public education system is still not fully functional; there is no single national curriculum and so it may be understandable that a specific policy for displacement-affected communities will only be prioritised after the overall education sector has policies in place. Contestations over the wider process of decentralisation of governance structures, including the different responsibilities of federal, regional and district authorities, hamper the ability of government to coordinate and effectively deliver education services throughout the coun-

try, including to displacement-affected communities. In spite of these wider challenges, the Ministry of Education is developing a National Education Strategic Plan for Refugees, IDPs and Returnees. In addition, the NCRI has established an Education Unit focused on promoting the education of displaced persons and returnees alongside host communities. The new National Policy on Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons makes several provisions for refugee education, including the guarantee that refugees, returnees and IDPs will be able to obtain replacement educational documentation and access to basic education for all displaced and host populations (Federal Government of Somalia, 2019a).

That said, there is in Somalia relatively less education-specific programming for displaced populations and host communities than there is support for such sectors as livelihoods. Interviews revealed that, while many of the multi-year durable solutions programmes have a livelihoods pillar, education does not feature as strongly. This may be because the education sector is funded through other development funding streams in Somalia.[24] Nevertheless, education remains among the least prioritised and funded sectors in responses to protracted crises in the Horn of Africa (Ndeda and Birungi, 2018).

Uganda had the most extensive educational rights (as well as other rights) for refugees before the signing of the Djibouti Declaration. As noted above, the 2006 Refugee Act provided refugees the right to access primary education. In September 2018, a National Refugee Education Response Plan (ERP) for Refugees and Host Communities was launched by the Ministry of Education and Sports (Government of Uganda, 2018b). The ERP is tied to the overall national education strategy. However, despite these initiatives, overall spending on education in Uganda has dropped from 15 per cent to 11 per cent of the national budget, making it one of the lowest expenditures on education as compared to GDP in the region (World Bank, 2018b). These shortfalls prevent the fulfilment of many of the goals regarding universal education and improvement in educational standards. That said, our Uganda country researcher reported that a mid-term review of the ERP found that nearly $90 million out of the budgeted $95 million had been spent in the first year of the programme. Efforts have also been renewed to deliver the ERP implementation to district level.

6.3   Steps have been taken towards refugee inclusion, but challenges remain

In all countries, steps towards greater refugee inclusion and harmonisation of educational opportunities available to the displaced and host communities have been taken. In Djibouti, information provided by the CRRF national implementation status shows that students of first, second and sixth grades are included in the national curriculum and have access to the school of their choice. In addition, a primary school was built at the junction of Obock and the Markazi site to receive both refugee children and children from local communities. However, efforts to promote inclusion are hampered by the inadequate number and capacity of schools to meet the current demand, as well as the reluctance of many children to register as refugees, which results in them not being eligible for inclusion (see the section on socio-cultural barriers below).

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[24] For example, the 2014–20 funding from the European Development Fund, which amounts to €286 million, focuses on (1) state building and peace building; (2) food security and resilience; and (3) education. This funding is aimed at strengthening education systems and promoting the provision of primary and secondary education, higher education, enhancing the capacity of teaching staff and education administrations, curriculum implementation and holding centralised examinations. In addition, the EU supports payment of teacher salaries through country systems. The EU also contributes to the Global Partnership for Education, which has investments in Somalia.

In Kenya, steps have already been taken in Kakuma, Kalobeyei and Dadaab to register camp schools as public learning institutions under the leadership of a TSC-registered head teacher. However, according to interviews with local-level stakeholders in Kakuma and Dadaab, this registration is only being done on a provisional basis. This may be due to logistical and budgetary limitations that prevent the national government from being able to fully take up the running of the schools on a permanent basis.

Efforts have also been made to include older and adult students who wish to resume studies that have been interrupted by displacement, but have no choice but to join classes with much younger children. To provide an appropriate alternative, Accelerated Learning programmes have been adopted in Uganda and Kenya, some of which aim to progress students over a period of five classes in just two years. In Uganda, these programmes are not widespread, despite the need for them, and the Refugee Education Strategy does not include provisions for Accelerated Learning. There is also a need for provision of early learning and nursery facilities, which are insufficient in number and in many cases only available privately. The lack of nurseries may derail parents' efforts to continue their education in Accelerated Learning programmes or to obtain employment.

A review of UNHCR education briefings shows some recent successes in applying the whole-of-society approach within the education sector. UNHCR is moving away from a separate focus on refugees only to an approach that better mainstreams refugee education within national education structures and systems. Some important examples of private sector involvement in refugee education have been recorded. In Kenya, these include a handful of refugees admitted to the M-Pesa Foundation Academy (a residential high school), as well as other secondary school scholarships courtesy of Equity Bank Foundation. Although there is complementarity between these initiatives and the Nairobi and Djibouti Declarations, there is not always a direct link from the Declarations to the education programmes currently being implemented and their successes. Instead, they can be linked to innovations by partners working within the challenging humanitarian conditions on the ground, pre-existing efforts to get government and other private sector partners on board, as well as long-standing advocacy efforts.

Whether refugees in Kenya are better off compared with host communities in terms of educational opportunities is still unclear. Two recent studies on Kakuma (IFC, 2018; Betts et al, 2018a) draw different conclusions on this question (Manji and de Berry, 2019). Nonetheless, access to education remains a big challenge for both refugee and host communities in Turkana, Garissa and even Nairobi. The camps are home to many more potential students than can be hosted by existing schools. In the Dadaab camps, the situation has been compounded by the closure of Ifo 2 and Kambioos camps, and the subsequent relocation of learners to the older camps of Hagadera, Dagahaley and Ifo 1. This has also coincided with an overall reduction in funding. There is also growing demand for education among new refugee arrivals in Kakuma and Kalobeyei, of whom a large percentage are school-aged children and youth. In Kalobeyei, around 46 per cent of school-aged refugee children are out of school (Samuel Hall, 2018). In Nairobi, research also shows that refugees are lagging behind the host communities in terms of education levels (Betts et al, 2018b).

In Somalia, the largest displacement-affected group are IDPs, who live in camps, informal settlements and with relatives. Most IDPs have moved to the cities, where they are joined by the poorest refugee returnees. Education for most of these groups is unavailable. As observed by one NGO staff member: "Most of [the] education providers are the private sector, and those IDPs who can afford it can access this. But most IDPs can't access this. There are some make-shift schools in IDP camps run by NGOs but these are make-shift and basic. Most IDPs are rural and they don't necessarily see education as important. There is also a lack of awareness of the importance of education especially for girls in Somalia." What is more, the heavy involvement of the private sector and NGOs in providing

education makes coordination and standardisation of a national curriculum difficult for the Federal Government of Somalia.

In Uganda, an assessment of the ERP in September 2019 reported that refugee student enrolment had risen from 58 per cent in 2017 to 72 per cent in 2019 (CRRF Uganda, 2019). There have been significant initiatives in recent years, including the World Bank-funded ReHOPE and the Uganda Secondary Education Expansion Project in the West Nile districts of Yumbe, Moyo, Arua, Adjumani and Koboko. The DRDIP initiative, also funded by the World Bank, has brought at least 45 different education-related projects to Uganda in its initial phase, aiming at providing inclusive services to displaced persons, refugees and host communities together. Another project, the Education Cannot Wait (ECW) initiative, brings together the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), Save The Children, and the Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE). ECW supports the implementation of the ERP and aims to meet the specific educational needs of children living in refugee settlements and their host communities in Uganda. It includes innovative solutions such as Accelerated Learning, double-shifting of some schools, adapted infrastructure, as well as refugee teacher training and certification.

Despite efforts to promote inclusion barriers persist

Access to education is constrained by socioeconomic factors, which are highlighted in the literature and featured prominently during FGDs with refugee and community leaders in all the study countries.

In Kenya, a survey by REACH found that 43 per cent of refugee households in Dadaab faced barriers to accessing education, including not being able to afford it (REACH, 2018). At the tertiary level, access is limited by the high costs (tuition fees, transport and accommodation) and limited scholarships (UNHCR, 2019h). One Kakuma refugee said: "After completing secondary education, there are no higher education opportunities here. I completed high school in 2006 and there were no scholarship opportunities for me. There were no further opportunities to advance my career." Poverty, high illiteracy levels among adults, recurrent droughts and lack of awareness of the value of education among parents often combine to disrupt children's education.

In Djibouti, there is a reluctance of some people who may face a well-founded fear of persecution (particularly unaccompanied children but also some who have come into the country with their families) to register for refugee status, for fear that they will be obliged to remain resident in the camps (even though there is no formal encampment policy in the country) or that they will be returned to their country of origin. Lacking formal registration, they are unable to access schools, and many children are living in the streets of Djibouti City.

Another barrier to education in Djibouti is language. Primary education is taught in three languages: a French-speaking system mainly for Djiboutian-born children, an Arabic-speaking system for Yemeni-origin populations and an English-speaking system using Kenyan curriculum for refugees coming from Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia. While this approach benefits new arrivals who are accustomed to learning in English, it may limit opportunities for further education beyond primary education where French and Arabic curricula are used, and in the longer term may also constitute a major challenge to social integration if displacement becomes protracted. Given that the curriculum used for refugee education is based on the Kenyan curriculum, there are further issues with educational qualifications being recognised by Djiboutian authorities.[25] Language also acts as a barrier to education in Somalia,

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[25] Under the CRRF's plans to include refugees in national education, Djibouti will translate the national curriculum into English and will open English classes to nationals too, reflecting the Government's position that education in English may be useful as it is the "language of business."

where most of the schools in major cities use Somali as the language of instruction. Returnees have generally not studied in Somali and they lack the ability to read and write it.

There are particular barriers to girls' education linked to early marriage, teenage pregnancies, domestic chores and poverty (UNHCR, 2019g). In all countries (and not only in refugee-affected areas), girls drop out of school as a result of early marriage, pregnancy and a lack of sanitary facilities. Improved school water and sanitation facilities were regularly cited in interviews as important for keeping girls in school. These quotes illustrate the challenges that girl students face:

> I am a primary school teacher so I have seen the challenges: some girls are dropping out as they don't have sanitary towels, they lack uniforms, and the issue of food keeps children out. (Refugee leader, Kakuma, Kenya)

> Once a girl undergoes the cut [FGM], she is considered a woman and is married off. This affects access, retention and completion in school. (Key informant, Dadaab, Kenya)

In addition to cultural barriers, poverty often proves an insurmountable obstacle to education. In Somalia, UNHCR's repatriation grant covers nine months of school fees, but many returnee households struggle to be able to afford the fees once this package runs out. In Uganda, the drop in public expenditure on education has resulted in higher costs for parents to send their children to school. In some cases these extra costs can become prohibitive. Where they can, some parents and parent associations have contributed money and labour towards construction of new school facilities, latrines and teacher housing.

Finally, there are many students needing psychosocial support to be able to fully take advantage of educational opportunities. This was raised as an issue in both Uganda and Kenya. In Uganda researchers were told that many students were traumatised or suffering from mental health complications. This has reportedly resulted in some cases of mental illness, depression and even suicide. In Kenya and Uganda the lack of teachers specifically trained to support children with special needs such as autism, disability and trauma was cited. In Kalobeyei there is one specialised school, but most areas are unable to provide specialised educational support for children with disabilities.

Quality of education is a major challenge

Quality of education is another key challenge affecting all the study countries. Attainment of learning outcomes is particularly hampered by overcrowded schools, inadequate teaching materials and high student-to-teacher ratios. In Kenya, the average learner-to-teacher ratio is 73:1 in camp schools (UNHCR, 2019g); however, classes of up to 150 students were reported to the researchers. In Adjumani, Uganda, a major refugee-hosting area, it was reported to researchers that the standard pupil-to-teacher ratio was 153:1, but that overcrowding had driven the ratio up to 175:1. It was also reported that desks designed for three students were being used by up to six students, and that the textbook–to-student ratio was 1:7. Such challenging educational conditions lead to pupil inattention and high dropout rates, and to teachers effectively having to perform 'crowd control' rather than focusing on teaching.

Interviews with education partners on the ground in Kenya revealed that a shift system has been introduced within the camp schools in Turkana West to deal with the large numbers of learners. While the implementation of this system may be an example of how programming can be adapted to meet local needs and challenges, this cannot be considered CRRF best practice, which would have refugees being able to access public schools in other locations, without additional financial restrictions. It also highlights the infrastructural and resource challenges, even in Kalobeyei, where temporary schools have been established and unqualified teachers deployed (Samuel Hall, 2018).

An evaluation of EU support to Kalobeyei flagged education as a key concern, arguing that the low efficiency and effectiveness of interventions was compromising the result of offering integrated services (Samuel Hall, 2018). In addition, in many refugee camp schools there is a high proportion of overage students – some 47 per cent of enrolled learners in Kenya's camp schools are overage – which can lead to behavioural problems, including violence towards younger learners and sexual harassment (UNHCR, 2018b).

In Somalia, the context is complicated by the fact that many returnees coming from the refugee camps in Kenya have had access to better education than is available in local communities of return. Even where schooling is available, the curriculum in Somalia differs from that in Kenya, as does the quality of teaching. Many returnees to Somalia who have completed secondary education and want to continue their education are not happy enrolling at local universities, because they consider the standards to be low. The better schools, including those where Arabic and English are the language of instruction, are privately run and charge tuition fees that many returnees cannot afford.

Certification of refugees' educational attainment is complicated and expensive

In all the study countries, refugee students face difficulties in having their educational attainment from their country of origin recognised in the country of asylum. For example, in Kenya and Uganda, refugee children from South Sudan have to go back to lower classes, as there is no system for recognising their education certificates.

For refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo, who tend to have been educated in French before coming to Uganda, transition to the Ugandan curriculum is also challenging. Obtaining certification that a student has completed a particular level of education in their country of origin that will be recognised in Uganda is expensive, and many refugees cannot afford to do so. This has resulted in high demand for alternative education, such as skills training, which is offered by the NGOs.

However, efforts have been made to streamline systems of certification. For example, in Djibouti, as noted above, the English-language refugee education programme is modelled on the Kenyan curriculum. In February 2019, officials from the Kenyan Ministry of Education travelled to Djibouti to oversee the administration and marking of the pre-national examination tests for refugee students in the Ali Adeh and Holl Holl refugee camps. Students will now be prepared for the national examinations under the Kenyan curriculum, and the Government of Kenya will be involved in administering and marking these exams as well.

Efforts to promote primary education are not matched by increases in secondary and tertiary levels

All the study countries have a dearth of educational opportunities at secondary and tertiary levels. In Adjumani (Uganda) sub county's four villages, there is only one secondary school open to both nationals and refugees. There are no tertiary education facilities in Adjumani and the nearest university is in Gulu, over 100 kilometres away. In spite of this shortage of secondary and tertiary facilities, UNHCR funding only covers primary schools. The Windle Trust, an NGO, has diverted some funding from its scholarship programme to build secondary schools, but the resources are still not enough to meet the needs.

In Somalia, most schools in displacement contexts are run by NGOs or the private sector. Emergency education programmes are also funded by the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) organisation, mainly in urban areas. However, there are few secondary education programmes that displacement-affected people can access. Furthermore, most secondary schools

and universities are run by private sector operators that do not follow a national curriculum, and whose school fees are prohibitively expensive for most refugees, returnees and IDPs. Refugee leaders from Dadaab in Kenya who attended our Analysis Workshop reported that many of those who had returned from Somalia to the camp had done so because they could not pay for education once their short reintegration allowance ran out, or that they had been disappointed with the quality of education available in Somalia.

In Kenya, refugees do have some access to secondary and tertiary education either in the camps or, if they have sponsorship or can prove their ability to finance their studies, outside the camps. However, to access schools refugees need to be registered, which is a problem for many who have returned from Somalia after initially repatriating, since they no longer have their refugee registration document.

6.4   Recommendations for improving education in refugee-affected areas

1. To promote refugee inclusion in national education systems, donors should channel their financial support through Ministries of Education wherever possible. This would encourage the transition from project-based support to more durable long-term development assistance. It would also help to ensure that all schools in refugee and displaced persons settlements are brought within the government network of educational facilities so that they are eligible for the same funding and staffing (with the same pay) as other schools in the country.

2. To improve the quality of education in refugee-hosting areas, policy and programmes should prioritise additional teaching/learning spaces and improved school infrastructure, learning materials and recreational equipment. Urgent training and recruitment of qualified teachers able to work in refugee-hosting areas is also needed. This should be coupled with incentives for teachers, including emergency payments for overtime and housing support. Training on school safety, life skills and psychosocial support is also needed.

3. Child friendly sanitary facilities are needed for girls and boys, with particular attention given to the needs of adolescent girls.

4. Psychosocial support and training of teachers to provide such support is needed to help children in all countries.

5. To simplify the education certification process, policy and programmes should assist refugees to trace their educational documentation or to re-certify them if needed. This would benefit students looking to continue their studies, as well as displaced teachers who can be re-enlisted in teaching.

6. A regional system for recognising qualifications, as called for in the Djibouti Declaration (see paragraphs D31 and 32) would significantly facilitate access to education for refugee and other mobile populations.

7. Efforts should be expanded to increase the opportunities for refugee students at secondary and tertiary levels in all countries.

7 Jobs & livelihoods

7.1   The Kampala Declaration in brief

The Kampala Declaration on Jobs, Livelihoods and Self-reliance for Refugees, Returnees and Host Communities in the IGAD Region commits member states to working to "advance livelihood opportunities and economic inclusion to improve self-reliance of refugees, returnees and host communities." Key provisions include the facilitation of free movement for refugees within asylum countries, expanding access to labour markets, improving access to services, and including refugees and returnees in national development plans. It includes provisions for engaging the private sector to stimulate job opportunities, support and enhance livelihoods, and to facilitate private sector involvement by developing infrastructure and working to provide training in marketable skills for refugees, returnees and host communities (see IGAD, 2019). This Declaration was a deepening of the commitment in the 2017 Nairobi Declaration to provide basic services and livelihoods (IGAD, 2017b).

7.2   Policy and legislative changes

Despite the commitments made in the Kampala Declaration, respondents interviewed in this research expressed concern that not as many changes had been seen in policy terms as had been the case in the education sector. Coordination is complicated by the fact that multiple ministries have somewhat overlapping mandates (Labour and Social Protection, Agriculture, Immigration, etc), which makes implementing changes with jobs and livelihoods more difficult than with the education sector.

Furthermore, all the study countries have a predominantly informal labour market. This prompted some interviewees to say that they did not currently see the issue of the legal right to work as a pressing need. For example, a UN respondent interviewed in Nairobi remarked: "We are still at the stage where we need to invest in financial inclusion, skills training, infrastructure, development." However, this was contradicted by a UN respondent working in Somalia, who expressed the view that "we need the same process that was done for education to be done for livelihoods."

In Kenya, the Kampala Declaration has been more difficult to implement than the Djibouti Declaration on Education, given that there is not yet a firm commitment to giving refugees the right to work and to move freely within the country. Where work and travel authorisation are possible, they are only approved through extremely complicated bureaucratic processes that dissuade most refugees from applying (see below). There has also been little change in the national legislative framework governing refugees. The pending 2019 Refugees Bill frames discussions about refugee livelihoods within the encampment and designated areas discourse. That said, since 2017 coordination has been strengthened to some extent, facilitated by support from UNHCR and RAS. For example, ministries have reportedly been more engaged at the national levels, through the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) Councils, and RAS is also working with different ministries.

Study informants said that including Kenyan host community needs and beneficiaries in refugee responses, as is called for in the Kampala Declaration, is a departure from previous approaches, in which integrated refugee/host approaches were carried out only on a limited ad hoc basis and were

based on the discretion of individual implementing partners and donors. There has also been a shift towards more systematic integration of refugees within hosting areas of Kenya, aligned to the CIDPs. Indeed, the local economic development approach (LED) is now central to DRDIP, KISEDP and GISEDP.

In Somalia, the currently operational durable solutions consortia all began their interventions in 2017–18, and it is therefore too soon to talk about impact. Mid-term evaluations of RE-INTEG– under which vocational training, an incubator programme for entrepreneurship and a cash-for-work approach on infrastructure projects are being rolled out – and the Durable Solutions Programme (DSP) – which focuses on the provision of livelihood opportunities in terms of training, employment and access to finance – will be carried out in the coming months. When available, these evaluations should provide insights into what is working well and what challenges remain.

In Djibouti, the National Refugee Law gives refugees the same rights to seek formal wage-employment, self-employment opportunities, financial services and other services as Djiboutian nationals. UNHCR Djibouti has developed a Livelihoods Strategic Plan 2018-2022 (UNHCR Djibouti 2018) under which it pledges to support the Government of Djibouti to coordinate activities relating to the promotion of livelihoods, including forming a working group to oversee coordination and provide technical capacity building for members. The Strategic Plan includes specific objectives related to protection of domestic workers and promotion of food security.

In Uganda, the Refugee Act of 2006 and the refugee policy of 2010 grant refugees relative freedom of movement and the right to seek employment; gives refugees a piece of land for agricultural use, the right to own and dispose of movable property and to lease or sub-lease immoveable property; the right to engage in agriculture, industry, and business; the right to practice one's profession; and to access formal and informal employment opportunities. These commitments are augmented in the National Development Plan II (2015-2020) and related STA and ReHoPe strategy.

In addition, in March 2017, the CRRF was piloted in Uganda with an objective of enhancing refugee self-reliance. Under the auspices of the UNHCR, a Livelihoods Sector Technical Working Group Response Plan was drafted to improve livelihoods of refugees and their hosts (Zewdu 2017). Unlike the education and health sector plans, the draft livelihood plan makes mention of the need for gender sensitive programming to address gender inequalities to ensure women, girls, boys and men have equal access to livelihoods opportunities and that all humanitarian and development interventions take care of their needs and vulnerabilities. However, according to Crawford and O'Callaghan (2019) the draft Livelihoods Response Plan, coordinated under the CRRF and led by the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, has not won the enthusiasm of donors. Despite this, findings of this study show that there are initiatives at both national and district level towards a joint livelihood response. At a national level, there is a Livelihoods working group[26] which aims at enhancing coordination and operational effectiveness of livelihood programming in Uganda by promoting market-driven opportunities, private sector linkages and extensive capacity building of individuals and groups. At a district level, the UNHCR livelihoods coordinator revealed how the livelihoods working group is holding partner meetings at district and sub county levels as well as promoting livelihood activities in refugee settlements.

In Uganda TVET is coordinated by the Ministry of Education and Sports. There are at least 110 vocational training centres, schools, institutes and polytechnics in the country. The Ugandan Skills Development Project, a $100 million investment by the World Bank, is a major source of investment in job training.

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[26] This working group is chaired by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) and World Vision Uganda.

7.3   Progress on jobs and livelihoods is complicated by political economy and local context

Legislative bottlenecks are heavily influenced by the political economy and local context. In Kenya, for instance, although the Refugee Education Inclusion Policy has recently been stalled, up to this point educational reform had been seen as progressive and significant, in contrast to jobs and livelihoods policy. In large part, this can be attributed to a conducive political-economy environment at central and local levels. Ensuring refugees' access to national education services is arguably seen as less contentious than expanding employment and livelihood opportunities for several reasons.

First, as noted in the Kampala Declaration, expanding access to jobs is contingent on free movement. Some governments – Kenya's and to a degree Djibouti's – are more resistant to the notion of free movement than they are to providing equal access to education. Low levels of private sector engagement and weak market linkages in remote refugee hosting areas mean that there is a limited capacity for generating employment in camp settings. Second, promoting jobs for refugees is politically unpopular with voters already concerned about high levels of unemployment across the country. While educational inclusion may also be unpopular with voters concerned about the additional pressure on public services, the fact that the target group is children (rather than working-age adults) may help to make such concessions politically palatable. In any case, the fact that many refugee children are often already absorbed into national education systems is likely to limit this impact. Finally, education is a "clearly defined sector with a limited set of actors," which makes it easier to achieve engagement and consensus on these matters (O'Callaghan et al, 2019, p 7).

Political economy and local context can also reduce the impact of policy and legislative implementation. For example, it has been convincingly argued in the literature that refugee freedoms of movement, employment and education in Uganda have not translated into self-reliance, as expected, thanks to a range of regulatory, legal and administrative barriers that work to restrict refugees to settlements and limit their capacity to build livelihoods beyond sustainable agriculture (Betts et al, 2019a; Hovil, 2018). Undoubtedly, Uganda's ability to facilitate self-reliance activities is also hampered by the recent large numbers of newly arrived refugees.

During FGDs and interviews across the four countries, refugees expressed frustration at a range of challenges, including opening bank accounts, registering for services, registering with professional associations, accessing documentation and requesting permits. Private sector respondents also indicated that these challenges acted as a barrier to their own wider engagement in refugee areas (see Chapter 8 for more details). IGAD's role in promoting a culture of inclusion through its political advocacy can help to move stalled processes along and generate sustained political commitments to pursue greater levels of inclusion.

7.4   Vocational training initiatives are proliferating in all study countries

While the policy environment in support of livelihoods has yet to be fully developed across the four study countries, many individual programmes and projects are being implemented in a piecemeal way across all countries to provide vocational training and livelihoods support. The drive to promote self-reliance outcomes among refugees is also piecemeal, and is being promoted by initiatives including market-driven skills training, business incubation programmes to strengthen entrepreneurship, financial inclusion initiatives, and partnerships with the private sector in terms of direct employment or by facilitating banking and credit access.

According to one NGO worker based in Turkana: "Now the main initiatives are centred around mar-

ket-driven skills development, we are no longer keen on just training tailors, for example, but looking at skills gaps in the market. The fashion-design project of AAH-I [Action Africa Help International], whereby beneficiaries are designing African t-shirts and selling them in the market, is an example. We have identified the demand in the market and are looking at who has the skills to meet this. [The] initial target was SGBV [sexual and gender based violence] survivors, but now even [their] spouses are supporting them as they see the benefit, and at the household level, the net worth has increased."

SNV has been implementing an integrated market-based energy access intervention in Kakuma since 2017. As part of this project, some 100 refugees have gained employment in the energy sector and 50 businesses have been created in the camp selling renewable energy products. Refugees in Dadaab have also benefited from the Danish Refugee Council's (DRC) livelihoods programme, which supports groups with initial capital for start-up businesses. The market-based model has also been stimulated by cash and voucher-based interventions, such as those promoted by donors including the EU and DFID, to gradually replace in-kind food distribution.

Kalobeyei has been cited as fertile ground for testing integrated and development-oriented livelihoods approaches. The shift by the World Food Programme (WFP) and UNHCR to cash-based assistance for food and shelter, in partnership with private sector actors such as Equity Bank and Safaricom, provide important lessons for these approaches. They began to be tested before 2017 and so may not be direct results of the Kampala Declaration commitments. Research by Betts et al comparing socioeconomic outcomes for refugees in Kakuma and Kalobeyei found that refugees in Kalobeyei fared better in terms of income, food security, and consumption (Betts et al, 2018a). This was particularly attributed to Kalobeyei's integrated service delivery, designated market areas and other spatial constructs, more extensive use of vouchers, and greater promotion of subsistence agriculture.[27]

Nonetheless, the authors noted that nearly all newly arrived refugees in both Kakuma and Kalobeyei were struggling economically, and it cannot be said that recently arrived refugees in either settlement have achieved a measurable degree of self-reliance.

Other vocational training initiatives being piloted in Kakuma and Kalobeyei include the WFP and AAH-I 'tech for livelihoods' project (whereby qualified refugees are paired with digital companies for employment purposes) and the Refugee Employment and Skills Initiative (RESI), which seeks to link a handful of refugees in Dadaab and Kakuma to employment opportunities in online work.[28] Such initiatives, though consistent with the aims of the CRRF and the Kampala Declaration, cannot be said to be direct results, as they have been piloted in Kenya for a number of years. They are more related to the realities of the encampment policy as well as the general trend in outsourcing digital work. However, the number of refugees that these projects are training and targeting is still very small and implementers are looking at ways to scale up their activities. Here again, the regulatory framework is proving challenging, with refugees being required to present valid documentation to access their payments through bank transfers.

In Somalia, TVET departments have been established at federal and state levels to promote basic skills training for people who have left or missed out on formal education. However, coordination of these initiatives remains problematic, with programmes being run by both the Somali government

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[27] Several other evaluations of self-reliance initiatives are currently under preparation, including the joint evaluation of the integrated solutions model in Kalobeyei and WFP's report on its unrestricted CBI pilot in Kalobeyei, which started in June 2019. These evaluations will provide much-needed data on the successes and limitations of these initiatives thus far.

[28] This project is supported by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and International Trade Centre (ITC).

and NGOs. One donor observed that "the international community has undertaken erratic efforts on livelihoods and skills development. TVET is project- and NGO-driven. There is no government involvement in the TVET sector [in terms of regulation or coordination] and there isn't a strategy or system in place." Despite this, large programmes promoting durable solutions funded by DRC, NRC, DFID, IOM, and Concern in Somalia were mentioned as having some impact on improving livelihoods. The EU-funded RE-INTEG programme, which supports the sustainable re-integration of refugee returnees and IDPs, was also credited with having an impact. These initiatives have increased livelihood options by providing technical skills, cash and educational opportunities.

A review of the literature and key informant interviews in Somalia point to some promising pilots which might be scalable in terms of location and the inclusion of other displacement-affected communities. For instance, a review of a 2017–18 rental subsidy and livelihoods pilot scheme in Mogadishu,[29] implemented by NRC and UN-Habitat to respond to a surge in the IDP population, showed that even in contexts where public participation is weak, better tenure agreements, such as leases and rents, and the injection of cash for livelihoods, are effective. The importance of cash grants was also highlighted during an interview with an international NGO worker: "After households were given a multipurpose cash grant to subsidise their rent for three months and a livelihoods grant to meet their basic needs, 80 per cent of these families were self-sufficient and not reliant on gate keepers. The gap identified was that a social protection component was missing." As in the other study countries, however, the livelihoods activities in Somalia are ad hoc and have not yet been scaled up to the level needed. A 2019 study concluded that "It is too early to speak of sustainable (re)integration in Somalia, which is about self-reliance and resilience" (ReDSS, 2019a).

In Adjumani in Uganda, vocational training programmes offered by AAH-I, DRC and Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) include hair dressing, tailoring and catering (for which there are apparently more job opportunities), carpentry and joinery, and phone repair. Here members of the host community reported that many people who had attended vocational and skills training schools did not subsequently find employment. One person said: "They train and then come back and sit at home because the start-up kits given are not adequate for one to start up business, and employment opportunities are scarce." Research undertaken by the REF found there was a high level of unemployment in the refugee settlements and Uganda's refugee-hosting areas as a whole (REF, 2019). In 2017, a study by World Vision found that 58 per cent of refugees living in and around Imvepi and Rhino camps did not have any other source of income besides assistance. Research by the ODI (Crawford and O'Callaghan 2019) found that only 2 per cent of refugees in Rhino and Bidibidi camps reported that they were self-sufficient.

For the current study, respondents indicated that many of those who had received training and were not able to find employment locally either had to move to new towns or go back to South Sudan, where there are more opportunities despite the insecurity. REF research with new graduates of TVET programmes study found that 63 per cent had either found a new job related to their training or had started a new business after finishing their training (REF, 2019).

One of the limitations surrounding use of skills gained during the training was the inability to afford the initial investment to put the skills to work. Interviewees expressed a desire to see implementing partners and government provide more opportunities for youth in vocational and skills training and provision of adequate start-up kits at the end of the training.

Another difficulty reported was in applying the skills gained from the training to market opportuni-

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[29] As part of the project, 80 families were provided with money to cover their rent for 12 months, in addition to monthly cash assistance of $70 for seven months to cover basic needs. They were also provided with business skills development training and give a grant of $500 for enterprise activities.

ties. One NGO worker in Kampala reflected: "In terms of jobs it's still a challenge, even in the country itself the job opportunities are not there. There is need for a serious action, for example equipping the refugees with real employable skills that are competitive and can help someone earn a job." The same respondent went on to suggest that the level of vocational skills being provided in sectors such as tailoring and carpentry were too basic for participants to subsequently secure a decent job. Indeed, in all the study countries, most people in displacement-affected settings work informally and as casual labourers with low wages, even if they have had some access to vocational training. In general, men tend to gravitate to the construction industry to find employment, and women towards the domestic service sector.

In Djibouti the DRDIP programme creates job opportunities for refugees and host communities. UNHCR and WFP have also been involved in assessing refugees' skills in order to better identify job and vocational training opportunities. The UNHCR Livelihoods Strategy 2018–22 also calls for vocational training programmes to include "technical skills, soft skills, and language skills, where appropriate" (UNHCR, 2018b, p 56). Although not defined in the document, 'soft skills' usually refers to skills that include timekeeping, teamwork, problem solving, communication and self-motivation. Urban refugees consulted said that they were not aware of any vocational training opportunities available for them. They said that their main constraint was in obtaining formal authorisation to work in the local economy. NGOs are also working to provide job opportunities and training for refugees; Lutheran World Services, for instance, is operating a fisheries project in Obock for both refugees and hosts. Private mechanic companies also have developed a training programme for mechanics, hiring the strongest students.

Language and lack of skills equivalency certification systems and documentation prevent labour market absorption of refugees

In all the study countries, there are language barriers that prevent refugees from accessing employment, both formal and informal. In Somalia, language is a major challenge for those many refugees, IDPs and returning refugees who speak Af Maay or other minority dialects in terms of securing employment. In some cases, language barriers intersect with clan or ethnic barriers. In Mogadishu, for example, respondents reported that local businesspeople preferred to employ locals, particularly those with whom they shared clan ties. Refugees from Ethiopia, Yemen and Syria who do not speak Somali fluently are often overlooked in job recruitment. In addition, as refugees in Somalia do not have proper legal permits to work, they struggle to find employment and are typically paid less than local residents. These problems apply to IDPs and returned refugees in Somalia as well. An unknown but sizeable proportion of IDPs and returnees are from the Digil Mirifle or other minority clans, and do not speak Somali as fluently as those from majority clans. They also lack the skills and social connections to help them compete with local residents for employment.

A similar picture emerges in Uganda, where South Sudanese refugees struggle to find work, as their education certificates are not recognised by Ugandan employers. As noted in the Education chapter above, refugees seeking to convert their academic documents to the Ugandan equivalent can do so, but many are deterred by the bureaucratic and expensive process, and the need to travel to the relevant offices. Furthermore, although refugees are legally able to join the formal sector, they must first have a work permit to do so, which involves another complicated and potentially expensive process. Work permits themselves are free, but obtaining a permit is an online activity that requires computer literacy, which most of the refugees do not have. What is more, only refugee registration cards entitle the bearer to apply for a free work permit, but many refugees are not registered and hence cannot obtain the permit.

Efforts are being made to try to redress these problems. Some NGOs provide help to refugees to

navigate the certification process. They also hire refugees as assistants (at the lower 'incentive' payment level) to the organisation, where work permits are not required; although this provides jobs to the unemployed, such schemes are also criticised as the salaries that refugees can hope to earn are much lower than what nationals would be paid for the same work. They are given work where their qualifications fit best, even if they do not have the documentation to prove it. In Djibouti, ONARS has been assisting refugees to get driving permits to help them secure employment.

7.5   Perceived discrepancies between opportunities for refugees and hosts often lead to tensions

Tensions between refugees, IDPs and hosts are often exacerbated if there is a feeling that one group has more opportunities for training or employment than another. In Kenya, the view that refugees benefit from larger and wider assistance, including livelihood support, remains prevalent among host community leaders. Comparisons are often drawn between the levels of support provided to both communities, and many people know about and cite the refugee:host assistance ratio of 70:30 per cent as evidence that hosts do not receive as much as refugees. The views of community leaders are typical of this sentiment, as in these complaints:

> "Refugees are the guests here [in Kakuma] and they get houses and rations while we Kenyans get nothing." (Host community representative, Turkana, Kenya)

> "Sometimes we are trained together but when the jobs come about it is only people from Dadaab [i.e. the refugees] who get them." (Host community representative, Dadaab, Kenya)

In all the study countries, however, tensions between refugees and hosts extended beyond access to livelihood resources. A recent Samuel Hall evaluation in Kalobeyei recommended that "striking a balance between host and refugees in all sectors is key for the vision of KISEDP to take shape." The tensions in Kalobeyei may stem from the fact that the site was established as an integrated settlement to accommodate the influx of newly arrived South Sudanese refugees, yet most so-called hosts do not live there. Although hosts are able to access integrated services, their nomadic livelihoods are not conducive to remaining in the settlement. As refugee leaders in a Kalobeyei FGD explained, "When we came in 2016, the host community was closer, but because they [the host community] have animals, they can't stay where people [refugees] are, and many decided to move."

In contrast, host community leaders in Dadaab struck a more accommodating tone, perhaps indicating greater fluidity and closer community and clan bonds between them and the refugees, and a greater acknowledgment of the interdependence of the communities. Community leaders in Hagadera, one of the Dadaab camps, said: "We have championed for refugees to be included in education. We have integrated to the extent that we even go to bail them from the police stations." Similarly, host community leaders in Ifo indicated that relations with refugees have improved as a result of closer interaction. During FGDs in Dadaab, they told us: "Our children go to school together. Some things are now happening in common. When you go to the market, they buy animals and milk from us. We live together, intermarry, do great business together." At our Analysis Workshop, a government official from Garissa said: "In Dadaab there is a 'silent integration' that takes place between refugees and hosts. We should be looking for mutual opportunities for self-reliance and social cohesion rather than pitting them against each other." Clearly there are important opportunities for strengthening host–refugee cohesion in such a context.

At Amelo Polytechnic Institute, in Adjumani, Uganda (a government-funded institute located at the refugee settlement) the students include both refugees and members of the host community. They learn carpentry, driving, bricklaying, computer skills and tailoring. In Arua, refugees and hosts are

trained together in catering, tailoring and electronics (which is a popular choice, but requires some background knowledge in science and mathematics, which most trainees do not possess). While the usual guidance in Uganda indicates that 30 per cent of training places should be given to nationals and 70 per cent to refugees, more nationals were utilising the lessons than the refugees. That said, as highlighted by a host community member in Adjumani, places for training are very limited: "When the organisation sends the application forms here for about 10 slots, they pick only one or two. The facilities are for both nationals and refugees. But when the advertisement comes out and we apply, a national who applied for carpentry, for example, might end up training for phone repair. Refugees are trained in exactly what they applied for, but nationals, it is not a guarantee."

Hosts said that, in the absence of more lucrative opportunities, many supported themselves by burning charcoal and collecting firewood for sale, driving *boda bodas* (motorcycle taxis), engaging in small-scale fishing (although they complained that weeds have covered the water, making fishing impossible), and buying maize from outside the sub-county and selling it locally. However, the opportunities are few, and many hosts and refugee youth "stay at home and play games the whole day to pass time," as one host community member interviewed in Adjumani observed.

7.6   Mobility and legal work authorisation are key to self-reliance

There is a consistent message in the literature and in our own empirical findings that restrictions on refugees' mobility negatively affects their ability to establish businesses, find employment, and market their skills and goods outside the camp. Limited mobility undermines their ability to achieve self-sufficiency and strengthens their dependence on external assistance (Manji and de Berry, 2019). Efforts to support county- and district-level engagement to remove administrative barriers, such as those impeding business registration, may be more effective than pushing for legislative change to permit greater refugee mobility, but there are limits as to how much can be achieved without the latter.

Legal restrictions on refugees' right to work result in refugee incentive workers (including, crucially, teachers) being paid lower-than-market and, according to refugees, lower-than-subsistence-level wages. This also complicates efforts by private businesses to employ the best candidates. This predicament was acknowledged by county government officials in Garissa, who asked: "How do we expect refugees to engage in meaningful businesses if they do not have work permits? The result is that they end up doing illicit trade." Another interviewee suggested that the process for refugees in Kenya to obtain travel permits should be simplified so that they might receive training in other locations of the country and facilitate knowledge transfer. Furthermore, some refugee leaders in Kalobeyei expressed concern that those engaged in refugee assistance had a vested interest in restricting their mobility to the vicinity of the refugee camps rather than facilitating their resettlement to other countries.

7.7   Promotion of livelihoods is needed in areas of settlement and return

Beyond vocational training and employment generation, displacement-affected communities have a range of livelihoods needs that require attention. In pastoral and other rural areas, where environmental change is necessitating adaptations in livelihood practices, support in terms of conservation works as well as livelihood diversification assistance can help displaced and returnee populations, together with local hosts, to achieve self-reliance. As a donor respondent working in Somalia observed: "There are bigger discussions that need to take place. The EU could help steer this discussion with respect to viable sectors, what models are sustainable in light of climate change and droughts. IDPs bear the brunt of this and if they are expected to go back to their homes and farms, this needs

to be addressed."

In Somalia, a major obstacle for returnees and IDPs from rural areas is lack of infrastructure to support productive livelihoods. For instance, Lower Shabelle and Juba both have ample arable land and nearby rivers but they lack irrigation systems, flood control infrastructure, boreholes, and other watershed management works, so much of the agricultural potential of the area is left unexploited.

In Uganda, refugees face a number of challenges in regards to livelihoods. First, as noted above, access to agricultural land is limited. The size of plots allocated to refugees for agricultural use is very small – not larger than a kitchen garden – and refugees complain that in some places the land is rocky and unsuitable for crop production. In Adjumani, negotiations are taking place with the host community to make more land available, but the process is slow and many refugees report that they have not received any land at all. They say that they are unable to keep animals because they do not have enough land and that, if they do try to expand their land use, they run into conflict with the host community. In Arua, since 2012, refugee households have been allocated plots of only 50m^2 (in other areas plot sizes of 30m^2 were reported), although plots sizes can increase up to 100m^2 for larger households of ten or more people. A second challenge in Uganda stems from some refugees' attitudes about what is an appropriate livelihood activity or what they are able to do. Many Dinka from South Sudan, who are traditionally pastoral nomads, have refused to take up crop production as they say they lack the skills and knowledge for it. This greatly limits their livelihood options.

For host communities in all countries, livelihood challenges include changes in weather conditions and seasons, which are affecting crop production. There is also a lack of equipment for mechanised agriculture; most use hand hoes, which results in low production. Modern farming methods, including the use of fertilisers to enhance crop production, have not been widely adopted by farmers (often because they cannot afford such inputs), which again results in low yields. Some NGOs provide tools for seeds, agrochemicals and fertilisers to enable farmers to produce enough food to be able to sell in the local markets. A few refugees have been able to lease land from host communities to increase their production and to graze livestock, although this has also driven up the price of land leases for everyone. Furthermore, while some refugees are interested in producing crops for sale, others say they are not interested in producing on a large scale for commercial purposes beyond household consumption.

A key element to producing strategies for promotion of jobs and livelihoods work is the successful engagement of the private sector. It is this aspect that is considered in the next chapter.

7.8   Recommendations for improving effectiveness of jobs and livelihoods support

1. All IGAD member states should integrate the commitments made in the Kampala Declaration into national legislation and policy. This should include costed action plans, terms of reference for coordinating bodies, and local strategies for implementation.

2. Where vocational training or employment generation schemes are active, efforts should be made by NGOs, private operators or other implementing bodies to link them to demonstrated labour market demand.

3. Vocational training and employment generation activities should be open to refugees, local hosts and others affected by displacement. This principle should be incorporated into policy and implementation plans, and should be monitored.

4. Particular groups that experience restrictions on their access to labour markets on the basis of language, ethnicity, disability, or lack of certification, should be given targeted support.

This could take the form of language training, support with certification, advocacy with employers to improve recruitment practices, and legal support to prevent discrimination against workers.

5. Displacement-affected communities need support in facilitating access to financial services. This includes providing cash-based assistance and micro-credit (where appropriate); it may also involve facilitating refugees' access to identification documents, skills certification and other documentation needed for access to bank accounts. Government should work with financial service providers, implementing NGOs, workers and employers to facilitate these activities.

6. Efforts to promote mobility of refugees, through the Freedom of Movement Protocol as well as other national policy, should be promoted.

8 Private sector engagement with displacement-affected communities

Given that the private sector is the major potential employer in all the four countries, there is a clear need to engage with it in all aspects of livelihoods support. Building partnerships with the private sector for better jobs and livelihood opportunities for refugees is expressly called for in the Kampala Declaration. However, achieving this objective requires a range of supporting initiatives, such as training programmes, certification and documentation provisions, job placement support, market development, and reforms to many countries' rules on refugee movement.

For a start, it is useful to break down the many forms that private sector engagement with these communities can take: as providers of services, employers, vocational trainers, financial services providers, and contractors of government or nongovernmental organisations. This chapter considers the different ways that private sector engagement can be strengthened.

8.1   Growing optimism around private sector engagement

The CRRF has been described as a "unique opportunity" for engaging with a wide range of actors, including the private sector, under the auspices of a whole-of-society approach (ReDSS, 2018). While the CRRF has legitimised building partnerships with the private sector, it should be noted that optimism around the role of the private sector has been gaining momentum for a number of years, preceding the framework of the CRRF. Indeed, in 2015 the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development set out an important role for the private sector in humanitarian and development interventions (Humanitarian Leadership Academy and HSBC, 2019).

In this context, the CRRF has helped to contribute to a sense of optimism around private sector engagement, and an interest in exploring new and sustainable ways to engage. Interviews with donors, UN and implementing partners reveal a sense of optimism and excitement around the potential opportunities and benefits of partnering with the private sector, and new conversations and partnerships are starting to happen. "Everyone is trying to unlock and crack this thing of private sector money," explained a UN respondent interviewed in Mogadishu, Somalia.

Some private sector respondents shared this sense of optimism. Others, however, had not heard of the CRRF or been included in discussions about supporting refugee responses, while those who had been included often raised concerns about doing so. "Convincing private sector partners to come into refugee areas hasn't been a walk in the park," explained a Kenyan NGO respondent. A combination of the high costs of investment, perceived insecurity, poor infrastructure, limited access, high levels of risk, lack of market data and the low purchasing power of potential customers are the main barriers cited by private sector respondents to doing business with refugees. With this in mind, it shouldn't be assumed that the private sector will engage, even with the offer of new investments and markets: "They need the private sector, but the private sector does not need them," explained a

donor respondent in Kenya.

At the Global Refugee Forum in Geneva in December 2019, the Amahoro Coalition was launched to mobilise private sector support for African refugees. The Coalition, headed by founder Isaac Kwaku Fokuo Jr, brings together African entrepreneurs (some of whom are former refugees). It has begun to place potential entrepreneurs in higher education and to give them the necessary tools to build successful enterprises.

8.2   Private sector engagement remains limited to specific projects

Private sector engagement has been limited across all the study areas, although there are some pockets of progress. In Somalia, interviews suggest that the private sector has on the whole been slow to engage with IDPs, refugees and returnees. Nevertheless, Baidoa was cited by a handful of respondents as a good example of growing private sector engagement in construction, remittances and telecommunications sectors that benefit displaced communities. This expansion was reportedly facilitated by government support, including the provision of land for private sector partners.

In Uganda, focus group discussions with refugees and hosts indicate that private sector engagement in the settlements has been very limited, an outlook that was shared by a government respondent in Arua, Uganda: "Private sector response and participation in refugee activities is still very low." That said, several respondents recognised that the SPRS–NU project implemented by Enabel, the Belgian Development Agency – which provides refugees and hosts with technical training and apprentice-ships with business and industrial providers – is helping to improve private sector engagement in refugee responses.

In Kenya, other initiatives such as KISEDP (which prioritises private sector engagement as a strategic objective),[30] and the IFC Challenge Fund for Kakuma and Kalobeyei,[31] have also increased optimism about private sector engagement, although, given the recent introduction of these initiatives we cannot speak about their impact. The increased availability of market information and assessments (such as those conducted by the IFC and World Bank) that show the amount of money circulating in refugee economies and the potential opportunities of these markets has also helped to stimulate private sector engagement and interest. These examples show that a number of initiatives – not just the CRRF – are contributing to wider private sector engagement.

8.3   Structural challenges that inhibit further private sector engage-ment

In spite of the positive momentum behind the role of the private sector, there are concerns that structural issues continue to undermine wider, more sustainable progress. Interviews reveal signifi-cant administrative and regulatory obstacles that undermine wider private sector engagement. "The policy environment isn't conducive for the private sector," explained an NGO respondent inter-viewed in Kenya. An IFC study reported similar findings, as "national policy and regulatory con-straints were the most important determinant for private sector looking to invest in the refugee space" (Berfond et al, 2019). Access to remote and often securitised camps and settlements where engagement is more political, expensive and cumbersome was particularly problematic and, for the most part, it is easier and cheaper for the private sector to do business with refugees in urban set-

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[30] Strategic Objective 1 of KISEDP is to create a conducive environment that attracts investment from the pri-vate sector and financial service providers to promote the local economy (UNHCR, 2018b; UNHCR, 2018b).
[31] The Kakuma–Kalobeyei Challenge Fund is a financing mechanism for disbursing donor funding to incentivise for-profit companies, social enterprises, and local and refugee entrepreneurs to start or scale existing opera-tions in the Kakuma–Kalobeyei area.

tings, or not at all. However, as a spokesperson from Equity Bank, which operates in refugee-affected communities in Kenya, explained in our Analysis Workshop, it is possible to engage with these communities without incurring losses, if the investment climate is made favourable.

In Kenya, the private sector is interested in engaging with refugee and host communities, but turning this into real opportunity is proving challenging in practice. As one NGO staff member working in Kakuma observed: "Convincing private sector partners to come into refugee areas hasn't been a walk in the park. You have to provide de-risking for them, incentivise them to come to do business here. For businesses, it's about profits. They don't care if these are refugees or hosts. We engaged 15 local and international companies and out of this number, we now have seven of them on board. Some that began found it challenging and not lucrative."

As noted above, refugees have not been able to develop strong self-reliance strategies. At least two-thirds of the refugees in both Kakuma and Dadaab rely on humanitarian assistance as their primary form of food support (Manji and de Berry, 2019). This has an impact on refugees' ability to access subsidised services and credit. One of the key lessons learned from SNV's 'clean energy' project in Kakuma is that many of the refugees are too poor to be able to afford their services and products, even if they are subsided and despite their pay-as-you-go model. Further, lessons learned from a pilot run by Sanivation in Kakuma reveal that there is also a related challenge of how to make such solutions sustainable and scalable: "There doesn't seem to be money in the economy to address sanitation for instance, and the private sector cannot make their services free" said one NGO staff member.

As explained in Chapter 7, in spite of progressive policies associated with the CRRF, many refugees still struggle to open bank accounts, access financial services, move freely or secure work permits, all of which make it difficult for the private sector to work with them as providers of financial services or as employers. If the legal parameters in which the private sector can work with refugees are not clear, they will seek labour and resources from elsewhere. This was expressed during an interview with a Kenyan NGO respondent, who explained that, in spite of the facilitation and support they had offered to businesses (including funding, training, access, and so on), they had only succeeded in convincing one private sector partner to invest. In the long run, donor funding alone will not be sufficient without government intervention to address the wider structural issues required to bring about an enabling business environment.

As well as citing problems with structural issues, business operators also expressed concerns about navigating the humanitarian aid landscape. In particular, they say they are discouraged by complicated procurement processes, unclear intellectual property ownership rules and differences in language and approach. Interviews show that many businesspeople have not been consulted on the CRRF or, if they have been, engagement has taken place late in the process once projects have already been designed. It is clear that, at this relatively early stage, both sides still need to work out how to work together more efficiently and transparently.

8.4   Private engagement in service delivery

Private sector respondents noted that in some cases, humanitarian partners were actively undermining private sector engagement by providing services, such as water, internet and energy, for free. According to a donor interviewee, "If we want private sector to come in then we have to make the space, they cannot compete with free giving of goods and services." Where an established market becomes undermined by an influx of discounted or free humanitarian supplies, the impact on the private sector can be disastrous, dis-incentivising others from investing there. For example, the provision of free water to refugees in western Uganda by humanitarian organisations has been linked to the collapse of the growing local water market (Coggio, 2018).

One of the key puzzles that needs to be unpacked is how to make engaging with displacement-affected communities and promotion of post-conflict recovery more attractive to private actors than supporting conflict economies. In Somalia and South Sudan, many private contractors have made enormous profits through their contracts with humanitarian organisations. These business interests have proved difficult to dismantle, and the political economy of humanitarian aid must grapple with how to dismantle the incentive structure that makes private operators unlikely to work for peace (see Keen (2008) on the benefits of famine and de Waal (2015) on political marketplaces).

8.5   Profit versus philanthropy

The motivations of private sector actors, like those of humanitarian and development actors, are often mixed. Motivations towards profit may be entwined with those of developing social entrepreneurship. A recent IFC study found that most private sector actors interviewed said that they were more interested in impact than financial gain (Berfond et al, 2019). Nevertheless, as a donor respondent in our study observed, "The private sector will only come in if it makes economic sense." A Kenyan NGO staff member emphasised that "for businesses, it's about profits. They don't care if these are refugees or hosts. It's about money."

This suggests that, while the private sector may be interested in working with those with the skills and financial capital to bring returns, the challenge is to help those who are the poorest and most excluded from markets, including labour markets, to better access them. This will make it more appealing for private operators to engage with them. At the same time, boosting private sector engagement should not just be about how to get businesses to support refugees; it is also about how to develop refugees' own entrepreneurship so that they can develop their own private-sector activities.

8.6   More market information is needed

In order for private sector engagement to be most effective, there is a need to expand on the available market information – including local and national (and even in some cases international) demand for products and services – to identify opportunities that will attract private sector investment and generate more livelihood opportunities. Interviews with private sector and NGO respondents indicated that, where private sector operators are engaging with refugee-affected communities, their interest has been driven by the increased availability of market information and assessments showing the amount of money circulating in refugee economies, as well as the potential opportunities in these markets. If such information about market demand were matched to a database of locally available (both refugee and host) skill sets, workers could be recruited to fill identified gaps or could be trained to develop the skills needed to develop such gaps.

A useful assessment of entrepreneurial opportunities for refugees in the Dadaab refugee camp was conducted by Samuel Hall for the International Labour Organisation (ILO, 2019). Based on their assessment of local demand and available opportunities, three potential areas for entrepreneurial activity were identified: waste management and recycling and fruit and vegetable production. Other areas were deemed not to have much potential given the remoteness of the refugee camps and the inability of workers to move out of them to market their goods or to seek employment. This suggests that mobility is an important key to widening opportunities for refugees.

This chapter has delved into the challenges and opportunities for private sector involvement in CRRF implementation. Despite the sector being regularly referred to as a potential partner, there is a long way to go before these opportunities are fully developed. More collaborative research is needed with private sector actors to consider the ways in which the energy and talent of private sector op-

erators can best be collaborated with to benefit refugee and host communities.

8.7   Recommendations for better engagement with the private sector

1. To foster an enabling environment for the private sector, policy and programmes should strengthen local markets in refugee-hosting areas. One option for doing this is the expansion of unrestricted cash-based systems that help to increase the purchasing power of camp residents and reduce competition with free in-kind humanitarian assistance.

2. To ensure sustainable engagement and long-term investment, partners should involve the private sector in early planning and decision making, and offer multi-year contracts for service delivery.

3. Beyond the private sector, policy and programmes should also seek to empower refugees to establish their own entrepreneurial and business activities, by working with local government to ease access to capital and financial services, as well as the issuance of business and movement permits.

4. Clear guidelines and structures are needed for how the private sector can approach humanitarian partners, be contracted directly for service or product provision, and work together with them to improve cost effectiveness. Topics covered would include intellectual property and revenue ownership. Currently there are loopholes within current procurement structures that allow humanitarian–private partnerships to happen, but these are time consuming and can deter private partners from engagement.

5. There is a need to expand on the market information that IFC and other organisations have started to compile. Understanding market opportunities will attract private sector investment and generate more livelihood opportunities. UNHCR and some host governments have also been developing skills directories. These should be used by private actors to see what local labour skillsets are available for recruitment or to identify skill gaps for training.

6. Additional research is needed to consider how supply chains in key sectors work, and how they might be adapted to include refugee-affected communities; how strategic matchmaking between private sector and refugee enterprises might work (particularly linking small and medium enterprises with larger commercial enterprises); and how financial inclusion and credit function in the refugee context.

9 Durable solutions

Much of the focus of the CRRF and the Nairobi Process have been on developing better ways of supporting refugees in their host countries. The work done on education, and jobs and livelihoods, as discussed above is indicative of this approach. However, there is also a strong impetus towards promoting the three so-called 'durable solutions' – repatriation, local integration and resettlement to a third country. Our research included a strand in which 'non-traditional actors' – including line ministries not typically involved with displacement issues as well as the private sector, Chambers of Commerce and other actors – have been involved, working towards durable solutions; we have also considered the perceptions of all stakeholders of the role that IGAD has played in promoting durable solutions in the region.

In this chapter we consider integration and repatriation efforts, as well as cross-ministerial collaboration to promote durable solutions. We do not look as much at resettlement, since as noted above the space for pursuing third country resettlement has been shrinking, though we do acknowledge that much more advocacy is needed in this area to provide safe havens for people who are unable to either repatriate or to remain in the country of first asylum safely. Durable solutions in the Nairobi Process are premised on the principle that different people may require different solutions. Integration may be the best solution for refugees who have lived out of their country of origin for many years, particularly if safe and sustainable return is not possible. However, within a given refugee population some people may wish and be able to be repatriated safely, whereas others may not and thus may need to pursue local integration options.

9.1   Integration and local–host relationships

Of all the study countries, the most comprehensive pathway to local integration is in Uganda, where refugees can move between settlement and city, access all basic services, and can work and own property. Other countries have increased the provisions for promoting self-reliance and enabling some form of integration, to varying degrees. None of the countries has legal pathways to enable refugees to become citizens.

In several countries, the goal of promoting education and livelihoods is aimed not only at facilitating local integration if return is not possible, but also at preparing people to be able one day to return to their countries of origin with skills that they may use to support themselves.

Integration support under the CRRF builds on processes of integration that have been going on for long before the CRRF or Nairobi Process were introduced. This is the process that the county representative from Garissa, who mentioned "silent integration," was referring to in Section 7.5. Such integration, based on shared cultural ties, marriages, economic relations and use of common resources, has been most fraught when resources have been too scarce to be shared equitably. One refugee leader in Kakuma said: "There is some inter-marriage between both communities and some have produced children but no dowry is paid, as we do not have animals." Support aimed at promoting both refugee and host communities is intended to improve both communities' abilities to share resources and to peacefully coexist.

Integration efforts in Kenya have been somewhat hampered by concerns about refugees being secu-

rity threats, as well as taking opportunities away from local hosts in districts where jobs and services are scarce. As an informant in Garissa said: "Integrating them locally … means that once they are here they farm, do business, get jobs etc. These things are not available thereby making it difficult in terms of provision. It is even worse in arid areas. If you have too many of them [refugees] then this becomes a problem to be fully achieved. The economy is slim. Getting them to integrate is difficult, you cannot integrate without jobs etc. It is the same case with schools and of course the issue of sustainability also becomes difficult."

Local host community members and local government officials expressed some concern about investing heavily in providing services and opportunities for refugees, given the uncertainties about the future of Dadaab camp. As one local government official put it: "The problem is how the framework is fronted (we are not taking a loan to build a school for refugees…the schools are built in our land and the refugees that happen to be there also benefit). What will happen when refugees go and we remain with the schools?" Another worried that focusing on integration of refugees might distract from the government's main objective of facilitating repatriation from Dadaab: "Don't forget about Dadaab. It is clear that it will close at some point, but we need to focus on what will happen to the affected populations. We need to support the movement of non-Somalis to Kakuma, the resettlement or repatriation of Somalis and non-Somalis, support the vulnerable Kenyans who had registered as refugees."

Efforts to promote integration by providing the same kinds of assistance to refugees and hosts do not always work to plan. A key informant in Turkana said: "Houses being built by NCCK [National Council of Churches of Kenya] were for refugees but there are some houses outside Kalobeyei for hosts but they come in during the day, they sell firewood and meat, and in the evening, they go back (to their original homes that aren't far away). Their lifestyle is different."

In Uganda, like Djibouti and Somalia, efforts have been made to integrate refugee issues into the National Development Plan. There have also been several initiatives to promote comprehensive assistance to refugees and hosts in terms of facilitating integration, which have been going on for many years (see Chapter 4). However the sudden and dramatic increase in numbers of newly arrived refugees from South Sudan in the past few years has placed such strain on local communities that the additional support has in most cases not brought tangible benefits to hosts and has not been able to smooth relations between refugees and hosts. Conflicts between refugees and host communities have emerged over the availability of land and natural resources, including water and fuelwood.

Focus on urban displacement and integrating urban planning with durable solutions programming

Particularly in Somalia, where internal displacement intersects so strongly with the challenges facing refugees, returnees and hosts, and where displacement tends to be an urban issue, informants emphasised the need to coordinate work between durable solutions and urban development to "ensure that the conversation about the urbanisation economic growth engine (smart cities, etc) is meshed with the story of solutions to displacement. Urbanisation in Somalia is an outcome of the displacement crisis. These populations are poor and asset-stripped. There are parallel conversations happening [but] the concerns are the same."

Many of those displaced into cities are realistically unlikely to be able to return to their rural homes, and many have no desire to do so. In research by the REF undertaken in Somalia in 2018, the desire on the part of IDPs to return to their rural places of origin varied considerably. Thirty-three per cent of IDPs in Baidoa, 36 per cent in Kismayo and 67 per cent in Mogadishu expressed a desire to

return (REF, 2018a, p 18). Therefore planning and servicing growing cities has to take into account the needs of the urban displaced as well.

While the urban nature of displacement may be most stark in Somalia, it is also an issue in all the other study countries. Djibouti's refugees are increasingly leaving the refugee camps and seeking to settle themselves in Djibouti City or Ali Sabieh, but lack most forms of support, and their presence is becoming a matter of concern for local urban residents. Similar dynamics were also reported in Kenya and Uganda.

9.2   Repatriation

Among the study countries, repatriation is being pursued most strongly from Kenya to Somalia. Since the formal start of the voluntary repatriation programme in 2014, an estimated 91,531 people have been assisted to return from Kenya to Somalia (UNHCR, 2019d). They receive a reintegration package which includes food assistance for the first six months, a one-time installation grant of $200 per person, core relief item kits, and education packages for the first nine to 12 months (UNHCR, 2019h). Refugees from Dadaab, however, say that many people have returned to the camp either because of insecurity or because they were unable to support themselves after the reintegration package had finished. One refugee said: "I was born here in Kenya and if I want to go back, I would like it rather than be here. But on social media I see people fleeing [from Somalia] while [the] UN is saying we should go back. We have several people who went to Somalia and came back to the camp." These decisions may be particularly difficult for women to make, given the constraints that they are likely to face in terms of livelihoods and access to services.

To make repatriation to Somalia more 'durable' will of course take time, as the country works to expand areas of security and build national service systems. At the same time, some interviewees felt that, even in the current environment, more could be done to make return sustainable by pushing for an expanded understanding of durable solutions to include social safeguards, healthcare, integration of education, protection and secure livelihoods.

The 2019 ReDSS Solutions Analysis Update on lessons learned to support (re)integration programming in Mogadishu, Baidoa and Kismayo concluded that: "As of 2019, the pieces of the durable solutions puzzle are present but have not yet come together in a cohesive manner in Somalia" (ReDSS, 2019a p 8). Key reasons for this are that "the processes to support durable solutions only began in Somalia in 2016, and progress is hindered by inadequate levels of information sharing and joint planning, as well as a lack of common tools and standards for monitoring and evaluation" (ReDSS, 2019a). Nonetheless, despite the initial challenges and parallel processes linked to the CRRF and durable solutions landscape in Somalia, there are some aspects of the CRRF process that are viewed in a more positive light, especially in terms of improved coordination among partners and greater government engagement.

9.3   Cross-ministerial collaboration for durable solutions programming

As noted in the country profiles above, most countries have CRRF steering committees that bring together the different line ministries and other actors engaged in durable solutions programming. In Somalia, CRRF work has been folded into the Durable Solutions Secretariat within the Ministry of Planning at federal level. The practice of 'tagging' activities related to durable solutions within the government's overall budget has also been introduced, in order to make it easier to monitor progress on durable solutions programming across the different ministries.

In Somalia, a key change since 2016 has been the growing number of consortia and initiatives dedicated to durable solutions. Many of these durable solutions programmes are aligned with the CRRF,

even though they may not be direct results of it. From a donor perspective, evaluations and lessons learned from earlier projects and phases of implementation appear to have been more important in the design and approach of current programmes. A federal Durable Solutions Secretariat has been established within the Ministry of Planning, and a durable solutions steering committee has also been created to bring together different ministries involved in delivering durable solutions.

A Nairobi-based key informant reflected on the role of durable solutions programming in operationalising the terms of the Global Compact: "The Global Compact is wider than what the [durable] solutions programmes are delivering. The GC was about sharing resources, responsibilities; it was high-level while these solutions programmes look at issues sector by sector. UNHCR says the Compact is the same as the [durable] solutions programmes but it isn't. [Durable solutions programmes] are specific – ensuring urban cities are not over stretched, ensuring protection issues are mitigated (for instance on domestic violence), ensuring local administration is able to respond, ministries are capacitated ... CRRF is bigger than the above." The challenge, this informant went on, is to help ensure that the Federal Government of Somalia has the budget to expand the infrastructure and that there is commitment by governments to support these activities.

In Kenya, there is discussion on creating a Ministry of Coordination that will create a whole-of-government approach and refugee issues may be linked to this ministry. If this plan is implemented it could be a significant improvement over the current situation, where refugee affairs are managed by the Ministry of Interior.

While cross-ministerial cooperation is improving in all the study countries, the biggest shift may be seen in Djibouti, where the government has established a strong CRRF steering group co-chaired by the Minister of Interior and ONARS, supported by the Expanded Working Group and Cluster Groups (see the Djibouti country profile above).

As coordination improves, the confidence of donors and operational agencies to engage more with durable solutions programming is also building. In all countries, new partners are coming in or are increasing their support for durable solutions programming. This includes the World Bank-led DRDIP programmes in Djibouti, Uganda and Kenya, and new programmes from ILO and UNDP. This is an encouraging trend that should be promoted through the demonstration of effective coordination and monitoring mechanisms, as well as the completion of costed Action Plans in each country.

9.4   IGAD's leadership has helped shift the political debate on durable solutions

IGAD's role in elevating durable solutions to the political agenda of regional member states is credited by many interviewees. Said one Nairobi-based actor: "The whole solutions agenda had a force from the IGAD process. Even donors and implementing partners started to talk about solutions when IGAD started to talk about the CRRF." Another interviewee agreed, saying, "The discussion on solutions has gained momentum and organisations not [previously] involved in solutions now are part of it."

In Kenya, the Nairobi Declaration is credited with helping shift the political debate away from repatriation as the only acceptable solution for such refugees towards a more nuanced approach, which offers pathways for greater integration alongside preparations for repatriation and continued resettlement (even in the face of fewer resettlement places being made available). Informants noted that the political imperative to close the Dadaab refugee camp and repatriate all Somali refugees has waned since the Nairobi Declaration was agreed.

9.5   Recommendations for durable solutions

1. Durable solutions programming should continue to take the 'different solutions for different people' approach that underlies the Nairobi Process and the CRRF. Neither repatriation nor integration is likely to be a viable solution for all refugees. This should be reflected in IGAD's approach, in donor programming, and in government policy and implementation.

2. In all CRRF countries, donors should support government to take the lead on durable solutions. Donors need to know the importance of each ministry, when each ministry should come in, and allow these ministries to exercise their mandates.

3. Strengthening local governance is a key priority of many of the durable solutions programmes in Somalia, Uganda and Kenya. More training and sensitisation among local actors on durable solutions concepts and related issues is required.

4. The need for stronger partnerships between actors working on durable solutions (government, donors, humanitarian actors, development partners, and recipient countries) is a priority. Work by the Durable Solutions Secretariat in the Ministry of Planning in Somalia, for instance, should be supported, as should its efforts to bring support for displacement-affected communities in line with the National Development Plan.

5. Gender inequality needs to be reflected in durable solutions programming, and opportunities made available for women in displacement-affected areas (and others who are excluded from programme benefits such as disabled persons or those who are discriminated against on the basis of clan, ethnicity, etc). Durable solutions programming should also cover protection laws.

6. IGAD and donor countries should continue to work towards creating opportunities for third country resettlement for refugees who are not able to repatriate or to remain their country of first asylum safely.

10 Key recommendations

The research conducted in Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda shows that significant results can be seen from the region's implementation of the CRRF and the Nairobi Process. The role of IGAD as a political broker, bringing together the states within the region to achieve these results, and as a provider of technical support to national processes, has been significant. The recent launching of the Platform to support IGAD's work on refugees is a welcome development, which should help the region to continue on this path.

Detailed recommendations for education, jobs and livelihoods, engagement with the private sector and durable solutions have been given in Chapters 6-9, respectively. In this concluding chapter we highlight the key recommendations of the full study, noting who should take them forward.

1. *Support for IGAD is essential.* IGAD's role as political broker is unique and it should be supported by donors and member states to continue to perform this important function. Its coordination and technical functions should also be supported by donors, member states and line ministries in CRRF countries. This can be done by establishing an independent monitoring system with reporting indicators for each country and for all partners and agencies involved.

2. *More donors should commit to multi-year funding, including direct budgetary support*, to CRRF countries to foster the expansion of activities to the local level and to enable full incorporation of refugees into national development plans.

3. *Participation of local level governments, civil society, refugees and host communities* should be incorporated into planning, implementation and monitoring of all CRRF activities by member states. Development donors and implementing agencies should also work to integrate displacement-affected communities into their programming. Local action plans for implementation should be developed together with local government counterparts, civil society, and refugee and host communities.

4. *The education sector needs urgent attention to make the transition from ad hoc projects to national systems*. Financing from the international community will be key for the implementation of education inclusion policies (including secondary and tertiary education), as well as quality of education for refugees and host communities. Governments should work to ensure that coordination functions effectively to ensure that implementation and localisation have real impact.

5. *Further policy formulation is needed on jobs and livelihoods*, and where policy and legislation is not yet enacted these processes should be completed. Jobs and livelihoods interventions need to be better coordinated and guided by government policy that sets out procedures and standards for developing employment opportunities for refugees and hosts, based on market demand that facilitates mobility of refugees and encourages the engagement of private sector employers and trainers. IGAD should monitor and support these processes, and

bring together member states to harmonise their efforts to develop effective jobs and livelihoods policies that benefit refugees, hosts and others affected by displacement.

6. Governments should incorporate commitments to protecting refugees' rights into livelihoods policy with respect to documentation, access to services and mobility, all of which maximise the impact of livelihoods initiatives. IGAD should provide technical support in this respect to enable learning from best practice.

7. Governments, IGAD and members of the private sector, in particular potential employers, should develop policy frameworks and partnership guidelines for the engagement of the private sector at the local level. This could include ownership, revenue sharing, intellectual property and procurement guidelines.

8. *There is a need to consolidate and expand the gains made with respect to education and jobs and livelihoods*, and to use the experiences gained from these sectors in the expansion of the approach to other sectors, particularly the health sector. IGAD should continue to coordinate and provide a forum for sharing monitoring information.

9. Durable solutions programming, promoting different solutions for different people, should be pursued through close coordination facilitated by IGAD and member states. This can be done at the political level by encouraging states to commit to pursuing all of the durable solutions (rather than, for instance, focusing solely on return) and integrating durable solutions programming into national development plans (by governments) and development programming (by donors and implementing partners).

10. Particular attention should be given by governments, donors, and implementing NGOs to the needs of women in displacement-affected areas, as well as vulnerable groups that are often side-lined in humanitarian and development programming. This is relevant for localisation and participation, education, jobs and livelihoods, private sector engagement, and durable solutions programmes and policies.

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Annex 1: List of acronyms

AAH-I	Action Africa Help International
CBI	Cash-based intervention
CIDP	County Integrated Development Plan
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
DFID	Department for International Development
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DRDIP	Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project
DSI	Durable Solutions Initiative
ECHO	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
ECW	Education Cannot Wait
ERP	Education Response Plan
EUTF	European Union Emergency Trust Fund
FGD	Focus group discussion
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
GCR	Global Compact on Refugees
GISEDP	Garissa Integrated Socio-Economic Development Plan
GPE	Global Partnership for Education
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IDP	Internally displaced person
IFC	International Finance Corporation
ILO	International Labour Organisation
INEE	Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
ITC	International Trade Centre
JRS	Jesuit Refugee Service
KISEDP	Kalobeyei Integrated Socio-Economic Development Plan
KNBS	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
LED	Local economic development
MoE	Ministry of Education
NCRI	National Commissioner for Refugees and IDPs
NDP	Somalia National Development Plan (2017-2019)
NIIMS	National Integrated Identity Management System
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
ONARS	Office National d'Assistance aux Refugiés et Sinistrés
RAS	Refugee Affairs Secretariat
RDPP	Regional development and protection programme
REF	Research and Evidence Facility
ReHoPE	Refugee and Host Population Empowerment
RESI	Refugee Employment and Skills Initiative
ReDSS	Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat
SGBV	Sexual and gender based violence
SOAS	School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
TSC	Teachers Service Commission
TVET	Technical and vocational education and training

UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WFP	World Food Programme