The Lure of the City
Synthesis report on rural to urban migration in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda

Table of Contents

Map of Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda

Map of Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. The map shows the region including Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Yemen, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Somaliland, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania.

Legend:
- Site of investigation
- International border
- Contested border
- Region – Uganda and Ethiopia
- Former province – Kenya
- National capital
- Selected city or town
- Railway
- Selected road
- Selected river
- Lakes

250 km

© Rift Valley Institute 2018
Boundaries and names shown do not imply endorsement by the RVI or any other body

© **MAP**grafix 2018

Data source: OpenStreetMap

Rural to urban mobility project

Project background

According to the African Development Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Development Programme, more than half of all Africans are expected to live in cities by 2050 (AfDB, OECD, & UNDP, 2016). As more than half of Africa's population is under 19 years of age, many of those living in and moving to urban centres are youths. Under the Sustainable Development Goals, governments have committed to make cities and human settlements more inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable. Achieving this is a major challenge particularly for African governments. A failure to do so could result in irregular and dangerous migration to either elsewhere in the region or beyond. In order to better understand and response to these evolving patterns of mobility, it is important to analyse the experience of migrants within Africa's growing urban areas.

In the Horn of Africa, as in many parts of Africa, migration from rural to urban living is increasing (Ibid.). There are multiple factors driving this, such as climate change, especially drought, or insecurity, as well as pull factors such as employment and education opportunities, access to other services, and changing expectations of young people. For some migration is aspirational, with people choosing to move to increase their options, for others the decision to move may be to escape physical or economic insecurity. How these rural to urban movements contribute to new patterns of mobility that may become more permanent and long-distance is not well understood. While in-migration to the capital cities of the Horn is better studied, large-scale movement to secondary cities is under-researched and policies of governments and development organizations under-developed. Provincial and regional capital cities in the Horn of Africa are playing host to increasing numbers of migrants who are placing pressure on fragile physical and social infrastructure. Dynamics between urban settlement and rural livelihoods are also not well understood and it is possible that some urban migration may actually help those kin who remain in rural areas to maintain their agricultural or pastoral livelihoods, supplemented with income shared by urban relatives.

For the migrants themselves, the move into cities is not always a positive one. They may have moved out of desperation when they could not sustain themselves through their rural livelihoods. They may move to cities expecting it be temporary, until conditions in the countryside improve, only to find that their stay becomes protracted or permanent. Others make the move intending it to be permanent, expecting that life will be better in the cities. But, as many newly urban residents find their lack secure access to housing, employment, and social services, means the move may not deliver a better standard of living but trap them in a cycle of destitution from which it is virtually impossible to emerge.

Scope of research

Our research focused on Gulu in Uganda, Eldoret in Kenya, and Dire Dawa in Ethiopia as destination cities, and a selective examination of rural areas where people are migrating from.

The study examined the following overarching research questions:
- To what extent and how does rural–urban migration enhance people's livelihoods and resilience? How much do such movements lead to improved access to services, higher incomes, better employment and improved security? How effective are urban linkages in introducing a safety net for those who live in rural areas?
- What is the impact of people's movement into secondary cities on infrastructure and services, social cohesion, and security? What impact does a growing population have on strengthening the urban economy or on putting pressure on services, exacerbating tensions and contributing to insecurity?
- How does migration to secondary cities affect subsequent migration? Does the first experience of migration prepare people for further migration?

In addition to these primary research questions it was necessary to understand:

- Historical trends in movements to the secondary cities.
- The demography of the people moving (ethnicity, gender, age, individual, or family, wealth group).
- Drivers of migration (the social, economic, political, environmental push and pull factors).
- Patterns of movement (short or long term, individual, family or group)
- The material infrastructure, including roads and transport, but also, importantly, communications and financial infrastructure, such as mobile networks, that facilitate the movement of people, financial flows and goods.
- Social networks and affiliations and how they influence and support migration, settlement patterns, and access to labour markets.
- The impact of migration on social stratification in rural places of origin
- Aspirations, desires and values attached to rural to urban mobility in both the sites of origin and destination and the way they move along migration routes.

Project team

Supported by the EU Trust Fund for Africa, the Research and Evidence Facility (REF) was created to collate and produce evidence and policy-relevant knowledge that can inform the work of the Trust Fund in the Horn of Africa. Key themes for the research of the REF include information on the drivers of migration, dynamics of cross-border economies and centre-periphery relations, the features and limitations of government migration management systems and

social service provision, drivers of radicalism and violent extremism, and opportunities for strengthening resilience.

The project is coordinated by a consortium made up of the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London as the lead partner, and the University of Manchester, Sahan Research and the University of Oxford. The research upon which this report is based was conducted by the Rift Valley Institute (RVI).

Overall coordination of the research was conducted by Gianluca Iazzolino, with support from Tymon Kiepe and Connor Clerke of the RVI. Support in the concept and design processes was provided through the Research and Evidence Facility (REF) for the EU Trust Fund by Team Leader Laura Hammond, Migration and Development Key Expert, Oliver Bakewell, and Conflict and Governance Key Expert, Vincent Chordi. Communications Support was provided by Idil Osman.

Research was carried out by three research teams in Dire Dawa, Eldoret and Gulu. The Dire Dawa research team consisted of Dr Dereje Feyissa (Lead Researcher), Dr Milkessa Midega (Research Associate) and Dr Ketema Wakjira (Research Associate). The research team in Eldoret consisted of Miriam Badoux (Lead Researcher), Kennedy Mwangi (Research Associate) and Elvis Abuga (Research Associate). The Gulu research team consisted of Dr Ronald Kalyango (Lead Researcher), Isabella Amony (Research Associate) and Kindi Fred Immanuel (Research Associate).

Feedback on an earlier draft of this report was provided by the REF team, RVI, staff of the EU Trust Fund (Horn of Africa Window) as well as from staff of the EU Delegations in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda.

The views expressed in this report are those of the researchers and do not indicate a position or opinion on the part of the Research and Evidence Facility, the Rift Valley Institute, the European Union or the EU Trust Fund for Africa.

Corresponding Author: Gianluca Iazzolino, giazzolino@gmail.com

Rift Valley Institute
Taasisi ya Bonde Kuu
معهد الأخدود العظيم
Machadka Dooxada Rift
የስምጥ ሸለቆ የጥናት ተቋም
Instituto do Vale do Rift
东非大裂谷研究院
Institut de la Vallée du Rift
www.riftvalley.net

Summary

This report provides a synthesis of the findings from a study of rural to urban migration in three secondary cities: Dire Dawa, Ethiopia, Eldoret, Kenya, and Gulu, Uganda. The study examined the drivers of migration to cities, the experiences of those who have moved, the question of whether they have continued to maintain ties to rural areas, and the challenges faced by municipal and other government departments in responding to the increases in the numbers of urban residents.

Dire Dawa, Gulu and Eldoret have experienced a dramatic growth in recent years as a result of a combination of political, economic and social factors. The history of all three cities has been shaped by their strategic locations, magnified by the construction of critical infrastructures. Both Dire Dawa and Eldoret were established along international railway lines. The economic fortune of Dire Dawa in particular has depended for a long time on its role as a major transport hub between Ethiopia and Djibouti, which is now the former's only outlet to the sea. The location of Eldoret at the crossroads of important road axes linking Nairobi to Northern Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan places the city at the heart of important flows of people and goods. Gulu is Uganda's gateway to the north of the country and to South Sudan first and Sudan later.

Whether integrated in the borderland economy, such as is the case of Dire Dawa and Gulu, or buoyed by nearby agricultural production, such as in Eldoret, the three cities have experienced waves of migrants who have come to occupy economic niches and stake political claims. Over time, they have contributed to creating vibrant, and often conflict-prone, urban environments. Initially catalysed by exogenous factors—the pull exerted by urban development, industrialization, improved security and access to education in the case of Dire Dawa and Eldoret and by humanitarian assistance in the case of Gulu—migration systems have become self-sustaining once the initial conditions have changed or ceased to exist. Migrant communities have emerged as the number of migrants from different backgrounds has reached a critical mass, leading to a proliferation of ethnic businesses and the creation of ethnically segmented niches in the labour market.

To what extent and how does rural–urban migration enhance people's livelihoods and resilience? How much do such movements lead to improved access to services, higher incomes, better employment and improved security? How effective are urban linkages in introducing a safety net for those who live in rural areas?

 The main benefits for migrants moving to Dire Dawa, Gulu and Eldoret include job opportunities—derived from infrastructural and industrial investments and commerce—higher education opportunities and security. Predictably, this aspiration resonates with the youth, who make up most of the migrant population in Dire Dawa, Gulu and Eldoret. This points to the lack of viable options to improve their lives in rural areas, which are perceived by study respondents as being increasingly neglected by governments in terms of infrastructure and services.

Social networks based on kinship, ethnicity and friendship shape migrants' experiences and determine to a great extent migrants' ability to access the local labour market and services.

Such urban linkages prove effective in providing a safety net for rural populations. Multilocality has emerged in recent years as a vital strategy in political landscapes perceived as increasingly unpredictable. Having a foot in the city is seen as a crucial risk-management strategy. The 'foot' may be a relative who can provide shelter in case of need, or a property to store value, or both.

The hospitality of relatives and ethnic fellows, however, is often a double-edged sword: while it provides support, it also creates obligations and expectations of the migrant. In situations of marginality and where kin networks are not available, bonds across ethnic divides are often forged among individuals deploying strategies to negotiate their participation in the informal economy.

The emergence of well-educated, tech-savvy youth—albeit still a small segment of the population—has facilitated the increased use of social media and ICTs for working remotely for digital companies or to integrate the urban and rural economy, thereby cutting out the middlemen. For some high-skilled workers, ICTs appear to reduce the gap between the capital and secondary cities as activities that once could be performed only in Nairobi, for example, can today be performed also in Eldoret.

Residents of the rural villages from where most migrants to the three cities originate largely consider the impact on the sites of origin as positive, with some caveats. The interviewees recognize the economic importance of remittances for both smoothing consumption and providing funds to set up income generating activities. In Eldoret and Dire Dawa, cash crop farmers see migration as an opportunity to access urban markets by using children living and studying in the city as trusted intermediaries, for example by relaying information, such as prices, and selling products.

However, the lack of contacts in the urban areas is likely to discourage people from moving again. Migration patterns are thus interwoven with social stratification in rural areas, and they both reflect and contribute to reproducing inequalities urban centres.

Elders from villages around the three cities studied expressed concern over the risk of a mass rural exodus that would deplete rural areas and erode traditional values. Male interviewees, particularly in the villages of origin, typically see women as more vulnerable to the dangers associated with urban life or, broadly speaking, to life outside of their community of origin. The dangers most commonly referred to are unwanted pregnancy (mentioned in Eldoret and Gulu), human trafficking (mentioned in Dire Dawa) and prostitution (mentioned in Gulu).

What is the impact of people's movement into secondary cities on infrastructure and services, social cohesion, and security? What impact does a growing population have on strengthening the urban economy or on putting pressure on services, exacerbating tensions and contributing to insecurity?

The study has revealed similarities in the way migrations are transforming Dire Dawa, Gulu and Eldoret in both positive and negative ways. The latter include contributing to the development of urban ethnic clusters and sprawling informal settlements, putting public services under strain, and fueling an urban land rush.

In the three cities studied, existing infrastructure is buckling under the strain of a fast-growing population. Due to limited resources and the politicization of the issue, local administrators have been hitherto unable to adequately respond to this urbanization boom with adequate provision for basic services, such as sanitation and garbage collection. In Dire Dawa, for instance, in 2014, the local administrative council passed a resolution to legalize all illegal settlements built before 2011 and to outlaw any illegal settlement built henceforth. It also committed to provide social housing to mitigate the impact of the rising cost of living. The study found that city authorities also see the growing number of street vendors as an additional burden to the already thorny issue of waste disposal as they are often blamed for littering the streets in which they operate. The expanding informal economy is a sources of tensions between shop owners and street vendors, particularly in Gulu and Dire Dawa.

Moreover, migrants are often accused of driving down wages, a sensitive issue compounded by the current lack of a government-established minimum wage in any of the three countries studied. According to local residents, the intensification of rural flows to these cities is inducing dramatic changes not only to the cost of living and rent, but also to the underlying socio-cultural fabric, exacerbating tensions between cosmopolitanism and tribalism, and stirred by the rising political and economic significance of secondary cities. This is also compounded by demographic changes in Dire Dawa and Eldoret, which is feeding into long-standing political tensions related to claims to the city.

How does migration to secondary cities affect subsequent migration? Does the first experience of migration prepare people for further migration?

Contrary to the expectations, the study suggested that most migrants see the secondary cities at the centre of this study as final destinations and valid alternatives to the national capital. However, there is some onward migration from all the cities. In the case of Dire Dawa, this issue plays out in different ways. Located between Addis Ababa and Djibouti, the country's major access to the sea and a popular transit route for migration to the Gulf countries and Europe, the city is a transit point for migrants planning to move east to the Gulf countries or north towards Europe. In addition, Dire Dawa provides a variety of income-generating opportunities for those trying to save up to fund their journey abroad.

Eldoret is also a stopover for migrants heading to Europe via South Sudan, Sudan and Libya. Interviews with residents of the suburb of Mali Nne, where the Eldoret fuel pipeline terminal is located, suggest that an illegal migration industry thrives in the area as brokers with international connections and long-haul truckers meet the demand of migrants from Somalia.

The case of Gulu, on the other hand, presents little evidence of the city as a stepping-stone for further migration. In fact, while young South Sudanese refugees tend to move to town from rural settlements in search of livelihood opportunities, a number of young people interviewed continue to entertain the idea of moving to Juba to earn a living, when security conditions improve.

Policy considerations

As secondary cities are becoming increasingly popular destinations for migrants and this research suggests that they can have a greater capacity to absorb migrants and to meet their expectations than capital cities, they could form important components of comprehensive migration management strategies. This will require a better understanding of city-specific drivers and dynamics of rural to urban migration as well as the particular draw of secondary cities and the challenges faced by these cities compared to rural areas, capital cities and international destinations. Drawing on the research findings, the EU could consider the following:

1. In all three cities, services—such as healthcare, education, housing and waste management—and employment are strained as a result of various factors, including growing populations. The EU could invest in strengthening the capacity of secondary cities to absorb new migrants through strategic investments in local government's and job creation programmes.
2. The EU could support a progressive tax system, which includes migrants, as a way to ensure migrants contribute to the development of their city and also to deter discrimination around migrants' use of services. These tax systems can help deter capital flight to ensure that wealth is properly distributed to labourers in Africa.
3. EU programmes should consider targeting displaced populations and the poorest migrants in urban areas through income-generating schemes and ensuring protection of vulnerable individuals, such as women and informal workers. Additionally, the EU could support skills development in relevant urban industries but also, such as in Uganda, agriculture, where a lack of viable rural livelihoods has contributed to rural to urban migration.
4. Policies could increase efforts to support shelters for victims of human trafficking and gender-based violence—in places such as Dire Dawa—and organizations promoting awareness of the risks associated with smuggling and trafficking.
5. The EU is planning to support Ethiopia's industrial policy. Addressing the issue of a minimum wage and working conditions could ensure the safety and well-being of workers in the new facilities. Labour unions can be

strategic allies in this effort and could help mitigate tensions among native and migrant workers.

6. Future policies should carefully consider current land policies, such as customary tenure in Gulu and displacement in Dire Dawa, and how this affects rural to urban migration, infrastructure development and conflict.

7. Although often viewed as cosmopolitan, Dire Dawa and Eldoret are not yet fully cosmopolitan. Both are contested cities with majority populations made up of two ethnic groups. Current and future programmes should be aware of this delicate ethnic balance to ensure secondary cities are able to continue to absorb new migrants and are not upset by major shocks, such as electoral violence in the case of Eldoret, or the Ethiopian government's plan to provide 30,000 jobs for refugees in various industrial parks in the country. The cosmopolitan images of the cities are positive and could be built upon.

8. The EU could support conflict resolution initiatives to prevent the eruption of violence, particularly during elections in contested cities such as Eldoret and Dire Dawa. EU Trust Fund and EU IDEAS programmes in Kenya are useful references.

9. The key concerns expressed by migrants could serve to directly inform policy priorities, including employment, social services and security, in order to prevent irregular migration and to ensure that secondary cities can meet the expectations of migrants and have the capacity to continue to absorb new migrants.

1. Introduction

Our research/this study engages with the grey and academic literature on interconnected topics of urbanisation in Africa and on intra-Africa migration. The discussion on African cities has mostly been dominated by a focus on capital cities, often at the expense of an examination of the role of mid-size or secondary cities in bridging rural hinterlands with the larger metropolis and beyond. At the same time, overshadowed by the political and media-driven interest in outward migration from Africa and in the developmental role of African diasporas outside of Africa (Potts, 2013; Mercer et al., 2009), the study of rural to urban migration in East Africa has only recently gained significance for EU policymakers, as they have become increasingly aware of how internal and international mobility patterns are entwined.

The backdrop to these debates is the changing landscape of sub-Saharan Africa where, according to the African Development Bank (AfDB), in 2015, almost 472 million people—35 per cent of the sub-Saharan Africa population—lived in urban areas, up from 237 million in 1995 (AfDB et al., 2016: 147). The main cause of urban growth is natural population growth, but rural to urban migration still accounts for 25 per cent of this increase.[1] Data from the AfDB indicates that urbanisation in sub-Saharan Africa is most rapid in urban centres with less than 300,000 inhabitants (which account for 58 per cent of urban growth during the decade 2000-2010). As Lohnert (2017, 11) points out,

> observations over the past 30 years support the impression that the flow of rural-urban migration has been redirected to the smaller towns, together with an urban-urban migration from large to smaller cities. The major reason for this development lies in the declining quality of life for migrants in the big urban agglomerations, where they mainly find themselves living in marginalized and precarious conditions.

Most research on urban development in sub-Saharan Africa uses large urban centres as analytical units, but this risks glossing over the complex networks connecting cities, towns and their peripheries. In particular, it neglects the role of secondary cities located 'in the periphery of the centre and in the centre of the periphery' (De Boeck et al., 2010). According to De Boeck et al. (2010), 'the ambivalent situation of these towns … generates a particular, and by definition highly hybrid, socio-cultural urban dynamic' in which 'there often is more room for improvisation.'

---

[1] The share of rural-urban migration as a factor of urban growth contributed to at least half of all urban growth during the 1960s and 1970s (AfDB et al., 2016). Today, it is estimated to contribute to 50 per cent of urban growth only in Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Lesotho, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, and South Africa (Potts, 2009; Tacoli, McGranahan and Satterthwaite, 2015).

[2] See for example, Beardsley and Hugo 2010 and Barbieri et al. 2010.

[3] International organisation officials, national and local government functionaries, community and religious leaders, social service providers, including NGOs, business people, particularly in the transport and financial sector.

[4] A charter city is one in which the system of government is defined by the city's own

The complexity of these dynamics stem from the variety of types of migrants to secondary cities, where the cost of living is lower than capital cities and are therefore more accessible to a broader range of migrants, who are migrating for different reasons and different goals. As Lohnert (2017) points out, the decision to migrate is usually the result of a complex set of factors including security, independence and expectations. This approach challenges dominant neoclassical micro-migration perspectives —particularly in Eastern African scholarship— that emphasise the importance of economic drivers of migration (Potts, 2013; Lohnert, 2017) and migration as a long-established coping strategy of 'strategic nomadism' (Lohnert, 2017), one that informs the links between the city and the village.

An alternative analysis of different forms of mobility embraces the concept of circular migration, defined as a 'repeated movement between origin and destination with substantial time spent in both places' (Lohnert, 2017: 42), and seasonal migration, to explain mobility patterns and the maintenance of rural to urban linkages to respond to the volatility of rural livelihoods. However, in the Eastern African context, characterised by multiple situations of protracted displacement, it is important to consider migration as a multi-layered phenomenon in which the interaction between migrant networks, individual agency and institutional frameworks make it extremely problematic to draw a clear line between forced and voluntary migrants. Studies of rural to urban migrations in Ethiopia, for instance, bring to the fore the significance of the politically induced movement of people to cities 'from the settlements established and controlled by government' (Mberu, 2006: 511). The complex interplay of different drivers of migration also emerges from the scholarship on the relationship between climate change and security.[2]

According to a study on migration in Kenya, approximately one third of all Kenyan households are divided between urban and rural homes (Agesa 2004). Migration, therefore, is considered a risk-mitigation strategy, particularly in response to conditions of environmental stress, as Smucker and Wisner (2008) show in their study on household responses to drought in Kenya's Eastern Province. Moreover, Hunnes (2012) suggests that rural to urban migration remains a key strategy for poor rural farmers in response to environmental degradation and changing weather patterns in Ethiopia. While some suggest that environmental deterioration is a key decision-making factor in migration (Parry et al. 2010), others point out that migration is the result of the interaction of environmental change with political, social, economic, demographic, and environmental factors (Hunnes, 2012). Our study seems to corroborate this latter position. Its findings also support the idea that rural to urban migration is a coping strategy to create linkages that can be mobilised in situations of need, whether for security or economic reasons.

Within the broader research on rural to urban migration, it is possible to identify different themes focused on specific aspects of emerging migrant networks, the

---

[2] See for example, Beardsley and Hugo 2010 and Barbieri et al. 2010.

urban place of destination and the rural site of origin. Influenced by Massey's (1990) conceptualisation of migration networks as social capital, a rich literature has examined how migrant networks form and facilitate access to the job market in the place of destination. As shown by Kajisa (2007) and Yamauchi and Tanabe (2008), among others, the presence of previous migrants in urban centres increases the ability of new migrants with the same ethnic background and coming from the same place to find a job in urban areas. This analysis of migration systems is very helpful for teasing out the mechanisms that initiate and sustain migrant networks, calling attention to the interplay of endogenous and exogenous factors and the role of 'pioneer' migrants in paving the way for the arrival of other community members (Bakewell et al., 2011; de Haas, 2010). The literature on informal economics has explored how social networks are critical for access to informal labour markets, facilitating the flow of information and connecting the employer to a supply of trustworthy labour (Meagher, 2005). Social networks, therefore, have a critical role in facilitating the recruitment of employees, particularly among populations of recent migrants and refugees, who largely lack recognized credentials or familiarity with the local labour market (Barr and Oduro, 2002; Muto, 2012). However, as the Ethiopian case presented here clearly illustrates, ethnic networks can also play an important role in securing access to formal employment in the civil service.

These networks play a critical role in creating feedback mechanisms that reshape the place of arrival and departure, making the migration process self-reinforcing (De Haas, 2010). The importance of remittances has been widely discussed. Studies in Kenya (Agesa, 2004; Eriksen et al., 2005; Oucho, 2008) and Ethiopia (De Brauw 2014, Wondimagegnhu, 2015) have observed that remittances from urban areas are a vital lifeline for rural households, having a beneficial impact on food security, but also presenting a more nuanced picture when assessing the implications for improved farming production.

The attention given to the practices and the material infrastructure of the networks has been increasingly devoted to ICTs, and specifically to mobile phone handsets, and to their centrality in decision-making processes (Muto, 2012). In a study on rural to urban migration in Uganda, for instance, it has been observed that access to mobile telephony is particularly relevant for members of small ethnic groups who decide to move to the city. Studies examining the interaction of ICTs and personal networks in affecting decisions about migration have emphasised how access to information is expected to reduce the cost of finding employment and thus encourages migration. Dekker and Engbersen (2012) explore how social media is used to strengthen both strong and weak ties, allowing prospective migrants to become streetwise before setting out on a journey. It is evident, therefore that social media is transforming migration networks and lowering the threshold for migration.

Since the main protagonists of this rural to urban migration phenomenon are young, the debate on mobility in Africa intersects with one on the medium and long-term socio-economic implications of the so-called youth bulge. FAO's State of Food and Agriculture 2017 report, for instance, warns that, given the significance of rural areas for economic growth in developing countries, a

chronic brain and muscle-drain from the countryside to the city might undermine efforts to eradicate poverty. The evidence on this is, however, mixed. Reviewing the literature on the impact of rural to urban migration on places of origin, Grenier and Sakdapolrak (2013) focus on the feedback effect of migration on the environment in rural sending areas, arguing that, 'there are distinct relations between migration, agricultural change and the environment. These are mediated in varying degrees by flows of remittances, loss of labour, socioeconomic stratification, gender dynamics, and cultural factors.' Individual migration enables the household to maximize its chances of survival by diversifying its sources of income and spreading its risks. Studies in Ethiopia suggest that migration contributes to meeting the labour demands of receiving areas, bringing back skills, and contributing to the diversification and improvement of household income (Degefa, 2005). Regarding the impact on sites of destination, Lohnert (2017) draws on UN forecasts that link momentous urbanisation and urban sprawl. The rapid proliferation of informal settlements on the borders of cities is blamed for the worsening of the environmental quality of those cities and the transformation of farming areas into mere 'rural-urban interface areas' (Lohnert, 2017). However, while increasing the distance between areas of agricultural production and central urban markets, the informal markets thriving in urban sprawls can provide economic opportunities for a large number of unskilled workers, ranging from urban gardening to trade and brokerage between urban markets and rural farming communities.

The debates sketched above are played out in the analysis of the secondary cities at the centre of this study. Dire Dawa, Gulu and Eldoret have experienced dramatic growth in recent years as a result of a combination of political, economic and social factors. The history of all three cities has been shaped by their strategic locations, magnified by the construction of critical infrastructure. Both Dire Dawa and Eldoret developed along international railway lines. The economic fortunes of the former in particular have depended for a long time on its role as a major transport hub between Ethiopia and Djibouti, and Ethiopia's f only outlet to the sea. The strategic location of Eldoret at the crossroads of important road axis linking Nairobi to northern Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan places the city at the heart of important flows of people and goods. Gulu is Uganda's gateway to the north of the country and to South Sudan and Sudan. Whether integrated into the borderland economy, as in the case of Dire Dawa and Gulu, or farming production, as in the case of Eldoret, the three cities have experienced waves of migrants who have occupied economic niches and staked political claims, and whose encounters have contributed over time to creating vibrant, and often conflictive, urban environments. Today, Dire Dawa, Gulu and Eldoret each display a cosmopolitan social fabric. They have also recently undergone administrative changes entailing infrastructural developments that have accelerated their demographic growth.

The cities are both contested places and safe spaces where many seek shelter during man-made and environmental crises. However, the study found that real estate values have increased dramatically in recent years, feeding the expectations of developers and entrepreneurs but also leading to rent rises and adding strain to the budgets of residents and the poorest migrants. Moreover,

innovations in information and communication technologies (ICTs), embraced by youth, have ushered in new practices and behaviours, reshaping rural to urban value chains and social relationships, paradoxically strengthening traditional ties while facilitating the circulation of cosmopolitan values.

This report begins by presenting the background and aim of the research, and the methodology employed. It then describes the sites of investigation and provides an overview of migration patterns to Dire Dawa, Eldoret and Gulu in a historical perspective. It then examines the implications of rural to urban migration for people's livelihoods, resilience, access to services and security, and its beneficial effects for those who live in rural areas. This is followed by a discussion on the impact of peoples' movement into secondary cities on infrastructure and services, social cohesion, and security before examining the extent to which migration to secondary cities affects onward migration. The report concludes with recommendations for policymakers.

Methodology

The research for this study was undertaken using a mixed-methods qualitative approach standardized across the three cities to allow for comparative analysis. The researchers undertook key informant interviews (KIIs), in-depth interviews (IDIs) and focus group discussion (FGDs) and a variety of participatory exercises.

For each city team, the fieldwork stage was preceded by a review of academic and grey literature to understand the existing state of knowledge on rural to urban migration and the historical, socio-cultural, economic and political contexts. Lists of key informants[3] and a data collection strategy were drafted to identify individuals for FGDs and interviews. Particular attention was paid to the diversity of respondents, including gender, ethnicity, age, place of origin and employment sector.

In Ethiopia, 13 KIIs, 12 FGDs and 5 IDIs were conducted in urban and rural Dire Dawa. The FGDs consisted of 5 to 7 participants. In addition, numerous informal talks and conversations were conducted to generate insight on issues related to rural to urban migration and the contested status of Dire Dawa city. Observation was also carried out at Seido daily marketplace in the Sabean neighbourhood of the city. Data collection was constrained by a volatile security situation triggered by clashes between security forces and local smugglers, and by an escalation of political violence between the neighbouring Oromia and the Somali Regional State (SRS). The resulting tensions influenced the attitude of some key informants towards the research team, whose attempts to probe the links between migrants and crime were perceived through a political lens and, in some instances, were met with hostility. Security-related challenges restricted the research team's access to only two rural areas on the peripheries of Dire

---

[3] International organisation officials, national and local government functionaries, community and religious leaders, social service providers, including NGOs, business people, particularly in the transport and financial sector.

Dawa (Harla and Mudi Aneno villages), in addition to the fieldwork in Dire Dawa city.

In Uganda, 16 KIIs, 14 FGDs and 47 IDIs were conducted in the four divisions of Gulu Municipality and in the rural areas, including the rural areas of Laco, a suburb of Gulu, and Bungatira sub-county in Gulu district. The FGDs consisted of 6 to10 participants. Some 30 IDIs were conducted in Gulu town and 17 in rural areas, which focused on the life histories of the migrants. Primary data was also collected from the Gulu District Development plans.

In Kenya, a total of 18 KIIs were conducted in Eldoret, (including state/county officials, NGO representatives, community leaders, political leaders, religious leaders, elders, youth leaders, entrepreneurs, urban planners, and service providers in the transport and financial sectors). Thirty-seven IDIs were conducted with migrants. Three FGDs were held in Eldoret, respectively bringing together carpenters from Nyanza Province, young people from various places of origins, and *jua kali* workers in the neighbourhood of Maili Nne. To complement the data collected in Eldoret, research was conducted in two rural areas—Moiben and Chesikaki—in order to get views on rural to urban migration from the perspective of the migrants' place of origin, as well as to assess the impact of migration on these sites. The field research took place shortly after Kenya's Supreme Court ruling nullifying the result of the August 2017 general election, but the much-feared political tensions, in an area with a long record of political violence, did not materialise and did not disrupt the study.

2. Research context

Dire Dawa

Dire Dawa is Ethiopia's second charter city[4] and the fourth largest city by population. While Dire Dawa administrative area is mostly rural, the population is concentrated in Dire Dawa city. Located in the strategic area between Ethiopia and Djibouti, the country's economic artery and outlet to the sea, the city is at the centre of the country's development agenda, which rests on two tenets: urbanization and industrialization. Dire Dawa city has one of the country's highest urbanization rates, with a 50 per cent growth rate between 1985 and 2015 (Haliu, 2014). According to the 2007 Population and Housing Census, migrants made up around 30 per cent of Dire Dawa's total population, of which 52 per cent were female and 48 per cent male. Of these migrants, 45,842 people (45 per cent) migrated from rural areas, while 55,474 people (55 per cent) migrated to the city from other urban areas (Central Statistics Agency, 2007).

The ethnopolitical composition of Dire Dawa, and its location as a strategic gateway to the sea and the outside world, has made the city one of the most politically contested locations in Ethiopia. This is evident in the regular administrative turnover as a result of major changes in political control of the city. Between 1991 and 1993, Dire Dawa was administered by the Oromo People's Democratic Organisation/Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (OPDO/EPRDF) as part of Oromia Regional State. With the establishment of the Somali Regional State in 1993, the Issa-Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF) escalated its claims over Dire Dawa as its capital. The annexation of most of the Issa-inhabited areas from under the Dire Dawa administration into the new Somali Regional State sowed the seeds of a territorial dispute between the two polities.

The ethnic re-affiliation of the Gurgura[5] from the Oromo to Somali ethnic identity further exacerbated the tensions. In response to the political instability caused by the competition between the Oromo and Somali political organisations over the control of Dire Dawa, a transitional government directly administered Dire Dawa from 1993 to 1995. Successive administrations gained then yielded control until, in 2004, Dire Dawa was given the status of a self-governing charter city like Addis Ababa, accountable to the federal government. In 2008, a 40:40:20 power-

---

[4] A charter city is one in which the system of government is defined by the city's own charter document rather than by state, provincial, regional or national laws. Such a city can adopt or change its organizing charter by decision of the local administration, according to the procedures established in the city charter. Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa are the only two charter cities in Ethiopia.

[5] Most of the Somali who currently live in Dire Dawa administration are Gurgura regardless of the fact that most of them speak Oromiffa as their mother tongue. The Gurgura share both Somali and Oromo identities, speaking the Oromo language and tracing their genealogy to the Dir Somali clan family. Therefore, by origin the Gurgura are Somali similar to their Issa neighbours. However, historically they have been assimilated into the Oromo, specifically the Nolle clan that live in areas around Dire Dawa.

sharing formula was agreed between the OPDO and the Ethiopian Somali People's Democratic Party (ESPDP) under the auspices of the federal government. According to this formula, the regional political leadership is equally divided between the OPDO and ESPDP, each with 40 per cent of the seats in the Dire Dawa city council. The remaining 20 per cent of seats are reserved for all other ethnicities represented by the two EPRDF member parties - the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) and the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (SEPDM). Far from buttressing political stability, this arrangement is perceived by all the parties as unfair, thus undermining the city's growth potential and cosmopolitan legacy.

Indeed, Dire Dawa has long been known for its cosmopolitan character despite—or because of—its high level of cultural diversity. With a diverse population of Oromos, Somalis, Amharas, Gurage and Tigrayan, bilingualism, and in some cases, multilingualism, is widespread. The residents of Dire Dawa are mostly Muslim, but the city also includes Orthodox Christians, Protestants, Catholic and residents of other faiths. The increasing politicisation of ethnicity in the past two decades, however, has had repercussions on the ethnic composition of the city. Between 1994 and 2007, the number of Oromo and Amhara declined by 2 per cent and 7 per cent, respectively (CSA, 2012). The size of the Somali population, on the other hand, increased by 10 per cent. In terms of the two major religions, the percentage of Orthodox Christians declined by 9 per cent while the number of Muslims increased by 7 per cent. The growth of the Somali population may be attributed to migration to the city and to the recent ethnic re-affiliation of the Gurgura from Oromo to Somali. Up until the 1974 revolution, Dire Dawa also had a well-established expatriate community, largely of Italian, French, Indian, Arab and Sudanese origin.

While livelihoods in rural Dire Dawa revolve around agro-pastoralism, the economic mainstay of urban Dire Dawa is trading. Businesspeople based in the city can leverage its location as a logistics hub, boosted in the past by the railway line. Throughout Dire Dawa's modern history, the railway has supported both formal and informal trade, fostering the development of small and medium scale industries, as happened in the 1960s. The railroad also facilitated the smuggling of contraband goods coming from Djibouti and Somalia, as was the case from the 1970s to the early 1990s, when Dire Dawa became Ethiopia's contraband capital.

Dire Dawa also thrives on the *khat*[6] economy, mostly run by migrants from Aweday, in Eastern Hararge, in Oromia Regional State. In recent years, the city has been experiencing an economic resurgence. New small-scale manufacturing, hotels, cafes and other businesses have opened and, in the past decade, more than 20,000 jobs have been created for Dire Dawa residents through small and medium-sized businesses.[7] Today, investments in the service and manufacturing sectors both by the public and private investors are booming. Manufacturing, in particular, is growing, including cement factories, food processing, detergent, textile and steel production. Dire Dawa now has more than eighteen privately

---

[6] Mildly narcotic plant widely consumed in Ethiopia.
[7] Personal communication with the Office of the Mayor of Dire Dawa.

owned manufacturing plants in a 138-hectare industrial area. This development is part of the Ethiopian government's plan to establish ten industrial parks country-wide during the current five-year growth and transformation plan period (2015-2020). The government is allocating USD one billion of annual investment in industrial parks over the next decade to boost exports and make Ethiopia Africa's top manufacturer. The expected game-changer for the economy of Dire Dawa is the Dire Dawa Industrial Park (DDIP), currently under development as a Special Economic Zone on 4,156 hectares of land. The park is expected to create 68,000 jobs. A central feature of the DDIP is to provide 30 per cent of jobs in a second phase of development for Somali refugees (Ethiopian News Agency, 2017). This move is to be supported by a range of donors, including the European Union.

Gulu

Gulu is the capital of the eponymous district and northern Uganda's main administrative and largest urban centre. Located at the cross-section of the main roads to South Sudan and the Central Africa Republic, the town is among the fastest-growing urban centres in the country. The population of Gulu town has tripled from 38,297 residents in 1991 following the influx of thousands of people forced from their lands by the Lords Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency. Although the majority of the displaced returned to their homes when the violence declined after 2006, Gulu's population has continued to grow due to the massive presence of aid organisations working on integration of displaced persons and post-conflict reconstruction. When conflict broke out in South Sudan in 2013, Gulu became an alternative destination for refugees fleeing the violence, and for entrepreneurs previously based in Juba.

On the outskirts of Gulu, subsistence farming remains the main source of household livelihood, employing 58 percent of the active population (DPP, 2016), while the town economy is dominated by the informal economy. Street commerce is widespread and recent years have seen vendors moving to Gulu from Kampala, where more restrictive rules on street hawking have been imposed. The formal sector employs less than 20 per cent of the active population of Gulu. Government, parastatal bodies (such as the Post Office, the National Water and Sewerage Corporation and the power company, Umeme) and aid agencies are Gulu's major formal employers, followed by food processing and manufacturing, metal work, and the thriving hospitality sector.

Moreover, Gulu serves as a regional trade hub for surroundings districts, providing a marketplace for both formal and informal traders. In the recently refurbished Gulu market, a wide range of products from all over the country are traded. The market, originally established in 1932, hosts more than 4,000 vendors.

Eldoret

Eldoret is the main urban centre of the Uasin Gishu County in Kenya (formerly part of Rift Valley Province). Founded at the beginning of the twentieth century

along the railway connecting Mombasa to Kampala, the city has been a magnet for migrants since colonial times. Despite being surrounded by Kalenjin villages and pastures used by Maasai pastoralists, the city is often referred to as a cosmopolitan town, where several Kenyan ethnic groups live and mingle. The main ethnic groups in Eldoret are the Kalenjin, Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo and Kisii. Despite this diverse social fabric, resulting from the particular history of the city, discourses and perceptions of migration in Eldoret are entwined with politics. Given the economic significance of the city, in the middle of a highly productive agricultural area, competition between groups vying for control over resources—primarily land—and stoked by political elites at the national and local levels, has taken the shape of identity politics, stirring violence along ethnic lines during the 1992, 1997 and 2007–2008 elections. The clashes mainly pitted Kalenjin and Kikuyu against each other and, despite a reconciliation process and, crucially, a pact between elites in the aftermath of the 2008 political violence, these tragic events have weakened trust between communities. This shows tribalism as the flip side of cosmopolitanism, and foregrounds the politicisation of claims over urban space in the Rift Valley.

The devolution[8] reforms implemented since 2013 have further exacerbated the politicisation of relations between those who have lived in the area for many years and those who have moved in more recently. Devolution has raised expectations, with the promise to bring more resources to the local leve. But, it is also seen as another wedge in a political game where the definition of who belongs to the Rift Valley is seen as increasingly relevant.

According to the data collected during fieldwork, since 2013 the concern that Eldoret's demographic balance would shift in favour of non-Kalenjin—as happened in Nakuru[9] for example—has prompted many young Kalenjin from rural areas—at the instigation of political leaders—to registers as voters in the city rather than in their rural home. This is part of a broader trend, accelerated by devolution, whereby those with relevant skills or status have been returning to their county of origin to find work in the civil service or to seek the awards of county government tenders. These political changes have had repercussions on the economic development of the city. Surrounded by large farms producing mainly wheat and maize, the city is a major collection and trading centre for local farmers. Besides its centrality in the rural economy, in the 1980s, Kenya's second president, Daniel arap Moi, a Kalenjin with a strong support base in the Northern Rift Valley and a knack for patronage politics, poured funds into developing Eldoret's infrastructure, including health and education facilities, as well as productive activities, such as flour-milling, food-processing plants, and textile factories. The extension of the Mombasa-Nairobi pipeline up to Eldoret in the 1990s and the establishment of the oil terminal in the neighbourhood of Maili

---

[8] In 2010, the Constitution of Kenya was promulgated following the result of a referendum to decentralize the system of government. Some legislative and executive functions were transferred to lower levels on government in 47 newly formed counties.
[9] As a cosmopolitan secondary city southeast of Eldoret, Nakuru has many historical and socio-cultural similarities with Eldoret, however, there is a demographic majority of Kikuyu. See for example, Kenya Free Press, *Kalenjin elders demand fair share for community in Nakuru politics*, 2017.

Nne (and the subsequent liberalisation of the fuel distribution market in 2003) also boosted the economy of the city. Despite the political violence that broke out in 1992, 1997 and 2007/8, which tarnished the image of Eldoret's stability and discouraged outside investment, the city's reputation has been revamped by the emergence of new opportunities within the framework of Kenya's Vision 2030 Development agenda.

3. Mobility patters in historical perspective

Although urbanisation in the three sites of investigation has gained pace in recent years, rural to urban migration can be understood only by adopting a historical perspective. The reconstruction of the historical trajectories of Dire Dawa, Gulu and Eldoret, a key component of the research design, helped problematise notions of indigenousness and foreignness which were often instrumentally asserted by interviewees from different ethnic communities. This was particularly the case in Dire Dawa and Eldoret, to advance claims over land and administrative control of the city. This historical perspective also shed light on continuity and changes in pull and push factors and helped identify migration trends across the three cities.

In the cases of Dire Dawa, Gulu and Eldoret, geography has been a key determinant of their historical trajectories. The strategic locations of these cities and the construction of critical infrastructure has facilitated the arrival and transit of migrants. Both Dire Dawa and Eldoret, for instance, developed along international railway lines. The economic fortunes of the former in particular have depended for a long time on its role as a major transport and trade hub between Ethiopia and Djibouti, the country's only outlet to the sea since Eritrea's independence. The strategic location of Eldoret at the crossroads of important road routes linking Nairobi to northern Kenya, Uganda and South Sudan places the city at the axis of important flows of people and goods, while Gulu is Uganda's gateway to the north of the country and to South Sudan and Sudan.

A common pattern can be identified in the three sites of investigation. Initially catalysed by exogenous factors—the pull exerted by industrialisation in the case of Dire Dawa and Eldoret and by humanitarian assistance in the case of Gulu— migration has continued once the initial conditions have changed or ceased to exist. Across the three sites of investigation, migrant communities have emerged as the number of migrants from different background has reached a critical mass, thus leading to the proliferation of ethnically-based businesses and labour demand (Bakewell et al., 2011) and with beneficial effects on the broader job market. However, as the interaction of exogenous and endogenous mechanisms continues to reshape the context, other drivers may acquire relevance in migrants' decision making.

The drivers of migration have differed at different times in the history of each city.

Dire Dawa

The railway period in the early twentieth century: Not only Ethiopians from other regions but also expatriates from various countries came and settled in Dire Dawa to make use of new economic opportunities spurred by its role as an international trade hub. Ethiopians, particularly Somalis, came to Dire Dawa as railway construction workers.

The industrialisation period of the 1960s: The establishment of cement and food processing factories attracted labourers from various parts of the country.

The contraband period of the 1970s and 1980s: Smuggling to and from Djibouti and Somalia thrived in response to the scarcity of goods created by the economy of the military dictatorship.

The EPRDF period of the 1990s: As the importance of contraband dwindled, some of Dire Dawa's established residents, particularly Amharas, left the city. Dire Dawa gradually turned into a mainly Oromo and Somali city.

The economic revival period of the 2000s: A construction boom and a new industrialisation phase attracted migrants, mostly from southern Ethiopia, but also from eastern Oromia, affected by recurrent drought and land degradation.

Gulu

The short-staying period of the 1960s and 1970s: In the period following independence, rural residents spent only a short time in the city to trade their produce, do menial jobs and then return home. This period, coinciding with the presidency of Idi Amin, also saw a deterioration of the security situation and agricultural production in the region.

The night commuting period, from the mid-1980s to mid-2000s: The insurgencies of Alice Lakwena's Holy Spirit Movement first and Joseph Kony's LRA later swept the Acholi land, pushing farmers, and particularly rural youth, to seek shelter in protected villages and IDP camps, and then in the city at night to escape violence, abductions and forced recruitment. During this period, a humanitarian economy thrived in Gulu. Aid agencies directly employed people as administrators, guards, office assistants, cleaners or drivers while others were employed in the service sector that grew up around the humanitarian industry and in the petty vending sector. Gulu attracted many displaced persons looking for income-earning activities while IDP camps were a fallback for those unable to sustain themselves in town. As a result, a circular migration between IDP camps and Gulu developed.

The post-conflict period, from the mid-2000s onwards: the long neglect of the fields in the areas previously under the control of the LRA and the youth's lack of farming skills made it challenging to readjust to agricultural-based livelihoods. Infrastructure and improved services, coupled with geopolitical transformations at a regional level enhanced the attractiveness of Gulu for rural migrants, particularly the youth, in search of livelihoods and education. More recently, since 2015, there has been a steady influx of refugees from South Sudan into the region and the city.

Eldoret

The colonial period: The Kenyan population of Eldoret mainly consisted of workers for the settlers' farms and was already ethnically mixed.

The reafricanisation of the White Highlands: Following independence, the so-called settlement schemes attracted Kenyans from various regions of the country to the fertile areas surrounding Eldoret and to the city. As a result, the city was largely developed by migrants, especially Kikuyu, who reaped the benefits during the first two decades of independence.

The 'infrastructure' years, from the mid-1970s to the 1990s: The infrastructural development taking place under Moi[10], with the establishment of industries, as well as health facilities and educational institutions, primarily Moi University, attracted migrants, mainly Kikuyu from Central Province, Luhya from Western Province, and Luo and Kisii from Nyanza Province. At a time of rapid urban growth, these migrants cemented Eldoret's cosmopolitan character. However, while a small Kalenjin elite contributed to Eldoret's development, most Kalenjin stayed in the surrounding rural areas. Active in farming, they came to Eldoret to sell their produce and buy the necessary inputs, seeds and machines for their agricultural work. The Moi years also saw politically induced migrations, as a result of political violence in 1992 and 1997. While some victims of the violence in rural areas moved to the city for safety, some inhabitants of Eldoret went back to their home areas. In the aftermath of the violence, many migrants disengaged from their businesses and activities in Eldoret—or became reluctant in starting new businesses—leaving space for Kalenjin to become more active in the city.

The liberalisation period, from the early 2000s onwards: The industrial decline paved the way for the informalisation of the economy. New business opportunities emerged, spurred for instance by the liberalisation of the energy market, which boosted the activities at the oil terminal in Mali Nne, an Eldoret suburb. At the same time, as access to the civil service became more selective, a growing number of Kalenjin youth enrolled in higher education institutions in the city. In addition, the more fraught political environment contributed to entrenching ethnic identities and reshuffling the ethnic composition of the city.

The post-2008 violence period: Following the 2008 post-election violence, many Kikuyus left their farms and moved to Eldoret or pursued a multi-locality strategy, splitting their time between the village and the city. Devolution ushered in by the 2010 Constitution further reshaped migration patterns. While it attracted Kalenjin—especially Nandi—because of the opportunities which opened up at the county level, this unequal distribution of resources pushed outsiders to look for business opportunities in other counties. Added to this, smaller urban centres around Eldoret, such as Iten in Elgeyo-Marakwet County or Kapsabet in Nandi County, became more attractive because of devolution, thereby reducing the pressure on Eldoret.

---

[10] Daniel Arap Moi succeeded Jomo Kenyatta, the first president of Kenya, in 1979. He remained in power until 2002, when he was barred from running and Mwai Kibaki was elected.

4. Opportunities in a changing urban landscape

Economic opportunities

The pursuit of economic opportunities emerges from the study as one of the most relevant pull factors of migration to the cities under examination. These opportunities are engendered by the interaction of infrastructural and industrial investments and growing demand for goods and services associated with the demographic boom in the urban population. However, they are not a completely new phenomenon.

The appeal of Dire Dawa, for instance, has varied according to economic ebbs and flows that have punctuated the city's recent history. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the construction of the railway attracted Somali workers from eastern Ethiopia and spurred economic opportunities that lured both Ethiopians and international traders. In the 1960s, the opening of cement and food processing factories attracted labourers from various parts of the country, while the political upheaval of the following decade gave momentum to the smuggling trade in response to the scarcity of goods created by Ethiopia's military dictatorship. Benefiting from its location at the crossroads of Djibouti, Somaliland and Somalia, this contraband economy attracted migrants to the city from all over the country, creating income-generating activities of different sizes, from wholesalers to shopping mall retailers and street hawkers. The dynamic smuggling sector that blossomed in the 1980s was epitomized by the construction of two large business centres, each hosting registered businessmen trading in goods imported from Djibouti, Somaliland and Somalia, and embedded in international contraband trade networks. As reported by many interviewees, the Somali dominance of the smuggling business dates back to that period and has weathered the political changes to survive up to present time.

In recent years, Dire Dawa has experienced a construction spree, supported by state and private investments. The Dire Dawa Industrial Park (DDIP), which opened at the end of 2017, is expected to increase the influx of migrants, the majority of whom are currently being absorbed into the informal sector. Moreover, migrants also facilitate the economic integration of rural and urban areas through their linkages to their village of origin, which enables them to trade local produce (mostly from the Hararghe Zone of Oromia Regional State) and livestock (from East and West Hararge Zones and from Shinile Zone of Somali Regional State) in the markets of Dire Dawa.

Similar dynamics can be found in Eldoret, where job opportunities in the industrial park on the outskirts of the city initially acted as a powerful magnet for members of different communities. During the Moi period, many migrants, particularly Luos from western Kenya, came in search of work at the industrial park, settling in the area of Langas, along Kisumu Road. Following the gradual decline of the textile sector, however, the only opportunities left for those who had been laid off was to engage in petty trade.

The extension of the Mombasa-Nairobi pipeline to Eldoret in the 1990s and the establishment of an oil terminal in Maili Nne, a suburb of Eldoret, was a boost the economy of the city. While most of the economic development was state-led during the two decades following Kenya's independence, structural adjustment and liberalisation in the 1980s and 1990s led to the collapse of some industries and the reduction of job opportunities in the formal sector. As a result, urban residents and migrants turned to the informal economy to make ends meet, mainly as *jua kali*[11] workers, in the construction or transport sector, or as brokers of agricultural products.

Recent years have seen the emergence of a well-educated, tech-savvy countryside youth using social media and ICTs to work remotely for digital companies. This also helps to integrate the urban and rural economy, cutting out the middlemen. Although this segment of the population is still very small, research suggests that, for some high-skilled jobs, ICT has reduce the gap between capital and secondary cities as activities that once could be performed only in Nairobi can today be performed in Eldoret. Moreover, research suggests that those who reap the most benefits from the using digital tools, such as WhatsApp, to arrange the shipment of agricultural produce have ties with rural areas in the area surrounding Eldoret.

In Gulu, besides the civil service, the main employer is the humanitarian sector, which has expanded over the past two decades to deal with the displacement crises both in Uganda and across the South Sudanese border. Migrants from all over northern Uganda have converged on Gulu to work as administrators, guards, office assistants, cleaners or drivers in aid organisations and in the informal economy thriving around the humanitarian sector. However, the majority of residents still rely on subsistence agriculture as the main source of household livelihood (GDDP, 2016). The influx of refugees from South Sudan following the outbreak of civil war in 2013 has also changed the economic landscape of the city, as entrepreneurs who were previously based in Juba have moved their operations to Gulu.

Educational opportunities

A recurrent theme that emerges from the research is the importance of the cities as places where it is possible to attain upward mobility through higher education. This is particularly important for youth, who make up the majority of the migrants in Dire Dawa, Gulu and Eldoret. It also points to a lack of opportunities and pathways to upward socio-economic mobility in rural areas, which are perceived as increasingly neglected by governments in terms of infrastructure and services. This is especially the case in Gulu where, as a result of the conflict and displacement, many youth missed out on formal and informal educational opportunities and therefore struggle to access the labour market. In addition, a lack of agricultural skills, also a result of conflict, has put the youth in a critical situation. At the same time, Gulu has emerged as an educational centre,

---

[11] *Jua kali* ('hot sun') is a Swahili expression used to indicate hustlers, informal fixers and intermediaries in urban contexts.

attracting scholars and students studying conflict in Uganda. In 2002, Gulu University was opened, which has approximately 5,000 students (DD, 2016) and is one of four universities in the city. For many students from rural areas, relying on family and friends in Gulu is a prerequisite to pursuing education in the city.

In Dire Dawa the study found that the opportunity to access higher education is one of the main drivers of migration from rural Dire Dawa, where there are few high schools. The lack of educational opportunities in rural areas is a particularly acute problem for female students. Cultural constraints that discourage girls from traveling unaccompanied are compounded by their parents' anxiety about sending their daughters to an urban environment that they perceive as insecure for women and girls. They are also dissuaded from sending girls to the urban schools by the cost of lodging and board. Our research corroborates the literature on obstacles to female education, including the early withdrawal of girls from school and their submission to forced or arranged marriages. To tackle these problems, a girls' hostel was built in 2007 by the Dire Dawa city administration in partnership with UNICEF.

In Eldoret, accessing education is also one of the main reasons for moving to the city. In the 1990s, school degrees began gaining importance as a prerequisite to finding employment in the civil service. This prompted many youths from Kalenjin communities in the outskirts of Eldoret, previously bound to an agropastoralist lifestyle, to move to the city. According to a Kalenjin farmer in Moiben, a village outside Eldoret,

> Back in the 1990s, life in the village was better and only a few people moved to town. There was no pressure to get a good degree to find a job. But at the end of the 1990s, life in the village started deteriorating. Education disrupted things because you were expected to have a good degree to find a government job. People without degrees were outsmarted by younger ones who had a better education.

This brought about a major demographic change, illustrated by several interviewees' observation that, over the past twenty years, the Kalenjin language has replaced Kiswahili as the most popular language in downtown Eldoret. The ethnic composition of the student population, however, varies according to the education institution. For instance, while Moi University, a public institution, is more diverse, the students at Moi Western campus, a private university, are mostly of Kalenjin background.

Improved security

Across the three countries, urban spaces are seen as safe havens during man-made and environmental crises. The accounts collected by the research illustrate the significance of migration as a strategy to bridge the security gaps in rural areas. The capacity of the state to grant personal safety is perceived as greater in urban areas than rural areas where the reach of the state is mores limited—due also to poor infrastructure—and violence is more prevalent because of

contentious issues such as land. This particularly vivid in Kenya and Uganda. Located on a political and ethnic fault line, Eldoret witnessed significant inflows of people displaced by violence during the 1992, 1997 and 2007 elections, when clashes pitted Kalenjin against Kikuyu in particular. These clashes were rooted in deep-seated grievances revolving around land ownership and politics of belonging. Interviewees who had to flee their farms during the post-electoral violence, recounted their ordeal in reaching Eldoret, which they saw as a sanctuary where they could wait for the violence to abate. They also discussed the importance of having a foot in the city, including secure access to property and social connections to rely upon during troubled times. Multi-locality has thus emerged in recent years as a vital strategy in an unpredictable political landscape, and one which places a growing emphasis on cities at the expenses of rural areas.

Eldoret has been hosting Somali refugees since the 1990s, both in the city centre and in the suburb of Maili Nne, where refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and South Sudan have also settled. Residents of Eldoret's Eastleigh and Maili Nne have suggested that the Somali presence in the city has expanded in recent years as many previously living in Nairobi have moved to Eldoret, where harassment by the police is reportedly less common than in the capital.

From the 1990s until the mid-2000s, as previously mentioned, security was Gulu's main pull factor, as the town offered sanctuary to hundreds of thousands of people displaced from their rural homes. Many of the displaced eventually settled in the city. Others arrived after the LRA insurgency was quelled. The majority of those who tried to return to their pre-conflict homes faced the challenge of reclaiming their land, particularly when the land was owned under customary—and therefore less formal—tenure. The contestation of land boundaries and ownership was exacerbated by the widespread lack of title deeds and the weakness of conflict resolution mechanisms and law enforcement in rural areas. Those deeply affected included orphans and widows, who were unable to rely on close relatives to support their land claims. They often failed to regain tenure of their pre-conflict homes and therefore had to resort to finding work in Gulu's informal sector. The outbreak of the civil war in South Sudan in 2013 has once again turned Gulu—which lies only 100 km south of the Uganda-South Sudan border—into a humanitarian hub for aid workers and refugees, and a transit point for businesspeople with operations in South Sudan.

Another source of insecurity highlighted during the research is environmental degradation. This is a critical driver of migration in Dire Dawa and, to a lesser extent, in Gulu. Food insecurity is endemic in drought-prone areas such as rural Dire Dawa and the surrounding East and West Hararge Zones of Oromia Regional State and Shinile Zone of Somali Regional State. Already constrained by land scarcity and a shortage of water, in recent years, repeated droughts and erratic rainfall has threatened the livelihoods of the more than 154,000 people in rural Dire Dawa who depend on agriculture. Political fragmentation in Dire Dawa has hitherto undermined the capacity of the state to respond to drought, such as the one induced by El Niño in 2015/16. Indeed, the study found that a significant

number of migrants in Dire Dawa's informal settlements, such as Ganda Miskina, are drought-affected people from the surrounding Oromia Regional State and from various parts of the country such as Hadiya and Wolayta Zones in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Regional State (SNNP), which are characterised by severe land shortage and a history and culture of migration.

Female migrants

Female migrants find both benefits and challenges in moving to the cities at the centre of this study. Economic benefits were mentioned in all three cities. Divided households, in which only the husband migrates to the city are common (this study found this particularly common in Gulu), although some women do join their husbands and seek work in the city. A woman from Nebbi district, in Northern Uganda, explained her experience when moving to Gulu six years ago.

> The wife of a soldier transferred to Gulu, she was initially not very keen to move to Gulu. However, she says now, 'coming here was a blessing in disguise. At least here I have my small business'. In her village, Mityana, she lived on subsistence farming. Today, she proudly claims, 'I'm able to earn and supplement to our livelihood for the family'.

The most common occupation for urban female migrants is petty commerce and some market niches, such as fish mongering in Eldoret, which is almost entirely run by women. In many cases, women in Eldoret's Langas slum have been forced to become the breadwinner after their husbands have been laid off following the closure of the factories. Groups of housewives, often members of the same rotating savings and credit associations and linked to fishing companies based on the shores of the Lake Victoria, come together to enter the fish-selling business. When a woman is the head of the household—often but not always because she is divorced or widowed—her migration often depends on the availability of support in the city and in the place of origin, in the form of childcare. This was the case of a 27 year-old single mother of three who moved to Gulu six years ago.

> A Catholic by religion, she runs a petty commerce business, selling fish, avocados and fried cassava. She left her children in the village under the care of her mother, to whom she regularly sends money. At the beginning, she did not have any support in town and claims that the initial period was hard because of the challenges to find an affordable accommodation. However, she succeeded in being accepted by a ROSCA (rotating savings and credit association) and was thus able to secure a small capital to start her business. Through the ROSCA, she was also able to 'make some friends and these are helping me.'

Moreover, attaining economic independence may afford greater leeway to female migrants but this is often a closed circle since they need to have access to key resources—such as capital to invest in business activities or education—in the first place. The story of a 25-year-old woman from Kapsabet, near Eldoret,

exemplifies the idea of social class as the capacity to translate different forms of capital into one another.[12]

> She has been living in Eldoret for the past two and a half years. She initially came to study public speaking and marketing but recently she has begun trading produce from her family's farm in her school. She explains her success with the fact that she is able to guarantee timely deliveries. She initially lived with her aunt but her father was so pleasantly surprised by her entrepreneurial skills that he did not blink when she told him that she had found an accommodation for herself. She also emphasizes the importance of mobile phones and Whatsapp as crucial tools for staying in touch with family.

In general, female migrants appear to have less agency than male migrants in all three cites, although there are variations based on the social, financial and cultural capital they are able to mobilise. Women are typically deemed more vulnerable to the dangers associated with urban life or, broadly speaking, to life outside of the community of belonging. However, the voices of female migrants help to bring to the fore a multifaceted reality in which both needs and aspirations are played out through creative strategies and an incessant negotiation between agency and structure.

For young single women, the presence of trustworthy relationships in the city is particularly important, given the looming concern that, as bluntly put by a farmer from Chamaluk village outside Eldoret, 'the girl goes to town and comes back pregnant'. There are institutional and informal mechanisms to address female migrants' vulnerability. Examples of the former have been identified in Ethiopia. In recent years in Dire Dawa, there has been an increase in shelters for rural women who are victims of domestic abuse. A common phenomenon is the arrival in the city of young women from rural Dire Dawa and the neighbouring regions of Oromia and Somali who have run away from their homes to avoid female genital mutilation and early or forced marriage. The study found that the majority of them end up eking out a living as domestic workers in Dire Dawa, earning an average of 500 birr per month (USD 22).

In Gulu and Eldoret, support comes mostly through informal networks, based on kinship and ethnicity, which guarantee protection and control. However, it would be misleading to assume that pre-existing social relationships are always effective in rescuing female migrants from the pitfalls of urban life. The story of a 34-year-old woman who moved to Gulu from the village of Masindi in 2012, shows that sometimes the opposite can be true.

> She was encouraged by a friend who lived in Gulu and wanted to sett up a business together. She moved to her place but shortly after discovered that her friend was a sex worker. 'At first', she said, 'I hesitated to join her in the business but she reminded me that I had to contribute somehow to the rent and to pay for food.' For six months she was forced into prostitution until she met someone who helped her secure a job in a restaurant. She quit the sex trade and started working a double shift, as a waitress during the day and as a street food vendor in the evening.

---

[12] For a discussion on the application of Pierre Bourdieu's notion of social class to the study of migrant networks, see Van Hear, 2014; Cederberg, 2012; De Haas, 2010.

Blending in

As a result of their location along strategic infrastructure and proximity to international borders, the three cities attract nationals, international migrants and refugees. For those coming from abroad, one of the main perceived benefits is the security offered in secondary cities, where the living conditions are viewed as more manageable than in the sprawling capital cities. At the same time, however, secondary cities generally offer fewer job opportunities than the capitals, although major infrastructure projects—such as the Dire Dawa Industrial Park—and other developments may change this.

In Eldoret, for instance, migrants from other countries, such as South Sudan and the DRC, have fewer employment opportunities. The reasons for this should be the object of further investigation but our research suggests that this is mostly due to the small size of these communities and the lack of local partners that would facilitate their economic integration. Two stories of migrants from South Sudan and the DRC show the challenges that young individuals have to face in Eldoret.

The case of a 25-year-old from South Sudan currently residing in Mali Nne pre-dates the conflict that has ravaged his country since 2013, however, his story resonates with those of other young international migrants with no other income-generating opportunities but hustling.

> A Nuer from Eastern Equatorial State in South Sudan, he first heard about Mali Nne in 2010, just before the South Sudanese independence. Seven years ago, he boarded a truck, helping the driver unload goods. 'Then, one day, I was unloaded here as well.' He initially slept in the street, earning some money doing menial jobs and receiving the help of other truck drivers. Today, he hangs out with other hustlers of different background, often doing business together and sharing the earnings of the day. His family fled South Sudan last year and is currently in a refugee camp in Uganda. Sporadically, he sends them some money using the mobile money service, M-Pesa.

A 28-year-old from Bukavu, in the eastern DRC, explains his decision to move to Kenya was mostly driven by economic reasons, although he acknowledges that insecurity is linked to the lack of job opportunities at home.

He studied pedagogy but never finished his degree. In 2013, he came to Eldoret for the first time where he has been hawking throughout the city centre in search of customers for the golden jewelry he carries in a small suitcase. The reason why he decided to leave the DRC is that it is easier to 'get by in life' in Kenya. When he first left the DRC, accompanied by friends, he looked for opportunities in Kampala, Kisumu, Kisii, Nairobi and even Mombasa. He decided to stay in Eldoret because there were not many other Congolese jewelry sellers and he saw good chances for business. Since then, more Congolese have come to sell jewelry, which makes his work more challenging and therefore he might try his chance in Kampala next year. He currently stays in Eldoret on a three-month tourist visa he can renew for another three months, after which he has to go back to the DRC to apply for a new visa. 'If they catch you, you get a fine or you go to jail', he says. It happened to him in 2014 when he was jailed and sent back to Bukavu but he soon returned to Kenya on a tourist visa. Consequently, he fears encounters with the police, as well as municipal agents who patrol the streets of Eldoret looking for informal hawkers and street vendors. If he is caught, he usually pays USD 2-5. Roland's dream is to leave the African continent and establish himself in Europe or in North America yet he is aware that it is almost impossible for him to get there. At the same time, he wishes there was more security and a good government in the DRC. 'If there was security in the DRC, not even one Congolese could decide to stay abroad, we would stay there!'

The study also revealed the presence of refugees in each of the cities. In the case of Dire Dawa, a major pull factor for displaced people from neighbouring Somalia is the possibility to blend in among Somalis from the Somali Regional State. In 1991, territorial clashes between Oromos and Somalis in the rural areas surrounding Dire Dawa displaced Somalis to the city. This also makes it challenging to identify refugee clusters in the city. However, as the plans for the construction of a new industrial park include the establishment of a quota for refugees[13], the refugee population in the city is likely to become more conspicuous in the future. This development also has the potential to inflame tensions between Somalis and other ethnic groups if it is not managed well.

The situation is different in Gulu. In recent years, the city has seen an influx of South Sudanese refugees who have moved from rural settlements to Kanyogoga village, in Gulu's Bardege division. While government policy is to provide basic food rations to refugees in rural settlements, the study found that many are pushed to Gulu due to a shortage of land available. The government's approach of assigning plots of land to refugee households was to facilitate their self-reliance. However, the dramatic increase in the number of refugees has strained this policy, frustrating efforts to attain self-sufficiency through agriculture within two years of being granted asylum. With the arrival of more than 270,000 South Sudanese refugees in Bidi Bidi refugee settlement since 2016 (UNHCR, 2016), competition for land has increased. Since it has become harder for a refugee family to sustain themselves through agriculture, many have turned to other livelihood opportunities in Gulu's informal economy, mostly as menial workers but also as small-scale entrepreneurs.

---

[13] As reported by the Ethiopian News Agency, the Administration of Refugees and Returnees Affairs (ARRA) plans to secure 30,000 jobs for refugees after three industrial parks will be built in Dire Dawa, Mekele, Jimma or Ziway, providing employment opportunities for 100,000 persons (ENA, 2017).

5. The physical and human infrastructure of the city

Ethnic clusters and informal settlements

The different waves of migrants, and their daily activities, constantly reshape the city or, to paraphrase De Herdt and Marysse (1999), reinvent the city from below. Some of these transformations are visible on maps, although rarely official ones. Others work under the surface, changing the social fabric of the city and the way the city is seen and experienced by locals and migrants alike.

The dramatic population growth that Dire Dawa, Gulu and Eldoret have experienced in recent years has coincided with a spike in demand for housing that has driven up real estate and prompted the expansion of informal settlements. In Dire Dawa, there is a backlog of demand for 24,000 houses, and the demand is expected to grow annually by 2,900 (UN-Habitat, 2008). More than 25 per cent of the settlements in the city are reckoned to be informal and without sufficient services. Moreover, approximately 180,000 people live in slums or sub-standard housing, mostly located in the hills and floodplains around the city and are therefore vulnerable to natural hazards including landslides and floods—such as those that killed hundreds of people in 2005 and 2006 (BBC, 2008)—and to health issues due to poor sanitation.

Similar dynamics have driven transformations in Eldoret. The booming population has led to a change in urban housing policies. As the state has proven unable to catch up with the rising demand, a land agent explained that 'People have just improvised on how to own houses'. The settlements of Langas, Huruma and Munyaka embody the failure of the state to address the shortage of affordable housing. Instead, land agents, brokers and surveyors—mostly working in the informal sector—are providing this service. Migrant clusters have formed on the outskirts of Eldoret under specific historical circumstances. For instance, Munyaka, an informal settlement located in the east of Eldoret, emerged after Kikuyu were relocated from surrounding forests to the city. Mali Nne, located in the eastern periphery of Eldoret, has expanded following the liberalisation of the energy market in 2003. Moreover, these settlements have often emerged in the direction of the place of origin of the largest tribe. For example, Luos have settled in Langas, on the road to Kisumu while Luhyas occupy the settlements near the industrial park in the western part of Eldoret. It should be noted, however, that most neighbourhoods are mixed. Langas, for instance, is divided into three sections: Kisumudogo, with a Luo majority, and Konabaya and Yanubi, both with a majority of Kikuyu residents.

In Gulu, destitute migrants are mostly settling in the areas of Vanguard, Pece-Lukung, Cere-lenu, Limu, Kony-Paco, Kanyagoga, Cuk pa Oweka and Town Center. Localities such as Pece district have been completely transformed as a result of the arrival of many—mostly male—migrant labourers. Cheap lodging and leisure venues have proliferated in the area, attracting women who have turned to sex work for a lack of other options. Although many of the informal settlements developed during the years of the LRA insurgency are being phased out and residents encouraged to relocate, without an alternative many are forced

into other settlements, creating a cycle that does not address the convergence of poverty and the rising cost of living.

An urban land rush

The three cities are being transformed not only by the inflow of migrants but also the inflow of capital. The rising value of urban real estate was often mentioned in the interviews conducted in all three cities. This is related not only to the greater housing demand, which drives up rents, but also to a view of the city as a space for investment. For example, Gulu has become an alternative place for investment for businesspeople who were forced to leave Juba following the outbreak of conflict there in 2013. This pattern reflects a partial shift in the geographical imagination of value, where buying urban plots is increasingly seen as a safer way to store value than purchasing farming land. This appears particularly evident in Eldoret, where better-off farmers, mostly from Kalenjin and Kikuyu communities, have been investing in urban properties. This trend accelerated after the 2007–2008 election violence, as many farmers affected by the unrest realised the need to gain a foot in the city to provide a backup in case of fresh turmoil. There is also a political undertone in the multi-locality strategy pursued by resourceful farmers, and it is related to the ethnic politics that is shaping the development trajectory of the city. This resonates with the situation of Dire Dawa. Here, political and economic logic are interwoven. As a Somali interviewee noted, 'when Somali Issa become rich they come to Dire Dawa', where they buy land and build houses. Urban zoning, however, is a politically charged topic, given the peculiar political dispensation of the city, where Oromos and Somalis vie for influence through demography.

The power of networks

The exchanges of money and information illustrated above, and the ethnic clustering of the city, are shaped by social networks, mostly based on kinship, ethnicity and friendship. Kinship ties are most critical for poor migrants with no previous city experience. A lack of contacts in the urban areas is likely to thwart mobility aspirations, as an interviewee from a village northeast of Dire Dawa explained.

> Our village has been hit by recurrent drought. We used to be agro-pastoralists, combining sorghum and maize cultivation with cattle and camel. We used to sell milk in Dire Dawa city. But now, crops failed and we no longer rear cattle; only goats and camel. We are left with only goats and camel thanks to their capacity to survive even extreme drought. We see people going to Dire Dawa where they work during drought. But you cannot simply go there without relatives who support you until you start working or to get a job. As a result, we depend on relief distributed by the government. Our children are also not educated. There is only one primary school (1-4 grades) in Mudhi Anano. We complained that if the children pass to grade 5, they would have to go to Dire Dawa. And we cannot afford to pay for their cost of living there. Those who have relatives

in the city could continue their education. So far, only eight students from Mudhi Anano who have relatives in Dire Dawa are pursuing their education above grade 5.

When no close relatives are available, ties are established on the basis of ethnicity, culture or religion. In Gulu, for instance, the study found that most people from eastern Uganda, especially the Bagisu and Alurs, and the Lugbara and Baganda from central Uganda, rely on networks based on a shared language and provenance from the same region, but not necessarily the same village. People from the same ethnic groups tend to meet both formally and informally at venues such as the Buganda Pub, frequented by migrants from eastern and central Uganda, and often cluster in the same areas of Gulu town. In Dire Dawa, the Aba Gada and Ugaz are the cultural institutions representing the Oromos and Somalis, respectively, and are often visited by new migrants to the city. Meanwhile, religious networks can cut across ethnic boundaries and link members of different ethnic groups. For instance, while the Somali population is almost entirely Muslim, the Oromos are almost equally divided between Christians and Muslims. In urban and rural Dire Dawa, the majority of the Oromos are Muslims like their Somali neighbours, thus smoothing the frictions between the two groups. However, many of the Oromo civil servants in Dire Dawa are Christian from central and western Oromia Regional State, as are the Amhara and other migrants from the north. On the other hand, religious institutions help migrants adapt to the city. Although Dire Dawa is a Muslim-majority city (76 per cent), all religious groups—Muslims, Orthodox Christians, Protestants and Catholics—have well-established religious institutions with active associational life. A case in point is the one of a 28 year-old migrant from SNNP Regional State, who explained how faith helps make sense of migration and define migration-related decisions:

He came to Dire Dawa in 2005 from Hosanna Ashegraramo village in Hadiya Zone in SNNP Regional State. 'Life in the city is tough. One is expected to be self-reliant', he says. Initially, his only option was to do menial works such as being a porter. He worked in a variety of different jobs, often suffering abusive conditions. 'Ethiopia is not good for the poor. The system favours the rich. That is why they either pay below the standard or do not pay at all. They blackmail you saying, "all it takes is a phone call."' He points out that, although stigmatising international migration 'day in, day out', the government pushes people to migrate. 'For most poor people, international migration is a question of justice. They say, "I better die in the journey than staying at home and suffer from lack of justice". The government says, "wait for some time. We will find you a job!"' He claims that only his Christian faith prevented him from migrating to the Gulf countries like many of his acquaintances have already done. 'But I am a believer and worship God. I go to a Protestant Church in Dire Dawa every Sunday. For me as a believer *sidet* [international migration] is not an option. I would have migrated had it not been for my faith. I am a Protestant and I believe that God would help me, one way or the other.'

Similarly, in Eldoret, tribal connections have contributed to creating a migration system that has reshaped the city plan. Industrialisation in Eldoret has attracted migrants from all across Kenya, with many settling in the Langas area, close to

the industrial park along Kisumu Road. Following the closure of most of the factories in the city, former employees turned to the informal economy—mostly petty commerce—and ethnic clusters have helped fulfil two main needs at once: accessing the job market and protecting ethnic kin during political turmoil, such as during the 2007/08 political violence.

The case of the Somali community is particularly interesting as it shows, on the one hand, the resilience of clan ties straddling national borders while on the other hand, the social stratification is subsumed in relationships of solidarity. After the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, displaced Somali migrants with resources—and who were able to purchase a Kenyan ID—settled in the West Indies neighbourhood of Eldoret, so-called because of the large Indian presence, where they engage in various business activities. Businesspeople purchased land to build a mosque, which Muslim Kalenjin from the area also attend and later, many shops mushroomed around the mosque. Somali entrepreneurs have set up different kinds of companies, mostly for long-haulage transport of fish and other goods. This, in turn, has attracted Somali Kenyans from the former North-Eastern Province. The rise in the value of land has priced out migrants unable to afford the rent, or to rely on support. Therefore, many have had to move to the suburbs of the city. The story of a 26 year-old, born in Eldoret from parents originally from Somalia, highlights the key role of pioneer migrants in paving the way for ethnic kin and fellow Muslims.

> His parents are originally from Somalia's Gedo province and hail from the Garre, a Dir subclan straddling the Kenya-Somali-Ethiopia border. In 1991, they fled Somalia as the country was descending into civil war and sought shelter first in Mandera, a Kenyan city on the border. They then travelled to Nairobi, Isiolo and Nakuru before deciding to settle in Eldoret. 'They loved the place', he says, referring to his parents. They arrived with a small group of Somalis. Back in Somalia, his father was a butcher and realised that he could continue his business in the area, where the cost of living was lower, and the weather milder, than in Nairobi. His father was able to open a butcher shop in town but, in 2003, he was forced to close because of intimidation from Kenyan competitors. Thus, they moved to Mali Nne, at the time a rural suburb of Eldoret, where they bought a 24 square meter plot of land for KES 4,000 (the current value is KES 1.2 million or USD 12,000). Today, his father is a local leader and the one who has done the most to boost the Somali population in Mali Nne. In the early 2000s, the number of migrants from the former North-Eastern Province intensified as business opportunities in the area—due to the opening of the oil terminal—and the reputation of the place began circulating. 'Somalis (mostly Garre) were saying to each other, "There is this place called Eldoret…" and many, who were previously thinking to relocate to Nairobi Eastleigh, moved here.'

The significance of ethnic ties for migrants resonates across the three fields of investigation, shaping the labour market. For instance, in Dire Dawa, migrants from SNNP Regional State dominate the construction sector as daily labourers. Assumptions and perceptions of ethnicity often emerged from the interviews to explain the large presence of members of the same community in a specific sector. Migrants from SNNP Regional State were considered ideal daily labourers because of their physical fitness and because they were forced by harsh constraints at home to take on hard work for a low pay. Meanwhile, cultural

stereotypes regarding Somalis were put forth as an explanation for the presence of so few Somalis in the manual labour sector. Another explanation, however, is that Somali networks facilitate access to trade and more lucrative livelihoods, thus reducing the pressure to accept more physically demanding jobs. In Gulu, different market niches are occupied by specific groups. For example, although local Acholi dominate the hospitality and restaurant sectors, they tend to hire staff from central Uganda due to a local demand for food from that region of the country. In addition, following the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan in 2013, Ethiopian and Eritrean entrepreneurs previously based in Juba have moved into the city and purchased a number of hospitality and leisure venues. Some estimates from interviewees suggest that these two groups own more than 80 per cent of the hotels in Gulu.

The hospitality of relatives and ethnic kin, however, is often a double-edged sword. Although it provides support, it also creates obligations and control. Students from the rural areas who move to the city and stay with relatives and return to the village during the holidays—a common situation in Dire Dawa, Gulu and Eldoret—tend to establish and maintain friendships across ethnic divides. While inter-ethnic relationships are mostly mediated by a common faith, in Dire Dawa, in Eldoret, a city scarred by violence along ethnic lines, many youths pride themselves on being able to overcome ethnic rivalries. The case of a young Kalenjin man from Marakwet, in Elgeyo-Marakwet County east of Eldoret, illustrates the negotiation between structure and agency in which recently arrived migrants are engaged.

> He came to Eldoret when he was still a teenager. He has been staying at his aunt's place and has been running a fruit juice business and a small eatery owned by his aunt. With customers from different backgrounds, staying in a mixed neighbourhood and playing football with other youths, he has developed his own network of friends, cutting across ethnic lines. In the discussion, he stressed his identity as a resident of Eldoret and a citizen of Kenya, rather than as a Kalenjin.

As described above, the significance of kinship, ethnic and religious ties decrease as the migrants become more familiar with the urban setting and expand their networks. This is also the case among individuals with different backgrounds but sharing a condition of marginalisation who deploy strategies to negotiate their participation in the informal economy. An example from Eldoret clarifies how

> He grew up in a village northwest of Eldoret and came to the city in 2007 when he was 18. His fate was decided by the elders of his village after his parents passed away. He was separated from his siblings and sent to the city, where he did not know anybody. During the first three months, he slept in the streets. 'I lived like a *chokora* (street boy) but at least I didn't sniff glue,' he recalls. A friend employed in a car wash introduced him to a street vendor who hired him to sell vegetables and he was able to find a room for KES 300 per month (USD.3). 'The room was small and dirty, and the rain would flood it regularly, but at least I had a place where I could sleep.' The job also helped him expand his network of contacts. 'I got to know more people, we help each other. I specialised in selling avocados that I buy from a friend who brings them from Kisii. The only problem is that county officers patrol the streets and disturb us. They say we are illegal, so we hide as soon as we see them. If they find us we get a fine, or we pay *kitu kidogo* (bribe).' His dream is to buy a plot of land in Eldoret, build houses and become a landlord.

poor migrants lacking social capital engage and make sense of hustling.
The location of the three cities has, over time, turned them into safe havens for nationals, international migrants and refugees looking for opportunities that could not be found in areas directly affected by humanitarian crises. The cities also provide an alternative to those unable or unwilling to venture to the capital cities.

Challenges and opportunities for urban renewal

In the three cities, existing infrastructure is buckling under the strain of a fast-growing population. Due to limited resources and the politicization of urbanisation, however, local administrators have been hitherto unable to respond to the urbanisation boom with an adequate provision of basic services. In Dire Dawa, for instance, in 2014, the local administrative council passed a resolution to legalize all illegal settlements built before 2011 and outlaw any illegal settlement built since. It also committed to provide social housing to mitigate the impact of the rising cost of living. However, the fraught politics of the city, where Oromos and Somalis vie for control, has undermined efforts to regulate the use of the land around Dire Dawa. In a similar fashion, in 2014, Uasin Gishu County in Kenya banned the subdivision of parcels of land, both to preserve agricultural land and to regulate land usage. The decision has been seen by many through a political lens, as a way to secure the dominance of Kalenjin land-owners in the outskirts of the city.

In Gulu, the dramatic population increase over the last two decades has had mixed consequences for the management of the city. As a result of these transformations, and the challenges associated with them, the town has become one of the largest recipients of infrastructure development funds in Uganda.[14] While the granting of a larger number of business licenses has increased the revenue flow, thus allowing for more public spending, the local government has had to face challenges related to the spike in the demand for affordable housing, access to clean water and sanitation, and garbage collection and environmental degradation.

Simmering economic tensions

As previously mentioned, demographic changes in Dire Dawa and Eldoret are feeding into long-standing political tensions. It is therefore hard to disentangle ethnic, political and economic claims. In Gulu and Dire Dawa, challenges are emerging as the informal economy is fuelling tensions between shop owners and street vendors, as well as between informal workers and local governments.

In Gulu, street vendors are often accused by city authorities of avoiding taxes and by the Market Traders Association of unfair competition and free-riding services for which licensed merchants are required to pay. The challenge of regulating the informal sector, particularly the transport and trade sectors, is contributing to

---

[14] Interview, Senior Assistant Town Clerk, Bardega Division, Gulu.

the conflation of immigration and illegality in public discourses, exacerbating economic anxieties and community tensions.

Similar tensions are found in Dire Dawa, where a number of street vendors are underage. Their young age prevents them from being employed as daily labourers, and therefore selling items such as books, small electronic goods, roasted chickpeas and sunflowers is their only source of income. However, local residents draw a distinction between forms of mobile street hawking associated with migrants and 'traditional' street vending whereby local goods such as fruits, cosmetics or *khat* are sold in street-side stalls.

Migrants are often accused of driving down wages, a sensitive issue compounded by the current lack of a government-established minimum wage. As explained by the Acting Head of the Security Directorate of the Social and Labour Affairs Office of Dire Dawa, 'natives of Dire Dawa perceive that the migration of people from other regions have reduced not only their job opportunities but also their negotiating power vis-à-vis employer.' The unemployment rate in Dire Dawa currently stands at 18.5 per cent, above the national average. Unemployment data collected between 2011 and 2016 suggests that there is not a direct relationship between rural migration and unemployment; while rural to urban migration has increased, unemployment has decreased (Urban Job Creation and Food Security Agency of DDA, 2017).

In Dire Dawa and Eldoret, where political discourses are largely based on narratives of belonging, the term migrant is politically charged. As Oromo and Somali elites vie for political control over Dire Dawa, migration is often perceived by local residents as driven by the goal of influencing the demographic balance. With the end of the Derg government in Ethiopia in 1991, the new political era brought a change in the demographic composition of the city. Some of its long-time Amhara residents left Dire Dawa, and the Oromo and Somali populations started growing in response to the autochthonous claims advanced by both ethnic groups over the city.

Today, this politics of numbers is epitomised by the 40:40:20 formula, a power-sharing arrangement that has increasingly been challenged by the steady rise of the Somali population in the city and by the growing Somali influence in the political arena. Claims of politically motivated migrations to Dire Dawa by members of the two ethnic groups under the auspices of the political parties recurred throughout the interviews. According to many Oromo interviewees, Somali elites have actively encouraged Somali migration to the city in order to change its demographic structure to back up their ownership claim over the city. This claim, however, was impossible to corroborate. Meanwhile, many Somalis portrayed the growing number of Somalis in Dire Dawa as a return, not an expansion. They presented the Oromo as latecomers, albeit with preferential access to land and housing due to the political leverage they have on the Dire Dawa Administration. Moreover, the study has captured a widespread anxiety over the transformations of Dire Dawa into a city of migrants, foregrounding the tension between the cosmopolitan legacy of the city and the growing tribalism stirred by identity politics. This is akin to the situation of Eldoret, where the

devolution ushered in by the 2010 Constitution is having repercussions on migration flows to and from the city, contributing to a reorganisation of the population along ethnic lines. While attracting Kalenjin because of the opportunities opened up at the county level, this unequal distribution of resources is pushing others to look for business opportunities elsewhere.

Impact on the sites of origin

The impact on the sites of origin is largely considered positive by interviewees in all three cities, although the benefits are unequally distributed and the views of migration to the city are nuanced. The benefits fall into three broad categories: financial remittances; ideas and values, or what Levitt (1998) calls 'social remittances'; and economic integration.

Financial remittances are mostly portrayed as a critical lifeline to sustain the rural household left behind. In Kenya and Uganda, the interviews in the villages of origin of migrants to Eldoret and Gulu suggested that remittances largely fulfil basic needs such as food, school fees and medical expenses. In Moiben, a village close to Eldoret, a farmer claimed that the need for external financial resources is higher in September and from January to April, after paying children's school fees and preparing the field for planting. This is when the pressure on migrants to the city is greatest. Besides paying for school fees, most informal workers, particularly in Eldoret and Gulu, said that they remit money back home mainly to address household emergencies, such as sickness and funeral expenses, and, sometimes, to sustain income-generating activities or to finance building a house. The story of a 38-year-old from Arua, illustrates the balance between social obligations and investment aspirations.

> When I first came to Gulu I relied only on my savings. Now I sell clothes. In the village, I support four family members and I send them money three times per year. I mostly send them UGX 20,000, 30,000 or 50,000 (USD 5, 8 or 14) depending on the need. During the festive seasons, I also send them clothes through my village mates when they travel back. I am also a member of a savings group, through which I plan to save over UGX two million and build myself a house in the village. I want to expand my business.

In recent years in Kenya and Uganda, mobile money has become the preferred way to send funds to families at home, due to the low cost and high efficiency. In Eldoret, for example, residents will often send money using the mobile money service, M-Pesa, to family or friends within Kenya.

In a limited number of cases, remittances are used for investments in the village of origin. In Ethiopia, *khat* farmers from Aweday who moved to Dire Dawa use remittances to expand their farms and support family members. When they are unable to do so, however, many said that they would opt to stay in Dire Dawa rather than return to the rural areas for fear of losing face.
Besides financial remittances, rural sites also receive social remittances in the form of ideas of female empowerment or cosmopolitism, which study

respondents suggest are well received by the youth. In Ethiopia, a young woman from Harla village reported how she escaped forced early marriage and has since become a successful educated woman. Such stories are an inspirational story for other girls from her village.

> When she was in grade 4, her parents arranged a marriage for her with a man from another village, however, she escaped from her husband and returned to her village to continue studying. Her teacher reported the case to the Women's and Children's Affairs Office in Dire Dawa and her parents were reprimanded for forcing their daughter into an illegal early marriage. The family returned the dowry to the husband and permitted their daughter to continue her studies. Today, she travels around rural Dire Dawa, encouraging girls to say no to early marriage.

Migrants in urban sites may also contribute to greater economic integration with rural areas according to their skills, their pre-existing connections and infrastructure conditions. This was the case in Eldoret, in particular. For Kenyan farmers in the villages of Moiben and Chesikaki, having children in Eldoret is seen as a way to cut out the middlemen. For example, a farmer in his fifties living in Moiben, has three children who work as middlemen in Eldoret, Naivasha and Nairobi. They send lorries to the village to pick up the goods and sell them in urban areas. The farmer noted that the advantage of having his own children doing this work is that there is no risk of being ripped off and that they communicate price variations in advance by phone.

In fact, rural-urban linkages have gained strength with the rise of ICTs, and this trend is expected to continue as technology develops and becomes increasingly accessible.

6. Moving onward

Examining the role, and the attractiveness, of the cities under investigation as stepping-stones to other destinations, both internal and international, yielded mixed findings. For most migrants, these secondary cities appear to be their final destinations and are considered valid alternatives to the capitals, as they offer a good balance between job opportunities, cost of living and quality of life.

The study suggests that the three cities are now competing with capital cities for the work and educational opportunities and security they provide, and also for the way they capture the imaginations of prospective migrants. However, there is some onward migration from all the cities. In the case of Dire Dawa, this issue plays out in different ways as, the city is a transit point for migrants planning to move east to the Gulf countries or north towards Europe. In addition, Dire Dawa provides a variety of income-generating opportunities for those trying to save up to fund their journey abroad.

Often the decision about whether to move on from the city is subject to revision, depending on the conditions migrants face in the city. Transit migrants from rural areas are very vulnerable to human traffickers, who often lure people with promises of safe passage in exchange for a small down payment.[15] Women are a particularly vulnerable and the research revealed frequent reports of abuses being directed at them along the way. Those who are rescued are often hosted in shelters in Dire Dawa and some decide to settle there.

According to interviewees, Eldoret is also a stopover for migrants heading to Europe via South Sudan, Sudan and Libya. Interviews with residents of the suburb of Mali Nne, where the Eldoret fuel pipeline terminal is located, suggest that an illegal migration industry thrives there as brokers with international connections and long-haul truckers meet the demand of migrants from Somalia.

The case of Gulu, on the other hand, presents little evidence of the city as a stepping-stone for further migration. In fact, while young South Sudanese refugees tend to move to town from rural settlements in search of livelihood opportunities, a number of young people interviewed continue to entertain the idea of moving to Juba to earn a living, when security conditions improve.

---

[15] Anecdotes collected during fieldwork illustrate the kind of deceit these migrants fall victim to. For instance, several migrants claimed to have been abandoned in the National Cement Factory, on the outskirts of Dire Dawa, despite having paid the full brokerage fee to Djibouti or Dubai. The Ethiopian government has recently undertaken a major crack down on human trafficking. According to the 2015 Trafficking in Persons Report of the US State Department, over 90,000 men, women and children from Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea transit every year through Djibouti, as voluntary and undocumented economic migrants on their way to Yemen and other locations in the Middle East.

7. Conclusion

The picture that has emerged from the different cities is nuanced. Migration to Dire Dawa, Eldoret and Gulu emerges from the study as a strategy to access a combination of opportunities, including jobs, higher education and improved security. The perceived lack of viable options to improve livelihoods in rural areas, which are seen as being neglected by governments in terms of infrastructure and services, acts as a powerful push factor. The subsequent increase in the urban population feeds the demand for goods and services, and in return attracts infrastructural investments, such as industrial parks, roads and housing.

The capacity to reap the benefits of migration to urban areas appears partially dependent upon pre-existing resources, in terms of social and financial capital. Social networks based on kinship, ethnicity and friendship shape migrants' experiences and are a significant source of social capital. Social and financial capital can allow recently arrived migrants the ability to better navigate the opportunities and challenges that are presented in urban areas. Mobility patterns are thus interwoven with social stratification in rural areas, as they both reflect and contribute to reproducing inequalities. The physical proximity of the rural to the urban area, and access to infrastructure, such as roads, matters. As the case of Eldoret illustrates, migrants from villages properly connected to the city are better positioned to take advantage of rural linkages and broker access for farmers from their village to urban markets. Migrants are also expected to maintain the linkages with their villages of origin by offering help to new arrivals, through remittances and, possibly, trade partnerships. Failure to fulfil these expectations may result in frustration and further isolation. However, poor migrants seem unable to regularly contribute to the welfare of those at home. While critical in facing unexpected emergencies or paying expenses such as school fees, the contribution of remittances appears insufficient to increase the economic resilience of rural areas to shocks derived, for instance, from crop failures or other disruptive events.

Urban linkages prove effective in introducing a safety net for those who live in rural areas. Multilocality has emerged in recent years as a vital strategy in political landscapes perceived as increasingly unpredictable. Having a foothold in the city is seen as a crucial risk-management strategy. This foothold might be either a relative who could provide shelter in case of need, or a property to store value, or both.

Residents of the villages from where most migrants to the three cities originate largely consider the impact on the sites of origin as positive albeit with some caveats. The interviewees recognise the economic importance of remittances for both smoothing consumption and providing funds to set up income-generating activities. In Eldoret and Dire Dawa, cash crop farmers see migration also as an opportunity to access urban markets by using children living and studying in the city as trusted intermediaries. Meanwhile, the social implications of migration to the city is nuanced and varies according to the demography of the interviewee. For instance, some elders from villages around the three cities expressed

concern over the risk of a mass rural exodus that would deplete rural areas and also raised concerns that the influence of city life on the youth, and on young women in particular could erode traditional values.

The impact of rural to urban migration on these cities is significant. The intensification of rural flows to Dire Dawa, Eldoret and Gulu is increasing the cost of living—particularly housing—the job market and the underlying socio-cultural fabric. In the cases of Dire Dawa and Eldoret, it is feared that migrant inflows could disrupt the delicate balance between competing ethno-political constituencies, while in Gulu—where most migrants are absorbed by the informal economy—there is a growing friction between shop owners and street vendors. The challenge of regulating the informal sector, such as transport and trade, is contributing to a conflation of immigration and illegality in public discourses, exacerbating economic anxieties and community tensions. Similar tensions are also found in Dire Dawa, where migrants are accused of driving down wages, an issue compounded by the current lack of a government-established minimum wage. Moreover, the demographic changes of the three cities are nurturing tensions between cosmopolitanism—which has a long history in Dire Dawa and Eldoret—and tribalism, stirred by the rising political and economic significance of the secondary cities at the centre of this study.

Investigation into onward migration produced mixed results. The study showed that Dire Dawa, Gulu and Eldoret are becoming destinations, rather than stepping-stones towards other national or international destinations. However, their appeal also lies in the opportunities they offer to move further, should the need arise. Meanwhile, although the gap between urban and rural development in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda has widened in recent years, the one between the secondary cities under examination and the respective capital cities has narrowed. Therefore, on the one hand, a growing number of rural migrants are moving to the city in search of security and opportunities for upward and onward mobility while on the other hand, migrants are no longer targeting almost exclusively capital cities, as was the case in the past, but are also moving to these secondary, yet economically vibrant, cities.

Policy considerations

As secondary cities are becoming increasingly popular destinations for migrants and this research suggests that they can have a greater capacity to absorb migrants and to meet their expectations than capital cities, they could form important components of comprehensive migration management strategies. This will require a better understanding of city-specific drivers and dynamics of rural to urban migration as well as the particular draw of secondary cities and the challenges faced by these cities compared to rural areas, capital cities and international destinations. Drawing on the research findings, the EU could consider the following:
1. In all three cities, services—such as healthcare, education, housing and waste management—and employment are strained as a result of various factors, including growing populations. The EU could invest in strengthening the capacity of secondary cities to absorb new migrants

through strategic investments in local government's and job creation programmes.

2. The EU could support a progressive tax system, which includes migrants, as a way to ensure migrants contribute to the development of their city and also to deter discrimination around migrants' use of services. These tax systems can help deter capital flight to ensure that wealth is properly distributed to labourers in Africa.

3. EU programmes should consider targeting displaced populations and the poorest migrants in urban areas through income-generating schemes and ensuring protection of vulnerable individuals, such as women and informal workers. Additionally, the EU could support skills development in relevant urban industries but also, such as in Uganda, agriculture, where a lack of viable rural livelihoods has contributed to rural to urban migration.

4. Policies could increase efforts to support shelters for victims of human trafficking and gender-based violence—in places such as Dire Dawa—and organizations promoting awareness of the risks associated with smuggling and trafficking.

5. The EU is planning to support Ethiopia's industrial policy. Addressing the issue of a minimum wage and working conditions could ensure the safety and well-being of workers in the new facilities. Labour unions can be strategic allies in this effort and could help mitigate tensions among native and migrant workers.

6. Future policies should carefully consider current land policies, such as customary tenure in Gulu and displacement in Dire Dawa, and how this affects rural to urban migration, infrastructure development and conflict.

7. Although often viewed as cosmopolitan, Dire Dawa and Eldoret are not yet fully cosmopolitan. Both are contested cities with majority populations made up of two ethnic groups. Current and future programmes should be aware of this delicate ethnic balance to ensure secondary cities are able to continue to absorb new migrants and are not upset by major shocks, such as electoral violence in the case of Eldoret, or the Ethiopian government's plan to provide 30,000 jobs for refugees in various industrial parks in the country. The cosmopolitan images of the cities are positive and could be built upon.

8. The EU could support conflict resolution initiatives to prevent the eruption of violence, particularly during elections in contested cities such as Eldoret and Dire Dawa. EU Trust Fund and EU IDEAS programmes in Kenya are useful references.

9. The key concerns expressed by migrants could serve to directly inform policy priorities, including employment, social services and security, in order to prevent irregular migration and to ensure that secondary cities can meet the expectations of migrants and have the capacity to continue to absorb new migrants.

Glossary of acronyms, words and phrases

AfDB	African Development Bank
ANDM	Amhara National Democratic Movement
DDIP	Dire Dawa Industrial Park
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
ESPDP	Ethiopian Somali People's Democratic Party
FGM	female genital mutilation
ICT	information communication technologies
IDP	internally displaced person
hawala	a traditional Somali money transfer system
IGLF	Issa-Gurgura Liberation Front
jua kali	Swahili; an expression used to indicate hustlers, informal fixers and intermediaries in urban contexts
khat	a mildly narcotic plant widely consumed in Ethiopia
LRA	Lord Resistance Army
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPDO	Oromo Peoples' Democratic Organization
SEPDM	Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement
SNNP	Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples' Regional State

Bibliography

AfDB, OECD, & UNDP. (2016). African Economic Outlook 2016 : Sustainable Cities and Structural Transformation. http://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/aeo-2016-en

Agesa, R. (2004). One family, two households: Rural to urban migration in Kenya. *Review of Economics of the Household*, 2(2): 161–178.

Bakewell, O. and Jonsson, G. (2011). *Migration, mobility and the African city: synthesis report on the African perspectives on human mobility research programme*. Oxford: International Migration Institute, University of Oxford.

Bakewell, O., Haas, H. De, & Kubal, A. (2011). *Migration systems, pioneers and the role of agency*. International Migration Institute Working Papers, November: 1–26.

Barbieri, A., Domingues, E., Queiroz, B., Ruiz, R., Rigotti, J., Carvalho, J., et al. (2010). Climate change and population migration in Brazil's Northeast: Scenarios for 2025–2050. *Population and Environment*, 31(5): 344–370.

Bardsley, D., & Hugo, G. (2010). Migration and climate change: Examining thresholds of change to guide effective adaptation decision-making. *Population and Environment*, 32(2): 238–262.

Barr, A. and A. Oduro (2002) Ethnic Fractionalization in an African Labour Market. *Journal of Development Economics*, 68: 355–379.

BBC News. *Scores killed in Ethiopia Floods*. (7 August 2006). http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5250386.stm. Flooding in 2005 also caused similar levels of casualties and damage [Accessed 9 February 2018].

Central Statistical Agency. (2012). *2007 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia: Dire Dawa Report*. Addis Ababa: Central Statistics Agency.

De Boeck, Filip & Cassiman, Ann & Van Wolputte, Steven. (2010). Recentering the City: an Anthropology of Secondary Cities in Africa. *African Perspectives*. 33-41.

de Brauw, A. (2014). *Migration, Youth, and Agricultural Productivity in Ethiopia*. Mimeo.

Degefa T. (2005). *Rural Livelihoods, Poverty and Food Insecurity in Ethiopia: A Case Study at Ernessa and Garbi Communities in Oromya Zone, Amhara National Regional State*. PhD Dissertation, NTNU 2005, Norwegian University of Science and Technology Management (NTNU), Trondheim.

de Haas, H. (2010). The Internal Dynamics of Migration Processes: A Theoretical Inquiry. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36(10): 1587–1617.

Dekker, R., & Engbersen, G. (2012). *How social media transform migrant networks and facilitate migration*. Working Paper 64. IMI: University of Oxford.

Eriksen, S. H., Brown, K., & Kelly, P. M. (2005). The dynamics of vulnerability: locating coping strategies in Kenya and Tanzania. *The Geographical Journal*, 171(4): 287–305.

Ethiopia News Agency (ENA). (5 April 2017). *Industrial Parks to Employ Refugees.* Food an Agriculture Organization (FAO). (2017). *The state of food and agriculture: Leveraging food systems for inclusive rural transformation.*

Gulu District Local Government (GDDP). (2016). *Second Five-Year District Development Plan, 2015/2016–2019/2020.* Gulu: Gulu District Local Government.

Greiner, C., & Sakdapolrak, P. (2013). Rural-urban migration, agrarian change, and the environment in Kenya: A critical review of the literature. *Population and Environment*, 34(4): 524-553.

Hailu, Abiy. (14 June 2014). Ethiopia: Why Ethiopia Needs Fast Growing Secondary Cities?. *allAfrica*. http://allafrica.com/stories/201606141195.html. [Accessed 12 February 2018].

Hunnes, D. E. (2012). Understanding rural-to-urban Migration in Ethiopia : Driving factors , analytical frameworks , and recommendations. *Journal of Global Health Perpectives*, 17.

Kajisa, K. (2007) Personal Networks and Nonagricultural Employment: The Case of a Farming Village in the Philippines. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 55: 669–707.

Kenya Free Press (2017). *Kalenjin elders demand fair share for community in Nakuru politics*. http://www.kenyafreepress.com/top-stories/2017-elections/1103/forced-democracy-creeps-into-nakuru-politics [Accessed 14 February 2017].

Levitt, P. (1998). Social Remittances: Migration Driven Local-Level Forms of Cultural Diffusion. *The International Migration Review*, 32 (4): 926-948.

Lohnert, B. (2017). *Migration and the Rural-Urban Transition in Sub-Saharan Africa*. SLE Discussion Paper. Centre for Rural Development (SLE): Berlin

Mberu, B.U. (2006). Internal migration and household living conditions in Ethiopia. *Demographic Research*, 14: 509–540.

Meagher, K. (2005). Social capital or analytical liability? Social networks and African informal economies. *Global Networks*, 5(3): 217–238.

Mercer, C., Page, B. and Evans, M. (2009). *Development and the African diaspora: Rethinking the Politics of Belonging*. London: Zed Books.

Muto, M. (2012). The impacts of mobile phones and personal networks on rural-to-urban migration: Evidence from Uganda. *Journal of African Economies*, 21(5): 787–807.

Oucho, J. (2008). African Diaspora and Remittance Flows: Leveraging Poverty? *African Migration Yearbook 2008*: 1–26.

Potts, D. (2013). *Rural-Urban and Urban-Rural Migration Flows as Indicators of Economic Opportunity in Sub-Saharan Africa: What Do the Data Tell Us?* Working Paper 9. Migration out of Poverty Research Programme Consortium.

Smucker, T. A., & Wisner, B. (2008). Changing household responses to drought in Tharaka, Kenya: Vulnerability, persistence and challenge. *Disasters*, 32(2): 190–215.

Tacoli, C., G. McGranahan and D. Satterthwaite (2015). *Urbanisation, rural-urban migration and urban poverty*. IIED Working Paper. IIED's Human Settlements Group.

Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS), 'The National Population and Housing Census 2014–Main Report', Kampala: Uganda, 2016.

UN-HABITAT. (2008). *Ethiopia: Dire Dawa Urban Profile*. UN-HABITAT.

UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). (November 2016). *Uganda–Bidibidi Settlement, Yumbe: UNHCR Operational Update*. UNHCR.

United States State Department. (2015). Trafficking in Persons Report: July 2015. US State Department.

Yamauchi, F. and S. Tanabe (2008). Nonmarket Networks among Migrants: Evidence from Metropolitan Bangkok, Thailand. *Journal of Population Economics*, 21: 649–664.

Wondimagegnhu, B. A. (2015). Staying or Leaving ? Analyzing the Rationality of Rural-Urban Migration Associated with Farm Income of Staying Households: A Case Study from Southern Ethiopia. *Advances in Agriculture*, 2015.