# Mid-term Evaluation of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa 2015-2019

**Final Report**

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# Mid-term Evaluation of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa 2015-2019

This evaluation was commissioned by
the Evaluation and Results Unit of the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (European Commission)

*Evaluation Team:*

*Dr. Arne DISCH, Team Leader*
*Dr. Ana GARCIA FEMENIA, Senior Evaluator*
*Mr. Andrew LAWDAY, Senior Evaluator*
*Dr. Landis MACKELLAR, Senior Evaluator*
*Mr. Huibertus POOT, Senior Evaluator*
*Ms. Aurelie LARQUEMIN, Research Associate*

*Mr. Pauric BROPHY, Project Manager*

*Mr. Stephen YEO, Quality Assuror*

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# ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

| | |
|---|---|
| AFD | *Agence Française de Développement* – French Development Agency |
| AU | African Union |
| AVRR | Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration |
| CRRF | Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework |
| CSO | Civil Society Organisation |
| DG DEVCO | Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development |
| DG ECHO | Directorate-General for Humanitarian aid and Civil Protection |
| DG HOME | Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs |
| DG NEAR | Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations |
| EAM | European Agenda on Migration |
| EC | European Commission |
| ECA | Economic Commission of Africa |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| EDF | European Development Fund |
| EEAS | European External Action Service |
| ENI | European Neighbourhood Instrument |
| EQ | Evaluation Question |
| EUTF | European Union Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa |
| GCM | Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GIZ | *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit,* |
| FCV | Fragility, Conflict and Violence |
| HOA | Horn of Africa |
| ICMPD | International Centre on Migration Policy Development |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Person |
| IGAD | Intergovernmental Authority on Development |
| ILO | International Labour Organisation |
| IOM | International Organisation for Migration |
| IP | Implementing Partner |
| IR | Inception Report |
| JC | Judgment Criterion |
| MLS | Monitoring and Learning System |
| MS | Member State |
| MSME | Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises |
| MTE | Mid-Term Evaluation |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |

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| NIP | National Indicative Programme |
|---|---|
| NOA | North of Africa |
| OAU | Organization of African Unity |
| OCHA | UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| OECD | Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development |
| REF | Research and Evidence Facility |
| RIP | Regional Indicative Programme |
| SLC | Sahel and Lake Chad |
| SO | Strategic Objective |
| TCF | Technical Cooperation Facility |
| THB | Trafficking of Human Beings |
| TOC | Theory of Change |
| ToR | Terms of Reference |
| TVET | Technical and Vocational Education and Training |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNHCR | UN High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNODC | United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime |
| WFP | World Food Programme |

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## Introduction

In response to the massive influx of asylum-seekers and refugees into Europe in 2014-2015 and the political concerns that this caused in a number of EU member states, a high-level international summit was convened in November 2015 in Valletta. This summit agreed the *Joint Valletta Action Plan*, which led, in turn, to the establishment of the *EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa* (EUTF).

With an original budget of about EUR 1.9 billion that by April 2020 had grown to about EUR 4.7 billion, the EUTF was designed to "*respond to the different dimensions of crisis situations by providing support jointly, flexibly and quickly*". It was to complement other development actions by the EU, member states, and other donors in the region. Since its inception, it has financed nearly 600 interventions in 26 countries, organised in three "windows": the Sahel and Lake Chad (SLC), Horn of Africa (HOA), and North of Africa (NOA). All funds are to be allocated by the end of 2020.

To address its mandate, the EUTF is designed around four ***Strategic Objectives*** (SOs):
- **SO-1:** Greater economic and employment opportunities, especially for youth and women;
- **SO-2**: Strengthened resilience of communities and the most vulnerable;
- **SO-3**: Improved migration management in countries of origin, transit, and destination; and
- **SO-4**: Improved governance and conflict prevention.

Despite considerable time pressures to take action, EUTF governance were established to be inclusive and flexible. The EUTF ***Strategic Board*** consists of Directorates General of the European Commission, the European External Action Service, and donor representatives. EUTF partner countries join as observers as do regional/ sub-regional organizations such as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States and the European Parliament. It meets at least once a year to set the strategic orientations of the Fund. ***Operational Committees*** **(OpComs)** for each window examine and approve the actual programmes, with a composition fairly similar to the Board. Small ***Secretariats*** for the Board and OpComs are responsible for the implementation of EUTF actions and keep in touch with the ***EU Delegations*** (EUDs) that manage the EUTF funded activities in their country.

The Evaluation and Results Unit in the Commission's Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development contracted this mid-term evaluation (MTE) of the EUTF to:

- *"provide the relevant external co-operation services of the European Union and the wider public with an overall independent midterm assessment of the EUTF for Africa.*
- *identify key lessons and to produce recommendations to improve current and inform future choices concerning EU strategic approaches and operationalization to support all aspects of stability and contribute to better migration management as well as addressing the root causes of instability, forced displacement and irregular migration."*

The MTE identified nine Evaluation Questions (EQs) to address in order to assess EUTF performance to date. The main findings by EQ are presented below, followed by a summary of key conclusions and recommendations.

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## Key Findings - Answers to the Evaluation Questions

**EQ-1: To what extent do EUTF's objectives and strategy address the situation of the target populations and the priorities of the target geographic areas regarding the flows of refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs and irregular migrants?**

The first two SOs have a clear focus on the needs of various categories of migrant (or potential migrant) and the communities from which they come. Interventions under these SOs appear to be benefiting the intended beneficiary groups. While the EUTF has not been able to dent the levels or causes of forced displacement, EUTF interventions have been able to mitigate *consequences* through interventions under SO-1 and SO-2.

SO-3 and SO-4 concentrate on state functions and the capacity of the public sector to cope with the various migration flows. The attention to regularising trans-border moves has grown as a result of increasing security concerns or where countries of destination wish to reduce these inflows, both legitimate concerns of the state. However, increased focus on border controls may have negative effects on vulnerable groups that are dependent on cyclical or regional trans-border movements for household survival. Sustainable migration policy must balance the need to regularise migratory flows while, at the same time, providing alternatives to the release valve that migration provides to communities and households that are under pressure for survival.

National ownership of the EUTF has increased over time, particularly as the EUTF became more context-sensitive and attentive to host communities. Since many EUTF activities take place in fast-moving environments and address complex issues, there is a recognition of the need for flexibility and tailored responses.

It is also noted that the second pillar of the Valletta Action Plan, which addresses legal migration and mobility from and between European and African countries, is hardly addressed by the EUTF.

**EQ-2: To what extent are the EUTF interventions coherent – internally and with other EU policies, strategies, and international commitments – and complementary with those of Member States, partner countries, and other development partners?**

The EUTF is very much part of EU's overall support to a given country and thus aligned to the larger EU programme and to national policies. Cross-country coherence is less likely as implementation of a particular programme has to be appropriate to country context.

The EUTF adds value particularly along two dimensions. Firstly, it addresses issues that the European Development Fund and the European Neighbourhood Instrument do not, but that are now recognised as important. Secondly, EUTF flexibility allows for new ways of programming that may be more relevant to the complex fast-moving environments that are being targeted.

There is considerable formal and informal coordination in the field, with member state co-financing of EUTF activities being the most notable. In addition, EUTF works closely with others on specific interventions such as budget support. EU Delegations work in very practical ways to ensure the coherence, complementarity and value-added of EUTF interventions, though in the early phase this was more difficult.

**EQ-3: To what extent is the EUTF delivering efficiently?**

The EUTF's decision-making structure is inclusive although the voice of partner countries could be stronger. The EUTF allows fast processing of decisions and expedited contracting, though some projects have experienced significant implementation delays.

The structure and flexibility of the operational decision-making bodies with representatives from the wider stakeholder community is ensuring timely and effective decision making. The contribution made by field officers in the identification and preparation of programmes is especially important.

## EQ-4: How and to what extent has EUTF contributed to improve employability and economic opportunities of target populations?

The EUTF has made modest contributions to increasing economic opportunities for target populations.

A key challenge for EUTF has been addressing labour market demand weaknesses deriving from economic fragilities. For example, vocational training provided in remote areas has provided employable skills but there is limited evidence that beneficiaries have gained employment in the local labour market. In cases where projects support national education systems, the EUTF contributes to better capacity and governance in the vocational training sector.

Generally, EUTF support to the private sector is weak although there have been some successes in promoting self-employment. Better business development services through national/local development agencies and business associations have yielded positive results. On the other hand, EUTF contributions to the investment and business climate that are relevant to target beneficiaries are limited. The diaspora has provided some investments but diaspora involvement may in fact encourage irregular migration since they are seen to do well abroad.

## EQ-5: Have EUTF interventions led to any immediate improvement in the resilience of communities and households? Have they created conditions that are likely to lead to increased resilience in the future?

The overall finding is that EUTF resilience programmes have strengthened the capacity of basic service providers, improved rural livelihoods and built disaster preparedness at local level. However, expected impact on migration levels is modest. Sustainability is threatened by lack of government funding commitments and limited private sector involvement in service delivery.

The EUTF has contributed to some improvements in the provision of basic social services to relevant target groups. The capacity of basic service providers to deliver such services is also being enhanced. Progress varies between projects, but there is evidence of improvements in the nutrition and health status of some target groups.

The EUTF is contributing to improving livelihoods for target beneficiaries as a result of its crop/livestock productivity-enhancing interventions and to a lesser extent through promotion of new income generating activities.

Local institutions and community structures have been strengthened in local and disaster risk reduction planning and some disaster risk management plans have been produced.

EUTF resilience projects are quite well integrated with ongoing programmes in the areas of food and agriculture and broader economic development. The involvement of the Commission's Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection ensures complementarity with emergency aid, though coordination is sometimes less positive.

Capacity building, training, strengthening of community structures, equipment and improvement of facilities contribute significantly to the sustainability of the interventions. Sustainability is, however, adversely affected by lack of public funds for continued basic social service delivery and lack of private sector involvement in service delivery.

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**EQ-6: How and to what extent has the EUTF contributed to improved migration management in partner countries?**

EUTF has promoted improved policies and practices as well as international coordination and cooperation in line with international norms and standards, migrant-centred, rights-based approaches. It has worked actively in Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) and Voluntary Humanitarian Return (VHR) but there is little evidence about the concrete results of these reintegration efforts.

The EUTF has provided significant protection and direct assistance to Internally Displaced Persons, vulnerable migrants, and refugees, though protection services are sometimes slow. There is so far little evidence on the protection measures specifically targeted at victims of the trafficking of human beings (THB).

Most SO-3 projects are concerned with urgent situations, and while capacity building and institution strengthening ensure some longer-term effects, the financial sustainability of these projects is realistically speaking not likely in the weak fiscal and institutional environments within which they are carried out.

**EQ-7: How and to what extent has EUTF contributed to improved internal security and border management and the fight against smuggling and trafficking networks?**

The EUTF has funded significant investments for strengthening border management, law enforcement and criminal justice, including capabilities to identify and disrupt criminal networks involved in smuggling of migrants (SOM) and trafficking of human beings, though evidence on results is so far limited.

The EUTF is supporting activities aimed at improving operational border management across the three windows. These activities have a focus on state capacity for border security and are less concerned with legislation, procedures and methodologies. The long-term impact of these activities on the fight against smuggling and trafficking networks remains unclear.

**EQ-8: How and to what extent has EUTF contributed to improved prevention and management of conflict and the growth of radicalisation?**

The EUTF financed widespread and sometimes promising local capacity building to address and mitigate conflicts in specific locations. This was particularly evident in national and regional peace-building efforts especially in HOA, which often had a focus on strengthening local capacities and involving women and/or young people. While there is limited evidence so far on the long-term impact that this may have on local communities, over half a million participated in peace-building activities in HOA and SLC.

The EUTF supports only a few programmes explicitly aimed at reducing radicalization and extremism, largely at community level through dialogue, education, mentoring, and social support.

**EQ-9: How and to what extent is EUTF support likely to contribute to the overall goal of reducing instability, forced displacement and irregular migration?**

The EUTF, as a short-term instrument, is not an appropriate vehicle for addressing root causes of major societal problems. But it has brought attention to the issues, mobilised resources to address them, and is producing important data and lessons learned that can be used in the design and management of future interventions.

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National authorities and local administrations that have been receiving EUTF support are over time better informed and more open to addressing such problems. There is so far limited evidence that this has led to a concomitant shift in resource reallocations, though some EUTF initiatives are evidently receiving more public funding over time

The EU and Member States are directing more resources towards the areas of EUTF concern, in particular migration, but it is not yet clear whether the support is more coherent or effective.

## Conclusions

C-1: **The EUTF focuses on some of the world's most vulnerable groups.** Although its full impact will not be known for some time, the EUTF has provided critically needed resources for improving migration management. It has supported a range of interventions that focus on some of the world's most vulnerable groups subjected to forced displacement.  It has generated important lessons about the management of complex programmes in fragile environments and has established a comprehensive system for knowledge production and quality assurance in the area of migration.

C-2: **The EUTF, being a short-term emergency instrument, had too wide a mandate**. The EUTF was established as a time-limited financing mechanism under the emergency trust fund provisions of the Financial Regulation of the EU. Despite its time-limited nature, it was tasked with addressing the root causes of some of the most intractable societal challenges that is faced by partner countries. In seeking to address these root causes, a complex portfolio of interventions was created on the basis of (mostly) local level knowledge and understanding rather than a more targeted strategic approach across the programme. On the one hand, this provided the EUTF with a great deal of flexibility to respond to specific local issues as they arose, a feature that is particularly important in fragile contexts. On the other hand, it created a portfolio of interventions that was not always internally coherent and did not always have clear exit strategies in mind.

C-3: **There are challenges in keeping results frameworks in sync with evolving needs in rapidly evolving situations.** EUTF produced an early results framework and later a more rigorous indicator system for tracking progress. A devolution of responsibilities to the windows and OpComs for defining regional results frameworks led to regionally more appropriate focus. However, this results framework does not appear to have had a strong influence in the strategic direction of projects. In particular, a number of EU Delegations pointed to the lack of a programming framework as a challenge when they were deciding on allocations across the SOs and to specific interventions as it was not always clear how to connect important projects directly to the results frameworks. In this respect, there is a certain incongruity in a management system that, on the one hand, needed flexible programming processes to address rapidly evolving situations and, at the same time, was required to respond to a quite static set of results indicators.

C-4: **The information base for resource allocations in the EUTF slowly improved over time.** The EUTF allocated significant resources for addressing irregular migration although the nature of the problem, or the most appropriate means for addressing it, was not well defined in the early stages. As experience was accumulated and more information gathered, the information base for EUTF interventions improved considerably. Nevertheless, data on the particular factors affecting levels of *irregular* migration remains limited.

C-5: **EUTF investment in complex situations resulting from fragility and conflict may yield important long-term returns.** The EUTF has directed significant financial support to addressing complex situations resulting from fragility and conflict. Given the increasingly acute global problem of fragility, conflict and violence, this investment may yield important long-term returns. However, a more complete understanding of the contribution that the EUTF has made to reducing instability, forced displacement and irregular migration in these situations will become more

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evident as the various projects mature. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the emergency nature of the EUTF, a better analysis of the drivers of fragility, conflict and violence (FCV) could have provided a more consistent framework for both designing EUTF-funded interventions but also for streamlining its mandate more generally. The information that has been generated as a result of the EUTF should make such analysis easier in any future interventions that the EU may undertake in the area of FCV.

C-6: **The EUTF governance and management structure was flexible and efficient**. It delivered fast decisions based on a strategic overview of the issues and knowledgeable and committed staff. Structurally, EUTF governance separated oversight (the Strategic Board) from operational decision-making functions (the three OpComs). This allowed fast processing of decisions and expedited contracting though some projects have still experienced implementation delays. Programming has become less hectic as it has matured, allowing for more careful vetting and approval of interventions.

C-7: **EUTF knowledge production and quality assurance are highly value-adding**. The EUTF has generated vast quantities of new data through the Monitoring and Learning System (MLS), the Research and Evidence Facility (REF) and the Technical Cooperation Facility (TCF). These facilities have collectively increased the international knowledge base about complex development issues and help to ensure the transparency of EUTF activities. It is notable, however, that the three regions have availed themselves of these resources to different degrees. While some of this is due to the difference in framework conditions across the regions, there are still issues crossing regional boundaries that might have benefitted from more coherent knowledge production and sharing

C-8: **The EUTF has made modest contributions to increased economic opportunities and employment**. Although employment creation remains one of the more intractable challenges for any economy, and especially for weak and fragile economies, the EUTF has managed to make modest contributions to increased economic opportunities and employment. The EUTF was most effective in this area when interventions were packaged in a way that engaged the private sector directly. These measures also worked better where there were more sophisticated labour markets and higher levels of labour demand.

C-9: **EUTF has ensured increased local and international attention to the migration issue**. Important results have been achieved in building the capacity of national bodies responsible for migration management throughout the EUTF region and cross-border cooperation between these bodies has been an important development in some cases. However, the EUTF's focus on irregular migration, combined with weak migration policy frameworks in partner countries, has undermined attempts to engage in effective dialogue on the larger migration challenges.

## Recommendations

R-1: During the remaining implementation period, the EUTF should focus on generating further knowledge and understanding of its interventions and do this in a collaborative manner with other international bodies. To better capture outcomes and impacts, an ex-post evaluation should be conducted at least one year after all EUTF activities have been completed.

R-2: The EU should consider programming all its interventions in a country or region within *one* common (analytical) framework

R-3: The EU should have differentiated results framework structures depending on the development challenges in the partner country/region

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R-4: The EU should strengthen the treatment of migration in its bilateral and regional programmes, ensuring that the entire Valletta Action agenda is covered.

R-5: The EU should develop differentiated contracting and implementation regulations for FCV contexts

R-6: The EU support to economic opportunities and employment creation should be embedded within larger market development efforts and private sector involvement

R-7: The EU should provide "whole of community" resilience interventions particularly when addressing situations of natural resource fragility

# 1.    INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

**Addressing the migration crisis: The *Valletta Action Plan*.** In 2014-2015, Europe experienced a sudden surge in asylum-seekers due to the conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan and parts of Africa. This came on top of continuous migratory pressures caused by population growth, climate change and stagnant local economies and led some EU member states (MS) to demand strong action to address an influx that was seen as overwhelming and politically destabilizing. In November 2015, a high-level international summit in Valletta, Malta, brought together countries of origin, transit, and destination of the migrants to discuss the challenges of migration and to create a common framework for addressing these challenges. This resulted in the *Joint Valletta Action Plan*[1], and where 25 EU Member States, Norway, Switzerland and the European Commission signed the **Constitutive Agreement** for the *EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa*, the **EUTF**[2].

**EUTF Objectives: Addressing crises in a complex context.** The EUTF was set up as an emergency instrument with a foreseen duration of five years and an original budget of about EUR 1.9 billion. It was to "*respond to the different dimensions of crisis situations by providing support jointly, flexibly and quickly*"[3]. While the EUTF therefore came about in the context of a political crisis and hence was an urgent response, its objectives were in line with the *European Agenda on Migration* (EAM) published six months earlier[4]. It was to complement other actions by the EU, MS and other donors in the region, with interventions in 26 countries across the three regions of the Sahel and Lake Chad (SLC), Horn of Africa (HOA), and North of Africa (NOA), referred to as "windows". The markedly different political, economic and social problems that were present in each of these regions could be tackled by the flexible nature of the new Fund. The EUTF became operational in 2016 and all funds were to be allocated by 31 December 2020.

**The mid-term evaluation: Accountability and lessons learned.** The Evaluation and Results Unit of the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) of the European Commission (EC) contracted this mid-term evaluation (MTE) of the EUTF in February 2019. The Terms of Reference (ToR) note that "*the general purpose of this evaluation is*:

- *to provide the relevant external co-operation services of the European Union and the wider public with an **overall independent mid-term assessment** of the EUTF for Africa.*
- *to identify **key lessons** and to produce **recommendations** to improve current and inform future choices concerning EU strategic approaches and operationalization to support all aspects of stability and contribute to better migration management as well as addressing the root causes of instability, forced displacement and irregular migration."*

## 1.1  Designing the EUTF

**Addressing structural issues: A complex agenda**. The EUTF is to address *root causes* of three structural problems: *instability, forced displacement, irregular migration.* It is to provide an integrated response that has migration, stability/security and development as core concerns. Article 2.1 of the **Constitutive Agreement** states that: *"The overall objective and purpose of this Trust Fund shall be to address the crises in the regions Sahel and the Lake Chad, the Horn of Africa, and the North of Africa. It will support all aspects of stability and contribute to better migration management as well as addressing the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and*

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[1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21839/action_plan_en.pdf.
[2] *Agreement establishing the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa*: https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/original_constitutive_agreement_en_with_signatures.pdf
[3] *Strategic orientation document: the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa*: https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/strategic_document_eutf_africa_1.pdf
[4] European Commission. 2015. *European agenda on Migration*: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration_en

*irregular migration, in particular by promoting resilience, economic and equal opportunities, security and development and addressing human rights abuses''.*

**Operationalising the EUTF: Addressing Strategic Objectives**. To address this agenda, the EUTF is designed around four **_Strategic Objectives_** (SOs):

- **SO-1**: Improved economic and employment opportunities through establishing inclusive economic programmes, especially for youth and women, with a focus on vocational training and creation of micro- and small enterprises, and support to returnees after their return.
- **SO-2**: Strengthened resilience[5] of communities and in particular the most vulnerable as well as refugees and displaced people in terms of food security, basic services for local populations, as well as environmental sustainability.
- **SO-3**: Improved migration management in countries of origin, transit, and destination, including protection of migrants and refugees, support to national and regional strategies on migration management, containing and preventing irregular migration and fight against trafficking of human beings (THB), smuggling of migrants and other related crimes, promoting effective return and readmission, international protection and asylum, legal migration and mobility, and enhancing synergies between migration and development.
- **SO-4**: Improving good governance[6], promoting conflict prevention and reduction of forced displacement and irregular migration, addressing human rights abuses and enforcing the rule of law, including capacity building in support of security and development including border management, and contribute to prevent and counter radicalisation and extremism.

The **NOA** region falls under the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), leading the EUTF in this window to have a somewhat different structure. It has a particular focus on SO-3 but includes five strategic sub-objectives (section 2.3):

- Foster rights-based migration governance systems in the region.
- Increase mutually beneficial legal migration and mobility.
- Strengthen protection and resilience of those in need.
- Foster more inclusive social and economic environment and stability in the region.
- Mitigate vulnerabilities arising from irregular migration and combat irregular migration.

**Towards the end of the period: Increased focus**. Since all EUTF funding is to be allocated by the end of 2020 – though activities on the ground may continue until the end of 2024 – the EUTF Strategic Board, at its 4th Meeting in April 2018, decided that subsequent approvals should primarily address six issues:

- Return and reintegration.
- Refugee management (Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, CRRF).
- Completing progress on the securitisation of documents and civil registry.
- Anti-trafficking measures.
- Stabilization efforts in Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and the Sahel if resources are available.
- Migration dialogues (Gambia, Ethiopia, etc.).

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[5] The 2012 Commission Communication defines resilience as *"the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, adapt and quickly recover from stresses and shocks"*. The EU global strategy takes the concept further. It speaks of resilience as *"a broad concept encompassing all individuals and the whole of society"* that features *"democracy, trust in institutions and sustainable development, and the capacity to reform"*. (*European Commission - Fact Sheet, Joint Communication on "A Strategic Approach to Resilience in the EU's External Action", 2017*:http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1555_en.html

[6] While there is no official definition of 'good governance', the concept is generally used about the social contract between authorities and the populations and with the following characteristics: Rule of Law, Participation including involving civil society; equal opportunities for all stakeholder groups to participate in and benefit from development processes; openness and transparency; responsiveness to the needs of the population; effective and efficient use of resources; predictability; strategic vision and leadership to implement it; coherence, including policy alignment; and legitimacy and accountability.

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## 1.2 The Crisis Elements

**Instability: Vague concept, clear reality.** While there is no universally accepted definition of "**instability**", there is a multitude of indices and metrics applied for stability and/or fragility. The EU refers to the OECD definition of a "fragile state or region" as one that has "*weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society*"[7]. In general, **crisis and instability** refer to a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses or impacts. Crisis and instability are particularly characterised by an inability of that community or society to cope using its own resources. Large parts of Africa have been affected by many of the key manifestations of instability in recent decades, where armed conflict is of particular concern. Data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program[8] and other sources show that armed conflict peaked in 1990/91, declined to 2005/6, remained relatively stable until 2010/11 before increasing again.

**Instability: Complex sources**. The *reasons* for the increase in conflict levels are several. Anti-government sentiment has increased[9] for a host of reasons: perceived increases in corruption, lack of government services to aggrieved groups, local conflicts where the state may be siding with one particular group or withdrawing from its usual arbitration role. Elections are not always seen as free and fair, leading to resentment among those who feel their voice has not been heard.[10] There has been an increase in the availability of arms[11], a hardening of opinions and views, and high unemployment among young men makes for fertile recruitment grounds for groups willing to take up arms. This in itself makes it more difficult for government services to reach contested areas, further exacerbating feelings of marginalisation and lack of trust in central authorities.

**Irregular migration: Decreasing over time.** The International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines irregular migration as a "*movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving country*"[12]. According to the IOM, a migrant in an irregular situation may (i) *enter* the country irregularly, for instance with false documents or without crossing at an official border crossing point; (ii) *reside* in the country irregularly, for instance in violation of the terms of an entry visa/residence permit; (iii) be *employed* in the country irregularly, for instance may have the right to reside but not to take up paid employment in the country. Irregular migrants therefore aim to avoid detection, though data reliability is improving. Table 1.1 shows that while forcibly displaced and refugees *within* Africa is growing, irregular migration *to Europe* from the three EUTF regions in Africa has fallen by 80% from its peak in 2016. The fall in the number of irregular migrants from SLC and HOA is particularly sharp as the Libya route has largely been closed, while the Western Mediterranean is currently the most active. This has also meant fewer recorded deaths among those trying to reach Europe, going from the peak of 5,143 in 2016 to under 1,900 in 2019[13] - still a tragically high number.

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[7] European Commission. *Resilience, peace and security:* https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/topics/resilience-peace-and-security_en
[8] Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace and Conflict Research. *Number of conflicts 1975-2017:*https://ucdp.uu.se/
[9] Economist Intelligence Unit (2016) Citizens frustrations will fuel political risks in 2017.
[10] Cilliers, J. 2016. *The future of democracy in Africa*.: https://issafrica.org/research/papers/the-future-of-democracy-in-africa
[11] Muggah and Sang (2013) The enemy within: rethinking arms availability in sub-Saharan Africa, in *Conflict Security and Development 13(4)* · September 2013
[12] IOM. *Key migration term:* https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms
[13] IOM (2020): https://migration.iom.int/europe?type=arrivals

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**Table 1.1: Forcibly displaced and irregular migrants, 2014-2019**

| Category | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Displaced due to conflict [a] | 12,113,500 | 11,887,200 | 11,595,000 | 11,361,200 | 18,024,700 | n.a. |
| Refugees from the 3 regions [b] | 3,346,273 | 3,596,015 | 4,259,927 | 5,327,976 | 5,283,261 | n.a. |
| Irregular migrants to Europe, SLC [c] | 42,601 | 65,297 | 114,814 | 77,795 | 43,116 | 7,564 |
| Irregular migrants to Europe, HOA [c] | 46,536 | 70,875 | 42,850 | 17,989 | 7,788 | 5,627 |
| Irregular migrants to Europe, NOA [c] | 10,717 | 21,615 | 19,410 | 27,884 | 26,127 | 16,483 |
| Irregular migrants to Europe, total | 99,854 | 157,787 | 177,074 | 123,668 | 77,031 | 29,674 |

(a): IDMC – IOM data https://www.internal-displacement.org/database
(b): UNHCR data https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.REFG.OR
(c): FRONTEX data: https://gmdac.iom.int/research-database/frontex-trends-and-routes. Figures for 2019 cover January through November – December data not yet available.

**Forced Displacement: A broad category**. The EU uses the broad term "forced displacement" to refer to groups of people forced to leave their homes "*because of conflict, violence, human rights violations, persecution, and natural disasters*"[14]. The term is applied to diverse categories of persons which may include refugees, asylum seekers, returnees, and internally displaced people (IDPs). IDPs are defined normatively, and recognized under the African Union's Kampala Convention[15] as *"persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to, avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border"* [16]. Since IDPs do not cross borders, they are not eligible for protection under international refugee law, though the UNHCR may be given lead responsibility for protection of certain IDPs.

Of course, the nature of irregular migration is such that a proper understanding of patterns, trends, causes and consequences of various migratory flows takes a considerable effort in time and resources. Tracking the destiny of displaced persons for example, and understanding their specific needs, is a huge challenge. Yet this is necessary in order for management teams in the respective windows to allocate resources to those activities that are likely to have the greatest positive impact.

## 1.3 Migration as Problem and Solution

**Migration: Seeking a better life situation.** People move to improve their life situation – either because they have to or because they seek better opportunities. Major "push" factors include when the local resource base no longer appears able to sustain livelihoods or conflicts physically threaten the family. The main "pull" factor is the hope or expectation that in the movement to a different location will bring an improvement in overall quality of life. (Figure 1.1). Yet the decision to move is normally not easy. In the site of origin, individuals and households belong to a community and are part of economic and social networks that provide critical social safety nets and community resilience. Physical assets such as homes and investments in land may be lost, acquired knowledge about local production is less applicable elsewhere, informal rights and understanding of power and decision making may no longer be valid. At the destination point, recent arrivals typically end up at the bottom of the pecking order when it comes to rights, access to resources and markets. Recent arrivals are often exploited, without protection, and thus face high transaction costs when trying to establish a new life, where the most-at-risk are typically women and children/youth.

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[14] ECHO *Fact sheet: Forced displacement.* http://ec.europa.eu/echo/what-we-do/humanitarian-aid/refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons_en
[15] The African Union (2009), *Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa* (Kampala Convention) https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36846-treaty-kampala_convention.pdf
[16] OCHA 2001, *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement'*. https://www.internal-displacement.org/internal-displacement/guiding-principles-on-internal-displacement

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**Voluntary versus forced and legal versus irregular migration**. Voluntary migration is often based on an assessment of whether expected gains from movement are likely to exceed expected costs. Involuntary migration/displacement is about avoiding unacceptable costs of remaining, and often without knowledge of options available. Figure 1.1 lists factors considered central to migration decisions but may underplay social capital losses when moving ("Stay" factors) and the risks of exploitation and THB when moving to a new location ("Stay away" factors)[17]. The final decision is thus a risk-weighted consideration of incentives and disincentives, where trusted information networks and contacts in the desired destination appear key.

The largest migration movements are voluntary. Much of the voluntary migration in recent decades has been a large rural to urban exodus, with the result that over 75% of the world's 7.8 billion inhabitants now live in urban areas[18]. But at the same time, forced migrations have also increased due to conflicts[19], natural disasters and longer-term natural resource depletion, where climate change is an increasingly important factor[20]. Drivers of migration can thus largely be divided in two: *Voluntary migration* is based on a desire for a better life situation at the point of destination ("pull"), while *involuntary migration/forced displacement* is imposed by external factors ("push")[21]. Most migrants follow *regulated or legal migration pathways*, though some opt for *irregular migration*, despite its higher costs and risks. Irregular migrants may originate from either the economic or displacement streams, so there do not appear to be distinct "root causes" of irregular migration as such (Box 1.1)[22].

**Figure 1.1: Factors influencing migration decisions**



Source: Bodvarsson & Van den Berg (2013), *The Economics of Immigration: Theory and Policy*, Second edition, Dordrect, Springer, New York.

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[17] While Figure1 is considered a simplistic representation of a complex reality, it seems to capture the main factors that should be included in the analysis required for this MTE, has been found to be helpful and thus is used in this study.

[18] See the EU's Joint Research Centre *Atlas of the Human Planet 2019,* launched February 2020: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/publication/eur-scientific-and-technical-research-reports/atlas-human-planet-2019. While urbanisation rates are lower in Africa, they are rapidly increasing.

[19] The World Bank's "World Bank Support in Situations Involving Conflict-Induced Displacement" (June 2019) notes that at end 2017, 68.5 million are forcibly displaced due to conflict, of which 40 million are IDPs, 25 million refugees and 3 million asylum seekers. https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/evaluations/forced-displacement

[20] In 2018 about 17.2 million people in 148 countries left their homes due to natural disasters, according to IOM. "Climate change refugees" numbers do not exist, but climate *trends* may suddenly make livelihoods untenable. There is agreement that climate change is increasingly a driver of natural disasters: https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/06/lets-talk-about-climate-migrants-not-climate-refugees/

[21] Migali and Scipioni, "A Global Analysis of Intentions to Migrate", EU/Joint Research Centre Technical Reports, 2018

[22] A succinct presentation of current knowledge on migration drivers was presented to a EUTF workshop in Brussels 4 July 2019 by Sona Kalantaryan of the *Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography* of the EU's Joint Research Centre

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Box 1.1 Regular versus Irregular Migration

"There are no migrants who decide to emigrate regularly and migrants who decide to emigrate irregularly: ***there are no root causes of regular migration on the one hand, and root causes of irregular migration on the other*** [*our emphasis*]. At the start, there is a plan to migrate and a decision to leave, and it is only during the implementation of this migratory project that the migration may possibly become irregular. It is therefore external factors - external to the migrants themselves and to the reasons for their emigration - which create the irregularity during certain steps or during the entirety of their migration route towards the destination country. Provided that the relevant question is that of the "causes", we support the need to free ourselves from the term "irregular" and to treat the "causes" without differentiating between regular and irregular migrations".

Source: Bacon and Robin (2018): "State of the Art: The root causes of irregular migration in the region of the Rabat Process". ICMPD, May, p. 12.

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**The EUTF: Focus on the structural causes of migration.** While the decision to enter an irregular migration stream is thus a function of both structural and individual factors, the EUTF focuses on influencing the structural factors directly, and the personal choice factors more indirectly (affecting the incentive environment – the perceived weight of "push", "pull", "stay" and "stay away" factors).

As a programme addressing root causes, the EUTF has obvious links to the general support the EU is providing to partner countries for their general economic and social development. The effects of EU assistance on migration are complicated, as one meta-analysis points out: "*studies have found little systematic deterrent effect of economic growth on emigration until poor countries reach roughly USD 8,000–10,000 GDP/capita.*"[23] This means that emigration will be expected to *increase* as countries emerge from extreme poverty and move towards middle-income status. The study concludes by noting that, "*It is now clear that emigration rates in middle-income countries are typically much higher than in poor countries ... Additional disposable income causes many poor families to invest it in more migration. Overall development – better incomes, health, and education – is, in fact, strongly associated with rising emigration*" (op. cit., p. 675).

The same study goes on to state that active labour market policies trying to address youth unemployment largely fail: "*these policies [are] generally far less effective than policymakers, program participants, and economists typically expect.*" The least successful programs have focused on job training and matching; the most successful programs have assisted firms in overcoming regulatory barriers to hiring and have assisted workers in leaving geographic areas where employment is scarce for more promising destinations (op.cit., p. 673). The findings of the Clemens and Postel study are supported by a recent study for Sweden's *Expert Group for Aid,* EBA[24].

**Aid and root causes of instability: Limited results.** The literature similarly questions the effects of donor interventions to address instability: "*The evidence for a violence-dampening effect of aid in conflict zones is not strong. Aid in conflict zones is more likely to exacerbate violence than to dampen violence. A violence-dampening effect of aid appears to be conditional on a relatively secure environment for aid projects to be implemented.*" (op.cit., p. 674). But the environment for aid in these situations is, by definition, *not* relatively secure. A recent evaluation of the World Bank's support for conflict-induced displacement therefore focuses on the application of such insights for identifying appropriate interventions in conflict-affected areas[25].

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[23] Clemens and Postel (2018): "Deterring Emigration with Foreign Aid: An Overview of Evidence from Low-Income Countries". Population and Development Review 44:4 pp. 667-693, December.

[24] Robert E Lucas (2019): "Migration and Development: The Role for Development Aid", EBA Research Overview 2019:5.

[25] World Bank/Independent Evaluation Group (2019): "World Bank Group Support in Situations Involving Conflict-Induced Displacement", Washington DC, June, pp. xiii-xiv.

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**Irregular migration: Addressing incentives.** Information campaigns present the costs, dangers and difficult situations irregular migrants are likely to face in Europe, based on notions that "*communication… offers a high return on investment relative to other migration management and protection measures. Where implemented properly, they also offer a non-coercive, rights-compatible approach to migration management*"[26]. The value of such campaigns is questioned, however: Nigeria accounts for the single largest number of irregular African migrants to Europe, but fully half come from one particular region. This has roots back to the 1980s and has by now turned into a complex network that provides would-be migrants an information-rich and thus risk-managed access to Europe[27]. A number of such networks exist with nodes in Europe and Africa, providing would-be migrants with personal and trusted sources of information that public campaigns have difficulties challenging in terms of credibility and thus effect[28].

This picture is enriched by the recent UNDP study, ***Scaling Fences***[29], where over 3,000 irregular African migrants in 13 European countries from 43 African countries were surveyed. This emphasizes the lack of hope that most feel regarding their future in their home countries due to economic but also political factors: they see their societies as favouring an elite. Because of this, only 2% said that greater awareness of the risks of the irregular migration would have caused them to stay at home: "*Irregular migration… , for those interviewed, is an investment in a better future… enabling a radical rejection of the constraining circumstances at home in order to scale …. fences to personal fulfilment and better opportunities*" (op. cit., p. 5). This latter observation is in line with a study of ***who*** chooses to migrate, noting that it is the better educated and those with more resources who actually become irregular migrants[30].

## 1.4  EUTF Structure

**EUTF: Designing an inclusive and flexible mechanism.** The ***Constitutive Agreement*** establishes the EUTF Governance structure[31]:

- **The EUTF Strategic Board** meets at least once a year and is mandated to set the strategic orientations and guidelines for the Fund. It is chaired by DG DEVCO in close cooperation with DG NEAR and the European External Action Service (EEAS) and other Commission services such as DG HOME and DG ECHO. It is composed of representatives of the donors (EU MS plus Norway and Switzerland). Those that have contributed at least EUR 3 million are given voting rights. EUTF partner country representatives meet as observers, as do regional/ sub-regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS.  As of 2017, the European Parliament has also participated as an observer. Some implementing partners such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) may be invited to attend meetings as technical partners.

- **The EUTF Operational Committee (OpCom)** is organized by window to examine and approve the respective programmes. The OpCom consists of the Commission, the EEAS and the MS and other donors that have contributed at least EUR 3 million. Other donors, partner countries and their regional organisations may attend meetings as observers.

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[26] Optimity Advisors & SEEFAR (2017), "How West African migrants engaged with migration information en-route to Europe". September, p. 6.
[27] Beber and Scacco (2018), "Can the provision of information or economic benefits prevent irregular migration?" WZB Berlin Social Science Center, May.
[28] EU Joint Research Centre/Science for Policy Report (2018), "International Migration Drivers: A quantitative assessment of the structural factors shaping migration", Technical Report 112622.
[29] UNDP (2019), "Scaling Fences: Voices of Irregular African Migrants to Europe". New York, October.
[30] Migali and Scipioni (2018), "A global analysis of intentions to migrate", EU Joint Research Centre, Technical Report 111207.
[31] *Agreement establishing the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa, and its internal rules:*
https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/constitutive_agreement_en_plus_signatures_to_date_1.pdf

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- **EUTF Secretariat:** Dedicated TF managers and secretariats support the EUTF processes in Brussels. Their role includes overseeing implementation and information management, with an EUTF Coordination Unit at the apex of this structure to ensure cross-window and overall programme management. Secretariat size varies by window, with NOA having fewer staff (Figure 1.2). Most EUTF programmes are managed directly in the field by the EU Delegations (EUDs), where some EUD staff have been contracted directly by the EUTF, normally to address technical fields that, until then, had not been part of the EU aid portfolio.

**Figure 1.2: Governance Structure of the EUTF for Africa**



## 1.5   EUTF within EU cooperation

**EUTF: An innovative and necessary instrument?** The EUTF was established because there was a realisation that existing instruments could not handle the Valletta Action Plan issues well enough. There was a particular need to improve the EU and MS cooperation in these fields while strengthening the dialogue with partner countries, so the EUTF was to address a series of emergent issues:

- **Addressing migration and forced displacement in a systematic way:** The key concern was to quickly mobilise significant resources to address the problems of large-scale migration/ forced displacement across the entire region, reaching intended beneficiary groups that often were in difficult-to-access areas and who had received minimal political attention and support.

- **The humanitarian-development nexus:** In a situation of fragility and massive population dislocations there is a need to link humanitarian assistance and development cooperation, so as to build resilience, stability and improved livelihoods. Humanitarian aid has time limits for its support yet emergency situations like recurring droughts require longer-term support. The existing separation between humanitarian interventions and development cooperation makes it more difficult to produce a coherent but rapid response in a complex setting. The EUTF was to address this gap.

- **Working with the state *and* civil society:** While DEVCO and NEAR largely work with public sector organisations, ECHO works more with non-state actors to reach vulnerable groups in crisis. The migration crisis has forced large groups to move to areas where the state should

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take responsibility, such as urban/peri-urban areas, so humanitarian aid should be coordinated with the public sector. At the same time, assisting vulnerable groups in marginal areas/fragile states may require longer-term support that the state is not able to provide independently of non-state actors. Delivering a programme that combines short and medium-term support under difficult circumstances meant that the EUTF has to be able to engage both public and non-state actors as appropriate.

- **Innovation, risk-taking and monitoring:** The EUTF was set up with a number of distinguishing functional characteristics. It was to have faster decision-making processes, an ability to contract directly while operating in high-risk areas. It was also designed to generate more monitoring information faster and to make it more easily accessible.

- **The SLC-HOA ⇔ NOA link:** While SLC and HOA windows fall under the purview of DEVCO, NOA is part of DG NEAR's remit. The relations between the EU and the respective partner countries are regulated by different agreements and priorities, meaning that the responses to the migration concerns may differ. The EUTF is to ensure that responses to the larger migration picture is coherent, comprehensive and consistent.

- **Adding the security dimension:** In addition to regular migration policies, the EUTF is to assist partner countries to manage irregular border crossings, smuggling of migrants and THB while respecting the human rights of people on the move. DG HOME provides assistance and advisory services to support police, border services, the judiciary and other rule of law bodies. The security dimension therefore became part of the EUTF universe.

- **Working with marginalized groups in marginal areas:** Public funding tends to go to areas and groups that show the most promise of high payoff. Entire regions and population groups may therefore not receive much in the form of public resources, yet these may be areas and groups that are vulnerable to migration decisions. EUTF, as an instrument that can complement the NIP and assist where humanitarian aid is not required, became important, especially for reaching vulnerable groups among the various migrant populations.

# 2. THE EU TRUST FUND FOR AFRICA

**EUTF: A EUR 4.7 billion trust fund.** At the time of the evaluation, the EUTF had mobilised about EUR 4.7 billion and signed nearly 600 projects across the 26 countries and three regions (see Annex E)[32]. While the three OpComs approve Decisions (programmes), the actual contracts are for specific projects signed with implementation partners (IPs) with specific results frameworks and risk analyses defined and agreed. The IPs may themselves have sub-contracted parts of the project to other parties such as local CSOs or public agencies. These projects and the external quality assurance instruments – Results-Oriented Monitoring (ROM) reports, Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) reports, project evaluations, Research and Evidence Facility (REF) studies – constitute the EUTF universe considered for this Mid-Term Evaluation.

## 2.1 The EUTF Financing

**EUTF Funding: Largely EU**. Table 2.1 shows the various EU sources of EUTF funding which represents nearly 90% of total EUTF funding. The EDF funds indicated in the Table are unallocated surplus from the EDF-11 programme, so the availability of these funds at a time of urgent need was serendipitous.

**Table 2.1 Contributions from EDF and EU budget (in EUR million)**

| Source of funding | Funding provided |
|---|---|
| European Development Fund – EDF (DG DEVCO) | 3,149.3 |
| Development Cooperation instrument – DCI (DG DEVCO) | 352.5 |
| European Neighbourhood instrument – ENI (DG NEAR) | 424.0 |
| Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund – AMIF (DG HOME) | 130.0 |
| DG ECHO | 50.0 |
| **Total EU Contribution** | **4,105.8** |

Source: EUTF reporting system[33], up to date 1 April 2020

**EUTF as trust fund: Limited external funding.** An original aspiration was that EUTF would mobilize external funding, so the EU financing was in part to function as "start-up" capital. This ambition has gone unfulfilled. Two MS – Italy and Germany – have provided nearly 60% of the additional funding. Financing from *outside* the EU has been limited to minor contributions from Norway and Switzerland, together providing about 0.5% of the total trust fund. This contrasts with non-EU trust funds, where the administrator of the fund generally does not provide funding but rather takes on the fiduciary and management responsibilities[34]. A further EUR 187.3 million is provided in the form of co-financing for particular projects, 80% of this from France, Germany and UNHCR

**Table 2.2 EUTF contributions over EUR 1 mill, pledged and received (in EUR million*)*

| | Contributions pledged | Contributions received |
|---|---|---|
| **Austria** | 8.0 | 8.0 |
| **Belgium** | 12.0 | 12.0 |
| **Czech Republic** | 10.4 | 10.4 |
| **Denmark** | 50.2 | 42.2 |
| **Estonia** | 1.8 | 1.8 |

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[32]  It should be noted that this includes a large number of non-operational projects such as some studies and evaluations.

[33] European Commission. *https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/trust-fund-financials_en*

[34]  This goes for all funds administered by the World Bank, such as the USD 11 billion Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, or the funds administered by the UNDP through its UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, www.unmptfo.org. The large international multi-partner funds set up to address global public goods, like the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, GAVI, and the Global Fund to fight Aid, Tuberculosis and Malaria, GFATM (often referred to as "the Global Fund") and others have independent boards and all external financing.

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| | Contributions pledged | Contributions received |
|---|---|---|
| **Finland** | 7.5 | 7.5 |
| **France** | 9.0 | 9.0 |
| **Germany** | 225.0 | 225.0 |
| **Hungary** | 9.5 | 9.5 |
| **Ireland** | 15.8 | 13.5 |
| **Italy** | 123.0 | 123.0 |
| **Luxembourg** | 4.1 | 4.1 |
| **Netherlands** | 26.4 | 26.4 |
| **Norway** | 21.3 | 21.3 |
| **Poland** | 10.6 | 10.6 |
| **Portugal** | 5.0 | 5.0 |
| **Slovakia** | 10.4 | 10.4 |
| **Spain** | 9.0 | 9.0 |
| **Sweden** | 11.8 | 8.9 |
| **Switzerland** | 4.1 | 4.1 |
| **United Kingdom** | 13.5 | 11.9 |
| **Total external contribution** | **591.2** | **576.4** |

Source: EUTF reporting system[35], up to date 1 April 2020. Countries that contributed under EUR 1 mill: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovenia.

## 2.2 The EUTF Portfolio

**The EUTF: A complex portfolio**. In March 2020, 223 programmes had been approved for a total of nearly EUR 4.5 billion with 600 contracts (projects) for a total of nearly EUR 3.6 billion signed. Of the programmes approved, 101 were in the SLC for just over EUR 2 billion; 87 in HOA for a little over EUR 1.6 billion and 31 in NOA for just over EUR 800 million.

**Figure 2.1: Approved amounts per window, March 2020 (in EUR million)**



Source: https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/trust-fund-financials_en.
\* including contributions to cross-window programmes

**EUTF Funding: Fairly equal across Strategic Objectives.** The programmes are largely dedicated to one of the four SOs. As of March 2020, SO-3 *Improving Migration Management* has received the most with EUR 1,426 million, largely because NOA defines its entire programme as SO-3 (section 2.3). SO-2 S*trengthening Resilience* has received EUR 1,110 million, SO-4 *Improved Governance* EUR 947 million and SO-1 G*reater Economic and Employment Opportunities* EUR 904 million[36].

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[35] https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/table_i_2.pdf

[36] EUR 71 million are dedicated to *other/cross-cutting* priorities, such as *Research and Evidence Facility for the Sahel and Lake Chad Region and the North of Africa (T05-EUTF-REG-REG-01)*, the *Monitoring and Learning System for the EUTF Sahel and Lake Chad (T05-EUTF-SAH-REG-17),* and the *Facilite de cooperation technique (T05-EUTF-REG-REG-02).*

Figure 2.2 shows that under SO-1, 52% of the funds went to the SLC window and 48% to HOA. SO-2 programmes showed the opposite allocation, with 55% in HOA and 45% in SLC. Nearly 60% of SO-3 programmes were in NOA while about 63% of SO-4 activities took place in SLC.

**Figure 2.2: Approved amount per Strategic Objective and Window (M EUR)**



Source: EUTF Coordination, data as of 31.12.2019
* including contributions to cross-window programmes

**Figure 2.3: Approved amounts per Country (M EUR)**



Source: EUTF Coordination Team, figures as of 15 July 2020.

**Funding: Mostly country-based but with important regional/cross-window interventions.** Around 78% of the amount approved is for single country programmes while 22% is for regional projects supporting two or more countries. The main recipient countries are Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Niger and Mali (Figure 2.3).

**Beneficiaries: Vulnerable groups and public sector capacity.** Most funding goes to vulnerable groups: the forcibly displaced, their origin and host communities, and victims of trafficking and smuggling, with particular focus on women and youth. At organizational level, national and local authorities, civil society groups and community-based organisations benefit largely in the form of capacity building and training activities.

**EUTF implementing partners: Non-traditional composition.** An analysis of contract allocations shows that the most important implementing partners (IPs) are MS agencies (EUR

1,086 million), UN agencies (EUR 894 million); NGOs (EUR 472 million), partner country institutions (EUR 330 million), other international organisations (EUR 99 million) and other implementers (EUR 109 million). Some IPs sub-contract national actors on a number of projects.

**Figure 2.4: Share of EUTF Contracts by type of Implementing Partner**



Source: EUTF Coordination Team, end of January 2020. Note: These are adjusted totals that show shares implemented by NGOs, Member State agencies and UN when considering sub-contracts signed by NGOs with UN and Member State agencies.

## 2.3 EUTF's Strategic Objectives

**EUTF Strategic Objectives:** The European Court of Auditors' 2018 Report on the EUTF notes that "*The EUTF for Africa is a flexible tool but considering the unprecedented challenges that it faces, its design should have been more focused*" and "*The EUTF is a flexible tool but its objectives are too broad to efficiently steer action and measure impact*"[37].

Staff given the responsibility of managing the EUTF agree with the above observations, but point to two factors that explain this situation: (i) the extreme time pressure they were under for initiating activities and delivering results; and (ii) the very ambitious agenda set for the Fund[38]. A third factor is the structuring of the Fund into three windows. Staff note the differences in the nature of the migration issue across the three regions, and how this has led the windows to produce portfolios that vary in their strategic focus. NOA in particular differs from the other two, both because it is part of DG NEAR and thus must take into account the region's different political and economic relations to the EU, but also because it is largely a region of migration transit and destination. As a result, the NOA portfolio was classified as SO-3 (albeit with the five sub-objectives noted in section 1.1). Furthermore, while *funding* has been classified according to a particular SO, the *projects/activities* may have addressed wider sets of issues. This is particularly seen in the case of projects in HOA where a number of larger projects include activities that fall under different SOs.

The SOs themselves are also not uniquely defined. For example, a project supporting increased job opportunities under SO-1 can, in some contexts, also fall under SO-2 when it contributes to strengthening household and community resilience. For the purposes of the discussion below, the projects are classified according to SO funding, based on the allocations registered by EUTF.

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[37] EU Court of Auditors (2018), Special Report: European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa: Flexible but lacking focus, report 32. https://www.eca.europa.eu/en/Pages/DocItem.aspx?did=48342 , pp. 11,12.

[38] Interviews with EUTF managers and desk officers in DG DEVCO, DG NEAR and in EU Delegations visited

## 2.4 SO-1: Increased economic opportunities and employability

**SO-1: Greater economic and employment opportunities.** SO-1 aims at establishing inclusive economic programmes that create employment, especially for young people and women in local communities. In broad terms, SO-1 has a focus on vocational training and creation of micro- and small enterprises. Other interventions focus on support for returnees to their countries of origin[39]. Special attention is given to creating economic and employment opportunities in regions with a high migration potential, with the aim of preventing irregular migration and facilitating returns. The creation of these economic opportunities is to be achieved through a diversified approach that includes:

- Enhancing the professional skills and employability of young people,
- Stepping up support to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in the formal and informal sector,
- Facilitating market access for the local producers,
- Increasing access to finance and deepening financial inclusion for the poor and marginalised,
- Supporting the local economy in order to boost growth, local investment and trigger job creation and work opportunities.

**SO-1: Both short-term and structural interventions.** SO-1 includes actions aimed at accelerated rates of business creation, particularly amongst women and youth. Projects also address structural issues: improving the business environment for micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), cutting red tape, facilitating market access and strengthening value chains, promoting inclusive finance and strengthening human capital to better align youth qualification to private sector job opportunities.

SO-1 also focuses on transforming systems built around irregular migration in regions where migrant-smuggling and services for migrants are important economic drivers. Projects here aim to provide alternative forms of economic and trade opportunities to local communities in regions of transit.

Projects supported under SO-1 include:
- Vocational training and on-the-job training for improved target populations' employability.
- Support to private sector to engage in new economic fields and for better business climate.
- Support to existing and new MSMEs to help them integrate into local and regional value chains and access existing and new markets.
- Financial education and incentives for financial saving as well as access to entrepreneurial schemes in order to boost self-employment
- Capacity building of institutions at local and national levels stimulating economic development and addressing the needs of returning migrants, IDP and refugees.

**SO-1 in SLC: Focus on migration.** SLC is an important transit territory for migrants and significant local economic activity is linked to these population movements. SO-1 in the SLC window includes actions that support alternative income generating activities to reduce the dependency of local populations on income generated by migration flows and migrant smuggling. SO-1 funding amounts to almost EUR 486 million and is mainly dedicated to two sub-objectives: enhancing the professional inclusion of young people and stepping up support to MSMEs in the formal and informal sectors. In some cases, the focus on employability is linked to an increase of population's resilience (SO-2). Actions aimed to increase the levels of entrepreneurship are strongly linked to access to finance. Special attention is also given to the reinforcement of local

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[39] Strategic Orientation Document adopted by the Strategic Board in November 2015

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agribusinesses (Mali, Cameroon, Senegal) artisanal/crafts sectors (Burkina Faso, Mali) as well as fishing sector value chain support (Mauritania).

**SO-1 in HOA: Multi-purpose activities.** Many SO-1 interventions are linked to SO-2: creation of economic opportunities is seen as a way to build resilience among target communities. Stimulating economic opportunities for youth as well as for refugees and host communities is also considered a way to prevent conflict and therefore related to SO-4. In some cases, the reintegration of returnees is supported by SO-1 activities, and therefore connected to SO-3. The district project in Kalobeyei in Kenya, for example, includes protection for refugees and local communities so components could fit SO-1, SO-2, SO-4.

## 2.5 SO-2: Strengthened Resilience

**SO-2: Focus on structural concerns.** Most actions under SO-2 take place in regions exposed to conflict, extreme poverty and vulnerability to climate change and environmental disasters. SO-2 thus aims to strengthen the resilience of households *and* communities by addressing food insecurity and malnutrition, improving access to basic services (e.g. health, education, water and sanitation), and addressing issues such as social cohesion and natural resource management for the intended beneficiary groups. The intended beneficiary groups include vulnerable communities and households but also displaced persons and refugees.

Programmes thus may address immediate needs to bridge the gap between humanitarian and development aid but also to build long-term resilience by increasing the capacities of national and regional institutions to deliver better public services for affected groups. Projects also strengthen the capacities of local communities to plan and prepare for likely shocks and stresses, including ensuring the continued provision of these basic services by improving the larger systems of which they are a part ("linkages").

**SO-2 in the SLC: Addressing complex vulnerabilities.** Projects in the SLC aim to tackle both structural and urgent issues in a sustainable and comprehensive manner. SO-2 generally adopts a multi-sector approach that meets essential food-related needs while improving access to basic services. It also addresses long-term issues such as community dialogue and natural resources management. SO-2 projects take place predominantly in regions exposed to conflict and extreme poverty, and address:
- Preparation of local development plans.
- Improvement of water, hygiene and sanitation services.
- Strengthening access of populations to basic services and reviving the local economic fabric, including better health services though training of health staff, improved supplies and rehabilitation of clinics.
- Local economic projects in the field of agriculture, livestock and fish farming.
- A Regional Emergency Programme to address urgent needs in border areas offering a regional response to improve living conditions, access to water, resilience and social cohesion of vulnerable populations in the most fragile areas.

**SO-2 in HOA: Attention to integration.** The large numbers of IDPs and refugees have necessitated a wide range of activities:
- Improve access to basic services for these large beneficiary groups.
- Support to reintegration activities for refugees and IDPs and building the capacity of national and local authorities in this area.
- Improve living conditions, household resilience and economic opportunities for refugees, IDPs and vulnerable communities by introducing better agricultural practices such as improved irrigation systems, organised rangeland rehabilitation, water conservation, etc.

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- Providing vocational training for refugees and host communities, helping them integrate into the local economy.

**NOA window: No formal SO-2 activities but attention to resilience.** A number of activities that are funded under SO-3 also strengthen local resilience:

- Protection and assistance of migrants in need by providing essential health care, critical goods and a safe environment for the most vulnerable persons and enhancing sustainable livelihoods for IDPs and their host communities.
- Implementing a cross-regional action with a particular focus on Libya to support IOM's Voluntary Humanitarian Return operations from Libya to countries of origin.
- Reinforcement of the cooperation with UN agencies to protect and assist stranded migrants and their host communities along the migration routes.
- Managing mixed migration flows in Libya through expanding protection space and supporting local socio-economic development.
- Facilitating access to basic services for vulnerable migrants by strengthening local associations and organisations' capacity to effectively deliver such services.

## 2.6 SO-3: Improved Migration Management and Governance

**SO-3: Based on EU commitments.** The cornerstones for SO-3, which focuses on improving migration management, include the EU's *Global Approach to Migration and Mobility* (GAMM), the *European Agenda on Migration* (EAM), the high-level dialogues on migration addressed by the *Rabat* and *Khartoum* processes*,* and the *Valletta Action Plan*. A central tenet of these frameworks is that migration can be beneficial to countries of origin, transit *and* destination. Indeed, the EU Consensus for Development makes specific reference to migration as a direct and a transversal issue.[40]

**SO-3: Addressing the migration complexity.** Under SO-3, the EUTF supports sound migration management by helping to strengthen/build institutional capacity to better manage regular migration, refugee and asylum seeking, irregular migration, trafficking of human beings (THB), and smuggling of migrants. It encompasses protection and direct assistance, as well as comprehensive actions targeting migrants and their host communities. It covers Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) and Voluntary Humanitarian Return (VHR) for those returning to their communities of origin. It supports the evacuation and resettlement of vulnerable persons in need of international protection from Libya via Niger to third countries. It includes border management and internal security related to the criminal networks engaged in migrant smuggling and THB.

**SO-3 in HOA: Country and regional programmes.** SO-3 interventions are carried out both at country and regional levels. *Better Migration Management* covers eight HOA countries, combining capacity building, putting in place regulatory and administrative frameworks (policies, laws, institutions, procedures), and collaboration with national institutions on direct protection. Country projects support community-based projects, self-reliance and livelihoods. Other projects support the reintegration of returnees from Europe, improvement of countries' asylum systems and other country-specific needs.

One regional programme covering six countries focuses on return and reintegration in support of the Khartoum Process, facilitating AVRR processes and sustainable reintegration. Sustainable reintegration is to be achieved through improved livelihoods, enhanced social and psycho-social support and enhanced returnees' rights.

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[40] https://ec.europa.eu/international-partnerships/european-consensus-development_en

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**SO-3 in SLC: Wide scope of interventions.** SLC regional programmes support AVRR and protection, including by strengthening the capacities of institutional actors and communities to protect vulnerable migrants. Another action strengthens the legal basis for the fight against THB, enhances the capacity of justice and law enforcement authorities, reinforces the agencies to which victims of trafficking may have recourse, and strengthens mechanisms for cross-border and regional cooperation. One cluster of country-level projects strengthens management and governance of migration and sustainable return and reintegration.

**SO-3 in NOA: Broad agenda.** Since NOA is part of the EU's neighbourhood region and thus has a different relationship to the EU, only SO-3 was seen as fully compatible with the overarching agreements with the EU. Overall priority has been given to the situation in Libya, where interventions support:

- Improved reception conditions for migrants, including disembarkation centres for those intercepted attempting the crossing to Europe.
- Improved conditions for those in detention.
- Enhanced resilience of vulnerable groups that have been provided return and reintegration assistance.
- Humanitarian assistance.
- Protection of migrants, including forcibly displaced persons, asylum seekers, and IDPs.
- Building the capacity of Libyan authorities to carry out maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) operations.

Total allocations to Libya by mid-2020 amounts to EUR 455 million, of which just over half is for protection and assistance for those in need, about 35% for stabilisation of Libyan municipalities and the remainder for integrated border management. Projects in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt also address policy aspects of migration management since these countries receive large inflows of migrants.

## 2.7 SO-4: Good Governance and Conflict Management

**SO-4: Ambitious goals.** The objective of SO-4 is to improve overall governance by promoting conflict prevention, addressing abuses of human rights and enforcing the rule of law. This is achieved, inter alia, through capacity building of institutions responsible for security and development as well as law enforcement, border and migration-related aspects. Some actions also contribute to the prevention of radicalisation and extremism at local levels.

Just under three-quarters of the funds have been spent on border management and internal security, while 23% has gone for conflict prevention and the prevention and fight against violent extremism, while about 5% has been spent on upgrading civil registries, an important step in managing trans-border human movement.

**Border management and internal security: Strengthening the apparatus of the state.** of the EUTF's work in border management and internal security includes projects aimed at tackling criminal networks involved in migrant smuggling and THB, and regional police cooperation.

Border management projects support:

- the development of national strategies and action plans on internal and/or border security;
- rehabilitation of border posts, including provision of detection and communication equipment;
- support to interagency cooperation and provision of training on border control and border management.

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In the field of police/internal security, activities support:
- building the operational capacity of services in charge of criminal investigations (police and prosecution services);
- creation of joint investigation teams;
- creation of rapid intervention teams; and
- the provision of training and equipment.

Enforcement activities include building the capacities of authorities to conduct investigations against terrorism and supporting the judiciary to try cases of terrorist acts. These interventions usually involve the provision of training and equipment to security forces or the adoption of new policies and strategies in relation to measures against terrorism.

**Addressing conflicts: Focus at community level.** Projects supporting conflict prevention and the fight against violent extremism have been implemented in communities facing or prone to violent conflict and possible extremism. Interventions include establishing monitoring/early warning systems to support peace processes and provide early warning signs of any escalation of conflicts. CSOs and faith-based organisations are often the actors working with populations at risk of violent extremism, providing socio-economic opportunities, awareness raising, facilitating the reintegration of ex-fighters and supporting reconciliation initiatives. These projects may also include efforts to upgrade local infrastructure.

**SO-4 interventions: Technical skills intensive.** Half of the projects under this SO are implemented by specialised agencies from various MS, like Civipol and FIIAPP. The others are implemented by NGOs, partner countries, international organisations and UN agencies.

## 2.8 Addressing Knowledge and Quality Assurance Concerns

**Building knowledge, learning lessons**: In addition to regular monitoring and evaluation activities, including Results-Oriented Monitoring (ROM), the EUTF allocated resources for additional instruments to build knowledge about the EUTF programme and improve its quality over time:
- **Monitoring and Learning System** (MLS) generates systematic data on all EUTF activities to improve programme performance but also to inform the public on progress.
- **Research and Evidence Facilities** (REFs) is to produce evidence and policy relevant knowledge to inform broader policy development but also for programming interventions.
- **The Technical Cooperation Facility** (TCF) which finances technical support and studies, and monitoring, evaluation, learning, and auditing of individual actions and projects.

**Monitoring EUTF Performance: MLS Quarterly and ROM reports**. In order to provide an overall picture of EUTF performance, it was decided to produce quarterly performance reports for each of the three windows, reporting on 41 indicators. These indicators are to cover as much of the universe of EUTF projects as possible while still keeping the number of indicators at a manageable level. Because of the differences between the programmes in HOA and SLC versus NOA, but also because the origins are somewhat different, the reporting has evolved somewhat differently (Annex N). As of June 2020: HOA has produced four quarterly reports for 2018 and three reports covering the first three quarters of 2019; SLC has produced one report covering all of 2018 and then one each for the first three quarters of 2019; NOA has so far published one quarterly report for the second quarter of 2019.

ROM studies are carried out as part of the general EU quality assurance approach with over 60 such reviews of EUTF projects done as of April 2020. The MLS contractor for HOA has also produced case studies and an overall "lessons learned" review.

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**Research and Evidence Facilities (REF): Providing in-depth insights**: The REFs have been established at window level, but with a slightly different structure: one REF covers SLC and NOA, while the other covers HOA. The HOA REF has been contracted to a research consortium under the leadership of SOAS/University of London and has prepared a range of overarching studies on issues of relevance to the HOA programme. The REF studies for the SLC have been contracted more on a cases-by-case basis, with organisations like the International Crisis Group, Oxfam or GIZ carrying them out, often addressing country-specific issues.

**Technical Cooperation Facility: Supporting quality of EUTF interventions.** The TCF is a EUR 14 million technical support facility that supports the identification, development, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of EUTF interventions. It is to increase the efficiency of the EUTF, including through gender- and rights-sensitive technical assistance.

# 3.   EVALUATION DESIGN

## 3.1 The Evaluation Matrix

**The Evaluation Matrix: Nine EQs.** Based on the reconstructed ToC (Annex B), the evaluation matrix presents the Evaluation Questions (EQs) that were addressed, the judgment criteria (JCs) applied for answering them, and their respective indicators. The matrix consists of nine EQs, where EQs 1-3 are ***Strategic/Transversal Questions*** regarding the EUTF as a mechanism. EQs 4-9, on the other hand, are ***Thematic/Results Questions*** that look at EUTF achievements (Outcomes) in the four SOs as well as the EUTF's overarching impact, its approach and performance. The specific questions relate to:

- **EQ-1:** *Relevance* of the EUTF strategic approach.
- **EQ-2**: *Coherence, Complementarity* and *Value Added* of EUTF with respect to other EU, Member States and partner country interventions.
- **EQ-3**: The *Efficiency* of EUTF's structure, functions, and modalities.
- **EQ-4**: Attainment of Improved Economic Opportunities and Employability.
- **EQ-5**: Attainment of Strengthened Household and Community Resilience.
- **EQ-6:** Attainment of Improved Migration Management.
- **EQ-7, EQ-8:** Attainment of Improved Governance, Conflict Prevention and Rule of Law.
- **EQ-9**: Prospects for the Achievement of Impact and Sustainability.

**The Strategic Questions: The EUTF as mechanism.** *EQ-1* investigates the extent to which the Fund addresses the priority concerns of those stakeholders that are facing the core challenges that the EUTF is designed to tackle. *EQ-2* looks at how the EUTF fits into the larger donor support picture and the extent to which EUTF provides value added. *EQ-3* examines the EUTF's "business model" and whether its governance and operational set-up has provided the efficiency hoped for in terms of decision-making and implementation.

**The Results Questions: Addressing Strategic Objectives.** *EQs 4-8* explores whether the expected results of the four SOs were achieved while *EQ-9* looks at what can be said about possible impact and overall sustainability of EUTF results. Since this is a mid-term evaluation, the inventory of projects examined are in various stages of completion of implementation. This means that the information on results as one goes out the delivery chain, from Outputs to Intermediate Outcomes to Outcomes, becomes more uncertain, with data on Impact largely incipient.

## 3.2 The Evaluation Approach

**Methodology: Theory-based.** The methodology used in this evaluation is based on the EC's guidelines for thematic and other complex evaluations.[41] These guidelines favour theory-based evaluation where the EUTF's ToC is used as a basis for following the results chains from inputs through Activities, Outputs, Outcomes to expected Impact. Based on the ToC, our evaluation matrix (Annex F) contains the evidence compiled from applying a mixed-methods approach, collecting both qualitative and quantitative data. These data were used to analyse the contributions that various parts of the EUTF made to the EUTF objectives. This contribution analysis traces the links in the results chain but also pays attention to the evolving political, economic and institutional contexts that may have affected the strength of the results chains (Annex B presents the methodology, including the data collection tools; Annex F presents the evidence in the form of an aggregated evaluation matrix; Annexes H-M present the case country evidence).

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[41]    Capacity4dev. *Evaluation methodological approach*: https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/evaluation_guidelines/wiki/en-methodological-bases-and-approach-0

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**The evaluation process: Extensive consultations.** The Inception Report with the reconstructed ToC and evaluation methodology was formally approved on 10 September 2019. This was based on an extensive consultation process that involved a Reference Group with staff from DG DEVCO, DG NEAR, DG HOME, ECHO and EEAS; the three EUTF windows teams; and specialist sector staff in DEVCO. A Consultative Group consisting of evaluation units from EU Member States also provided observations. A Desk study was subsequently produced based on:

- an extensive document review
- interviews with EU staff in Brussels and a number of Delegations,
- interviews with the contract holders for the MLS quarterly reports
- interviews with implementing partner representatives.

The Desk study was presented on 25 November, with field visits to the first two countries taking place in November-December 2019 and the other four countries in January-February 2020. The draft Final Report was submitted early March 2020, and the Final Report was submitted in October 2020.

## 3.3 The Evidence Base

**Complex programme: Mixed methods sources.** This Evaluation relies on seven sources of information to generate, triangulate and validate/reject the underlying evidence:

(i)     EUTF programme and project documents;
(ii)    Stakeholder interviews;
(iii)   Stakeholder survey;
(iv)    Field visits to six countries;
(v)     Project reviews;
(vi)    Statistical data, mostly from the MLS reports; and
(vii)   Two thematic studies: one on the Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) system adopted by the EUTF and one on management and operational efficiencies.

**Document universe: Vast and foundational**. The starting point for the evaluation has been the inventory of nearly 1,200 documents compiled for this exercise. From this total inventory of 1,200 documents, almost 600 documents were EUTF contracts, an indication of the scale of the EUTF programme.

In addition to the contracts, a considerable body of technical work has been produced by the academic, think-tank and civil society communities on topics that the EUTF is to address. In particular, there has been considerable technical discussion on the various dimensions of the migration issue, as reflected in sections 1.2 and 1.3 of the current report. While the team has consulted relevant material generated from outside the EU system, the overwhelming majority of the 1,200 documents listed in Annex C are produced either by, or for, the EUTF itself. These include policy, programme and project documents including progress reports, third-party monitoring and evaluation studies and the commissioned analytical studies under the REF.

Additional material was collected during field visits that included national development strategies, reports by other actors such as MS or the World Bank on EUTF-related activities, and internal documents from some of the IPs. Overall, the team is confident that it was given access to and has been able to cover this vast information universe in a comprehensive manner.

When addressing the EQs, *Reliability* of the documentation is seen as *Very Strong* since most documentation has been through some form of vetting before being made public. *Relevance* is on average *Strong* since the quite large proportions of the documentary material reviewed did not specifically address the issues to be covered in our EQs. The variation in Relevance is great, however, since some of the REF studies, for example, provide in-depth analysis of issues that are

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critically important to this evaluation. On the other hand, since there is often a considerable time-lag between data collection and publication, Relevance of the information may be weakened (particularly in fast-changing contexts).

**Stakeholder interviews: Critical information source**. Because this is an MTE and not a final evaluation, many of the results remain incipient. The EUTF programme is also highly dynamic with changes and adjustments to volatile circumstances in some countries that entail redirecting resources and efforts which may not be fully documented or updated in the reporting. The team has therefore relied heavily on information from stakeholders, from intended beneficiaries on the ground, staff of implementing partners in the field and at their head offices. We have also elicited the views of decision makers and managers at EU head office and Delegations, as well as representatives of partner countries and EU member states. In order to ensure that information collected addresses the key issues, a semi-structured conversation guide was sent to interviewees beforehand, where possible (Annex D for list of persons spoken with, Attachments 2 and 3 to Annex B for Conversation Guides). In all, over 250 persons were interviewed.

In addition, a number of focus group discussions with beneficiary groups were undertaken during the field visits. These contained representative mixes of stakeholders, to the extent that this was possible in the local environment.

In the conflict-affected countries that we visited, even reaching public servants engaged in capacity building activities often proved difficult. This has affected the evaluation's ability to address questions of longer-term and organisational development results.

The *Reliability* of stakeholder information is generally considered *Strong,* but it is typically biased due to the direct stake and thus particular perspective that the various actors have on particular issues. At the same time, many of these respondents are individuals who have often been involved with the programme for years and thus have a good understanding of a given programme or project and its effects. The weakness, however, is the lack of representativeness of the larger stakeholder population outside of the EU system itself. The *Relevance* of the information provided tends to be *Very Strong* since the evaluation team was able to formulate the questions and pursue interesting avenues as they came up, thus generating a richer contextual understanding for the answers provided.

**Country visits: Cornerstone of the evaluation.** Six country visits were carried out by the evaluation team in late 2019/early 2020. The countries selected were Morocco and Libya in NOA; Ethiopia and Somalia in HOA; and Niger and Senegal in SLC. The country selection ensured coverage of a number of key dimensions of the EUTF programme:
- **Geographic**: Considering the differences in needs, priorities, and EUTF approach among the three windows, each window had to be properly covered.
- **SO**: The countries had to have a reasonable balance of projects across the four SOs.
- **Level of fragility and development**: The six countries cover the range of framework conditions, from fragile to quite stable states.
- **The migration-development-security concerns:** The countries vary in terms of emergency needs, development assistance, migration management, and security challenges.
- **The direct beneficiaries:** The countries have diverse direct beneficiaries: migrants, IDPs, refugees, host populations, vulnerable youth, government entities, local authorities, etc.

For each country, the team prepared a draft country note describing the country context, programme activities, programme achievements (as recorded in the MLS reports). The report also discussed the work of the EUTF in the context of other EU and MS efforts, and presented a filled-in evaluation matrix for that country based on the desk review and first interviews. These draft notes were sent to the field in advance of the field visits for information and comment.

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During the visits, the team met with as wide a range of stakeholders as possible, in order to triangulate, verify or challenge the evidence in the draft note. Stakeholder interviews focused especially on their views about what worked well, what was less successful, and what were seen as key determinants of success (or failure).

In each country, four projects were selected for scrutiny and visited. These visits aimed to get a balanced view of the country's project portfolio, although we selected projects with a specific focus on a particular SO (SO-1 in Senegal, SO-2 in Ethiopia etc.), to enrich the SO-findings. The finalized Country Notes (Annexes H-M) constitute key inputs to the evaluation report.

The *Reliability* of the evidence in the Country Notes is considered *Strong to Very Strong* since the team had prepared the Country Note prior to the field visit, allowing various stakeholders to detect missing information, data-bias etc. The *Relevance* of the evidence is *Very Strong* since the team had a dialogue with the EUDs about which projects to select, areas to visit, and stakeholders to interview and which specific pieces of information still needed to be collected. Selection bias in the choice of Case Study countries is considered limited although they cover only six of the 26 EUTF countries.

**Project reviews: Enriching the evidence base.** In addition to the 25 projects visited in the six countries, the team selected a further 25 projects for review. These were selected in dialogue with the three EUTF windows, considering a number of dimensions:

- **Geographic**: They include projects from all 3 windows and include regional/cross window projects.
- **Strategic Objectives**: The projects had to reflect the balance between SOs.
- **Budget size**: A bias towards larger projects was agreed since these reflected the priorities of EUTF management and since they were more likely to have a real result.
- **Date of approval:** The team focused on early-approval projects since these have produced results further out the delivery chain than more recent approvals.
- **Implementing partners**: The projects had to include a balance between the various IP categories – UN agencies, MS agencies, NGOs/CBOs.

The rich evidence base that was assembled in this evaluation was particularly important given the different and rather specific contexts within which activities were implemented in the three windows. So as to ensure that the overall findings of the evaluation were properly reflective of the diversity of the challenges being faced at window level, the evaluation team took special care to ensure an adequate balance in the geographical sourcing of evidence and interview opportunities. The evidence collected from this project review has been included in the Evaluation Matrix (Annex F). The list of projects selected is presented in Annex B, Attachment 5.

The *Reliability* of the evidence collected through the project review is *Strong.* Although we reviewed published information that has been through a vetting process, the team had access to less information on these projects than the ones actually visited. The overwhelming majority of the documents were produced by or for the EU, so there may be an overall positive information bias. The *Relevance* of the evidence from this source is *Strong* since these projects were included specifically to complement the other information that had been collected. Like other documentary information, the materials reviewed here did not necessarily address the specific questions that this evaluation is to answer.

**Stakeholder survey: Validating information.** The programme involves a vast number of actors, most of whom were not interviewed by the team. An online survey was therefore sent to about 300 stakeholders: EU staff working with EUTF in Brussels; EUD staff working with EUTF in all 26 partner countries; staff of IPs in the field and at their head offices. The survey, in English and

French, asked respondents to rate their level of agreement with statements related to an indicator, from "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree" or "No opinion/ Do not know". The ratings begin with the most negative value, to reduce somewhat the typical bias of wanting to be in agreement with a positive statement. The 44 statements were grouped according to the nine EQs. For each EQ, respondents could provide more specific comments, which provided additional insight on a number of topics. The response rate of nearly 40% is very high, showing the interest that stakeholders have in the EUTF. The comments are included in the evaluation matrix (Annex F) while the groupings of answers are shown in Annex G (Annex B, Attachment 4, for Survey Questionnaire).

The ***Reliability*** is ***Very Strong*** since those contacted were people with a known link to the EUTF and responded to the same questions with the same rating instrument. While there clearly was some self-selection bias in who responded – just over 60% did not return the survey – we believe that the results are representative of the larger population of stakeholders. The ***Relevance*** is ***Strong*** as all questions are formulated based on the EQs and JCs. However, the actual ratings did not show a lot of variation, largely because the need for a limited length survey did not allow much scope for more careful dissection of issues. The numerous comments provided by a number of the respondents were very Relevant, however, as they enriched the answers with specific and insightful observations.

**Statistical data: Seeing the big picture.** The team used the EUTF indicator data recorded in the quarterly MLS reports, especially for the SLC and HOA countries, both in the country case notes but also in the main report[42]. Statistical data on the EUTF programme itself were received from EUTF management and from the EUTF website. Data regarding migration, IDPs and refugees are collected by bodies such as IOM and UNHCR but also by the EU's Joint Research Centre's *Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography* and its Dynamic Data Hub at https://bluehub.jrc.ec.europa.eu/migration/app/. These sources were used to inform various parts of the report. The ***Reliability*** of the MLS data, which are the data most used, is ***Very Strong,*** since data for the MLS reports go through quality control procedures that ensure their accuracy. The ***Relevance*** is ***Acceptable*** to ***Strong*** since most variables only address activities and Outputs.

**Thematic case studies: In-depth views on key issues.** Two thematic case studies were carried out to provide more in-depth understanding of key aspects of EUTF implementation:
- **EUTF Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL)**: This looks at the Monitoring and Learning Systems (***MLS***) and the Research and Evidence Facilities (***REF***) to understand the value-added of these various instruments, and the extent to which they have supported the design, implementation, monitoring/evaluation and reporting of EUTF financed interventions. It examines the ways in which MEL has been used in the management and governance of the EUTF and how it may have contributed to the efficiency, effectiveness, and coherence of the EUTF implementation (Annex N).

- **The efficiency of EUTF interventions**: While the Court of Auditors noted that the programming and contracting of EUTF projects was faster and more flexible than standard EU projects, actual implementation was sometimes slower than expected. A major challenge for implementation of EUTF projects is their operational environment: they are often operating in specific local contexts characterized by insecurity, remoteness, lack of state presence or conditions of crisis.

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[42] The MLS data are provided for the SLC and HOA windows only because the tables here give data as of end 2018 and the third quarter of 2019 to provide not only the most recent data but also a picture of the changes over the more recent period. At the time of this report only one report for NOA was available, with data as of mid-2019, so data points were not compatible and no changes over time could be generated. Since NOA is the smaller of the regions, it is not believed this is biasing the picture dramatically, though this information gap should be borne in mind.

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The evaluation used the project cases in the six case countries to analyse the activity cycles and, in particular, to investigate whether the speed of programming has come at the expense of local ownership, involvement of communities, risk management design and implementation. Similarly, this study examined whether faster start-up creates trade-offs against quality of personnel, compliance with duty of care responsibilities, mobilization of complementary resources for successful implementation, etc. The study also assessed whether there were perceived differences across the classes of implementing partner – MS agency, UN agency, NGOs – and if there were changes/improvements in efficiency over time, what caused them (Annex O).

# 4.  FINDINGS

**Evaluation Findings: Considerable variations in context and in the issues addressed, but some commonalities**. The EUTF has funded around 600 projects in 26 countries, from local support for vulnerable groups to regional collaborative arrangements for better policy development and implementation. The evaluation has identified answers to the Evaluation Questions that, notwithstanding the heterogeneity of the operating environment and the issues addressed, remain valid across most of the EUTF universe of activities. These answers to the Evaluation Questions constitute a sound basis for drawing Conclusions and providing Recommendations (chapter 5).

**The evidence basis: Compiling answers across a complex programme**. Synthesizing and balancing the disparate evidence base presented in section 3.3 has been challenging. Two approaches have been used to underpin the Findings. The first is to rate the strength of the evidence about each of the Indicators on a scale ranging from *Very strong (3 stars), Strong (2 stars), Acceptable (1 star)* or *Not relevant/No data (represented by a 0)*. This rating focuses on the overall solidity of the evidence base and indicates the most important sources of information for our findings. A final category, "Indicator strength", shows the extent to which the evidence base actually confirms the given indicator, using the same ratings scheme. In this case, a "0" thus means that the evidence does *not* support the indicator statement. These two components constitute the basis for the summary *Findings* provided in the text boxes.

## 4.1  EQ-1: Relevance

**EQ-1: To what extent do EUTF's objectives and strategy address the situation of the target populations and the priorities of the target geographic areas regarding the flows of refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs and irregular migrants**?

> *The Main Finding is that the first two SOs have a clear focus on the needs of various categories of migrant (or potential migrant) and the communities from which they come while the two subsequent SOs concentrate on state functions and the capacity of the public sector to cope with the various migration flows. A major challenge in designing a complex programme like this is that the interests of migrant populations are not always compatible with objectives of the state. It is also noted that the second pillar of the Valletta Action Plan, which addresses legal migration and mobility from and between European and African countries, is hardly addressed by the EUTF.*

**The four SOs: Different target audiences.** EUTF programme documents address the needs of target populations in different ways. The first two SOs consider the direct needs of target populations at the individual, household or local community levels by looking at improved economic and employment opportunities (SO-1) and strengthening resilience of communities and households (SO-2). The two other SOs consider issues often at national/state level and with a focus on the public sector, addressing various dimensions of improved migration management (SO-3) and good governance, conflict management, rule of law including security and border management (SO-4). In practice, this means that the first two SOs intervene most often at individual, community or local level, while the two other SOs often address the target populations indirectly, where the intention is to defend their rights and interests through more appropriate interventions or enhanced performance by the state or through increased capacities of non-state actors[43].

**SO-1 and SO-2: Targeting communities and households**. The lack of economic opportunities and employment as well as weak community and household resilience are deep-seated structural and organisational problems in most EUTF countries. EUTF has largely focused specifically on

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[43] In Morocco, for example, EUTF provides considerable support to migrants' rights through non-state channels.

improving the economic welfare and resilience of households and communities affected by the various forms of migration. In some countries, however, EUTF interventions have addressed broader societal dimensions – notably Senegal on employment, several countries regarding resilience – where the EUTF supported national strategies (Senegal) or piloted innovations welcomed by government (Ethiopia).

**SO-3 and SO-4: Focus on organisational challenges.** Migration management (SO-3), good governance and conflict prevention (SO-4) are necessarily more public sector focused, and impact individuals through systemic changes. One challenge that EUTF has had to face is when the state has priorities that do not align with those of target populations. Such challenges may arise, for example, when the state is seen as party to a conflict that has led to people being displaced, or when the state's concerns about border control reduce options available to displaced populations. Such dilemmas are all the more challenging for the EUTF since the sensitive areas of forced displacement and instability are its core concerns.

**EUTF priorities and national ownership: Improved alignment over time.** With significant pressure to launch EUTF activities quickly, and limited time for dialogue and building national ownership,[44], national authorities were not always in agreement regarding early EUTF interventions. This hampered implementation in some cases, though over time national authorities have come to appreciate the EUTF focus on migration issues, in part as EUTF has shifted its focus to the larger migration picture by not just considering the displaced but also the hosting communities, building a "win-win" approach to its support and resilience interventions[45].

**Addressing root causes of irregular migration:** The EUTF is concerned with refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs and irregular migrants. The distinctions are to some extent legal: if a displaced person remains within her country, she is an IDP. If she crosses a national border, she is an asylum seeker or refugee, the latter being a person whose asylum request in another country has been granted. These groups generally leave their area of origin due to external factors such as conflict or natural disasters – they are *leavers*. When looking at the figures of forcibly displaced (Table 1.1), it can be seen that the number of displaced and refugees has increased about 50% over the period, from a total of just under 15.5 million in 2014 to over 23.3 million four years later. The causes are ones noted earlier: increased conflict in parts of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa and Libya, and natural disasters, though the *general* trend of rural-to-urban migration when people are simply seeking better opportunities may be difficult to separate out – the disaster may have been the last straw in a long decision chain leading to families leaving. As noted in studies on the issue (section 1.3), root causes for migrating vary considerably, and both literature and case country interviews therefore question the degree to which EUTF interventions have an impact on migration trends and levels. The interventions do, however, appear to be benefiting the intended beneficiary groups (section 4.4). While the EUTF has not been able to dent the levels or causes of forced displacement, EUTF interventions have been able to mitigate *consequences* through interventions under SO-1 and SO-2 (sections 4.4 and 4.5).

**Migration: Beneficial to vulnerable groups.** Much of the migration across Africa is not due to forced displacement but either short-term cyclical moves – for wage income during fallow periods or when natural disasters force temporary dislocations until return is possible. A large part is also due to the wider rural-to-urban exodus described earlier. Much of this migration is trans-border, which in the case of the ECOWAS region has been formalised but may also be along historical trade routes. The attention to regularising trans-border moves has grown as a result of increasing security concerns or where countries of destination wish to reduce these inflows, both legitimate

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[44] Comments received to the survey where in particular highly critcial of early EUTF decisions – see Annex F.

[45] While approaches varied from one country to another, and in some instances more inclusive support to rural communities was already in place, in several countries national authorities and IPs pointed to a more systematic "whole of community" thinking being applied that was seen as innovative and more systematically pursued by EUTF. This refers largely to rural interventions – in peri-urban areas issues were more complex.

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concerns of the state. The increased focus on border controls may therefore have negative effects on the vulnerable groups that are dependent on cyclical or regional trans-border movements for sustained household survival. Sustainable migration policy must balance the need to regularise migratory flows while, at the same time, providing alternatives to the release valve that migration provides to communities and households that are under pressure for survival. The forcibly displaced who often constitute sudden migratory flows can easily become particularly vulnerable to inadequate migration management. Morocco has made strides in formalising such a new approach to migration management, though the more recent rise in irregular migrants along the Western Mediterranean route has slowed/reversed intended implementation.

**Tackling irregular migration.** Asylum seekers and migrants can be categorized by where they want to *arrive*. Asylum seekers apply for legal protection in another country based on international law. Irregular migrants know they do not have a right to enter the country of destination yet attempt this anyway. What is noteworthy is that while the number of displaced has increased by 50% over the period, the number of irregular migrants to Europe in 2019 has fallen to only 20% of its peak value in 2016, and that peak value was still a minuscule 1% of the total number of displaced that year (Table 1.1). But this drop is more due to the EU's efforts to stem the tide of would-be migrants across the Mediterranean rather than any effects of EUTF interventions to reduce incentives to travel among would-be migrants (Section 4.6).

**EUTF and irregular migration: Hitting the target?** As noted in section 1.3, many of those who migrate to Europe are male, urban-based, better educated and with the resources to fund the long and costly trek to Europe. This is normally not an individual choice but part of a household strategy, to increase local income with remittances from those who have migrated, whether to urban areas close by or to Europe. The irregular migration to Europe may therefore be a household investment decision which is not influenced by EUTF activity since, to a large extent, the EUTF is not focused on well-educated urban males with resources.

At the same time, stakeholders expressed concern that the EU has not sufficiently addressed the connected issue of legal migration and mobility in the Valletta Action Plan. At the Senior Officials' Meeting in November 2018 to review the achievements of the Action Plan, it was stated that "*Valletta partners recognise that further concerted efforts should be made in domain 2 concerning legal migration and mobility"[46]*. Data presented for the meeting pointed to a total of EUR 11.4 billion mobilised for JVAP implementation, but only EUR 113 million for this domain[47]. This is primarily because Member States have not followed up on the issue of legal migration to Europe. The exception is the point on promoting mobility of students, researchers and entrepreneurs, where considerable expansion has taken place, but which does not tackle the situation leading to the *irregular* migration to Europe. Here the EU promised "*promoting regular channels for migration and mobility from and between European and African countries"[48]*, which has not yet happened.

> **JC-1.1: The EUTF's strategic approaches are evidence-based and evolve in response to changes in context, needs and lessons learned.**

> **The Finding** is that EUTF interventions over time have become more context-sensitive and relevant. Since many EUTF activities take place in fast-moving environments and address complex issues, there is a recognition of the need for flexibility and tailored responses, where REF studies in particular have been helpful.

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[46] See https://africa-eu-partnership.org/en/stay-informed/publications/joint-valletta-action-plan-2018-senior-officials-meeting pt 4.
[47] See https://www.khartoumprocess.net/images/jvap/Infographic/JVAP-Infographic_New_EN.pdf.pdf
[48] https://www.consilium.europa.eu › media › action plan in section 2

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| JC-1.1 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-1.1.1:** Evidence that credible analyses of causes of irregular migration and forced displacement form the basis for EUTF strategic approaches | *** | ** | ** | * | ** | ** |
| **I-1.1.2:** Evidence that lessons learned and new evidence are taken into account in the evolution of EUTF's strategy and programming decisions | *** | *** | ** | *** | ** | *** |
| **I-1.1.3:** Extent of EUTF's strategy aligning with national policy priorities and their evolution, if any, over time | ** | ** | ** | ** | * | ** |

**Programming documents: Sections for learning.** While some early EUTF decision documents[49] were hastily put together, the documents contain rationale for the interventions in light of SOs, country situation and now have clear "lessons learned" sections. The analytical sections look at country/regional dynamics and trends that the intervention either should support, if seen as positive, or needs to take into account if they point to increasing challenges, such as a deteriorating security situation. "Lessons learned" assesses the realism of what the EUTF can hope to achieve in light of previous activities and what other actors are doing. Coordination is often an important topic, and regional programmes present an analysis of how the various national components are expected to perform and how they come together to form a truly *regional* intervention. The documents also contain a budget, a risk analysis and risk mitigation plan and the results framework/logframe that form the basis for performance monitoring. Quality assurance steps are also articulated in these documents.

**EUTF: Building on but different from EDF/ENI:** EUTF builds on the knowledge generated by the programming of other EU support, in particular EDF/ENI-funded activities and their country programming processes.[50] A key difference is that EUTF documents are not prepared as part of a larger, long-term integrated programme, but focus on the specific intervention foreseen at a particular point in time. While the subject matter across decisions is normally diverse, important "lessons learned" often have to do with the relations to national authorities, the changes to operating conditions on the ground, and coordination with and knowledge about other related activities. Since the EUTF is not bound by the usual country programming processes and their approved sectors, it can address areas that are new to the EU as a system, and this incremental learning about new sectors is important for ensuring relevance and effectiveness.

Since approval is formally done in Brussels by OpCom teams, there is an additional opportunity to look at lessons from other countries. While staff rotation in the EUDs is a challenge, many staff are recruited specifically for the EUTF programme, both to increase capacity on the ground but also to get technical skills in the new sectors/areas that the EUTF is to address, which has strengthened the knowledge about the issues and the interest in generating and applying new evidence.

**EUTF: Applying learning tools.** The quarterly ***MLS*** reports by window provide aggregate data for the region, but also break down data by country and highlight various project results. The MLS reports are particularly important for keeping MS stakeholders updated on progress. Head office staff also appreciate the overviews provided while EUD staff find the country-level information too general. What has been helpful is the support that the MLS contract holders have provided to projects where results frameworks have been poor, or where baselines have been missing or weak. In these cases, the MLS contractors have played an important role in ensuring more harmonised results reporting.

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[49] These are the documents presented to the OpComs for approval, sometimes referred to as action fiches.
[50] South Sudan, which has not signed the Cotonou Agreement, is in a particular category. Since EUTF does not require adherence to this Agreement, South Sudan benefits from EUTF funding, which is the only EU financing South Sudan has access to apart from emergency/humanitarian aid.

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While some IPs see the MLS as costly data-collection exercises often imposed after the projects' own results framework had been agreed, there is a recognition that the quarterly reporting helped some projects improve their own results tracking and allowed them to see how their own project fitted into the larger EUTF scheme.

The delays in publishing the quarterly reports, especially in the case of the NOA, reduces their information value, however.

While the MLS has had a common structure across the three windows, the use of the **REF** has varied across the windows. HOA has had a framework agreement with SOAS of London to carry out a series of studies that have looked at "the big picture" related to migration in the region and in particular cross-border issues. This work has helped build considerable research knowledge and capacity across the region. The HOA framework has produced more studies with more communications and outreach activities, including a major regional research dissemination event in 2019.

SLC has contracted more country-specific or thematic studies to address particular programming issues, with some cross-border work with NOA.

NOA, while publishing a couple of larger studies, has also used the facility to produce insight into more sensitive issues that has allowed the window to re-target some of their assistance to vulnerable groups.

Overall, the REF studies are seen to have improved context understanding and intervention designs[51].

For EUDs, the Results-Oriented Monitoring (**ROM**) reports provide directly operational findings, and Third-party monitoring (**TPM**) are highly valuable, especially in countries and situations where EUD staff themselves cannot visit and monitor activities directly. Overall, EUDs see that the EUTF provides a set of instruments that improves their capacity to track, quality assure and report on new and complex issues across varying and sometimes extremely difficult circumstances. These innovative instruments represent important "value for money" for management and, consequently, for the continuing relevance of the programme overall (Annex N).

**A dynamic and complex programme: Need for updated information**. Many issues that the EUTF is to address happen within fast-moving contexts so "lessons learned" yesterday may have less validity today. Some issues are also highly complex so that even well-designed interventions may have unintended consequences[52]. Both of these factors point to the importance of having in place learning and quality assurance instruments that can provide management with updated and corrective information, but it also points to the need for close dialogue with stakeholders on the ground. IPs interviewed note that the EU is more flexible and willing to listen to arguments for change than they have experienced with earlier EU-funded projects. This is reflected in survey results where IPs are more positive to the statement that the EUTF's strategic approach is based on updated knowledge and lessons learned – EUD staff being the least positive – and that the approach has evolved in response to changes in context and partner country needs (Annex G).

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[51] Views from numerous interviews of EU staff in Brussels and EUDs, and IP staff in the field.

[52] Examples mentioned include the stricter border controls outside Agadez in Niger and the support to Libya's marine patrols, Annexes I and K.

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## JC-1.2: The EUTF is respecting the ownership principle.

**The Finding** *is that at local level there is considerable consultation with communities, intended beneficiary groups, and local administration, and projects try to ensure inclusivity, partnership and ownership. At national level, there is increasing appreciation of, and trust between, national authorities and the EUTF in countries that expressed early scepticism. The respect for national/local ownership has improved over time and is being increasingly implemented in practice.*

| JC-1.2 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-1.2.1:** Evidence that EUTF's strategic choices are based on consultations with, and the priorities of, key stakeholders: national and local authorities, and representatives of beneficiary groups | *** | *** | *** | ** | ** | ** |
| **I-1.2.2:** Evidence that key stakeholders at local, national levels agree with EUTF's strategy and programming decisions that are being prioritised | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** |

**National ownership: Improving**. Some partner countries were not interested in, or committed to, the EUTF to begin with. There were a number of reasons for this. Firstly, actual resources available to some countries were limited and, as a result, the programme was not given a high priority. Secondly, migration and refugees were often not the priority concerns of partner countries. Thirdly, some governments felt their voice was not really heard when it came to EUTF decisions. Finally, there was a perception that the EUTF's main purpose was to reduce irregular migration to Europe. This position has changed fairly consistently across space and over time as more authority for programme management has been delegated to the field, which has resulted in better dialogue. In addition, with the increase in numbers of displaced, the issue itself has become of greater concern, though with regional differences remaining[53].

**Local ownership: Generally strong.** At local level, there appear to have been quite extensive consultations, with baseline studies carried out to identify priority needs and surveys undertaken to track how stakeholder groups perceive the results. This includes attempts at involving the local business community in both commercial/implementation dimensions of the projects, but also as parties to the planning for future local development.

In countries with a functioning local administration, local authorities appear to have been regularly involved in validating proposed approaches and methods. In countries with poor or absent local administration, IPs have helped establish or support local bodies that are representative of the local communities, so the various groups are included and heard[54].

IPs point to improving relations over time as projects show their value to the local communities. The IPs themselves are generally experienced actors that are used to working under challenging circumstances and have learned the value of listening and dialogue. However, the situations that IPs find themselves in are often difficult and consensus is not always possible. For example, conflict-lines may across and between groups, such as IDPs and host communities; youth may want more influence where older leaders not willing to cede much authority; gender-based violence and discrimination may be provoked by a gender-equality agenda. The overall evidence, however, is that local stakeholders and EUTF parties experience greater mutual trust and improved common ground regarding the prioritisation and implementation of EUTF-funded interventions. The survey results show that IPs are most positive about the degree of local ownership, while EUD staff are the least positive. While the pattern is the same when asked whether EUTF interventions

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[53] The major exception is NOA, where the programme in Egypt has not moved due to contracting issues, Algeria has so far not agreed to a programme, and Libya poses particular challenges with no functioning state across large parts of its territory (Annex I). See also ICMPD, *First Monitoring Report, North of Africa window,* June 2019, p. 23
[54] In Libya, the situation is of course totally different, where IPs often have to negotiate with local militias and tribal clan groups for access to areas and beneficiary groups.

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are based on national plans and priorities, the overall *level* is considerably lower, especially for EUD staff.

*JC-1.3: The EUTF ensures that the "Do no harm" principle is followed.*

***The Finding*** *is that "Do no harm" is often not an issue at local level because this is in practice addressed in local consultations. At national level, concerns of the state (security, border protection) can sometimes remove a migratory "release valve" or increase the cost of trade amongst for beneficiary groups, but this is seen as a political issue rather than a breach of the "Do no harm" principle.*

| JC-1.3 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-1.3.1:** Evidence that EUTF interventions are designed with clear "Do no harm" conditions and that in particular steps are taken to shield women and youth from possible negative consequences | ** | ** | ** | * | *** | ** |
| **I-1.3.1:** Evidence that intended beneficiaries have not experienced negative consequences of EUTF interventions as per the "Do no harm" principle | * | * | * | * | 0 | * |

**"Do no harm": In practice addressed at local level**. Few programme documents make explicit reference to the "Do no harm" principle.  Where "Do no harm" is mentioned, it is mostly in the context of conflict prevention and anticorruption. According to a number of IPs, this is often because "Do no harm" is not an issue at all: the intervention is providing clear net positive benefits and the issue is more about access and distribution of those benefits, especially amongst vulnerable groups.

**Trade-offs: State interests versus vulnerable groups**. Some cases pose dilemmas, however, and the closing of the migrant smuggling corridor through the Agadez area in northern Niger is often cited as an example. Long-distance trading in commercial goods as well as illicit items across the long trading routes going north and east has historically been a key activity and an important source of income for the local economy. The tighter border controls imposed thanks to EUTF support have not only reduced migrant smuggling but also increased the costs of other forms of trade, constraining the resilience of the local economy that has few alternative sources of income. Some income-generating activities have been financed by the EUTF, but they do not fully compensate for this income loss. The situation is further hampered by the general situation in some countries, like Libya, where limited government control and open armed conflict makes it extremely difficult to carry out meaningful capacity building and long-term development[55]. When it comes to irregular migration  and the "Do no harm" principle, the dilemma is therefore how the rights of migrants engaged in an illegal activity can be protected while not in practice abetting what is in the first place an intended breach of law.

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[55]  Annex I, Libya Country Case note, in particular I-1.3.1 and I-1.3.2. The argument is in fact rather complicated since if the migrants are turned back early on in their travels, the risk of drowning is basically eliminated, so while they do not reach Europe, they at least are alive. While many migrants seem to be aware of this risk, they are still willing to take it,

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## 4.2  EQ-2: Coherence, Complementarity and Value Added

**EQ-2: To what extent are the EUTF interventions coherent – internally and with other EU policies, strategies, and international commitments – and complementary with those of Member States, partner countries, and other development partners?**

*The Main Finding is that EUDs work in a practical way to ensure the coherence, complementarity and value-added of EUTF interventions, though in the early phase this was more difficult. Value added is particularly clear regarding migration management, where the Valletta Action Plan accords a clear role for the EU.*

**Coherence, Complementarity and Value Added**: **Important justifications for EUTF**. A key argument for setting up the EUTF rather than channelling the additional funding through existing mechanisms was the expected additional benefits from having this flexible funding mechanism.

The EUTF's *complementarity* derives in part from the fact that the EUTF addresses issues that were not at the top of the EU cooperation agenda. In the NOA region, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and its European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) for 2014-2020 is the central funding mechanism for EU assistance. In the case of Morocco, for example, the annual Action Programmes are in line with the ENI priorities of equitable access to social sectors; democratic governance, the rule of law and mobility; and employment and inclusive growth. These are clearly compatible with EUTF SOs yet the EUTF directs attention to particular beneficiary groups and issues that are not part of the ENI programme[56]. All actions financed by EUTF can be considered to support the national migration strategy and to be complementary to ENI-financed budget support to that sector. Similar situations are found in the HOA and SLC regions where National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) and Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs) for the period 2014-2020 had locked in most of the funds available to identified sectors or issues. The programming of these funds was largely finalised by the time the Valletta Conference took place late 2015[57]. The ability to free up substantial resources for a new set of priorities linked to the Valletta Action Plan was therefore limited.

**EUTF and ENI/EDF: Gap-filling versus lack of focus.** As the EUTF is to address *root causes* of instability, forced displacement and irregular migration, the conditions for strong complementarity with ENI/EDF are obvious. The EUTF programme documents all point to the linkages between EU core funding and the supplementary financing provided by the EUTF. The complementary nature of the EUTF brings some benefits and costs. On the one hand, it is a useful and flexible instrument that is capable of filling important gaps in the existing development portfolio in partner countries (although there have also been soe examples of duplication or overlap in project interventions). On the other hand, the use of EUTF as a means to complement the work of other instruments is often cited as reason for the EUTF's apparent lack of focus, as highlighted in the Court of Auditors report[58].

**Complementary to other donors: Function of local coordination.** The complementarity with other funding agencies – MS, other donors, multilateral bodies – is largely a function of the degree to which active coordination takes place, whether led by national authorities or by inter-donor mechanisms. In the countries visited, there were a number of coordinating bodies in place, from IPs constituting consortia for implementing EUTF activities along with funding from other donors, to information sharing to actual joint programming and implementation[59].

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[56]  Annex J, Morocco Country Case note.
[57] The exception is South Sudan, which has not signed the Cotonou Agreement and thus not eligible for EDF funding.
[58] EU Court of Auditors Special Report 2018/32, https://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR18_32/SR_EUTF_AFRICA_EN.pdf
[59] In Somalia, for example, EUTF budget support is closely coordinated with World Bank and IMF, while the Joint Police Programme is a fully coordinated programme both on the donor and national authorities' side – see Annex M.

**EUTF: Aligning with national policies over time**. EUTF programmes have become better aligned with partner country plans and priorities over time. As noted in section 4.1, a number of governments were initially sceptical of the EUTF: the programme did not address their own key objectives; there was a lack of control over resources; there were disagreements on issues like procurement rules, etc. All of this led some NOA countries to remain on the outside of EUTF.

Elsewhere, coherence with national policies is largely in place. It was clear, however, that EUTF's concern with migration management was initially not on all governments' priority lists but, due in large part to the EUTF policy dialogue and projects, a broader understanding and consensus has been built. This broader consensus is evidenced by a number of cross-border programmes and more local commitments to the EUTF agenda.

**EUD-EU HQ coordination: Coming into place**. During the period immediately following the establishment of the EUTF, the pressures to launch activities was great, leading to some projects being approved in Brussels without, according to some EUDs, sufficient dialogue with national stakeholders. As the programme evolved and the OpComs began functioning, however, EUDs have taken more charge of programming, and more opportunity is given to national authorities to present their opinions and preferences during the OpCom deliberations.

**EUTF Value-added: Important both within EU and to MS**. EUTF resources have been used to address issues that are important with regards to instability, forced displacement and irregular migration. EUTF has been able and willing to take on the sometimes challenging dialogue surrounding forced displacement and migration, to strengthen the dialogue with national authorities and local actors, to promote a more holistic approach towards migration, and to get implementable programmes in place. These are issues that MS on their own generally would not want, or be able to take on, though in some partner countries, one or more MS pursue their own agendas on issues like migration directly with partner authorities.

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### *JC-2.1: The EUTF's strategy and implementation are internally coherent*

> ***The Finding*** *is that EUTF is very much part of EU's overall support to a given country and thus aligned to the larger EU programme and to national policies. Cross-country coherence is more difficult to achieve as implementation of a particular programme has to be appropriate to country context.*

| JC-2.1 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-2.1.1:** Evidence that EUTF interventions at *national level* are coherent with the policy priorities of partner countries | *** | *** | ** | ** | *** | *** |
| **I-2.1.2:** Evidence that EUTF interventions responding *to a particular SO* are consistent across windows/countries. | ** | ** | ** | *** | * | ** |

**Strategy and implementation: In-country coherence.** Programme documents across all three windows refer to national priorities and programmes as foundational for the EUTF programmes. EU country fiches, when presenting the full range of EU support to that country, place the EUTF in that broader EU supporting context, at times also noting links to MS interventions. On the ground, interaction between ECHO and EUTF is addressing the "nexus" between humanitarian and development interventions. In the six countries visited, the EUTF programme makes an important contribution to the larger EU support. Some HoCs and staff from the political section note that EUTF has opened possibilities for policy dialogue in fields that otherwise might not have been broached. This arises because NIPs have a sectoral structure, and more specialized instruments like IcSP do not have the size and importance of the EUTF. As security considerations have increased, the importance of EUTF and its regional interventions in fields like border

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management, migration policies, addressing refugee flows across borders also gave more importance to EUTF and its strategic objectives.

**Cross-border coherence: More challenging.** The degree of coherence of cross-border activities is more difficult to answer. Regional projects have clearly brought greater consistency for cross-border collaboration and policies in a number of fields, such as the Better Migration Management (BMM) regional programme across key countries in HOA[60]. Similarly, the *Groupes d'Action Rapides – Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel* (GAR-SI SAHEL) aimed at building rapid reaction police teams to address threats and contribute to stability in areas where state authority is less present[61]. These projects also provide arenas for national actors to work together and share experiences, so in addition to the direct deliverables that can be attributed to the projects, they also support the establishment and continuation of important networks across national borders. Some EUDs note, however, that some regional projects suffer from poor design in terms of how they are to function on the ground. In particular, they point to the challenge regional initiatives face when trying to cover contiguous geographic areas that include quite different country contexts.

**Inter-SO coherence: Variable.** Implementation of projects under a given SO can vary a lot across countries: what is a priority under SO-1 in one country is clearly not the same priority in another country. But even when addressing the same issue across countries, such as reintegration of returnees or how to support increased resilience in communities and among households, it is the conditions on the ground and national policy in that area that really determines what is done. Given that national contexts vary so much, trying to implement a given approach across countries is unlikely to be beneficial, though in fields like TVET cross-country learning may be useful. There are, however, examples of national actors exchanging experiences, and larger IPs such as IOM, UNHCR, GIZ bring experiences from one country to another where they see this as relevant.

*JC-2.2: The EUTF complements and adds value to other EU strategic approaches and interventions.*

> **The Finding** *is that the EUTF adds value particularly along two dimensions: it addresses issues that EDF/ENI funding do not but that are now recognised as important; and EUTF flexibility allows for new ways of programming, like integrated spatial planning.*

| JC-2.2 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-2.2.1:** Evidence that EUTF programmes include appropriate linkages to other EU instruments in-country | *** | *** | *** | *** | ** | *** |
| **I-2.2.2:** Evidence that EUTF interventions have identified and addressed geographic and thematic gaps not covered by other EU interventions | *** | *** | *** | ** | *** | *** |

**Country fiches: Documenting the breadth of EU engagement.** Country fiches present the various instruments applied in the given country, with an overview of how they are linked. The analysis contained in these fiches has ENI/EDF financing as the foundation around which other instruments are reviewed. The EUTF is typically presented right after these core programmes, thus constituting the second major EU support to the country. While emergency aid is sometimes the second largest in terms of resources it does generally not play the same strategic role. Some of the first projects to be approved were in fact activities that had been developed in the context of the core country programme and therefore naturally had close links.

**Joint Programming: EUTF sometimes included.** In some SLC and HOA countries, EUTF funding has been discussed during Joint Programming (JP) exercises (e.g. Ethiopia). These bring

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[60] See T05-EUTF-HOA-REG-09
[61] See T05-EUTF-SAH-REG-04

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together the EU and the MS present on the ground for joint analyses and resource programming with national authorities. Where this takes place, the EUTF is included in a more comprehensive and strategic dialogue with national authorities, thus ensuring the EUTF's role being clarified in the larger picture. This avoids possible overlaps and duplications and ensures a focus on how the EUTF can be value-adding. However, in most countries, there is either not a JP process in place, or it may already have concluded by the time the EUTF was to be programmed.

**EUTF programming: Addressing beneficiary groups from a wider perspective**. While the EUTF has defined clear target beneficiaries, they can be reached in different ways. In some countries, supporting host communities and arriving refugees and IDPs to work together to exploit and develop local resources has provided "win-win" results and reduced tensions between host communities and the arrival of potential competitors for scarce local resources[62]. Addressing needs of host communities and internal migrants from a "whole of community" perspective[63], establishing the "humanitarian–development nexus", ensures that the emergency support provided to recent arrivals is coupled with more classic development assistance for the host community. This strengthens the community's overall resilience and ability to cope with the sudden increase in population and is in line with EU's policy of linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD). While the LRRD thinking has often been associated with rural development, and the resilience projects in north of Somalia exemplify this, many displaced persons move to urban areas where the LRRD approach may be equally valid. In Somalia, the influx of IDPs to urban areas like Mogadishu and Baidoa has led to tensions due to competition for scarce infrastructure resources but where interventions attempt to identify "win-win" solutions.  In Libya, ensuring that EUTF actions benefit host populations as well as migrants has been a strong component of dialogue with Government.

**EUTF programming: Taking a spatial approach**. A different approach used in the EUTF has been to focus resources on specific geographic areas. Instead of taking a sector approach, which is how NIP programming is largely done, spatial planning – such as the corridors in Somalia – looks at the resource base and the population composition to programme a more comprehensive response. This geographic approach may include the (re-)building of local decision-making bodies – committees, councils – and public authority. In the Somalia context in particular, where local authority is very weak or absent, this spatial programming may be providing value-added along a number of dimensions. Given the way EUTF resources can be programmed, where the IPs may play a central role in defining the contents and approach of the given intervention, IPs have also noted a willingness and openness on the side of the EU to taking on board such locally-defined bottom-up designs of capacity building that includes the public sector. This flexibility, including a willingness to adjust the design if experience or evolving conditions point in a different direction, is seen as also being a valuable aspect of the EUTF approach.

**Survey: Confirms the EUTF's strategic value**. The survey results also point to a high degree of consensus around the proposition that the EUTF complements and adds value to other EU strategic approaches and interventions, with EUDs being almost as positive as Brussels-based staff and IP staff (Annex G).

> **JC-2.3: The EUTF complements and adds value to interventions financed by MS and those of other donors.**

> ***The Finding*** *is that there is considerable formal and informal coordination in the field, with MS co-financing of EUTF activities being the most notable. In addition, EUTF works closely with others on specific interventions such as budget support.*

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[62] Most references to this approach have so far been noted in the HOA region, with different examples in Ethiopia, Somalia and Uganda in particular.
[63]  World Bank "Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict and Violence 2020-2025", Washington DC, February 2020.

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| JC-2.3 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-2.3.1:** The existence of formal and informal mechanisms to ensure complementarity and coordination with MS activities and coordination with other development partners, at HQ and in the field/Delegations | *** | ** | *** | ** | ** | *** |
| **I-2.3.2:** Evidence of sharing of information and policy analyses, joint evaluations, inclusion of EUTF in programming and programming missions with EU MS and other donors. | ** | * | ** | * | 0 | 0 |

**EUTF complementing others: The role of local coordination.** In most countries, both EUTF coordination committees and various donor coordination mechanisms are in place. The big difference seems to be the extent to which national governments chair and manage these mechanisms, such as Donor Assistance Groups, or whether these are more informal sector working groups. In all countries, there are coordination mechanisms in place that support information sharing and allow closer implementation collaborations. EUTF funded programmes are well known in the donor community, and to the extent they are relevant to such coordinating mechanisms, the EUD normally is represented.

**EUTF formal linkages: JP and co-financing.** In Ethiopia, the EU and MS included the EUTF in the Joint Programming process, ensuring the linkages between the general NIP programming and the EUTF resources. But there are also formal collaborations at the individual project level, where Germany and Italy in particular provide co-financing of EUTF projects. The regional *Better Migration Management* project in the HOA region has a significant German financial contribution and where the co-financing ensures that there is *one* project with *one* IP, in this case Germany's GIZ[64]. The potential downside is obvious: the co-financing basically means that the IP is the donor's own implementation agency, in this case for a EUR 40 + 6 million programme. A different form of collaboration is ensured with the Joint Police Programme in Somalia, where the UK and Germany as the two major bilateral donors in this field are supporting the UNOPS-led programme, ensuring policy and operational consistency.

**EUTF complementing others: A positive contribution**. EUTF funds and technical assistance have been provided in the form of budget support or used alongside budget support programmes or other public finance management (PFM) programme by the World Bank, IMF, and/or the African Development Bank. In these cases, all parties seem very satisfied with the results, which is also reflected in the survey results, which are very positive across all stakeholder groups.

*JC-2.4: Other EU policies are supportive of the development objectives of the EUTF as per the EU's Policy Coherence for Development (PCD).*

*The Finding is that other EU policies are supportive of EUTF, though issues are raised regarding consistency between EU policies on irregular migration and EUTF-funded interventions.*

| JC-2.4 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-2.4.1:** Evidence that other EU policies have contributed to EUTF objectives | *** | *** | *** | ** | ** | *** |

**EUTF Strategic Objectives: Mirroring EU priorities**. Since the EUTF is to address *root causes,* it follows that a number of the interventions funded through EDF/ENI are inevitably addressing some of these same long-term development challenges. The country analysis behind the programming of core funding resources is thus also used for EUTF programme documents, as relevant, ensuring that the Policy Coherence for Development principle holds for EUTF

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[64] T05-EUTF-HOA-REG-09.

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interventions. EUTF is also consistent with EU external policy in the area of migration as embodied in the European Agenda on Migration (EAM) and the Joint Valletta Action Plan.

*JC-2.5: The EUTF has enabled policy and political dialogue on issues otherwise insufficiently addressed by the EU.*

**The Finding** *is that that policy issues* **have** *been raised in connection with EUTF funding, in particular questions surrounding migration and migrants' rights.*

| JC-2.5 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-2.5.1:** Evidence that policy and political dialogue under EUTF has led to development/ reforms/ upgrading of policies, laws, systems relevant to EUTF beneficiary groups | *** | ** | *** | ** | ** | ** |
| **I-2.5.2:** Evidence that policy, political dialogue under EUTF has led to a more rights-based approach to addressing migrants' rights and needs, and in particular those of the more vulnerable groups including women and youth | ** | ** | ** | * | 0 | * |

**More funding: More dialogue**. Some EUDs noted that coming in with what was perceived as fresh or additional resources in the form of EUTF funding was critical for opening a dialogue with national authorities on migration issues, such as reintegration of returnees, protection of refugees and other vulnerable groups due to forced displacement – issues that the EU would otherwise probably not have raised and which national authorities would not have been very interested in discussing.

At the more practical level, a number of projects have supported political dialogue on difficult questions such as migrants' rights, reintegration of returnees, women's rights and the situation of vulnerable groups due to their forced displacement. When projects in fact interface with national institutions it is possible to raise issues at national policy level. This can be seen, for example, in the Joint Police Programme in Somalia where issues regarding community policing and the rights of vulnerable groups is part of the development of the "corporate culture" that is to be developed. However, moving from specific issues to more general policies is often more challenging. ROM reviews of initiatives both in Ethiopia and Niger note what is perceived as a failure to exploit possibilities for raising and resolving political issues at national level.

## 4.3 EQ-3: Efficiency

**EQ-3: To what extent is the EUTF delivering efficiently?**

**The Main Finding** *is that EUTF's decision-making structure is inclusive although the voice of partner countries could be stronger. The EUTF allows fast processing of decisions and expedited contracting though some projects have experienced significant implementation delays.*

**EUTF: Contradictory expectations.** The EUTF is set up as an *emergency* trust fund and yet it is to address *root causes* of three complex societal challenges: instability, forced displacement, irregular migration[65]. This dual nature of the Fund has generated some contradictory pressures.

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[65] EU Trust Funds are set up under a separate EU regulation for this purpose approved in 2013. They are supposed to offer a number of advantages: they are EU-led, offering better coordination with MS; better control of operations; enhance EU visibility; provide fast decision-making and constitute a flexible, proactive and adaptable tool, and the costs are seen to often be much lower than costs of TFs managed by other international entities. On the other hand, they need to provide documentable added value (its objectives can be better met at EU than at national level) and additionality (the trust fund should not duplicate already existing and similar EU financing instruments).

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*Mid-term evaluation of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa 2015-2019*

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**Improving efficiency: Simplifying procedures**. In recognition of the complex environment within which EUTF was to be delivered, certain standard EU procedures were modified with the aim of improving efficiency. While EDF and ENI funds are programmed *en bloc* through a carefully structured process where strong buy-in from national authorities and the identification of core sectors is central, the EUTF formally does not require either. This was in part because the intended target groups – refugees, IDPs, etc. – did not necessarily constitute priority concerns for many governments. In order to systematically reach groups that were not a priority for the mainstream development programmes, the EUTF required fast action and attention to these groups. The required the simplification of some of the steps in identifying, approving and implementing action:

- Decisions were made by windows-based OpComs to ensure quick decision-making across a larger-than-normal group of actors: DG DEVCO, DG NEAR, DG HOME, ECHO, EEAS.
- The political buy-in from the MS was important, due to the political sensitivities surrounding the migration issue but also to mobilise additional resources from them for the trust fund.
- Partner countries were represented by their offices to the EU but only with observer status, so their role was different from that of the formal ENI/EDF negotiations.
- The process for identifying and preparing proposals was streamlined, with less formal consultations on the ground required.
- EUDs could do direct contracting and were encouraged and in some cases strongly steered towards contracting specific IPs, where the universe of eligible IPs included MS implementing agencies, UN bodies, and large recognized international NGOs.

*JC-3.1: EUTF's institutional set-up is conducive to timely and effective decision making.*

> **The Finding** *is that the structure, the flexibility of policy setting and the operational decision-making bodies with representatives from the wider stakeholder community is ensuring timely and effective decision making. However, there is a lack of formal programme agreements at field level.*

| JC-3.1 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-3.1.1:** Evidence that inclusion of MS and partner countries in decision making bodies encourages more strategic decision making. | ** | ** | ** | * | ** | * |
| **I-3.1.2:** Evidence that management structure (windows; OpComs; TF management in Brussels) provides for faster, flexible, more efficient and effective decision making (compared with other EU instruments). | ** | *** | *** | ** | ** | ** |
| **I-3.1.3:** Evidence that EUTF decision making structure in the field provides for faster and more effective decision making (compared with other EU instruments). | * | *** | *** | ** | 0 | ** |
| **I-3.1.4:** Evidence that sufficient staff, in quantitative and qualitative terms, are available in Brussels and in the EU Delegations. | 0 | ** | ** | * | 0 | ** |

**Streamlined structure: Clear divisions of labour.** The EUTF has a centralised but inclusive policy and operational decision-making structure (Figure 1.2), while dividing the management of the EUTF universe into windows-based OpComs for fast action and close monitoring. This streamlined structure that includes both central coordination team and windows-based EUTF teams make operations efficient and smooth.

**Making policy: The Trust Fund Board.** Also referred to as the Strategic Board, the Trust Fund Board decides the EUTF's overall policies and funding priorities. It includes high-level representatives from across the EU system, bringing EU services together that otherwise do not often meet to discuss operational matters. Representatives of MS and partner countries are sufficiently senior to allow them to speak on behalf of their country. This facilitates efficient decision-making at Board meetings, with some decisions having important operational consequences for the overall EUTF programme. The first Board meetings were important for

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reaching consensus on how the overall mechanism was to work. The April 2018 meeting redirected the remaining funds to a more limited set of objectives, while the most recent Board meeting in June 2019 explored whether additional funding could be mobilised in support of EUTF objectives.

**The Board: Trading depth of discussion for breadth of representation.** Board meetings are large, with as many as 100 persons present, so the ability to engage in detailed discussion is largely precluded. The working papers sent around beforehand – often quite late, according to several – are operational and to the point, allowing for direct comments/suggestions, while permitting Board management to achieve broad agreement on the issues.
While the first meetings reflected divergent opinions of the EUTF, there is now more consensus about the issues that need to be addressed. Participants at Board meetings consider it a good mechanism for bringing key stakeholders around the table to take key strategic decisions.

The informal discussions that take place at the fringes of the formal meeting allow a number of associated issues to be addressed in an efficient manner. The face-to-face interaction is important for maintaining relations and trust, even in cases where differences remain between parties. The partner country representatives feel that their role on the EUTF board is often more meaningful than at some other EU meetings since they have the opportunity to actually represent their country's views during board discussions.

Having partner countries representatives on the Board has to some extent addressed the absence of strategic country-based decision-making similar to the EDF and ENI country programming processes. This more inclusive Board therefore represents a pragmatic solution to country ownership concerns, though EUDs appear to be much less convinced of this than EU Brussels staff (see Annex B). It is interesting to note that IP staff are the most positive here, pointing to the fact that key IPs such as UN agencies now have a place at the table, which is not common in the general EU system.

**Addressing Board legitimacy: Extending participation**. Other key stakeholders are invited to participate in the board as observers. These include the European Parliament, regional bodies such as the AU and ECOWAS, and at times key IPs. This increases the legitimacy and transparency of the deliberations. There is general agreement that the Board is fulfilling its expected function of bringing stakeholders together, presenting key issues for principled but efficient deliberations, allowing serious concerns to be brought to the table when required, and ensuring that the EUTF is seen as accountable to its key stakeholders. There is, however, a lack of time for in-depth deliberations, so some participants see the meetings as much as decision *informing* as decision *making*.

**Taking decisions: The Operational Committees, OpComs.** Programmes are discussed at the level of the three EUTF windows by their respective OpComs. This is seen as efficient since the regions have different characteristics in the key areas of instability, forced displacement and irregular migration. Each region also has somewhat different approaches to the programming of their resources. The OpComs approve the various programmes and discuss the strategic choices in a given country or for a regional intervention, ensuring that there is an overall vision behind each decision. The participation of partners beyond the EU once again ensures a broader buy-in and understanding of what is being decided, and why. Having window-specific management units and one overall coordinating unit in Brussels is appreciated, ensuring that communication lines are short and well-known, allowing for efficient communications. The survey shows a quite positive view of the efficiency of the OpComs, with EUDs almost as positive as Brussels staff. IPs are somewhat less enthusiastic about the OpComs than they were about the Board, but they still give a score close to those of the EUDs and Brussels staff.

**OpComs and EUDs: Increased role for the field?** For the EUDs, the OpComs represent efficient bodies for discussing and approving programmes as they arise. While early decisions were seen to

be heavily Brussels-influenced, the field now has a stronger role in the identification and preparation of programmes. While OpComs approve general programmes, the specific projects are designed in the field. This is to ensure that the field-perspective is embedded in the actual interventions that are approved, and this aspect has been strengthened over time. A number of the staff in the EUDs handling the EUTF have been recruited specifically for the EUTF programme, further strengthening the field's ability to influence the design and focus of the interventions. While the survey shows all three groups are positive about the project selection process, they are all quite negative regarding the degree to which local stakeholders are included in the selection process. This question was, in fact, the one that got by far the least favourable rating of all questions in the survey. The opinion of the EUDs about the involvement of local stakeholders was less favourable than those of Brussels-based staff. A number of quite critical comments were received in the survey form (Annex G).

> ### *JC-3.2: EUTF's programming process produces well-conceived projects/ programmes for timely implementation.*

> ***The Finding*** *is largely in line with the findings of the Court of Auditor's report that noted that "Compared to traditional instruments, the EUTF for Africa was faster in launching projects. It has, overall, managed to speed up the signing of contracts and making advance payments. However, projects face similar challenges as traditional instruments that delay their implementation".[66] This evaluation would note that while most contracting has been expeditious, there are some examples of slow contracting and major delays in start-up, which point to challenges in the EUTF approach.*

| JC-3.2 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-3.2.1:** Evidence that intervention documents have clear results-based design, risk analyses and realistic implementation plans. | *** | ** | *** | ** | **0** | *** |
| **I-3.2.2:** Evidence that contracting flexibility and choice of partners (MS and UN agencies etc.) have been conducive to proper, timely, flexible and effective implementation | ** | *** | *** | ** | ** | ** |
| **I-3.2.3:** Evidence that EUTF interventions are perceived to be more efficient in implementation and effective in results compared with other EU instruments | ** | *** | *** | * | ** | ** |

**Early interventions: EDF prepared.** Some early approvals, particularly in the SLC region, were EDF-projects modified to conform to EUTF objectives, but with limited input from the field. This led to comments that some EUTF interventions were more EDF extensions rather than fit-for-purpose activities focusing on "root causes". On the other hand, actors agree that it was politically important to demonstrate an energetic start to the programme.

**Programming: Overall well-conceived.** HOA and SLC were under pressure to quickly initiate activities, so some early projects were originally prepared for the NIP programme and modified to respond to EUTF objectives. NOA undertook a more deliberate programming process, with an external adviser assisting to develop an intervention logic that provided a more complete results hierarchy. NOA thus got off to a slower but more programmed start. Following the start-up phases, projects that were subsequently designed specifically for EUTF funding are seen to have been well-conceived, though some suffered from design weaknesses relating to insufficient baseline information, incomplete results frameworks and unrealistic start-up timelines. A number of these issues were later addressed in collaboration with the MLS consultants, so that overall project designs have consistently improved over the period.

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[66] Court of Auditors' Special report 32/2018, p. 4.


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**IP contracting: Success and problems**. Overall, the contracting process has been quicker than normal since instead of putting tasks out to tender, the local EUD could contract a so-called *preferred IP*[67]. These preferred IPs included MS implementing agencies like GIZ, AFD and FIIAP; UN agencies like IOM and UNHCR; and large international NGOs. Some projects have been implemented by national authorities while some regional programmes have been handled by regional bodies like IGAD.

The larger than usual role for the UN is mostly due to EUTF's focus on the various dimensions of migration. UN bodies have formal mandates with respect to migration issues, often had a presence on the ground and an access to the actors involved. International NGOs have a history of working in difficult situations including where the public sector has minimal or no presence, so for these reasons NGOs were logical partners for EUTF.

While initial agreement on contracting was often expeditious, the actual contract negotiations in several cases took a long time because, according to several EUDs, the selected IP either faced challenges or wanted to change contractual terms and were in a strong bargaining position to obtain such changes. For the IPs, the challenge was that they still had to comply with duty-of-care responsibilities often in difficult situations so creating local conditions, identifying appropriate candidates etc. was challenging. According to EUDs, this was a particular issue for MS agencies that were not, in some cases, very familiar with the thematic field or geographic area.

**Implementing partners: NGOs generally positive.** For many NGOs, contracting was faster and simpler than in other programmes, although discussions about budget size, overheads etc. could take time. EUDs have been flexible and listening – some see this trend pre-dating EUTF – so interventions could be more tailored to the situation on the ground. The EU is still demanding with regard to its reporting requirements, but these costs have not been any greater than for other EU contracts.

**UN Agencies: EUTF positive but demanding**. In a number of situations, UN agencies are best placed to address the task and, for the UN, the EUTF has increased stakeholder awareness around core concerns such as the increasing number of displaced and their precarious situation. The EUTF has also increased the UN agencies' budgetary resources considerably, allowing them to scale up their activities. They experience what is perceived as a lack of coherence in the approaches, however. For example, one UN agency has been given framework agreements in NOA and HOA but 12 separate contracts in the SLC plus a framework agreement. Similarly, reporting requirements are not consistent, the MLS indicators are not interpreted the same way in all countries, there are constant demands for *ad hoc* reporting including from various MS, so contract management costs are seen as high.

**MS agencies: Mixed views.** For MS agencies, EUTF has posed opportunities and challenges. While new projects are welcome, they have in some cases been given less preparation time since the process is quicker. This means that the time for agreeing job descriptions, identifying candidates, having them vetted and approved is shorter. Some of the EUTF thematic areas are new to them so it took time had to build their expertise or find the right partners and/or local actors. The projects are often in more difficult-to-access areas where duty-of-care is more complicated and requires more preparations.

The rules and procedures for contract implementation are standard EU regulations, so while some EUDs complain that the MS agencies are sluggish and following standard, meticulous routines,

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[67] This term has occasioned some comments that EUDs have not been "locked" to so-called *preferred IPs*, so the practice may have varied across windows. Most EUDs have referred to this system, however, which has on the one hand allowed them to contract without competition, but thus also has limited the field of eligible IPs, which has not always been helpful. For some EUDs, such as Somalia, that already operate under the EU's emergency operations procedures, this does not represent any operational change with the exception of the list of preferred IPs.

MS agencies reply that this is correct, because that is what they are obliged to do. Over time, implementation issues are being handled better as IPs develop their experience, on-the-ground presence and local understanding (Annex O).

One argument for using MS agencies was that this might provide an incentive for the MS to provide additional funding, based on the original concept of the EUTF as a trust fund that could mobilize additional resources from the various MS. In the case of Germany, this has to a considerable extent happened. While GIZ has been awarded contracts for around EUR 245 million, Germany has been by far the largest external donor to the EUTF providing about EUR 225 million (Table 2.2) and has co-financed a number of programmes. France, whose implementing agencies AFD, Civipol and *Expertise France* have received contracts of even higher value - about EUR 253 million - has contributed much less (EUR 9 million). But to some MS, the notion of bilateral contributions to the EUTF is seen as somewhat contradictory since the EUTF *is* EU funds – which come from the MS (Table 2.1). Furthermore, since most MS do not have implementing agencies, this incentive for funding the EUTF was not convincing.

For EUDs, the preference for MS agencies has been a mixed blessing. While EDF procurement rules include strict deadlines for coming to agreement, this does not hold for EUTF and some MS agencies have taken over a year to reach agreement. A number of these agencies did not have much experience in working in EUTF fields and ultimately sub-contracted local CSOs for actual implementation. This cascading of sub-contracting could take time, with the overall process ending up not being as time- and cost-saving as intended.

## 4.4 EQ-4: Improved Economic Opportunities and Employability

**EQ-4: How and to what extent has EUTF contributed to improve employability and economic opportunities of target populations?**

*The Main Finding is that EUTF has made modest contributions to increasing economic opportunities for target populations.*

**Employment support: Most success with self-employment interventions**. EUTF is supporting employability among target beneficiaries through providing technical and vocational education and training (TVET) and/or skills development training. This has improved personal income generating activities through increased self-employment/entrepreneurship amongst beneficiaries.

**Training for labour market: Uneven results**. TVET training activities that have aimed at providing skills for local labour markets, have produced uneven results. Some training schemes, especially in rural areas, have supplied the local labour market with relevant skills whereas in most countries, indications are that the gap between the skills provided and the requirements of employers persists.

Complementary services like job search assistance and counselling are usually not provided, and support for improving the investment and business climate in areas of relevance to target beneficiaries shows a varied picture. A few countries report partnerships between EUTF interventions and local development agencies, while in other countries these partnerships are less evident for two main reasons: (i) lack of planning and involvement of private sector agents; (ii) lack of a national strategy and public bodies focusing on these issues.

**Local economic opportunities vs. reduced migration: Limited evidence.** While better skills improves the probability of improved livelihoods, it is less clear if the extensive and varied type of training provided actually leads to a stronger integration of the target population into the local labour market in a way that will prevent people from becoming irregular migrants. A key reason

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for this is that the target populations for the various training interventions – displaced persons and women and youth among them in particular – are not the ones most likely to engage in long-distance, high-risk and costly migration to Europe (Section 1.3).

### JC-4.1: EUTF is addressing labour market barriers faced by target beneficiaries.

*The Finding is that EUTF has faced challenges addressing labour market barriers. TVET training in remote areas has provided employable skills though there is limited evidence of beneficiaries landing jobs in the local labour market. Where MS projects support national systems, EUTF contributes to better TVET capacity and governance.*

| JC-4.1 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-4.1.1:** Evidence that EUTF is improving employable skills among target beneficiaries, with particular reference to women and youth (**MLS 1.4**). | *** | *** | *** | ** | ** | *** |
| **I-4.1.2:** Evidence that EUTF is improving labour market conditions for target beneficiary groups (through for example job search assistance, counselling, etc.) with particular reference to women and youth | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** | * |
| **I-4.1.3:** Evidence that target beneficiaries who have received employable skills are finding jobs/employment in the local labour market | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** | * |

### Beneficiaries of services provided through employment and economic programmes

| MLS Code | Beneficiaries | SLC end 2018 | SLC end 2019-Q3 | HOA end 2018 | HOA end 2019-Q3 | Total end 2018 | Total end 2019-Q3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1. | # jobs created | 15,572 | 28,403 | 16,601 | 31,279 | 32,173 | 59,682 |
| 1.2 | # MSMEs created or supported | 1,519 | 7,251 | 1,960 | 4,584 | 3,479 | 11,835 |
| 1.4. | # benefitting professional training (TVET) or skills development | 21,491 | 52,339 | 15,609 | 27,636 | 37,100 | 80,075 |

Source: Altai Consulting, MLS reports, HOA and SLC.

**Employment creation: Numbers growing rapidly.** Employable skills in the target populations are being improved through TVET and/or skills development both in the SLC and HOA regions, and to a lesser extent in the NOA region. The main types of support recorded by **MLS 1.4** are skills development trainings such as financial literacy, numeracy and other soft skills. Most of the jobs created (**MLS-1.1**) are self-employment positions, jobs in micro small and medium enterprises (**MLS-1.2**), and cash for work. Women have gained more from self-employment and jobs in MSMEs compared to cash for work, which is a modality often used for male-dominated construction work. The numbers point to a rapid increase in all metrics over time, although the absolute numbers compared with the potential beneficiary groups remain low (Table 1.1).

**Addressing labour market barriers: Supporting national efforts.** In some countries, EUTF has addressed labour market barriers by supporting national efforts to strengthen the vocational training system (such as in Senegal, Guinea, the Gambia). The aim is to provide better skills needed by the labour market, and to extend vocational training provision to remote regions with potential migrants or displaced persons whose pressure to migrate will consequently be reduced. In Senegal, EUTF is enabling TVET extension to regions not previously covered by the national education system, such as Tambacounda, Kédougou, Casamance. EUTF is thus supporting the broader geographic coverage through three new centres and six mobile training units as an innovative option to improve access to the VET.

**Labour market barriers and weak state capacity: Challenges are much greater.** In Somalia, a mix of natural disasters, longer term climate change, conflict and insecurity, unstable government, poor rule of law, and unstable conditions for private investments have made labour market interventions much less successful. In Libya, a number of EUTF-financed projects implemented by UNDP, IOM, and GIZ, involve infrastructure rehabilitation and construction, with

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potential impact on local labour markets. Other training activities, aimed at promoting enterprise development and income-generating activities, may also support local area economic development. However, neither ROM reports nor field visits offer clear indications whether such results are in fact emerging and whether they will be sustainable. Another complicating factor has been that where the EUTF targeting has been very focused on the migrant groups, local communities complain that their needs are being neglected, potentially causing some resentment and discord between migrants and host communities.

**More integrated approach: EUTF pointing towards model of success.** In some countries, EUTF-funded interventions link up with training centres, chambers of commerce, etc., and, in this way, allowing the programme to respond better to the needs of the local labour market. This joined-up approach is even more successful when part of national policies and efforts. In Senegal, EUTF interventions coincided with the introduction of a new policy which obliges employers to contribute to the professional development of their employees. This includes both continuous vocational training at the company level as well as in the occupational vocational training system. There has also been a process of decentralization in which TVET responsibilities have been extended to regions and departments. The essential aim here is to adopt a more participatory approach, with the involvement of training centres, chambers of commerce, local development agencies, to assessing skills gaps and to adjusting the curricula and training to bridge those gaps. This, in turn, is expected to contribute to an improved environment for training investment and development as well as to a more effective system of training provision. In Ethiopia, interventions on vocational training are also based on labour market assessments and a linkage with the private sector, introducing apprenticeships and providing support to the public employment service.

**Successful training: Extending the vision**. Training centres often provide activities that are to guide the students in the job market. However, such job search assistance and counselling have not been a strong component in the countries visited, though such 'soft' skills are requested by trainees to improve their chances of employment.

**Training for new beneficiary groups: Mixed results**. EUTF has also supported national vocational training strategies to support a new beneficiary group: returning migrants. This poses specific challenges in terms of socio-professional integration. In countries like Niger, the EUTF has funded thousands of jobs, largely in the Agadez region, through short-term and high-impact income-generating activities. The extent to which this has been able to compensate for the total income lost as a result of the implementation of the new law against migrant smuggling is not clear. For the former migrant smugglers themselves, however, incomes have clearly reduced as a result.

**Training for youth and women: Women seem to benefit equally.** EUTF was to target groups considered likely to engage in irregular migration as well as those forcibly displaced. Within these groups, youth and women were to be paid particular attention. However, since about 80% of irregular migrants are young men, the design of EUTF training interventions in regions that have a history of high irregular migration needed to also reflect the potential migrant population.

According to the survey, both IPs and the EUDs are quite positive about the ability of TVET programmes to reach women and youth. The survey suggests, however, that TVET interventions are slightly less effective for women in addressing barriers to labour markets, or in becoming self-employed. However, respondents also believe that women and youth are succeeding more or less at the same rates when it comes to accessing finance, which is positive given the additional barriers that women typically face. Overall, therefore, it may be that TVET programmes are in fact particularly successful when it comes to supporting women, though it should be borne in mind that the survey did not cover the actual beneficiaries but only those on the "supply side" of the EUTF interventions, and it may therefore have over-estimated the impact that TVET interventions have had on women.

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## JC-4.2: EUTF is strengthening private sector opportunities for target beneficiaries.

> **The Finding** is that EUTF support to the private sector is weak. Better business development services through national/local development agencies and business associations have provided some results, but contributions to the investment and business climate relevant to target beneficiaries are limited. The diaspora has provided limited investments but may in fact encourage irregular migration since they are seen to do well abroad.

| JC-4.2 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-4.2.1:** Evidence that EUTF is improving access to finance for MSMEs for target beneficiaries, with particular reference to women and youth | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** |
| **I-4.2.2:** Evidence that EUTF has contributed to better business development services of relevance to target beneficiaries (*MLS 1.6*). | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** |
| **I-4.2.3:** Evidence that EUTF has contributed to improving the investment and business climate in areas of relevance to target beneficiaries. | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** | * |
| **I-4.2.4:** Evidence that EUTF has strengthened the involvement of the diaspora in the development of these countries' economies (*MLS 3.1*). | *** | *** | *** | *** | *** | ** |
| **I-4.2.5:** Evidence that target beneficiaries have improved their levels of self-employment/ entrepreneurship (*MLS 1.3*). | ** | ** | *** | *** | *** | ** |
| **I-4.2.6:** Evidence that returnees through AVRR have found employment or established own enterprise/ business. | * | ** | * | * | * | **0** |

### Beneficiaries of services provided through employment and economic programmes

| MLS Code | Beneficiaries | SLC end 2018 | SLC end 2019-Q3 | HOA end 2018 | HOA end 2019-Q3 | Total end 2018 | Total end 2019-Q3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.2 | # MSMEs created or supported | 1,519 | 7,251 | 1,960 | 4,584 | 3,479 | 11,835 |
| 1.3. | # assisted to develop income generating activities | 70,163 | 150,857 | 104,064 | 163,318 | 174,227 | 314,175 |
| 1.6. | # industrial parks, business infrastructure constructed, expanded, improved | 14 | 41 | 4 | 4 | 18 | 45 |
| 3.1. | # projects by diaspora members | 19 | 44 | N/C | N/C | 19 | 44 |

Source: Altai Consulting, MLS reports, HOA and SLC.

**Livelihoods support: Rapid growth.** The support to increase local livelihoods has led to rapid growth in the number of MSMEs created or supported (**MLS-1.2**) and the number of people assisted to develop self-employment activities (**MLS-1.3**). Larger infrastructural investments are much fewer, though in the SLC region this has picked up considerably during the last period for which data are available (**MLS-1.6**). Investments by the diaspora in local activities remains sporadic, though again the SLC region records some growth (**MLS 3.1**).

**Supporting entrepreneurship: Does it reduce irregular migration?** The EUTF has provided considerable funding for activities that support target groups to develop income-generating activities. Promotion of entrepreneurship has been supported through public campaigns in countries like Senegal and Gambia. These campaigns appear to be having success in disseminating the idea that young people can start up and achieve success in their own country instead of doing that abroad. One argument is that they can finance the start up in their own countries with the same money that they are ready to pay the smugglers to take the irregular trip to Europe. In fact, only a minority of migrants, including irregular migrants, aspire or have the means to cross to Europe as most simply want to find work in places like Libya (historically) and Morocco. Furthermore, it is difficult to identify the potential migrants since many are young people who are outside of the system and often interact more with NGOs than with the organs of the state. The other challenge

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is that many youths do not want to start up their own business, for a number of reasons – they prefer employment.

**Self-employment achievements: There *are* success stories**. The field visits identified a number of MSMEs that are succeeding. These include the creation of women-led agri-businesses in Senegal, commercial sewing projects and brickmaking in Ethiopia, and miscellaneous small businesses that have stimulated the local economy in Agadez.

**Access to credit and business advice: Obstacles remain.** In Ethiopia, some returnees have received assistance to start up self-employment activities with mixed results though some clear success stories exist. In Libya local economic development strategies have been elaborated, and a local business incubator/co-working space was launched in Benghazi, but results are unclear in part because the banking system in Libya has essentially collapsed.

**Success stories: National framework is key**. In the Gambia, where the small size of the country allows for a more integrated approach to private sector development, EUTF-funded interventions benefit from the favourable political context in which the transition to democracy has ensure the active involvement of a strong diversity of stakeholders. Trade associations and national authorities cooperate to improve the business environment, boosting cooperatives and micro-credit institutions. The Gambia thus shows how important it is that key political and institutional parameters coincide for more general success in the area of private sector development.

**Private sector partners: Largely absent**. In most countries the private sector is largely absent from EUTF funded activities, with some exception. In Senegal, the local business environment has been enhanced by supporting the expansion and development of two economic development agencies in new regions. NGOs are providing coaching and mentors to beneficiaries to help them scale up their businesses. In Somalia, trading centres and markets have been supported in order to stimulate business activities and professional opportunities for local communities in areas of migrant return. With regard to the improvement of business climate, 14 industrial parks and/or business infrastructures have been constructed or improved in the SLC region.

**The role of the diaspora: Contradictory signals**. In some countries, the EUTF is encouraging the diaspora to invest in their regions of origin. Several projects in the three EUTF windows are developing diaspora investment models for local business development. These models are being developed with the support of relevant European diaspora networks, and in close partnerships with national authorities. There is certainly an increased attraction by migrants living in Europe to the intervention zones as opportunities arise. However, the diaspora may at the same time represent role-models of "successful migrants" that may *encourage* irregular migration to Europe, undermining the communication campaigns that are directed towards *discouraging* youth to migrate.

**AVRR and VHR: So far limited results**. Data on the ability of returnees under assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) and VHR programs to find employment or establish own businesses is scarce. Projects have identified three key challenges: (i) the returnees' own rejection of reintegration; (ii) the authorities' lack of will to support returnees' reintegration; and (iii) lack of experience and coordination among public bodies mandated to address the issue. Returnees find it particularly difficult to start up or to find their own way to be socially and economically reintegrated after a return process they might consider as a personal failure. Weak social protection structures also play a role in this.

### JC-4.3: EUTF projects/programmes carefully consider sustainability factors

*The Key Finding is that most SO-1 interventions did not include sustainability concerns, largely due to their emergency nature, so where interventions require public funds to maintain results, sustainability is generally not assured.*

| JC-4.3 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-4.3.1:** Evidence that EUTF projects/programmes in their design and implementation integrate sustainability factors and considerations | * | * | ** | * | ** | * |

**Sustainability of interventions: Major challenge**. The projects under this SO were primarily designed to address the short-term consequences of forced displacement. This has meant that the more structural and capacity building dimensions could typically not be addressed, and the sustainability of interventions was not the primary concern. Most interventions were more localised, not necessarily based on identified needs of the labour market, and not well anchored in a longer-term labour market strategy. It is not surprising that an emergency instrument has not been able to ensure that this foundation is in place when designing urgent responses to what are real needs. Challenges now include strengthening relevance, institutional continuity and financial sustainability of the largely scattered initiatives that nevertheless provide needed assistance for intended beneficiary groups.

**EUTF and sustainability: Public sector commitment key.** Where EUTF interventions are implemented by MS agencies that have a history on the ground, they often have a greater likelihood of sustainability due to the MS history of supporting national structures and institutions. Most projects in Senegal, for example, build on previous interventions by MS, where Lux-Dev has a real partnership with the TVET line ministry and is fully aligned with its strategy. Lux-Dev also has agreements with other public bodies and contributes to enhancing local agencies' and institutions' participation in the development of the new training system. In the Gambia, the prospect of sustainability is also enhanced by the involvement of national counterparts at national, regional and local level. In the SINCE project in Ethiopia, TVET activities are strengthening institutional capacity and the capacity of teachers and provide training that responds to market demands. Many of the trainees acquire marketable professional skills, though given the precarious labour market, this does not guarantee that they can find a job that provides a stable livelihood. Furthermore, where interventions require government funding to maintain the training activities, sustainability is not assured. It was also seen that involving private sector in delivering some of the services would strengthen local support and sustainability, but such partnerships are not common. Finally, little thought seems to have gone into developing realistic exit strategies, where one exception is some of the projects in Ethiopia.

**Sustainability in fragile states: Prospects are poor.** In Mauritania, where the EUTF is strongly contributing to the EU's employment portfolio, sustainability is undermined because there is little attention given to government capacities to back the projects. In other countries where national institutions are not sufficiently strong or not involved, sustainability appears weak, and challenges of funding are found everywhere. In Djibouti, for example, the TRANSFORM project has started training delivery but efforts to establish a sustainable vocational training institute are still ongoing. In Niger, an evaluation of the PASSERAZ project found that income-generating activities and high-intensity labour projects allowed beneficiaries to own assets, but the sustainability of those outputs and their local ownership is questionable without follow up support and longer-term financing arrangements. In Somalia, various projects have taken steps to improve the probability of sustainable results, but this is fragile at both local and national levels given the volatile conditions in the country. Projects in Libya also place little emphasis on sustainability since the emphasis there has been on responding to the humanitarian crisis in the country. To the extent that

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actions implemented require budgetary commitment by the government, such as maintenance of buildings and equipment, the financial fragility of government precludes much support.

## 4.5 EQ-5: Household and Community Resilience

> **The Main Finding** *is that EUTF resilience programmes have strengthened the capacity of basic service providers, improved rural livelihoods and built disaster preparedness at local level. However, expected impact on migration levels is modest. Sustainability is threatened by lack of government funding commitments and limited private sector involvement in service delivery.*

**EUTF resilience programmes: Short- and long-term focus.** The resilience programmes funded under the EUTF aim to strengthen access to basic services such as health and education, and livelihoods both in the short- and long-term. The EUTF responds to short-term basic needs through food distribution, cash transfers, material supplies, health care provision and education services. Other concrete supports include agricultural inputs and tools, etc. For the longer term, most programmes have a capacity building component which may include awareness raising, training and technical assistance, and the (re)construction of community facilities (water supply, schools, clinics, storage). In several programmes, the formulation of local development/disaster plans is supported. The EUTF enabled the EU to allocate more funding to resilience programmes than would have been possible under the EDF.

**Targeting: Vulnerable households and communities**. Technical assessments of vulnerabilities in the target areas and populations have been done to a varying extent for EUTF programmes. A review of resilience activities implemented reveals that EUTF programmes are generally relevant and address key needs and vulnerabilities of the target populations.[68] EUTF programmes have been more successful in working closely with local authorities than EDF funded programmes, since the latter are normally channelled through national ministries.

**Implementation success: IP selection and focus**. Selecting IPs with previous experience in project implementation in the target area is important, as confirmed in several ROM reports. But some resilience building projects, due to their multi-faceted nature, can be excessively complex and ambitious. One ROM review notes that one of the RESET II projects in Ethiopia shows weaknesses related to design/intervention logic and contractual implementation arrangements, as the project aims to improve community welfare in general. Expected benefits include access to health and nutrition, diversified income activities, reduced malnutrition, household dietary, family planning, increased agricultural yields, increased livestock productivity and others. A similar conclusion was drawn on another project where the common theme was that the projects were looking at general development problems instead of concentrating on those related to drought and other natural disasters.[69]

> **JC-5.1 The EUTF is contributing to ensuring basic social services to target beneficiaries: local vulnerable groups/communities, refugees/IDPs as relevant.**

> **The Finding** *is that progress is being made in improving the provision of basic social services to relevant target groups. The capacity of basic service providers to deliver such services is also being enhanced. Progress varies between projects, but there is evidence of improvements in the nutrition and health status of some target groups.*

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[68] Study on Results from ROM Review of Trust Fund Projects, 2017-2019, April 2019
[69] ROM Report: HOA-ET-01-03 Building resilience and creation of economic opportunities, Liben cluster, RESET II, April 2018

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| JC-5.1 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-5.1.1:** Evidence that the capacity of institutions providing basic services (nutrition and food security, health, education, water, social protection) to the most vulnerable, including refugees and displaced persons (***MLS 2.8***) | *** | ** | *** | *** | ** | *** |
| **I-5.1.2:** Evidence that the health, nutritional etc. status of target beneficiaries has improved due to EUTF interventions (***MLS 2.9***). | ** | ** | *** | ** | ** | ** |

**Beneficiaries of basic services provided through resilience programmes**

| MLS code | Beneficiaries | SLC end 2018 | SLC end 2019-Q3 | HOA end 2018 | HOA end 2019-Q3 | Total end 2018 | Total end 2019-Q3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.6 | Hectares land rehabilitated | 8,141 | 35,537 | 45,834 | 54,919 | 53,975 | 90,456 |
| 2.7 | # people reached by info campaigns on resilience building and basic rights | 370,772 | 1,004,493 | 451,578 | 803,121 | 822,350 | 1,807,614 |
| 2.8 | # staff trained to strengthen service delivery | 16,295 | 35,413 | 20,440 | 44,607 | 36,735 | 80,020 |
| 2.9 | # people having access to improved basic services | 488,562 | 3,047,894 | 3,878,131 | 4,487,084 | 4,366,693 | 7,534,978 |

Source: Altai Consulting, MLS reports, HOA and SLC.

**Provision of basic services: Large numbers reached.** Generally, resilience programmes provide a wide variety of basic services, including direct nutritional support, education, health, water supply and sanitation. These programmes also strengthen food security by improving agriculture, livestock and fisheries in rural communities and addressing environmental protection. The programmes have effectively targeted intended EUTF beneficiaries including vulnerable communities that are potential sources of migrants.

Compared to EDF resilience programmes, EUTF has been especially good at working more directly with local authorities and communities. By contrast, EDF projects are often channelled through national ministries with limited trickling down to local levels.[70]

**Large numbers: Uncertain goal attainment level.** Programme data reflect the results of some of the larger-scale interventions with respect to basic social services, nutrition and food security (agricultural improvement) services in both the SLC and HOA regions. In the HOA region, basic social services and food security has reached substantial numbers of beneficiaries. In SLC, on the other hand, nutrition assistance has become increasingly important. The data also show a significant increase in outreach during 2019.

A weakness in MLS data is that no target values are shown, so it is not immediately apparent how successful EUTF has been in achieving the quantitative targets. In Somalia, programmes provide basic services, in particular access to water through the RESTORE programme, though the extent to which this addresses local deficiencies is unclear. In Ethiopia, efforts to improve access to basic services was initially slow, but projects have accelerated and expect to achieve their targets. In Senegal, the EUTF has strengthened basic services in the fields of nutrition, access to water, primary health, hygiene, awareness raising while in Niger, the EUTF helped to improve access to basic services for refugees and host populations through the innovative land parcel project in Diffa.[71]

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[70] Interviews with EU Brussels staff and EUDs.
[71] Annex F, case country notes.

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The survey shows that close to 80% of respondents either agree or strongly agree that the resilience programmes have had a positive impact on ensuring better access to basic services amongst the target populations.[72]

**Efficiency of implementation: Generally improving.** The achievement of targets for basic service delivery is affected by the efficiency of project performance, which varies. Many projects experienced significant delays in implementation due to slow disbursement of funds to IPs, longer-than expected inception periods, poor coordination among IPs, lack of budget for specific activities, conflicts in the region where the project operates, or droughts. However, several projects have seen a pick-up in results as project efficiency improves over time. In the light of this improved performance, no-cost extensions were approved for many projects.

*JC-5.2 The EUTF is contributing to ensuring more robust livelihoods for target beneficiaries: local vulnerable groups/communities, refugees/IDPs as relevant*

*The Finding is that the EUTF is contributing to improving livelihoods for target beneficiaries as a result of its crop/livestock productivity-enhancing interventions and to a lesser extent through promotion of new income generating activities.*

| JC-5.2 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-5.2.1:** Evidence that authorities are providing relevant support to target beneficiaries to move to more appropriate and resilient agricultural production and practices. | *** | ** | *** | ** | ** | ** |
| **I-5.2.2:** Evidence that target beneficiaries are applying appropriate and resilient agricultural practices | *** | ** | *** | ** | ** | ** |
| **I-5.2.3:** Evidence that target beneficiaries experience their livelihoods situation as more stable or improved due to EUTF interventions | *** | ** | *** | ** | ** | ** |

**Rural livelihoods: Improving**. There is evidence that livelihoods are improving through a variety of means, including: (i) improving and diversifying crop production through extension services, provision of inputs (especially improved seeds), and improved access to water; (ii) improved livestock practices through veterinary services, improved fodder seeds and production practices, in-kind provision of small ruminants; and (iii) support to income generating activities through Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLAs) and microfinance, especially targeted at women and young people (honey production, petty trading, tailoring, catering, etc.).

**Improved livelihoods: Uncertain migration impact**. The MLS reports for HOA and SLC note that nearly 670,000 people had benefited from livelihood support (through, for example, agricultural land improvement, better irrigation, etc.). A case study of a resilience programme based on an integrated approach in Wolaita cluster in Ethiopia under RESET II shows how an integrated approach can more efficiently build the resilience of vulnerable rural communities through better access to basic services[73]. While the Wolaita zone is considered migration prone, it is not clear that migratory movements in times of scarcity would have involved *irregular* migration or simply traditional temporary movements.

**Support to women and youth: Lack of full value-chain analysis**. Efforts to stimulate income-generating activities focused heavily on the development of micro-enterprises. A number of efforts were, however, found to lack focus and did not pay enough attention to the establishment of sustainable value chains and viable off-farm micro-firms[74].

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[72] Annex G: Table 2.
[73] Altai Consulting, RESET II Wolaita Cluster - Case study of a Resilience Programme based on an Integrated Approach, July 2018
[74] ROM Review:

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**Rural resilience: "Whole of community" approach.** Most resilience projects reviewed have addressed the plight of rural communities facing natural resource scarcities due to combinations of soil exhaustion, population growth, climate change and conflict. In many of these cases, IDPs are forced to leave their place of origin due to conflict or natural disasters and move to a location not too far away where they can find shelter and subsistence livelihoods. The sudden influx of IDPs pose particular challenges to host communities, though in general the building of resilience entails both short-term emergency and medium-term development measures. This leads to the "whole of community" approach championed by development actors[75] and implemented by many EUTF projects with what appears to be considerable success in terms of building resilience.

**Urban displacement: More complex.** When forced displacement is to urban areas – often because they offer better safety – the situation is often quite different. A sudden inflow of IDPs tends to cause conflicts with existing residents. It puts strains on infrastructure like housing and water. Newcomers are desperate for incomes and push wages down. They disrupt local political, ethnic and social networks and therefore are often marginalised by the existing residents.

The starting point for putting in place any "whole of community" programme is thus complex. Attempts at addressing such rural-to-urban dislocations, such as in Mogadishu and Baidoa in Somalia, are less well documented but face difficulties. Differentiating such forced displacement from regular rural-to-urban migration may be important since they may constitute different situations, and REF studies seem to focus more on the organised economic rural-to-urban move[76]. Forced displacement to urban areas is likely to increase, however, so this is an issue to follow.

> *JC-5.3 The EUTF is strengthening the capacity of institutions to improve household and community resilience.*

> ***The Finding** is that local institutions and community structures have been strengthened in local and disaster risk reduction (DRR) planning and some disaster risk management plans have been produced.*

| JC-5.3 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-5.3.1:** Evidence that local institutions have developed strategies and plans with costings for improving local community and household resilience | ** | ** | *** | ** | ** | ** |
| **I-5.3.2:** Evidence that the capacity of relevant institutions to planning for and carrying out risk and disaster management of relevance to target beneficiaries has improved | ** | ** | *** | ** | ** | ** |
| **2I-5.3.3:** Evidence that relevant institutions are implementing risk and disaster management activities that improve the resilience of target beneficiary communities with respect to shocks and stress (***MLS 2.5***). | ** | ** | *** | ** | ** | ** |

**Beneficiaries of basic services provided through resilience programmes**

| MLS code | Beneficiaries | SLC end 2018 | SLC end 2019-Q3 | HOA end 2018 | HOA end 2019-Q3 | Total end 2018 | Total end 2019-Q3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.5 | # local gov'ts, communities that adopt, implement local DRR strategies | 35 | 298 | 119 | 174 | 154 | 472 |

Source: Altai Consulting, MLS reports, HOA and SLC.

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[75] World Bank (2020), "Group Strategy for Fragility, Conflict and Violence 2020-2025", referenced earlier when discussing JC-2.2.

[76] See the three studies on Gulu, Eldoret and Dire Dawa and the summary report, "The Lure of the City: Synthesis report on rural to urban migration in Ethiopia, Kenya and Yganda", undated, commissioned under the HOA REF framework agreement with the consortiuim led by SOAS. Even the highly useful Altai February 2020 study on "Lessons Learnt from the EUTF for Africa" does not look into this distinction.

**Field projects: Strengthening local bodies**. Most resilience projects with field interventions have been successful in establishing close coordination with public institutions, from central to local and village level. The resilience interventions have been closely aligned with each level's priorities and planning, and MOUs have been concluded with public bodies. Capacity building support for public institutions has also been provided, including for local offices[77].

A review of a resilience programme in Mali concluded that the project had contributed to strengthening the leadership roles of the authorities and technical services at all levels. This leadership role included the coordination, implementation and evaluation of the combined set of interventions that improve the resilience of the vulnerable population with respect to food and nutrition security[78].

Many resilience programmes support community level disaster management planning, such as in several RESET II projects in Ethiopia. The MLS data show that since 2019 the number of local bodies implementing DRR strategies have strongly increased.

The survey shows that close to 60% of respondents either agree or strongly agree that resilience programmes have been successful in building the capacity of local institutions[79].

> ***JC-5.4 The EUTF is supporting improved resilience by strengthening links between emergency relief and development activities.***

> ***The Finding** is that EUTF resilience projects take into account ongoing programmes in the areas of food and agriculture and broader economic development. The involvement of ECHO ensures complementarity with emergency aid, though coordination is sometimes less positive.*

| JC-5.4 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-5.4.1:** Evidence of increased cooperation between relief and development organisations to support local resilience, due to EUTF interventions. | *** | *** | *** | ** | ** | *** |
| **I-5.4.2:** Evidence that local authorities are confident their ability to handle future shocks or stress has increased due to EUTF interventions | ** | ** | *** | ** | ** | ** |
| **I-5.4.3:** Evidence that vulnerable households perceive their ability to cope with stress and shocks has improved due to EUTF interventions | ** | ** | *** | ** | ** | ** |

**EUTF resilience interventions: Links between development and humanitarian activities**. In the current EDF cycle (2014-2020) and in the Agenda for Change, the EU is supporting sustainable agriculture and food security as focal sectors.[80] Under the EUTF, there is close cooperation with ECHO, in particular through resilience building programmes, and ECHO has contributed EUR 50 million to the EUTF. ECHO is also invited to comment on all resilience-based programmes. There is also coordination with the US G8 New Alliance initiatives and EU-US reinforced cooperation on food security. Various donor committees are also in place to work with EU Member States and Norway. Substantial food support is provided through WFP.

The resilience programme in Mali conforms to the common intervention approach defined by the EUD and ECHO built on the strategic pillars of the Global Alliance for Resilience, AGIR, for Mali.[81] Another example is the RESET II programme in Ethiopia where ECHO and DEVCO did a joint needs assessment and formulated a joint strategy and action framework. In Somalia, the

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[77] Study on Results from ROM Review of Trust Fund Projects, 2017-2019, April 2019
[78] ROM Review: SAH-ML-01, Programme de l'alliance pour la resilience communautaire au Mali, March 2019
[79] Annex G: Table G.2.
[80] Study on Results from ROM Review of Trust Fund Projects, 2017-2019, April 2019
[81] ROM Review: SAH-ML-01, "Programme de l'alliance pour la resilience communautaire au Mali, March 2019

RE-INTEG and RESTORE programmes provide important bridges between emergency and development activities that strengthen the resilience of local communities and vulnerable households. In Senegal, the strategy followed by the Yellitaare project responds to the humanitarian-development nexus approach to combatting malnutrition and food-insecurity, where women's empowerment has been prioritized. In Niger, the Kallo Tchidaniwo project strengthens resilience of refugees and host communities through its links with the PARCA initiative (Humanitarian-Development Nexus) though no evidence of resilience outcomes is yet available and security concerns remain a serious obstacle to programme implementation.[82]

### JC-5.5 EUTF projects/programmes carefully consider sustainability factors

> ***The Finding*** *is that capacity building, training, strengthening of community structures, equipment and improvement of facilities contribute significantly to the sustainability of the interventions. Sustainability is, however, adversely affected by lack of public funds for continued basic social service delivery and lack of private sector involvement in service delivery.*

| JC-5.5 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-5.5.1:** Evidence that EUTF projects/programmes in their design and implementation integrate sustainability factors and considerations. | *** | ** | *** | ** | ** | ** |

**Capacity building: Improving sustainability**. EUTF resilience programmes often have substantial human and institutional capacity building components through training, extension services, technical assistance, provision of equipment and construction/rehabilitation of facilities. But several projects face problems: For example, in the Senegal-based, "*Projet de Renforcement de la Securite Alimentaire et Nutritionelle de la Region de Matam*", the state's limited budget will make it difficult to continue project activities once EUTF support ends.

Projects have often omitted to discuss funding after the project ends with district officials[83]: the end of allowances, *per diems* and lack of access to transport means district officials sometimes lose interest in projects once they close. Another problem is a high turnover of staff in local institutions, especially in remote areas.[84] The mid-term evaluation of the IMPACT programme in South Sudan concluded that the government is unlikely to be able to sustain incentive payments that the programme had made to primary school teachers after the end of the programme in March 2020.[85] On a resilience programme in Mali, it was found that no financial measures had been taken by the government to guarantee the continuity of the project's services. It also found that private sector parties that are currently part of the programme, have only been contracted to provide services but have not invested in order to guarantee the durability of the action.[86]

**Private sector involvement: Limited**. One avenue for improved sustainability is to involve the private sector in taking over the provision of services that were introduced or strengthened by the EUTF programme.  However, most projects do not involve the private sector in this way. A ROM review of a Chad programme pointed this out[87] as did the review of a food security project in Sudan, where the lack of significant private sector involvement was considered a threat to the sustainability of the project[88]. On the other hand, the RESET II Wolaita cluster resilience project has improved sustainability by integrating the project's actions with those of the government and

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[82] Annex F; Case country notes
[83] Study on Results from ROM Review of Trust Fund Projects, 2017-2019, February 2019
[84] Study on Results from ROM Review of Trust Fund Projects, 2017-2019, February 2019
[85] IBF International Consulting, Mid-term evaluation IMPACT Sudan, December 2018
[86] ROM Review: SAH-ML-01, "Programme de l'alliance pour la resilience communautaire au Mali, March 2019
[87] ROM Review: SAH-TD-02-01, Projet de renforcement de la resilience et de la cohabitation pacifique au Chad (PRCPT), March 2018
[88] ROM Review: HOA-SD-22-01, Food security and sustainable livelihoods for vulnerable communities in Red Sea State, April 2019.

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other partners. The government is involved in all of the programme's training activities in order to enhance its capacity. It also involves microfinance institutions and other private partners early in the project design, which contributes to the sustainability of the project's actions.[89]

**Impact on resilience: Benefits from seeing the 'big picture'.** A recent study looked in some detail at the impact of resilience programmes on target local communities.[90] It concluded that many of the current resilience programmes grew out of humanitarian approaches, and as a result focus on people and communities identified as vulnerable. This implies that programmes work on solutions that apply to small communities – a village or a group of people within the village or individual households. Many projects include a wide range of activities covering different sectors. There is evidence that these investments did have some impact on the resilience of targeted households/communities but only to a limited extent on the resilience of the population at large. The main exception to this is investment in water infrastructure, which often had a significant resilience impact. It recommends that investments should be made over a longer time period, address problems more systemically, focusing more on the working of markets, and build rural-urban linkages. More attention should be paid to structural factors, especially in the local or regional economy, as resilience investments need an overall guiding vision, strategy and plan.

## 4.6 EQ-6: Improved Migration Management

**EQ-6: How and to what extent has the EUTF contributed to improved migration management in partner countries?**

*The Main Finding is that EUTF is not well suited to longer-term migration policy development although it has contributed to protocols and procedures at sub-national levels and built capacity for migration management. It has achieved significant results in Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) and Voluntary Humanitarian Return (VHR) but there is little evidence about the concrete results of these reintegration efforts.*

**EUTF and migration management: Working in difficult contexts.** Key to understanding the EUTF's contribution to improved migration management is its status as an emergency funding channel working in difficult contexts. In particular, EUTF is often trying to engage in circumstances where partner country migration policy is poorly defined or non-existent. Its strategic and tactical approaches reside in a grey area between emergency humanitarian assistance, stabilisation, and development cooperation. Existing instruments like EDF and ENI are better suited to supporting policy formulation and implementation since experience shows that success requires more long-term collaboration and consultation.

**Migration management: A broad remit.** In line with the Valletta Action Plan, EUTF has promoted improved policies and practices, often using regional and cross-window projects to fund cross-border coordination and cooperation. These actions tend to be based on international norms and standards, and a migrant-centred, rights-based approach. In addition, EUTF has supported border management and addressed migrant smuggling and THB through direct assistance, Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR), and Voluntary Humanitarian Return (VHR).

**EUTF: Significant results in AVRR and VHR.** In Libya, EUTF has contracted IOM and UNHCR, two UN agencies with long-standing expertise and effective field presence, to support migrants stranded/detained in that country. EUTF is also financing re-integration programmes, particularly in West African countries but also in the Horn of Africa, though little is known about

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[89] Altai Consulting, RESET II Wolaita Cluster - Case study of a Resilience Programme based on an Integrated Approach, July 2018
[90] Ahmed Said, Helen Jeans, Justin Okwir and Yilma Muluken, The Assessment of Resilience Programme, Contribution to Reduce Adverse Effect of Drought on Pastoralists and Agropastoralists in Siti Zone, Somali Region of Ethiopia, Oxfam Research Reports, May 2019.

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the results of the second stage of return. While return is a fast-moving process that lends itself to timely quantitative indicators, reintegration is a more complex, long-term process that needs to be analysed in qualitative as well as quantitative terms.

**Protecting vulnerable groups: Important achievements.** EUTF has contributed to the protection of IDPs, vulnerable migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees. It has also provided direct assistance, sometimes despite national laws and policies impeding access by NGOs and even international organisations to those in need. EUTF actions have prioritised groups most at risk, specifically women and children, especially unaccompanied and separated minors. Somewhat surprisingly, there is little information specifically about the protection of victims of THB.

**The EUTF challenge: A short-term instrument.** Because of the EUTF's limited (five-year) time horizon, relatively little attention has been given to considerations of the sustainability of the actions supported. In the urgent situations that have been addressed, it has been almost taken for granted that continued donor support will be necessary to maintain the flow of benefits. Some capacity-building and institution-strengthening aspects favour sustainability, as do specific actions in the area of training, schooling and health, where end beneficiaries will continue to reap the benefits of today's action far into the future. For the most part, however, EUTF in the area of migration management has primarily been a "firefighting" tool.

*JC-6.1: Migration governance systems and practices at national and regional levels established/improved.*

*The Finding is that EUTF has promoted improved policies and practices as well as international coordination and cooperation in line with international norms and standards, migrant-centred, rights-based approaches.*

| JC-6.1 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-6.1.1:** Evidence that national migration/refugee laws, strategies, policies, plans have been prepared/ contents improved due to EUTF support. | ** | ** | *** | 0 | * | ** |
| **I-6.1.2:** Evidence that migration/asylum practices at national, regional, local levels are aligning with national policies and international norms and standards. | *** | *** | *** | 0 | * | *** |
| **I-6.1.3:** Evidence that migration authorities are collaborating across borders, improving coordination and information exchange due to EUTF. | * | ** | ** | ** | ** | ** |
| **I-6.1.4:** Evidence that migration/asylum policies and practices are (increasingly) compatible with a rights-based and migrant-centred approach (*MLS 3.6*). | *** | *** | *** | * | * | ** |

**Beneficiaries of activities regarding migration management**

| MLS Code | Beneficiaries | SLC end 2018 | SLC end 2019-Q3 | HOA end 2018 | HOA end 2019-Q3 | Total end 2018 | Total end 2019-Q3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.6 | # institutions, non-state actors strengthened in protection, migration management | 39 | 398 | 145 | 374 | 184 | 772 |
| 3.7 | # individuals trained in migration management | 1,158 | 2,535 | 6,310 | 14,410 | 7,468 | 16,945 |

Source: Altai Consulting, MLS reports, HOA and SLC.

**Migration management: Capacities improved.** Capacity building is accelerating, and the number of institutions and individuals that have received training and other forms of capacity development has grown rapidly (**MLS-3.6, 3.7**). The contents and results of these activities need to be tracked so as to better undertand their longer-term outcomes.

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**Policy development: Some advances**. Effective migration management depends on the presence of comprehensive national migration laws, strategies, policies, and plans. There is evidence in some countries that EUTF support has contributed to support policies and strategies at national level. In Niger, for example, the EU-financed AJUSEN budget support programme supported the development of a national migration policy that is expected to be in place, along with an action plan, by the end of 2020. In Morocco, EUTF supplemented migration sector budget support through its backing of the national migration strategy. In Mauritania, EUTF-financed budget support has as one of its objectives improved migration management, including protection of, and direct assistance to, the most vulnerable. In Senegal, inter-ministerial coordination is supported, and tutorials and continuous training is provided to national services involved in the fight against migrant smuggling and irregular migration, particularly trafficking. In the Horn of Africa, the regional Better Migration Management (BMM) project provided support to national legislative and policy drafting in Eritrea, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan and helped to transpose the UN Convention on Transnational Crime and its protocols into national legislation. In Ethiopia, BMM advised Government on a national migration policy while in Somalia BMM has concentrated more on capacity building than policy development.

**The Valletta Action Plan wide-ranging: EUTF more narrowly focused.** Despite its ambition to cover the wide range of migration and development issues as presented in the Valletta Action Plan, EUTF is, in its implementation, focused on irregular migration, border control, displacement, smuggling of migrants, and THB. A wide range of stakeholders interviewed expressed concern that while the Valletta Action Plan was a notable achievement, the EUTF has focused on issue of migration to Europe rather than the broad migration and development agenda that in particular African governments envisaged.

**EUTF interventions: Under intense scrutiny**. EU Member States, the European Parliament and civil society groups are tracking EUTF interventions to ensure that they support migration and asylum practices that are in conformity with international norms and standards, rights-based, and migrant-centred. The evidence is that EUTF takes these commitments seriously in its programming, as reflected in, among other things, the minutes of OpCom meetings. All implementing partners, many of them UN agencies, promote practices and policies in line with international norms and standards.

Even in Libya there has been some success in promoting a level of compliance with international protection standards. At the same time, EU advocacy for a more rights-based approach to migration management in that country has met with limited success, due to the continuing armed conflict over control of the country, and the criminal networks embedded on both sides of the conflict. The result is that existing law is not in conformity with international conventions to which Libya is a signatory. , Nevertheless, the EU has supported protection activities at disembarkation points, advocated for changes in the detention system, and provided some direct assistance to detainees, in addition to promoting VHR from the centres.

**Regional collaboration: Significant achievements**. Coordination, collaboration and information exchange are critical for improved cross-border migration governance. EUTF has been particularly successful in promoting such regional approaches in HOA, notably through three projects: BMM (noted above), the *Facility on Sustainable and Dignified Return and Reintegration in support of the Khartoum Process,* and *Towards Free Movement of Persons and Transhumance in the IGAD Region.* A major regional project aimed at combatting criminal networks is now being implemented by UNODC in NOA. Similarly, an integrated border management project joining Morocco and Tunisia also aims at combatting criminal networks. The cross-window action *Mediterranean City-to-City Migration* (MC2CM) project has already led to significant people-to-people contacts and exchanges of experience between cities and municipalities of North Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. *Coopération Sud-Sud,* which will promote coordination and

cooperation between Morocco and three West African countries of origin is now beginning full-scale implementation.

**JC-6.2: Systems and practices for dignified voluntary return and reintegration are established/ improved.**

*The Finding is that EUTF with IOM and UNHCR has achieved significant results in the areas of AVRR and VHR by addressing dire situations in Libya. While EUTF furthermore supports general reintegration though there are no data to document results or national commitment.*

| JC-6.2 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-6.2.1:** Evidence that national and local authorities are improving systems and practices regarding dignified AVRR. | *** | *** | *** | *** | * | *** |
| **I-6.2.2:** Evidence that national and local authorities are providing political support and resources to returning migrants for dignified AVRR (**MLS 3.4**). | ** | ** | ** | * | * | ** |
| **I-6.2.3:** Evidence that returnees are successfully integrating into communities due to AVRR/ EUTF. | * | * | * | * | * | * |

**Beneficiaries of activities regarding migration management**

| MLS Code | Beneficiaries | SLC end 2018 | SLC end 2019-Q3 | HOA end 2018 | HOA end 2019-Q3 | Total end 2018 | Total end 2019-Q3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.4 | # voluntary returns/ repatriations supported | 26,748 | 75,421 | 17,183 | 18,990 | 43,931 | 94,411 |

Source: Altai Consulting, MLS reports, HOA and SLC.

**AVRR and VHR: EUTF priorities.** Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) and Voluntary Humanitarian Return (VHR, a more urgent measure) have been high priorities for EUTF, whose strategic and tactical approaches are located in a grey area between emergency humanitarian assistance, stabilization, and development cooperation. This high priority, combined with the fact that agencies with specialised expertise and good field presence, notably IOM and UNHCR, have become implementing partners has resulted in this being a strong performing area of EUTF support. Also contributing has been the eagerness of some governments, such as Libya's, to rid themselves of unwanted irregular migrants. The Libya Country Note reports significant achievements in the area of IOM-implemented VHR, including good buy-in by central authorities. A theme running throughout the Libya Country Note is that national and local ownership of VHR is far stronger than support for protecting or improving the living conditions of migrants. An unexpected challenge is that the possibility of qualifying for UNHCR re-settlement to a third country discourages detainees from seeking VHR to their country of origin (**MLS-3.4**).

**Success rates: Little is known.** Much less is known about the success of reintegration efforts since successful reintegration is a slow-moving process. While the Niger Country Note reports precise data on numbers of returnees and even the number who have received EUTF-financed legal assistance for reintegration, but it is too early to see results. Similarly, Senegal reports 4500 migrants returned by planes and buses but little on successful reintegration. National buy-in for reintegration, evidenced by national and local authorities providing political support and resources to returnees, is important, as is the success of such support. EUTF is promoting political support and providing the financial means to provide resources to returnees (e.g., Country Note evidence for Ethiopia, Senegal, Somalia). For example, in Somalia, IOM with EUTF support and in close collaboration with national authorities, assisted over 10,000 returnees forced to return with reception assistance and early cash-for-work transition. Under the same project, IOM is working in border areas and returnees are receiving reception assistance and early cash-for-work transition as a specific intervention. However, nowhere has there emerged evidence of government commitment to continue support for returnees; much less qualitative evidence of how successfully returnees have reintegrated. In Senegal, reintegration has faced challenges linked to the lack of

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ownership by the Government. Projects to watch will include those in Ethiopia (for returnees from Europe) and Somalia, where the country analyses have so far found no relevant evidence. However, there is reportedly a fundamental lack of systems, structures, and policies related to return and reintegration in all the countries of the Horn of Africa region.

**JC-6.3: *Effective protection systems in place/ operational for IDPs, vulnerable migrants, refugees and victims of THB.***

*The Finding is that EUTF has provided significant protection and direct assistance to IDPs, vulnerable migrants, and refugees, though protection services are sometimes slow, and there is so far little evidence on the protection measures specifically targeted at victims of THB.*

| JC-6.3 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-6.3.1:** Evidence that vulnerable migrants in transit, IDPs, and refugees are protected or provided with direct assistance (***MLS 3.2***). | *** | *** | *** | * | * | *** |
| **I-6.3.2:** Evidence that victims of THB are assisted or referred to assistance services (***MLS 3.2***). | * | ** | *** | * | * | * |

**Beneficiaries of activities regarding migration management**

| MLS Code | Beneficiaries | SLC end 2018 | SLC end 2019-Q3 | HOA end 2018 | HOA end 2019-Q3 | Total end 2018 | Total end 2019-Q3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.2 | # migrants, IDPs, refugees protected, assisted | 2,439 | 7,079 | 48,308 | 58,753 | 50,747 | 65,832 |
| 3.3 | # (potential) migrants reached by info campaigns against irregular migration | 174,218 | 668,467 | 65,694 | 212,535 | 239,912 | 881,002 |

Source: Altai Consulting, MLS reports, HOA and SLC.

**EUTF protection: Significant assistance provided.** The emergency nature of EUTF calls for particular attention to be given to protection and direct assistance. There is solid evidence that vulnerable migrants in transit, IDPs, and refugees are protected or provided with direct assistance via EUTF.

In Libya, the EUTF beneficiary country experiencing the most acute crisis, there are numerous achievements in the provision of protection and direct assistance, especially via the EUTF-supported IOM intervention. Other agencies delivering significant EUTF-financed protection and direct assistance are UNICEF and UNHCR. Progress, however, is hampered by delays caused by policies that restrict access to populations in need of protection by NGOs and even international organisations, such as UNICEF and UNHCR.

Restrictions on IPs are not, however, confined to Libya – they were also noted in the largely favourable review of the Horn of Africa Regional Development and Protection Programme. Evidence of significant protection and direct assistance can be found in Somalia. A North of Africa regional project *Facility for Migrant Protection and Reintegration in North Africa* will be implemented by IOM but has not yet commenced. In Niger, EUTF has supported protection and assistance to refugees, IDPs, and host communities, but migrants have been underserved relative to their needs.

**Trafficked human beings: Underserved group?** Despite the emphasis in the EUTF strategy on tackling the smuggling of migrants and THB, there is little concrete evidence that victims of THB are assisted or referred to assistance services through EUTF support. This arises primarily due to the absence of disaggregated data on THB in EUTF information systems. Morocco was the only country where detailed information on the national situation was available. In Morocco, national policy guarantees access to protection and services for the victims of THB, but government has limited capacity in this area and often simply refers victims to local NGOs. Moreover, no EUTF

contribution to services for victims of THB has been found either in Morocco or in Libya, even though the latter country is known to be deeply affected by THB. A centre for victims of THB is in place in Niger, but there are questions about whether an adequate system is in place. THB has not received much attention in Senegal. On the other hand, the *Better Migration Management* (BMM) project in HOA has, as one of its 4 key objectives, a focus on trafficking and addresses human trafficking at a regional level. In Ethiopia, for example, BMM supports shelters for male and female victims of trafficking and has provided food, sanitary materials, school material, and supported individuals with documentation, family tracing, transportation and family reunification.

### *JC 6.4 EUTF projects/programmes carefully consider sustainability factors*

*The Finding is that most SO-3 projects are concerned with urgent situations, and while capacity building and institution strengthening ensure some longer-term effects, the financial sustainability of these projects is realistically speaking not likely in the weak fiscal and institutional environments within which they are carried out.*

| JC-6.4 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-6.4.1:** Evidence that EUTF projects/programmes in their design and implementation integrate sustainability factors and considerations. | * | * | ** | ** | * | * |

**SO-3 projects: Responding to urgent situations.** There is little evidence that sustainability was a major consideration in EUTF SO-3 project/programme design and implementation. Libya, as always, is the extreme example, where there are obvious obstacles, such as absence of an effectively functioning government able to make budget allocations or a banking system capable of implementing them. There, as elsewhere, sustainability has been viewed as a long-term concern, dependent on the evolving situation and factors beyond the EU's control.

In ROMs, sustainability was sometimes couched in terms of, or even candidly defined as, continued donor support, and relates to the fact that the EUTF was meant as an emergency funding channel.

Projects on migration management in Senegal have tried to ensure that national authorities strengthen their capacities. However, they are facing institutional challenges since the national migration policy is not in place yet. Across programmes reviewed, there are elements of sustainability due to capacity building, especially at individual level, and institution building, but the essential factor of financial sustainability is often missing**.**

## 4.7 EQ-7: Improved Rule of Law

**EQ-7: How and to what extent has EUTF contributed to improved internal security and border management and the fight against smuggling and trafficking networks?**

*The Main Finding is that EUTF funded significant investments for strengthening border management, law enforcement and criminal justice, including capabilities to identify and disrupt criminal networks involved in smuggling of migrants (SOM) and trafficking of human beings (THB), though evidence on results is limited.*

**Survey responses: Moderately positive**. EUTF stakeholders expressed moderately positive perceptions about EUTF contributions to border management and internal security. Respondents to our survey indicated a slightly higher approval of EUTF's contribution to border management than to its effectiveness in combating SOM and THB. Such guarded views may also reflect the

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general sense that many activities are underway but evidence about results remained scarce. Interestingly, HQ staff were slightly more positive than EUD and IP respondents.

### JC-7.1 The EUTF is contributing to improved management of national borders by national border authorities

> **The Finding** is that EUTF is supporting activities aimed at improving operational border management across the three regions. These activities have a focus on state capacity for border security and are less concerned with legislation, procedures and methodologies. There is limited evidence of results to date.

| JC-7.1 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-7.1.1:** Evidence of increased capacity by national border authorities to manage national borders due to EUTF support (**MLS 4.1 and 4.2**). | *** | *** | *** | *** | * | ** |
| **I-7.1.2:** Evidence of improved legislation, procedures, methodologies (and/or strategies/ policies/regulations) adopted/ implemented by border forces due to EUTF assistance | * | 0 | *** | * | * | ** |
| **I-7.1.3:** Evidence that performance of national border management institutions has improved due to EUTF support, including respect and protection of migrants' rights. | 0 | 0 | ** | 0 | * | * |

### Beneficiaries of activities in border management, law enforcement and peacebuilding

| MLS Code | Beneficiaries | SLC end 2018 | SLC end 2019-Q3 | HOA end 2018 | HOA end 2019-Q3 | Total end 2018 | Total end 2019-Q3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.1 | # border stations supported to strengthen border control | 10 | 10 | 55 | 49 | 65 | 59 |
| 4.2 | # gov't staff, security forces, non state actors trained on security, border mng't, CVE, conflict prevention, protection of civilian populations, HR | 130,556 | 19,150 | 11,558 | 15,053 | 142,114 | 34,203 |
| 4.2 bis | # institutions, civic actors benefiting from capacity building/operational support on security, border mng't, CVE, conflict prevention, protection and human rights | 1,429 | 962 | 419 | 642 | 1,848 | 1604 |

Source: Altai Consulting, MLS reports, HOA and SLC.

**Border management capacity: Improved.** Evidence shows that EUTF support has helped to increase the capacity of national border authorities to manage national borders. There have been a number of substantial regional projects in SLC, HOA and NOA allocated more than EUR 40 million each[91], and various country-based projects.

EUTF-supported activities have shown some measurable results in SLC and HOA with 65 border posts reinforced, capacities built in more than 1,800 national institutions and civil society organisations, and more than 140,000 people trained on border management and related areas[92]. In Niger, AJUSEN budget support incentives worth more than EUR 30 million resulted in:
- eight border posts being built or rehabilitated in migration-affected areas;
- four specialized border police units established; and
- a runway being rehabilitated at the northernmost town of Dirkou near Libya to strengthen control of that border.

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[91] See NOA-REG-07, SAH-REG-04, HOA-REG-09

[92] Data comes from Altai Consulting (2019), EUTF Monitoring and Learning System Sahel and Lake Chad, 2018 Report, and Altai Consulting (2019), EUTF Monitoring and Learning System Horn of Africa, Quarterly Report - Q1 2019

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In Libya, EUTF-funded support to coastal security and coast guard made slow progress in terms of boats repaired and crew trained, while a mobile border control facility, supported by EUTF, did not become operational leaving the southern border with Niger difficult to manage. Equipment is being procured for two border management projects in Morocco, one maritime and one land-based. In general, border management activities included interventions focused on strengthening capacities at borders (border posts, border forces, equipment, specialist training), larger projects focused on strengthening national capacities for border management, including through budget support (related institutions and agencies, immigration officials, law enforcement, judicial actors) and some mentions of cross-border collaboration, both in the Sahel and Horn of Africa.

**Overarching frameworks: Limited progress.** There is less evidence that border management legislation, procedures and methodologies have improved due to EUTF assistance. The EUTF made some specific investments in strengthening relevant laws, strategies, policies and plans, for example through support to national authorities in HOA, but these were clearly less significant than the investments that were made in actions and operational capacities.

In Niger, the EUTF made a notable contribution to the implementation of the country's first national border policy and action plan. AJUSEN variable tranches worth EUR 3.5 million were invested in implementing the policy and plan, which was expected to result in their adoption by end 2019. Stakeholders perceive that AJUSEN is making an important policy-level contribution to strengthening control of Niger's huge borders, resulting in them being relatively well managed compared to neighbours.

In Libya, the EUTF was not effective in addressing gaps in legislation or policy in border management and immigration control. Progress stalled particularly due to deteriorating security and minimal government interest. The 2004 and 2010 migration laws fall short of international human rights standards by allowing the indefinite detention of irregular immigrants pending deportation. The Libyan government has also significantly inhibited the protection activities of UNHCR and UNICEF.

**Outcome results: So far limited evidence**. There is limited evidence of outcomes in terms of actual improved performance in border management or respect for and protection of migrants' rights.

> *JC-7.2 Increased capability to identify and disrupt criminal networks engaged in smuggling of migrants.*

> **The Finding** *is that significant efforts were made to improve operational agencies' capacity to identify and disrupt criminal networks involved in the smuggling of migrants. EUTF efforts focus to a lesser extent on strengthening legal frameworks and law enforcement cooperation between countries of origin, transit and destination on SOM.*

| JC-7.2 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-7.2.1:** Evidence that EUTF is contributing to the strengthening of legal frameworks regarding migrant smuggling in line with international standards | * | * | *** | * | * | * |
| **I-7.2.2:** Evidence that EUTF is contributing to the strengthening of effective investigation and prosecution capacities with regards to human smuggling in line with international standards | 0 | * | *** | * | * | ** |
| **I-7.2.3:** Evidence that the EUTF is contributing to law enforcement cooperation between countries of origin, transit and destination regarding smuggling of migrants | ** | 0 | ** | ** | * | ** |

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**Beneficiaries of activities in border management, law enforcement and peacebuilding**

| MLS Code | Beneficiaries | SLC end 2018 | SLC end 2019-Q3 | HOA end 2018 | HOA end 2019-Q3 | Total end 2018 | Total end 2019-Q3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.5 | # cross-border cooperation initiatives created, supported | 12 | 75 | 38 | 56 | 50 | 131 |

Source: Altai Consulting, MLS reports, HOA and SLC.

**Framework improvements: Uneven though some progress.** The EUTF supported the development of numerous laws, strategies, policies and plans (304 in SLC and HOA by end 2018), some of them focused on strengthening national frameworks for migration and border management, including the fight against SOM, but it is not known how many of these related specifically to SOM.

Niger is considered a leader in the fight against human smuggling since Law 036/2015 outlawed migrant smuggling. The issue has become a political priority in Niger with the EU as a primary partner. The EUTF is supporting the State's justice system to fight organized crime and people smuggling through budget support. This budget support programme aimed at strengthening the State's wider 'regalian functions', including by supplying the Ministry of Justice and Inspector General's office with the equipment and human resources needed to fulfil their new legal mandates more effectively. Nonetheless, the Ministry remains underfunded and not functioning well and the EUTF-supported national justice plan remains behind schedule.

**Addressing SOM and THB: Improved investigation and prosecution capacities**. The EUTF supports several regional projects aimed at strengthening capacities for investigation and prosecution of both SOM and THB. In the greater HOA region, a regional programme aims to strengthen the capacity of all institutions and agencies responsible for migration and border management, including by improving procedures for investigating and prosecuting cases of trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants. A EUR 5 million project implemented by Civipol also works to disrupt cross-border criminal organizations profiting from irregular migration, human trafficking and other types of organized crime by focusing on their financial resources. In SLC, the EUR 41.6 million GAR-SI Sahel project aims to contribute to stability in specific areas where state authority is less present, with the ability to address threats including organised crime involved in SOM. In NOA, a regional EUTF project, '*Dismantling the criminal networks involved in migrant smuggling and human trafficking*' was still being initiated, despite being approved in December 2017. In Niger, the EUTF addresses SOM through the EUR 80 million budget support project that aims to strengthen the capacities of justice actors to fight organized crime and people trafficking. This support is delivered through budget allocations and specific EUTF investments in strengthening the prison system 2019-2020. The project is perceived to have strengthened the capacities of criminal justice, law enforcement, and prison actors in particular. In addition, promising results were highlighted for the EUR 6 million EUTF-funded joint investigations teams project to fight against irregular migration, human trafficking and smuggling (ECI).

**Cross-border cooperation: Some advances.** Some EUTF-funded interventions supported law enforcement cooperation between countries of origin, transit and destination on SOM or THB although evidence of effectiveness is not yet readily available. In HOA and SLC, EUTF-funded actions have created, launched or supported 50 cross-border cooperation initiatives, according to MLS reporting, but these do not specify how many, if any, relate to SOM or THB. Several EUTF-funded activities on migration management and SOM include cross-border aspects. One is supporting HOA countries in drafting national legislation and policies on migration and border management, including advocacy on the need to adopt legislation on trafficking in human beings.

Another project is promoting increased joint border management as already piloted between Ethiopia, Djibouti and Sudan.

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### JC-7.3 Increased capability to identify and disrupt human trafficking networks.

*The Finding* is that EUTF made significant efforts to strengthen operational agencies to tackle criminal networks involved in SOM and THB though few concern THB specifically.

| JC-7.3 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-7.3.1:** Evidence that EUTF is contributing to the strengthening of legal frameworks regarding trafficking in human beings in line with international standards | * | * | *** | * | * | * |
| **I-7.3.2:** Evidence that EUTF is contributing to the strengthening of effective investigation and prosecution capacities with regards to trafficking in human beings in line with international standards | * | * | ** | * | * | * |
| **I-7.3.3:** Evidence that the EUTF is contributing to law enforcement cooperation between countries of origin, transit and destination regarding trafficking in human beings | ** | * | * | * | * | * |

### Beneficiaries of activities in border management, law enforcement and peacebuilding

| MLS Code | Beneficiaries | SLC end 2018 | SLC end 2019-Q3 | HOA end 2018 | HOA end 2019-Q3 | Total end 2018 | Total end 2019-Q3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.4 | # victims of THB assisted or referred to assistance services | NA | 1 | 319 | 1,065 | 319 | 1,066 |

Source: Altai Consulting, MLS reports, HOA and SLC.

**Disrupting THB: Few activities target this specifically**. EUTF contributed to strengthening of legal frameworks for both SOM and THB in some countries, but there was little evidence to date on the quality of results achieved.

In Niger, there was little progress reported on developing national action plans to combat THB, although judicial actors were to review whether legal instruments for dealing with THB were adequate. On the other hand, EUTF is strengthening the capacity of the national agency to combat THB, and the country's approach is recognized as effective, both for its investment of political will and its concrete activities. The EUTF used budget support variable tranches worth EUR 2m to support the establishment of regional branches of the National Agency to Combat Human Trafficking (ANLTP) and to support the agency's HR capacity development. By 2018, the ANLTP established three regional branches to encourage victims to take legal action against perpetrators using urgent procedures. The number of permanent staff of the ANLTP was increased, though questions are raised by stakeholders about the agency's conflation of THB and SOM and slow progress in the care of THB victims.

In Morocco, a law on THB has been passed, but this was supported more by ENI budget support, and so far, the efforts of the government to investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes are limited. The EUTF is supporting multiple activities to strengthen investigation and prosecution of both SOM and THB by strengthening border management, law enforcement and criminal justice institutions. The EUTF also finances some activities with a specific focus on THB, including, for example, support to the State agency against THB in Niger, addressing THB across West African countries and protecting migrant children from exploitation and trafficking in Mauritania.

The EUTF is also supporting efforts to assist THB victims. In HOA 768 victims of THB have been assisted or referred to assistance services by 2019 Q1, according to MLS monitoring. No similar data is reported for NOA or SLC. In Morocco, Government tends to outsource the protection of victims of THB to NGOs. However, no disaggregation of data is available with respect to the sex, age, and forms of exploitation to which the victims were subjected.

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## 4.8 EQ-8: Conflict Management and Addressing Radicalization

**EQ-8: How and to what extent has EUTF contributed to improved prevention and management of conflict and the growth of radicalisation?**

*The Main Finding is that EUTF supported a range of projects to address conflict and security threats, helped strengthen state security capacities and the capabilities of operational actors in some countries but supported relatively few programmes explicitly aimed at extremism and radicalisation.*

**Survey responses: Contributions understood to be limited.** In general, survey respondents believe the EUTF helped to improve local governance and conflict prevention but only to a limited extent. While respondents expressed only moderately positive perceptions overall, they had slightly more positive views on "*addressing and mitigating local conflicts*" and slightly less positive ones on "*responding to and preventing radicalization and extremism*". Some pointed out that the EUTF contributed with additional financing and bilateral projects, but these were of a modest nature in relation to growing insecurity, conflict and jihadism in some partner countries. Such views support the overall finding that the EUTF made some promising contributions to improving the management of specific local conflicts, but relatively modest ones to addressing extremism and radicalization or affecting wider conflict dynamics in the region.

*JC-8.1 EUTF increased the capacities of public bodies to respond to security threats*

*The Finding is that EUTF is strengthening the capacities of both the State and operational actors to address security threats, though there is little evidence of results or feedback from communities affected about levels of confidence in state bodies to protect them.*

| JC-8.1 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-8.1.1:** Evidence that EUTF assistance has strengthened the capacity of public bodies – frameworks, mandates, operational capacities - to respond to security threats, notably acts of violence and terrorism (***MLS 4.2***). | * | *** | *** | ** | * | ** |
| **I-8.1.2:** Evidence that local communities believe the ability of public bodies to improve their protection from acts of violence and terrorism has improved due to EUTF support | * | * | ** | 0 | * | * |

**SLC: Strengthening response capacities**. In the Sahel countries, the EUTF is increasing both state capacities and in particular operational capabilities to address security threats. EUTF supported a regional project to establish a mobile rapid reaction police forces to address diverse threats in Chad, Mali and Niger. It also provided direct support to local security forces in remote or crisis-affected areas, such as Mopti and Gao in Mali and Lake Chad in Chad. In Mali, the EUR 29 million PARSEC Mopti/Gao Action is working to strengthen the rule of law in the central regions of Mopti and Gao and on the borders with Burkina Faso and Niger, by strengthening the effective presence of the Malian security forces. In Niger, the EUTF supported the capacity building of the State security apparatus at various levels. EUTF projects in Niger provided budget support fixed tranches worth EUR 37 million to strengthen vital state functions, including security. At the same time a variable tranche worth EUR 1.5 million was provided to equip and operationalize eight mixed border posts with the aim to increase the capacity of internal security forces to coordinate with civil defence forces in response to any type of crisis at local level. It also supported other operational actors in Niger, using joint investigation teams and GAR-SI projects which are reported to be delivering promising results.

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**HOA: Focus on Somalia**. In Somalia, the EUTF is similarly supporting activities to strengthen security through budget support and a joint police programme. The Joint Police Programme is working to increase the presence and efficacy of police throughout the country while, at the same time, building a more accessible, reliable and competent justice sector.

**NOA: Less activity.** Despite increased insecurity in Libya, none of the EUTF actions explicitly sought to strengthen response to security threats, largely due to the intensity and scale of armed conflict which makes such EUTF activities difficult to implement.

**Community security perceptions: Little change**. There is limited evidence about the level of confidence among local communities in the capacity of state bodies to provide protection. In Niger, it is perceived that the EU/EUTF strengthened the State's capacities to address security threats in the face of growing attacks by militant groups in remote areas, bordering Mali and Burkina Faso. However, in Agadez, for example, there was little evidence that local communities felt any safer as a result.

> ### *JC-8.2 EUTF increased the capacity of local actors to address and mitigate local conflicts.*

> ***The Finding*** *is that EUTF financed widespread and sometimes promising local capacity building to address and mitigate conflicts in specific locations. This was particularly evident in national and regional peacebuilding efforts especially in HOA, which often had a focus on strengthening local capacities and involving women and/or young people. While there is limited evidence so far on the impact that this has had on local communities, over half a million participated in peacebuilding activities in HOA and SLC.*

| JC-8.2 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-8.2.1:** Evidence that EUTF assistance has strengthened ability of local actors – local authorities, CSOs, communities – to identify and address emergent conflicts and cases of serious local grievances (***MLS 4.2***). | **0** | ** | *** | *** | * | * |
| **I-8.2.2:** Evidence that local communities believe practices for addressing possible and actual conflicts have improved | ** | **0** | * | ** | * | * |

### Beneficiaries of activities in border management, law enforcement and peacebuilding

| MLS Code | Beneficiaries | SLC end 2018 | SLC end 2019-Q3 | HOA end 2018 | HOA end 2019-Q3 | Total end 2018 | Total end 2019-Q3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.3 | # participating in conflict prevention, peace building | 498,965 | 809,410 | 31,132 | 48,324 | 530,097 | 857,734 |

Source: Altai Consulting, MLS reports, HOA and SLC.

**Niger: Addressing local tensions.** In Niger, EU supported a new law against migrant smuggling that resulted in a significant drop in income in the Agadez region. In response to the problems and tensions that arose, EUTF funded the projects PASSERAZ and PROGEM which supported livelihoods, built dialogue with the traders/smugglers, who had operated entirely legally until the 2015 law, and reinforced trust in local authorities. These projects also engaged more than 400,000 people in conflict prevention and peace building campaign activities. Nevertheless, tensions remained in Agadez since only a third of the former migrant transporters were assisted and there is dissatisfaction with the level of compensation that the EUTF projects provide.

**Country-specific initiatives: Yielding results.** In Nigeria, the EUTF supported a EUR 21 million programme, implemented by DFID, to enhance decentralized and community level conflict management capability. The aim of this project was to prevent the escalation of tension into violent conflict in parts of North-Eastern Nigeria. By end 2018, progress was reported in strengthening community-level conflict management mechanisms, training and engaging traditional rulers in

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dispute resolution and mediation. The project established Community Peace and Safety Partnerships (CPSPs) and promoted women's participation in these mechanisms.

In Ethiopia's border areas, a localized cross-border conflict prevention and peacebuilding project was implemented between Ethiopia and Kenya in the Marsabit-Moyale cluster. Similar efforts were made between East Sudan and Western Ethiopia to strengthen government and informal local peace structures. This included supporting groups that critically reflect upon the role and use of social media in peace and conflict issues (addressing misinformation, fake news and hate speech). It also included demarcated corridors through which livestock can move.

In Libya, the EUTF supported various local-level socio-economic development and community stabilization projects aimed at defusing tensions between migrants, refugees, IDPs, and host communities.

**Peacebuilding: Training and awareness raising**. In addition to financing local level interventions, the EUTF also supported national and regional peacebuilding capacities, especially in the HOA region.

In Chad, the EUTF supported the EUR 18 million PRCPT project focused on resilience and peaceful coexistence, and in Niger, the EUTF provided important support to a national peacebuilding structure, *the Haute Autorité à la Consolidation de la Paix* (HACP) to sustain the national body charged with implementing the 1995 peace accord.

In some countries like Senegal, the EUTF supported training of hundreds of state and non-state actors in conflict prevention. At the regional level, EUTF supported a EUR 35 million project to promote peace and stability in HOA (IGAD countries). This project aimed to strengthen the capacity of the IGAD secretariat in the area of peace and security. It also included a programme to promote peace building, conflict management and resolution, by conducting conflict analyses and mapping of local drivers of conflict. In the SLC region, the EUTF supported a EUR 2.2 million project aimed at involving young people across Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad. Evidence from Agadez in Niger suggests some appreciation of EUTF achievements in conflict prevention / peacebuilding, particularly in building social dialogue to support implementation of the anti-migrant smuggling Law 036/2015 and to mitigate its economic repercussions.

**Larger results: Mainly unknown.** For national and regional peacebuilding efforts, there was little evidence yet of the broader benefits for the populations affected. Some EUTF-funded activities have successfully involved mass participation in peacebuilding activities. In SLC and HOA, more than 537,000 people participated in EUTF-supported conflict prevention and peace building activities, including 395,000 people in Niger. Similar peacebuilding and conflict prevention awareness raising activities were conducted in Kenya and Uganda.

> *JC-8.3 EUTF increased the capacity of local actors to respond to and prevent radicalisation and extremism within their communities.*

> **The Finding** *is that the EUTF supports only a few programmes explicitly aimed at reducing radicalization and extremism, largely at community level through dialogue, education, mentoring, and social support.*

| JC-8.3 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-8.3.1:** Evidence that EUTF assistance has strengthened ability of local actors – local authorities, CSOs, communities – to identify and address emergent possibilities of radicalisation and extremism within their communities | 0 | 0 | * | *** | * | * |

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**Activities in a few countries: Community level focus.** In Mauritania, the EUTF is supporting the EUR 5.5 million CORIM programme aimed at preventing radicalisation at a national level. A general objective is to contribute to the stability of the Sahelo-Sahelian strip, the security and the resilience of the Mauritanian population, and in particular the youth. In Burkina Faso, the EUTF supported a EUR 4.3 million programme to prevent violent extremism. This programme was implemented through a range of smaller projects, some of which were aimed at fostering dialogue. EUTF also supported a EUR 9.5 million action aimed at improving the social and economic conditions of young people in order to reduce the risks of radicalization. In Kenya, the EUTF supported a EUR 4.8 million project for the implementation of the Kenya CVE (combating violent extremism) strategy, and a project to provide personal mentoring to individuals identified as 'at risk' of being drawn to conflict and violence.

## 4.9 EQ-9: Impact and Sustainability

**EQ-9: How and to what extent is EUTF support likely to contribute to the overall goal of reducing instability, forced displacement and irregular migration?**

*The Main Finding is that the EUTF, as a short-term instrument, is not an appropriate vehicle for addressing root causes of major societal problems. But it has brought attention to the issues, mobilised resources to address them, and is producing important data and lessons learned that can be used in the design and management of future interventions.*

**EUTF: Providing focused attention to core problems.** The EUTF has been an important instrument for implementing the *Valletta Action Plan* and for operationalising the *European Agenda on Migration*. It has created arenas where key stakeholders – the EU, MS, partner countries, IPs, others – meet to discuss priorities and agree strategy and resource allocations. There are systems in place to review lessons learned so that better solutions can be designed in the future, and there is an institutional memory regarding decisions taken, results achieved and proposals that did not deliver as hoped.

**Achievements: Many levels, very dispersed.** The EUTF has attempted to address the root causes defined in its mandate by allocating funding across its four SOs in a mix of local contexts. This means that results can be found across a broad spectrum of sectors and societal levels.

At individual and household levels, a large number of people have been provided humanitarian assistance and/or protection during displacement. , Many have received support to re-establish livelihoods in new locations, or have been provided with additional skills and start-up capital to create a new future. Local communities, businesses and public administration now have a greater capacity to plan and address problems as they arise. Resilience in some areas is improved, and conflict management and handling the threat of radicalisation strengthened.

National bodies like migration authorities, police and court systems have been strengthened to tackle migrant smuggling and THB. Laws, regulations and procedures have been established or improved to deal with trans-border movements. Systems to ensure the protection of migrants (including the rights of various displaced groups) have been put in place or strengthened, and there is now improved regional collaboration in managing and supporting cross-border movements. The *sustainability* of these achievements appears highly variable, and the likely *impact* of this disparate set of interventions is also unclear.

**Reducing instability: EUTF is too small.** The sources of instability are myriad, where in large parts of the EUTF regions armed conflict is the most visible and disruptive. But climate change, population growth, stagnant economies, competition over limited natural resources, corruption, ethnic tensions, and a host of other problems lead to various forms of instability. All of this reduces

government legitimacy and credibility and undermines the foundational "social glue": the social contract between government and governed.

As a short-term instrument, EUTF has had limited ability and resources for addressing such deep-seated and long-germinating issues. An area where EUTF has had systemic impact is in lifting the migration issue onto the regional agenda, engaging national authorities to pay more attention to the various dimensions of migration, and strengthening regional initiatives in the area. However, where it seems to have had most success is at local levels where interventions have contributed to building trust and relations, reducing uncertainty and conflict. This has helped to build hope for the future within those communities and encouraged investment not just in the household but also in more shared forms of capital. the long-term *practical* effects of this work remain to be seen, but examples and lessons remain important for future efforts.

**Reducing forced displacement: EUTF largely not appropriate.** If by "root causes of forced displacement" one thinks of events that force larger numbers of people to flee (e.g. conflict or natural disasters), then the EUTF is probably a less appropriate instrument because these kinds of extreme occurrences require commensurate levels and persistence in responses to have sustainable impact. EUTF has funded a number of local resilience programmes that have improved local capacities to absorb and integrate IDPs that were forced to leave their homes. But once again these activities depend on larger and more systemic support to ensure sustainability and longer-term societal impact.

**Reducing irregular migration: EUTF formal response in part misdirected**. EUTF has tackled irregular migration through two mechanisms: addressing the underlying causes for individuals wanting to reach Europe and strengthening formal border controls to prevent such migration. With regards to reducing incentives for individuals to seek to enter Europe, the EUTF has probably not had much impact since those who voluntarily wish to move to Europe are not the ones that participate in EUTF-funded VET projects or projects to support self-employment.

The strengthening of migration controls, however, and in particular the closing down of the Libya routes have led to a dramatic fall in total numbers and the shift toward the Western Mediterranean route seen (Table 1.1). However, the EU has also applied non-EUTF resources and avenues in its dialogue with North African countries on these matters, and have put in place own controls in the Mediterranean, etc., so it is difficult to ascertain the role that EUTF as such has played.

**Quality assurance and monitoring: Building a knowledge base.** The intensive monitoring and reporting along with the studies under the REF facility are being made readily available on the EUTF website, and project-level data is provided on the Akvo platform[93]. The EUTF is thus building a knowledge base that is comprehensive, transparent, easily accessible – though not (yet) integrated into the regular EU information systems, a source of some frustration in EUDs that have to use two different systems for internal reporting purposes. This not-fully-consistent dimension is also found in the MLS reporting. HOA and SLC reports, produced by one contractor, take a somewhat different approach and in some instances have a slightly different usage to those found in NOA reports, which are produced by a different contractor. The speed with which the MLS reports are finalised differs, so while periodicity is the same, the time lag for publication has been significantly slower for NOA.

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[93] See https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/results-monitoring-and-evaluation_en for the web-site, and the AKVO dataset can be accessed at https://eutf.akvoapp.org/en/projects/.

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**JC-9.1: *Local, national and transnational authorities are improving their response to causes and consequences of instability, irregular migration and forced displacement***

*The Finding* is that national authorities and local administrations receiving EUTF support are over time better informed and more open to addressing such problems. There is so far limited evidence that this has led to a concomitant shift in resource reallocations, though some EUTF initiatives are evidently receiving more public funding over time.

| JC-9.1 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-9.1.1:** Evidence that relevant local, national and transnational authorities have better understanding of root causes of crises, instability | ** | ** | ** | * | ** | ** |
| **I-9.1.2:** Evidence that relevant authorities have put in place and are implementing better policies and practices for addressing the causes and consequences of crises and instability | ** | * | * | * | ** | ** |
| **I-9.1.3:** Evidence that governments, due to EUTF, allocate more budget, human resources to address instability, forced displacement, irregular migration, with focus on vulnerable groups, women, children, migration prone communities | 0 | * | * | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| **I-9.1.4:** Evidence that relevant national authorities are collaborating across borders to more efficiently and effectively address irregular migration and its root causes. | ** | ** | ** | * | 0 | * |

**Within countries: Greater appreciation of issues over time**. The responses from local officials and national authorities in the countries visited point to a great appreciation for EUTF support and a good understanding of its underlying rationale. There has been stronger buy-in over time for a number of the initiatives. The extent to which this will translate into more sustained and broad-based political and financial support is unclear. Ultimately, it will depend both on financial resource availability but also the perceived importance and urgency of the particular issue. National authorities seem particularly interested in interventions that strengthen the capacity of the state to control territory and manage larger conflict issues while local officials are more supportive of local development and conflict mitigation undertakings.

**Cross-border collaboration: Regional initiatives beginning to bear fruits**. There is appreciation of cross-border programmes as these allow for sharing information and experiences, setting up common procedures and exchanging information along joint borders. Cross-border initiatives are particularly effective in establishing networks of trust that are important for tackling complex and politically sensitive issues, such as return of migrants from neighbouring countries. EUTF has played a positive role by funding a number of cross-border initiatives. While it is unclear to what extent local actors will step in once EUTF resources dry up, the networks established and/or strengthened represent important gains in regions that may have quite intensive informal movements across borders, and weak government capacities to manage them.

The fact that major international bodies addressing migration issues, such as IOM, UNHCR, ICMPD, are involved across state boundaries may be another important vehicle for sharing experiences and moving towards more common positions on such issues. Regional bodies like the African Union (AU), ECOWAS and IGAD have also been involved with the EUTF on a continuous and high-level basis, the first two as observers at Strategic Board meetings, and IGAD as project IP. IGAD also has an intergovernmental coordinating body on governance matters. The AU and ECOWAS host meetings at their head offices where EU/ EUTF staff are present, so there is a steady exchange of views and information that contributes to shared factual knowledge and understanding.

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**Instituting change: The long-term impact.** EUTF funded activities have provided inputs to a large number of laws, regulations and practical guidelines, as presented above. While a number of formal frameworks have been improved due to EUTF support, the *application* of these frameworks in many cases leaves much to be desired. One problem is the lack of sustainability of EUTF projects when national authorities do not provide future funding – though some MS are providing further financing for some interventions. At the same time some governments, such as Ethiopia, are now allocating targeted resources to issues that the EUTF raised. However, the evidence that more national resources are allocated to addressing these issues is so far largely anecdotal and related to particular interventions rather than being part of a more systemic shift in national policies and budget allocations.

**Survey results: Mildly optimistic.** The survey shows that stakeholders believe that the EUTF has contributed to national and local authorities being more attentive to the issues raised by the EUTF, though the typical response is somewhere between "no opinion" and "agree". There is thus not strong support for these views, though once again the IPs are somewhat more positive. This may be because a number of them have a history on the ground and may therefore see changes more clearly than desk-bound officers in Brussels and national capitals – though it should be noted that the differences are probably not statistically significant.

**JC-9.2: EUTF partners are more efficient and effective at addressing the root causes of instability, forced displacement and irregular migration due to EUTF**

**The Finding** *is that the EU and MS are directing more resources towards the EUTF areas of concern, in particular migration, but evidence of more coherent and effective action is limited.*

| JC-9.2 | Doc review | Inter-views | Country cases | Project reviews | Survey | Indicator strength |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **I-9.2.1:** EUTF has produced evidence-based actionable knowledge regarding how better to address causes, consequences of instability, forced displacement and irregular migration | *** | *** | ** | * | * | ** |
| **I-9.2.2:** Evidence that EU, MS are allocating additional resources for interventions addressing the causes and consequences of instability, forced displacement and irregular migration | * | * | ** | 0 | * | * |
| **I-9.2.3:** Evidence that the EUTF partners – EU, MS, partner countries – have a clearer shared understanding of root causes and common vision regarding how to address them, and are thus providing more effective, sustainable and locally-owned response to these challenges | ** | ** | ** | 0 | 0 | * |

**The EU: Increased focus on migration.** Within the framework of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027, the European Commission is proposing a new and more comprehensive instrument for its external aid, the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI)[94]. The nearly EUR 90 billion budget is to be divided into three components – a geographic, a thematic, and a rapid response mechanism. The geographic component, which is to receive about EUR 68 billion, will among other things address good governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights, poverty eradication, fight against inequalities and human development, *migration and mobility*, environment and climate change, inclusive and sustainable growth and decent employment, and security, stability and peace (our emphasis). The rapid response component, though global, will only have EUR 4 billion – less than the EUTF yet for a seven-year period. Funding will be for stability and conflict prevention, strengthening the resilience of states, etc. Discussions between the Commission and Parliament, which are ongoing, have led to proposals for changes, and a Council document of November 2019

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[94] See European Commission 14 June 2018, COM(2018) 460 final.

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suggests that particular attention be paid to migration and forced displacement by allocating at least 10% of the financing for this. It says that this should in part be guided by the experiences of the EUTF, and while it still refers to "addressing the root causes of *irregular* migration" (our emphasis), it goes on to note that EU support should take into account the development benefits of regular migration, and should remain in full respect of international law including international human rights and refugee law[95]. While still at proposal stage, this is a clear signal of where the EU is likely to move.

**The larger EU and MS community: Change less evident.** This evaluation has not explored the extent to which MS governments have increased the relative share of their development cooperation budgets to address issues of instability, forced displacement and (irregular) migration. However, with the increased global attention to the negative spill-over effects of conflict and instability, it is known that many countries are shifting resources in this direction. What is not clear is whether this is necessarily attributable to the EUTF[96]. The evidence from country visits points to some more MS joint support for addressing the core EUTF issues, but often at the level of specific projects and programmes rather than as a result of a more comprehensive strategic consensus. The survey shows that people believe that there is in fact more collaboration, but there is less certainty that this has led to more efficient and effective action.

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[95] See Council of the European Union, 27 November 2019, 14628/19, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14628-2019-INIT/en/pdf point (30).

[96] The World Bank Board of Directors on 25 February 2020 approved the Bank Group's first *Strategy for Fragility, Conflict and Violence*, where the Bank intends to more or less double the funding for FGV from IDA-18 to the IDA-19 period - http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/844591582815510521/World-Bank-Group-Strategy-for-Fragility-Conflict-and-Violence-2020-2025 .

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# 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

**A vast programme: Many lessons.** EUTF has funded an unusually wide-ranging programme, from small-scale rural water supply schemes to integrated community development, local conflict management, public sector capacity building, national migration management, support for return of migrants, combating international criminal networks, cross-border cooperation, and budget support. EUTF has funded activities under very different conditions, ranging from the stable environment in countries like Morocco, to conflict zones in some countries, to the large-scale fighting in Libya. Against this heterogeneous backdrop, it is not easy to find commonalities that permit the identification of generalised lessons, not least of all because a number of the interventions are still in early stages of implementation so longer-term results remain speculative. At the same time, the EUTF has introduced new approaches to how it programmes, manages, quality assures and communicates about its work that are important to understand and take forward.

## 5.1 Conclusions

**C-1:** *Overall Assessment:* **Although its full impact will not be known for some time, the EUTF has provided critically needed resources for improving migration management. It has developed flexible procedures for managing a complex programme and has established a comprehensive system for knowledge production and quality assurance.**

*This conclusion is based on the overall Findings of this evaluation.*

- The EUTF portfolio is highly heterogeneous, across countries, sectors, societal levels, beneficiary groups, scales of intervention. It has addressed the needs of disparate groups of migrants – IDPs, refugees, asylum-seekers, irregular migrants – and has provided support on issues like evacuation, transit and resettlement, migration governance, trans-border issues, etc. The EUTF has brought this complex issue to the fore across the region, forging a recognition of the importance of migration as a political and societal challenge. It has supported a range of interventions that focus on some of the world's most vulnerable groups subjected to forced displacement. The EUTF is thus recognised as an important actor for continued efforts in this field.

- The EUTF governance structure and procedures, which are characterised by flexibility and speed of decision making, have been important for delivering urgent solutions on the ground. This quick flexible response came at some cost to national ownership and voice at the beginning of the programme but the involvement of local actors has become stronger over time. Nevertheless, this remains an issue to be carefully monitored.

- The EUTF's *Research and Evidence Facility* (REF) has provided the EUTF with an important generator of new knowledge about the various dimensions of migration. It provides both in-depth and broader perspectives, for strategic planning and specific programming. The *Monitoring and Learning System* (MLS) has contributed to more consistent and structured tracking and reporting through the windows-based quarterly reporting. In addition, the EUTF has generated standard project reporting including *Results-Oriented Monitoring* (ROM) reports, as well as third-party monitoring plus technical assistance funded through the *Technical Cooperation Facility* (TCF). Together, the data generated by these instruments have contributed to more evidence-based decision-making throughout the programme. The consistency in use and the timeliness of information provision has varied considerably across the programme. This reflects the differences in the situations (and information needs) across the three windows, but also a lack of a common vision for what kinds of information was needed for which purpose.

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**C-2: The EUTF, being a short-term emergency instrument, had too wide a mandate.**

*This conclusion is based on the overall Findings of this evaluation.*

- The Valletta Action Plan and the subsequent establishment of the EUTF were rapid political responses to the massive influx of asylum-seekers and refugees to Europe in 2014/2015. The political pressures to respond urgently pushed the Commission to set up the programme at short notice and initiate activities quickly.

- EUTF was established as a time-limited financing mechanism under the emergency provisions of the Financial Regulation of the EU yet was tasked with addressing *root causes* of some of the most intractable societal challenges these countries face. While formally it was only to *address* these issues – no expected achievements were defined – it meant that there were few boundaries regarding the range and scale of interventions to be funded.

- Most of the activities funded under the first two SOs seem appropriate for a short-term instrument as they are to a large extent small-scale and locally implemented interventions directly targeting migrant communities (or potential migrant communities). The last two SOs are of a more structural/ institutional nature and require longer-term commitment and support, yet the possible exit strategy, or the link to follow-on action whether by EU or other donors, is seldom spelled out.

- EUTF did not have the luxury of time to develop a more analytical understanding of which root causes of migration it was best equipped to tackle, and which ones could be better addressed by other mechanisms. This meant that some early approvals were, in fact, existing project proposals which were adapted to the EUTF mandate. While EUTF programming subsequently has become more structured and streamlined, the argument that the EUTF as an emergency instrument requires flexibility and should not be subject to a stifling programme framework, has persisted among some EUTF staff. While this provides an important instrument to combat emerging problems, it has also contributed to an unnecessarily complex EUTF portfolio.

**C-3: EUTF produced an early results framework and later a more rigorous indicator system for tracking progress. However, there was a certain incongruity in a management system that, on the one hand, needed flexible programming processes to address rapidly evolving situations and, at the same time, was required to respond to a quite static set of results indicators.**

*This conclusion is based primarily on EQs 4-8*

- By April 2016 the EUTF had developed a Results Framework, applying four indicators, that was to monitor the achievement of the programme's overall objective of "*improved stability, migration management and development in the region*". A further 13 indicators would track performance at the level of the four SOs, plus one indicator for a cross-cutting concern of "*Improved policy and practice*"[97]. While the indicators for the SOs are largely at Output level, the four indicators addressing the general objective of the EUTF are at an overarching Impact level, relying on societal-level indicators for monitoring. However, this results framework does not appear to have had a strong influence in the strategic direction of projects.

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[97] See https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/eu-emergency-trust-fund-results-framework-25042016_en_2.pdf

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- In February 2019, the three windows produced a joint risk analysis addressing reputational, operational and financial risks. This analysis identified 19 risk factors, presented in a classic likelihood/consequence table[98]. The most serious reputational risk was seen to be "*Wrong perception that EUTF-funded actions support security and migration agenda of countries violating human rights*"[99]. The two most serious risks overall were (i) external factors – i.e., conflicts and natural disasters – that would jeopardise implementation, and (ii) "*delays in negotiating contracts with implementing partners*"– that is, it was recognised that the main efficiency challenge was probably related to contracting procedures.

- A devolution of responsibilities to the windows and OpComs for defining regional results frameworks led to regionally more appropriate focus. Despite this, and subsequent efforts to streamline the system of indicators, a number of EUDs pointed to the lack of a programming framework as a challenge when they were deciding on allocations across the SOs and to specific interventions as it was not always clear how to connect important projects directly to the results frameworks. While the system allowed flexibility, it also created uncertainty regarding where they should focus attention.

- The early pressures to deliver implementable proposals for quick start-up also meant that one might have to go for the simpler idea or an existing proposal rather than one that could have delivered more appropriate and sustainable answers to the problems to be addressed.

- This lack of an operational programming framework meant that the MLS contractors had to spend a lot of time providing advice to project managers on improving projects' results frameworks. There was thus a problem at the level of the EUTF approving projects that had inadequate results frameworks[100]. This again was in part due to the wide mandate for the EUTF that made it difficult to define operational parameters for the interventions.

**C-4: The EUTF allocated significant resources for addressing irregular migration although the nature of the problem, or the most appropriate means for addressing it, was not well defined in the early stages. As experience was accumulated and more information gathered, the information base for EUTF interventions improved considerably.**

*This conclusion is based on EQ-1 and EQ-6*

- The EUTF mandate includes attention to the root causes of irregular migration, with a practical focus on irregular migration to Europe[101]. The EUTF never spelled out its understanding of what it considers to be the root causes of irregular migration, however, nor did it provide an operational understanding of who the (potential) irregular migrants actually are.

- The migratory movements across Africa are vast and increasing, mostly driven by economic considerations but including forced displacement, leading to complex mixed migration patterns. However, given EUTF's concern with irregular migration, a more careful identification of who among the economic migrants and the forcibly displaced were likely to engage in irregular migration to Europe would have been helpful in the early stages.

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[98] See https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/euetfa/files/risk_register_eutf_0.pdf
[99] That is, the risk is not that the EUTF might be violating the human rights but that this *perception* – which is defined to be wrong – emerges.
[100] Even in NOA, where the MLS contractor had helped the region develop a comprehensive ToC-based set of intervention logics with indicators along the delivery chains, projects stumbled in designing results frameworks – see Annex N.
[101] One of the earliest REF studies, "Migration between the Horn of Africa and Yemen", July 2017, notes that the largest irregular migratory stream from the HOA is to the Arabian Peninsula through Yemen. Other studies point to the large stream going south, particularly to South Africa, though the largest irregular migration is the informal transborder crossings within the regions themselves, in particular from the interior towards more coastal economies.

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- Information on migration patterns and levels are being produced by IOM, UNHCR, FRONTEX and others, and specific studies under the REF have generated more detailed knowledge. Much of this has been compiled by the EU's own Joint Research Centre (JRC) *Demography and Migration Knowledge Centre*. The informational base on migration has therefore improved substantially, informing specific interventions on the ground including cross-border initiatives, though it does not provide much additional insight on *irregular* migration[102].

- The factors behind economic migrants choosing the irregular route to Europe and their characteristics, noted above, appear different from the considerations of the forcibly displaced. While EUTF interventions addressing the forcibly displaced have addressed their livelihoods situation, there is little evidence that this has affected the levels of irregular migration.

- Resilience-stabilisation nexus interventions in parts of the Sahel and in countries like Ethiopia have increased the ability of rural communities to address societal stress caused by structural changes like population growth and climate change, reducing pressures to migrate.

- EUTF was not formally mandated to address the second pillar of the Valletta Action Plan on improving *legal* migration to Europe since this is largely a political matter handled by the MS. Yet this is an issue of great relevance to the problem of irregular migration to Europe. Despite initiatives by DG NEAR in this field, the absence of a politically acceptable action plan on expanded regular migration makes it ever more difficult to effectively address irregular migration with Partner Countries through a jointly owned migration strategy.

**C-5: The EUTF has directed financing to complex situations resulting from fragility and conflict. Given the increasingly acute global problem of fragility, conflict and violence this investment may yield important long-term returns. However, a more complete understanding of the contribution that the EUTF has made to reducing instability, forced displacement and irregular migration in these situations will become more evident as the various projects mature.**

*This conclusion is based on EQs 1 and 4-8*

- The EUTF was to address the root causes of instability and forced displacement, often in situations characterised by fragility, conflict and violence (FCV). The growing challenge due to FCV is reflected in the fact that on a global basis it is estimated that over half the extremely poor will be living in FCV affected states by 2030. Several of the EUTF countries are already seeing such increases.

- The World Bank's recent FCV strategy notes that "*An essential premise for the FCV Strategy is that, given the diversity of FCV challenges, there can be no one-size-fits-all approach*"[103]. Indeed, the flexible programming approach adopted by the EUTF is consistent with this multi-dimensional understanding of FCV. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the emergency nature of the EUTF, a better analysis of the drivers of FCV could have provided a more consistent framework for both designing EUTF-funded interventions but also for streamlining its mandate more generally. The information that has been generated as a result of the EUTF should make such analysis easier in any future interventions that the EU may undertake in the area of FCV.

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[102] The EUTF was about to organise a major learning event in May 2020 that was to congregate lessons from both the MLS and REF facilities. While the covid-19 pandemic for the time being put a stop to these plans, this kind of learning event would be of great value and it is hoped that something along these lines can take place.
[103] The World Bank's first strategy for FCV was released on 25 February 2020:
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/844591582815510521/World-Bank-Group-Strategy-for-Fragility-Conflict-and-Violence-2020-2025

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- The MLS system is directed towards tracking results of the various interventions. Indicators for understanding the contribution that EUTF has made toward reducing instability, forced displacement and irregular migration are lacking. These are, of course, complex issues. EUTF contribution to these wider objectives can only be expected to emerge as the various projects mature. In many cases, such contribution will require the effects of many different interventions to converge so as to influence some of these broader issues in a systemic way.

- Many studies have highlighted the gender and youth dimensions of conflict and the need for targeted interventions to address these groups' situations. The MLS data are providing more gender-disaggregated data – though the MLS contractors would still like to see more projects providing disaggregated results data – and a number of baseline studies also contain gender-disaggregated data. However, there has been relatively little attention given to tracing how differentiated support has strengthened women's ability to cope in FCV situations.

**C-6: The EUTF governance and management structure delivered fast decisions based on a strategic overview of the issues and flexible and committed staff**

*This conclusion is based on EQ-3*

- The EUTF's decision-making was timely and effective. Structurally, it separated oversight (the Strategic Board) from operational decision-making functions (the three OpComs). These bodies all had representatives from the wider stakeholder community, though formal voting rights were with the funding partners. The experience in the OpComs was that representatives that had a direct interest/stake in a project came prepared, so deliberations were seen as genuine. It allowed fast processing of decisions and expedited contracting though some projects have still experienced implementation delays.

- DG DEVCO and DG NEAR quickly allocated dedicated staff to the Fund. Small, agile and efficient windows management teams and an overall coordinating unit in Brussels provided professional backstopping to decision-making bodies in Brussels and implementation staff in the EUDs. Staff with relevant skills in thematic areas that were new to the EU – migration in particular – were recruited, and the evaluation team met committed and knowledgeable staff both in Brussels and the EUDs, which has been fundamental for EUTF achievements.

- While some early project approvals were made with insufficient consultation in the field, this has been improved. The field is doing more of the programming, though in some instances this has meant having the designated IPs put together important parts of the proposals. This was pointed to as problematic by EUD staff due to the temptation to over-programme consultancy inputs. At the same time, the time pressure and lack of own technical skills in certain areas made this a pragmatic solution. Programming has at the same time become less hectic as it has matured, allowing for more careful vetting and approval of interventions.

**C-7: EUTF knowledge production and quality assurance are highly value-adding. They increase the international knowledge base about complex development issues and help to ensure the transparency of EUTF activities. There is potential for greater inter-window collaboration in knowledge-generation and sharing.**

*This conclusion is based on EQs 1 and 3 and Annex N*

- The **REF** facility provided a flexible tool for generating in-depth understanding on topics that were largely new or unfamiliar to the EU and for which funding decisions had to be taken. The

*MLS* was established somewhat later and was primarily a monitoring/reporting system while the *TCF* has been used for specific reviews and technical assistance.

- The REF has been managed differently by each window. *HOA* developed the concept and put out to tender a framework agreement that was won by a consortium led by SOAS. This produced a series of studies, some of which were based on fieldwork in areas where EU staff could not visit and thus brought forth data and analyses from areas and on issues that could not otherwise be addressed. The success of the first round led to an extension of the contract that was simplified and with remuneration based on deliverables rather than inputs-based. This provided a model for such framework contracts. The more predictable contract enabled SOAS to develop longer-term relations with the EUDs but also – more importantly – with local researchers and think-tanks.

- The joint REF facility for SLC and NOA allowed the two windows to contract studies that looked at the larger migration issues across the two regions, which has been helpful. NOA has essentially two framework agreements. The first one is an extension of ICMPD's MLS work in which ICMPD provides capacity building and some monitoring and evaluation across the region. The other is with a consortium that has, on the one hand, provided some in-depth studies on sensitive issues surrounding migration management in Libya, and on the other hand is monitoring on a permanent basis the dynamics of this issue to inform policy and intervention adjustments.

- In SLC most of the financing was used by EUDs to contract hands-on actors for addressing complex programming questions rather than academic actors. A number of such studies have been produced, some also using TCF financing or project funding, so the distinction between the REF facility and other sources for preparatory insight is less clear than in the windows.

- The windows have therefore neither used the REF facility in the same way, nor have they collaborated in this field. There have been no joint processes or products apart from a couple of NOA-SLC migration studies. The EUTF has therefore perhaps missed an opportunity to generate a bird's-eye view of instability-forced displacement-migration thematics. A planned EUTF-wide event scheduled for May 2020 would have included the first joint REF session, though has unfortunately been cancelled due to the pandemic.

- While the MLS system has primarily been set up to produce reporting on EUTF performance, the *learning* component has been used by the HOA to generate a couple of case studies and a "lessons learned" synthesis study, relying on the vast database that the MLS work has led to.

- The two contractors in the MLS system, Altai Consulting and ICMPD, have worked together to ensure as much consistency in reporting as possible, but there are still differences in how they present the information. This is in large part due to the quite different universes they are to report on, ICMPD having a limited number of countries and projects, and the differences across the countries making region-wide aggregations less useful. The big difference, however, is the periodicity, with HOA providing eight MLS reports, SLC four and NOA only one quarterly report as of July 2020.

- The contract with Altai included a number of learning and experience exchange events with IPs and EUDs. One such event for the HOA took place in 2019. A second one, planned for the summer of 2020, had to be postponed/cancelled. A workshop in Brussels in February 2020 was the first time the three windows and the two MLS contractors jointly met to discuss and exchange views on the overall MLS system. An earlier such initiative might have been beneficial for all parties.

- The intention of producing timely and comprehensive information on programme performance is laudable and in line with current thinking such as in the World Bank's recent FCV strategy, which specifically brings attention to evaluation framework that assesses country programmes and operations *in FCV settings*[104].

- It is notable that the three regions have availed themselves of these resources to different degrees. While some of this is due to the difference in framework conditions across the regions, there are still issues crossing regional boundaries that might have benefitted from more coherent knowledge production and sharing.

- The EUTF has generated considerable data and other information that is publicly available on the EUTF website and AKVO platform, making it easily accessible and International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) compliant, ensuring a high level of transparency.

**C-8: Although employment creation remains one of the more intractable challenges for any economy, and especially for weak and fragile economies, the EUTF has managed to make modest contributions to increased economic opportunities and employment. The EUTF was most effective in this area when interventions were packaged in a way that engaged the private sector directly. These measures also worked better where there were more sophisticated labour markets.**

*This conclusion is based on EQ 4*

- EUTF made modest but serious efforts to increase economic opportunities for target beneficiaries through programmes that provided better and more appropriate skills, either for local employment or for own income generating activities.

- Most of the skills provision was for self-employment activities. However, it is unclear to what extent market studies or other analyses have identified the actual potential for such self-employed activities to generate jobs and income.

- Regarding skills training for employment, many of the intended beneficiaries in *rural* areas face a weak local economy where an influx of additional labour typically encounters demand limitations.

- In *urban* areas, the informal economy may be larger and more dynamic, but evidence suggests that EUTF-provided skills training offers limited long-term value. Instead, informal networks based on family, clan, ethnic, religious bonds appear critical for success. It is unclear to what extent this reality was explored and exploited[105].

- Where the skills provision was based on an identified gap in the local labour market, training often led to some local employment, though little is known about the sustainability of these jobs.

- Success appears to be more likely when the training was offered as part of a larger package of support that included soft skills development, job search, counselling and support to private sector development. As noted above, this may also have been dependent on a larger, more sophisticated labour market requiring such additional skills and services.

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[104] See World Bank FCV strategy reference above, p. xii, points 4 and 5.
[105] This is discussed in the context of rural-to-urban migration in HOA in the REF study "The Lure of the City: Synthesis report on rural to urban migration in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda", undated, SOAS-led consortium.

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- Where EUTF was able to engage the private sector more directly, more durable solutions seem to have been generated. In some countries, better business development services through national or local development agencies and business associations generated some positive results.

- Overall, employment creation remains one of the more intractable challenges for any economy, and this is all the more the case in weak economies facing major disruptions such as instability leading to large-scale forced displacement. As in some other areas of intervention, the EUTF was asked to address an issue for which – as a short-term emergency instrument – it was poorly placed to be able to deliver meaningful, let alone sustainable, results.

**C-9: EUTF has ensured increased attention to the migration issue. Important results have been achieved in building the capacity of national bodies responsible for migration management throughout the EUTF region and cross-border cooperation between these bodies has been an important development in some cases. However, the EUTF's focus on irregular migration, combined with weak migration policy frameworks in partner countries, has affected dialogue on the larger migration challenges.**

*This conclusion is based on EQ 6*

- EUTF has brought considerable attention to the issue of migration management and provided support to national bodies responsible for this issue. This has also been a notable aspect of regional programmes, where cross-border collaboration has been an important development. In particular, efforts have been made to promote cross-border trade and manage seasonal migration with a view to improving income generation opportunities for border communities.

- Due to its formal mandate of addressing root causes of irregular migration and the considerable political concerns of some Member States, significant resources have been allocated to border control to address the flow of irregular migrants to Europe. The attention by the EU to this particular aspect of the larger migration question is obvious to African partner countries and somewhat colours local dialogues on more general migration policies and management.

- The results from the EUTF support to general migration management have been affected by the fact that national migration policies are weak relative to other areas such as trade. In NOA it is only Morocco that has a National Migration Strategy, and even that has been delayed in implementation. The policy vacuum has been especially challenging for progress in migration management, including its asylum and protection components.

- The EU's efforts are built on a clear human rights foundation and support for international conventions and agreements. There are, however, challenges to the EUTF's work in this area. For example, the focus on irregular migration to Europe led to the widely discussed consequence of the EUTF being seen to be complicit in returning would-be asylum-seekers to unacceptable conditions in Libya. This latter issue is a problem the EUTF has spent considerable resources trying to address but where the virtual collapse of the state in Libya makes sustainable capacity building extremely difficult.

- Where the strategic directions of migration policy are not in place, management is bound to be *ad hoc*. The same is true for protection if basic policy does not define the rights of migrants (regular or irregular), asylum-seekers, and refugees. While the Valletta Action plan and Joint Africa-EU Strategy offer excellent platforms for dialogue and EU external action with EUTF partner countries in the area of migration policy, progress has been limited.

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## 5.2 Recommendations

**Looking ahead: Recommendations for an unknown tomorrow**. This exercise is a mid-term evaluation. The focus ought therefore to be on how the remaining part of the programme can improve results delivery. This is less of an issue in this case, for two reasons. The first is that almost all decisions of any importance have been taken, so there are few choices remaining that merit a comment. The other aspect is that the EUTF has committed virtually all of its funding. Since it is not likely to mobilize much additional financing, it is not likely to continue as a *financing* mechanism beyond its foreseen closing date in December 2020, though many EUTF financed activities will continue *implementation* through December 2023. For these reasons, most recommendations have been kept at the level of some principles that hopefully may be of use for the design and management of interventions of this nature in the future.

> **R-1: During the remaining implementation period, the EUTF should focus on generating further knowledge and understanding of its interventions and do this in a collaborative manner with other international bodies. To better capture outcomes and impacts, an ex-post evaluation should be conducted at least one year after all EUTF activities have been completed.**

> *This Recommendation derives from C-1 and C-7*

- With the knowledge base EUTF now has, coupled with recent research and knowledge generated by actors like the World Bank and INCAF, EUTF might consider looking at a reconstructing a more comprehensive, coherent and consistent results framework from the Output levels it currently has up to its overarching objectives. Data inputs to this results framework would be disaggregated to take account of specific target groups like victims of THB, etc. The idea would be to see what can be learned about programming and managing complex programmes across diverse framework conditions, and what kinds of indicator, data collection and information management systems might be useful to handle such complexity.

- Another issue to pursue is information management, storage and dissemination systems that can meet management needs while also providing public access to searchable databases of key information. Here EUTF can take advantage of the considerable work done by Altai and ICMPD in building their databases, but also the work of REF partners like SOAS, Global Initiative and others. In this connection, EUTF might also consider how to ensure that these valuable data will be maintained and remain accessible after the EUTF has closed down, looking at possibilities like the EU's own *Knowledge Centre on Demography and Migration* as a more permanent home for such valuable information.

- EUTF might consider establishing a facility similar to the REF and MLS initiatives that will fund more rigorous Outcome and Impact studies, based on a "big picture" strategy for ensuring that key questions are looked into. These could include some of the issues raised in this evaluation, such as "Who are most likely groups to engage in irregular migration to Europe, why, and what are most effective interventions for addressing this?" Such studies might also give a lot more attention to what kinds of partnerships make sense for addressing different kinds of issues, such as those related to labour markets or local resilience.

- For such a facility to function, it may perhaps be useful that the EUTF Coordination Unit be given the direct management responsibility for decision making, financial allocations and oversight since such a programme is likely to benefit from a "whole of system" approach to maximise both strategic thinking, implementation and dissemination of results.

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- A further value-added aspect might be to set aside resources to ensure genuine collaboration with other relevant actors that can both contribute on the inputs/knowledge production side, but also become important partners in applying the lessons learned. This would include the multilateral system – relevant UN agencies, the international financial institutions – but also research communities and international networks like INCAF and similar ones involving the global NGO/CSO community. While this in itself will require attention and staff to handle properly, this might over time become among the most important lasting results of the EUTF through the discussion, refinement and dissemination of EUTF lessons.

- As noted earlier, many activities were at early stages of their implementation by the time this mid-term evaluation was launched. This meant that outcomes and impacts remained incipient during our investigations. We suggest that the growing data resources contained within the EUTF be used for an ex-post evaluation, which is specifically designed to capture outcomes and impact over a longer time horizon.

**R-2: The EU should consider programming all its interventions in a country or region within *one* common (analytical) framework**

*This Recommendation derives from C-3 and C-4*

- No matter the issue, understanding and programming a response will benefit from the long-term stability of national or regional programming frameworks. The greater the uncertainty, and in particular the greater the importance of the FCV dimension in a country's likely development trajectory, the greater overall flexibility in programming needs to be. This suggests the greater use of "streams programming" and "tranche programming".

- "Streams programming" means that the various resource streams are planned based on their particular objectives. Typical streams might be: (i) core national support programme, in line with current NIP approaches. This would typically receive the lion's share of funding; (ii) support to non-state actors to address issues like democratic governance, transparency, accountability, or private sector development, perhaps in two different (sub-)streams since allocation criteria would differ; (iii) unprogrammed flexible rapid response fund to address unforeseen or perhaps even expected future challenges, including recurring humanitarian aid, where the exact nature of the challenge is not known at the time of programming. The relative size of the streams would be decided based on a political economy understanding of national context (likelihood of natural disasters, degree of government corruption, need for private sector development etc.). It might be useful to have some model resource-stream *shares* according to key country contexts (level of FCV, GDP/cap etc.).

- "Tranche programming" means that while *indicative* allocations for a given stream for the full programming period can be agreed, the actual programming period for each resource stream may vary. While the core development programme may be agreed for the full period, the flexible fund may be programmed for two years at a time where careful reviews allow for re-direction of programme focus and priorities, to accommodate changing national contexts and concerns.

- Most humanitarian interventions in the EUTF area have been responses to protracted or recurring crises. Furthermore, recent data show that 80% of forcibly displaced people remain for at least five years in their new location, if they return at all. This means that even humanitarian interventions would benefit from being inside a more long-term framework where FCV or natural disaster responses are explicitly planned for.

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- When action leads to unintended consequences, as sometimes happens in programmes like this, the EU should have a response mechanism in place. The flexible response resource stream might provide the resources for this.

- The role of national authorities in the programming will vary depending on national context and programming stream. Core development programmes could build on existing NIP experience. Private sector development and support to non-state actors could operate according to (adapted) EU guidelines such as for IcSP. The programming of the flexible response fund could again build on lessons from the EUTF regarding LRRD – and security-development linkages – with possible down-stream links to the core development programme if and when instability is successfully being addressed.

- The experience of the EUTF has shown that the pooling together EU and MS/donors resources brings some value added. This value added is not so much to be found in the addition of resources that is made available to address particular issues (it has been pointed out that all EUTF resources are ultimately MS resources) but rather in further adding to the coherence of programming processes of the EU and the Member States and donors. In this context, efforts to pool resources in future EUTF-type interventions may be desirable.

**R-3: The EU should have differentiated results framework structures depending on the development challenges in the partner country/region**

*This Recommendation derives primarily from C-3 and C-5*

- A comprehensive national programming framework requires context-relevant results frameworks. Some parameters are known to be of particular importance such as FCV, as this will to a large extent determine the space for decision making and implementation.

- This will require fairly dynamic programming, making "tranche programming" options important and allowing for the possibility of shifting the relative shares of the various "streams".

- While national results frameworks therefore will have several sub-frameworks to allow for the specificities of the various streams, they should as far as possible have higher-level objectives linked to SDG goals and indicators, to ensure overarching consistency and focus.

- One of the clearest lessons from the EUTF is the value of producing and managing strategic knowledge with appropriate monitoring tools. A properly funded knowledge function can support strategic oversight of the programme, clarify operational priorities, and provide continuous and structured arenas for learning and experience sharing across key stakeholder groups. The share of resources dedicated to MEL should be a function of the degree of uncertainty that the country programme faces.

**R-4: The EU should strengthen the treatment of migration in its bilateral and regional programmes, ensuring that the entire Valletta Action agenda is covered.**

*This Recommendation derives primarily from C-4 and C-5*

- Bilateral cooperation has traditionally been, and will continue to be, the mainstay of EU external action in the countries now covered by EUTF. The EU should strengthen the place and deepen the treatment of migration in bilateral (and where called for, regional) programming. In view of the need for enhanced dialogue, and in recognising that many partner countries have viewed the EU's migration agenda as more attuned to European needs than their own, the EU should ensure that the entire Valletta Action Plan agenda is covered.

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- A specific step is to assess EUD capacity in the area of migration. Experience and expertise developed under EUTF should as far as possible be maintained and not be allowed to dissipate. Similarly, the overall governance and management structure of the EUTF, which allowed flexible and inclusive decision-making, offers a good model for future programmes and should be maintained. The effectiveness of these existing structures may be enhanced with a strengthened central co-ordination body that would ensure a greater strategic coherence to the portfolio and promote better information and experience-sharing across windows. This strengthened central co-ordination body would pay particular attention to promoting the sustainability of actions and ensuring adequate linkages to other relevant funding instruments.

- A constructive internal dialogue is needed on the proper balance between securitization of external action in migration and the migration and development agenda. ECHO should be involved as should EU agencies such as FRONTEX and Europol. This dialogue should consider the balance to be found between ensuring effective border control of irregular migration to Europe and, at the same time, protecting returnees from the consequences of their return to deeply unstable situations.

- The EU needs to be sensitive to state capture, and review support to strengthening the control and repressive apparatus of the state if this might come at the expense of the legitimate rights and interests of the population at large or specific target populations (ethnic, religious minorities, etc.). In cases where such state capture is a risk, increased allocations to resource streams for non-state actors engaged in transparency, accountability and advocacy activities, etc. could be contemplated.

- Most African migration is intra-continental labour migration. A comprehensive migration policy should include inter-African issues of labour migration, where the Joint Africa-EU Strategy may be a strategic basis for regional migration interventions. Actors such as the African Union and ECOWAS might play important roles in promoting mutually beneficial migration and put in place the policies and capacities required. The range of regional subjects is broad, and could cover facilitating remittances, diaspora issues, mobility issues such as harmonization of academic and professional credentials, portability of social protection, etc. Areas currently covered by regional EUTF projects, such as the fight against cross-border criminal networks, border control, and root causes of displacement could also be pursued under regional programmes. Experience gained under EUTF with conflict management and community level development would be applicable to problems of anti-immigrant sentiment that have been observed in some settings.

**R-5: The EU should develop differentiated contracting and implementation regulations for FCV contexts**

*This Recommendation derives primarily from C-4 and C-5*

- While there is an increasing number of potential implementing partners that have experience of working in FCV contexts, the EUTF policy of preferred IPs was not sufficiently flexible and open to ensure optimal partner choices in a number of cases.

- The EU should develop a dynamic roster of potential IPs based on a classic two-step process. The first step would be a due diligence pre-selection phase based on geographic, sector, administrative/financial performance, documenting experience and operational capacity to deliver. This would allow for a short-list or quasi-framework arrangement for those that passed the test including national NGOs. In this way, it would be possible to run series of quick mini-competitions among a limited set of relevant IP candidates for specific tasks. Such lists should

ensure that national/ local actors can be included, since it becomes important to build the local capacities for implementation of such projects.

- By 2030, as noted, it is expected that over half the world's extreme poor will live in FCV countries. While contracting under EUTF was quick, implementation suffered from IPs having to largely follow standard EU implementation regulations. The EU should review its operational guidelines to see where they can be simplified and adapted to differentiated contexts, with a clear understanding of the risk mitigation measures that need to be put in place but at the same time accepting that some risk is inherent and cannot be programmed away.

**R-6: The EU support to economic opportunities and employment creation should be embedded within larger market development efforts and private sector involvement**

*This Recommendation derives primarily from C-8*

- EUTF support to employment creation was largely targeted at specific beneficiary groups. It was basically small-scale and geographically confined, and was not always well integrated with local labour market dynamics and actors. Results were therefore necessarily limited and with unclear sustainability prospects.

- At the same time, it is clear that providing or strengthening livelihoods for groups of people forcibly displaced is important for stabilisation. It strengthens the legitimacy of national authorities, and prevents young unemployed men in particular from being recruited into criminal or conflict groups. Short-term public work programmes therefore can play a role, as was done for the returnees from the Middle East to Somalia, but they should be part of a more long-term and comprehensive strategy leading to more sustainable livelihoods.

- Even short-term public works programmes should therefore be embedded within a larger perspective, in part because those engaged need to be given a realistic hope of what the future holds. This, however, is a huge task that requires the creation of effective partnerships: partnerships with national and local authorities, national and local businesses and associations, foreign and local investors, other funding partners. It also requires significant investment, whether in grants from donors, or loans and credits from public and private institutions. All of this has to happen within a stabilising macro-economic framework.

- This extremely demanding requirement means that particular programmes similar to EUTF need to properly understand the overall framework for employment creation and self-employment in particular contexts, so that realistic steps are taken and real value-added is provided by the donor, and unrealistic expectations are not created.

**R-7: The EU should provide "whole of community" resilience interventions particularly when addressing situations of natural resource fragility**

*This Recommendation derives primarily from C-5*

- Many of the EUTF resilience programmes have grown out of humanitarian approaches and focus on people and communities identified as vulnerable. This leads to a focus on solutions that apply to small communities or individual households. At the same time, many projects include a wide range of activities covering different sectors. There is evidence that these investments did have some impact on the resilience of the targeted households/communities but only to a limited extent on the resilience of populations in wider regions.

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- Based on the lessons learned from recent resilience programmes, options to improve the effectiveness of resilience programmes include (i) identifying priorities among the needs of vulnerable communities, where significant change can be made, e.g. in the area of water resources, (ii) increasing the lifespan of interventions, (iii) focusing more on changes in systems including the working of markets and on behavioural changes, (iv) involve more actively the private sector in taking over the provision of services that were introduced or strengthened by the EUTF programme

- There is also scope to strengthen the early involvement of the private sector through contracting, access to finance and capacity strengthening support. Moreover, projects may not need to be designed to maximise the number of direct beneficiaries but rather to achieve replicability.

- This "whole of community" approach assists both IDPs and host communities improve access to basic social services, expand economic opportunities, and enhance environmental management, where the role of the private sector is central. Some successful examples of this approach can be found in projects funded under EUTF in Somalia and Ethiopia. This "whole of community" approach is seen as most applicable when the challenge is natural resource scarcity. In the face of violent conflict, the more comprehensive stakeholder engagement is vulnerable to disruptions.