



EUTF Monitoring and Learning System SLC

2023 REPORT

COVERING UNTIL 31 DECEMBER 2023

Altai Consulting for the European Union – June 2024



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
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the 13th report prepared by the Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) for the Sahel and Lake Chad (SLC) window. It covers all outputs achieved through funding from the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced people in Africa (EUTF for Africa or EUTF) in the SLC region, from the start of activities until 31 December 2023, with a specific focus on outputs generated in 2023.

This report includes outputs from programmes implemented in Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, The Gambia and Togo.¹

As of 31 December 2023, the EUTF for Africa had committed² EUR 5.0B (billion), including EUR 2.2B to 114 decisions in the SLC window. A total of 213 operational projects have been contracted in the SLC region, including 160 completed projects, 52 projects in implementation and one project in inception. 49 of the projects currently in implementation have data or other qualitative information to report and three are either too early in their implementation phase to be able to report outputs or their activities have not yet generated outputs that are relevant to the EUTF indicators. The current report includes data on 209 projects (equivalent in funding to EUR 2.09B), comprising 160 completed projects, as well as 49 projects in their implementation phase with data to report.

Figure 1: Contracted budget breakdown by country and Strategic Objective, December 2023³



Strategic Objective 1: Greater economic and employment opportunities

In 2023, West African economies struggled with high inflation, weak currencies, and slowing gross domestic product (GDP) growth. Inflation peaked at 20.3%⁴ while real GDP fell from 4.4% to 3.2%.⁵ Despite these challenges, projections for 2024–2025 suggest potential improvements. Amidst this economic backdrop, several countries undertook debt relief measures; however, debt service remained a major burden, absorbing 47.5% of government revenues.⁶

As the EUTF nears its conclusion, the number of active programmes focusing on job creation (indicator 1.1), micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprise (MSME) creation or support (indicator 1.2), as well as increasing the number of people benefitting from technical and vocational education and training (TVET) and skills development (1.4) significantly declined (from 47 in 2020 to just 21 in 2023), leading to the lowest annual output since the Fund's inception for these indicators. Over the year, a total of 20,926 new jobs were created, bringing the cumulative total to 158,651 jobs (indicator 1.1). Skills training emerged as the predominant strategy for job creation, accounting for 58% of new jobs, shifting away from previous focuses on MSME development and cash-for-work programmes. Countries with the highest numbers of created jobs were Ghana (41%), Niger (16%), and Guinea (15%). In contrast to

¹ Outputs in Benin, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Togo are collected through regional programmes.

² This refers to funds allocated following decisions by the Operational Committees.

³ Share of budget for projects contracted and relevant to the MLS.

⁴ AfDB, 'Africa's Macroeconomic Performance and Outlook', January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ AfDB, 'Africa's Macroeconomic Performance and Outlook', January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ World Bank, 'Africa's Pulse', October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

the diminishing overall results, the number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities (IGAs) (indicator 1.3) reached 158,644 in 2023, mainly through the GrEEEn UNCDF¹ project, with 79% of beneficiaries located in Ghana. This marks the second highest annual result since EUTF's inception.

Strategic Objective 2: Strengthening the resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable, including refugees and other displaced people

The food security situation across West Africa and the Sahel deteriorated sharply in 2023, due to a confluence of conflict, climate shocks and large-scale population displacement. These crises drove acute malnutrition up by 83%², affecting over 45 million people at crisis levels of food insecurity, including 25,505 in the catastrophe/famine stage.³ The persistent insecurity continued to destabilise fragile food systems and hamper aid delivery across key affected countries. It also affected the region's capacity to provide essential services. Consequently 8,397 schools⁴ and 471 health centres⁵ remained closed this year, restricting access to education and health care.

Amid these challenges, EUTF interventions provided targeted support to strengthen resilience. In Mali, PST ML⁶ provided unconditional cash transfers to 153,184 vulnerable individuals (indicator 2.4) during the lean season. In Chad, DIZA Sud⁷ enhanced long-term food security through the distribution of agricultural tools to cooperatives and farmers, benefitting 212,256 people, 45% of whom were women (indicator 2.4). The regional PDU⁸ programme supported water and sanitation access in Burkina Faso and Chad. In Burkina Faso, it successfully provided improved water access to a total of 6,550 individuals, including host communities and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and facilitated improved access to clean water for 40,808 patients at health centres (indicator 2.9). In Chad, the programme effectively increased access to latrines and/or drinking water services for a total of 95,188 people (indicator 2.3).

Strategic Objective 3: Improved migration management in countries of origin, transit, and destination

Forced displacement across West Africa continued to escalate in 2023, with the total number of displaced individuals reaching over 8 million, primarily driven by intensifying conflicts.⁹ Nigeria and Burkina Faso, grappling with jihadist violence, along with Chad, which received a large influx of refugees fleeing violence in Sudan, recorded the most significant increases.¹⁰ The spillover effects of violence erupting in Sahelian countries during the latter months of the year led to increased displacement in coastal states. By the end of 2023, Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo collectively hosted 125,112 refugees, asylum-seekers, and IDPs, a nearly five-fold increase from the 27,132 recorded at the end of the previous year.¹¹ In addition, there was a notable rise in irregular migration along the Atlantic and Central Mediterranean routes to Europe, with a 157% increase compared to 2022.¹²

¹ GH-02-02: Boosting Green Employment and Enterprise Opportunities in Ghana. This project is a joint project between the European Union (EU), the Netherlands, UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) and the Netherlands Development Organisation (SNV).

² WFP, 'West Africa and Sahel: Food insecurity, malnutrition, set to reach 10-year high', April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Cadre Harmonisé, 'Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023', November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ OCHA, 'Burkina Faso, Mali and Western Niger – Humanitarian Snapshot', 18 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ ML-14-12: Programme de Soutien à la Transition en République du Mali.

⁷ TD-07-02: Programme de développement inclusif dans les zones d'accueil – Zone sud.

⁸ REG-18: Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.

⁹ UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics – December 2023', 20 January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ Compared numbers from: UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics', December 2022 and 2023. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Figures extracted and compared from Frontex, 'Detections of illegal border-crossings', February 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

In this context, EUTF interventions aimed to strengthen migration management, protection and governance capacities. Programmes, like Protection West Africa¹ and *Stabilisation Agadez*² in Niger, supported migrant protection, with the latter facilitating voluntary returns for 420 individuals (indicator 3.4). Meanwhile, ALTP *Golfe de Guinée*³ provided reintegration support to 308 trafficking in persons (TIP) victims across four countries (indicator 3.5bis). Additionally, capacity-building also remained a key priority, with 1,738 personnel trained on migration-related topics, 69% of them trained specifically on TIP (indicator 3.7). In addition, 20 institutions and organisations were strengthened on issues related to protection and TIP, including 13 in Ghana, four in Guinea and three in Niger (indicator 3.6).

Strategic Objective 4: Improved governance, security and conflict prevention

The security landscape in West Africa deteriorated in 2023, as conflict intensified across the central Sahel region. Burkina Faso was particularly hard-hit, with the death toll from violence nearly doubling from the previous year. Extremist activities expanded across the country, approaching the capital and leaving the government controlling less than half of Burkina Faso's territory. In Mali and Niger, clashes with jihadist groups became more frequent and severe. This escalation occurred amid regional geopolitical shifts, including the withdrawal of French troops from Mali and the Malian junta expelling the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Similarly, Burkina Faso formally requested France to withdraw troops in January and suspended all military cooperation with France in September.

In Niger, the presidential guard orchestrated a coup d'état on 26 July, ousting President Mohamed Bazoum, which led to economic sanctions imposed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In response, the three countries - each led by regimes from military coups - founded the Alliance of Sahel States in September to consolidate defence efforts against threats, distancing themselves from ECOWAS.

EUTF interventions worked to strengthen governance capacities to address root causes of instability and support broader security efforts. In Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, the EUTF ended its cooperation with institutional actors and activities were implemented through support to civil society actors. A key component of the efforts in the region in 2023 was the training of personnel on improved governance, conflict prevention and human rights. In Mali, for example, PST-ML trained 14,625 individuals (indicator 4.2). Additionally, equipment was delivered to institutional actors across the region to strengthen governance. In total, 11,436 items were distributed, ranging from information technology (IT) and technical equipment to vehicles, with Senegal (45%) and Mauritania (17%) receiving the largest share (indicator 4.1 bis).

¹ REG-13: *Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest.*

² NE-12: *Stabilisation et renforcement socio-économique des populations affectées par la migration irrégulière dans les zones de transit au Niger.*

³ REG-12: *Appui à la Lutte contre la Traite des Personnes dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée.*

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND

The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced people in Africa (EUTF for Africa or EUTF) was launched in November 2015. It is composed of three geographical 'windows' – North Africa (NoA), Horn of Africa (HoA) and Sahel and Lake Chad (SLC), which includes 12 main countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and The Gambia. Neighbouring countries are also eligible for regional programmes. This report includes outputs from programmes implemented in 16 countries: the 12 mentioned above as well as Benin, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Togo.¹

This is the 13th report prepared by the Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) for the EUTF SLC window, covering all of the outputs achieved with EUTF funding in the SLC region, from the start of activities through the end of December 2023, with a focus on outputs generated in 2023. Previous reports can be found [here](#).

1.2. THE EUTF SAHEL AND LAKE CHAD WINDOW IN 2023

As of the end of December 2023, the EUTF had committed EUR 5.0B (billion), corresponding to allocated funds following decisions by the EUTF Operational Committees. The SLC window was the largest in size in terms of funding, with EUR 2.2B committed across 114 decisions.² There were 213 operational contracts of interest to the MLS.³ Of these, 160 projects worth EUR 1.6B were completed; 52 projects worth EUR 500M (million) were being implemented; and 1 project (EUR 13M) was in inception. Out of 52 projects currently in implementation, 49 had data to report.⁴ This report presents data from 209 projects, including 160 completed projects, covering a total contracted amount of EUR 2.09B. As such, it covers one additional project compared to the last MLS report (S1 2023).

Funding and implementation continue to follow the EUTF's four Strategic Objectives⁵ (SOs) and the strategic priorities set by the EUTF Strategic Board and ratified in September 2019: i) returns and reintegration; ii) refugee management; iii) progress on the securitisation of documents and civil registry; iv) anti-trafficking measures; v) essential stabilisation efforts; and vi) migration dialogue.

¹ Outputs in Benin, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Togo are collected through regional programmes and are presented in the overview of results section (4.2) of this report.

² EUTF website. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Projects are considered operational when they deliver outputs to beneficiaries. Administrative projects and non-operational projects (e.g. projects contracted under the Research and Evidence Facility and the Technical and Cooperation Facility, feasibility studies, audits, etc.) are not included in the analysis.

⁴ Three projects were either too early in their implementation phase to be able to report outputs at the time of writing, or their activities did not yet generate outputs that are relevant to the EUTF indicators.

⁵ The four Strategic Objectives (SOs) of the EUTF are: SO1 'Greater economic and employment opportunities'; SO2 'Strengthening resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable including refugees and other displaced people'; SO3 'Improved migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination'; and SO4 'Improved governance and conflict prevention and reduction of forced displacement and irregular migration'.

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1. MONITORING AND LEARNING SYSTEM METHODOLOGY

2.1.1. OUTPUT MONITORING

The MLS team works with each implementing partner (IP) to develop a reporting system that allows the MLS to collect the most detailed and granular level of data common to all IPs. To that end, the MLS has developed a reporting template that it uses with most IPs, although the reporting template is tailored to each project through a drafting and feedback process with respective IPs. Given the complexity and diversity of the EUTF portfolio, and the fact that IPs and M&E systems have different resources, limitations and capacities, the MLS tries to offer as much flexibility as possible with regard to the quantity, disaggregation and format of data collected from IPs.

The MLS then aggregates the collected data using a standardised methodology (and later disaggregates it again along various lines of analysis). This approach allows the MLS to help IPs map their own activities and outputs against the list of EUTF common output indicators and to have access to a finer level of disaggregation (e.g., by gender, beneficiary type, location, etc.). It also gives the MLS significant flexibility in adapting the way data is analysed or presented.

Based on received information, the MLS team completes output indicator mappings for each project, collects the relevant data from each IP, checks the data for quality and enters it into the MLS database for aggregation, further quality checking and analysis.

During the S1 2020 reporting period, the EUTF revised its common output indicators and their respective methodologies. The resulting revisions have been formalised through a set of methodological notes, which can be found in the annexes to the S1 2020 report. For more information about this process, please see the S1 2020 report.

2.1.2. OUTCOME ANALYSIS

In addition to output monitoring, the EUTF MLS started to include project- and programme-level outcome analysis in S2 2020 in the form of focus boxes for certain completed projects. As explained in previous reports as well as in this [MLS methodological note](#), aggregating outcome data for the EUTF portfolio is not possible in the way that it is for output data, because there are no common and standardised EUTF outcome indicators. This means that no methodologically harmonised outcome data has been collected by EUTF projects, without which comprehensive and meaningful outcome analysis is impossible. Therefore, it was agreed that the MLS would not undertake a comprehensive quantitative aggregation of outcome indicators across projects.

However, as part of the MLS's broader efforts to assess potential large-scale changes effected by the EUTF in its areas of implementation, in March 2022, the team conducted a review of all outcome indicators reported on by projects completed before July 2021,¹ to assess whether partial aggregation could be feasible in some cases, and if limited conclusions could be drawn about the potential outcomes of the EUTF portfolio beyond specific projects and programmes.

A total of 56 projects that ended before S2 2021 in the SLC window were assessed as part of this exercise.² Of these 56, 35 projects had shared a final evaluation report with the MLS team. The

¹ According to EUTF directives, projects are required to deliver their final report no later than six months after the end of their project, hence the choice of this deadline for the inclusion of projects in the study. It should be noted, however, that the lack of a final report after this deadline may be due to various factors, including the possibility that reports were not made available to the MLS team.

² See footnote 1.

remaining 21 projects were either not relevant for a final evaluation, pending a final evaluation due to a recent end-date, or part of an ongoing programme, or the related documents were not made available to the MLS team. Collectively, these projects reported on 514 outcome and impact indicators, of which 370 were categorised by the MLS to be 'true' outcomes indicators.¹ Among those, 313 indicators were assessed by the team to be SMART.² Combining results in initial SLC and HoA analysis, 33 common outcome indicator categories were identified, of which 20 were relevant to outcomes mapped under SLC projects.

However, while categories allow indicators to be grouped into batches of similar expected outcomes, the way indicators are measured or defined often prevents aggregation. Even in cases where outcome indicators are exactly equivalent, aggregated values cannot be weighted or calculated without knowing the relevant population or sample size. Furthermore, limitations in the quality and availability of project indicator descriptions and data negatively affect their aggregation potential. In many cases, indicators measured at baseline were not measured again at endline (or vice versa), or the endline evaluation collected data for a similar but incomparable indicator to the one used at baseline.

As such, it is only possible to aggregate a limited number of indicators across EUTF projects and, even in these cases, methodological limitations and caveats must be considered. These aggregable indicators were then analysed in the SO sections of the 2021 annual report, and these analyses will be continually revised in future annual reports (as a critical mass of additional completed projects are required before the aggregated data can be significantly updated). Project-specific outcome analyses continue to be included as focus boxes in their respective country sections.

2.2. CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS IN THE 2023 REPORT

During the implementation of the methodological changes, some projects were unable to provide the additional disaggregation requested. In these cases, data was included under the 'unspecified' category in the MLS analyses. Others lacked data for the newly created indicators. Significant cases of this include:

- Due to the methodological changes to the common output indicators performed in S1³ 2020, not all previously gathered GIZ data could be transferred to the changed system. Therefore, the GIZ data included in this report is not complete and numbers may differ from earlier reports.⁴
- For completed projects where IPs could no longer be contacted, the MLS team applied only those methodological changes that were feasible without consultation, using project documents, such as final evaluations, for reference.

Data for 2023 was received from all projects for which it was expected, except for the following (which sent partial or no data):

- G5 Law Compliance (REG-23-02), PDU RECOSOC (REG-18-08), POC Mali (ML-13-01), PARSEC EF (ML-06-02), AJUSEN CENTIF (NE-06-04), Stabilisation ESO Niger (NE-06-07), RDPPDH (NE-06-09), DESERT (NE-11-03), PASREP (NE-12-01), and TUUMA (BF-06-01).

Finally, it is important to note that, as projects are closing, they compile their total outputs and often conduct a complete revision of their data. They sometimes ask the MLS to correct past data over the whole lifetime of the project. The full list of corrections impacting data reported in past MLS reports is provided in Annex 6. This year, large corrections were introduced by ALTP *Golfe de Guinée*, the EU-IOM Joint Initiative, GrEEen UNCDF and DIZA Sud.

¹ See footnote 2.

² Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, and Time-bound.

³ S1 stands for the first semester, and S2 for the second semester.


⁴ However, historical data for all projects was retroactively adapted to the methodological changes, whenever possible, and therefore data provided within the same report is comparable, even across reporting periods.

3. PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW

3.1. BUDGET AND NUMBER OF CONTRACTS BY STATUS

As of 31 December 2023, the EUTF for Africa had committed¹ EUR 5.0B, including EUR 2.2B to 114 decisions in the SLC window. A total of 213 operational projects have been contracted in the SLC region, including 160 completed projects, 52 projects in implementation and one project in inception. Of the projects currently being implemented, 49 had data or other qualitative information to report. The remaining three projects were either too early in their implementation to be able to report outputs or their activities had not yet generated outputs relevant to the EUTF indicators. The current report includes data on 209 projects (equivalent in funding to EUR 2.09B), comprising 160 completed projects, as well as 49 projects in their implementation phase with data to report.

Figure 2: Projects and budget covered by the annual 2022 MLS report, December 2023



Since the publication of the previous report, the following projects have been added to the MLS database and to this report:


Table 1: Project newly added to the MLS for the annual 2023 report, December 2023

Country	Programme Name	EUTF ID	Project Name	Lead IP	EUTF Budget
Regional	Support to the strengthening of police information systems in the broader West Africa region	T05-EUTF-SAH-REG-03-02	<i>Appui au renforcement du Système d'Information Policière au Tchad</i>	Interpol	€ 3,000,000

The graph below represents the evolution in the number of EUTF contracted operational projects as well as the number of projects included in the MLS reports, together with the corresponding funding amounts. Between July and December 2023, the project listed above was newly included in the MLS database, representing an EUR 3M funding increase. However, a total increase of EUR 73M in funding is covered by the present report, as recent adjustments in budgets were not reflected in the previous MLS SLC reports.


¹ This refers to funds allocated following decisions by the Operational Committees.

Figure 3: Evolution of projects and budgets covered by the MLS in SLC, December 2023



The graph below shows the 213 contracted operational projects by budget, lifespan, and status of implementation. The graph uses shortened programme names for the sake of clarity. Budgets refer solely to the EUTF contribution. The length of the bars represents the lifespan of the project and the height/width of the EUTF budget per project. The colour of the bars indicates the status of the project. Dates of completion are considered as of January 2024.


Figure 4: EUTF SLC contracted projects by budget and implementation status, January 2024



3.2. BUDGET DISTRIBUTION BY COUNTRY, IMPLEMENTING PARTNER AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

As of December 2023, regional projects collectively represented the largest amount of contracted EUTF funding. At the regional level, EUR 667.3M (or 31% of the total) were contracted to 55 projects. At the country level, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso have the largest portfolios, with budgets of EUR 290.6M (14%), EUR 285.3M (13%), and EUR 190.1M (9%), respectively.

Figure 5: Budget distribution by country and implementing partner, June 2023^{1,2}



The EUTF SLC budget for operational contracted projects remains largely managed by member state agencies (EUR 885.6M, or 42% of the budget), as well as United Nations (UN) agencies, funds, and programmes (EUR 509.0M, or 24%). Projects managed by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) represent 19% of the total budget, amounting to EUR 392.8M. The governments of recipient countries directly receive 11% (or EUR 237.7M) of the budget, mostly in the form of budget support actions, followed by international organisations (EUR 69.1M, or 3%) and the private sector (EUR 24.3M, or 1%).³

With regard to the Strategic Objectives (SO), security and governance activities (SO4) receive the largest share of the budget at 32% (EUR 667.9). SO4 is the main priority in Burkina Faso (70% of the budget), Nigeria (56%), Niger (42%), Mali (41%) and Mauritania (41%). Regional projects receive the

¹ The map shows the distribution of the combined SLC budget (EUR 2.18B) for the 213 operational projects, per country.

² 'New' refers to projects newly added to the MLS for the current report.

³ For many contracts, parts of the budgets are subcontracted by IPs (including member state agencies and UN agencies, funds and programmes) at least in part to NGOs and CSOs.


largest amount of funding for SO4 (EUR 134.4M), followed by projects in Burkina Faso (EUR 131.9M) and in Niger (EUR 120.7M).

Resilience-building (SO2) represents 25% of EUTF funds in the SLC window (EUR 536.8M) and is particularly significant in Chad (74%) and Cameroon (49%) as well as among regional projects (32%). Regional projects dedicated to SO2 represent EUR 215.1M, followed by Mali (EUR 89.5M), Chad (EUR 82.5M) and Nigeria (EUR 39.0M).

Economic and employment opportunities (SO1) are supported by 23% (or EUR 492.9M) of the EUTF SLC budget. These types of activities are particularly important in West African coastal countries, such as The Gambia (90% of the total funds for this country), Côte d'Ivoire (83%), Guinea (82%), Ghana (80%) and Senegal (55%). In absolute numbers, the countries with the largest amount of funding dedicated to SO1 are Senegal with EUR 90.3M and Niger with EUR 87.0M.

Finally, migration management (SO3) represents another 20% (EUR 421.1M) of total EUTF funding in SLC. SO3 is funded primarily through regional programmes, which represent EUR 277.3M. National country programmes dedicated to SO3 are prevalent in Niger (EUR 53.9M) and Senegal (EUR 28.4M).

Figure 6: Contracted budget breakdown by strategic objective, June 2023¹



¹ Share of budget for projects contracted and relevant to the MLS.

4. SITUATION AND RESULTS OVERVIEW

4.1. THE SAHEL AND LAKE CHAD REGION IN 2023

The security and humanitarian crisis affecting West Africa, and particularly the Sahel region, persisted throughout 2023 as violence intensified in several Central Sahel countries. Jihadist insurgent groups remained highly active and threatened the integrity of the countries. In Burkina Faso, armed groups approached controlled 50% of the territory¹ and the number of victims doubled compared to the previous year, making 2023 the deadliest year since the conflict's onset.² Meanwhile, tensions heightened in northern Mali, between the Malian armed forces (FAMA) and Tuareg separatist groups.³ Northern Nigeria was another epicentre of violence in the region, where jihadist groups continued fierce attacks contributing to chronic instability.⁴

These conflicts took place amidst volatile political and institutional contexts in the region. In Burkina Faso and Mali, military juntas, increasingly tightened their grip over their respective countries, threatened the freedom of the press and undermined opposition groups, jeopardising potential democratic transitions.⁵ In July, Niger also fell into military rule, following a coup which ousted democratically elected President Mohamed Bazoum, considered close to Western nations.⁶ These three countries distanced themselves from France and Western institutions. The Burkina Faso junta formally requested the withdrawal of French troops in January⁷ and suspended all military cooperation with France in September.⁸ In addition, the Mali junta demanded the immediate withdrawal of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in June, marking the end of its decade-long operation in the country.⁹ Lastly, in September, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali founded the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)¹⁰, as an alternative to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Violence contributed to the deepening displacement crisis. Nigeria and Burkina Faso hosted the largest numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs), whereas the Gulf of Guinea coastal nations and Chad saw increased numbers of refugees. By December, over 8.3 million people were forcibly displaced across West Africa,^{11,12} including both IDPs and refugees, with the highest numbers in Nigeria (3.6 million), Burkina Faso (2.1 million), Chad (1.3 million), Niger (0.6 million) and Mali (0.5 million).¹³ The coastal Gulf of Guinea states¹⁴ recorded 125,112 refugees and IDPs in Benin, Côte

¹ APNews, 'More than 2 million people displaced, Burkina Faso's government says, as aid falls short', 5 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² ACLED, 'The Sahel: A deadly New Era in the Decades-Long Conflict', 17 January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ BBC, 'Mali army seizes key rebel northern stronghold Kidal', 14 November 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ ICG, 'JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters', 28 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ France 24, 'Au Burkina Faso, les élections s'éloignent et la Constitution sera modifiée', 30 September 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ France 24, 'In the fight against jihadist groups, Niger has no better allies than France and the US', 3 August 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ RFI, 'Le Burkina Faso confirme avoir demandé le départ des troupes françaises', 23 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Jeune Afrique, 'Le Burkina Faso rompt définitivement sa coopération militaire avec la France', 15 September 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Le Monde, 'Au Mali, la mission de l'ONU engage sous tension une nouvelle phase de son retrait', 17 October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ Jeune Afrique, 'Le Mali, le Burkina Faso et le Niger scellent "l'Alliance des États du Sahel"', 16 September 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ This and the following numbers include figures from: Benin; Burkina Faso; Chad; Côte d'Ivoire; Ghana; Guinea; Mali; Mauritania; Niger; Nigeria; Senegal; The Gambia; and Togo. Benin and Togo, which are not part of the SLC region, were relevant to mention in regard to the spillover effects of the conflict in the Sahelian countries.

¹² Mauritania, which is part of the SLC window, does not appear in the UNHCR regional monthly statistics used for the other countries. Figures for Mauritania were found in another UNHCR source: UNHCR, 'Mauritania – Registered refugees and asylum-seekers as of 1 January 2024', January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹³ UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics – December 2023', 20 January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁴ Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo.

d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo by the end of 2023 (a fivefold increase compared to December 2022).¹ The conflict that broke out in April 2023 in Sudan also led to a significant arrival of refugees in eastern Chad.

Amidst significant regional displacements, the main migration routes to Europe experienced an increase in numbers in 2023. Between January and December, 39,673 migrants reached the Canary Islands through the Atlantic Route, representing a 157% increase compared to 2022.² Of migrants taking this route in 2023, 83% came from the SLC countries.³ The Central Mediterranean route also saw a 54% increase in numbers, from 105,561 individuals in 2022 to 162,714 in 2023.⁴

Cadre Harmonisé data showed that millions of people faced food insecurity or even famine during the lean season from June to August, during which 45.2 million people faced crisis levels of food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or higher). This included 25,505 people experiencing Catastrophe/Famine (IPC Phase 5), with 19,867 located in Burkina Faso and 1,671 in Mali.⁵ Chad was also especially impacted by food insecurity, with 1.5 million people in a state of food crisis – twice as many as in 2022. In Chad, this surge was attributed to agricultural shortfalls caused by pest infestations and irregular rainfall.⁶

The region also suffered from structural economic issues in 2023. West African economies endured high inflation, weak currencies and slow growth. Inflation peaked above 20.3% after rising sharply from 2022 levels.⁷ Currencies like the Ghanaian cedi and Nigerian naira depreciated against the dollar. Debt loads remained extremely high despite the restructuring of some nations' obligations.⁸ The IMF and World Bank judged debt distress acute for Cameroon, Chad, Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia, declaring Ghana already in debt distress.⁹ Unsustainable debt burdened domestic banking sectors, private industries and employment across much of the West African region.¹⁰

4.2. THE EUTF RESPONSE – OVERVIEW OF RESULTS

This section offers an analysis of the results of the EUTF's response to date against its four Strategic Objectives: economy and employment; resilience (food security and access to basic services); migration management; and governance and conflict prevention.

¹ Compared numbers from: UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics', December 2022 and 2023. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).

² Figures extracted and compared from Frontex, 'Detections of illegal border-crossings', February 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ For this analysis, nationals from countries covered by the SLC report were considered: Burkina Faso; Chad; Côte d'Ivoire; Ghana; Guinea; Mali; Mauritania; Niger; Nigeria; Senegal; and The Gambia.

⁴ Figures extracted and compared from Frontex, 'Detections of illegal border crossings', February 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Cadre Harmonisé, 'Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023', November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ UNOCHA, 'Chad Humanitarian Update December 2023', January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ AfDB, 'Africa's Macroeconomic Performance and Outlook', January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).


⁸ World Bank, 'Africa's Pulse', April 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ World Bank, 'Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)', consulted in April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ EIB, 'Finance in Africa', 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

4.2.1. OVERVIEW OF EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Figure 7: Main achievements of EUTF-funded programmes in December 2023



The table below shows the aggregated values reported by SLC projects for the 38 EUTF common output indicators as of 31 December 2023.


Table 2: EUTF common output indicators for all SLC projects, December 2023¹

Indicateur FFU	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	S2 2023	Total	volutio
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	17,333	24,311	30,917	31,189	33,976	11,524	9,402	158,651	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	4,234	4,555	10,652	15,953	13,668	3,480	548	53,090	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	74,906	96,819	77,451	122,793	227,291	37,806	120,838	757,903	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	32,254	44,718	31,062	61,716	52,590	11,511	3,886	237,737	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	18	326	169	144	70	7	4	738	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	70	122	57	61	130	24	6	470	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	1,573	3,443	2,421	3,259	978	484	260	12,418	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	403,805	459,923	127,115	49,791	374,841	12,971	7,900	1,436,346	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	560,237	737,215	341,586	223,079	422,735	171,219	162,775	2,618,846	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	522,319	698,582	801,273	561,068	502,195	379,851	38,036	3,503,325	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	182	218	17	45	15	6	0	483	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	11,413	93,450	21,461	33,434	54,399	5,530	22,863	242,551	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	666,654	1,337,305	34,126,065	9,820,252	16,377,060	437,083	503,260	63,267,680	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	15,129	33,331	52,437	33,887	8,723	10,133	1,126	154,767	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	2,423,091	1,340,869	727,945	1,020,324	864,585	282,676	526,143	7,185,643	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	19	36	36	127	152	4	8	382	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	61,089	12,320	18,100	64,235	55,909	1,236	3,649	216,538	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	443,515	1,022,823	1,253,904	1,808,879	13,893,695	2,935,931	73,858	21,432,606	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	29,194	19,165	16,231	8,012	193	420	0	73,215	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	47,775	22,572	10,625	11,415	11	0	0	92,398	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	17,971	18,089	31,008	22,224	2,770	626	170	92,868	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	64	328	80	50	4	19	1	546	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	729	1,615	3,655	8,214	4,662	1,229	509	20,614	
3.8 Number of people of concern benefiting from evacuation and resettlement...	2,915	1,395	583	465	18	0	0	5,376	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	11	326	305	210	31	0	0	883	
3.11 Number of awareness-raising events on migration	10,340	4,122	1,816	655	487	88	260	17,768	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	22	22	23	49	13	2	4	135	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	2,315	1,313	7,099	34,193	19,033	10,034	1,402	75,389	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	13,686	10,696	10,703	22,149	21,650	11,520	9,673	100,077	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	544,936	432,030	2,650,585	472,161	865,839	1,397,417	1,770,536	8,133,506	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	133	728	362	988	665	63	46	2,985	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	213	760	920	1,175	928	604	169	4,769	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	188	311	2,374	2,144	2,496	27	145	7,685	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	158	201	150	573	602	257	50	1,991	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	47	44	19	37	18	11	8	184	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	11,465,917	2,147,301	6,844	0	0	13,620,062	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	745,288	1,120,130	3,554,229	1,493,015	13,115	6,925,777	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	1,234	1,130	195	21	2	2,583	

¹ Trendlines represent quarterly non-cumulated outputs across time.

4.2.2. GREATER ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

Figure 8: Strategic Objective 1 dashboard, SLC, December 2023¹



In 2023, West African economies struggled with high inflation, weak local currencies, and moderate growth. While many of these challenges are expected to be progressively overcome

¹ Budget figures are related to projects that are contracted, relevant to the MLS, and which provide data.

in the next few years, public debt remains a considerable risk. Between 2021 and 2023, real GDP growth in West Africa declined from 4.4% to 3.2%. However, the African Development Bank expected economic activities to accelerate again in 2024 and 2025, projecting 4.0% and 4.4% growth, respectively.¹ Similarly, inflation in West Africa was assessed to have peaked in 2023, after increasing from 16.8% in 2022² to 20.3% in 2023.³ Finally, local currencies, marked by accelerated depreciation in 2023 in Ghana and Nigeria, were expected to stabilise in the near future.⁴ Despite these positive projections, debt levels remained a risk for West African economies. While debt restructuring in Chad and Ghana and domestic reforms in Nigeria mitigated the risk of debt distress, high debt maturities in 2024 were expected to challenge economic recovery in several West African countries. Concerns over the ‘wall of Eurobond maturities’ in 2024⁵ were also reflected in the results of a 2023 survey conducted by the European Investment Bank, according to which the dominant concern of African banks was the cost and availability of foreign currency funding.⁶ According to the Debt Sustainability Analysis of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the risk of overall debt distress was estimated to be high in Cameroon, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, and The Gambia, while Ghana was assessed to already be in debt distress.⁷

Unsustainable levels of public debt diminished the performance of domestic banking systems, the private sector, and labour markets in the SLC region. Heightened public debt deteriorated banks’ balance sheets and adversely affected private sector lending: domestic banks funding public debt crowded out credits for private companies, limiting the latter’s capacity to invest.⁸ Furthermore, increased interest rates to curb inflation tightened credit standards, impacting credit accessibility particularly for MSMEs.⁹ Since MSMEs account for a large share of jobs in Africa, these developments also affected labour markets, although the exact consequences were less well documented. While the International Labour Organization (ILO) asserted that job growth was keeping pace with the growing labour force in sub-Saharan Africa, resulting in a relatively stable labour force participation rate, the absolute numbers of both people in employment and people in unemployment was increasing over the last years. Importantly, 62 million young people in sub-Saharan Africa were estimated to be not in employment, education, or training (NEET) in 2023, representing an increase from 22.2% of the youth in 2013 to 25.9% in 2023.¹⁰ Finally, high levels of debt also impaired governments’ capacities to provide infrastructure and services for MSMEs and workers, considering that debt servicing amounted to 47.5% of public revenues in sub-Saharan Africa in 2023.¹¹

Notwithstanding these regional challenges, economic development among SLC countries was uneven: while Ghana and Nigeria experienced full-blown economic crises, the countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) showed remarkable resilience. In Nigeria, the new government sought to address long-standing structural problems linked to the country’s oil dependency by introducing far-reaching reforms: although removing the fuel subsidy and unifying and liberalising the exchange rate fuelled inflation and currency depreciation in the short-term, these reforms were expected to stabilise the country in the medium-term. Most notably, the fuel subsidy removal considerably widened the government’s fiscal space.¹² In Ghana, debt distress forced the government to implement a domestic debt exchange programme, engage in debt restructuring under the G20

¹ AfDB, ‘Africa’s Macroeconomic Performance and Outlook’, January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² AfDB, ‘Africa’s Macroeconomic Performance and Outlook’, January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ AfDB, ‘Africa’s Macroeconomic Performance and Outlook’, January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ World Bank, ‘Africa’s Pulse’, October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ African Peer Review Mechanism & United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, ‘Africa Sovereign Credit Rating Review’, 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ EIB, ‘Finance in Africa’, 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ World Bank, ‘Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA)’, consulted in April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ EIB, ‘Finance in Africa’, 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ ILO, ‘World Employment and Social Outlook. Trends 2024’, 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ World Bank, ‘Africa’s Pulse’, April 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹² World Bank, ‘Nigeria Macro Poverty Outlook’, October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

Common Framework for Debt Treatments, and agree to a USD 3 billion IMF programme.¹ Meanwhile, the World Bank estimated WAEMU growth at 5.1% in 2023, only slightly down from 5.8% in 2022², and the European Investment Bank found that the loan quality of WAEMU banks was improving³, illustrating the uneven and country-specific development challenges in the SLC region.

The EUTF has contracted EUR 468M (22% of the total EUTF SLC budget) to enhance economic and employment opportunities (SO1) in the region. The Trust Fund primarily targets inclusive job creation focusing on the most vulnerable, both through the job market and by supporting people to develop IGAs. In addition, it aims to strengthen MSMEs through improved governance, access to funding, and enterprise development, as well as by building, renovating, and expanding business infrastructure. Finally, its programmes support professional training (TVET) and skills development.

As of December 2023, 22 programmes focusing on SO1 had been completed, representing 81% of the budget allocated to this Strategic Objective. Eight programmes were ongoing, representing the remaining 19% of the budget.⁴ Ongoing programmes were being implemented in seven countries, with the highest budget still in implementation allocated to Ghana.

Diminishing SO1 results, high level of IGA, and continued job creation in 2023

In 2023, the number of jobs created or supported (indicator 1.1), the number of MSMEs created or supported (indicator 1.2), and the number of people benefitting from TVET and skills development (indicator 1.4) were the lowest since 2018. The main reason was that an increasing number of programmes had closed, as the EUTF's end was approaching. Of the programmes focusing on SO1, three were concluded in 2021, five in 2022, and eight in 2023. Meanwhile, no new programme has started since January 2021. Accordingly, a decreasing number of programmes (both focusing on SO1 and other SOs) yielded results under EUTF indicators 1.1-1.4 since 2020: from 47 in 2020, to 36 in 2022 and only 21 in 2023. Some of the concluded programmes were among the largest contributors to economic and employment opportunities, including *Pôles Ruraux*⁵ in Niger on job creation (indicator 1.1) and *Développer l'emploi au Sénégal*⁶ on MSME support (indicator 1.2) and TVET (indicator 1.4).

¹ IMF, '2023 Article IV Consultation, First Review under the Arrangement under the Extended Credit Facility', January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² World Bank, 'Africa's Pulse', October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


³ EIB, 'Finance in Africa', 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ These programmes represent 40 completed projects and ten ongoing projects.

⁵ NE-03: *Projet d'appui aux filières agricoles dans les régions de Tahoua et Agadez*.

⁶ SN-04: *Développer l'emploi au Sénégal: renforcement de la compétitivité des entreprises et de l'employabilité dans les zones de départ*.

Figure 9: Output evolution EUTF indicator 1.2, SLC, December 2023



In contrast to this trend of diminishing results, 158,644 people were assisted to develop IGAs in 2023 (indicator 1.3), the second highest annual number since the EUTF's creation. The 2023 results represent 21% of all outputs achieved under this indicator. The large majority of IGAs in 2023 were supported in Ghana (79%), followed by Niger (9%) and Burkina Faso (7%). Ghana has benefitted from most IGAs developed with EUTF support since 2022, replacing Mali, which had been the main beneficiary between 2018 and 2021. Within Ghana, only GrEEen UNCDF¹ reported IGA-related results in 2023. The project developed 124,838, or 79%, of all IGAs created with EUTF support in 2023 by supporting 11 financial service providers in improving financial literacy and delivering financial services to the population of the Ashanti and Western regions.

In 2023, EUTF-funded programmes created or supported 20,926 jobs, bringing the total since the EUTF's start to 158,651 (indicator 1.1). 41% of the jobs reported in 2023 came from Ghana, mainly as a result of GrEEen GH². The second and third largest countries of EUTF-supported job creation in 2023 were Niger (16%) and Guinea (15%), driven by *Pôles Ruraux* and INTEGRA³, respectively. In addition to these national programmes, the regional ARCHIPELAGO⁴ programme also contributed significantly to the 2023 results by aiming to better match labour supply with demand through bottom-up TVET initiatives. It is notable that successful TVET support was the most important strategy for job creation in 2023, while support to MSMEs or Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLA) as well as cash-for-work schemes had played a more central role in previous years. In 2023, TVET support accounted for 58% of job creation, compared to 19% for MSME or VSLA support and 12% for cash-for-work. This can be explained by the large contribution of the GrEEen SNV⁵ project, which put a strong focus on skills development. In terms of occupations, in 2023, services represented a larger share of

¹ GH-02-02: Boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in Ghana.

² GH-02: Boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in Ghana.

³ GN-01: *Programme d'appui à l'intégration socio-économique des jeunes*.


⁴ REG-15: ARCHIPELAGO: an African-European TVET initiative.

⁵ GH-02-01: Boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in Ghana.

jobs created (24%) than in previous years (3% on average between 2018 and 2022), while agriculture, fishery and livestock production remained an important sector (25% in 2023). Conversely, the share of jobs in construction decreased in 2023, reaching merely 1%, compared to 14% between 2018 and 2022.


4.2.3. STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE OF COMMUNITIES

Figure 10: Strategic Objective 2 dashboard, SLC, December 2023



The food security situation in West Africa and the Sahel region was critical in 2023, particularly during the lean season between June and August when 45.2 million people faced Crisis levels of food insecurity (Integrated Food Security Phase Classification [IPC] Phase 3 or higher). This included 25,505 people in Catastrophe/Famine (IPC Phase 5), with 19,867 in Burkina Faso and 1,671 in Mali.¹ Chad was also particularly affected, with 6.5 million people in a state of food Crisis – twice as many as in 2022. This surge was attributed to significant agricultural deficits caused by pest infestations and irregular rainfall patterns. Additionally, the large influx of Sudanese refugees following the onset of conflict in April 2023 further strained resources.²

Figure 11: Number of people at stages 3 to 5 of IPC, December 2023



The nutritional outlook for the region was also severe, as 16.5 million children under five years of age suffered from acute malnutrition. This represented an 83% increase compared to the 2015–2022 average and the highest level observed in ten years.³ The intensification of conflict, alongside civil and cross-border insecurity, undermined the food and nutritional security across five countries: Burkina Faso; Mali; Niger; northern Nigeria; and western Chad.⁴ Continuing violence has further destabilised already precarious food systems and restricted access to nutritious foods, particularly affecting vulnerable populations.

Violence has driven large-scale population displacements across West Africa,⁵ leading to severe disruptions of agricultural livelihoods, pastoral transhumance, and trade in conflict-affected areas. The influx of large numbers of displaced populations has intensified competition over scarce natural resources, leading to overexploitation that threatens social cohesion and risks escalating community tensions. Deprived of traditional means of subsistence, many displaced individuals have turned to

¹ Cadre Harmonisé, 'Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars–mai 2023 et projetée en juin–août 2023', November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² UNOCHA, 'Chad Humanitarian Update December 2023', January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ WFP, 'West Africa and Sahel: Food insecurity, malnutrition, set to reach 10-year high', April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ ACLED, 'ACLED – Dashboard', consulted in April 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ The countries relevant to this paragraph are Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and The Gambia, Benin and Togo. Benin and Togo, which are not part of the SLC region, were relevant to mention with respect to the spill-over effects of conflict in Sahelian countries.

unsustainable exploitation of farmland and water resources to meet basic needs.¹ Additionally, unstable security conditions have greatly impeded aid delivery. Many EUTF programmes were impacted by both security risks which jeopardised activities, and by stringent controls enforced by the authorities, which included enhanced authorisation procedures for conducting fieldwork in certain areas.

Conflict has disrupted access to education and health across the region, exacerbating an already critical humanitarian situation. As of October 2023, 8,397 schools were shut in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Burkina Faso bore the brunt with 5,723 non-functional schools.² While this represents a slight improvement from 2022, when 8,796 schools were closed in the three countries, it nonetheless indicates that only a limited number of schools were able to reopen in the region in the past year.³ Health care access has similarly deteriorated. By the end of 2023, 471 health centres were closed across these three countries compared to 302 in 2022.⁴ Burkina Faso again faced the gravest situation with 398 non-functioning facilities.⁵

The EUTF contracted EUR 536.8M (25% of EUTF total funding) to 26 programmes aiming to support resilience in the region. In 2023, six programmes were active. Three closed their activities during the year (DIZA⁶, PRCPT⁷, SAFIRE⁸). The other three programmes will remain operational in 2024: PDU⁹ and PROJES¹⁰ aim to improve local communities' access to basic services, such as water, and to promote social cohesion, and Resilience ASP¹¹ supports pastoral and agro-pastoral communities as well as ecosystems in western Niger.

Enhancing resilience through improved WASH in the Sahel

Access to safe WASH services is essential in the Sahel, given the gravity of the humanitarian situation. Large population movements have strained existing infrastructure and services. In contexts where malnutrition and weakened public health systems prevail, WASH interventions are urgently needed to prevent the spread of water-borne diseases. Targeted WASH support can help resilience, ensuring that displaced and crisis-affected communities have access to clean water, appropriate sanitation facilities, and hygiene education and materials.

The regional PDU programme, initiated by the G5 Sahel Alliance and implemented by 12 development stakeholders¹², focused on enhancing WASH services to strengthen resilience in fragile border regions of Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad. In 2023, PDU achieved substantial results in improving access to WASH facilities in Burkina Faso and Chad, despite challenging security circumstances. PDU provided improved access to WASH for 6,550 individuals from the host community as well as IDPs in the Sahel region of Burkina Faso (indicator 2.9). This was achieved through 250 new water connections improving the distribution to households, as well as the drilling of two boreholes (indicator 2.1 bis). Additionally, the programme constructed one Simplified Water Supply System – a decentralised drinking water supply system that uses simple infrastructure.¹³ In Burkina Faso, where 20% of health centres lacked access to clean water and 10% lacked access to adequate sanitation facilities in 2021, the programme proposed a rapid and low-cost chlorination method to treat drinking water or provide a disinfectant solution to treat wounds, objects, and surfaces. The programme installed water treatment kits in three different health centres to implement this

¹ FSIN, 'Rapport régional 2023 sur les crises alimentaires pour le Sahel et l'Afrique de l'Ouest', June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² OCHA, 'Burkina Faso, Mali and Western Niger – Humanitarian Snapshot', 18 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ OCHA, 'Burkina Faso, Mali & Western Niger – Humanitarian Snapshot', 16 February 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ OCHA, 'Burkina Faso, Mali and Western Niger – Humanitarian Snapshot', 18 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ TD-07: *Programme de développement inclusif dans les zones d'accueil*.

⁷ TD-02: *Projet de Renforcement de la Résilience et de la Cohabitation Pacifique au Tchad*.

⁸ MR-07: *Programme de renforcement de la résilience des communautés urbaines et rurales vulnérables en Mauritanie*.

⁹ REG-18: *Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel*.

¹⁰ ML-10: *Programme Jeunesse et Stabilisation – PROJES – régions du centre du Mali*.

¹¹ NE-14: *Résilience agro-sylvo-pastorale, Ouest Niger*.

¹² ACF, ACH, CRB, HD, HI, IRC, LUXDEV, ONEA, OXFAM, PMLAL, Save the Children, TDH.

¹³ Standalone sources that independently collect and store water locally through boreholes or protected wells rather than relying on piped network connections.

approach (indicator 2.1 bis). As a result, 40,808 patients benefitted from improved access to clean water (indicator 2.9).¹

PDU also adopted the Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) approach to enhance sanitation, encouraging communities to collaborate and to create clean and hygienic environments. This aims to eliminate open defecation, which poses significant risks to human health as it can lead to the spread of diarrhoeal diseases through contamination of drinking water and food sources. In 2023, with subsidies and technical support from the programme, 1,500 people (indicator 2.2) benefitted from the construction of 75 latrines in Burkina Faso (indicator 2.1 bis).

In Chad, PDU's EPEVA² project concentrated also on water and sanitation improvements. It rehabilitated 36 modern wells and built 21 new ones. It also rehabilitated two drinking water supply networks and built two new ones (indicator 2.1bis). Regarding sanitation, the CLTS approach encouraged the construction of 575 family latrines (indicator 2.2). As a result of these water and sanitation infrastructure developments, 95,188 people gained increased access to latrines and/or drinking water (indicator 2.9).

Food security: Responding to shocks and ensuring lasting resilience

Strengthening food resilience remained a priority for the EUTF in 2023. Several programmes provided support in the most food insecure countries. PST ML³, initiated in May 2021, aimed to strengthen food and nutritional security and livelihoods for all, particularly the most vulnerable, in targeted areas of Mali. PST-ML established social safety nets, notably through unconditional cash transfers, to strengthen food security and nutrition in response to sudden conflicts, climate and seasonal shocks. Literature and past interventions have shown cash transfers to be effective in managing the impacts of climate shocks and food crises.⁴ Providing cash assistance gives households the flexibility to take decisions based on their specific circumstances. This flexibility is particularly relevant in volatile emergency settings where on-the-ground realities are fluid and often not reflected by assessments. In 2023, this approach assisted 153,184 people in Mali (indicator 2.4).

The EUTF's focus on food security was also reflected in the DIZA Sud project in Chad.⁵ The project's objective was to improve agricultural production and resilience to negative external shocks, contributing to long-term improvements in food security. The project distributed agricultural tools to cooperatives and farmers to increase productivity and reduce the strain of work. It also distributed improved seed varieties, favouring better crop yields and greater resistance to climate events. The seeds were selected in collaboration with the Chad Agricultural Research Institute for Development, which contributed to the project by providing insights on local conditions and preferences. In 2023, 212,256 people received agricultural tools and improved seeds, 45% of whom were women (indicator 2.4).

¹ WaterAid, 'WaterAid Burkina Faso Country Programme Strategy 2023–2028', 24 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² REG 18-03: *Eau Potable et Villages Assainis*.


³ ML-14-12: *Programme de Soutien à la Transition en République du Mali*.

⁴ Patrick Premand, Quentin Stoeffler, 'Cash transfers, climatic shocks and resilience in the Sahel', October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ TD-07-02: *Programme de développement inclusif dans les zones d'accueil – Zone sud*.

4.2.4. IMPROVED MIGRATION MANAGEMENT

Figure 12: Strategic Objective 3 dashboard, SLC, December 2023¹



In 2023, West Africa² continued to witness significant migratory flows and forced displacements. By the end of the year, there was an estimated 8,357,735 people displaced in the region, including 6,500,312 IDPs (79%) and 1,857,423 asylum-seekers and refugees (21%). This is 974,524 more displaced people than at the end of 2022.

Most of the displaced people were located in Nigeria (43%), Burkina Faso (25%), Chad (16%), Niger (8%) and Mali (5%).^{3,4} Jihadist violence in the north of Nigeria continued to cause increasing displacements in 2023, especially in the three north-eastern states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (BAY states). As of December 2023, the country recorded a total of 3,485,827 IDPs⁵, 311,763 more than in December 2022,⁶ with 59% of them in the BAY states.⁷ In Burkina Faso, intensified violence made 2023 the deadliest year since the conflict's onset.⁸ The country counted 2,062,534 IDPs, representing 9% of its population and a 10% increase compared to 2022.⁹ Chad was massively affected by spillover effects of conflict in Sudan and hosted 1.1 million refugees, making it the largest host country per capita in Africa.¹⁰ Following the eruption of civil war in Sudan in April, recorded asylum-seekers and refugees in Chad jumped from 597,728 in 2022 to 1.1 million as of December 2023¹¹, 80% of them in the three regions bordering Sudan: Wadi Fira; Sila; and Ouaddai.¹² In addition, an estimated 131,425 Chadians returned to their country.¹³

The spillover effects of violence in the Sahelian countries also resulted in more displaced people in the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea: Benin; Côte d'Ivoire; Ghana; and Togo. The total number of affected individuals, including refugees, asylum-seekers and IDPs, recorded in these four countries increased from 27,132 in December 2022 to 125,112 by the end of 2023. New refugees and asylum-seekers, having arrived in 2023, numbered 41,861 in Côte d'Ivoire, 22,801 in Togo, 14,899 in Ghana and 9,634 in Benin.¹⁴

As northward displacements continued, North African countries deported sub-Saharan migrants back across their borders. In 2023, at least 26,031 migrants were expelled from Algeria and left stranded in the desert at the Nigerien border – the highest figure in recent years according to a non-governmental migration cooperation network.¹⁵ According to humanitarian NGOs, in the second half of 2023, 8,500 more migrants were deported from Tunisia to Algeria and Libya, in a context of escalating violence and hate speech against sub-Saharan nationals in Tunisia following the country's President's anti-migrant statements.¹⁶

Amidst significant regional displacements, the main migration routes to Europe experienced increased traffic in 2023. Between January and December, 39,673 migrants reached the Canary Islands through the Atlantic Route, which represents a 157% increase compared to 2022 (15,463).¹⁷ Of

¹ Budget figures are related to projects that are contracted and relevant to the MLS.

² The countries relevant to this paragraph are Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and The Gambia, Benin and Togo. Benin and Togo, which are not part of the SLC region, were relevant to mention with respect to the spill-over effects of the conflict in the Sahelian countries.

³ Compared numbers from: UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics', December 2022 and 2023. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).

⁴ Mauritania, which is part of SLC window, does not appear in the UNHCR regional monthly statistics used for the other countries. Figures for Mauritania were found in another UNHCR source: UNHCR, 'Mauritania – Registered refugees and asylum-seekers as of 1 January 2024', January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics – December 2023', 20 January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Compared numbers from: UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics', December 2022 and 2023. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).

⁷ UNHCR, 'Nigeria: All Population Snapshot – December 2023', 11 January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ ACLED, 'ACLED – Dashboard', consulted in March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Compared numbers from: UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics', December 2022 and 2023. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).

¹⁰ UN, 'Le Tchad a besoin d'aide face au risque d'une hausse des arrivées de réfugiés soudanais, prévient le HCR', 1 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ Compared numbers from: UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics', December 2022 and 2023. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).

¹² OCHA, 'Tchad : Aperçu de la situation humanitaire au Tchad – 31 décembre 2023', 8 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹³ IOM, 'IOM Chad: Sudan Crisis Response Situation Update No 26', 29 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁴ Compared numbers from: UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics', December 2022 and 2023. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).


¹⁵ Alarm Phone Sahara, 'Alarm Phone Sahara mission to Assamaka, December 2023 – Impressions from the Niger-Algeria border', 22 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁶ France24, '70,000 migrants intercepted by Tunisia in 2023: official', 9 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁷ Figures extracted and compared from Frontex, 'Detections of illegal border-crossings', February 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

the migrants taking this route in 2023, Frontex reported that 83% came from SLC countries¹, including 45% from Senegal. The Central Mediterranean Route also saw a 54% increase, from 105,561 individuals in 2022 to 162,714 in 2023, including 36% nationals of SLC countries.² Another West African route seemed to gain prominence, connecting the West African coast to the United States via Nicaragua: in 2023, 58,462 migrants from African countries entered the United States irregularly at its southern border, including almost 50% Senegalese and Mauritians. This represented a 336% increase compared to the 13,406 migrants recorded the previous year.³

Figure 13: Number of IDPs and refugees, and main migration flows in 2023⁴



In response to evolving migratory flows, European, African and regional public policies on migration saw developments in 2023. The European Commission introduced two new Action Plans, one for the Western Mediterranean and Atlantic Routes in June⁵ and one for the Eastern Mediterranean Route in October⁶, complementing two previous plans for the Balkan and Central Mediterranean Routes which had been adopted in 2022. These four plans, covering the five major migratory roads to Europe, aimed to strengthen cooperation with partner countries and countries of origin on border and migration management, search and rescue measures, and return procedures. Within the SLC region, faced with increased migrant departures in 2023, the Government of Senegal launched a National Strategy to Tackle Irregular Migration (SNLMI) in July, focused on promoting education and training, creating jobs and economic opportunities, protecting human rights, and cooperating with international actors.⁷

¹ For this analyse, nationals from countries covered by the SLC report were considered: Burkina Faso; Chad; Côte d'Ivoire; Ghana; Guinea; Mali; Mauritania; Niger; Nigeria; Senegal; and The Gambia.

² Figures extracted and compared from Frontex, 'Detections of illegal border-crossings', February 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Mixed Migration Centre, 'Quarterly Mixed Migration Update West Africa, Quarter 4, 2023', 4 February 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ The borders depicted in this map do not represent political opinions.

⁵ European Commission, 'Migration routes: Commission presents new Action Plan for the Western Mediterranean and Atlantic routes', 6 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ European Commission, 'Commission presents EU Action Plan for the Eastern Mediterranean route', 18 October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Gouvernement du Sénégal, 'Validation de la Stratégie Nationale de Lutte Contre la Migration', 27 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

Conversely, Niger opted to repeal a law criminalising assistance to illegal migration in the Agadez region – a main transit zone to North Africa and Europe – which was introduced in 2015 with EU and UNODC support¹ and was considered by the junta as benefitting foreign powers more than Nigerien interests.²

The EUTF has contracted EUR 421.1M (20% of EUTF total funding) to 12 programmes aiming to implement migration management-related activities in the SLC region. Half of this funding (66%) was allocated to seven regional programmes.

In 2023, seven programmes remained active. Four of them ended by the end of the year: Migration ML³ in Mali, and three regional programmes – Protection West Africa⁴, Protection CMR 1⁵ and the EU-IOM Joint Initiative⁶ covering Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria, Senegal, and The Gambia.

Three programmes are continuing into 2024, one regional programme (ALTP *Golfe de Guinée*⁷) and two national programmes in Senegal (Migration SN⁸) and Ghana (Border Security GH⁹).

Decreasing active SO3 programmes and results

The EUTF funded 12 programmes with a focus on improving migration management. Since each programme can encompass several projects, a total of 30 projects were implemented. By the end of 2023, 27 projects were completed, 18 of them during the year (16 in S1 alone), including the EU-IOM Joint Initiative (EU-IOM JI)¹⁰, which accounted for 62% of the total SO3 budget. Just three projects remain active in 2024, ending by the end of the year.

EUTF-funded projects protected and/or assisted 216,538 migrants in transit over the EUTF's period, refugees/asylum-seekers and IDPs (indicator 3.2), mostly in Niger (48%), Mali (21%) and Burkina Faso (15%). Protection West Africa supported 110,616 (51%) beneficiaries across seven countries¹¹ through temporary housing, medical or psychosocial assistance, legal counsel, food assistance, non-food item kits, and referral and emergency care services for children and youth. The EU-IOM JI reached another 92,160 migrants (43%), including 73,700 in Niger through five transit centres providing similar services.¹²

¹ ISS, 'More than borders: effects of EU interventions on migration in the Sahel', 16 August 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² Jeune Afrique, 'Au Niger, les migrants au centre d'un bras de fer entre la junte et l'UE', 8 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#)

³ ML-07: *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Mali*.

⁴ REG-13: *Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest*.

⁵ REG-04: Protection and sustainable solutions for migrants and refugees along the Central Mediterranean route.

⁶ *Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants*. This initiative is implemented through various programmes at both regional (REG-08) and national levels, in Burkina Faso (BF-04), Cameroon (CM-04), Mauritania (MR-03), Niger (NE-07), Nigeria (NG-04) and the Gambia (GM-02).

⁷ REG-12: *Appui à la Lutte contre la Traite des Personnes dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée*.


⁸ SN-06: *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Sénégal et accompagnement des investissements de la diaspora sénégalaise*.

⁹ GH-01: Strengthening Border Security in Ghana.

¹⁰ For the following analysis, all EU-IOM JI figures (budget and results) have been gathered as one joint programme, including EU-IOM JI projects falling under other programmes.

¹¹ 16% in Mali, 13% in Burkina Faso, 10% in Niger, 3% in Guinea, 3% in Côte d'Ivoire, 2% in Senegal, 1% in The Gambia and 3% through a regional project covering Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

¹² The remaining 6% were achieved through five other programmes active in Mali, Mauritania and Niger: Refugees' Resilience, Nexus SRD, AFIA, Protection CMR 1 and Stabilisation Agadez.



In total EUTF-funded programmes have supported 73,215 voluntary returns (indicator 3.4) from Niger (75%), Burkina Faso (12%), Mauritania (6%) and Mali (5%).¹ The EU-IOM JI has facilitated 79% of these returns by providing pre-departure services as well as travel support to 58,089 migrants mostly stranded in Niger – a major migration crossroad for migrants expelled from North Africa. These services included assistance for identity and travel document issuance, food and accommodation support on the way, and chartering of buses or planes. Refugees' Resilience has supported another 20%² of voluntary returns, focusing on Malian refugees present in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mauritania through information on return areas and cash transfers for transport. At the same time, the Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM) Niamey has evacuated 3,674 persons of concern (indicator 3.8) trapped in and outside detention centres in Libya and relocated them in a dedicated centre near Niamey pending a durable resettlement solution in a third country.

The EU-IOM JI was also responsible for 95% of post-arrival assistance (indicator 3.5) and 73% of reintegration assistance (indicator 3.5 bis) for returning migrants. Post-arrival assistance has been granted to 92,398 people, mostly in Mali (23%), Guinea (21%) and Nigeria (20%), and took the form of cash transfers to meet immediate needs.³ Reintegration assistance included material, technical and financial support to promote economic reintegration, benefitting 92,868 migrants in Senegal (23%), Guinea (16%), Nigeria (15%), Mali (14%) and 10 other countries⁴. The EU-IOM JI has backed 67,518 migrants with in-kind assistance – individually, collectively, or communally – for the development of IGAs or other community projects across 13 countries.⁵ Migration SN has helped 16,200 returnees develop IGAs after receiving training, find jobs or create businesses in Senegal, while Diza has allowed another 6,688 returnees to find jobs in the peanut and shea butter industry in Chad.

¹ The remaining 2% are distributed among nine countries: Chad; Côte d'Ivoire; Senegal; Cameroon; The Gambia; Guinea; Ghana; Nigeria; and Guinea-Bissau.

² The remaining 1% were supported by PROSTARAZ in Niger.

³ Refugees' Resilience ML provided financial support to 4,480 of the 92,398 beneficiaries, and Border Security GH provided psychosocial counselling to 11.

⁴ Chad (7%), Côte d'Ivoire (6%), The Gambia (5%), Cameroon (5%), Niger (3%), Burkina Faso (3%), Ghana (2%), Guinea-Bissau (1%), Togo and Mauritania (less than 1%).

⁵ This includes: 20% in Nigeria, Guinea and Mali; 8% in Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, 6% in The Gambia and Cameroon, 4% in Niger and Burkina Faso, and the other 4% in Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Chad and Mauritania together.

Remaining SO3 results focusing on migrant protection and migration management trainings

Despite a decrease in SO3-related activities in 2023, EUTF-funded programmes that remained active continued to show varied results. Two programmes provided protection or assistance to migrants (indicator 3.2): Transit centres established by *Stabilisation Agadez* in the Zinder region of Niger welcomed 3,649 migrants, and Protection West Africa helped another 1,236 persons in Côte d'Ivoire (60%), Senegal (13%), The Gambia (11%), Guinea (10%) and Mali (6%) through temporary accommodation and food as well as medical, psychosocial, and legal assistance. *Stabilisation Agadez* also facilitated the voluntary return of 420 migrants (indicator 3.4) stranded in Niger. Two other programmes, DIZA and ALTP *Golfe de Guinée*, respectively provided reintegration assistance (indicator 3.5 bis) to 480 persons in Chad, and to 308 victims or potential victims of trafficking in Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, and Ghana.¹


Several programmes implemented training or capacity-building-related activities targeting both individuals and institutions. For example, 1,738 people were trained on migration management and protection (indicator 3.7) across 11 countries, which represents 8% of the total migration-related trainings implemented since the EUTF's launch. Of these trainings, 68% focused on TIP (mostly through ALTP *Golfe de Guinée*) and another 18% on migrant protection, including against gender-based violence (through Protection West Africa).² Capacity building or material and technical support on improved protection and migration management (indicator 3.6) were also provided to 20 institutions and non-state actors: 13 associations in Ghana and four civilian institutions in Guinea – with a focus on TIP and smuggling of migrants – and three migration observatories in Niger.

¹ Eight persons also benefitted from reintegration assistance in the Gambia through the programme YEP.

² The remaining 14% focused on migration management, border management and other unspecified themes.

4.2.5. IMPROVING GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT PREVENTION


Figure 14: Strategic Objective 4 dashboard, SLC, December 2023¹



¹ Budget figures are related to projects which are contracted, relevant to the MLS, and providing data.

The central Sahel states – Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger – continue to face a severe jihadist insurgency that has persisted for over a decade. This conflict involves major jihadist groups, such as al-Qaeda’s Sahelian branch, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP). In 2023, the conflict escalated, with deaths rising from 10,078 in 2022 to 13,941.¹ Burkina Faso, in particular, saw a dramatic surge in violence, as deaths nearly doubled to 8,493 people from the previous year, resembling a conflict of civil war proportions.² This escalation occurred as extremist activities expanded geographically, leaving the government in control of only 50% of the country.³

Figure 15: Evolution of the number of violent events in 2022 and 2023



Despite the ongoing challenges in combating jihadist forces, the Burkina Faso junta formally requested the withdrawal of French troops in January⁴ and subsequently suspended all military cooperation with France in September.⁵ Similarly, the Mali junta demanded the immediate withdrawal of MINUSMA in June, marking the end of its decade-long operation. The withdrawal of MINUSMA occurred amid heightened tensions, particularly in northern Mali, an area long troubled by conflicts with separatist groups.⁶ As MINUSMA withdrew from the northern city of Kidal, violent clashes surged between the JNIM, Tuareg-led groups and the Malian Armed Forces, culminating in the latter seizing control of Kidal in November.⁷

In northern Nigeria, the security situation continued to deteriorate as two groups, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and the Group for the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad (JAS), clashed violently and inflicted harm on civilian populations.⁸ Meanwhile, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a coordination mechanism between Nigeria and its three Lake Chad neighbours – Cameroon, Chad and Niger – struggled to execute its planned operations, reflecting the challenges facing the regional security partnership.⁹

In 2023, the SLC region witnessed tense elections in Nigeria, a military coup in Niger and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States. In Nigeria, the Independent National Electoral Commission announced the victory of Bola Ahmed Tinubu on 1 March, with 36% of the vote. While the election was largely peaceful, armed groups disrupted the electoral polls in several states.¹⁰ Voter turnout was

¹ ACLED, ‘ACLED – Dashboard’, consulted in April 2024. Retrieved [here](#).
² ACLED, ‘The Sahel: A deadly New Era in the Decades-Long Conflict’, 17 January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).
³ APNews, ‘More than 2 million people displaced, Burkina Faso’s government says, as aid falls short’, 5 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).
⁴ RFI, ‘Le Burkina Faso confirme avoir demandé le départ des troupes françaises’, 23 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).
⁵ Jeune Afrique, ‘Le Burkina Faso rompt définitivement sa coopération militaire avec la France’, 15 September 2023. Retrieved [here](#).
⁶ Le Monde, ‘Au Mali, la mission de l’ONU engage sous tension une nouvelle phase de son retrait’, 17 October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).
⁷ BBC, ‘Mali army seizes key rebel northern stronghold Kidal’, 14 November 2023. Retrieved [here](#).
⁸ ICG, ‘JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters’, 28 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).
⁹ Ibid.
¹⁰ International Crisis Group, ‘Calming Tensions amid Nigeria’s Post-election Controversy’, 26 May 2023. Available [here](#).

notably low at 27%, a decline from 35% in the previous 2019 election. Analysts attribute this downturn to a widespread distrust of the electoral system and voter fatigue from successive elections.¹

Meanwhile, in Niger, the presidential guard staged a coup d'état on 26 July, ousting President Mohamed Bazoum² and establishing the National Council for the Safeguarding of the Homeland (CNSP). In response, ECOWAS imposed an economic blockade on Niger on 30 July, halting all commercial and financial exchanges with the country.³ ECOWAS initially hinted at a possible military intervention, but this threat later subsided. By December, discussions at the ECOWAS summit in Abuja contemplated easing sanctions against Niger.⁴

In September, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali – each led by regimes established through military coups and consequently suspended from ECOWAS – founded the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). This alliance initially aimed to consolidate the military resources of its members to counter rebel and jihadist threats effectively. However, the scope of their collaboration expanded in November when the foreign ministers of the three countries met and committed to strengthen their union by deepening economic, diplomatic, and political ties, and positioning the Alliance as an alternative to ECOWAS.

The EUTF has contracted EUR 667.9M (32% of the EUTF SLC budget) to improve governance and conflict prevention in the SLC region. These funds were disbursed across 34 programmes operating in 13 countries. The funds were contracted at the regional level (20%) and in the countries most affected by the ongoing security crises, namely Burkina Faso (20%), Mali (18%), Niger (18%), and Nigeria (11%).

In 2023, 20 active programmes addressed a range of challenges in the region. They enhanced judicial systems, facilitated citizens' access to legal documentation, prevented violent extremism, bolstered border management and security, supported transitional governance and addressed COVID-19-related issues. Nine of these programmes ended in 2023: ECI *Terrorisme*⁵; GAR-SI⁶; MCN⁷; Nexus SRD⁸; One UN Response Plan⁹; POC¹⁰; POC Mali¹¹; PST-ML¹²; and Radio Jeunesse Sahel¹³. 11 programmes

¹ International Crisis Group, 'Calming Tensions amid Nigeria's Post-election Controversy', 26 May 2023. Available [here](#).

² ACLED, 'Regional Overview: Africa', July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ France 24, 'Niger : la Cédéao fixe un ultimatum d'une semaine et n'exclut pas un "recours à la force"', 30 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Jeune Afrique, 'Le Niger toujours asphyxié malgré les perspectives de levée des sanctions', 11 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ NE-15: *Création d'une Équipe Conjointe d'Investigation (ECI) pour la lutte contre les réseaux criminels liés au terrorisme*.

⁶ REG-04: *GAR-SI SAHEL (Groupes d'Action Rapides – Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel)*.

⁷ NG-03: *Enhancing state and community level conflict management capability in Northeastern Nigeria*.

⁸ MR-08: *L'UE pour le nexus sécurité-résilience-développement en Mauritanie*.

⁹ NG-09: *EU Support to the United Nations 'One UN Response Plan to COVID-19 in Nigeria'*.

¹⁰ SN-10: *Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint de lutte contre l'immigration irrégulière, la traite et le trafic de migrants au Sénégal*.

¹¹ ML-13: *Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint, de lutte contre l'immigration irrégulière, le trafic de migrants et la traite des êtres humains en République du Mali*.

¹² ML-14: *Programme de soutien à la transition en République du Mali*.

¹³ REG-25: *Radio Jeunesse Sahel – Appui européen à la phase de démarrage de la radio*.

were active and will continue implementation into 2024: AJUSEN¹, *Etat Civil* GN², *Etat Civil* SN³, GESTDOC⁴, Justice BF⁵, PAGES II⁶, PARSEC⁷, PEV⁸, POC MR⁹, Security G5 Sahel¹⁰, WAPIS¹¹.

Enhancing the capacity of governance actors in the Sahel and Lake Chad region

In 2023, nearly all SO4 programmes conducted training sessions on governance, conflict prevention and human rights, reaching 21,193 staff from governmental institutions, internal security forces and non-state actors (indicator 4.2). Most training sessions (71%) took place in Mali, where PST-ML delivered training on improved governance and electoral observation to 14,625 staff from civilian institutions and CSOs as well as community representatives and youth ambassadors.¹² In Burkina Faso, four programmes (PDU¹³, Security G5 Sahel¹⁴, Justice BF¹⁵, PEV) provided training to 3,379 participants on peacebuilding, human rights, justice, protection, and security (indicator 4.2). Lastly, in Guinea, *Etat Civil* GN¹⁶ trained 1,457 staff from civilian institutions on civil registration processes to improve access to civil registration services across the population. Additional training sessions addressing justice, security, border management and civil registration took place in other SLC countries, including Cabo Verde, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, and Senegal.

Since its inception, the EUTF has facilitated the training of 100,077 staff on conflict prevention and human rights (indicator 4.2). A significant portion of these training efforts have been led by PST-ML and MCN (26% of results). With these key programmes concluding in 2023, there will be a marked reduction in the number of staff trained by the EUTF in 2024.

Beyond training, EUTF programmes focused on strengthening governance capabilities through the distribution of 11,436 items of equipment in 11 countries in 2023 (indicator 4.1 bis). This equipment included IT equipment (28%), technical equipment (67%), and vehicles (1%), among others. The equipment was distributed to national institutions, as well as journalists, justice officials, security forces, and regional institutions, reflecting commitment to strengthen the capacity of all types of actors across the region.

Senegal received the largest proportion of this equipment (45%), followed by Mauritania (17%), Niger (15%), Ghana (9%), and Guinea (6%), among others. The equipment was selected to meet the specific governance challenges faced by each country: strengthening the justice systems in Burkina Faso and Niger, improving the provision of civil registration services in Guinea and Senegal, and enhancing governance in Mali, Mauritania and Senegal. In addition, some of the equipment supported border management and security, notably in Cabo Verde, Chad, Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal.

¹ NE-06: *Contrat relatif à la Reconstruction de l'État au Niger en complément du SBC II en préparation / Appui à la Justice, Sécurité et à la Gestion des Frontières au Niger.*

² GN-05: *Projet pilote d'amélioration des performances de l'état civil guinéen par le recours à la digitalisation.*

³ SN-07: *Programme d'appui au renforcement du système d'information de l'état civil et à la consolidation d'un fichier d'état national d'identité biométrique au Sénégal.*

⁴ REG-14: *Modernizing and strengthening secure identity chains and documental security.*

⁵ BF-11: *Appui à la justice au Burkina Faso pour renforcer la lutte contre l'impunité au travers d'une justice plus accessible et efficace.*

⁶ REG-20: *Programme d'Appui au G5 pour la Sécurité au Sahel Phase II.*

⁷ ML-06: *Programme d'Appui au Renforcement de la Sécurité dans les régions de Mopti et Gao et à la gestion des zones frontalières.*

⁸ BF-02: *Rebâtir une cohésion sociale au Nord du Burkina à travers un meilleur suivi de la radicalisation, la promotion du dialogue et la valorisation de l'économie pastoraliste.*

⁹ MR-02: *Renforcement des capacités pour une meilleure gestion de la migration afin de protéger l'enfance migrante contre l'exploitation et la traite;* MR-03: *Contribuer au renforcement de la gouvernance et de la gestion des migrations et des frontières, et faciliter la protection, le retour et la réintégration durable de migrants en Mauritanie;* MR-09: *Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint pour la Mauritanie.*

¹⁰ REG-01: *Appui à la coopération régionale des pays du G5 Sahel et au Collège Sahélien de Sécurité.*

¹¹ REG-03: *Support to the strengthening of police information systems in the broader West Africa region.*

¹² PDU also trained 393 people in peacebuilding and human rights.

¹³ SAH-REG-18: *Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.*

¹⁴ REG-01: *Appui à la coopération régionale des pays du G5 Sahel et au Collège Sahélien de Sécurité.*

¹⁵ BF-11: *Appui à la justice au Burkina Faso pour renforcer la lutte contre l'impunité au travers d'une justice plus accessible et efficace.*

¹⁶ GN-05: *Projet pilote d'amélioration des performances de l'état civil guinéen par le recours à la digitalisation.*

4.2.6. OVERVIEW OF COUNTRIES WITH FEW OUTPUTS

In 2023, and especially in the second semester, the total number of outputs diminished compared to previous years. This was a reflection of the increasing number of programmes closing, as the EUTF's end approached. In some countries, this resulted in few to almost no new outputs. For the countries showing insufficient data to write an entire country section, outputs are provided in the following paragraphs. This includes Chad, Guinea, Mauritania and Nigeria.

Chad

In the second half of 2023, only two programmes were still active in Chad, both operating at the regional level: PDU¹ and WAPIS.² In the first semester, in addition to these two programmes, four other regional programmes (ARCHIPELAGO³, IPDEV2⁴, PAGES II⁵, Radio Jeunesse Sahel⁶) and three national programmes (Bal Al Amal⁷, DIZA⁸, PRCPT⁹) were active in the country and reported significant outputs. Their respective results were covered in the S1 2023 report.

In the second half of the year, the PDU programme, through its EPEVA¹⁰ project, focused its main efforts in Chad on the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) sector. It rehabilitated and constructed 48 water access points (indicator 2.1 bis). This was in addition to the construction of 575 family latrines that were reported in the first semester (indicator 2.2). Together, these efforts benefitted 95,188 people in 2023 (indicator 2.9). For the WAPIS programme, the second semester marked the beginning of operational actions to implement the Police Information System in Chad¹¹ allowing the seamless and efficient sharing of police data at the national level. WAPIS trained 51 agents on its usage in the second half of the year, including 49% women (indicator 4.2). Both programmes will continue implementing activities in 2024.

¹ REG-18: *Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.*

² REG-03: Support to the strengthening of police information systems in the broader West Africa region.

³ REG-15: ARCHIPELAGO: an African-European TVET initiative.

⁴ REG-11: *Soutenir les entrepreneurs et les petites PME en Afrique de l'Ouest.*

⁵ REG-20: *Programme d'appui au G5 pour la sécurité au Sahel – Phase II.*

⁶ REG-25: *Radio Jeunesse Sahel – Appui européen à la phase de démarrage de la radio.*

⁷ TD-03: *Projet de soutien à l'insertion socio-professionnelle des jeunes tchadiens en situation de vulnérabilité.*

⁸ TD-07: *Programme de développement inclusif dans les zones d'accueil.*

⁹ TD-02: *Projet de Renforcement de la Résilience et de la Cohabitation Pacifique au Tchad.*

¹⁰ REG 18-03: *Eau Potable et Villages Assainis.*

¹¹ *Système d'information policière au Tchad (SIPT).*

Table 3: EUTF common output indicators for Chad, December 2023

Indicateur FFU	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	S2 2023	Total	Evolution
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	2 081	2 092	1 314	913	791	180	0	7 371	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	32	46	80	141	0	0	299	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	5 268	15 401	11 501	20 539	16 719	2 110	0	71 538	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	230	2 729	2 842	4 285	3 427	1 355	0	14 868	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	3	24	21	16	19	0	0	83	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	26	47	11	35	46	3	0	168	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	139	274	407	272	55	26	48	1 221	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	660	2 567	17 824	14 262	56 637	875	0	92 825	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	18 546	10 477	8 684	10 083	5 856	3 611	0	57 257	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	34 999	18 610	155 902	54 258	5 566	212 256	0	481 591	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	8	40	9	3	0	0	0	60	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	70	225	1 496	6 991	0	0	0	8 781	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	21 672	32 099	185 192	12 734	7 179	3 749	941	263 566	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	57	1 622	430	286	941	378	0	3 713	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	35 160	221 000	14 206	50 195	80 999	12 550	86 538	500 648	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	0	43	300	458	0	0	0	801	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	0	605	1 468	15 621	0	0	0	17 694	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	9	119	360	309	0	0	0	797	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	10	1 228	2 958	2 035	133	480	0	6 844	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	86	446	23	294	0	0	850	
3.8 Number of people of concern benefiting from evacuation and resettlement...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	
3.11 Number of awareness-raising events on migration	0	16	23	12	0	0	0	51	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	0	0	16	0	0	0	0	16	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	216	709	130	5 186	53	0	6 294	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	667	1 205	3 118	2 905	4 619	30	51	12 595	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	60 527	233 942	69 314	18 472	32 332	74 777	0	489 364	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	1	1	5	4	0	0	1	12	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	17	175	194	218	243	2	0	850	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	5	12	157	143	150	0	0	467	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	10	20	8	2	1	0	0	41	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	8	0	1	1	0	0	0	10	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
6.3 Number of entities benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

Mauritania

Of the 21 programmes that implemented activities in Mauritania over the EUTF's period, only three reported results in the second semester of 2023: POC MR¹ and two regional programmes, PDU² and IPDEV2³. In the first half of the year, in addition to these programmes, three other national programmes (Nexus SRD⁴, Promopêche AECID⁵, SAFIRE⁶) and four regional programmes (ARCHIPELAGO⁷, GAR-SI⁸, PAGES II⁹, Radio Jeunesse Sahel¹⁰) were active in the country. The reported results for these programmes were covered in the S1 2023 report.

Activities in S2 2023 mainly focused on improving governance (SO4) and strengthening the resilience of communities (SO2). Most of the results were achieved through PDU in the Hodh ech Chargui region, bordering Mali. 2,120 people participated in conflict prevention (58%) and resource management (42%) related activities (indicator 4.3) through dialogue spaces and community mechanisms supported by the programme. PDU also trained 60 persons on conflict prevention, justice and security (indicator 4.2) – including staff from civil society organisations (CSOs) (67%) and local civilian institutions (17%).¹¹ Finally, 379 people benefitted from nutrition-related assistance (indicator 2.3) and 149 persons were reached through sensitisation campaigns (indicator 2.7) on nutrition and food security. Regarding economic opportunities (SO1) and migration management (SO3), IPDEV2 created 43 new jobs (indicator 1.1) and POC MR trained 26 police officers on migration management with a focus on smuggling of migrants (indicator 3.7).

¹ MR-09-01: *Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint pour la Mauritanie.*

² REG-18: *Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.*

³ REG-11-01: *Soutenir les entrepreneurs et les petites PME en Afrique de l'Ouest.*

⁴ MR-08: *L'UE pour le nexus sécurité-résilience-développement en Mauritanie.*

⁵ MR-05-01: *Promotion de l'emploi et amélioration des conditions de vie des pêcheurs artisanaux côtiers, jeunes et femmes aux alentours des espaces naturels protégés du secteur nord de Mauritanie.*

⁶ MR-07-02: *Programme de renforcement de la résilience des communautés urbaines et rurales vulnérables en Mauritanie.*

⁷ REG-15: ARCHIPELAGO: an African-European TVET initiative.

⁸ REG-04: GAR-SI SAHEL (Groupes d'Action Rapides – Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel).

⁹ REG-20: *Programme d'appui au G5 pour la sécurité au Sahel – Phase II.*

¹⁰ REG-25: *Radio Jeunesse Sahel – Appui européen à la phase de démarrage de la radio.*

¹¹ The remaining 16% were unspecified beneficiaries.

Table 4: EUTF common output indicators for Mauritania, December 2023

Indicateur FFU	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	S2 2023	Total	Evolution
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	46	325	1 888	1 078	869	323	46	4 574	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	18	468	595	520	4	2	1 607	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	5 160	7 678	4 205	5 890	3 330	2 101	0	28 364	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	533	1 747	3 562	4 202	2 978	582	0	13 604	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	4	11	47	13	2	0	0	77	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	404	204	334	180	0	0	0	1 122	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	3 098	40 332	587	3 124	130	379	47 650	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	0	5 422	13 367	5 388	280	596	0	25 053	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	8	12	14	0	32	0	0	66	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	87 260	298 839	6 500	11 280	2 766	149	406 794	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	0	170	14	203	60	9	10	466	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	0	1 375	0	125	0	0	1 500	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	213	1 380	2 627	3 383	632	0	0	8 235	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	6 558	14 138	1 524	0	0	0	0	22 220	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	906	2 525	373	483	0	0	0	4 287	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	9	19	11	17	0	0	0	56	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	9	7	7	15	0	0	0	38	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	15	76	44	12	0	0	0	147	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	65	773	50	822	0	12	26	1 748	
3.8 Number of people of concern benefiting from evacuation and resettlement...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	3	0	3	0	0	0	6	
3.11 Number of awareness-raising events on migration	13	30	10	0	0	0	0	53	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	2	2	0	0	1	0	0	5	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	31	0	1 628	7 176	3 709	1 888	7	14 439	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	223	339	961	1 142	575	248	62	3 550	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	15 250	511	62 716	8 324	856	185	2 120	89 962	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	39	10	17	144	5	2	8	225	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	26	122	23	10	0	0	181	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	13	6	269	122	311	2	0	723	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	5	32	32	8	5	4	0	86	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	9	0	1	1	2	0	0	13	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	35 207	10 041	5 554	0	0	50 802	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	6 662	4 707	2 795	0	0	14 164	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	95	10	1	0	0	106	

Nigeria

In 2023, only two programmes were still active in Nigeria out of the ten that implemented activities in the country over the EUTF's period: One UN Response Plan, which ended in December, and ALTP *Golfe de Guinée*, which is set to end in June 2024. One UN Response Plan, designed as an inclusive COVID-19 response, continued to implement activities benefitting both individuals (indicator 6.2) and entities (indicator 6.3), through the testing of 1,506,130 people and the expansion of the testing capability of 23 laboratories. The programme also supported 516 micro-, small-, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) (indicator 1.2), 333 people with cash transfers (indicator 2.9) and 100 health care workers with training in case management (indicator 2.8). ALTP *Golfe de Guinée* is a regional programme which focused on the fight against trafficking in persons (TIP) across Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Togo and Nigeria. In 2023, the programme organised one awareness raising event (indicator 3.11) and sensitised 78 employers (indicator 2.7) to the potential presence of victims of trafficking in the workforce, trained 290 individuals on migration management and protection (indicator 3.7) with a

focus on TIP, reinforced one dedicated social centre (indicator 2.1 bis) and provided 39 victims of TIP with reintegration assistance (indicator 3.5 bis).

Table 5: EUTF common output indicators for Nigeria, December 2023

Indicateur FFU	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	S2 2023	Total	Evolution
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	4 575	1	0	0	0	0	0	4 576	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	257	27	37	9 362	7 505	516	0	17 704	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	17 101	5 621	5 025	1 508	2 065	0	0	31 320	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	774	1 022	286	2 162	901	0	0	5 145	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	12	0	0	0	1	0	0	13	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	431	25	534	200	3	1	0	1 194	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	186 085	315 828	66 595	6 581	43 055	0	0	618 144	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	0	10 000	0	0	0	0	10 000	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	170 961	200 430	246 044	163 430	252	0	0	781 117	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	0	873	467	230	0	0	0	1 570	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	114 224	9 388	32 036 353	8 442 983	13 423 418	78	0	54 026 444	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	5 624	1 813	34 559	23 225	899	100	0	66 220	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	136 160	17 965	94 653	213 742	45 392	333	0	508 245	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	0	0	9	1	0	0	0	10	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	1 265	11 020	53 843	8 331	36 219	0	0	110 678	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	7	3	7	1	0	0	0	18	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	11 393	4 500	1 124	1 097	0	0	0	18 114	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	5 700	4 442	1 522	2 058	461	39	0	14 222	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	4	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	45	1 448	266	67	223	2 049	
3.8 Number of people of concern benefiting from evacuation and resettlement...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	41	71	12	0	0	0	124	
3.11 Number of awareness-raising events on migration	10	65	126	209	145	1	0	556	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	4	17	3	0	0	0	0	24	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	0	60	0	0	0	0	60	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	9 093	3 279	2 600	1 812	2 453	0	0	19 238	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	24 587	18 259	62 283	42 376	31 392	0	0	178 897	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	9	2	8	17	61	0	0	97	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	33	1	22	1	0	0	0	57	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	16	12	4	3	3	1	0	39	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	28	10	5	2	1	0	0	46	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	10 769 181	2 033 343	1 290	0	0	12 803 814	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	425 784	924 904	3 551 434	1 493 015	13 115	6 408 252	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	615	372	194	21	2	1 204	

The Gambia

In 2023, four programmes were active in The Gambia – the EU-IOM Joint Initiative in The Gambia¹, YEP², Protection West Africa³ (regional programme) and the Rural Infrastructure and Employment Creation Project (RIEC).⁴ However, the first three programmes all ended in the first half of the year. The EU-IOM Joint Initiative did not report any output in 2023. YEP reported some results before concluding, including directly creating or supporting 452 jobs (indicator 1.1), providing professional training or skills development to 472 people (indicator 1.4), and supporting the creation of 45 MSMEs (indicator 1.2). Additionally, YEP information campaigns reached over 87,765 youth with messages on the importance of TVET education, environmentally friendly technologies, and COVID-19 prevention (indicator 2.7). Protection West Africa assisted 135 migrants in transit, refugees/asylum-seekers and IDPs through support and services, including food, psychological support and housing (indicator 3.2). Meanwhile, its information campaigns on safe migration reached 3,726 potential migrants (indicator 3.3).

The RIEC project, implemented by Enabel, was the only programme active in the second half of the year. During that period, its activities centred around ongoing construction works. Two sites – a youth accommodation block in Farafenni and an agricultural food platform in Jenoi – progressed significantly throughout the year. Some delays were incurred as a result of construction contractors not meeting deadlines. In the light of the challenges faced and to allow project completion, a six-month, no-cost

¹ GM-02: Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants in The Gambia, and REG-04-03 : EUTF – IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration: Regional action for the Sahel and Lake Chad region. While the EU-IOM Joint Initiative in The Gambia (GM-02-01) administratively ended in June 2021, the activities were continued under the regional Extension of the EU-IOM Joint Initiative (REG-04-03) which provided outputs in The Gambia until late 2022, before ultimately stopping in S1 2023.

² GM-01-01: The Gambia Youth Empowerment Project.

³ REG-13: *Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest.*

⁴ GM-03-04: Rural infrastructure and employment creation project.

extension was approved by the EU Delegation, extending the project duration until June 2024. The programme plans to deliver the infrastructure in Q1 2024.

Table 6: EUTF common output indicators for The Gambia, December 2023


Indicateur FFU	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	S2 2023	Total	Evolution
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	370	1 681	1 514	5 804	1 102	453	0	10 924	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	335	306	1 633	1 985	698	45	0	5 002	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	1 770	2 956	3 114	3 612	3 345	0	0	14 797	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	767	2 877	955	2 437	1 601	472	0	9 109	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	0	5	8	30	0	0	0	43	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	0	0	7	9	23	1	0	40	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	0	21	42	61	0	0	0	124	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	0	241 939	85 550	99 430	87 765	0	514 684	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	0	42	257	73	53	0	0	424	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	688	2 400	1 621	0	0	0	4 709	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	0	2	32	764	921	135	0	1 854	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	8 775	74 560	97 530	299 828	310 431	91 491	0	882 615	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	3	5	1	24	0	0	0	33	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	2 710	1 091	340	650	0	0	0	4 791	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	2 131	1 225	568	523	104	8	0	4 559	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	710	184	725	30	0	1 649	
3.8 Number of people of concern benefiting from evacuation and resettlement...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	10	5	0	0	0	0	15	
3.11 Number of awareness-raising events on migration	65	215	292	151	148	2	0	873	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	4	1	1	1	0	1	0	8	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	4	4	3	0	0	0	0	11	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	1	7	5	1	0	0	14	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	112 796	100 114	0	0	0	212 910	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	40 744	2 790	0	0	0	43 534	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	402	738	0	0	0	1 140	

5. ANALYSIS BY COUNTRY¹

5.1. BURKINA FASO

5.1.1. BURKINA FASO IN 2023

Figure 16. Burkina Faso – Key facts and figures, December 2023



The year 2023 in Burkina Faso was marked by a significant escalation in conflict, making it the deadliest year since the conflict began. ACLED data reported 1,699 political violence incidents, resulting in 8,486 fatalities – double the 4,216 fatalities recorded in 2022. The violence was largely concentrated in the regions bordering Mali and Niger², which accounted for 63% of the deaths.³ Since assuming power in 2022, Captain Traoré’s junta has made the fight against jihadist insurgents a top priority. He established a unit of anti-terrorist volunteers called the "Volunteers for the Defence of the Nation" (VDP).⁴ International observers have criticised the VDPs and their effectiveness, their discipline and their respect for human rights.⁵ Violent attacks have persisted with significant casualties among both the VDPs and the military.⁶ In some instances, like the Zaongo massacre where 70 were killed, it has been difficult to identify the perpetrators of the attacks, as both jihadist groups and government forces could be accused.⁷

Against this backdrop, Captain Traoré tightened his control on the country, even though – officially – the military regime is a transition government. ECOWAS mandated the junta to hold legislative and presidential elections by July 2024, but delays have sparked scepticism among international observers about this timeline. The regime acknowledged delay in its electoral planning, citing security concerns.⁸ Domestically, the regime attempted to silence critical voices by increasing

¹ Countries which have few or no results for the second half of 2023 are not shown here. Please see section **Error! Reference source not found.** for details.

² *Boucle du Mouhon, Nord, Sahel and Est.*

³ ACLED, 'ACLED – Dashboard', consulted in March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ *Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie.*

⁵ Jeune Afrique, 'Au Burkina Faso, les VDP au service d'Ibrahim Traoré', October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Jeune Afrique, 'Semaine sanglante au Burkina Faso pour les civils et les VDP', July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Le Monde, 'Burkina Faso : au moins 70 morts, dont des enfants, dans un massacre début novembre', November 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ France 24, 'Au Burkina Faso, les élections s'éloignent et la Constitution sera modifiée', 30 September 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

arrests and, at times, forcibly enlisting opponents into the army to combat jihadists.¹ Tensions between the government and the military were evident, as protests erupted in barracks over poor living conditions and inadequate supplies.² The junta also claimed to have thwarted a coup attempt in September.³

On the international front, the junta sought to distance itself from France diplomatically, militarily, and culturally. In February, it demanded the withdrawal of French troops⁴ and, in September, it suspended all military cooperation.⁵ The regime has also demoted the French language from official to working language.⁶ In response, France retaliated by suspending EUR 100M in annual development aid.⁷ Meanwhile, Captain Traoré aligned more closely with Russia, receiving military equipment and counterterrorism advice from the latter.⁸ The regime also forged stronger ties with Mali and Niger. The three countries united under an Alliance of Sahel States in September to counter a potential ECOWAS military intervention in Niger and deepen counterterrorism cooperation.⁹

The ongoing conflict has severely impacted the humanitarian situation and the displacement crisis. The number of IDPs in Burkina Faso reached 2,062,534 in December¹⁰, a 10% increase from the previous year.¹¹ In addition, 62,374 Burkinabe sought refuge in neighbouring coastal countries, such as Côte d'Ivoire (26,569), Togo (23,521), Benin (8,958) and Ghana (3,326).¹² Although the number of people facing a Crisis level of food insecurity in October to December 2023, (IPC Phase 3 Crisis or above) decreased by 13% compared to 2022¹³, the figures remained alarmingly high at over 2.3 million.¹⁴ The conflict restricts economic activities, access to food, and humanitarian aid, especially in the northern and eastern regions, where about 30 municipalities are besieged by jihadists. The commune of Djibo, which has been besieged for two years, remains the most concerning area.¹⁵

¹ Le Monde, 'Menacées, enlevées, enrôlées de force : au Burkina Faso, les voix dissidentes réduites au silence', 8 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² Jeune Afrique, 'Au Burkina Faso, toujours des tensions au sein de l'armée', 25 September 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Le Monde, 'Au Burkina Faso, la junte dit avoir déjoué un coup d'Etat', 29 September 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ RFI, 'Les opérations des troupes françaises au Burkina Faso sont officiellement terminées', 20 February 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Jeune Afrique, 'Le Burkina Faso rompt définitivement sa coopération militaire avec la France', 15 September 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ VOA, 'Le français n'est plus la langue nationale au Burkina Faso', 7 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Jeune Afrique, 'Après le Niger, Paris ferme le robinet financier au Burkina', 8 August 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ France 24, 'Au Burkina Faso, la présence russe « s'accroît depuis le 10 novembre »', 7 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Jeune Afrique, 'Le Mali, le Burkina Faso et le Niger scellent « l'Alliance des États du Sahel »', 16 September 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics – December 2023', 20 January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics – December 2022', 20 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹² IOM, 'West and Central Africa – Multi-hazard surveillance tool for West African coastal countries: Benin - Côte d'Ivoire - Ghana - Togo', 30 September 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


¹³ Cadre Harmonisé, 'Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-décembre 2022 et projetée en juin-août 2023', November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁴ Cadre Harmonisé, 'Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre-décembre 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2024', November 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁵ FAO, 'Country Briefs – Burkina Faso', 21 February 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

5.1.2. EUTF IN BURKINA FASO

Figure 17: EUTF portfolio in Burkina Faso, December 2023^{1,2}



The EUTF has contracted EUR 190.1M in Burkina Faso. Most funds (70%) went towards governance and conflict prevention programmes (SO4). Resilience programmes (SO2) received 15% of funding. Employment programmes (SO1) obtained 10% of funds. The remainder (4%) supported migration-related programmes (SO3). As of the end of December 2023, 99% of the budget had been spent.

The EUTF has funded 11 programmes in Burkina Faso since its launch. Five focused on governance and conflict prevention (Justice BF³, PEV⁴, ProGEF⁵, Protection BF⁶, PUS BF⁷). Three targeted job creation (Emploi BF⁸, Stabilisation Séno⁹, and TUUMA¹⁰). Finally, one programme aimed to increase community resilience (SO2 - Résilience BF¹¹) and one programme supported migration management (SO3 - EU-IOM JI Burkina Faso¹²).

In 2023, four national programmes were active in the country (TUUMA, Justice BF, EU-IOM JI Burkina Faso and PEV). Only PEV and Justice BF are pursuing activities into 2024. In addition, six regional programmes conducted activities in the country in 2023. Half of them closed in 2023

¹ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

² This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

³ BF-11: *Appui à la justice au Burkina Faso pour renforcer la lutte contre l'impunité au travers d'une justice plus accessible et efficace.*

⁴ BF-08: *Rebâtir une cohésion sociale au Nord du Burkina à travers un meilleur suivi de la radicalisation, la promotion du dialogue et la valorisation de l'économie pastoraliste.*

⁵ BF-03: *Programme d'appui à la gestion intégrée des frontières au Burkina Faso.*

⁶ BF-07: *Protection des jeunes dans les zones à risque au Burkina Faso à travers l'éducation et le dialogue.*

⁷ BF-09: *Appui budgétaire pour la mise en œuvre du Programme d'Urgence Sahel du Burkina Faso.*

⁸ BF-05: *Programme d'appui à l'Emploi dans les zones frontalières et périphériques.*

⁹ BF-02: *Insertion et Stabilisation Socio - Économique des Jeunes et Femmes dans la Province du Séno.*


¹⁰ BF-06: *Appui à la compétence professionnelle, l'entrepreneuriat et l'emploi des jeunes et des femmes dans les régions rurales du Burkina Faso.*

¹¹ BF-01: *Programme "LRRD" de renforcement de la résilience des communautés vulnérables à l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle dans les zones frontalières septentrionales au Burkina Faso.*

¹² BF-04: *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Burkina Faso.*

(ARCHIPELAGO¹, Protection West Africa², Radio Jeunesse Sahel³) and three will remain active in 2024 (IPDEV2⁴, PDU⁵ and Security G5 Sahel⁶).

Figure 18: Selected EUTF outputs in Burkina Faso, December 2023



Relying on MUAC measurements to improve malnutrition diagnosis

The conflict in Burkina Faso has severely disrupted livelihoods, food systems, and infrastructure, leading to a sharp increase in malnutrition, especially among children. The violence has damaged agricultural lands and health facilities, reducing access to food supplies and health care services. 10% of Burkina Faso's population has been displaced, forced to leave their homes and usual food sources behind. In the most conflict-impacted areas, one in ten children are considered acutely malnourished.⁷

To address this crisis, the use of the mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) method has been rolled-out. This technique allows for a quick and effective diagnosis of nutritional status. During the

¹ REG-15: ARCHIPELAGO: an African-European TVET initiative.

² REG-13: *Projet d'appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables sur les routes migratoires du Sahel.*

³ REG-25: *Radio Jeunesse Sahel – Appui européen à la phase de démarrage de la radio.*

⁴ REG-11: *Soutenir les entrepreneurs et les petites PME en Afrique de l'Ouest.*

⁵ REG-18: *Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.*


⁶ REG-23: *Appui aux forces de sécurité des pays membres de G5 Sahel pour la lutte contre l'impunité et le renforcement de leurs liens avec les populations.*

⁷ UNICEF, 'Burkina Faso: Insecurity pushes more than 1 in 10 children into acute malnutrition in heavily affected areas', 28 November 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

COVID-19 pandemic, its adoption increased as it reduced the need for gatherings, and it continues to be used by mothers and caregivers to independently conduct diagnoses.¹

In the second half of 2023, PDU trained 99,722 women heads of household on the MUAC measurement method at home (indicator 2.3). Additionally, PDU applied the Baby Wash approach, designed to reduce malnutrition in young children through the promotion of breastfeeding, nutrition, hygiene, childcare, and water/sanitation, reaching over 10,000 households in S2 2023 (indicator 2.3). Both of these efforts were deployed in the provinces of Est and Boucle du Mouhoun, both areas which are severely affected by malnutrition.²

Figure 19: EUTF indicator 2.3 in Burkina Faso, December 2023



Strengthening justice and accountability in a complex security environment

The conflict between Burkina Faso's government and insurgent armed groups has taken an increasingly large toll on the population. Most of the fatalities are attributed to Islamist insurgents, but the Burkina Faso military has also been implicated in civilian deaths. At least 147 people, including


¹ Alima, 'PB-mères : une stratégie pour mieux dépister la malnutrition en période de COVID-19', 22 January 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² IPC, 'Burkina Faso Situation Nutritionnelle de 31 Provinces et de 6 Communes 2022-2023', 17 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

47 children, in Karma (Nord) were reportedly killed by the military.¹ However, the Burkinabe government has not confirmed these figures and the public prosecutor has been seized to conduct the investigation.²

The Justice BF programme is particularly relevant in this context, as it aims to combat impunity and enhance the accessibility and effectiveness of the justice system, with a particular focus on military justice. To this end, the project supported the creation of a military police command to act as judicial police within the army. For this special brigade, the project trained 40 officers, 40 subordinates, 15 special military magistrates and 10 clerks (indicator 4.2). The project combined these efforts with awareness raising activities aimed at providing education on the justice system and informing the population about their rights. This included discussion groups and debates that successfully engaged 28,665 people in 2023 (indicator 4.3).

Figure 20: EUTF indicator 4.3 in Burkina Faso, December 2023



¹ Amnesty International, 'Burkina-Faso : La responsabilité de l'armée pointée dans le massacre de Karma', 2 May 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² RFI, 'Massacre de Karma au Burkina Faso: Ibrahim Traoré, président de la Transition, prend à son tour la parole', 5 May 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

5.1.3. BURKINA FASO AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 7: EUTF common output indicators for Burkina Faso, December 2023

Indicateur FFU	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	S2 2023	Total	volutio
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	2,277	2,414	6,151	1,447	3,971	547	830	17,638	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	55	200	1,854	634	472	68	44	3,327	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	4,475	12,644	4,640	4,259	5,047	2,279	8,313	41,657	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET)	956	5,747	4,195	11,642	5,090	9	0	27,639	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	3	14	19	18	2	0	4	60	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	0	33	18	0	0	1	0	52	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	522	1,445	386	858	595	306	45	4,157	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	98,553	58,101	4,405	6,273	46,043	4,086	3,569	221,030	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	282,181	100,124	26,270	140,916	275,715	68,863	115,258	1,009,327	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	150,574	217,432	173,568	192,255	242,776	1,237	35,121	1,012,963	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	23	71	4	41	1	0	0	140	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	1,402	1,003	625	462	380	1	506	4,378	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	341,434	524,022	234,888	237,126	375,556	145,263	431,177	2,289,466	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	7,354	11,919	11,016	3,439	3,873	168	361	38,130	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	333,002	383,674	65,694	62,732	193,848	17,006	103,701	1,159,657	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	190	442	1,736	12,389	16,747	0	0	31,504	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migraton	9,018	27,040	13,248	20,794	63,812	2,160	0	136,072	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	1,635	1,260	5,683	64	0	0	0	8,642	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	1,580	822	662	476	0	0	0	3,540	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	1,244	258	242	535	171	0	0	2,450	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	30	1,145	208	28	0	1,411	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	2	23	16	6	0	0	0	47	
3.11 Number of awareness-raising events on migration	20	68	0	15	7	1	0	111	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	3	0	1	16	8	1	2	31	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	924	9	1,210	10,944	1,212	104	36	14,439	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	994	1,667	1,436	6,845	4,577	1,296	2,083	18,898	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	3,283	83,035	2,069,885	198,931	372,575	1,295,262	1,726,299	5,749,270	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	7	138	123	255	86	22	10	641	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	91	430	380	334	119	25	15	1,394	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	70	184	615	1,241	458	1	130	2,699	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	13	45	4	24	26	11	14	137	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	10	1	4	15	0	0	0	30	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	302,840	0	0	0	0	302,840	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	8,509	0	0	0	0	8,509	

5.2. CÔTE D'IVOIRE

5.2.1. CÔTE D'IVOIRE IN 2023

Figure 21: Côte d'Ivoire – Key facts and figures, December 2023



In early September 2023, Côte d'Ivoire held municipal and regional elections, which were largely considered a test for the country's main political parties ahead of the 2025 presidential election. Following the vote, the presidential party in power since 2011 – the Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace¹ – emerged as the clear winner, securing 125 municipalities out of 201 and 26 regions² out of 30.³ After the passing of Henri Konan Bédié in August, former head of state and president of the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire⁴ (PDCI), the main opposition party had to elect a new leader. Faced with internal party divisions and low scores in recent local elections, the PDCI's new leader Tidjane Thiam must now tackle the challenge of restoring unity within the PDCI to prepare for the 2025 election.⁵

In 2023, Côte d'Ivoire experienced a stable political and social situation, and maintained its economic development, despite challenges. Due to particularly heavy rains, which disrupted the cocoa crop, the country was forced to temporarily halt its 2023–2024 cocoa sales for fear of not being able to meet sufficient production volumes. Côte d'Ivoire also capped the price of rice and suspended rice and sugar exportation until the end of the year, to secure the supply of these essential commodities, the prices of which had skyrocketed in recent months.⁶ Despite these challenges, Côte d'Ivoire showed solid growth and reduced inflation. After averaging 5.2% in 2022, marking its highest level in years⁷, inflation dropped to 4.4% in 2023, and is estimated at 3.6% in 2024.⁸ Gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 6.5% and was projected to grow by 6.7% in 2024.⁹ The USD 3.5B programme supported by

¹ Rassemblement des houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix (RHDP).

² The 26th region was won in December during renewed voting in nine municipalities and one region due to irregularities in the first election held in September.

³ RFI, 'En Côte d'Ivoire, raz de marée du RHDP du président Alassane Ouattara aux élections locales', 5 September 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Parti démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire.

⁵ RFI, 'Côte d'Ivoire : les défis de Tidjane Thiam, le nouveau président du PDCI', 24 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ RFI, 'Cacao: la Côte d'Ivoire stoppe les contrats d'exportation pour 2023-2024 à cause des intempéries', 15 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Compared numbers from: World Bank, 'Macro Poverty Outlook', 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ World Bank, 'Macro Poverty Outlook', April 2024. Retrieved [here](#).


⁹ AfBD, 'Africa's Macroeconomic Performance and Outlook – January 2024', 16 February 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

the IMF to address financial challenges and foster economic transformation continued to make progress. Following the first review of the agreement concluded in May, the IMF assessed Côte d'Ivoire's performance as robust and gave its approval for the next disbursement. National infrastructure continued to develop with the inauguration of a new highway section between Yamoussoukro and Bouaké, a strategic route to interconnect national urban centres and in exchanges with Burkina Faso.¹ Two companies² also began the exploitation of a significant oil and gas deposit off the southwest coast in August as the country aimed to increase its electricity production, bolster its energy independence, and reduce prices.³

In 2023, the country faced a significant influx of refugees in its northern region. Most of the 41,861 individuals who crossed the border were Burkinabe fleeing from increased violence in their country.⁴ The Government of Côte d'Ivoire opened two centres for refugees in the north of the country, with a planned total capacity of 10,000 people.⁵ Although not yet meeting the accommodation needs of over 41,000 refugees, the fact that the Government of Côte d'Ivoire funded 90% of this initiative was praised by the UNHCR country representative as “a first in Africa”.⁶

5.2.2. EUTF IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Figure 22: EUTF portfolio in Côte d'Ivoire, December 2023^{7,8}



The EUTF has contracted EUR 28.9M in Côte d'Ivoire through two national programmes: 83% of the funds were allocated to economic and employment opportunities (SO1 – PSRE COVID⁹) and 17% to community resilience (SO2 – *Etat Civil*¹⁰). As of December 2023, 96% of the budget had been spent.

Seven regional programmes and one national programme of Burkina Faso¹¹ have been implementing activities in the country as well, focusing on employment-related activities (SO1: ARCHIPELAGO¹²,

¹ UEMOA, 'Inauguration de la section Tiébissou-Bouaké de l'autoroute Yamoussoukro-Bouaké', August 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² The Italian company ENI and Ivorian company PETROCI.

³ RFI, 'Côte d'Ivoire : début d'exploitation du méga-champs gazier "Baleine"', 28 August 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Compared numbers from: UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics', December 2022 and 2023. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).

⁵ VOA, 'Des centaines de réfugiés burkinabè accueillis sur deux sites ivoiriens', 24 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ RFI, 'La Côte d'Ivoire va inaugurer deux centres d'accueil pour les réfugiés burkinabè', 21 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁸ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁹ CI-03: *Programme de soutien et de relance à l'économie dans le contexte de la crise du COVID-19 en Côte d'Ivoire*.

¹⁰ CI-02: *Appui à la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale de l'état civil et de l'identification en Côte d'Ivoire*.

¹¹ Among the projects of the programme *Rebâtir une cohésion sociale au Nord du Burkina à travers un meilleur suivi de la radicalisation, la promotion du dialogue et la valorisation de l'économie pastorale* (PEV, BF-08), one project focuses on transhumance in the countries of the Accra Initiative, giving it a regional scope (PEV Accra, BF-08-11).

¹² REG-15: ARCHIPELAGO: an African-European TVET initiative.

IPDEV2¹), migration management (SO3: Protection West Africa², ALTP *Golfe de Guinée*³, EU-IOM Joint Initiative⁴, Erasmus+ West Africa⁵) and governance and conflict-prevention (SO4: PEV⁶, WAPIS⁷).

In 2023, six programmes were active in Côte d'Ivoire: one national programme (*Etat Civil CI*); and five regional programmes (ARCHIPELAGO, IPDEV2, PEV, Protection West Africa, ALTP *Golfe de Guinée*). ARCHIPELAGO and Protection West Africa came to an end during the year and *Etat Civil CI*, IPDEV2, PEV and ALTP *Golfe de Guinée* will continue to implement activities into 2024.

Figure 23: Selected EUTF outputs in Côte d'Ivoire, December 2023



Strengthening basic human rights to face regional humanitarian and security challenges

Côte d'Ivoire plays a key role in addressing regional humanitarian and security challenges that threaten the Gulf of Guinea countries. In the second semester of 2023, EUTF-funded programmes implemented activities aimed at strengthening basic human rights at national and regional levels for nationals and migrants.

***Etat Civil CI* contributed to strengthening basic rights by improving civil status management.**

Civil registration is the foundation of legal recognition of a person and is therefore pivotal in ensuring access to justice and respect of basic human rights. At the end of 2023, there were an estimated 931,076 individuals who were stateless or of undetermined nationality living in Côte d'Ivoire, 25% of whom were children. This included children born from unknown parents or not registered at birth.⁸ *Etat Civil CI* implemented birth certificate catch-up campaigns at the school level. First developed in pilot localities, these campaigns were designed so as to be scaled up nationwide by subsequent initiatives. In one of these pilot operations, in the second semester of 2023, 161 children received birth certificates (indicator 2.2) in Bas-Sassandra District, including 67 girls and 94 boys. At the same time, 1,116 field staff members from the National Office of Civil Status and Registration⁹ were trained (indicator 4.2) across the country's 14 districts, twice the number achieved in all previous semesters put together. Trainings were practice-oriented and aimed to improve service quality, thereby aiming to positively influence the rate of civil registration.

The regional programme ALTP *Golfe de Guinée* implemented activities in coastal countries, including Côte d'Ivoire, to enhance the fight against TIP and improve the protection of victims.

In 2023, 139 victims of trafficking (79 women/girls, 60 men/boys, 45 minors) in Côte d'Ivoire received basic social services through dedicated rehabilitation centres (indicator 2.2). Another 59 (47% minors) benefitted from reintegration assistance (indicator 3.5 bis). In addition, 540 judges, prosecutors, and judicial and security force officers were trained at the central and local levels (EUTF 3.7) on TIP and

¹ REG-11: *Soutenir les entrepreneurs et les petites PME en Afrique de l'Ouest.*

² REG-13: *Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest.*

³ REG-12: *Appui à la Lutte contre la Traite des Personnes dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée.*

⁴ REG-08: Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Chad.

⁵ REG-05: Erasmus+ in West Africa and the Horn of Africa.

⁶ BF-08: *Rebâtir une cohésion sociale au Nord du Burkina à travers un meilleur suivi de la radicalisation, la promotion du dialogue et la valorisation de l'économie pastoraliste.*


⁷ REG-03: Support to the strengthening of police information systems in the broader West Africa region.

⁸ UNHCR, 'Côte d'Ivoire Report on Statelessness 2023', 28 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ *Office national de l'état civil et de l'identification (ONECI).*

procedures for addressing it¹, bringing the number of staff trained in the country to 934 since the programme launched. Lastly, the programme reached 19,176 people through sensitisation campaigns in 2023: 18,387 potential migrants on the risks of migrating irregularly (indicator 3.3); and 789 employers (indicator 2.7) regarding the potential presence of victims of trafficking in workforces.

Figure 24: EUTF indicator 3.7 in Côte d'Ivoire, December 2023



5.2.3. CÔTE D'IVOIRE AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 8: EUTF common output indicators for Côte d'Ivoire, December 2023


Indicateur FFU	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	S2 2023	Total	volutio
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	0	71	2,375	722	706	66	3,940	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	0	9	182	65	64	1	321	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	0	0	0	1,024	462	670	2	2,158	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	0	0	0	128	370	51	249	798	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	0	0	23	25	0	789	837	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	0	0	0	36	240	460	0	736	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	4	3	2,344	1,336	1,630	746	0	6,063	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migraton	12,400	41,852	9,881	3,242	91,327	21,665	14,365	194,732	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	5	11	307	4	0	0	0	327	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	3,778	1,927	885	1,462	0	0	0	8,052	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	1,625	1,149	1,263	1,657	237	18	41	5,990	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	4	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	129	664	692	429	155	2,069	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	64	55	36	0	0	0	155	
3.11 Number of awareness-raising events on migration	10	343	105	10	69	29	128	694	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	0	0	0	15	0	0	0	15	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	0	0	17	0	0	0	17	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	0	0	10	740	890	337	1,120	3,097	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	0	0	0	2	109	12	0	123	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	0	1	3	2	5	0	0	11	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	0	0	4	42	1	78	125	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	0	0	1	4	4	2	2	13	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	4	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	

¹ Trainings addressed the orientation, protection and rehabilitation of victims, use of the national referral system, identification of TIP and application of corresponding legal procedures.

5.3. GHANA

5.3.1. GHANA IN 2023

Figure 25: Ghana – Key facts and figures, December 2023



While the Government of Ghana managed to bring the economic crisis under control, reduced household purchasing power continued to drive poverty and food insecurity. In the second half of 2023, the Government of Ghana continued its course of debt restructuring, fiscal consolidation, and tightened monetary policy. While the first stage of the Domestic Debt Exchange Programme had already been completed in February, discussions under the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments focusing on Ghana’s external official debt continued beyond 2023.¹ Aiming at fiscal consolidation, the government removed selected value-added tax exemptions and introduced new taxes. Furthermore, electricity tariffs almost doubled, bringing them close to cost recovery level. Regarding monetary policy, the Bank of Ghana significantly increased the policy rate in January 2022, reaching 30.5% in 2023.² The policies successfully reduced inflation from 54% in December 2022 to 23% in December 2023 and decelerated the depreciation of the cedi.³ Despite these achievements, households continued to suffer from reduced purchasing power throughout 2023. Food inflation was particularly salient, since the typical Ghanaian household allocates nearly 43% of its expenditure to food.⁴ As a result, 2 million people were in a situation of food insecurity between September and December 2023, compared to 800,000 people in the same period of 2022.⁵ For the 2024 lean season, the number was projected to increase to 2.2 million people.⁶ Relatedly, the World Bank estimated that extreme poverty (less than USD 2.15 per day) would increase from 24.8% in 2021 to 33.2% in 2025, mainly due to the macroeconomic crisis.⁷

In the north of Ghana, spill over from the conflict in Burkina Faso further increased pressure on resources, services, and food systems.⁸ Intensified conflict in Burkina Faso increasingly affected the

¹ IMF, ‘2023 Article IV Consultation, First Review under the Arrangement under the Extended Credit Facility’, January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ Ministry of Finance, ‘Press Release: Ghana Reaches Agreement with Official Creditors on Debt Treatment under the G20 Common Framework’, 12 January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ World Bank, ‘7th Ghana Economic Update’, June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ *Cadre Harmonisé* and IPC estimations for West and Central Africa, February 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ WFP, ‘Country Brief: November–December 2023’, January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).


⁷ World Bank, ‘Ghana Macro Poverty Outlook’, April 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ UNHCR, WFP, IOM, UNICEF, ‘Gulf of Guinea Joint Response Plan for refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons, and host communities: Ghana Planned Response’, 18 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

Upper East and Upper West regions of Ghana. Most importantly, the number of refugees and asylum-seekers in Ghana increased from 8,051 in 2022¹ to 22,950 in 2023², as people fled from the conflict in the neighbouring country.³ The government set up reception centres in Zini and Tarikom where refugees and asylum-seekers were registered and documented in order to benefit from access to education, health, and other services. Amidst the economic crisis, food insecurity was already above average in the northern parts of the country and may increase further if the number of refugees keeps rising.⁴ Among the Ghanaians in Emergency conditions (IPC Phase 4) between September and December 2023, 30%, or 26,447 people, were living in the Upper East and Upper West regions.⁵ According to needs and vulnerability assessments conducted by UN agencies in the two regions, 72% of households were worried about running out of food, and only 37% of communities had water sources that could serve additional populations.⁶

5.3.2. EUTF IN GHANA

Figure 26: EUTF portfolio in Ghana, December 2023^{7,8}



The EUTF has contracted two programmes in Ghana amounting to EUR 24.6M, 80% of which has been allocated to the employment-related GrEEn programme (SO1⁹) and 20% to the migration-related Border Security GH programme¹⁰ (SO3). Both programmes implemented activities in 2023 and are scheduled to close in 2024. As of December 2023, an estimated 88% of the EUTF-contracted budget in Ghana had been spent, while 12% remain to be spent. In addition to these two national programmes, six regional programmes and one national programme of Burkina Faso¹¹ have implemented activities

¹ UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics – December 2022', 20 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics – December 2023', 20 January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

³ UNHCR, WFP, IOM, UNICEF, 'Gulf of Guinea Joint Response Plan for refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons, and host communities: Ghana Planned Response', 18 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ UNHCR, WFP, IOM, UNICEF, 'Gulf of Guinea Joint Response Plan for refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons, and host communities: Ghana Planned Response', 18 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ *Cadre Harmonisé* and IPC estimations for West and Central Africa, February 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ UNHCR, WFP, IOM, UNICEF, 'Gulf of Guinea Joint Response Plan for refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons, and host communities: Ghana Planned Response', 18 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁸ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.


⁹ GH-02: Boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in Ghana.

¹⁰ GH-01: Strengthening Border Security in Ghana.

¹¹ Among the projects of the programme *Rebâtir une cohésion sociale au Nord du Burkina à travers un meilleur suivi de la radicalisation, la promotion du dialogue et la valorisation de l'économie pastorale* (PEV, BF-08), one project focuses on transhumance in the countries of the Accra Initiative, giving it a regional scope (PEV Accra, BF-08-11).

in Ghana since the start of the EUTF. Five of them were still active in 2023 (ARCHIPELAGO¹, the EU-IOM Joint Initiative², IPDEV2³, PEV⁴, ALTP *Golfe de Guinée*⁵) and four reported results in Ghana in 2023 (ARCHIPELAGO, IPDEV2, PEV, ALTP *Golfe de Guinée*).

Figure 27: Selected EUTF outputs in Ghana, December 2023



Promoting green jobs through holistic support

In the second half of 2023, EUTF-funded programmes created or supported 8,162 jobs in Ghana, more than in all previous semesters together (indicator 1.1). GrEEn SNV⁶ was by far the largest contributor to these results.⁷ Most newly created or supported jobs were in the service sector (60%), followed by agriculture, fishery, and livestock (30%). The growth in job creation was the result of GrEEn SNV's holistic approach to boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in the Ashanti and Western regions since 2019. SNV applied the Push-Match-Pull model to address the supply ("push") and demand ("pull") sides of labour, as well as the links between the two ("match"). Regarding push factors, in 2023, agriculture training course modules were conducted in cooperation with the Kwadaso Agriculture College in Kumasi. Regarding matching aspects, GrEEn SNV arranged internships and organised two regional job fairs in 2023, which included CV clinics and on-the-spot interviews.

¹ REG-15: ARCHIPELAGO: an African-European TVET initiative.

² REG-08: Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Chad.

³ REG-11: *Soutenir les entrepreneurs et les petites PME en Afrique de l'Ouest.*

⁴ BF-08: *Rebâtir une cohésion sociale au Nord du Burkina à travers un meilleur suivi de la radicalisation, la promotion du dialogue et la valorisation de l'économie pastoraliste.*


⁵ REG-12: *Appui à la Lutte contre la Traite des Personnes dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée.*

⁶ GH-02-01: Boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in Ghana.

⁷ GrEEn GH created or supported 8,135 jobs in the second semester of 2023, while IPDEV2 contributed 27 jobs.

Regarding push factors, SNV provided incubation and acceleration services to MSMEs and established the Young Entrepreneurs and Startups Support Fund. In addition, the GrEEen Innovation Challenge provided funding for sustainable business models to 15 SMEs in 2023. One of the challenges encountered by the project in 2023 was that high inflation and unfavourable exchange rates reduced the value of the grants disbursed to the awarded SMEs by up to 30%. It is also notable that a study conducted by the project found that many of the newly created jobs were lacking compared to decent work standards¹, missing important features such as job security and fair earnings.² Working towards more decent green employment, GrEEen SNV also continued its support to the Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations' implementation the National Green Jobs Strategy. Important activities initiated in 2023 were a green jobs inventory and nation-wide sensitisation on the potentials of green jobs.

Figure 28: EUTF indicator 1.1 in Ghana, December 2023



Fostering interoperability of border management

Following up on a 2021 regional conference on international border management cooperation³, Border Security GH⁴ conducted a regional cooperation workshop to enhance resilience and mitigate risks in border management (indicator 5.4). Border security agencies from Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo, as well as UNODC and ECOWAS participated in the two-day workshop. Discussions focused on current challenges and opportunities for regional cooperation and coordination in border management efforts, knowledge exchange, and the sharing of good practices to mitigate risks and enhance resilience. Recommendations emanating from the meeting were to strengthen inter-agency coordination at the national level, conduct joint risk analyses and develop joint

¹ ILO, 'Measuring decent work'. Retrieved [here](#).

² GrEEen SNV, 'Progress Report 4', February 2024.


³ The 2021 conference had been organised by Border Security GH together with the Strengthening Border and Migration Management and Security in Ghana (SMMIG) project funded by the Danish government.

⁴ GH-01-01: Strengthening border security in Ghana.

contingency plans at the sub-regional level, and ensure border management practices are professional, intelligence-led and respectful of human rights standards.¹

Addressing one of the regional workshop’s key recommendations, the project strengthened national interoperability of border management operations in Ghana. Most importantly, it supported the operationalisation of Joint Mobile Teams (JMT) through a participatory process involving national agencies engaged in border management (indicator 4.6). In addition to the Ghana Immigration Service, the project’s main partner, the JMT engaged customs authorities, the police, the Economic and Organised Crime Office, and the Bureau of National Investigations. The use of JMTs was intended to strengthen border management effectiveness and efficiency through joint border patrols, border investigations, and other operations, as well as the joint use of operational equipment and infrastructure. With these objectives in mind, Border Security GH organised a joint training event, including simulation exercises among all participating agencies, and conducted drafting sessions to develop the JMT concept and SOPs in a participatory process. The documents should be finalised and validated in 2024. Border Security GH also provided technical equipment to the Ghana Immigration Service in the second half of 2023, including 150 torchlights, 100 first aid kits, 100 camp beds, and 14 motorbikes (indicator 4.1 bis).

Figure 29: EUTF indicator 4.1 bis in Ghana, December 2023



¹ SBS Ghana, 'Interim Narrative Report – Fourth year: 01/12/2022 – 30/11/2023'.

5.3.3. GHANA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 9: EUTF common output indicators for Ghana, December 2023

Indicateur FFU	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	S2 2023	Total	volutio
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	0	2	2,132	4,463	390	8,162	15,149	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	0	5	131	823	1,224	45	2,228	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	0	0	84	16,635	164,345	14,838	110,000	305,902	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	0	5	618	3,018	11,801	1,257	1,740	18,439	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	0	0	0	10	0	0	0	10	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	0	0	0	12	0	29	0	41	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	0	0	0	62	198	240	45	545	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	0	0	0	160,000	1,500	11,007	172,507	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	0	0	90,156	0	120,151	0	210,307	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	0	0	0	3	2	0	0	5	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	0	0	5	7	0	0	0	12	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	3,164	25,290	826,213	3,708	303	11,326	59,493	929,497	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	0	0	5	17	0	0	0	22	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	843	298	753	185	11	0	0	2,090	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	177	268	444	657	83	17	3	1,649	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	0	2	2	1	13	0	18	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	235	519	468	175	28	1,425	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	5	88	64	64	4	0	0	225	
3.11 Number of awareness-raising events on migration	29	57	203	34	11	50	132	516	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	0	31	0	70	550	474	1,125	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	140	40	49	805	127	23	14	1,198	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	0	0	0	29	70	0	0	99	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	5	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	0	19	173	111	0	56	359	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	0	0	2	10	15	3	0	30	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	0	13	4	40	3	18	78	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	1	0	0	3	1	0	1	6	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	32,000	0	0	0	0	32,000	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	7,000	182,763	0	0	0	189,763	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	10	10	0	0	0	20	

5.4. GUINEA

5.4.1. GUINEA IN 2023

Figure 30: Guinea – Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2023



Compared to other military regimes in the region, Guinea has maintained relative stability and a low level of violence. Colonel Mamadi Doumbouya has engaged in the transitional process, initiating the drafting of a new Constitution, and declaring his intentions to step down by late 2024.¹

However, the situation remained precarious as the junta sought to consolidate its control by infringing on public freedoms in multiple ways. This is illustrated by the blocking of the local news site GuinéeMatin and the arrest of journalists who contested this censorship.² Additionally, some television channels critical of the regime were removed from the Canal+ package in December. The authorities cited national security reasons, although observers suggested that their critical stance led to their removal from Canal+.³

Protests have been banned since May 2022 and demonstrations have faced violent crackdowns.⁴ This was the case on the eve of 5 September 2023, marking the second anniversary of the junta's rule, when the *Force Vives* of Guinea (FVG)⁵ called for peaceful demonstrations in the capital, resulting in two deaths and dozens of injuries.⁶ The repression also targeted the military itself, as the junta carried out hundreds of arrests within its own ranks, amid rumours of a foiled coup attempt on the night of 26-27 August.⁷

Internationally, Guinea navigated a divided regional landscape, split between coup-led regimes and the rest of ECOWAS. The 26 July coup d'état in Niger forced Guinea to define its stance and the junta ultimately supported the new regime in Niamey⁸ and rejected any ECOWAS-led military

¹ Jeune Afrique, 'Mamadi Doumbouya réaffirme qu'il quittera le pouvoir à la fin de la transition', 22 February 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² RFI, 'Guinée: treize journalistes brièvement arrêtés lors d'une manifestation à Conakry', 17 October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Jeune Afrique, 'En Guinée, Canal+ coupe le signal de chaînes critiques envers Mamadi Doumbouya', 11 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ RFI, 'Guinée: la junte confirme l'interdiction de manifester malgré les réclamations de l'ONU', 2 June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ The *Forces Vives de Guinée* (FVG) are a coalition of opposition parties, trade unions and CSOs in Guinea seeking to restore civilian rule, comprising political parties, activists, and unions.

⁶ Reuters, 'At least two killed in Guinea anti-junta protests on eve of coup anniversary', 5 September 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


⁷ Jeune Afrique, 'Marche réprimée, arrestations dans l'armée... Drôle d'anniversaire pour Doumbouya', 5 September 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ RFI, 'Niger: la junte de Niamey demande du soutien à la Guinée', 13 August 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

intervention in Niger.¹ However, Guinea’s support to the new Nigerien regime remains limited as Guinea does not align with the more confrontational approach taken by Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali towards France and ECOWAS. Guinea’s foreign policy remained focused on maintaining strong relations with France, which the junta deemed in its national interest.²

5.4.2. EUTF IN GUINEA

Figure 31: EUTF portfolio in Guinea, December 2023^{3,4}



The EUTF has contracted EUR 73.0M for three programmes in Guinea. Most funds (82%) went to INTEGRA to support employment (SO1). The next largest budget (11%) went to RESIGUI⁵ and focused on resilience (SO2). A smaller budget (7%) went to *Etat Civil* GN⁶ to improve governance (SO4). As of December 2023, 88% of the allocated budget had been spent.

INTEGRA and *Etat Civil* GN were active in 2023. Both programmes will continue their activities in 2024. Additionally, three regional programmes were active in Guinea in 2023: IPDEV2⁷ which supported economic development (SO1), ALTP *Golfe de Guinée*⁸ and Protection West Africa⁹ which supported migration management (SO3). Only IPDEV2 and ALTP *Golfe de Guinée* will continue implementing activities in 2024.

¹ RFI, 'Les juntas burkinabè, malienne et guinéenne mettent en garde contre toute intervention militaire au Niger', 1 August 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² Jeune Afrique, 'Coup d'État au Niger : entre Goïta, Traoré et la Cedeao, Doumbouya, l'électron libre', 14 August 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁴ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁵ GN-04: *Améliorer la résilience des populations vulnérables de Guinée.*


⁶ GN-05: *Projet pilote d'amélioration du système d'état civil guinéen par l'effet catalyseur de la digitalisation.*

⁷ REG-11: *Soutenir les entrepreneurs et les petites PME en Afrique de l'Ouest.*

⁸ REG-12: *Appui à la Lutte contre la Traite des Personnes dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée.*

⁹ REG-13: *Projet d'appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables sur les routes migratoires du Sahel.*

Figure 32: Selected EUTF outputs in Guinea, December 2023



Guinea is actively working on modernising its civil registration system, which currently has substantial weaknesses and is not fully effective. For instance, in 2016, only 76.4% of children under five were registered in the civil system. This low registration rate can be partly attributed to challenges in accessing registration centres, particularly in rural areas during the rainy season.¹

The inadequacy of the civil registration system has far-reaching consequences in Guinea. It complicates the government ability to collect demographic data and constrains the planning of effective public services. The absence of proper documentation also means that many Guineans struggle to access essential services like health care, education, and social protection.

One of the main challenges of Guinea's civil registration system has been the loss of documents due to fires or acts of vandalism at registration centres over the years.² To address these issues, digitalisation has been identified as a key improvement strategy. Guinea has made substantial efforts to modernise and digitise civil registries, as illustrated by the National Strategy for Reforming and Modernising Civil Status in Guinea³, covering the years 2018–2022, with support from the EU. Despite these efforts, challenges persist.

The EUTF-funded *Etat Civil* programme, which is implemented by Enabel,⁴ supports Guinea's efforts towards the modernisation of the civil registration system. The programme identified several challenges which constrain the performance and the digitisation of civil status, including a shortage of qualified

¹ Crvssystems, 'Country profile – Guinea', February 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

² Wearefrica.com, 'Guinea launches the pilot phase of its digital civil registration project', 11 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


³ Republic of Guinea, 'Stratégie Nationale de la Reforme et de la Modernisation de l'Etat Civil en Guinée 2018–2022', November 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ GN-05-01: *Projet pilote d'amélioration du système d'état civil guinéen par l'effet catalyseur de la digitalisation*.

personnel, limited IT equipment and internet connectivity, inadequate storage systems, and a need for more effective awareness campaigns.

In 2023, as part of its modernisation efforts, *Etat Civil* provided 636 pieces of equipment to support civil registration centres in the project's pilot zone Conakry (indicator 4.1 bis). This equipment, including computers, decentralised and central servers, scanners, and printers, is essential to advance digitisation. During the second half of 2023, 179,478 individuals were registered for civil status events through the project (indicator 2.9).

Figure 33: EUTF indicator 2.9 in Guinea, December 2023



5.4.3. GUINEA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 10: EUTF common output indicators for Guinea, December 2023

Indicateur FFU	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	S2 2023	Total	volutio
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	55	1,363	1,080	3,074	3,083	23	8,677	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	444	1,058	443	907	864	447	4,163	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	0	1,246	1,278	10	0	0	110	2,644	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	0	2,026	4,551	16,479	3,413	3,543	307	30,319	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	0	3	2	1	8	1	0	15	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	1	0	0	128	3	0	0	132	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	0	0	0	1,363	4,135	82	83	5,663	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	0	0	17,996	0	0	0	17,996	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	0	0	0	827	0	0	0	827	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	0	8,787	14,864	7,722	0	0	31,373	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	0	74	0	1,779	116	0	16	1,985	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	0	6,975	108,535	50,580	0	179,478	345,568	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	1	3	36	2,315	5,027	123	0	7,505	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migraton	21,155	21,161	5,967	9,652	24,691	838	0	83,464	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	1	5	11	9	0	0	0	26	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	9,271	3,958	2,972	3,098	0	0	0	19,299	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	2,898	1,908	1,809	6,809	997	64	126	14,611	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	174	1	0	1	3	1	180	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	1,047	536	644	57	18	2,302	
3.11 Number of awareness-raising events on migration	672	107	91	52	70	2	0	994	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	0	0	0	8	0	636	644	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	4	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	8	1	3	73	450	9	544	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	0	8	1	6	4	5	7	31	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	15	1	12	12	0	1	41	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	0	36	0	1	0	1	0	38	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	23,015	2,106	0	0	0	25,121	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	4,035	1,053	0	0	0	5,088	

5.5. MALI

5.5.1. MALI IN 2023

Figure 34: Mali – Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2023



The second half of 2023 was marked by the withdrawal of MINUSMA and the intensification of fighting between the different forces in the country, including the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA¹), Tuareg independentist groups in the North (particularly the Coordination of Azawad Movements - CMA²) and jihadist groups. After ten years of presence, the Malian government demanded the departure of MINUSMA. The withdrawal took place in a climate of tension, especially in the northern regions, which are key in the conflict between the government and the CMA. The handover of MINUSMA's camps represented an opportunity for various stakeholders to confirm or establish new strategic positions.³ As MINUSMA withdrew, the FAMA progressively took over its military positions and moved northward threatening CMA's strongholds. The FAMA, reportedly backed by Wagner mercenaries, finally reached and seized Kidal on 14 November⁴, ending a decade of control by Tuareg independentist groups. In this volatile context, jihadist groups, such as the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (JNIM) also tried to expand their reach. From 8 August onwards, JNIM imposed a blockade on the city of Timbuktu⁵ (still ongoing at the end of the year) and led attacks in the regions of Gao and Tombouctou in September against military camps and civilians, resulting in at least 64 deaths, including 49 civilians.⁶

In this highly deteriorated security context, the transition government reaffirmed its diplomatic stance, distancing itself from France and fostering ties with Russia and allied neighbouring countries. In August, Mali suspended visa issuance for French nationals in response to France's suspension of visas for Malian nationals.⁷ At the same time, on 30 August, Russia blocked a UN Security Council resolution which aimed to renew the sanctions put in place in 2017 against individuals

¹ Forces Armées Maliennes.

² Coordination des mouvements de l'Azawad: alliance of independentist groups, predominantly Tuareg, which controls vast areas in the north of the country and has its stronghold in Kidal.

³ Le Monde, 'Au Mali, la mission de l'ONU engage sous tension une nouvelle phase de son retrait', 17 October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ BBC, 'Mali army seizes key rebel northern stronghold Kidal', 14 November 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ BBC News Afrique, 'Comment les populations de Tombouctou vivent-elles le blocus imposé par les djihadistes?', 14 September 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ RFI, 'Mali : série d'attaques terroristes dans les régions de Gao et Tombouctou', 8 September 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ RFI, 'La France et la Mali suspendent la délivrance de visas pour leurs ressortissants', 10 August 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

and entities jeopardising the 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali.^{1,2} Two months later, Wagner mercenaries reportedly assisted the FAMA in taking control of Kidal. Niger and Burkina Faso also contributed to this operation through the provision of material support, illustrating the AES's³ reality on the ground. Initially agreeing on a defence pact aimed at pooling military resources to combat rebel or jihadist groups, the three countries expressed their will to establish a true economic, diplomatic and political union in November as an alternative to ECOWAS, which had suspended them from its decision-making institutions in response to their respective coups.⁴ In contrast, in July, the West African Economic and Monetary Union" (WAEMU) announced the end of Mali's suspension from its bodies and institutions.⁵

At the political level, the transition government reasserted its commitment to national sovereignty. In August, Mali passed a new mining code to increase state ownership in new mining projects and foreseeing the creation of local development funds.⁶ Discussions were also led with Russia regarding the construction of a nuclear power plant in order to move towards greater energy autonomy.⁷ Regarding the electoral calendar, on 25 September, the junta announced the postponement of the presidential election planned for February 2024 to mark the end of the transition period and the return to constitutional order. The authorities cited, among others, the refusal of the French company Idemia, to transfer data obtained from an administrative census conducted for civil registration purposes, due to unpaid liabilities by the Malian state.⁸ Two months later, the transitional authorities dissolved the Observatory for Elections and Good Governance, accusing its president of statements likely to disturb public order, following critical comments on the participation rate during the recent constitution's voting process.⁹

¹ The peace agreement signed in 2015 under UN mediation aimed to restore peace and end the persistent clashes between the government and the Touareg independentist groups, after the latter launched a campaign for independence in 2012.

² FRANCE24, 'La Russie bloque une résolution de l'ONU prolongeant les sanctions au Mali', 30 August 2023, Retrieved [here](#).

³ Alliance des Etats du Sahel.

⁴ RFI, 'Réunion à Bamako pour faire de l'alliance des Etats du Sahel une coalition politique et diplomatique', 30 November 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Jeune Afrique, 'Pourquoi l'UEMOA a levé la suspension du Mali', 12 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ AfricaNews, 'Mali adopts new mining code to raise gold concessions ownership', 31 August 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


⁷ Courrier International, 'La Russie, grand parrain nucléaire au Sahel', 27 November 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ RFI, 'Le Mali annonce le report de la présidentielle et accuse une entreprise française', 25 September 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ RFI, 'Mali : les autorités de transition dissolvent l'Observatoire pour les élections et la bonne gouvernance', 21 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

5.5.2. EUTF IN MALI

Figure 35: EUTF portfolio in Mali, December 2023^{1,2}



The EUTF has contracted EUR 285.3M in Mali. In December 2023, 95% of this budget had been spent. Most of the funds were allocated to governance and conflict-prevention (SO4 – 41%), followed by resilience programmes (SO2 – 32%), economic and employment opportunities (SO1 – 22%) and finally migration-related programmes (SO3 – 5%).


Since its launch, the EUTF has funded 13 programmes in Mali, focusing on good governance and security (PAECSIS³, PARSEC⁴, PST-ML⁵, SDNM 2⁶), resilience (ADEL⁷, KEY⁸, PROJES⁹, RELAC II¹⁰), developing economic and employment opportunities (Diaspora Mali¹¹, EJOM¹², PAFAM¹³) and improving migration management (Migration ML¹⁴, POC Mali¹⁵). In addition, 17 regional programmes have implemented activities in Mali.

In 2023, four national programmes (Diaspora Mali, PROJES, PARSEC, PST-ML) and six regional programmes (ARCHIPELAGO¹⁶, IPDEV2¹⁷, PDU¹⁸, Protection West Africa¹⁹, Radio Jeunesse

¹ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.
² This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.
³ ML-08: Programme d'appui au fonctionnement de l'état civil au Mali: appui à la mise en place d'un système d'information sécurisé.
⁴ ML-06: Programme d'Appui au Renforcement de la Sécurité dans les régions de Mopti et Gao et à la gestion des zones frontalières.
⁵ ML-14: Programme de soutien à la transition en République du Mali.
⁶ ML-04: Sécurité et Développement au Nord du Mali – phase 2.
⁷ ML-12: Appui au Développement Economique Local et à la prévention des conflits dans les régions de Tombouctou et Gao.
⁸ ML-01: Programme de renforcement de la résilience des communautés, des ménages et des individus vulnérables à l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Mali.
⁹ ML-10: Programme Jeunesse et Stabilisation – régions du centre du Mali.
¹⁰ ML-03: Relance de l'Economie et Appui aux Collectivités II.
¹¹ ML-05: Projet d'appui aux investissements de la diaspora malienne dans les régions d'origine.
¹² ML-09: Youth Employment Creates Opportunities At Home in Mali.
¹³ ML-02: Création d'emplois par l'amélioration de la filière de l'anacarde, afin d'atténuer les causes de l'émigration, dans les régions de Sikasso, Kayes et Koulikoro.
¹⁴ ML-07: Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Mali.
¹⁵ ML-13: Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint, de lutte contre l'immigration irrégulière, le trafic de migrants et la traite des êtres humains en République du Mali.
¹⁶ REG-15: ARCHIPELAGO: an African-European TVET initiative.
¹⁷ REG-11: Soutenir les entrepreneurs et les petites PME en Afrique de l'Ouest.
¹⁸ REG-18: Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.
¹⁹ REG-13: Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest.

Sahel¹, Security G5 Sahel²) were still active. Diaspora Mali, PROJES, IPDEV2, Security G5 Sahel and PDU will continue implementing activities into 2024³, and PST-ML until 2025.

Figure 36: Situation in Mali and EUTF outputs – as of December 2023



Conflict-prevention and social cohesion

Mali has been grappling with a security crisis for over a decade. In this context, EUTF-funded programmes implemented activities aimed at preventing conflict and reinforcing social cohesion, especially at the community level.

In 2023, 29,696 people participated in conflict prevention activities (indicator 4.3) in the regions of Gao, Mopti, and Tombouctou.⁴ These three regions together accounted for 58% of the country's violent events and 63% of the fatalities over the year, with 918 events resulting in 2,701 deaths.⁵ Of the 29,696 people reached with conflict prevention activities, 23,795 participated in the elaboration of community and cross-border social cohesion plans in the region of Mopti. These plans, which were developed through community focal points supported by PDU PARIC, aimed to define conflict prevention and management measures and specified necessary resources and responsible individuals and institutions. PDU PROGRESS supported another planning exercise in the regions of Gao and

¹ REG-25: *Radio Jeunesse Sahel – Appui européen à la phase de démarrage de la radio.*

² REG-23: *Appui aux forces de sécurité des pays membres du G5 Sahel pour la lutte contre l'impunité et le renforcement de leurs liens avec les populations.*


³ PARSEC ended on 1 January 2024.

⁴ Less than 1% of beneficiaries was reached in Ségou and other unspecified regions.

⁵ ACLED, 'ACLED – Dashboard', consulted in April 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

Mopti, where local actors¹ were brought together to discuss their roles in providing basic services, natural resource management, public security and any other services identified as priorities by the populations. Based on identified needs, they developed capacity-building action plans. Communities were then involved in monitoring actions, through participatory evaluation frameworks and enhanced interactions and collaboration between service providers (local institutions) and users (communities). In total, 1,772 people took part in these activities in 2023. Also in the regions of Gao and Mopti, PDU PROGRESS encouraged 3,198 young leaders to implement inclusive initiatives for inter- and intra-community reconciliation based on identified conflicts. These actions², which were defined by the youth themselves, met criteria of inclusivity and cohesion, common benefits and interests, and sustainability. The remaining 931 beneficiaries were engaged across the three regions through awareness raising initiatives promoting peaceful coexistence and a culture of peace at the local level (479), dialogue forums between population and state representatives and local authorities (230), consultative frameworks on natural resource management (150) and election monitoring (72). All of these actions aimed to strengthen social cohesion between and within communities.

Figure 37: EUTF indicator 4.3 in Mali, December 2023



Human rights activities

Since 2020, the EUTF-funded programme Security G5 Sahel³ has supported the Malian National Human Rights Commission (CNDH⁴) to establish a consultation framework on the protection of human rights (HR), bringing together the CNDH, HR defence organisations, CSOs and security and defence forces. In 2023, this consultation framework held nine meetings at national and regional levels⁵ (indicator 5.4). Security G5 Sahel helped decentralise the activities by establishing two regional consultation frameworks in Ségou and Mopti, which held six meetings in 2023⁶. The consultation frameworks, which discussed matters such as allegations of HR violations attributable to the defence and security forces, consideration of HR and international humanitarian law in territorial security

¹ Including decentralised state services (for water, livestock, and agriculture), communal and departmental councils responsible for monitoring basic services, community service management committees (e.g. water point management committees), land commissions, police and judiciary representatives, traditional and religious authorities.

² Including infrastructure rehabilitation, sports events, participatory theatre performances, or the organisation of cultural festivals.

³ REG-23: *Appui aux forces de sécurité des pays membres du G5 Sahel pour la lutte contre l'impunité et le renforcement de leurs liens avec les populations.*


⁴ *Commission nationale des droits humains.*

⁵ Three at the national level and six at the regional level.

⁶ Four in Ségou and two in Mopti.

operations, as well as attacks suffered by the defence and security forces themselves, aimed to restore trust between security forces and populations. The programme also led five monitoring missions in investigation units (police stations and gendarmerie brigades) and detention and correctional facilities in various regions in 2023. Lastly, two data collection missions, one each semester, were led to assess the general HR situation in the regions of Kayes and Ségou, where 22% of the country's violent events occurred in 2023.¹

Figure 38: EUTF indicator 5.4 in Mali, December 2023



5.5.3. MALI AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 11: EUTF common output indicators for Mali, December 2023


Indicateur FFU	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	S2 2023	Total	volutio
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	2,198	1,307	2,927	1,231	36	39	7,738	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	950	1,664	718	575	37	2	3	3,949	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	18,499	30,552	20,574	55,880	5,753	2,757	420	134,415	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	3,689	5,511	5,998	9,229	1,636	337	558	26,958	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	7	58	19	40	0	0	0	124	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	0	0	0	0	9	0	0	9	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	248	241	120	739	99	74	153	1,674	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	3,813	2,344	1,290	11,210	222,836	7,252	3,927	252,672	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	108,815	190,481	63,346	17,883	39,029	47,954	15,128	482,636	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	38,880	69,426	56,314	22,561	154,307	159,814	1,100	502,402	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	10	2	0	0	0	0	0	12	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	5,133	4,736	4,152	17,512	12	0	4	31,549	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	31,343	176,408	314,206	544,346	2,017,177	140,070	30,268	3,253,818	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	633	5,124	364	678	1,032	3,521	0	11,352	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	1,749,378	284,844	233,291	176,144	271,786	21,442	4,092	2,740,976	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	0	0	21	9	15	0	0	45	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	6,088	3,021	1,692	18,191	17,299	71	0	46,362	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	0	91,476	42,729	218,702	72,561	543	0	426,011	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	1,885	981	349	321	0	0	0	3,536	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	9,612	6,212	2,292	2,879	0	0	0	20,995	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	2,046	4,364	3,111	3,723	20	0	0	13,264	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	3	19	18	23	0	0	0	63	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	25	0	281	1,247	254	56	0	1,863	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	2	14	6	9	0	0	0	31	
3.11 Number of awareness-raising events on migration	0	0	31	33	5	0	0	69	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	3	2	3	2	2	0	1	14	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	837	6	1,318	4,777	2,726	695	62	10,421	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	610	1,930	1,074	3,969	4,218	8,878	6,140	26,819	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	265	1,342	2,070	13,975	142,464	20,227	9,469	189,812	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	37	381	134	290	388	6	1	1,237	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	12	26	53	270	148	0	0	509	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	17	16	808	426	1,008	5	2	2,282	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	34	26	15	396	400	194	4	1,069	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	8	0	6	2	2	2	7	27	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	102,641	0	0	0	0	102,641	

¹ ACLED, 'ACLED – Dashboard', consulted in April 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

5.6. NIGER

5.6.1. NIGER IN 2023

Figure 39: Niger – Key facts and figures, December 2023



During the first half of the year, Niger progressed in enhancing its stability in the volatile Sahel region. President Bazoum adopted an innovative approach to reduce violence within the country. In addition, to conducting military operations, his strategy included negotiating with specific groups and facilitating the reintegration of former jihadists into society. This approach garnered substantial support from the United States and France, both of which recognised Mohamed Bazoum as a valuable ally in the fight against terrorism in the region.¹

On the morning of 26 July, the Nigerien Presidential Guard of Niger initiated a coup d'état, announcing on television that they had ousted President Bazoum, and established the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP).² The following day, the army declared its support for the coup.³ General Tchiani, leader of the Presidential Guard, assumed control as the head of the junta. On 31 July, the junta began targeting arrests, focusing on members of the PNDS (the ousted president's party) and key ministers, such as the Minister of Petroleum, Sani Mahamoudou, and notable PNDS figures. These arrests consolidated the junta and neutralised those deemed as threatening to the new regime.⁴

The international community unanimously condemned the coup. On 30 July, ECOWAS responded by imposing an economic blockade on Niger, suspending all commercial and financial transactions with its members. The regional organisation also issued threats of military intervention.⁵ However, the possibility of such an intervention gradually dissipated and, by the time of the ECOWAS summit in Abuja on 10 December, discussions had shifted towards potentially lifting the previously imposed sanctions.⁶

¹ France 24, 'In the fight against jihadist groups, Niger has no better allies than France and the US', 3 August 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² Comité National de sauvegarde de la patrie.

³ Jeune Afrique, 'Coup d'État au Niger : de « on va tenir » à « ça semble plié », comment tout a basculé pour Mohamed Bazoum', 27 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Jeune Afrique, 'Ministres, figures du PNDS, haut gradés... Au Niger, les putschistes multiplient les arrestations', 31 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ France 24, 'Niger : la Cédéao fixe un ultimatum d'une semaine et n'exclut pas un 'recours à la force'', 30 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Jeune Afrique, 'Le Niger toujours asphyxié malgré les perspectives de levée des sanctions', 11 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

The coup leaders openly criticised the presence of French military forces in the country, suspecting them of interfering in domestic affairs to restore President Bazoum. The junta and public demonstrations that took place throughout August 2023 also accused France of neo-colonial behaviour.¹ This hostility led the junta to cut off the signal of RFI and France 24² in early August and to demand the expulsion of the French ambassador by the end of that month. The ambassador, who refused to leave and remained confined to the embassy, eventually returned to France on 27 September.³ By the end of December, the embassy shut down indefinitely, citing restrictions imposed by the Nigerien authorities that hampered its diplomatic functions.⁴ The junta repealed an EU-supported law that criminalised assistance to irregular migration in the Agadez region, the main transit zone for migrants heading to North Africa and Europe. The EU expressed regret over this decision, which the junta justified by stating that the law prioritised foreign interests rather than those of Niger.⁵

The coup significantly impacted Niger's economy and humanitarian situation. Import bans imposed by the sanctions led to a significant increase in food prices, notably because of border closures with Benin and Nigeria, both key sources for imported food.⁶ Other factors worsened the crisis. The total cereal production, which was affected by localised rainfall shortages and pest infestations, fell by 13% in 2023 compared to 2022. Between June and December 2023, the price of imported rice rose by up to 50% from the previous year, partly due to global increase in rice costs following India's ban on exports of non-basmati white rice starting in July 2023.⁷

As a result, according to the *Cadre Harmonisé (CH)*, approximately 2.32 million people faced acute food insecurity⁸ between October and December 2023 (compared to 2.04 million in 2022), with nearly 42,921 people in Emergency conditions (IPC Phase 4).^{9,10}

Fatalities from violent incidents perpetrated by non-state armed groups increased by 73% between July and December 2023 compared to the first half of the year, particularly impacting the regions of Diffa, Maradi, Tahoua, and Tillabéri. Although the number of violent incidents declined from 258 to 188 over this period, fatalities escalated – rising from 417 to 729.¹¹ Military operations against armed groups limited humanitarian access, impacting long-term food security.¹² As of December 2023, humanitarian needs remained high for the 335,277 IDPs mainly located in the regions of Diffa and Tillabéri, and the 305,584 refugees and asylum-seekers, predominantly from Nigeria and Mali.¹³ These figures represent a slight decrease from those recorded in December 2022.¹⁴

¹ Ouest France, 'Niger : la France avait été sollicitée pour aider à libérer le président déchu Mohamed Bazoum', 19 August 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² RFI, 'Suspension de RFI et F24 au Niger : Cette attitude de la junte présage des lendemains difficiles pour les médias', 4 August 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ TV5 Monde, 'Niger : l'ambassadeur de France Sylvain Itté a quitté Niamey', 27 September 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ France 24, 'La France ferme son ambassade au Niger, qui ne peut plus assurer ses missions', 21 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Jeune Afrique, 'Au Niger, les migrants au centre d'un bras de fer entre la junte et l'UE', 8 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ FAO, 'Country Briefs – Niger', 25 January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ CH Phase 3 (Crisis) and above.

⁹ Cadre Harmonisé, 'Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre–décembre 2023 et projetée en juin–août 2024', November 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ Cadre Harmonisé, 'Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en octobre–décembre 2022 et projetée en juin–août 2023', November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ ACLED, 'ACLED – Dashboard', consulted in March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).


¹² FAO, 'Country Briefs – Niger', 25 January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹³ UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics – December 2023', 20 January 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁴ As of December 2022, there were 376,809 IDPs and 302,044 refugees and asylum-seekers. UNHCR, 'Monthly Statistics – December 2022', 20 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

5.6.2. EUTF IN NIGER

Figure 40: EUTF portfolio in Niger, December 2023^{1,2}



The EUTF has allocated EUR 290.5M to programmes in Niger. Of these funds, the bulk went to governance and conflict prevention programmes (SO4 – 41%), followed by employment programmes (SO1 – 30%), migration (SO3 – 19%), and finally resilience (SO2 – 10%).

Since the launch of the EUTF, four programmes have been dedicated to governance and conflict prevention (AJUSEN³, ECI⁴, ECI *Terrorismey*⁵, EP-GNN⁶), six to employment (A-FIP⁷, *Emploi Niger*⁸, PAIERA⁹, *Pôles Ruraux*¹⁰, ProEMPLOI¹¹, *Stabilisation Agadez*¹²), three to migration (EU-IOM JI Niger MRRM¹³, EU-IOM JI Niger SURENI¹⁴) and three for resilience (Kallo Tchidaniwo¹⁵, Resilience ASP¹⁶, Shimodu¹⁷). In addition to these national programmes, 17 regional programmes have operated in Niger.

¹ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across the years of implementation.

² This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional programmes implemented in the country.

³ NE-06: *Reconstruction de l'État au Niger en complément du SBCII en préparation / Appui à la Justice, Sécurité et à la Gestion des Frontières au Niger.*

⁴ NE-05: *Création d'une Equipe Conjointe d'Investigation (ECI) pour la lutte contre les réseaux criminels liés à l'immigration irrégulière, la traite des êtres humains et le trafic des migrants.*

⁵ NE-15: *Création d'une Equipe Conjointe d'investigation (ECI) pour la lutte contre les réseaux criminels liés au terrorisme.*

⁶ NE-16: *Soutien à la création d'un escadron polyvalent de la Garde Nationale du Niger.*

⁷ NE-04: *Appuyer la formation et l'insertion professionnelle des jeunes filles et garçons des régions d'Agadez et Zinder en vue de contribuer au développement socioéconomique de ses deux régions.*

⁸ NE-11: *Création d'emplois et d'opportunités économiques à travers une gestion durable de l'environnement dans les zones de transit et départ au Niger.*

⁹ NE-08: *Plan d'Actions à Impact Économique Rapide à Agadez.*

¹⁰ NE-03: *Projet d'appui aux filières agricoles dans les régions de Tahoua et Agadez.*

¹¹ NE-13: *Promotion de l'emploi pour le renforcement de la résilience économique des communautés dans la région de Tillabéry.*

¹² NE-12: *Stabilisation et renforcement socio-économique des populations affectées par la migration irrégulière dans les zones de transit au Niger.*

¹³ NE-01: Migrant Resource and Response Mechanism (MRRM).

¹⁴ NE-07: *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour durable au Niger.*


¹⁵ NE-09: *Soutien à la résilience institutionnelle et communautaire dans la région de Diffa.*

¹⁶ NE-14: *Résilience agro-sylvo-pastorale, Ouest Niger – Volet Sécurisation/résilience Parc W Niger et périphérie.*

¹⁷ NE-10: *Projet intégré d'appui à la résilience des populations vulnérables réfugiées, déplacées, retournées et hôtes de la région de Diffa, Niger.*

In 2023, eight national programmes operated in Niger. Five of these programmes (ECI *Terrorisme*, *Emploi Niger*, *Pôles Ruraux*, *ProEmploi*, *EU-IOM JI Sureni*) concluded their activities during the year. Meanwhile, three programmes are set to continue into 2024: one addressing governance and conflict prevention under SO4 (AJUSEN); another focused on employment stabilisation efforts under SO1 (*Stabilisation Agadez*); and a third building community resilience under SO2 (ASP Resilience). Two regional programmes were also active during the year (IPDEV2¹ and PDU²), and both are planned to continue their activities into 2024.

Figure 41: Selected EUTF outputs in Niger, December 2023



Conflict resolution beyond military operations

Since 2018, Niger has been embroiled in armed conflict with jihadist insurgents, a situation which is exacerbated by the country's lack of institutional stability. The violence has continued to spread, with the latest developments offering little hope that the situation will improve in the near future. Following the coup in July 2023, the junta pledged to tackle insecurity, but progress seems far off as the second half of 2023 has been marked by increased violence.

The protracted conflict is severely hampering Niger's development, which is concerning as the country is already one of the poorest in the world.³ Beyond military responses, research^{4,5} has

¹ REG-11: *Soutenir les entrepreneurs et les petites PME en Afrique de l'Ouest.*

² REG-18: *Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.*

³ Niger ranks 189th out of 191 countries in the 2022 UN Human Development Index. UNDP, 'Human Development report 2023-2024', 13 March 2024. Retrieved [here](#).


⁴ Ola Abegunde, 'Mediation in Niger Delta Resource Conflict: Assessing the Determinant of a Successful Process', July–August 2013. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Habiba, 'Conflicts in the Niger Delta: Analysis of Causes, Impacts and Resolution Strategies', February 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

demonstrated the effectiveness of alternative strategies to address such protracted conflicts. These include negotiation, socioeconomic development of the most affected regions, strengthened institutions, and inclusive dialogue.

The PDU programme has implemented an approach based on these principles. However, implementation has experienced challenges due to difficult political and security contexts. The new authorities increased scrutiny of NGOs and control, requiring strengthened movement approvals and reducing humanitarian access. Both foreign and national staff have been denied access and have been required to move with mandatory military escorts. Despite these obstacles causing delays and limiting field movements, the programme managed to continue implementing its activities. An adaptation plan was developed and approved by donors to address access limitations. Consequently, the programme managed to engage 24,327 people in constructive discussions and debates on conflict resolution in the second semester. The discussions were designed in collaboration with religious and community leaders to ensure relevance to the local context and beliefs. An additional 3,374 people benefited from peace caravans and theatre plays that promoted peaceful resolution, raising awareness on related issues (indicator 4.3).

Figure 42: EUTF indicator 4.3 in Niger, December 2023



Addressing development challenges in Zinder

The Zinder region in Niger is marked by considerable development and stability challenges despite high potential. The region has largely untapped mining resources and significant agricultural potential thanks to substantial irrigation opportunities and 50% of land area well-suited to pastoral activities. The region also has large available workforce and is well-positioned to strengthen trade ties with neighbouring Nigeria.¹ Regardless, the population suffers from high poverty rates and repeated food crises, which are exacerbated by recurrent climate shocks. In 2023, over 24,619 people in Zinder were affected by floods which damaged homes, livestock and crops.² Zinder also faces significant challenges managing its outflows of migration. The region is a significant transit and return point for migrants, which adds pressure on local resources, leading to competition with host communities.^{3,4} This is exacerbated by the high population growth rate that almost reached 4% between 2022⁵ and 2023.⁶

¹ République du Niger, 'Conseil régional de Zinder – Plan de développement régional (2016–2020)', December 2015. Retrieved [here](#).

² UNICEF, 'Niger Humanitarian Situation Report No. 3: July–November 2023', 5 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Observatoire régional de la migration, 'Analyse des conséquences de la migration dans la région de Zinder et proposition des mesures d'atténuation', June 2017. Retrieved [here](#).


⁴ EUTF, 'A Zinder, le FFU améliore l'accès des populations résidentes et des migrants aux services et infrastructures de base pour favoriser le vivre-ensemble', 28 February 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Institut National de la Statistique du Niger, 'Dépliant démographique', December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Institut National de la Statistique du Niger, 'Zinder en Chiffre', December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

To help address these challenges, the PROSTARAZ project, part of the *Stabilisation Agadez* programme, was initiated to boost livelihoods, strengthen resilience and improve migration management, especially in Zinder. In 2023, the project supported 728 people to develop IGAs (indicator 1.3) and another 329 beneficiaries to access TVET (indicator 1.4) in the region. The project also established two transit centres equipped with shelters, lavatories and water access to provide temporary respite to Nigerien migrants deported from Algeria (indicator 2.1 bis). In 2023, these facilities welcomed 3,649 migrants (indicator 3.2) and the project also funded the return journeys for 420 migrants stranded in the area (indicator 3.4).

Figure 43: EUTF indicator 3.2 in Niger, December 2023



5.6.3. NIGER AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 12: EUTF common output indicators for Niger, December 2023

Indicateur FFU	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	S2 2023	Total	volutio
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	4,831	4,488	8,100	5,443	11,802	3,294	144	38,103	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	91	127	399	708	690	362	2	2,379	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	5,940	5,332	8,623	12,989	22,578	12,734	1,995	70,192	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET)	6,110	7,875	3,757	4,788	5,509	1,288	511	29,838	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	0	212	72	32	22	6	0	344	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	26	29	21	13	42	20	6	157	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	62	852	749	941	181	46	11	2,843	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	1,020	6,340	5,254	7,086	1,439	385	0	21,524	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	184	3,455	35,614	45,016	50,661	32,010	166,940	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	70,386	123,818	125,031	99,141	86,255	5,948	1,815	512,394	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	0	0	0	1	14	6	0	21	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	4,680	82,858	13,467	6,542	53,965	5,529	22,353	189,394	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	3,669	196,270	369,839	244,266	50,120	28,329	892,493	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	651	1,426	1,316	4,035	1,275	556	420	9,679	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	144,191	266,542	211,714	281,618	176,677	7,625	49,007	1,137,374	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	54,592	7,335	8,585	16,696	12,146	0	3,649	103,003	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migraton	263,488	199,745	8,806	59,872	136,332	22,677	0	690,920	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	24,718	14,165	9,014	6,697	193	420	0	55,207	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	2,624	1,450	351	139	0	0	0	4,564	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	30	134	1,192	822	344	0	0	2,522	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	45	14	10	5	0	3	0	77	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	639	756	291	227	291	41	0	2,245	
3.8 Number of people of concern benefiting from evacuation and resettlement...	2,915	1,395	583	465	18	0	0	5,376	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	6	4	6	0	0	0	16	
3.11 Number of awareness-raising events on migration	9,233	2,996	22	0	0	0	0	12,251	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	10	0	0	14	0	1	0	25	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	489	1,082	1,433	10,871	5,728	1,744	0	21,347	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	1,607	1,784	781	2,541	2,835	485	155	10,189	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	395,666	78,383	46,964	186,719	280,375	4,264	32,648	1,024,998	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	7	40	16	24	77	4	18	186	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	46	40	88	102	36	3	11	326	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	48	58	451	175	511	2	0	1,245	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	29	17	13	24	53	18	4	158	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	8	7	5	7	10	0	0	37	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	3,713	1,696	0	0	0	5,409	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	867	3,913	0	0	0	4,780	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	20	0	0	0	0	20	

5.7. SENEGAL

5.7.1. SENEGAL IN 2023

Figure 44: Senegal – Key facts and figures, December 2023



In the lead-up to the presidential elections scheduled for February 2024, Senegal was marked by political instability. Demonstrations took place in Dakar and across the country during the first half of 2023, escalating into violent protests against the government in June. Amidst this turmoil, on 3 July, President Macky Sall declared that he would not seek a third term.¹ A few months later, his ruling party Benno Bokk Yakaar selected Amadou Ba as its candidate.² The political climate intensified further when opposition leader, Ousmane Sonko, was arrested and his party, Pastef, dissolved in July.³ This development compelled the opposition to put forward Bassirou Diomaye Faye as its new candidate, establishing him as the alternative to Ousmane Sonko.⁴

In October 2023, the IMF carried out its initial evaluation of IMF-supported programmes and financial agreements in Senegal. This evaluation assessed whether Senegal was adhering to the criteria and benchmarks necessary to maintain its support from the institution. Following a favourable review, the IMF board approved the disbursement of USD 275 million in December.⁵ The assessment underscored Senegal's commitment to structural reforms aimed at strengthening public financial management and improving anti-corruption frameworks.⁶ In addition, the IMF report commended the 2024 budget law, which set a deficit target of 3.9% of GDP, aligning with the regional goal of reducing deficit to 3% of GDP by 2025. It also included plans to increase tax revenue to 20% of GDP by 2025, demonstrating efforts to ensure debt sustainability.⁷ Beyond these policy measures, Senegal's economic indicators reflected positive developments, with the country's growth rate forecasted at 3.7% in 2023 and inflation expected to decrease from 9.7% in 2022 to 6.1% in 2023.⁸

¹ Jeune Afrique, 'Au Sénégal, Macky Sall ne sera pas candidat à la présidentielle de 2024', 4 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² RFI, 'Senegalese PM Amadou Ba named as ruling party's presidential candidate', 22 December 2024. Retrieved [here](#). 22 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Jeune Afrique, 'Arrestation d'Ousmane Sonko et dissolution du Pastef : le gouvernement assume', 3 August 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ RFI, 'Senegalese opposition chooses new candidate for presidential election', 20 November 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Jeune Afrique, 'Malgré les remous préélectorales, le FMI renouvelle sa confiance au Sénégal', 26 October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ IMF, 'IMF Executive Board Completes the First Review of the Arrangements Under the Extended Fund Facility, the Extended Credit Facility, and the Resilience and Sustainability Facility for Senegal', 13 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


⁷ Ibid.

⁸ World Bank, 'Macro Poverty Outlook: Senegal', April 2024. Retrieved [here](#).

In 2023, there was a surge in the number of irregular migrants travelling the Atlantic Route, a migration route that connects Western African countries to the Canary Islands in Spain. Frontex recorded the arrival of 39,673 irregular migrants in the Canary Islands, the highest number of arrivals recorded on this route since the agency started collecting data in 2009.¹ From 2009 to 2019, a total of 9,520 arrivals were recorded on the Atlantic Route, indicating a substantial increase in numbers since 2019. In 2023, Senegalese nationals constituted 45% of arrivals and were the largest group to reach Spain, followed by Moroccans (15%), Malians (14%) and Gambians (11%).² The journey along this route is dangerous, and at least 6,007 persons lost their lives in 2023.³ In response to the escalating crisis, the Senegalese government launched the National Strategy to Tackle Irregular Migration (SNLMI) in July 2023. The strategy focuses on four key areas: promoting education and training, creating jobs and economic opportunities, protecting human rights and fighting against exploitation, and cooperating with international actors.⁴

5.7.2. EUTF IN SENEGAL

Figure 45: EUTF portfolio in Senegal, December 2023^{5,6}



The EUTF has contracted EUR 164.5M in Senegal. Of these funds, the bulk has been allocated to employment-related programmes (SO1 – 55%), followed by governance and conflict-prevention (SO4 – 22%), migration (SO3 – 18%) and resilience (SO2 – 6%). In December 2023, 95% of the EUTF-contracted budget in Senegal had been spent.

¹ Frontex, 'Detection of illegal border-crossings', December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ Caminando Fronteras, 'Monitoring the Right to Life 2023', December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Gouvernement du Sénégal, 'Validation de la Stratégie Nationale de Lutte Contre la Migration', 27 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁶ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

Since its launch, the EUTF has funded nine programmes in Senegal, focusing on: job creation (DES¹, PASPED², PACERSEN³, PARERBA⁴); resilience (RSAN Matam⁵, Yellitaare⁶); migration management (Migration SN⁷); and good governance and security (*Etat Civil* SN⁸, POC⁹). In addition to national programmes, several regional programmes have implemented activities in Senegal, namely ARCHIPELAGO¹⁰ and IPDEV2¹¹ supporting economic development (SO1), Erasmus+ West Africa¹² and Protection West Africa¹³ supporting migration management (SO3), and GAR-SI¹⁴ supporting good governance and security (SO4).

In 2023, eight programmes were active in Senegal: four national programmes (PASPED, POC, Migration SN, *Etat Civil* SN), and four regional programmes (ARCHIPELAGO, GAR-SI, IPDEV2, Protection West Africa). Most of these programmes came to an end in 2023, and only Migration SN and *Etat Civil* SN will continue to implement activities into 2024 and 2025, respectively.

¹ SN-04: *Développer l'emploi au Sénégal : renforcement de la compétitivité des entreprises et de l'employabilité dans les zones de départ.*

² SN-09: *Programme de contraste à la migration illégale à travers l'appui au Secteur Privé et à la création d'emplois au Sénégal.*

³ SN-05: *Projet d'Appui à la réduction de la migration à travers la Création d'Emplois Ruraux au Sénégal.*

⁴ SN-08: *Projet d'Appui à la Réduction de l'Émigration rurale et à la Réintégration dans le Bassin Arachidier par le développement d'une économie rurale sur base des périmètres irrigués.*

⁵ SN-03: *Projet de renforcement de la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle dans la région de Matam.*

⁶ SN-01: *Résilience des populations les plus vulnérables face aux crises nutritionnelles et alimentaires dans les zones de départ de Podor, Ranérou, Matam et Kanel.*

⁷ SN-06: *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Sénégal et accompagnement des investissements de la diaspora sénégalaise.*

⁸ SN-07: *Programme d'appui au renforcement du système d'information de l'état civil et à la consolidation d'un fichier d'état national d'identité biométrique au Sénégal.*

⁹ SN-10: *Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint (POC) de lutte contre l'émigration irrégulière, la traite et le trafic de migrants au Sénégal.*

¹⁰ REG-15: ARCHIPELAGO: an African-European TVET initiative.


¹¹ REG-11: *Soutenir les entrepreneurs et les petites PME en Afrique de l'Ouest.*

¹² REG-05: Erasmus+ in West Africa and the Horn of Africa.

¹³ REG-13: *Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest.*

¹⁴ REG-04: GAR-SI SAHEL (Groupes d'Action Rapides – Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel).

Figure 46: Selected EUTF outputs in Senegal, December 2023



Access to basic services: health and education

In December 2023, the Government of Senegal published its Action Plan to operationalise the national development policy, known as the *Plan Senegal Emergent*, for the 2024–2028 period. In this document, the government reiterated its ambition to engage the diaspora (*Sénégalais de l'Extérieur*) in its development strategies, emphasising their role in strengthening decentralised cooperation efforts.¹

The EUTF-funded Migration Senegal programme supported the Government of Senegal to achieve this objective, through its *Diaspora Senegal*² project. *Diaspora Senegal* leveraged the resources and expertise of the Senegalese diaspora in France, Spain, Italy, and Belgium to encourage local development in Senegal. The project selected diaspora-led projects and provided them with financial and technical support to ensure their successful implementation. Each diaspora-led project was selected based on its alignment with national or local development plans and its collaboration with local authorities, CSOs or local associations in targeted regions.


In 2023, *Diaspora Senegal* contributed to local infrastructure development, including the construction or rehabilitation of four health centres and schools (indicator 2.1bis), thereby enhancing health care and access to education for 206,504 residents of Matam and Tambacounda (indicator 2.9). Since its inception in August 2017, the project has mobilised the Senegalese diaspora to build or rehabilitate 54 social infrastructures across seven Senegalese regions: Kédougou; Kolda; Matam; Saint Louis; Sédhiou; Tambacounda; and Ziguinchor. As a result, over 303,598 people have gained improved

¹ République du Sénégal, 'Plan Sénégal Emergent (PSE) : Plan d'Actions Prioritaires 3 : 2024–2028', December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² SN-06-02: Programme d'Appui aux Initiatives de Solidarité pour le Développement (PAISD) Phase III.

access to essential services, such as health care, water, and education (indicator 2.9). As this EUTF-funded phase concludes in 2024, the initiatives funded through the mobilisation of the Senegalese diaspora are set to continue in a new phase, funded by the *Agence Française de Développement (AFD)*.

Figure 47: EUTF indicator 2.1 bis in Senegal, December 2023



Access to basic services: civil documentation

The *Etat Civil SN* programme continued to advance towards its objective of modernising Senegal’s civil registration system. The project’s strategy focused on enhancing both the demand for, and supply of, civil registration services. In 2023, the programme’s efforts to increase awareness, both through in-person and mass media outreach, reached 5,960 people, bringing the cumulative total impacted by these campaigns to 36,864 (indicator 2.7). Additionally, the programme provided training to 5,260 local authority staff on civil registry systems (indicator 2.8) and equipped civil registry offices with 2,207 pieces of equipment (indicator 4.1 bis) to aid the digitalisation and archiving of data. These results were significant, as they represented 68% of all outputs for indicator 2.8 and 34% of all outputs for indicator 4.1 bis.

In December 2023, the Ministry of Territorial Communities, Planning, and Territorial Development (MCTADT), *Etat Civil SN*’s national counterpart, requested the programme’s support to organise the first ever Francophone Africa symposium on civil registration in Dakar.¹ The symposium aimed to provide a platform for French-speaking civil registry experts to exchange insights on recent policy and regulatory developments. It also provided an opportunity to share best practices and strategies to enhance civil registry management across French-speaking countries.

¹ MCTADT, ‘Ouverture du Premier Symposium sur l’Etat Civil en Afrique Francophone’, 11 December 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

5.7.3. SENEGAL AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 13: EUTF common output indicators for Senegal, December 2023

Indicateur FFU	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	S2 2023	Total	volutio
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	553	2,900	9,181	7,599	3,317	1,539	26	25,115	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	1,688	1,146	4,278	1,134	901	327	1	9,475	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	6,207	7,106	2,788	223	1,391	987	0	18,702	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET)	9,757	7,043	2,583	1,236	12,795	662	0	34,077	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	0	0	0	0	19	0	0	19	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	6	11	7	0	32	0	0	57	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	3	56	13	37	17	1	3	130	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	5,378	2,781	304	0	0	0	0	8,463	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	67,575	327,702	168,358	0	53,995	0	0	617,630	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	23,153	21,280	19,857	23,361	4,059	0	0	91,710	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	0	40	0	0	0	0	0	40	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	23	667	432	525	0	0	0	1,648	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	42,939	180,400	357,769	100,535	30,904	5,360	600	718,508	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	194	1,997	102	28	137	4,941	319	7,718	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	2,400	10,737	15,933	35,581	45,188	103,569	103,327	316,735	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	19	36	15	115	100	4	7	296	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	0	8	731	1,478	1,507	161	0	3,885	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	103,918	506,419	142,362	1,133,758	13,157,410	2,754,838	0	17,798,726	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	10	7	119	80	0	0	0	216	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	2,950	913	521	857	0	0	0	5,241	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	268	2,110	16,940	2,316	22	0	0	21,656	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	8	0	2	0	0	0	10	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	368	303	447	148	0	1,266	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	36	50	48	0	0	0	134	
3.11 Number of awareness-raising events on migration	221	73	548	131	28	3	0	1,004	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	4	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	34	0	702	278	325	4,976	180	6,495	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	150	50	141	662	690	67	0	1,760	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	9	28	10	53	18	22	4	144	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	44	9	27	49	9	0	138	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	8	9	3	5	27	1	4	57	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	14	5	16	33	27	7	6	108	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	84,525	0	0	0	0	84,525	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	251,687	0	0	0	0	251,687	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	93	0	0	0	0	93	

CONCLUSIONS


In 2023, the SLC region continued to grapple with high inflation and increasing debt, political instability, and intensified conflict, causing intertwined security, political and humanitarian challenges. The number of people facing crisis levels of food insecurity reached 45 million, 13.6 million more than in 2022. Likewise, at the end of the year, SLC countries hosted 6.5 million IDPs and 1.8 million refugees, representing, respectively, a 4% and a 64% increase compared to the end of 2022.

THE EUTF PORTFOLIO IN 2023

In 2023, the EUTF contracted portfolio in the SLC window grew, with one additional project. In December 2023, the portfolio included 213 contracts worth EUR 2.18B.

As of the end of 2023, 82 programmes out of 108 were completed. 26 programmes will continue to implement activities in 2024 and early 2025. The largest share of remaining programmes focuses on SO4 (41%), followed by SO1 (27%) and SO2 (25%). SO3 represents only 7% of the remaining active programmes.

Regional programmes represent 39% of the remaining programmes. At national level, countries with the most remaining active programmes are Niger (16%), Mali (11%), Senegal, Ghana and Burkina Faso (7% each). Countries such as Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria do not have any national programme still active.



THE MLS

This report is the outcome of the 13th round of data collection conducted by the MLS team for the EUTF's SLC window. Data collection for the second semester of 2023 lasted from the beginning of February 2023 to the beginning of March 2023. Many IPs also provided the MLS team with qualitative information on programme implementation, which supported the analysis and contextualisation of collected data.

This report includes data from 209 projects, a number that has been gradually increasing: 71 projects were included in the first report in 2018, 129 in 2019, 166 in 2020, 193 in 2021, and 205 in 2022.

2023 KEY ACHIEVEMENTS

Substantial results continued to be reported against all Strategic Objectives in 2023:

- **Economy and employment:** The EUTF supported the creation of 20,926 jobs in the SLC region in 2023, for a total of 158,651 jobs created or supported since the beginning of activities (indicator 1.1). During the year, 158,644 people benefitted from assistance to develop IGAs (indicator 1.3), and 15,397 people benefitted from TVET and/or skills development (indicator 1.4). Additionally, 4,028 MSMEs were created or supported (indicator 1.2). Finally, 11 business and productive infrastructures were built or rehabilitated (indicator 1.5).
- **Resilience:** EUTF-funded programmes supplied 417,887 people with food security-related assistance (indicator 2.4) and 333,994 beneficiaries with nutrition assistance (indicator 2.3) in 2023. EUTF-funded programmes also supported the delivery of 20,871 basic social services (indicator

¹ Estimates based on known contracts' budget, start and end dates. Only contracted and operational projects are included.

2.2), and improved access to basic services for 808,819 people (indicator 2.9) during the year. Furthermore, 744 social infrastructures were built or rehabilitated (indicator 2.1 bis), and 11,259 people were trained in the provision of services (indicator 2.8). Finally, 940,343 people were reached by resilience campaigns (indicator 2.7).

- **Migration:** EUTF-funded programmes provided assistance or protection to 4,885 migrants in transit, refugees, asylum-seekers and IDPs in 2023 (indicator 3.2). Programmes also provided capacity-building or operational support to 1,738 staff (indicator 3.7) and 20 institutions (indicator 3.6) in order to improve migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination. Campaigns on the risks of irregular migration reached 3,009,789 migrants and potential migrants over the course of the year (indicator 3.3). Finally, EUTF-funded activities supported 420 voluntary returns (indicator 3.4) and 796 returnees with reintegration assistance (indicator 3.5 bis).
- **Governance, security and conflict prevention:** EUTF-funded programmes supported the drafting of 109 laws, plans and policy documents aimed at improving governance and policymaking efforts in 2023 (indicator 4.6). Furthermore, 3,167,953 individuals participated in peacebuilding activities centred around social cohesion and conflict resolution during the year (indicator 4.3). EUTF-funded programmes also delivered conflict prevention and security-related training to 21,193 staff members and key actors involved in social cohesion and peace dynamics (indicator 4.2). Finally, six governance infrastructures were supported (indicator 4.1) and 11,436 items of equipment (indicator 4.1 bis) were provided to support governance and security.

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