



EUTF Monitoring and Learning System SLC

S1 2021 REPORT
COVERING UNTIL 30 JUNE 2021

Altai Consulting for the European Union – December 2021



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CONTENTS

CONTENTS	4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	5
1. INTRODUCTION	7
1.1. Background	7
1.2. The EUTF SLC window in S1 2021	7
2. METHODOLOGY	8
2.1. MLS methodology	8
2.2. Challenges and limitations in the S1 2021 Report	9
3. PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW	11
3.1. Budget and number of contracts by status	11
3.2. Budget distribution by country, implementing partner and Strategic Objective	15
3.3. Budget allocated to the COVID-19 response	17
4. SITUATION AND RESULTS OVERVIEW	18
4.1. The Sahel and Lake Chad region in S1 2021	18
4.2. The EUTF response – overview of results	18
5. ANALYSIS BY COUNTRY	44
5.1. Burkina Faso	44
5.2. Cameroon	53
5.3. Chad	59
5.4. Côte d'Ivoire	68
5.5. Ghana	72
5.6. Guinea	77
5.7. Mali	83
5.8. Mauritania	93
5.9. Niger	99
5.10. Nigeria	106
5.11. Senegal	113
5.12. The Gambia	122
CONCLUSIONS	127
6. INDEX	129
6.1. Tables	129
6.2. Figures	129


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the eighth report prepared by the Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) for the Sahel and Lake Chad window, covering all outputs achieved through funding from the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced people in Africa (EUTF) in the Sahel and Lake Chad (SLC) region from the start of activities until June 2021, with a specific focus on outputs generated during the first semester (S1) of 2021.

This report includes outputs from programmes implemented in Burkina Faso, Benin, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, The Gambia and Togo.¹

As of September 2021, the EUTF for Africa has committed (i.e. funds allocated following decisions by the Operational Committee) €4.92B (billion), including €2.21B to 114 decisions in the SLC window. A total of 202 operational projects have been contracted in the SLC region, including 53 completed projects, 128 projects in implementation and 21 projects in inception. 125 of the projects currently in implementation have data or other qualitative information to report and three are either too early in their implementation phase to be able to report outputs or their activities have not yet generated outputs that are relevant to the EUTF indicators. The current report includes data on 178 projects (equivalent in funding to €1.84B), comprising 53 completed projects, as well as 125 projects in their implementation phase with data to report.

Figure 1: Contracted budget breakdown by country and Strategic Objective, September 2021²



Strategic Objective 1: Greater economic and employment opportunities

While SLC economies are recovering from the region's first recession in half a century, EUTF-funded programmes have contributed to employment creation and the reduction of financial vulnerability through the development of livelihoods to mitigate the effects of the crisis. EUTF-funded programmes supported the creation of 14,335 jobs (indicator 1.1) in S1 2021, 38% of which benefitted women. Most jobs were created in the agriculture, fishery and livestock production or processing sector, reflective of labour dynamics in the region. The sector represented 48% of the jobs for which the nature of employment was specified in S1 2021.

Strategic Objective 2: Strengthening resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable including refugees and other displaced people

The SLC region remains affected by persisting insecurity, causing mass displacements and growing humanitarian needs. EUTF-funded programmes have supported the relief, resilience and recovery of populations through the strengthening of food security and the provision of basic services. In S1 2021, 326,199 people benefitted from direct relief assistance in the form of cash transfers (indicator 2.9). This

¹ Outputs in Benin, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Togo are collected through regional programmes.

² Share of budget for projects contracted and relevant to the MLS. The total displayed in the visual does not reflect budget allocated to cross-cutting activities, which represent €5M.

represents 29% of all cash transfers spent in the region since 2018 and a 66% increase compared to S2 2020. EUTF-funded programmes also provided 378,542 people with food security-related assistance (indicator 2.4) in S1 2021, 86% of which was provided during Q2 2021 to build resilience ahead of the lean season. Finally, 91,870 people benefitted from improved access to basic services (indicator 2.9) through the construction of new infrastructures, mostly in Niger and Mali.

Strategic Objective 3: Improved migration management in countries of origin, transit, and destination¹

In S1 2021, migrants continued to increasingly use the Atlantic Route in the first half of 2021, while the use of Central Mediterranean Route resumed after decreasing in 2020 because of Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) related restrictions. Both routes are dangerous for migrants and EUTF-funded programmes have supported awareness raising activities on the risks of irregular migration, as well as the provision of protection for people on the move. EUTF-funded programmes reached (potential) migrants with information campaigns through 420 events on migration (indicator 3.11) in the first half of 2021. In addition, during the first half of 2021, 1,798 individuals were trained on migration management and protection (indicator 3.7), a 74% increase compared to S2 2020. Most trainees (1,162) were protection actors. Additionally, 22,860 people on the move were protected and assisted in S1 2021 (indicator 3.2), representing 71% of the people assisted since the beginning of EUTF-funded activities.

Strategic Objective 4: Improved governance, security and conflict prevention

The security situation in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin region remained volatile in the first semester of 2021. EUTF-funded programmes supported peacebuilding through training of security forces, and through awareness raising and conflict prevention activities. EUTF-funded programmes organised conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities that reached 265,651 people in S1 2021, including 155,638 people through radio messaging. In S1 2021, 1,730 members of security forces were trained by EUTF-funded programmes (96% were national security forces and the rest local, indicator 4.2). In addition, 10,026 pieces of equipment were provided to security forces (94% of all governance equipment provided, indicator 4.1 bis). To support the deployment and fighting capacities of the national armies, EUTF-funded programmes have notably supported the creation, training and equipment of units embedded in the national systems.

COVID-19 response

As of June 2021, West Africa had registered nearly 525,000 cases of COVID-19, and 7,600 deaths. With the worst of the pandemic seemingly over for countries in SLC, programming related to COVID-19 (SO6) has generally decreased this semester compared to 2020. In particular, COVID-19 programming that relates to treatment, testing, and emergency response appears to have been scaled down. For example, 98% of individuals assisted in S1 2021 (indicator 6.2) were given support that was not primarily medical or personal protective equipment (PPE), such as prevention activities or socio-economic mitigation. By contrast, only 4% of the those assisted in S2 2020 (indicator 6.2) were given support that was not PPE or medical treatment and equipment. As need for urgent medical assistance waned in S1 2021, COVID-19 response increasingly focused on recovery from the pandemic.

¹ Results for indicators 3.2 and 3.7 do not include IOM data, except 99 (IOM JI Burkina Faso) and 219 (IOM JI Mauritania) for 3.2 and 25 (IOM JI Burkina Faso), 52 (IOM JI Cameroon), 220 (IOM JI Guinea Conakry), 147 (IOM JI Senegal) for 3.7, all in Q1 2019.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND

The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced people in Africa (EUTF for Africa or EUTF) was launched in November 2015. It is composed of three geographical 'windows': 'North Africa' (NoA), 'Horn of Africa' (HoA) and 'Sahel and Lake Chad' (SLC), which includes 12 'main' countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and The Gambia. Neighbouring countries are also eligible for regional programmes. This report includes outputs from programmes implemented in 16 countries: the 12 mentioned above as well as Benin, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Togo.¹

This is the eighth report prepared by the Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) for the EUTF SLC window, covering all the outputs achieved with EUTF funding in the SLC region, from the start of activities until the end of June 2021, with a specific focus on outputs generated in the first half of 2021. Previous reports can be found [here](#).²

In response to the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the European Union (EU) decided to reorient funds in the EUTF SLC portfolio and some implementing partners (IPs) chose to adjust their activities. Three new COVID-19 specific indicators were added to the EUTF common indicators to better capture the outputs generated through these initiatives in MLS reporting.

1.2. THE EUTF SLC WINDOW IN S1 2021

As of September 2021, the EUTF had committed (i.e., allocated funds following decisions by the EUTF Operational Committees) €4.92B (billion).³ The SLC window is the first in size in terms of funding, with €2.21B committed across 114 decisions, of which 96% or €2.11B have been contracted to 374 projects across the region. Out of these 374 signed contracts, 202 are operational and of interest to the MLS.⁴ Of these, 53 projects worth €333M (million) are completed, 128 projects worth €1.52B, are being implemented, and 21 projects (€129M) are in inception. Out of the 128 projects currently implementing, 125 have data to report.⁵ This report presents data from 178 projects, including 53 completed projects, covering a total contracted amount of €1.84B. As such, it covers 12 projects and €98M more in funding than the S2 2020 report.⁶ Funding and implementation continue to follow the EUTF's four Strategic Objectives⁷ (SO) and the strategic priorities set by the EUTF Strategic Board and ratified in September 2019 i.e. i) returns and reintegration; ii) refugee management; iii) completing progress on the securitisation of documents and civil registry; iv) anti-trafficking measures; v) essential stabilisation efforts; and vi) migration dialogue.

¹ Outputs in Benin, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Togo are collected through regional programmes and are presented in the overview of results section (4.2) of this report.

² https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/results-monitoring-and-evaluation_en

³ While this report presents output data up to 30 June 2021, portfolio data is presented as of September 2021.

⁴ Projects are considered operational when they deliver outputs to beneficiaries. Administrative projects and non-operational projects (such as projects contracted under the Research and Evidence Facility and the Technical and Cooperation Facility, feasibility studies, audits, etc.) are not included in the analysis.

⁵ Three projects are either too early in their implementation phase to be able to report outputs or their activities did not yet generate outputs that are relevant to the EUTF indicators.

⁶ The €98M increase in budget includes €83M for the 12 newly included projects as well as €15M for top-ups and/or budget amendments for already included projects.

⁷ The four Strategic Objectives (SO) of the EUTF are: SO1 'Greater economic and employment opportunities'; SO2 'Strengthening resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable including refugees and other displaced people', SO3 'Improved migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination' and SO4 'Improved governance and conflict prevention and reduction of forced displacement and irregular migration'.

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1. MLS METHODOLOGY

The Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) team works with each implementing partner (IP) to develop a reporting system that allows the MLS to collect the most detailed and granular level of data common to all IPs. To that end, the MLS has developed a reporting template that it uses with most IPs, although the reporting template is tailored to each project through a drafting and feedback process with respective IPs. Given the complexity and diversity of the EUTF portfolio, and the fact that IPs and M&E systems have different resources, limitations and capacities, the MLS tries to offer as much flexibility as possible with regard to the quantity, disaggregation and format of data collected from IPs.

The MLS then aggregates the collected data using a standardised methodology (and later disaggregates it again along various lines of analysis for reporting). This approach allows the MLS to help IPs map their own activities and outputs against the list of EUTF common output indicators and to have access to a finer level of disaggregation (e.g., by gender, beneficiary type, location, etc.). It also gives the MLS significant flexibility in changing the way data is analysed or presented as needed.

Based on the information received, the MLS team completes output indicator mappings for each project, collects the relevant data from each IP, checks the data for quality and enters it into the MLS database for aggregation, further quality checking and analysis.

During the S1 2020 reporting period, following a consultative process with implementing partners, EU delegations and the EU headquarters, the EUTF revised its common output indicators and their respective methodologies. This exercise aimed to better capture the portfolio's outputs, to ensure methodological coherence and consistency across implementing partners and regions by minimising room for interpretation, and to improve alignment with DG INTPA's¹ results framework, as well as other relevant common frameworks. INTPA's relevant thematic specialists were consulted for all SOs and for all three windows as part of this process. The resultant revisions have been formalised through a set of methodological notes, which can be found in the annexes to the S1 2020 report. For more information about this process, please see the main S1 2020 report.

2.1.1. OUTCOME ANALYSIS


In addition to output monitoring, the EUTF MLS started to include project- and programme-level outcome analysis in S2 2020 in the form of focus boxes for relevant completed projects. Because there are no common outcome indicators (as well as no common baselines and a variety of M&E systems) across EUTF projects, aggregating outcome data for the EUTF portfolio is not possible as projects usually cannot report on outcome indicators for which baseline data has not already been collected. In addition, aggregating outcomes of projects implementing in different countries, with different timelines, and contributing to various strategic objectives may not be relevant due to the importance of situating outcomes within their context. Therefore, it was agreed that instead of a quantitative aggregation of outcome indicators across projects, the MLS would focus on specific projects' outcome data as it becomes available, to provide an indicative picture of the changes to which the EUTF is contributing on the ground. For more information on the outcome component, the MLS produced a note that can be retrieved [here](#).²

¹ Directorate General for International Partnerships, formerly DEVCO.

² https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/default/files/eutf_mls_outcomes_vulgarisation.pdf

For this report, the MLS team reviewed the baseline, mid-term and final evaluations that were made available for completed projects and applied a funnelling approach to provide an indication of the number of potential outcome analyses which could be performed in future reports.

Figure 2: Projects eligible for outcome analysis, October 2021



Out of a total of 53 completed projects in the SLC window, 30 were considered to have at least one ‘real’ outcome indicator in their logical framework.¹ Among the remaining 23 projects, some either did not mention outcomes in their logical framework or did not present at least one indicator to measure them. Others did have one or several indicators presented at outcome level, but these were actually output indicators rather than outcome indicators.

Of the 30 projects with one of several outcome indicators, two had not made them SMART (Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, and Time-bound), making them difficult to exploit.

Of the 28 projects with at least one SMART outcome indicator in their logframe, 21 had either shared a baseline or a report that could serve as a baseline (such as a needs assessment) with Altai. It should be noted that the seven remaining projects do not necessarily all lack a baseline (some of them actually included baseline data in their final report) but they did not make the report available to the MLS team at the time of drafting this report.

Finally, of the 21 projects with a baseline, 17 shared a final evaluation or report with the MLS team. The remaining four projects are either pending a final evaluation because they just recently ended or were part of a programme which is still ongoing or did not make the documents available to the MLS team.

14 projects with at least one SMART outcome indicator, a baseline and a final evaluation presented some level of exploitable data (the remaining three mostly included qualitative information in their final report). All but one of these 14 projects focus on resilience (strategic objective 2). Eleven of these programmes have been examined through outcome focus boxes in the S2 2020 and this report.

2.2. CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS IN THE S1 2021 REPORT

During the implementation of the methodological changes, some projects were unable to provide the additional disaggregation requested. In these cases, data was included under the ‘unspecified’ category in the MLS analyses. Others lacked data for the newly created indicators. Significant cases of this include:

¹ "Real" here refers to an outcome indicator being a short-term or medium-term effect of an activity's output and not the direct product resulting from the development intervention, as per the OECD "Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management". Retrieved [here](#).

- Due to the methodological changes to the common output indicators explained above, not all previously gathered GIZ¹ data could be transferred to the changed system. Therefore, the GIZ data included in this report is not complete and numbers may differ from earlier reports.
- For completed projects where IPs could no longer be contacted, the MLS team has applied only those methodological changes that were feasible without consultation, taking as reference project documents such as final evaluations.

Data for S1 2021 was received from all projects for which it was expected, with the below exceptions:²

- In Burkina Faso, data for the TUUMA project (BF-06-01) is partial as internal data collection for some indicators is planned for November 2021.
- In Burkina Faso, the Protection PREFA project (BF-07-02) did not provide data in S1 2021.
- In Chad, one of the members of the RESTE *Emploi Résilience* OXFAM consortium (TD-01-01) did not report data for Q1 2021 (the project came to an end at the end of February).
- In Chad, the PRODECO project (TD-06-01) did not provide data during this data collection, due to changes to the project's logical framework, among other reasons.
- In Mauritania, *Nexus SRD Appui Budgétaire* (MR-08-01) did not provide data as the modalities of support were adjusted in 2020 to flexibly support the Government of Mauritania's response to the the COVID-19 crisis. Reporting on EUTF indicators is thus no longer relevant for this financial support.
- In Mali, data for the PAECSIS Enabel project (ML-08-02) is partial as no M&E focal point has been in place since Q3 2020.
- In Niger, the project AJUSEN Justice (NE-06-03) is being substantially modified and no activities took place during the period of reference.
- In Senegal, the PACERSEN AICS project (SN-05-02) was not able to share data due to recent project ending and important changes in project staffing.
- In Senegal, the DES PPI project (SN-04-05) did not have data to report for the S1 2021 period.
- In Senegal, the DES LuxDev (SN-04-02) was not able to share data due to important changes in project staffing, including the M&E officer.
- At the regional level, data for the PDU RECOLG project (REG-18-04) is partial, as data was difficult to collect in Burkina Faso for some indicators.

¹ *Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit* (GIZ)


² We estimate missing data for projects who have not been able to report on conducted activities would have contributed between 2% and 3% of the nearly 6,000 data points collected for S1 2021. Missing data for this semester will as much as possible be gathered for the next report.

3. PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW

3.1. BUDGET AND NUMBER OF CONTRACTS BY STATUS

As of September 2021, the EUTF for Africa has committed €4.92B, including €2.21B across 114 decisions in the Sahel and Lake Chad window, of which a total of €1.98B has been contracted to 202 operational projects so far.¹ The 202 contracted operational projects include 21 projects in their inception phase, three projects in their early implementation phase, with no data to report to the MLS yet, 125 projects in their implementation phase and with data to report and 53 completed projects. The current report includes data on 178 projects (equivalent in funding to €1.84B), comprising 53 completed projects as well as 125 projects in their implementation phase with data to report.

Figure 3: Projects and budget covered by the current S1 2021 MLS report, June 2021



Since the publication of the previous report, the following projects have been added to the MLS database and to this report:

Table 1: Projects newly added to the MLS for the S1 2021 report, June 2021

Country	Programme Name	EUTF ID	Project Name	Lead IP	EUTF Budget
Burkina Faso	Prévention de l'extrémisme violent autochtone (PEV)	T05-EUTF-SAH-08-09	Projet d'accompagnement des consortia dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre du programme PEV-FFU (PEV Consortia)	Terre des Hommes	€610,000 (completed) ²
		T05-EUTF-SAH-08-11	Construire de nouvelles coopérations entre pasteurs nomades et transhumants et les Etats de l'Initiative d'Accra (PEV Accra)	Pro-mediation	€1,600,000
Chad	Résilience et emploi au Lac Tchad (RESTE)	T05-EUTF-SAH-TD-01-12	Contrat mini Adductions d'Eau Potable (RESTE AEP1)	Berthy	€1,073,152
Côte d'Ivoire	Appui à la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale de l'état civil et de l'identification en Côte d'Ivoire (Etat Civil CI)	T05-EUTF-SAH-CI-02-01	Appui à la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale de l'état civil et de l'identification de Côte d'Ivoire (Etat Civil CI)	CIVIPOL	€4,950,000
Niger	Création d'emplois et d'opportunités économiques à travers une gestion durable de l'environnement dans les zones de transit et départ au Niger (Emploi Niger)	T05-EUTF-SAH-NE-11-03	Durabilité de l'environnement et stabilisation économique sur la route de transit (DESERT)	AICS	€13,790,000
	Création d'une Equipe Conjointe d'Investigation pour la	T05-EUTF-SAH-NE-15-01	Création d'une Equipe Conjointe d'Investigation pour la lutte contre les	CIVIPOL	€4,450,000

¹ The 202 projects include only 'operational' projects: 172 projects worth approximately €133M and considered 'non-operational' are excluded from the overall analysis. They are mostly evaluations and audits, air services, mappings and plans, reports, communications and events.

² This project started in April 2019 and is now completed since April 2021. It provided data this semester and is included in the report for the first time.


	<i>lutte contre les réseaux criminels liés au terrorisme (ECI CT)</i>		<i>réseaux criminels liés au terrorisme (ECI CT)</i>		
Regional	<i>Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest (Protection West Africa)</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-REG-13-03	<i>Projet d'appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables sur les routes migratoires du Sahel (PROMISA)</i>	Caritas Suisse	€5,000,000
	Modernizing and strengthening secure identity chains and documental security (GESTDOC)	T05-EUTF-SAH-REG-14-01	Modernizing and strengthening secure identity chains and documental security (GESTDOC)	Camoos	€5,000,000
	<i>Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-REG-18-10	<i>Améliorons nos vies ! Rétablir les espaces socio-économiques ruraux sécurisés et contrecarrer les menaces des changements environnementaux et des conflits socioculturels (PDU PMM)</i>	PMLAL	€13,600,000
	<i>Appui aux forces de sécurité des pays membres du G5 Sahel pour la lutte contre l'impunité et le renforcement de leurs liens avec les populations (Security G5 Sahel)</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-REG-23-01	<i>Appui aux forces de sécurité des pays membres de G5 Sahel pour la lutte contre l'impunité et le renforcement de leurs liens avec les populations (G5 Security Sahel)</i>	DIHR	€10,310,040
	<i>Réponse à la Crise Alimentaire au Centre Sahel : support nutritionnel et relèvement (CRIALCES)</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-REG-24-01	<i>Réponse à la Crise Alimentaire au Centre Sahel : support nutritionnel et relèvement (CRIALCES)</i>	WFP	€20,000,000
	<i>Radio Jeunesse Sahel - Appui européen à la phase de démarrage de la radio (RJS)</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-REG-25-01	<i>Radio Jeunesse Sahel - Appui européen à la phase de démarrage de la radio</i>	OIF	€2,050,000

The below graph represents the evolution in the number of EUTF contracted operational projects as well as the number of projects included in the MLS reports, together with the corresponding funding amounts. Between April¹ and September 2021, ten operational projects have been contracted, which are equivalent in funding to €62.4M. Over this period, the 12 projects listed above have been newly included in the MLS database. This represents an increase of €98M in funding covered by the MLS SLC reports.²

¹ Portfolio and funding data for the previous report, which covered output data up to 31 December 2020, was valid as of April 2021.

² The €98M increase in budget includes €82.4M for the 12 newly included projects as well as €15.6M for top-ups and/or budget amendments for already included projects.

Figure 4: Evolution of projects and budgets covered by the MLS in SLC, September 2021^{1,2}




The below graph shows the 202 contracted operational projects by budget, lifespan and status of implementation. Budgets refer solely to the EUTF contribution. The length of the bars represents the lifespan of the project and the height/width the EUTF budget per project. The colour of the bars indicates the status of the project. Dates of completion are considered as of June 2021.

¹ Please note that between April and September 2021, one project worth €2M was reclassified as 'not operational'. This explains the disparity between the nine added contracts in the graph, but the ten projects contracted since April 2021. In addition, several operational projects received top-ups and/or budget amendments during this period.

² In 2020, the MLS shifted from a quarterly to a biannual reporting schedule, initially to accommodate the methodological changes process described in section 2.1, and later to make room for other complementary work streams that aim to support the EUTF and the EU in the medium- to long-term future.


Figure 5: EUTF SLC contracted projects by budget and implementation status, September 2021



3.2. BUDGET DISTRIBUTION BY COUNTRY, IMPLEMENTING PARTNER AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

As of September 2021, regional projects collectively represented the largest amount of contracted EUTF funding. A total of €600.3M (or 30% of the total) were contracted to 55 projects at the regional level. At the country level, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have the largest portfolios, with respective budgets of €289.1M (15%), €213.6M (11%) and €189.8M (10%).

Figure 6: Budget distribution by country and implementing partner, September 2021^{1,2}



The EUTF SLC budget for operational contracted projects remains largely managed by member state agencies (€844.2M, or 43%), as well as United Nations (UN) agencies, funds and programmes (€412.4M, or 21%). Projects managed by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) represent 20% of the total budget, amounting to €386.9M. Recipient countries' governments directly receive 12% (or €240.3M) of the budget, mostly in the form of budget support actions, followed by international organisations and the private sector to a lesser extent, with 3% and 1% of the budget, respectively.³

With regards to Strategic Objectives (SO), governance, security and conflict prevention activities (SO4) receive the largest share of budget at 31% (€611.6M). SO4 is the main priority in Burkina Faso, Nigeria,

¹ The map shows the distribution of the combined SLC budget (€1.98B) for the 202 operational projects, per country.

² "New" refers to projects newly added to the MLS for the S1 2021 report.

³ For many contracts, parts of the budgets are subcontracted by IPs (including member state agencies and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes) at least in part to NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs).

Niger and Mauritania, where it accounts for 69%, 56%, 42% and 38% of the budget, respectively. In absolute numbers, regional projects, and, at the country level, Burkina Faso and Niger receive the largest amount of funding for SO4, with respectively €132.1M, €131.4M, and €121.1M dedicated to these activities.


Resilience building (SO2) represents 27% of the EUTF funds in the SLC window (€529.2M) and is particularly significant in Chad, Cameroon and Mali (where it accounts for 73%, 50% and 42% of the budget, respectively). In absolute numbers, regional projects dedicated to SO2 represent €212.1M, followed by Mali (€90M), Chad (€83.6M) and Nigeria (€39.6M).

Economic and employment opportunities (SO1) are supported by 24% (or €471.6M) of the EUTF SLC budget. These types of activities are particularly important in West African coastal countries such as The Gambia (90% of the total funds for this country), Côte d'Ivoire (83%), Guinea (82%), Ghana (80%) and Senegal (56%). In absolute numbers, the countries with the largest amount of funding dedicated to SO1 are Senegal with €92.2M and Niger with €87.1M.

Migration management (SO3) represents another 18% (€361.8M) of the total EUTF funding in SLC. SO3 is funded primarily through regional programmes, which represent €210.3M. National country programmes dedicated to SO3 are mostly prevalent in Niger (€53.9M) and Senegal (€27.9M).

The remaining 0.3% (€5.0M) of the EUTF budget contracted in SLC finances cross-cutting activities.

Figure 7: Contracted budget breakdown by Strategic Objectives, September 2021¹




¹ Share of budget for projects contracted and relevant to the MLS. The total displayed in the visual does not reflect budget allocated to cross-cutting activities, which represent €5.0M.

3.3. BUDGET ALLOCATED TO THE COVID-19 RESPONSE

To respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU reoriented funds in the EUTF SLC portfolio, and several IPs made adjustment to their activities. As part of the 2020 and S1 2021 data collection process, the MLS team asked IPs to provide information on any reorientation of their activities for the COVID-19 response and the EU to gather information on reallocation of funds. **As of June 2021, €99.8M have been allocated to the COVID-19 response through 59 projects.** This represents 5% of the €1.84M EUTF budget covered by the MLS in the SLC window. In most (70%) cases, projects undertook small activity adjustments while 29% involved agreements between the EU and IPs to reallocate funds. Only one project, the One UN Response Plan in Nigeria (€49.5M), is fully devoted to the COVID-19 response. Consequently, 50% of the budget allocated to the response to COVID-19 is implemented in Nigeria (€49.6M – 40% of the national budget).¹ Other main recipient countries include Burkina Faso (€28.3M – 16%), Mauritania (€8.5M – 11%) and Senegal (€8.1M – 6%). In the other countries, €1M or less was allocated to COVID-19, which represents around 1-2% of the national EUTF budgets. As the COVID-19 pandemic has somewhat subsided in the Sahel and Lake Chad region, projects have not allocated additional budget to the COVID-19 response since December 2020, except for PDU RECOLG (REG-18-04), which has allocated €35,801 to the creation of early warning systems on COVID-19.

Figure 8: Budget allocated to the COVID-19 response in the SLC, June 2021^{2,3}



¹ The €49.6M budget allocated to COVID-19 response in Nigeria includes €49.5M for the project 'One UN Response plan in Nigeria', as well as an additional €140,000 allocated by other projects in the country to respond to the pandemic.

² The 59 projects with funds allocated to the COVID-19 response and 56 projects with COVID-19-response outputs are not necessarily the same projects, as some projects have reported COVID-19-response outputs but not reallocated funds and some projects with funds allocated to the COVID-19 response have not yet generated COVID-19-related outputs that are relevant to the EUTF indicators.

³ The contribution of EUTF-funded projects to the response to COVID-19 is calculated only for projects currently implementing and with data to report (178 projects representing €1.84B).

4. SITUATION AND RESULTS OVERVIEW

4.1. THE SAHEL AND LAKE CHAD REGION IN S1 2021

In the first half of 2021, the security situation of the Sahel and Lake Chad region continued to deteriorate as banditry and intercommunal tensions increased. Violence from non-state armed groups continued, and 9,432 fatalities were recorded in 3,617 violent attacks in the region.¹ The number of fatalities rose by 48% compared to S2 2020 as the first half of 2021 saw a surge in violence against civilians, with a monthly average of 220 violent attacks against civilians, up from 183 in S2 2020. In both the Lake Chad Basin and Liptako-Gourma regions, bandits took advantage of generalised insecurity and local self-defence groups multiplied in response to persisting violence, fuelling intercommunal tensions.² Counter-terrorism activities, mainly led by the G5 Sahel and France with *Operation Barkhane*, have had limited results to quell violent extremism and national armed forces have had to adapt their strategies. The death of Chad's President Idriss Déby Itno, who was head of the main military power of the G5 Sahel, and France's decision to reduce its military presence in the Sahel, further emphasise this. As Déby based his political power on his military credentials and positioned himself as guarantor of the nation's security through his regular presence in the battlefield, his death creates uncertainty regarding the Chadian army's stability and its future role as part of the G5 Sahel.³

Persisting violence and extreme climatic events led to further mass displacements in the region during the first half of 2021. The number of IDPs reached 4.6 million in the Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad Basin regions in June 2021^{4,5} (up from 4.2 million at the end of November 2020).⁶ The SLC region is subject to extreme climatic events, especially droughts and floods, causing high levels of food insecurity: 24.8 million people were facing severe food insecurity in May 2021 and this number was expected to rise during the lean season (June-August). Competition over resources in turn led to further displacements and intercommunal tensions. Measures taken by governments to contain the spread of the COVID-19 led to lower food productivity, drove inflation, and further constrained humanitarian assistance, exacerbating people's vulnerability.

Yet, in S1 2021, as most governments eased COVID-19 measures, projections for the economic recovery of SLC countries were optimistic. After a 1.1% contraction in 2020, gross domestic product (GDP) for West and Central African countries was expected to grow by 2.1% in 2021.⁷ However, inequalities within the population in sub-Saharan Africa are also likely to increase, as 32 million people were thrown into poverty and disruptions to education could have long-term consequences for human capital accumulation.⁸

4.2. THE EUTF RESPONSE – OVERVIEW OF RESULTS

This section offers an analysis of the results of the EUTF's response to date against its four SOs: economy and employment; resilience (food security and access to basic services); migration management; and governance and conflict prevention.

¹ ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project dashboard', consulted in October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² ACLED, 'Sahel 2021: Communal wars, broken ceasefires, and shifting frontlines', June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ ICG, 'Chad: What are the risks after Idriss Déby's death?', April 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ UN OCHA, 'Burkina Faso, Mali & Western Niger – Humanitarian Snapshot', July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ UN OCHA, 'Lake Chad Basin – Humanitarian Snapshot', July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ UN OCHA, 'Sahel Dashboard – Humanitarian Overview', November 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ World Bank, 'Amid recession, sub-Saharan Africa poised for recovery', March 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ International Monetary Fund, 'Regional economic outlook for sub-Saharan Africa: Navigating a long pandemic', April 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

4.2.1. OVERVIEW OF EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

The table below show the aggregated values reported by SLC projects for the 38 EUTF common output indicators as of 30 June 2021.


Table 2: EUTF common output indicators for all SLC projects, June 2021¹

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	17,333	24,685	31,709	14,335	88,062	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	4,234	4,570	10,908	3,318	23,031	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	74,906	98,006	75,764	39,414	288,090	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET)...	32,254	44,832	30,673	19,187	126,946	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed,...	18	326	162	77	583	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	70	133	65	40	308	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	1,583	3,514	1,780	948	7,825	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	403,805	459,855	126,726	12,668	1,003,054	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	560,237	737,215	340,833	107,284	1,745,568	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	522,319	697,355	766,112	378,542	2,364,328	
2.5 Number of insitutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	182	218	17	20	437	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	11,413	93,257	22,035	4,483	131,187	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	666,654	1,259,787	#####	94,346,102	#####	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	15,082	33,237	18,313	5,552	72,184	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	2,456,491	1,364,114	747,497	449,012	5,017,115	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	19	36	36	44	135	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs...	1,867	2,246	5,030	22,860	32,003	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	443,383	1,020,583	1,206,508	1,952,811	4,623,285	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	28,900	19,228	14,715	4,096	66,939	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	50,500	21,820	8,728	9,761	90,810	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	15,991	19,864	30,574	9,059	75,488	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	63	328	76	32	499	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	729	1,975	1,355	1,798	5,858	
3.8 Number of people of concern benefitting from evacuation and resettlement...	2,915	1,395	583	98	4,991	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	11	326	305	177	819	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	10,340	4,115	1,845	420	16,720	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	22	22	23	18	85	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	2,315	1,313	7,098	10,668	21,394	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	13,686	12,190	11,350	9,601	46,827	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	544,936	429,191	2,663,369	265,651	3,903,148	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	132	732	360	128	1,352	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	213	793	857	491	2,355	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	188	311	2,382	1,072	3,953	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	158	200	150	70	578	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created...	47	44	24	20	135	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	11,465,917	2,061,929	13,527,846	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	746,287	188,910	935,197	
6.3 Number of entities benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	1,121	974	2,095	

¹ Results for indicators 3.2 and 3.7 do not include EU-IOM JI data, except 99 (IOM JI Burkina Faso) and 219 (IOM JI Mauritania) for 3.2 and 25 (IOM JI Burkina Faso), 52 (IOM JI Cameroon), 220 (IOM JI Guinea Conakry), 147 (IOM JI Senegal) for 3.7, all in Q1 2019.

4.2.2. GREATER ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

Figure 9: Strategic Objective 1 dashboard, SLC, June 2021



SLC economies are recovering from the region’s first economic recession in half a century, albeit at different speeds. In S1 2021, most governments lifted COVID-19 preventive measures – such as curfews, limitations on gatherings and travel bans – that had substantially affected the informal economy and the tourism sector. After a 1.1% contraction in 2020 in Western and Central Africa, the

GDP forecast for 2021 stands at 2.1%.¹ This figure hides important disparities across the region's economies: tourism-dependent economies, such as The Gambia (+5.6%) or Senegal (+5.2%) and agricultural commodity exporters, such as Côte d'Ivoire, are expected to be amongst the fastest growing economies.² Yet, recovery remains slower than in the rest of the world, as limited fiscal and policy space has hindered governments' ability to provide support during the crisis and subsequent recovery and vaccination campaigns have been slow.

The worldwide economic recession has had dire consequences on SLC populations as well as the rest of the continent. In 2021, despite positive growth rates, it is expected that 39 million Africans will fall into extreme poverty without economic support, with an overwhelming impact on people with lower levels of education and those in vulnerable or informal employment. Women are also disproportionately at risk of falling into poverty.³ The African Development Bank (AfDB) estimates that African countries would need to allocate \$4.5 billion in 2021 to close the extreme poverty gap caused by COVID-19.⁴

The EUTF has contracted €436.3M to enhance economic and employment opportunities (SO1), representing 24% of the total EUTF SLC budget. The Trust Fund primarily targets inclusive job creation. In addition, it aims to strengthen micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) through improved governance, access to funding, or enterprise development. It also supports people to develop income generating activities, focusing on the most vulnerable. Finally, its programmes support professional training (TVET) and/or skills development and help small businesses by building, renovating or expanding industrial parks, workshops and business infrastructure. S1 2021 saw the completion of *PACERSEN* (SN-05, implemented by AICS), which aimed to develop rural employment in Senegal; *Mode Ethique* (REG-07), which targeted enterprise development across the region and TUUMA (BF-06-01), which targeted entrepreneurship and young and female employment in Burkina Faso.

Contributing to employment creation to mitigate the effects of the economic crisis

In the SLC region, the labour market is not able to absorb a growing working-age population. The labour market remains characterised by high levels of informality, self-employment and underemployment. Informal workers are particularly vulnerable because they are often poorly paid and do not benefit from social protection.⁵ It is estimated that the informal economy represents 80% of employment and 90% of new jobs in West Africa.⁶ At the same time, the region has one of the highest population growth rates in the world, standing at 2.6% in 2020 compared to 1.7% in the Middle East & North Africa and 0.9% in Latin America.⁷

The COVID-19 pandemic shed light on – and exacerbated – existing labour fragilities. In Nigeria, the continent's largest economy, 20% of workers (both formal and informal) lost their jobs as a result of the pandemic and its auxiliary effects.⁸ The impact is most acute for informal workers, who were more likely to lose their jobs and experience a decrease in earnings. In Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal, respectively 48%, 34% and 42% of informal workers lost their jobs as a result of the pandemic.⁹

The lack of jobs and economic hardships are exacerbating social tensions in the region, particularly among youth. In some countries, increasing economic difficulties caused by the pandemic

¹ World Bank, 'Amid recession, sub-Saharan Africa poised for recovery', March 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ AfDB, 'African Economic Outlook 2021', March 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ AfDB, 2018. op. cited.

⁶ WEF, 'The importance of the informal sector in West Africa', March 2015. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ World Bank, 'World Bank Development Indicators', consulted in October 2021.

⁸ Reuters, 'Around 20% of Nigerian workers lost jobs due to COVID-19 - stats office', September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ UNU-MERIT, 'Labour market effects of COVID-19 in sub-Saharan Africa: An informality lens from Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal', May 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

have aggravated pre-existing drivers of conflict, for instance by increasing economic hardships and intensifying resource competition.^{1,2,3}

The EUTF is supporting job creation and youth employment across SLC countries with varying strategies depending on the countries' characteristics. In the first half of 2021, EUTF-funded programmes led to the creation of 14,335 jobs (indicator 1.1), an 8% increase from S1 2020. Thirty-six percent of the job created in S1 2021 were in Senegal (5,568 jobs), the highest across the SLC window. This was done mostly through the *Développer l'Emploi au Sénégal* (DES, SN-04) and PASPED (SN-09)⁴ programmes. DES contributed to the creation of 1,419 jobs in S1 2021, and 5,215 since the beginning of activities. The programme worked with the Senegalese *Bureau de mise à niveau*⁵ (BMN) and the *Agence pour le Développement et l'Encadrement des PME* (ADEPME) to assist and counsel small firms across the country: firms are selected and benefit from support by the BMN, which in turn contributes to job creation in different sectors (e.g. agri-business, hospitality, construction). Whilst most economic activity is concentrated in Dakar (which hosts 25% of Senegal's population),⁶ DES contributed to job creation in eight of the country's 14 regions, including 46% of its results in Saint-Louis. The PASPED programme, in turn, contributed to the creation of 2,281 jobs in S1 2021, for a total of 4,600 jobs since the beginning of their activities.⁷ PASPED supported job creation by providing financial and technical support to small firms across the country, especially in the regions of Thiès and Saint-Louis, which hosted 54% of all jobs created by the programme in S1 2021. After Senegal, 20% of the total jobs created by EUTF-funded activities in S1 2021 were in Niger, mostly through *Kallo Tchidaniwo* (NE-09, 912 jobs),⁸ *Pôles Ruraux* (NE-03, 824 jobs)⁹ and *Emploi Niger* (NE-11, 512 jobs).¹⁰

In conflict-affected countries, job creation aimed to provide rapid income to populations through casual daily labour, for instance, which represented 4,270 jobs (28% of the total) created in S1 2021, the highest across all types of work. In Niger and Cameroon, casual daily labour represented respectively 90% and 77% of job creation in S1 2021.¹¹ In The Gambia, on the other hand, 96% of total jobs in S1 2021 were long-term employment, most of them through successful TVET support. The youth, one of the segments of population most affected by the labour market inefficiencies, represented 20% of the beneficiaries, compared with 9% for people over 35 years old.¹²

In West Africa, women represent 46% of the labour force in sub-Saharan Africa,¹³ but they are more likely to be in informal employment compared to men.¹⁴ They represent 36% of EUTF beneficiaries for job creation in S1 2021; when excluding cash-for-work activities – which tend to be held by men, given their labour-intensive nature – women accounted for 40% of total beneficiaries in S1 2021, compared to 51% men.¹⁵ Their jobs resulted mainly from successful support to MSME (52% of female job creation in S1 2021, vs. 47% men).

Most jobs created were in the agriculture, fishery and livestock production or processing sector, which is reflective of labour dynamics in the region, where agriculture and the food economy

¹ Mercy Corps, 'An in-depth look at how COVID-19 intensifies conflicts', August 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ecdpm, 'Simmering tensions: the long-term impact of covid-19 on fragility and conflict in Africa', January 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Ibid

⁴ *Programme de contraste à la migration illégale à travers l'appui au Secteur Privé et à la création d'emplois au Sénégal*.

⁵ Levelling office that assists firms and heads of firms to explore growth avenues.

⁶ World Bank, 'the World Bank in Senegal', consulted in October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ This is the same as the total number of jobs reported in S2 2020 due to a change in the reported data: whilst in S2 2020 it was reported that 4,600 jobs were created for the period, a correction was then made to specify that the 4,600 jobs were created during the period S2 2020 – S1 2021. The project thus contributed to job creation in S1 2021, even though the total remains the same. For more information on data corrections, please refer to the Annexes.

⁸ *Renforcement de la résilience institutionnelle et communautaire dans la région Diffa, Bassin du Lac Tchad, Niger*.

⁹ *Projet d'appui aux filières agricoles dans les régions de Tahoua et Agadez*.

¹⁰ *Création d'emplois et d'opportunités économiques à travers une gestion durable de l'environnement dans les zones de transit et départ au Niger*.

¹¹ The number of jobs created or supported through cash-for-work activities is calculated in full-time equivalent, based on the number of days worked by beneficiaries divided by 230 (workdays per year).

¹² The remaining 73% of beneficiaries were of unspecified age.

¹³ World Bank, 'World Bank Development Indicators', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁴ Pew Research Center, 'In many countries, at least four-in-ten in the labor force are women', March 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁵ The remaining 8% being unspecified.

account for over two thirds of total employment.¹ The sector represented 48% of jobs for which the nature of employment was specified in S1 2021, compared to 37% in S2 2020.

Providing technical trainings to reduce the skills gap

In many crucial economic sectors such as agriculture, agribusiness, logistics, or industrial activities, the skills gap continues to undermine West African economies and limit professional insertion, especially for youth entering the job market in the post-COVID-19 context. While data do not fully capture the gap between youth employability and jobs in West Africa,² this disparity tends to lower productivity, decrease job creation, and make professional insertion more challenging overall. The skills gap mainly takes two forms: a sectoral one, a gap between the general population's skills and the requirements per sector, and an occupational one, the mismatch between unemployed people's skills and key occupations.³

While COVID-19-related measures forced training centres to fully or partially close, most professional training activities resumed in 2021. This benefitted to EUTF-funded programmes involved in trainings, which delivered professional trainings and skills development services to 19,187 people (indicator 1.4) in S1 2021. This represents an 18% increase compared to December 2020, and a 47% increase from S1 2020 when many training programmes almost ground to a halt. Women represented 36% of beneficiaries having received TVET in S1 2021,⁴ against 43% in 2020. The EUTF's strategy to deliver TVET mostly relies on two pillars. The first involves maximising professional insertion by matching unemployed people's skills with jobs, both in the formal and informal sectors.⁵ The second aims to support self-employment and entrepreneurship through targeted, hands-on TVET adapted to local economic realities, especially agricultural production and processing in rural areas.

Several EUTF-funded programmes aim to enhance professional insertion and create linkages between TVET centres, companies and entrepreneurs. Across SLC, 2,668 people received dual education⁶ in S1 2021, the main contributors to this component being INTEGRA (GN-01)⁷ in Guinea, the regional ARCHIPELAGO (REG-15),⁸ and *Emploi Niger* (NE-11).⁹ INTEGRA (GN-01) aims to enhance socio-professional insertion, provide internships to youth, strengthen the commercial orientation of small businesses and create networks of economic actors. The programme trained 4,209 people in S1 2021 (indicator 1.4), including 1,205 through dual education and 2,331 through technical TVET. At the regional level, 57% of the 1,728 people trained through ARCHIPELAGO (REG-15) in S1 2021 received dual education in various sectors. In Niger, 483 of the 868 people (56%) trained through *Emploi Niger* (NE-11) were young people who completed a technical and professional training and benefitted from follow-up consisting of periodic technical support and personal coaching aiming to enhance their professional insertion.

EUTF-funded programmes also target self-employment and job creation, especially in rural areas. Agricultural production and processing was the main TVET sector for the EUTF in S1 2021.¹⁰

¹ OECD, 'Agriculture, Food and Jobs in West Africa', April 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

² The proportion of youths not in employment, education or training (NEET) was 24% in 2020 in West Africa (29% for women, 19% for men), a figure that is below other regional averages – for instance 33% in southern Africa. That is actually due to the fact that the NEET rate tends to increase with income per capita up to a point, which corresponds to lower middle-income countries. This point has not been reached in the case West Africa. For more information, ILO, 'Report on employment in Africa (Re-Africa) – Tackling the youth employment challenge', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Christopher Rooney, Zaakhir Asmal, 'Job creation for youth in Africa: Skills needs and gaps for industries without smokestacks', March 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Men represented 51% of beneficiaries in S1 2021, while gender was unspecified for the rest.

⁵ Indeed, informal jobs represent over 92% of jobs in West Africa. For more information, ILO, 'Report on employment in Africa (Re-Africa) – Tackling the youth employment challenge', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Dual education, or dual training, refers to a form of training where TVET and internships are simultaneously delivered to beneficiaries. Dual training aims to enhance beneficiaries' professional insertion by connecting them to the job market and train them at the same time.

⁷ *Programme d'appui à l'intégration socio-économique des jeunes en République de Guinée*.

⁸ ARCHIPELAGO: an African-European TVET initiative.

⁹ *Les jeunes entreprennent et s'emploient au Niger*.

¹⁰ 30% of people benefitting from EUTF-delivered TVET in S1 2021 were trained on agriculture, fishery and livestock production or processing. 8% were trained on construction. The sector was unspecified for 48% of the beneficiaries.

Most beneficiaries of TVET for agricultural production and processing were reached by the RESIGUI programme (GN-04)¹ in Guinea. The programme aims to enhance the food security of rural smallholders through technical trainings on the use of adapted tools, crops and sustainable agricultural practices. In S1 2021, they trained 2,959 people. At the regional level, ARCHIPELAGO (REG-15) trained 1,728 people in S1 2021, 415 of whom were trained in agriculture, fishery and livestock. The programme aims to support youth and returnees to launch businesses in various sectors – for instance milk and dairy items in Cameroon, horticulture in Ghana, or production, packaging and distribution of quality seeds in Chad. In Mali, the ADEL programme (ML-12)² aims to enhance both salaried work and self-employment for youth in the Gao and Timbuktu regions through support to existing agricultural cooperatives, support to small associations and businesses, land irrigation, and better land repartition. The programme trained 1,156 young people in S1 2021.

Reducing financial vulnerability, improving livelihoods through IGA support

The COVID-19-induced economic crisis dealt a major blow to West Africa’s vulnerable households. In countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), more than 90% of households reported that COVID-19-related restrictions and disruptions had had a negative impact on their incomes, and 44% described the impact as “significant”.³ The crisis further increased the financial vulnerability of the many households who rely on only one or few income generating activities (IGAs). West Africa’s low labour force participation rate,⁴ which stood at 58% in 2021, below continental and world averages (respectively at 63% and 60%), show households’ reliance on few IGAs.^{5,6}

To address the financial vulnerability of SLC households and strengthen self-employment and informal businesses, the EUTF assists vulnerable people to develop IGAs. In S1 2021, EUTF-funded programmes provided IGA support to 39,414 people (indicator 1.3), a 16% increase from December 2020.

Agriculture, fishery and livestock production or processing represented 53% of the IGAs supported in S1 2021. Services to MSMEs (including financial services) made up 19% of IGAs supported in S1 2021. The rest of the IGAs supported in S1 2021 were in services, wholesale and retail trade, handicraft or construction.⁷ Most agricultural IGAs in S1 2021 were supported by the PAFAM programme (ML-02) in Mali,⁸ which assisted 8,557 people in developing IGAs in S1 2021 or 55% of the beneficiaries reached since the programme’s inception. PAFAM provided support to actors in the cashew nut sector through the structuration of the value chain, trainings on production and transformation techniques as well as on managerial aspects. Also in Mali, the EJOM programme (ML-09)⁹ supported 2,319 people in S1 2021, mostly by providing tool kits and fertilizers in the fields of horticulture (2,225) and agribusiness (94).¹⁰ In Chad, the DIZA programme (TD-07)¹¹ assisted 640 people to develop vegetable activities.¹²

¹ RESIGUI – Améliorer la résilience des populations vulnérables de Guinée.

² Appui au Développement Economique Local et à la prévention des conflits dans les régions de Tombouctou et Gao.

³ ECOWAS, ‘Covid-19 Pandemic: Impact of restriction measures In West Africa’, January 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ The labour force participation rate is calculated as the labour force, that is the active population of employed and unemployed people, divided by the total working-age population aged 15 to 64. The labour force is a broader measure than employment, and corresponds to the supply of labour available for the production of goods and services within a given period. For more information, OECD, ‘Labour force participation rate’. Retrieved [here](#). For more information, ILO, ‘Report on employment in Africa (Re-Africa) – Tackling the youth employment challenge’, 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ West African labour participation rate tends to be lower than other regions’ mostly for demographic and cultural reasons. For instance, housewives, students above 15, and retired people below 64 lower labour force participation rates.

⁶ ILO, ‘Report on employment in Africa (Re-Africa) – Tackling the youth employment challenge’, 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ For 23% of the people assisted to develop IGAs in S1 2021, the sector could not be obtained and remained unspecified.

⁸ *Projet d’Appui à la Filière de l’Anacarde au Mali.*

⁹ Youth Employment Creates Opportunities at Home in Mali.

¹⁰ Among the 94 beneficiaries, 12 were farm owners trained on general management of the farms.

¹¹ *Programme de développement inclusif dans les zones d’accueil.*

¹² The DIZA programme provided IGA support to 3,654 people in S1 2021 all sectors included.

In S1 2021, 36% of those benefitting from IGA support were women, and 38% men.¹ The share of women assisted to develop IGAs decreased compared to 2020, when women represented 45% of the beneficiaries and men 34%.² Examples of programmes with a strong gender focus are Make it in the Gambia (GM-03)³ or SAFIRE (MR-07) in Mauritania. The latter aims to support livelihood diversification in rural areas but also entrepreneurship and self-employment in rural and urban zones and to address Mauritanian women's financial vulnerability.⁴ In S1 2021, 1,931 people (76% women) were assisted by SAFIRE to develop IGAs, mainly through entrepreneurship and practical trainings – in sectors such as agriculture, construction, textile and clothing, retail, handicraft, etc.

¹ Gender was unspecified for the remaining beneficiaries reached in S1 2021.


² Gender was unspecified for the remaining beneficiaries reached in 2020.

³ Make it in The Gambia.

⁴ As divorced women tend to be more numerous in the Moorish community. EUTF, SAFIRE, 'Action Document'.

4.2.3. STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE OF COMMUNITIES

Figure 10: Strategic Objective 2 dashboard, SLC, June 2021



The SLC region remains affected by persisting insecurity, causing mass displacement and growing humanitarian needs. Violence continues to be mainly concentrated in the Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad Basin regions, where, respectively, 10.8 million and 10.5 million people were in urgent need of humanitarian assistance as of June 2021. In addition, 1.8 million and 2.8 million people were internally displaced in each region. Mass displacements put additional pressure on already scarce resources, notably food and basic services, increasing the vulnerability of both IDPs and host communities.

People's vulnerabilities were further exacerbated by the socio-economic consequences of COVID-19 containment measures, which led to lower food productivity and higher food prices. In S1 2021, food prices increased in almost all countries in West Africa, with Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Mauritania and Burkina Faso being the most impacted. As a result, by May 2021, 24 million people were faced with severe food insecurity across the SLC region, up from 16 million during the same period in 2020.¹ This number was projected to increase up to 31 million food insecure people during the lean season (June-August), despite favourable rains in 2021.²

Access constraints, mainly due to insecurity, in the Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad Basin regions posed additional challenges to assistance delivery to the most vulnerable populations. Insecurity and attacks targeting aid workers, like those that took place in Mali's Gao, Mopti and Tombouctou regions, often forced organisations to cancel or stop their activities. The destruction of public infrastructure, such as schools and health centres, further hampered the provision of services and assistance. Finally, the poor quality of roads, especially during the rainy season, limited physical access to secluded areas such as Cameroon's Far North Region. Measures taken to contain the spread of COVID-19 also restricted humanitarian access in most countries.

The EUTF has so far contracted €461.7M to 52 programmes focusing on resilience-building activities (SO2). EUTF-funded resilience programmes broadly adopt a Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) approach to better anticipate, prepare for and respond to crises related to insecurity, mass displacements and other shocks. Most programmes supported actions relating to food security (such as RRR, NG-07) and nutrition (such as PDU, REG-18) assistance, as the number of food insecure people kept growing in the region.

Insecurity and environment constraints also impeded the provision of basic social services, jeopardizing vulnerable livelihoods. To promote social protection schemes for the most vulnerable, EUTF-funded programmes delivered social services related to health care (ProGEM, NE-02), improved access to water (SDNM2, ML-04) and legal assistance to obtain identity documents (KEY, ML-01). Specific responses were also designed to overcome the challenges posed by the COVID-19 context and ensure continuity of care (On UN Response Plan, NG-09). These programmes also aimed to strengthen local service provision, notably through the capacity-building of local staff and by supporting local strategies related to resource management and the delivery of basic services.

Reinforcing food security of vulnerable populations in conflict-affected regions

Increasing numbers of people in the Lake Chad Basin and Liptako-Gourma regions are facing food insecurity. EUTF-funded programmes aim to address this issue, particularly ahead of the lean season. In S1 2021, EUTF-funded programmes provided 378,542 people with food security-related assistance (indicator 2.4), 86% of which was provided during Q2 2021, as the number of food insecure people is likely to rise further between June and August. The RRR programme (NG-07)³ provided 42% of the total achieved in S1 2021, all in Q2 2021 in Nigeria's Borno State. The PDU


¹ WFP, 'Food Security Highlights – West Africa', May 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ EU Support to Response, Recovery and Resilience in Borno State.

programme (REG-18)¹ delivered food security-related assistance to 20% of the SLC's beneficiaries in S1 2021, all in Burkina Faso.

Figure 11: Food security situations in the SLC region in January – May 2020 & 2021²



Livelihoods in the Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad Basin regions are still disrupted by persisting violence and the consequences of the heavy floods experienced in 2020, that destroyed crops and livestock and further damaged already deteriorated soils. Within the LRRD approach framework, EUTF-programming aimed to provide beneficiaries with direct assistance to address emergency situations and longer-term assistance to better prepare them for future shocks.

In S1 2021, 326,199 people benefitted from direct assistance in the form of cash transfers (indicator 2.9). This represents 29% of all the cash transfers distributed in the region since 2018 and a 66% increase compared to S2 2020. 228,230 were unconditional cash transfers – often but not necessarily used to buy food – 91% of which were handed out in Nigeria through RRR (NG-07) and the One UN Response Plan programme (NG-09). In S1 2021, inflation skyrocketed in Nigeria (monthly average inflation of 17.6%³) causing monthly average food prices to increase by 22%,⁴ one of the highest rises in West Africa during this period. Northern Nigeria was on the verge of famine due to the compounded effects of sharp inflation and persisting violence. According to *Cadre Harmonisé* data, the population at crisis or worse levels of food insecurity in northern Nigeria was projected to almost double during the lean season.⁵ The remaining 97,969 cash transfer were meant explicitly for food security. 67% of them were handed out by the RESIGUI programme in Guinea (GN-04).⁶ RESIGUI started in July 2020 and aims to improve the food and nutrition security of vulnerable households in Guinea during and after the lean season, the effects of which were recently aggravated by COVID-19.

EUTF-funded programming sought to reinforce livelihood resilience and food diversification with rapid-impact actions, including the distribution of farming inputs and livestock support. In S1 2021, 211,412 people benefitted from farming inputs or tools (indicator 2.4): 70% of them were in Borno, Nigeria and supported by the RRR programme, which provided quality agricultural inputs to reinforce crop production and diversification and therefore support food security. In addition, 36,678 people received support for their livestock, most of them in Burkina Faso (41%) and in Nigeria (28%), as both countries experience high levels of food insecurity. In Burkina Faso's Sahel Region, the PDU programme (REG-18) provided 6,480 vulnerable people, 98% of whom were agro-pastoralists, with

¹ *Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel*

² *Cadre Harmonisé* and Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, 'Food security Data in West and Central Africa', consulted in October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Trading Economics, 'Nigeria Inflation Rate' dashboard, accessed in October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Trading Economics, 'Nigeria Food Inflation' dashboard, accessed in October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ *Cadre Harmonisé* and Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, 'Food security Data in West and Central Africa', consulted in October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ *Améliorer la résilience des populations vulnérables de Guinée*

livestock feed, while the PEV programme (BF-08)¹ distributed livestock feed to 8,640 vulnerable pastoralists in the Nord region. In Nigeria's Borno State, 10,265 vulnerable people, 67% of whom were women, were provided with starter kits for poultry, fattening bulls or goat production.

EUTF-programming also support vulnerable populations with longer term land rehabilitation through improved irrigation. In the Liptako-Gourma region, the overall share of irrigated land is very low, mainly due to a lack of appropriate technology and investment.² In S1 2021, EUTF-funded programmes provided 50,734 people with improved irrigation and water access (indicator 2.4): 54% of the results came from the Shimodu programme (NE-10) in Niger. The programme equipped land with a solar irrigation system to support vegetable gardening. In addition, 30,623 people received land rehabilitation assistance. In total, 2,638 hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems benefitted from land rehabilitation (indicator 2.6): 66% of this land was in Niger's Agadez, Tahoua and Zinder regions and was supported by the *Pôles Ruraux* and DESERT³ programmes (NE-03 and NE-11, respectively).

Improving access to basic services for vulnerable people in areas with high access constraints

The Liptako-Gourma region is the stage of recurrent attacks by armed groups that directly target schools, health centres and other infrastructures. In 2020, health structures were directly targeted by attacks, leading to the closure of around 70 health centres in Niger's Tillabéry and Diffa regions. Also, in addition to the COVID-19 pandemic, Niger is experiencing sporadic disease outbreaks, namely measles, cholera and meningitis, putting additional pressure on an already weakened health system.

As EUTF-programmes aim to offset the loss of social infrastructure in vulnerable areas, 449,012 people received improved access to basic social services (indicator 2.9) in S1 2021. This is slightly higher than in S2 2020 and allowed the total number of beneficiaries with improved access since 2018 to reach 5,017,115.

Yet, increasingly high access constraints further impeded the delivery of humanitarian aid in the most vulnerable areas of the SLC region. According to ACAPS, in S1 2021, humanitarian access deteriorated in Nigeria and Mali, which faced 'extreme' constraints, and in Niger, which faced 'very high' constraints.⁴ Constraints also remained 'very high' in Cameroon and 'high' in Burkina Faso and Chad. Out of the nine indicators used by ACAPS to assess the criticality of humanitarian access, four reached the highest level for at least five of the six countries, namely ongoing hostilities, restriction and obstruction of access to services and assistance, environmental constraints, as well as movement restrictions within the country.

Most EUTF-funded programmes in these areas adapted their implementation strategies to these constraints by relying more on local partners and focal points in the conflict-affected areas, as well as by distributing cash transfers. Local partners allowed IPs to better assess the severity of situations and implement activities accordingly. Cash transfers ensured continuity of assistance despite reduced access for humanitarian workers that prevented them from conducting other types of activities. Of the 449,012 beneficiaries reported under 2.9 in S1 2021, 73% received cash transfers and 21% benefitted from newly constructed infrastructure. Most of the cash assistance supported food security, as previously detailed. This part will therefore focus on results linked to newly constructed infrastructure.

In S1 2021, 91,870 people benefitted from the construction of new infrastructures, mostly in Niger and Mali. Of this total, 41,762 beneficiaries had improved access to health services through the construction of health structures, almost all of them (98%) in Niger through ProGEM (NE-02).⁵ This

¹ *Prévention de l'extrémisme violent autochtone*

² Cascades, 'Climate Change, Development and Security in the Central Sahel', June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ *Durabilité de l'environnement et stabilisation économique sur la route du transit*

⁴ ACAPS, 'Humanitarian Access Overview', July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ *Renforcement de la gestion durable des conséquences des flux migratoires au Niger*

programme also aims to anticipate movements of populations and prepare accurate response mechanisms for such potential shocks at the community level.

In addition, 37,344 beneficiaries had improved access to water and sanitation, mostly (82%) in Mali's Tombouctou, Gao, Kidal, Mopti and Kayes regions through the SDNM2¹ and Diaspora Mali programmes (ML-04 and ML-05, respectively). Fewer than 68% (Mali's national average) of people in Mali's Tombouctou, Gao, Kidal, Menaka and Mopti regions have access to water.²


In S1 2021, 986 social infrastructures (indicator 2.1 bis) were built or rehabilitated in the SLC region, mostly in Niger (53%) and Mali (17%). Over half (60%) of infrastructures dealt with water access, and most (85%) were constructed by Shimodu (NE-10) in Niger's Diffa region.

¹ *Sécurité et développement au nord du Mali – phase 2*

² OCHA, 'Aperçu des besoins humanitaires – Mali', February 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

4.2.4. IMPROVED MIGRATION MANAGEMENT

Figure 12: Strategic Objective 3 dashboard, SLC, June 2021



In the first half of 2021, forced displacement continued to increase in the SLC region as the security and climate situation continued to deteriorate. Over the last three years, the conflict in the Sahel has developed into one of the world's worst humanitarian and displacement crisis.¹ The number of IDPs reached 4.6 million people in the Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad Basin regions in June 2021^{2,3} (up from 4.2 million at the end of November 2020).⁴ The number of refugees and asylum seekers also increased by 6%, reaching 907,502 in June 2021.⁵

Migrants continued to increasingly use the Atlantic Route in the first half of 2021, while the use of Central Mediterranean Route resumed after decreasing in 2020 because of COVID-19 related restrictions. Departing from the West African coast, more than 6,952 migrants arrived on the shores of the Canary Islands in the first half of 2021, a 156% increase compared to the same period in 2020.⁶ This route remains the most deadly route to Europe: in S1 2021, reportedly more than 250 migrants died between West Africa and the Canary Islands.⁷ The Central Mediterranean Route also saw an upsurge in usage in 2021, with an estimated 21,473 refugees and migrants arriving in Italy by sea this year, a 193% increase compared to the same timeframe in 2020.⁸

The management of migration flows and assistance to people on the move remains a challenge for West African governments. COVID-19 related travel restrictions, especially closure of land borders, further highlighted the continuous need for strengthening regional and national capacities in terms of migration management.⁹

The EUTF has contracted €359.0M (19% of the EUTF SLC budget) to improving migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination (SO3). The EU-IOM¹⁰ Joint Initiative (EU-IOM JI) represents the bulk of this budget with a total of €195.1M (54%), in part facilitating the sustainable and dignified return and reintegration of migrants. The EUTF also provides capacity building and operational support to strengthen organisations and institutions' capacity to manage mixed migration flows through programmes such as ProGEM (NE-02, €32.0M)¹¹ in Niger and AFIA (MR-02, €3.0M)¹² in Mauritania. Finally, EUTF-funded programmes also aim to improve capacities to fight against trafficking in human being through programmes such as TEH (REG-12, €17.4M).¹³

In May 2021, the EUTF commissioned a study on the state of migration governance in 21 countries, including 12 in the SLC region. This study is based on secondary research and interviews with key informants and aims to support the design of future programming by identifying each country's priority needs with regards to the governance of migration, mobility and displacement of people, existing governance frameworks and their level of implementation, and support currently available from the different donors and IPs. The 21 country reports as well as a transversal report should be made available in S2 2021.

Supporting protection and anti-human trafficking efforts

Governmental institutions in the Sahel and Lake Chad region remain challenged by a deteriorating security situation and the repercussions of COVID-19. These factors put pressure on institutions' already limited capacity and resources available to deal with migration management. In this

¹ ICMPD, 'Migration Outlook 2021', January 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² UN OCHA, 'Burkina Faso, Mali & Western Niger – Humanitarian Snapshot', July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ UN OCHA, 'Lake Chad Basin – Humanitarian Snapshot', July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ UN OCHA, 'Sahel Dashboard – Humanitarian Overview', November 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ IOM, 'Irregular migration towards Europe | Western Africa – Atlantic route', July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ UNCHR, 'Italy weekly snapshot', 4 July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Africa Portal, 'Corruption, Mistrust, and Praise? Assessing Governments' Management of the COVID-19 Pandemic in West Africa', 7 April 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ International Organisation for Migration (IOM)

¹¹ *Renforcement de la gestion durable des conséquences des flux migratoires.*

¹² *Renforcement des capacités pour une meilleure gestion de la migration afin de protéger l'enfance migrante contre l'exploitation et la traite.*

¹³ *Appui à la Lutte contre la Traite des Personnes dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée.*

context, support to institutions and non-state actors mandated to manage migration is key to ensure proper assistance to and protection of migrants.

EUTF-funded programmes aim to increase and improve the capacities of different actors involved in migration management. In the first half of 2021, 1,798 individuals were trained on migration management and protection (indicator 3.7).¹ This represents a 74% increase compared to data reported in S2 2020. Most of the trainees were reached by the Protection West Africa programme (1,162, REG-13)² or the TEH programme (203, REG-12).

Given the increased protection risks faced by people on the move, especially children, the EUTF aims to reinforce protection services for the most vulnerable.³ Increased insecurity and COVID-19 repercussions exacerbated pre-existing vulnerabilities of people on the move. In the first half of 2021, 822 trainees of the Protection West Africa programme were key child protection actors (indicator 3.7). Areas covered in the trainings included children's rights, protective accompaniment, case management, and protection from violence and sexual abuse. Protection West Africa trained an additional 340 community members and volunteers this semester on children protection, including on health protocols, psychosocial support, legal assistance, and referrals. The programme assisted 1,389 children in transit in S1 2021 (indicator 3.2). Another 36 children on the move received first aid from the emergency triage mechanism implemented by Nexus SRD (MR-08)⁴ in S1 2021. Resultantly, a total of 5,834 children on the move benefitted from protection services from EUTF-funded programmes since the beginning of activities, including from the now completed AFIA programme (MR-02). Under the EU-IOM Joint-Initiative, 15 of the migrant resource centres that have been set up (indicator 2.1bis) are still active in S1 2021 and provide basic assistance to transit migrants.

EUTF-funded programmes also aim to contribute to the fight against trafficking in persons (TIP) and smuggling of migrants (SOM) in the region by reinforcing both prosecution and protection.⁵ Smugglers who continued to transport migrants while COVID-19 related restrictions were in place resorted to different routes to avoid security measures at the borders. These routes were more dangerous and remote, presumably led to the deaths of dozens of migrants and put many more at risk of trafficking.⁶ The EUTF-funded TEH programme adopts a multi-level approach to strengthen all actors involved in the fight against trafficking, from prevention to protection and prosecution. It notably aims to strengthen the capacity of inter-ministerial committees to improve the implementation of the TIP-related legislative and normative frameworks developed at the national level. In this context, four national civilian institutions (in Togo, Benin, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire) were strengthened (indicator 3.6) and 51 members of the institutions were trained in S1 2021 (indicator 3.7). In the first half of 2021, TEH also continued to support protection actors working in centres dedicated to victims of trafficking: ten operators were trained to receive and refer calls from trafficking victims in Nigeria (including six women), and 15 agents were trained in the protection and rehabilitation of victims of trafficking in Côte d'Ivoire (including three women). Thanks to this, 139 potential or identified victims were referred to appropriate assistance services in S1 2021, including 31% women and 27% children (indicator 3.2). Finally, the TEH programme is working to reinforce the judiciary system to support the prosecution of traffickers. This semester, it trained 127 actors from local jurisdictions (3.7). Another EUTF-funded project, ECI (NE-05), mentored 41 members of a Joint Investigation Team created by the programme in the first half of 2021. These teams aim to fight against criminal networks linked to irregular immigration, trafficking

¹ Please note the results for indicator 3.7 do not include IOM data.

² *Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest.*

³ Protection is defined by the IASC as 'all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law (human rights law, humanitarian law and refugee law)'. Note however that here we use a narrower definition of protection mainly focusing on violence and rights' violations.

⁴ *L'UE pour le nexus sécurité-résilience-développement en Mauritanie.*

⁵ Data associated with search and rescue operations is not collected as part of EUTF indicators, although such activities are undertaken by certain EUTF-funded programmes like the EU-IOM Joint Initiative.

⁶ Global initiative against transnational organized crime, 'Conflict, coping, and Covid: changing human smuggling and trafficking dynamics in North Africa and the Sahel in 2019 and 2020', April 2021. Retrieved here.

in human beings and smuggling of migrants. A total of 831 people have been trained on combatting TIP and SOM since the beginning of EUTF-funded activities.

Increasing awareness on the risks related to migration and legal pathways

As more dangerous migratory routes emerge, EUTF-funded programmes continue to finance awareness raising activities on risks but also on other topics such as job opportunities and legal pathways. IOM's missing migrants project reported that loss of life along the Atlantic Route to the Canary Islands worsened in 2021¹ as migrants were increasingly transiting through Mauritania in an effort to reach Europe via the Atlantic, and most often failed to reach or were expelled from Spain after their arrival. Irregular migrants who continued their journey in spite of COVID-19 related restrictions resorted to new and more remote routes to avoid security measures at the borders. Providing practical, risk-reducing information that would allow irregular migrants to make the safest decision is key.² It has also been observed that communities often have prejudices based on false perceptions about migrants and refugees, which can be addressed through information campaigns.³

EUTF-funded programmes reached migrants and potential migrants through 420 events (indicator 3.11) in the first half of 2021. Most of these people were exposed to messages on the risks of irregular migration (66%) and were reached through face-to-face campaigns (51%) and mass media (49%). Both these means are relevant as new studies have found that, when accessing information about migration, potential migrants mainly use face-to-face interactions, and, to some extent, social media.⁴

In S1 2021, the EU-IOM JI⁵ continues to be the programme that reaches the most potential migrants with messages on the risks of irregular migration. The programme seeks to build an environment where information, mostly on the risks of irregular migration, can be more easily shared and accepted. For example, involving returning migrants brought authenticity to the discourse. Indeed, studies have shown that migrants mainly rely on and trust those who have experience or knowledge of migration when making migration decisions.⁶ Working with local leaders is also reported to build trust and facilitate two-way communication.

While IOM mostly raises awareness among potential migrants to inform them on the danger of irregular routes, the Protection West Africa programme sensitises host communities and transit migrants. In the first half of 2021, the programme sensitised 30,562 people from host communities on social cohesion with transit migrants, mostly in Niger (18,448) and The Gambia (4,883). It also sensitised 23,644 migrants in transit on immediate protection measures available in centres, mostly in Niger (6,327) and Mali (5,082).

Travel opportunities within the ECOWAS region were promoted by the Migration AECID project (ML-07-01).⁷ In S1 2021, the project trained 17 CSOs to carry out awareness raising activities (indicator 3.6), and 845 people participated in these activities (indicator 3.3). In addition, In the first quarter, the project developed and implemented two training plans (indicator 5.2) and subsequently trained 251 staff on the free movement of people. Most of those trained were members of national (46%) or local (32%) civilian institutions (indicator 3.7).

¹ IOM, 'Irregular migration towards Europe – Western Africa – Atlantic Route', July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² DIIS, 'Does information save migrant's lives?', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ United Nations University, 'Refugees, Racism and Xenophobia: What Works to Reduce Discrimination?', 20 June 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Ibid.


⁵ BF-04, SN-06-01, CM-04, GM-02, ML-07-02, REG-08,01, REG-08-02, REG-08-03, REG-08-04, REG-08-05, MR-03, NE-07, NG-04, SN-06-04.

⁶ DIIS, 2021. Op. cit.

⁷ *Projet d'information et de sensibilisation sur les risques et dangers de la migration irrégulière et la promotion de la libre circulation dans l'espace CEDEAO.*

4.2.5. IMPROVING GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

Figure 13: Strategic Objective 4 dashboard, SLC, June 2021



The security situation in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin region remained volatile in the first semester of 2021. The number of fatalities and security events continued to increase in the beginning of 2021 as frontlines shifted, putting new regions at risk of violence. International and national armies have been forced to adapt their strategies in the fight against non-state armed groups. In S1 2021,

9,432 people in the region died (almost 50% more than the 6,380 reported in S2 2020) in 3,617 security incidents (3,372 in S2 2021).¹

The crisis in the Liptako-Gourma² entered its tenth year in 2021. More than 20,000 civilians have died in the conflict since 2012³ and 1.9M people are currently displaced in the region.⁴ Faced with increased pressure in the Liptako-Gourma, both the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and the Al-Qaeda-affiliated *Jama'at Nusrat Al Islam Wal Muslimin* shifted their efforts towards areas out of the immediate reach of the military forces, which remain concentrated in the tri-border area.⁵ In addition, reported abuse at the hands of national and international armies and the lack of clear victories put in question the efficiency of the military response. In June 2021, French president, Emmanuel Macron announced the end of Operation Barkhane and the transformation of the French engagement in the region. While it is not yet known how the redeployment will happen, the European task force Takuba should take a more leading role and support the coordination of European armies deployed in the Sahel.⁶

In the Lake Chad Basin, the death in May of Boko Haram's leader Abubakar Shekau created an opportunity for a reconfiguration of forces. This could cripple Boko Haram but may also allow its rival, the Islamic State in the West Africa Province (ISWAP) to consolidate its power. Between May and August, more than 2,000 former Boko Haram fighters reportedly surrendered to authorities in Nigeria, fleeing territories falling under ISWAP control. Since Shekau's death, ISWAP has expanded its territory and gained access to fighters and weapons. More than 3M people were displaced in the Lake Chad Basin region in July 2021, and 10.5M in need humanitarian assistance.⁷

At the same time, reported non-state armed groups advances in coastal states like Benin⁸ and Côte d'Ivoire,⁹ and the growing instability in the south-central region of Niger (Maradi Region),¹⁰ could allow groups in the Lake Chad Basin and in the Sahel to strengthen their ties, thus forming an insurrectional front spanning from Mali to Cameroon.

The EUTF has contracted €611.6M to 57 SO4-priority projects in the SLC region (this report includes €547.5M worth). Since December 2020, five new SO4 projects have been contracted in the SLC region, including two justice sector projects in Burkina Faso and two regional security projects. EUTF funding on SO4 is mainly contracted at the regional level (22%), in Burkina Faso (21%) and in Niger (21%). While projects at the regional level focus on security cooperation and support to the G5 Sahel, most of the EUTF budget in Burkina Faso and Niger takes the form of budget support to governments to strengthen the justice sector and service provision.

Conflict prevention and peacebuilding through radio broadcasts

Conflict in the Sahel and Lake Chad region has developed through the exploitation by non-state armed groups of community conflicts and feelings of marginalisation. The protracted nature of the conflict and the failure of armies to protect civilians has pushed the latter to take arms to defend themselves and organise in militias and self-defence groups which have reportedly caused an increase in civilian casualties and violence.¹¹ In the first half of 2021, 3,898 people were killed in the countries

¹ ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project dashboard', consulted in September 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

² The centre of the conflict in the Sahel revolves around the area between Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, called the Liptako-Gourma.

³ ACLED, Op. Cit.

⁴ OCHA, 'Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger – Humanitarian snapshot', July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ ACLED, 'Sahel 2021: communal wars, broken ceasefires and shifting frontlines', June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ France24, 'Macron announces France's Sahel military force will end in early 2022', June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ OCHA, 'Lake Chad Basin – Humanitarian snapshot', July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Clingendael, 'Northern Benin and risk of violent extremist spill over', June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Le Monde, 'Côte d'Ivoire : à Abidjan, un camp militaire attaqué par des hommes armés non identifiés', April 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ ICG, 'Sud-ouest du Niger : prévenir un nouveau front insurrectionnel', April 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ ACLED, 'Sahel 2021: communal wars, broken ceasefires and shifting frontlines', June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

covered by the EUTF SLC window in interactions that involved communal and political militias and self-defence groups.¹

To rebuild trust between populations and between populations and the state, EUTF-funded programmes have organised conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities that reached 265,651 people in S1 2021 (indicator 4.3), a 7% increase from numbers achieved at the end of December 2020. Overall, since the beginning of activities, 3,903,148 people have participated in conflict prevention activities in the region. In S1 2021, 85% of the beneficiaries (226,540 people) were reached through awareness raising campaigns, including 155,638 people through radio messaging.

EUTF-funded programmes have supported radios to share peacebuilding messages and promote conflict sensitive information in zones where tensions are high. Radio is the first source of information for the youth in the Sahel and seven out of every ten young people listen to it regularly.² EUTF-funded programmes supported radio broadcasting of messaging adapted to local issues and in local languages. In S1 2021, most people were reached by the Shimodu programme (NE-10)³ which developed radio spots emitted by communal radios to promote changes in attitude when dealing with conflicts in Diffa, where displaced populations and host communities live together. The programme reached 113,000 people (indicator 4.3). Shimodu also trained 40 radio journalists in conflict sensitivity (indicator 4.2) to support long lasting changes in radio messaging. Similarly, the PEV programme (BF-08)⁴ reached 37,016 people through radio programmes in local languages in Seno. The messaging centred around peaceful resource management. Radios have also been helpful for widespread information sharing and were used by the PDU programme (REG-18)⁵ to inform populations about transhumance laws and international mobility rules.⁶

Radio has also been a powerful medium to ensure the continuity of peacebuilding activities during COVID-19. In 2020, the RESILAC programme (REG-05)⁷ adapted its activities in Nigeria notably by using radio spots to reach households with peacebuilding messaging. The programme reached 5,566 people in S1 2021 and reported being able to reach twice its initial target by using the medium (indicator 4.3). **Finally, radio has been used by EUTF-funded programmes as a space of expression for youth, in a context where youth marginalisation can lead to radicalisation.** The Radio Jeunesse Sahel programme (REG-25)⁸ is currently creating a radio guided by youth. In S1 2021, 46 youths animated programmes on this new radio (indicator 4.3).

Creating and supporting units to fight non-state armed groups, human trafficking and migrant smuggling

In the Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad Basin region, armies are under-equipped and ill-prepared to face non-state armed groups. In S1 2021, 1,730 members of security forces were trained by EUTF-funded programmes (96% were national security forces and the rest local, indicator 4.2). In addition, 10,026 pieces of equipment were provided to security forces (94% of all governance equipment provided, indicator 4.1 bis). **EUTF-funded programmes have also supported the creation, training and equipment of units embedded in national systems** to enhance the deployment and fighting capacities of national armies. Supported teams include the joint investigation teams (ECI, NE-05⁹ and

¹ ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project dashboard', consulted in September 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

² OIF, Institut Kantar, 'Analyse de la consommation média des jeunes dans la région Sahel', 2020.

³ *Projet intégré d'appui à la résilience des populations vulnérables réfugiées, déplacées, retournées et hôtes de la région de Diffa, Niger.*

⁴ *Rebâtir une cohésion sociale au Nord du Burkina à travers un meilleur suivi de la radicalisation, la promotion du dialogue et la valorisation de l'économie pastoraliste.*

⁵ *Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.*

⁶ Data for people reached was information provided by the local radios. It was deemed too broad and was not included.


⁷ *Redressement économique et social inclusif du Lac Tchad.*

⁸ *Radio Jeunesse Sahel – Appui européen à la phase de démarrage de la radio.*

⁹ *Création d'une Equipe Conjointe d'Investigation pour la lutte contre les réseaux criminels liés à l'immigration irrégulière, la traite des êtres humains et le trafic des migrants.*

ECI CT, NE-15¹), the common operational partnerships (POC Senegal, SN-10,² and one programme in inception, POC Mali, ML-13³) and the GAR-SI (REG-04) units.⁴

Figure 14: EUTF indicator 4.2, security forces, SLC, June 2021



Units were trained to support counter-terrorism and policing efforts. The GAR-SI programmes have trained 448 security forces in S1 2021, in Burkina Faso and Mali (indicator 4.2), and equipped units in Niger and Senegal with 10,003 pieces of equipment (indicator 4.1 bis). While the COVID-19 induced reduction in international shipping has considerably delayed the deliveries of equipment, all GAR-SI units in the five G5 Sahel countries⁵ and in Senegal are operational and deployed ahead of the end of the programme (between July and October 2021 depending on countries). GAR-SI units are deployed in remote areas where they serve as police units and are called to support the army in case of attack. The counter-terrorism joint investigation team in Niger (ECI CT, NE-15) was created in S1 2021 and 25 people were trained and included in the team to support Niger’s counter-terrorism activities.

¹ Création d'une Equipe Conjointe d'Investigation pour la lutte contre les réseaux criminels liés au terrorisme.

² Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint de lutte contre l'immigration irrégulière, la traite et le trafic de migrants au Sénégal.

³ Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint de lutte contre l'immigration irrégulière, le trafic de migrants et la traite des êtres humains en République du Mali.


⁴ Groupes d'Action Rapides – Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel

⁵ Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.

Units have also been created to support national police to fight human trafficking, migrant smuggling and irregular migration. The ECI was created in 2017 in Niger to fight human trafficking and migrant smuggling. In S1 2021, the ECI arrested 101 actors from smuggling and trafficking networks and identified 48 international and national networks. The unit was provided with 23 pieces of equipment (indicator 4.1 bis) including a biometric database, allowing it to record, share and analyse data about suspects and networks. **Two programmes also worked on strengthening already existing units active in the fight against irregular migration and migrant smuggling.** In S1 2021, the POC Senegal programme started activities, training 144 members of the security forces to support Senegal's anti-irregular migration efforts (indicator 4.2). The programme aims to strengthen the National Division for the Fight against Migrant Smuggling. A POC programme in Mali, supporting the Brigade for the Suppression of the Smuggling of Migrants and Trafficking in Persons, was contracted in April 2021 and is implemented by CIVIPOL.

4.2.6. COVID-19 IN THE SLC AND EUTF RESPONSE

Figure 15: COVID-19, key facts and figures dashboard, SLC, June 2021¹



¹ Nigeria was excluded from the dashboard (Figure 15) because it accounts for a disproportionately large number of people reached by COVID-19 campaigns (indicator 2.7). In Nigeria the number of people reached by COVID-19 campaigns is 205.3M, bringing the total across all programmes to 206.8M people.

As of June 2021, West Africa had registered nearly 525,000 cases of COVID-19 and 7,600 deaths.¹ SLC countries were generally quick and proactive at adopting COVID-19 prevention measures and implementing a response but infection rates during the second wave of the pandemic (late 2020 to early 2021) were about 40% higher than those during the previous wave.² Delivery of vaccines in the region began in March 2021 through the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) facility, but rollout has been slow and less than 5% of the population in SLC countries had received at least one dose as of June 2021.³ After the second wave slowed in early S1, most governments in the region eased COVID-19 measures, although gatherings and business activity are still restricted in some countries (i.e. Nigeria, Mali).⁴

Though West African economies are expected to recover from the pandemic's economic shock, COVID-19 has had a negative impact on livelihoods and food security in the SLC. Countries in West Africa experienced slowed economic growth and budget deficits as a result of the pandemic.⁵ While economies in the region have positive outlooks for economic growth, lockdown measures and border closures have devastated livelihoods. Poverty, commodity market volatility, supply chain disruptions, and reduced pastoral mobility due to the pandemic have exacerbated food insecurity.⁶ Additionally, one-third of surveyed migrants who left after April 2020 indicated that the COVID-19 crisis was to some extent a factor in their decision to leave, mainly for economic reasons.⁷

This semester did not see any notable additions to EUTF budgets allocated to COVID-19 in the SLC region, with COVID-19 programming still totalling €99.8M. The One UN Response Plan (NG-09) has the largest COVID-19 budget, at €49.5 million (as it is fully dedicated to COVID-19), followed by PUS BF (BF-09) with €28.3 million.⁸ Three projects, PDU PMM (REG-18-10), PDU RECOSOC (REG-18-08), and PEV PASRAP (BF-08-04), reported COVID-19 outputs for the first time this semester.⁹ In SLC countries this semester 188,910 people benefitted from COVID-19 emergency response activities such as medical treatment or equipment (indicator 6.2). Additionally, 974 MSMEs, health and training centres and government institutions received capacity building or medical support (indicator 6.3).

Scaling back the COVID-19 response, but with continued sensitisation activities

While monthly cases of COVID-19 increased by 31% during January of this year, the rate of case increases slowed to a 3% increase during May and a 2% increase during June.¹⁰ Governments in the SLC began rolling back restrictions on travel, business activity, and gatherings. With the worst of the pandemic over for countries in the SLC, programming related to COVID-19 has generally decreased this semester compared to 2020. For example, the total number of COVID-19 supplies provided by EUTF-funded programmes fell by 65% (indicator 6.1), and the total of beneficiaries of COVID-19 support fell by 8% between S2 2020 and this semester. In particular, COVID-19 programming that relates to treatment, testing, and emergency response has scaled down. Notably, 98% of individuals assisted in S1 2021 (indicator 6.2) were given support that was not primarily medical or personal protective equipment (PPE), such as prevention activities or socio-economic mitigation. By contrast,

¹ WHO, 'WHO Coronavirus Dashboard', Accessed September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² World Bank, 'Amid Recession, Sub-Saharan Africa Poised for Recovery', March 2021, Consulted September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Erika Fry, Nicolas Rapp, '23.4% of the world has received a COVID vaccine', Fortune, June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ OECD, 'Coronavirus Policy Tracker', Consulted September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ World Bank 'Africa Regional Overview', Consulted October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ UNOCHA, 'Humanitarian needs and requirements overview: Sahel crisis', Relief Web, April 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Aurelia Donnard, Roberto Forin, 'Migration in the Sahel', Mixed Migration, March 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ EU Support to the United Nations 'One UN Response Plan to COVID-19 in Nigeria'; *Appui budgétaire pour la mise en œuvre du Programme d'Urgence Sahel du Burkina Faso*.

⁹ *Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel*.

¹⁰ WHO, 'WHO Coronavirus Dashboard', Accessed September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

only 4% of those assisted in S2 2020 were given support that was not PPE or medical treatment and equipment.

The One UN Response Plan (NG-09)¹, the only programme fully focused on COVID-19, has continued medical support in Nigeria. Indeed, 96% of the supplies provided this semester across the region with EUTF funds (indicator 6.1) came from the One UN Response Plan. The programme also continued to support health systems with the COVID-19 response, including 89 laboratories and 115 healthcare facilities in S1 2021 (indicator 6.3). Additionally, three of the programme's IPs (WHO, UNAIDS and UNFPA) carried out epidemiological and qualitative research into COVID-19 trends and its social and economic impact (indicator 4.6) to inform future policy responses. Beyond medical support, the One UN Response Plan also continued large-scale sensitisation campaigns this semester.

Sensitisation on COVID-19 continued, reaching 93.7M people in S1 2021 (indicator 2.7). Nearly all people sensitised in S1 were reached through mass media campaigns by the One UN Response Plan, and other programmes' campaigns reached another 24,072 people. Most campaigns sought to promote safe practices and stem the spread of the virus through public health messaging. In S1 2021 in Nigeria, the One UN Response Plan reached nearly 83.9 million vulnerable people with sensitisation on COVID-19 and family practices, and another 9.8 million with a community-led sensitisation campaign. PEV in Burkina Faso also used a mass media campaign to sensitise 1,800 people on COVID-19.

Some campaigns incorporated COVID-19 sensitisation into their programmed activities. The Make it in The Gambia programme (MIITG, GM-03) runs the *Tekki Fii* campaign, a multi-stakeholder initiative to promote economic prospects for youth in The Gambia.² This semester, they included messaging on COVID-19 that reached 5,000 young people. In Niger, the PDU programme (REG-18) included COVID-19 messaging in a face-to-face campaign about child malnutrition, which reached 1,606 people (90% women).³ MCN (NG-03) in Nigeria incorporated COVID-19 messaging into their sensitisation and resilience campaigns that cover basic rights and reached 6,754 individuals.⁴ Other programmes used campaigns to maintain their programming in a COVID-safe manner. For example, Pôles Ruraux (NE-03) in Niger sensitised nearly 8,492 people working on land rehabilitation (28% women) on social distancing to ensure sites were safe.⁵

Shifting toward COVID-19 recovery

As the need for urgent medical assistance waned in S1 2021, the COVID-19 response increasingly focused on supporting entities and individuals to manage health risks and recover economically from the pandemic. Although programming related to COVID-19 generally decreased this semester, the number of entities benefitting from COVID-19 response activities is an exception, and increased slightly (4%, indicator 6.3). Notably, IPs worked to strengthen government capacity to manage COVID-19 response and recovery and also supported MSMEs.

EUTF-funded programmes in Ghana and Nigeria focused on local governments' response to COVID-19 and its secondary effects. In Nigeria, the One UN Response Plan supported 11 local and state governments in developing contingency, response, and recovery plans. In Ghana, the GrEEen programme (GH-02) provided financing to ten metropolitan, municipal, and district assemblies for their COVID-19 response plans (indicator 6.3). In turn, these plans involved interventions reaching an estimated 182,763 people (indicator 6.2).⁶

In S1 2021, 28% of the entities supported with regards to COVID-19 were MSMEs, compared to 6% in S2 2020 (indicator 6.3). Lockdowns and social distancing measures devastated MSMEs,

¹ EU Support to the United Nations 'One UN Response Plan to COVID-19 in Nigeria'.

² Building a future - Make it in The Gambia.

³ *Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.*

⁴ Enhancing state and community level conflict management capability in North Eastern Nigeria.

⁵ *Projet d'appui aux filières agricoles dans les régions de Tahoua et Agadez.*

⁶ Boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in Ghana.

particularly as governments in the region are fiscally unable to mitigate their losses with social spending.¹ In The Gambia, YEP supported 271 enterprises to mitigate COVID-19 related risks and manage human resources and financials in spite of reduced revenues (indicator 6.3). PASPED (SN-09) also supported MSMEs within the framework of their COVID-19 response, providing 67 businesses with financial assistance (indicator 1.2).² Additionally, a project was signed in June 2021, PSRE Côte d'Ivoire (CI-03), which supports a government fund that assists MSMEs in recovering from COVID-19 related shocks.³

This semester, most of the support to vulnerable people was economic (71%), and the remaining 29% involved medical support (indicator 6.2). In West Africa, 76% of jobs are characterised as 'vulnerable' by the ILO, and the pandemic particularly impacted the livelihoods of informal workers and subsistence farmers.⁴ In addition to upending livelihoods, the pandemic has worsened food insecurity in the SLC by disrupting supply chains and pastoral practices, and food prices have generally increased due to economic consequences of COVID-19.⁵ To improve resilience in the face of the pandemic, the One UN Response Plan provided cash transfers to 25,101 households (indicator 2.9). YEP supported the creation of short-term jobs and help entrepreneurs adapt to COVID-19, benefitting 1,424 vulnerable individuals (indicator 6.2). MIITG also provided economic support to 114 individuals as part of their COVID-19 emergency response.

¹ ECOWAS, 'Covid-19 Pandemic: Impact of restriction measures in West Africa', Consulted October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² *Programme de contraste à la migration illégale à travers l'appui au Secteur Privé et à la création d'emplois au Sénégal.*

³ *Programme de soutien et de relance à l'économie dans le contexte de la crise du COVID-19 en Côte d'Ivoire.* This programme has not yet reported outputs.

⁴ ECOWAS, 'Covid-19 Pandemic: Impact of restriction measures in West Africa', Consulted October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


⁵ FAO, 'Rapport régional sur la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle 2021', Consulted October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

5. ANALYSIS BY COUNTRY

5.1. BURKINA FASO

5.1.1. BURKINA FASO IN S1 2021

Figure 16: Burkina Faso – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021



In the first half of 2021, jihadist and intercommunal violence persisted at a relatively lower pace in Burkina Faso, particularly in the North, Sahel, Centre-North and East regions. In S1 2021, 936 conflict-related fatalities were recorded in the country, down from 1,691 during the same period in 2020.¹ This decrease can be attributed to counter-terrorism activities led by the G5 Sahel and French troops, that helped weaken the jihadist group Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.² Moreover, Burkinabè authorities have allegedly held a series of meetings with officers from the Al-Qaeda-affiliated *Jama'at Nusrat Al Islam Wal Muslimin* since March 2020 that may have helped set up a ceasefire.³ As of March 2021, however, violence resumed in several regions, which may have been partly triggered by actions by the national security forces and civilian volunteers fighting alongside them.⁴ In early June, suspected jihadist militants attacked the Solhan village in the Sahel region, killing over 160 civilians and displacing over 7,000 people. This is the deadliest attack to occur in Burkina Faso since 2015.⁵

As a result of persisting violence, Burkina Faso remained the country with the fastest growing displaced population worldwide, as it reached 1,312,071 internally displaced people in June 2021⁶ from 81,964 in early January 2019.⁷ During the first half of 2021, 237,078 additional people were internally displaced in Burkina Faso.^{8,9} Forced displacements increased pressure on already scarce resources in rural areas, making host communities more vulnerable. Non-displaced people accounted for 72% of the population in need of assistance in Burkina Faso.¹⁰

¹ ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project dashboard', consulted in October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² ACLED, 'Sahel 2021: Communal wars, broken ceasefires, and shifting frontlines', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ ICG, Crisis Watch Data, consulted in October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ OCHA, 'Burkina Faso – Humanitarian Snapshot', 26/07/21. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ OCHA, 'Burkina Faso – *Tableau de bord humanitaire*', 31/12/19. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ OCHA, 'Burkina Faso – *Aperçu de la situation humanitaire*', 31/12/21. Retrieved [here](#).


⁹ OCHA, 'Burkina Faso – Humanitarian Snapshot', 26/07/21. Op. Cit.

¹⁰ OCHA, 'Aperçu des besoins humanitaires au Burkina Faso', March 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

3.5 million people in Burkina Faso needed humanitarian assistance in the Sahel, North, Centre-North, East, Boucle du Mouhoun and Centre-East regions in June 2021.¹ The most pressing humanitarian need in Burkina Faso was food security, as 2.9 million people were food insecure in June 2021.² Persisting insecurity, extreme effects of climate change (such as droughts and flooding), combined with forced displacements and the COVID-19 crisis negatively impacted agro-pastoral production in the six regions mentioned above. This was expected to worsen as Burkina Faso was entering its lean season. The two other main humanitarian needs included WASH and health assistance (each 2.5 million people).³

5.1.2. THE EUTF IN BURKINA FASO

Figure 17: EUTF portfolio in Burkina Faso, June 2021^{4,5}



The EUTF has contracted €189.8M in Burkina Faso, focusing mainly on governance, security and conflict prevention-related programmes (SO4), which account for 69% of EUTF funding in the country (€131.4M). While support to security forces to strengthen border management (ProGEF, €30.0M, BF-03)⁶ started from the beginning, significant budget support (€74.7M) has been provided to the government of Burkina Faso since mid-2018 to strengthen its presence in remote and conflict-affected areas (PUS-BF, BF-09).⁷ These efforts aim to build peace, stability and security, and to reduce the vulnerability of local populations, especially in rural and conflict-affected areas. Mass displacements have also increased the vulnerability of local communities, as the presence of IDPs put additional pressure on already scarce local resources and services. In light of this, 16% of the EUTF's budget in the country went to resilience-building activities (SO2), all through the now completed *Résilience*

¹ OCHA, 'Burkina Faso – Humanitarian Snapshot', 26/07/21. Op. Cit.

² OCHA, 'Aperçu des besoins humanitaires au Burkina Faso', March 2021. Op. Cit.

³ OCHA, 'Aperçu des besoins humanitaires au Burkina Faso', March 2021. Op. Cit.

⁴ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.


⁵ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁶ Programme d'appui à la gestion intégrée des frontières au Burkina Faso.

⁷ Appui budgétaire pour la mise en œuvre du Programme d'Urgence Sahel du Burkina Faso.

Burkina Faso project (BF-01)¹ which aimed to address the root causes of instability, improve the livelihoods of local communities and foster social cohesion. In addition, 11% of the EUTF budget was allocated to the creation of employment opportunities (SO1) to strengthen the resilience of communities through a 'linking relief, rehabilitation and development' LRRD approach, mostly in conflict-affected areas. Finally, 4% aimed to improve migration management (SO3 – EU-IOM JI Burkina Faso, BF-04).² Overall, five programmes – 43% of EUTF funding in the country – are completed, and 93% of the contracted budget in the country has been spent.

Figure 18: Selected EUTF outputs in Burkina Faso, June 2021



Reinforcing food security-related assistance in remote and conflict-affected areas

According to data from the *Cadre Harmonisé*, 2.1 million people were in a situation of crisis or worse levels of food insecurity between January and May 2021.³ In May 2021, WFP highlighted both Burkina Faso's North and Sahel regions as first priority food security areas in West and Central Africa.⁴

In S1 2021, 97,142 people benefitted from food security-related assistance (indicator 2.4) in the country. Most beneficiaries (73%) were in the North region and 27% in the Sahel region. These results are down from 169,579 beneficiaries in S1 2020, as the *Resilience BF* and *Stabilisation Séno*

¹ Programme « LRRD » de renforcement de la résilience des communautés vulnérables à l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle dans les zones frontalières septentrionales au Burkina Faso.


² Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Burkina Faso.

³ *Cadre Harmonisé* & Integrated Food Security Classification, Food Security Data in West and Central Africa, consulted in October 2021. Retrieved here.

⁴ WFP, 'Food Security Highlights – West Africa', May 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

programmes both ended in early 2020. Consequently, 91% of the results are due to the PDU programme (REG-18),¹ which is recording results for the second semester under this indicator. Most PDU activities started around December 2019 or January 2020.

Figure 19: EUTF indicator 2.4, in Burkina Faso, June 2021



According to *Cadre Harmonisé* projections, 8 million additional people were expected to face high levels of food insecurity in Burkina Faso during the lean season (June-August), to reach 2.9 million people.² **EUTF-funded programmes deployed significant efforts to strengthen the resilience of communities during said lean period. Therefore, 93% of the results contributing to indicator 2.4 in S1 2021 were recorded in Q2 2021.** The lean season is the period between planting and harvesting, that results in low food production directly leading to food insecurity. In the first half of 2021, the PDU PMM project (REG-18-10)³ supported 30,569 people by setting up ten food preservation storage units in the North and Sahel regions. Food preservation attics aim to improve food security and regulate imbalances in food production by fostering the transfer of food products either from one area to another or from a season of abundance to a season of scarcity.⁴

Rising numbers of food insecure people during the lean season, compounded with movement restrictions due to measures to contain the spread of COVID-19, led to a general increase in the price of cereals in S1 2021 compared to the same period in 2020 and to the five-year average.⁵ **In this regard, EUTF-funded programmes provided people at risk of food insecurity with support in**

¹ Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel

² WFP, 'Food Security Highlights – West Africa', May 2021. Op. Cit.

³ Améliorons nos vies ! Rétablir les espaces socio-économiques ruraux sécurisés et contrecarrer les menaces des changements environnementaux et des conflits socioculturels.

⁴ SOS Faim, 'Les greniers de sécurité alimentaire au Burkina Faso – un impact confirmé', 2016. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Fews Net, 'Burkina Faso Bulletin Price', July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

buying food: they distributed food coupons to 26,796 people and livestock feed to 15,120 people.

All the coupons were handed out to women by PDU PMM ahead of the lean period. The approach focuses on women to allow for better system management and a direct positive impact on household nutrition. Coupons give access to a variety of products, formerly identified through locally conducted studies, and plan for the provision of enriched flour to cater for the nutrition needs of infants. Most beneficiaries of these coupons were vulnerable people (76%) and IDPs (13%).

Outcome analysis 1: *Résilience OXFAM* project (BF-01-02)

Résilience OXFAM		Main targets groups	
 <p><i>Projet de renforcement de la résilience des communautés vulnérables du Sahel et du Nord</i></p>	 <p>From June 2017 to March 2020</p>	 <p>Vulnerable households</p>	 <p>Women</p>
 <p>IP: OXFAM</p>	 <p>Objective: Support resilience of vulnerable communities in border regions through an LRRD approach</p>	 <p>Children under five</p>	
 <p>Budget: €8.0M</p>			

The mid-term evaluation of the *Résilience OXFAM* project suggests that there are concrete improvements in reproductive health practices and food access among beneficiaries of the programme. Notable findings include:

Improved access to services and practices related to sexual and reproductive health: A survey conducted in March 2019 showed that the percentage of pregnant and lactating women adopting good practices regarding reproductive health increased. The survey revealed that 72% of the respondents attended four prenatal consultations (up from 30.08% at baseline), 70.91% resorted to assisted delivery (up from 62.13% at baseline) and 44.24% attended postnatal consultations (up from 31.12% at baseline).

Best practices

- **Multidimensional approach to foster an efficient and sustainable provision of health services** – on one hand, the programme focused on rehabilitating health structures (15 health centres were rehabilitated) and providing them with equipment (38 health centres were enhanced with communication facilities and 15 ambulances for health evacuations were provided to facilitate health evacuations, along with evacuation management systems). The programme also engaged in building the capacities of health officers to ensure the long-term provision of services, beyond the programme’s end. The programme trained 138 officers on sexual and reproductive health and 243 officers as relay agents for information on family planning.
- **Awareness-raising activities to foster behaviour change** – as change comes first from people’s mindsets and behaviour, the programme engaged in activities to improve the local populations’ knowledge of sexual and reproductive health. It combined in-person activities like six caravan consultations, and mass communication through the broadcast of 306 micro programmes on the subject. These activities improved knowledge related to sexual and reproductive health and aimed for a long-term effect on pregnant women’s practices.

Challenges

- **Percentage of early breastfeeding decreased** – the percentage of women that breastfed their new-born in the first hour after the birth dropped from 59.32% (baseline) to 48.1%.

Improved access to food and productive capacities: The programme reached 38,304 beneficiaries in 4,788 households. This represents 29.7% of the population projected to be food insecure in the region according to 2017 *Cadre Harmonisé* data. A quantitative survey conducted in

March 2019 showed an increase in the proportion of households with an acceptable food consumption score from 61% (baseline) to 73.7%.

Best practice

- **Holistic approach combining emergency assistance with long-term support** – during the state of emergency in the Sahel region as it entered the lean season, the distribution of food coupons aimed to allow beneficiaries to rapidly address their basic needs. The survey conducted in March 2019 showed that the average index of negative coping mechanisms used by households that benefitted from the programme dropped from 6 at baseline to 2. Negative coping mechanisms include reducing the household's number of meals, buying cheaper products, etc. At the same time, to foster longer term impact, the project provided beneficiaries with 30 tons of seeds, the rehabilitation and irrigation of 100 hectares of communal land and herd reconstruction (3,486 households benefitted from the distribution of 10,458 small ruminants). These initiatives improved cereal and vegetable yield and supported households' productive capacities. A considerable increase in targeted households' income during this period by 67% (from CFA_96,385 to CFA_161,144) suggests that the provision of agricultural inputs and livestock may have contributed to improve livelihoods.

Challenges

- **Difficulty accessing improved seeds** – efforts by the State to distribute or sell this type of seeds is still limited and compromises the process's sustainability.
- **Baseline conducted during harvest period** – the baseline study was conducted in October 2017 during the harvest period while the survey was conducted in March 2019, ahead of the lean season and time at which households tend to start adopting negative coping strategies. Such practices contributed to a decrease in the proportion of households with an acceptable food diversity score from 83,99% (baseline) to 75,9%.

Reinforcing social cohesion in cross-border communities

In S1 2021, Burkina Faso experienced a decrease in attacks from non-state armed groups, that could be explained by both international and national efforts to fight terrorism in the Sahel. Yet, as local defence groups perpetuated the cycle of violence, intercommunal tensions remained high.¹ Intercommunal tensions have been a recurring issue since self-defence groups started forming in 2014 to fill the gap left by governance shortcomings in rural areas. The Government's January 2020 decision to allow civilian volunteers to fight alongside national security forces has allegedly led to exactions against civilians, notably Fulani, further fuelling intercommunal and interethnic tensions.²

In S1 2021, EUTF-funded programming supported the training of 1,989 staff from governmental institutions, internal security forces and relevant non-state actors on governance, conflict prevention and human rights (indicator 4.2), a 49% increase compared to the end of 2020. Most of the trained staff (1,054 – 53%) were community representatives, as efforts were notably focused on engaging the community at the local level to respond to violence. Burkina Faso's remote and conflict-affected areas also suffer from the scarce provision of basic services due to their volatile context and the lack of investment in public infrastructure. Jihadist groups and militias exploit local grievances related to such shortages to recruit youth into their ranks. The PEV programme (BF-08)³ trained 600 women to reinforce their role in the community warning system to fight radicalisation in the Centre-North and Boucle du Mouhoun regions by enhancing their ability to detect early signs of radicalisation. They

¹ ACLED, 'Sahel 2021: Communal wars, broken ceasefires, and shifting frontlines', 2021. Op. Cit.

² ICG, 'Burkina Faso: Stopping the spiral of violence', February 2020. Retrieved [here](#).


³ *Prévention de l'extrémisme violent autochtone*

were also trained to become mentors and train other women. The PEV programme emphasises women’s inclusion in its activities, especially those related to intercommunal and interreligious dialogue.

In S1 2021, conflicts between transhumant pastoralists and host communities also remained high in Burkina Faso’s cross-border areas with Mali and Niger. According to the Transhumant Tracking Tool set up by IOM as a warning system aiming to identify events related to the use of natural resources and agro-pastoral practices, 14% of the alerts that occurred in the Liptako-Gourma region in June 2021 were agro-pastoral conflicts and 33% of the actors involved were nomadic pastoral groups.¹ Agro-pastoral conflicts are mostly due to competition over resources. The PDU programme trained 454 mediators (indicator 4.2) in the Sahel, Boucle du Mouhoun and North regions on conflict prevention and peacebuilding. These trainings intend to reinforce traditional mechanisms of conflict management at the local level.

To complement the community representative training, in S1 2021, EUTF-funded programmes developed or directly supported 55 local legal frameworks (indicator 4.6) that aimed to strengthen social cohesion and peaceful coexistence between transhumant pastoralists and host communities in cross-border areas. This accounts for 87% of the results for this indicator in the Sahel and Lake Chad (SLC) region this semester. The PDU programme set up 32 early warning system committees in the Sahel region and the PEV programme provided operational and financial support for the implementation of ten systems for the non-violent management of communal tensions and agro-pastoral conflicts in the Sahel and Centre-North regions. It also helped set up 13 land tenure structures in the Centre-North region.

Figure 20: EUTF indicator 4.2, in Burkina Faso, June 2021




¹ IOM, 'Suivi des mouvements de transhumance (TTT) : Région du Liptako-Gourma (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger) – Alertes', September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

Protecting migrants in transit

Located on the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR) on the way to North Africa and Europe, Burkina Faso is a country of transit. During S1 2021, an estimated 21,374 refugees and migrants arrived in Italy through the CMR, a 193% increase compared to the same period in 2020.¹ MMC conducted a survey on vulnerability with migrants and refugees in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger between June 2017 and December 2019. The results show that Burkina Faso was the country where the respondents were most likely to report witnessing migrant deaths (around 10%), experiencing or witnessing sexual assault (around 12%) and physical abuse (around 24%), and experiencing robbery (around 21%).²

In S1 2021, 5,564 migrants in transit received protection assistance (indicator 3.2) in the Cascades, Centre, Hauts-Bassins and Sahel regions.³ This represents 98% of the total beneficiaries in Burkina Faso since 2018. All benefitted from the Protection West Africa programme (REG-13), and they represent 25% of all the migrants in transit who received protection assistance in S1 2021 in the region with EUTF funding. The Protection West Africa programme aims to provide protection assistance to vulnerable migrants, especially the ones who experienced traumatic events such as trafficking, abuse or exploitation. Protection West Africa set up mobile safe points that deliver “dignity kits” (composed of non-food items, including hygiene-related products), provide transit migrants with basic health services, and raise awareness on reproduction and sexual health (notably regarding HIV). 1,946 beneficiaries (35%) received dignity kits and 1,802 beneficiaries (32%) benefitted from medical treatment. The programme officially started in early 2020, but rising insecurity, compounded with restrictions of movements due to COVID-19-related measures, delayed the start of activities. In 2021, the Red Cross relied on local partners to be able to deliver services in remote locations and to overcome these constraints.

Figure 21: EUTF indicator 3.2, in Burkina Faso, June 2021



¹ MMC, 'Quarterly mixed migration update: West Africa', July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² MMC, 'A Sharper Lens on Vulnerability (West Africa)', November 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Please note results for indicator 3.2 (total of 7,917) do not include IOM data.

5.1.3. BURKINA FASO AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 3: EUTF common output indicators for Burkina Faso, June 2021

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	2,277	2,414	6,151	466	11,308	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	55	200	1,855	20	2,130	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	4,475	12,644	4,640	1,485	23,244	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET)...	956	5,747	4,195	1,339	12,237	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed,....	3	14	22	16	55	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	0	33	18	0	51	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	522	1,445	386	33	2,386	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	98,553	58,101	4,405	262	161,321	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	282,181	100,124	26,270	76,986	485,561	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	150,574	217,432	173,568	97,142	638,716	
2.5 Number of insitutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	23	71	4	17	115	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	1,402	1,003	682	516	3,602	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	341,434	524,022	168,435	275,904	1,309,795	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	7,354	11,919	10,957	1,128	31,358	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	333,002	383,674	62,713	4,317	783,706	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs...	0	99	0	5,564	5,663	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	9,018	27,040	13,292	4,675	54,025	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	1,635	1,260	5,682	72	8,649	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	1,595	822	467	362	3,246	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	444	612	212	133	1,401	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	1	0	0	1	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	25	30	125	180	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	2	23	16	6	47	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	20	68	1	4	93	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	3	0	1	4	8	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	924	9	1,210	0	2,143	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	994	1,667	1,432	1,989	6,082	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	3,283	83,035	2,070,455	109,410	2,266,183	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	7	141	123	63	334	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	91	430	380	24	925	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	70	184	615	1,005	1,874	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	13	45	4	5	67	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created...	10	1	4	10	25	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	302,840	0	302,840	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	8,509	0	8,509	

5.2. CAMEROON

5.2.1. CAMEROON IN S1 2021

Figure 22: Cameroon – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021¹



During the first half of 2021, Cameroon suffered from security issues, political conflict in the separatist regions, regional instability, extreme climatic events, and a COVID-induced economic crisis. Protracted conflicts in the English-speaking and Far North regions continued to forcibly displace people, reduce access to basic services, and undermine the economy. Cameroon was also exposed to the consequences of the political crisis in neighbouring Central African Republic (CAR), which led to forced displacements, including cross-border movements.² Between 27 December 2020 – the day Faustin-Archange Touadéra was re-elected President of CAR – and the end of June 2021, 8,465 refugees fled from CAR to Cameroon, making it the fourth destination country for CAR refugees,³ and bringing the total of CAR refugees in Cameroon to 325,336 by 30 June 2021.⁴ Finally, food security worsened, with migratory birds destroying millet fields in the North, increasing the risks of food shortages over the lean period.⁵

Cameroon was also one the region’s countries most affected by COVID-19. The country officially reported 80,858 cases and 1,324 deaths by 30 June. The pandemic continued to grow while the rollout of the COVID-19 vaccines was slow.⁶ In May-June 2021, “Covidgate” involved allegations of embezzlement of up to €290M in COVID-dedicated funds⁷ and fuelled social discontent toward the government.

¹ NOSO: North-West and South-West regions in Cameroon (in French, *Nord-Ouest et Sud-Ouest*).

² UNHCR, ‘Situational emergency update, Central African Republic (CAR) situation’, 21 January 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ After the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, and the Republic of Congo. UNHCR, ‘Situational emergency update, Central African Republic (CAR) situation’, 25 June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Cameroon – statistics – June 2021’. Retrieved [here](#).


⁵ Focus Economics, ‘Cameroon Economic Outlook’, August 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ As of 26 June, only 110,324 people had been vaccinated with a first dose, and 21,991 fully vaccinated. UNICEF, ‘Cameroon – Humanitarian Situation Report No. 6, January-June 2021’. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Or \$335 million. VOA, ‘Cameroon Investigates Missing \$335 Million in COVID Funds’, 31 May 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

5.2.2. THE EUTF IN CAMEROON

Figure 23: EUTF portfolio in Cameroon, June 2021^{1,2}



The EUTF has contracted €40.3M in Cameroon (excluding regional projects other than the EU-IOM JI operating in the country),³ an amount that has remained unchanged since 2019. All of Cameroon's national projects have come to an end, except for the EU-IOM JI (CM-04)⁴ which will carry out activities until May 2022 with funds from the regional Top-Up (REG-04). With a budget of €3.3M, the EU-IOM JI aims to provide various types of support to migrants returning to Cameroon and strengthen the migration management capacities of the Cameroonian authorities (S03). It also seeks to raise awareness on migration and the dangers associated with irregular migration. Finally, four regional programmes are active in Cameroon: RESILAC (REG-05),⁵ Erasmus+ West Africa (REG-10),⁶ IPDEV2 (REG-11),⁷ and Archipelago (REG-15).⁸

¹ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

² This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implementing in the country.

³ The EU-IOM JI in Cameroon (*Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Cameroun*) is part of the regional joint initiative, but is contracted as a national project in the country.

⁴ *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Cameroun*.


⁵ *Soutien aux populations du Bassin du Lac Tchad*.

⁶ Erasmus+ in West Africa.

⁷ *I&P accélération au Sahel (en appui à l'initiative IPDEV-2)*.

⁸ ARCHIPELAGO: an African-European TVET initiative.

Figure 24: Selected EUTF outputs in Cameroon, June 2021



Mitigating the effects of the economic crisis through job creation

The economic outlook of Cameroon was heavily affected by COVID-19. The country's real gross domestic product (GDP) contracted by 2.4% in 2020.¹ The COVID-19 pandemic caused 80% of businesses in the formal sector and 82% in the informal sector to reduce their activities,² and 60% of businesses to reduce their workforce.³ The economic situation in Cameroon's poorest regions remained particularly difficult, as insecurity continued to undermine livelihoods. Despite the economic stabilisation in 2021 – growth is expected to reach pre-pandemic levels, at 3.5% in 2021 –,⁴ the economic impacts of the pandemic on employment and living conditions are expected to be felt for at least the two years to come.⁵ The inequalities between Cameroon's richest and poorest regions are persistent, leaving many in informal jobs and self-employment, which represents 76% of Cameroon's jobs in 2021.⁶

¹ AfDB, 'Cameroon Economic Outlook', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² As showed in a study conducted by the INS and ILO in May 2020. ILO, 'Cameroon - Rapid evaluation of the impact of COVID-19 on employment and the labour market in Cameroon', December 2020. Retrieved [here](#).


³ ILO, 'Cameroon - Rapid evaluation of the impact of COVID-19 on employment and the labour market in Cameroon', December 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ AfDB, 'Cameroon Economic Outlook', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Trading Economics, data from the World Bank, 'Cameroon - Self-employed; Total (% Of Total Employed)'. Retrieved [here](#).

Figure 25: EUTF indicator 1.1, in Cameroon, June 2021



The EUTF implemented three different approaches to mitigate the effects of the economic crisis and create jobs in Cameroon's various regions. In S1 2021, EUTF-funded programmes created 290 jobs in Cameroon (indicator 1.1), representing 3% of the total since the Trust Fund's inception, and after no jobs were created in the country in 2020. First, in the Far North, where security and livelihoods remain dire, the EUTF supported immediate relief through cash-for-work activities and the construction of community infrastructure. In S1 2021, 222 full-time-equivalent jobs were created through the RESILAC programme (REG-05)¹ linking relief to development. Second, in the rural and relatively safer region of Adamawa, the ARCHIPELAGO programme (REG-15)² provided professional trainings aiming to support enterprise and job creations. In S1 2021, 43 young people (37% women) were supported by ARCHIPELAGO and the local chamber of commerce³ to launch a business in the milk and dairy production and processing sector. The programme supported selected young entrepreneurs by giving them access to entrepreneurial knowledge and skills development trainings.⁴ Finally, EUTF-funded programmes endeavoured to support promising small and medium businesses in big cities. The EUTF-funded IPDEV2 programme (REG-11)⁵ supported the creation of 25 jobs in two companies: Ecofood (a Yaoundé-based business providing mass catering to schools and companies) and Fisco (a Douala-based company marketing household and para-pharmaceutical products). The two companies were supported with seed funding and technical assistance from the Douala IPDEV fund. The choice of beneficiary companies reflected on IPDEV's approach to support growing mid-sized companies with a turnover ranging between €100,000 and €500,000 and less than 30 employees.

¹ Soutien aux populations du Bassin du Lac Tchad.

² ARCHIPELAGO: an African-European TVET initiative.

³ The Chambre d'agriculture, de pêche, d'élevage et des forêts du Cameroun (CAPEF).

⁴ ARCHIPELAGO, 'PROFOR: Formation de formateurs en entrepreneuriat agricole au Cameroun'. Retrieved [here](#).


⁵ I&P accélération au Sahel (en appui à l'initiative IPDEV-2).

Providing safe conditions for the return and reintegration of Cameroonian migrants

Cameroon remains an important country of emigration towards West Africa and Europe. Between January and June 2021, 806 Cameroonians illegally attempted to cross a European border.¹ Since 2019, Cameroonians are the second most represented nationality of the SLC window in terms of illegal European border crossings, behind Ivoirians (4,317 against 5,502).²

In the first semester of 2021, the EU-IOM JI supported 359 migrants with immediate, post-arrival assistance (indicator 3.5), representing 8% of the total since the programme began in Cameroon. This number reflects an acceleration after returns stalled in March 2020 due to COVID-19-related border closures (only 208 migrants returned to Cameroon and benefitted from post-arrival assistance in Q2, Q3 and Q4 2020 together). Post-arrival assistance mainly consisted in providing accommodation and cash for the migrants' immediate needs. In parallel, 105 migrants benefitted from reintegration assistance in S1 2021 (indicator 3.5 bis), representing 3% of the total since inception. The reintegration support depended on the needs identified during the vulnerability assessment conducted upon migrants' arrival. It included: housing, food, schooling assistance for children, psychosocial support, and short TVET trainings.

Figure 26: EUTF indicator 3.5, in Cameroon, June 2021



¹ Frontex, 'Migratory map', accessed September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

5.2.3. CAMEROON AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 4: EUTF common output indicators for Cameroon, June 2021

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	2,600	8,196	1	290	11,086	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	858	590	175	6	1,629	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	10,485	7,529	15,537	640	34,191	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET)...	9,438	8,120	1,714	451	19,723	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed,....	5	10	26	0	41	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	0	2	0	0	2	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	163	538	159	4	864	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	107,892	71,691	31,174	355	211,112	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	83,120	105,149	21,141	0	209,410	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	33,366	42,164	12,139	630	88,299	
2.5 Number of insitutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	141	65	4	0	210	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	98	3,056	767	41	3,961	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	115,042	324,059	251,822	0	690,923	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	616	9,145	4,381	40	14,182	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	22,800	155,419	81,705	0	259,924	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	6,489	6,423	47,650	0	60,562	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	0	85	0	0	85	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	2,621	1,218	575	359	4,773	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	2,014	965	430	105	3,514	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	36	0	0	36	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	52	0	0	52	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	1	40	34	19	94	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	33	125	340	0	498	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	0	322	499	426	1,247	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	45,359	14,778	1,354	3,886	65,377	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	19	126	42	0	187	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	11	7	28	4	50	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	10	4	56	0	70	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	25	25	31	2	83	

5.3. CHAD

5.3.1. CHAD IN S1 2021

Figure 27: Chad – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021



The first semester of 2021 marked an upheaval in the history of Chad, which experienced increased violence and political turmoil. The Chadian rebel group Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT)¹ initiated a military offensive from northern Chad to the Kanem region from 11 April to 10 May.^{2,3} Although officially defeated, the FACT's offensive culminated in the death of recently re-elected President Idriss Déby Itno, on 19 April. Déby's death, a major upheaval for Chad, entailed the formation of a Transitional Military Council chaired by Déby's son for an 18-month period. The FACT's attacks also led to the redeployment of defence and security forces from the Lac region to Kanem, which resulted in an increase in attacks from non-State armed groups (NSAGs) in Lac.⁴ Finally, the social climate deteriorated as Chadian security forces cracked down on post-11-April demonstrators calling for a civilian-led transition,⁵ killing at least seven people, wounding dozens and arresting more than 700 in April and May 2021.⁶

Insecurity, rising waters, and the destruction of basic services caused added displacements in April-May 2021, especially close to Ngouboua and Kangalam in the Lac region. As a result, the number of IDPs reached 401,511 in June 2021 in the Lac region, a 19% increase from December 2020 (336,124).⁷

¹ In French, *Front pour l'alternance et la concorde au Tchad* (FACT).

² African News, 'Calm and order in Chad three months after Idriss Déby's death', 19 July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ BBC, 'FACT : les rebelles tchadiens dénoncent « la fausse propagande de l'armée »', 10 mai 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ OCHA, 'Rapport de situation', June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


⁵ Demonstrators include members of the opposition parties and organisations united under the Wakit Tama coalition. Among their main demands are civilian rule over the transition, elections, and an end to foreign interference. For more information, HRW, 'Chad: Post-Déby Crackdown, Abuses', June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Human Rights Watch, 'Chad: Post-Déby Crackdown, Abuses', 24 June 2021.

⁷ UNHCR, 'Personnes relevant de la compétence du HCR au Tchad', December 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

5.3.2. THE EUTF IN CHAD


Figure 28: EUTF portfolio in Chad, June 2021^{1,2}



The EUTF's total funding in Chad has reached €113.7M. Completed projects account for 34% of the EUTF's budget in the country, and it is estimated that 20% of the contracted funds have yet to be spent. Most of the funding for Chad (€83.4M,³ or nearly three quarters of the EUTF's contracted funding in the country) aims to increase resilience (S02): the RESTE (TD-01),⁴ PRCPT (TD-02),⁵ PRODECO (TD-06)⁶ and DIZA (TD-07)⁷ programmes implement activities to create a sustainable access to basic services and foster community development (through hydraulic works, the construction or renovation of health, education and other types of infrastructures, or assistance to the elaboration of local development plans). They also assist populations in famine-prone areas with nutrition and food security-related assistance and conduct sensitisation campaigns on nutrition and food security. Second, the EUTF aims to strengthen local and national governance institutions. Governance (S04) accounts for €20.0M of the funds committed by the Trust Fund in Chad. Institutions supported range from municipal authorities in remote villages to the national military. Finally, the EUTF aims to provide job-oriented professional training through the *Bab-al-amal* programme (TD-03).⁸ TVET and professional insertion (S01) represent €10.3M, or 9% of the EUTF's budget in Chad.

¹ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.
² This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implementing in the country.
³ This figure excludes co-funding, such as the €7.5M from AFD in the DIZA programme.
⁴ *Résilience et emploi au Lac Tchad.*
⁵ *Projet de Renforcement de la Résilience et de la Cohabitation Pacifique au Tchad.*
⁶ *Appui au déminage, à la protection sociale et au développement des personnes vulnérables.*
⁷ *Programme de développement inclusif dans les zones d'accueil.*
⁸ *Projet de soutien à l'insertion socio-professionnelle des jeunes tchadiens en situation de vulnérabilité.*

Figure 29: Selected EUTF outputs in Chad, June 2021



Enhancing youth and vulnerable people's skills and economic insertion

In Chad, professional insertion remains a challenge for people under 25 who represent up to 70% of a rapidly growing population.¹ While 210,000 young people entered the labour market in 2020, this number is projected to reach 280,000 in 2030,² reflecting the need to build the capacities of professional training actors. In Chad's urban areas, professional insertion remains unsatisfactory, with an unemployment rate of 34%,³ and few vocational training and apprenticeship options.⁴

The EUTF funds five programmes which support professional training and skills development in Chad: *Bab-al-amal* (TD-03),⁵ ARCHIPELAGO (REG-15),⁶ DIZA (TD-07),⁷ RESTE (TD-01),⁸ and RESILAC (REG-05).⁹ While *Bab-al-amal* and ARCHIPELAGO mostly aim to enhance youth's skills, entrepreneurship and professional insertion in urban areas, RESTE trains people to ensure the sustainable use of hydraulic infrastructure in villages, and DIZA and RESILAC target self-employment

¹ AFD, 'AFPACET : Appui à la formation professionnelle et à la compétitivité des entreprises'. Retrieved [here](#).

² République du Tchad, Ministère de la Fonction Publique, du Travail et de l'Emploi, 'Politique nationale de l'emploi et de la formation professionnelle au Tchad (PNEFP)', April 2014. Retrieved [here](#).

³ AFD, 'AFPACET : Appui à la formation professionnelle et à la compétitivité des entreprises'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ AFD, 'AFPACET : Appui à la formation professionnelle et à la compétitivité des entreprises'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ *Projet de soutien à l'insertion socio-professionnelle des jeunes tchadiens en situation de vulnérabilité*.

⁶ ARCHIPELAGO: an African-European TVET initiative.

⁷ *Programme de développement inclusif dans les zones d'accueil*.


⁸ *Résilience et emploi au Lac Tchad*.

⁹ *Soutien aux populations du Bassin du Lac Tchad*.

and subsistence activities with a focus on vulnerable people – host communities, displaced people such as refugees and returnees for DIZA, and women in both cases.

In S1 2021, 1,680 people benefitted from professional trainings (TVET) and skills development (indicator 1.4), a 32% increase compared to December 2020. *Bab-al-amal* (TD-03) reported 722 people or almost half of this result. The programme aims to support Chad’s national employment and professional training policy (*Politique nationale d’emploi et de formation professionnelle* or PNEFP) in articulating two objectives: skills development trainings for vulnerable youth in five cities, and enhanced formal apprenticeship and internship trainings in line with the needs of businesses through the deployment of FONAP¹ branches in four cities.^{2,3} Through the programme’s first component, 507 people benefitted from professional trainings in sectors identified as promising (sewing, car mechanics, electricity, wood carpentry, restauration and hospitality, etc.).⁴ Through the second component, 87 people benefitted from an internship, and 128 professional supervisors and instructors of the FONAP centres were trained in S1 2021. Finally, *Bab-al-amal* helped people who had completed their internships find a job, creating 290 jobs in the first semester of 2021 (indicator 1.1) – a 30% increase from December 2020.

Figure 30: EUTF indicator 1.4, in Chad, June 2021



In parallel, the ARCHIPELAGO programme (REG-15) provided some sort of professional training to 399 people in S1 2021, an 87% increase from December 2020. Among beneficiaries, 224 persons

¹ *Fonds national d’appui à la formation professionnelle*, or National Support Fund for Vocational Training in English.

² Abéché, Bol, Moundou and Sarh.

³ AFD, *Bab-al-amal, ‘Rapport d’activités du premier semestre 2021’*, September 2021.

⁴ By order of importance regarding beneficiaries during the first half of 2021.

received dual training in the sectors of eco-construction, solar energy, and agricultural seeds. The rest of the beneficiaries trained by ARCHIPELAGO were trainers (77), firm executives trained in management practices to guarantee the sustainability of their businesses (73), and entrepreneurs (25).

Training governance leaders to create the condition for a sustainable peace

Governance in Chad remains plagued by local tensions and conflicts. In most cases, access to land and natural resources (between herders and farmers, or host and displaced communities), and ethnic rivalries underpin conflicts. Stress over resources and economic frustrations sometimes spur violence, radicalisation, and recruitment by armed groups.

To address the multiple tensions that undermine the Chadian society, EUTF-funded programmes have committed to train governance actors – mostly community representatives and local leaders – to prevent conflicts and build peace. During S1 2021, 1,126 staff and leaders from governance structures were trained on governance and conflict prevention (indicator 4.2), representing 18% of the total achieved since inception in the country. Four programmes contributed to training staff and leaders on governance in S1 2021: RESILAC (REG-05,¹ 747 people trained), DIZA (TD-07,² 166), PDU (REG-18,³ 113) and PRCPT (TD-02,⁴ 100). Since SECUTCHAD (TD-05)⁵ and SECGEF (TD-08)⁶ have ended, all the people trained were community representatives, in a shift from military and government actors to civil society and local governance stakeholders. Training topics varied from decision making and rural development to conflict prevention.

The RESILAC programme (REG-05) aims to activate local dynamics and build peace by strengthening community-based organisations (CBOs). During S1 2021, the programme trained 747 people on governance and decision making in the Lac region (indicator 4.2). The programme's objective is to facilitate fair and in-depth dialogue between users and power groups in order to draw up rules of use or locally negotiated conventions dealing with access to resources, but also to support the transition from a vertical system where the elders, the religious and the men rule, to a more collegial system in which all strata of the population are represented.

More directly centred on conflicts, the PDU *Médiation communautaire* project (REG-18-01)⁷ aims to offer mediation and peaceful solutions to conflicts dealing with natural resources and land access. It targets a wide range of stakeholders, mostly representatives of agricultural and pastoral communities in the Sahel (Lac and Kanem Regions in Chad) but also local authorities and ministerial actors. The approach taken by the Henry Dunant Centre to resolve conflicts consists in training community mediators, creating a network of mediators, and helping solve conflicts by identifying grievances, objectives and red lines, facilitating the negotiation and helping the parties establish consensual agreements and follow-up mechanisms.⁸ During S1 2021, the project trained 113 mediators (90 men and 23 women, indicator 4.2) in the Lac region. Mediators prevented, mediated and solved conflicts through delimitation of agricultural fields, enhanced communication channels for missing and stolen animals, or clarification regarding the rights of access to lands with salt or natron deposits, off and during the rainy season.^{9,10} Also through this project, 132 people participated in mediation sessions for the peaceful exploitation of natural resources (indicator 4.3).

¹ *Soutien aux populations du Bassin du Lac Tchad.*

² *Programme de développement inclusif dans les zones d'accueil.*

³ Emergency programme for the stabilisation of G5 Sahel border areas.

⁴ *Projet de renforcement de la résilience et de la cohabitation pacifique au Tchad.*

⁵ *Appui à la formation et à la sécurité publique au Tchad.*

⁶ Sécurité et gestion des frontières.


⁷ *PDU Médiation communautaire G5-HD.*

⁸ Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 'Agro-pastoral mediation in the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad)', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 'Agro-pastoral mediation in the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Chad)', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, '*Être médiateur agropastoral au Tchad*', September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

Figure 31: EUTF indicator 4.2, in Chad, June 2021



Enhancing food security in Chad

Food security remains a challenge in Chad. The country's Sahelo-Sudanese climate and extreme climatic events entail variations in yields from one year to the next. Over the 2020-2021 crop year, cereal production was down 1.5% compared to previous year (down 3.3% in the Sudanese zone).¹ Crop yield variations, which are exacerbated by the weak structure of the agricultural sector, the absence of stocks, and poor logistics, have dramatic effects on households' food security and vulnerability.

EUTF-funded programmes work on strengthening farming systems in the long run. During S1 2021, EUTF-funded programmes provided food security-related assistance to 37,331 persons in Chad (indicator 2.4), bringing the total to 205,574 persons since programmes' inception. Three programmes contributed to this result: DIZA (TD-07,² 27,432 beneficiaries), RESTE (TD-01,³ 9,889), and PDU (REG-18,⁴ ten).

In Chad's southern and eastern border areas, DIZA (TD-07) aims to reduce food insecurity and enhance peaceful cohabitation between host communities, refugees and returnees, among other objectives. In the first half of 2021, 27,432 people benefitted from food security-related support (indicator 2.4), a 64% increase from December 2020. DIZA contributed to increase beneficiaries' food security through three types of support: facilitating access to agricultural entrants and tools for farmers in the Sila region (20,880 beneficiaries over S1 2021), distributing vouchers during fairs (4,380), and granting land to refugees (2,172) in four regions.⁵

The PDU RECOSOC project (REG-18-08) operates in four municipalities of the Lac and Kanem regions, in contexts of chronic and structural food insecurity and difficult security conditions. It aims to screen children against malnutrition, enhance food security, and strengthen social cohesion between IDPs and host communities.⁶ During S1 2021, the project trained ten people on climate-

¹ SISAAP, 'Cadre Harmonisé d'identification des zones à risque et des populations en insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Sahel et en Afrique de l'Ouest (CH)', 29 March 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² Programme de développement inclusif dans les zones d'accueil.

³ Résilience et emploi au Lac Tchad.


⁴ Emergency programme for the stabilisation of G5 Sahel border areas.

⁵ The four regions are Logone-Oriental, Moyen-Chari, Ouaddaï, and Sila.

⁶ RECOSOC, 'Description of Action'.

resilient farming techniques (indicator 2.4) and distributed entrants and tools to 220 persons to support subsistence activities in the fishing, farming or livestock breeding sectors (indicator 1.3).

Figure 32: EUTF indicator 2.4, in Chad, June 2021



Outcome analysis 2: RESTE *Emploi Résilience* OXFAM (project, TD-01-01)¹ in Chad²

RESTE *Emploi résilience*

Budget: €15M

IP: OXFAM, consortium

Objective: Enhancing economic opportunities, nutrition, and peaceful cohesion for people in the Lac Chad region.

Main targets

Emploi, résilience et cohésion sociale dans la bande sahélienne et la zone du Lac Tchad (RESTE)

From **March 2017** to **February 2021**

- Host communities
- Youths
- Women
- IDPs

RESTE *Emploi Résilience* OXFAM was a €15M project implemented from March 2017 to February 2021 by an OXFAM-led³ consortium. It operated in the Bahr-al-Ghazal, Lac and Kanem regions. The project had three main objectives: improving access to economic opportunities for youth, women and vulnerable people, enhancing nutrition and food security, and strengthening local governance structures and social cohesion. A final evaluation measuring outputs and outcomes was completed by the consortium in October 2021 (upon which this box is largely based).

¹ *Emploi, résilience et cohésion sociale dans la bande sahélienne et la zone du Lac Tchad (RESTE Emploi Résilience OXFAM).*

² OXFAM, CARE, ACF, Chora, AIDER, ARDEK, 'Rapport narratif final projet « Emploi, Résilience et Cohésion Sociale dans la bande sahélienne et la zone du Lac Tchad » RESTE', October 2021.

³ Oxford Committee for Famine Relief.

Economic opportunities: the project reported that 57% of the beneficiaries aged 16-40 had increased their revenues by at least 30% by the end of the project. Furthermore, 38% of female and young beneficiaries had diversified their revenues by the end of the project – still falling short of the initial target of 50%. In order to increase beneficiaries' revenues and enhance revenue diversification, RESTE *Emploi Résilience* supported small businesses in the fields of production, processing and marketing of agricultural and livestock products in a value chain approach (okra, onion, millet, sheep, etc.), but also small-scale trade and innovative services.

Best practices

- **Knowledge** – the project capitalised on the documentation and studies on agricultural value chains that were available before its start, thus integrating past and existing practices.
- **Funding** – the *Fonds d'appui aux initiatives*,¹ an innovative tool to fund small initiatives, was successfully set up by the project to provide funding to women's and youths' small initiatives, alongside existing VSLAs.

Challenges

- **Measurement** – the way revenue increase is measured in the evaluation (based on feedback from beneficiaries) does not allow for further disaggregation and analyses. Revenue increases were not disaggregated per type of beneficiary (gender, age, migratory status).

Nutrition and food security: at the end of the project, the food diversification score of 37% of the beneficiary households had improved.² Furthermore, the cereal self-sufficiency of 75% of households had increased by at least two months at the end of the project, above the initial objective of 60%.

Best practices

- **The project provided direct support to agricultural production techniques** through the distribution of fertilizers, tools, seeds, the creation of irrigation systems, and technical trainings. It also supported livestock reconstitution through animal distributions and livestock vaccination parks.
- **A community-based early warning and response system** was established to better anticipate and address climatic events and natural catastrophes.³
- **The project supported participative agricultural planning methods** via the drafting, implementation and monitoring of local development plans (LDPs).

Challenge

- **Exit strategy** – while the presence of some of the consortium's NGOs in the region should allow to follow up with authorities on certain activities, the exit strategy drafted in the fourth year of implementation did not fully clarify the NGOs' roles or potential new sources of funding.

Local governance: seven governance structures were supported by the project to draft and execute LDPs. While the number of structures supported fell short compared to the initial objective (19), established LDPs were deemed satisfactory, rightfully and efficiently reflecting minorities' priorities and promoting a more inclusive and participatory form of governance. The evaluation found that 65% of women and youths interviewed believed that their needs and priorities were included in the LDPs.

¹ In English, Fund to support initiatives.

² In French, *score de diversification alimentaire des ménages* or SDAM.

³ *Système Communautaire d'Alerte Précoce et de Réponse aux Urgences* (SCAP-RU) in French.

RESTE mainly worked with existing civil society organisations, building their capacities and strengthening their participation in decision-making organs.

Best practices

- **RESTE relied on existing civil society organisations** to participate in the supported local committees.
- **The project validated and funded 68 microprojects** decided through the seven LDPs, with a total value of CFA 137M (€209,000).
- **Conflict management** – the project encouraged the organisation of one provincial round table on conflict management at community level, which brought together 102 participants.

Challenges

- **Lengthy fund allocation procedures** – the Fast Track fund's procedures to allocate money to civil society organisations were described as too slow.
- **Monitoring** – a lack of monitoring by members of local development structures, which relied too heavily on the project for that purpose, was observed. This also raises concerns on the sustainability of LDP monitoring processes.

5.3.3. CHAD AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 5: EUTF common output indicators for Chad, June 2021

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	2,081	2,268	2,140	970	7,459	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	47	74	2	123	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	5,268	16,982	9,109	6,482	37,841	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET)...	230	2,493	2,481	1,680	6,884	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed,...	3	24	11	11	49	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	26	56	19	20	121	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	139	264	298	91	792	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	660	2,567	17,824	2,280	23,331	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	18,546	10,477	8,717	1,809	39,549	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	34,999	18,610	114,634	37,331	205,574	
2.5 Number of insitutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	8	40	9	3	60	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	70	317	1,581	21	1,987	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	21,672	30,706	183,797	5,258	241,433	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	57	1,622	430	114	2,222	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	35,160	221,000	14,206	5,830	276,196	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	0	605	1,468	289	2,362	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	0	119	360	70	549	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	86	65	14	0	165	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	0	1,196	3,011	1,194	5,401	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	86	100	23	210	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	1	1	0	0	2	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	0	16	23	4	43	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	0	0	16	0	16	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	216	709	26	951	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	667	1,206	3,123	1,126	6,122	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	60,527	233,942	69,314	8,092	371,875	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	1	1	5	0	7	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	17	206	131	83	438	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	5	12	157	11	185	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	10	20	9	2	41	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created...	8	0	4	0	12	

5.4. CÔTE D'IVOIRE

5.4.1. CÔTE D'IVOIRE IN S1 2021

Figure 33: Côte d'Ivoire – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021



While Côte d'Ivoire has sustained robust economic growth since the post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011, as of June 2021, 46% of the 26.4M inhabitants still lived under the poverty line.¹ The COVID-19 pandemic and the economic crisis that ensued further exacerbated the fragility of poor households with 71% of households reporting an decrease in their income in 2020.² In addition, more than 37% of businesses were forced to close, facing lower sales and revenues as well as reduced working hours as a result of mitigation measures.³

Côte d'Ivoire remains deeply politically divided since the 2010-2011 crisis. The party of President Alassane Ouattara, who was re-elected for a contested third mandate in October 2020, won legislative elections in March.⁴ In March 2021, Laurent Gbagbo (president from 2000 to 2011) and Charles Blé Goudé (leader of the Young Patriots) were acquitted at the International Criminal Court, where they were charged with crimes against humanity for their actions during the crisis. Laurent Gbagbo returned to Côte d'Ivoire in June, in what is seen as a test of the political stability of the country.⁵

Côte d'Ivoire is an origin, transit and destination country for migrants in the sub-region. The country hosts 2.5M migrants and has a diaspora of 1.1M people.⁶ The country is at the centre of the Conakry-Lagos migration route, which is mostly labour migration.⁷ Finally, around 51,000 Ivorian refugees who fled during the 2010-2011 civil war still reside in neighbouring countries and the government, in coordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is supporting their return. Discussions for the cessation of refugee status were ongoing as of June 2021.⁸

¹ WFP, 'Côte d'Ivoire, country brief', June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² World Bank, 'The state of the Ivorian economy: how Côte d'Ivoire could rebound after the COVID-19 pandemic and boost growth', August 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Ibid.

⁴ France24, 'Côte d'Ivoire : le RHDP d'Alassane Ouattara obtient la majorité aux législatives', March 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Al Jazeera, 'Ex-president Laurent Gbagbo back in Ivory Coast after acquittal', June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


⁶ IOM, 'Regional mobility mapping, West and Central Africa', June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ UNHCR, 'Côte d'Ivoire : situation du rapatriement volontaire', August 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


5.4.2. THE EUTF IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Figure 34: EUTF portfolio in Côte d'Ivoire, June 2021^{1,2}



The EUTF has contracted €28.9M to two national projects in Côte d'Ivoire. A €24M budget support project was signed in June to fund the state's effort to provide financial support to small businesses impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and related economic crisis (PSRE COVID, CI-03, SO1).³ The EUTF also funds a €4.9M project to support the new national strategy on civil registration (*Etat Civil*, CI-02, SO3).⁴ Côte d'Ivoire is included in the Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) report for the first time this semester, as *Etat Civil* started delivering outputs in S1 2021. Regional programmes have implemented activities in Côte d'Ivoire since 2018, and results which were previously presented only at the regional level are now presented here as well.

Figure 35 : Selected EUTF outputs in Côte d'Ivoire, June 2021



Supporting civil registration efforts in Côte d'Ivoire

In Côte d'Ivoire, 28% of births overall, and as high as 40% of rural births, are unregistered. This situation leaves people at risk of statelessness (an estimated 1.6M people are at risk in the country)⁵ but also prevents the registration of children in schools, or access to employment and certain services. In addition, the **lack of reliable data jeopardises adequate planning and provision of public services** and the management of migration and returns.⁶ In order to reform and strengthen its civil registration system and provide birth certificates to unregistered Ivoirians, the government of Côte d'Ivoire adopted in 2018 a new civil registration and identification strategy. A national agency for civil registration and identification (*Office national de l'état civil et de l'identification* or ONECI) was created

¹ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

² This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

³ *Programme de soutien et de relance à l'économie dans le contexte de la crise du COVID-19 en Côte d'Ivoire*.

⁴ *Appui à la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale de l'état civil et de l'identification en Côte d'Ivoire*.

⁵ UNHCR, 'Operational data portal, Côte d'Ivoire', May 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ CIVIPOL, 'Description de l'action, Appui à la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale de l'état civil et de l'identification de Côte d'Ivoire', December 2020.

in 2019, which will support the identification of nationals and non-nationals in the country and the monitoring of flows.


The *Etat Civil* programme (CI-02), implemented by CIVIPOL, aims to support the implementation of the strategy. The programme started its activities in 2021 and will aim to build capacity of the national stakeholders in charge of the civil registration system (including the ONECI), sensitise the population and key stakeholders on the importance of civil registration and develop pilot actions to deploy new registration tools. To help stakeholders operationalise the ONECI, the *Etat Civil* programme has supported a coordination system between actors in the civil registration sector in S1 2021 (indicator 5.2). The programme also developed a ‘How to’ guide for civil registration actors (indicator 5.2) and organised a seminar in March 2021 in which 686 actors (97 women, indicator 4.2) of the civil registration sector were sensitised on the importance of the new government plan on civil registration.

Protection of vulnerable migrants and victims of trafficking along the migration routes

The Gulf of Guinea (from Guinea to Nigeria) is characterised by large migratory movements and Côte d’Ivoire is a transit, origin and destination country for migration in the region. Along the route, migrants in transit are vulnerable to protection risks and exploitative practices. **In S1 2021, 825 people on the move were protected and assisted by EUTF-funded programmes in Côte d’Ivoire**, a 48% increase from numbers reached at the end of December 2020 (indicator 3.2).¹

Most reported beneficiaries in S1 2021 were reached by Protection West Africa (787 children, and 95% of results achieved in Côte d’Ivoire in S1 2021, REG-13),² which focuses on the protection of children along migratory routes. Children on the move are especially vulnerable to discriminatory practices, detention and forced labour.³ The programme identified, reinforced or created and equipped one-stop centres (*Guichets uniques*) along the main routes which have provided protection and assistance to a total of 2,514 children since the beginning of the programme in Q3 2020, including 866 girls. The programme also trained 174 local actors in child protection in the main intervention areas since the beginning of the programme, including 130 people in S1 2021 (indicator 3.7) to ensure the sustainability of the action and the improvement of existing protection services.

Figure 36: EUTF Indicator 3.2, in Côte d’Ivoire, June 2021



An additional 38 people were protected by EUTF-funded programmes in the first half of 2021, all of them victims of trafficking assisted by the TEH programme (REG-12)⁴ in Q1 2021 (indicator 3.2). Sexual exploitation and forced labour are the main forms of human trafficking along the Conakry-

¹ The results for indicator 3.2 (total of 2,552) do not include IOM data.
² *Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l’Ouest.*
³ CAEDBE ‘Cartographie des enfants en mouvement en Afrique’, 2019. Retrieved [here](#).
⁴ *Appui à la lutte contre la traite des personnes dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée.*

Lagos axis, and 302 victims of trafficking were identified by the government in 2020 in Côte d'Ivoire.¹ The TEH programme has supported the creation of a referral system for victims of trafficking in the country and 182 actors were trained in human trafficking since the beginning of activities in Q2 2020, including 147 members of security forces (indicator 3.7). Of the 38 victims of trafficking referred to protection services in 2021, 19 were children (50%) and all were male (indicator 3.2).

5.4.3. CÔTE D'IVOIRE AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 6: EUTF common output indicators for Côte d'Ivoire, June 2021


EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	0	71	155	226	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	0	9	1	10	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET)...	0	0	0	432	432	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	0	0	0	1	1	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	0	0	0	38	38	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs...	0	0	1,727	825	2,552	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	12,400	41,852	10,814	1,035	66,101	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	5	9	307	2	323	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	3,631	1,865	859	1,089	7,444	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	1,241	875	1,239	942	4,296	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	0	0	1	1	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	132	224	356	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	64	55	35	154	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	10	343	125	0	478	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	0	0	10	686	696	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	0	1	3	0	4	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	0	0	1	1	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	0	0	1	2	3	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	0	1	0	1	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created...	0	0	0	1	1	

¹ US Department of State, 'Trafficking in persons report', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

5.5. GHANA

5.5.1. GHANA IN S1 2021

Figure 37: Ghana – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021



President Nana Akufo-Addo narrowly won a second term during general elections in December 2020. During his swearing-in ceremony in January, clashes erupted among members of Ghana's heavily polarized Parliament.¹ The losing party, the National Democratic Congress, contested the results and accused the Electoral Commission of manipulating vote counts. The results, however, were upheld by Ghana's Supreme Court in March.² The country's hung Parliament slowed the approval process for newly appointed ministers, and some NDC figures have hinted that Parliament will not easily approve bills submitted by the executive.³ Despite these difficulties in the first half of 2021, Ghana maintained its involvement in regional affairs, with Akufo-Addo chairing a summit of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in May following the coup d'état in Mali.⁴

Like other countries in the region, Ghana's economy and livelihoods have been adversely affected by COVID-19, and economic growth fell from 6.5% in 2019 to 1.1% in 2020. In spite of Ghana's rapid development over the last 30 years, the impact of growth on poverty has slowed in recent years and inequality and rural poverty persist.⁵ With regard to COVID-19, it is estimated that the number of people in poverty rose by approximately 430,000 due to the pandemic.⁶ Additionally, 85% of respondents to a survey published in March 2021 reported a decline in household income due to the pandemic, largely a consequence of lockdowns disrupting the labour market.⁷ It is expected that Ghana's economy will make a strong recovery in 2021, and in May, the International Finance Corporation signed an agreement with the green bond market allowing more opportunities for investment in climate-friendly projects and signals growth in Ghana's green economy.⁸

¹ France 24, 'Ghana army moves to quell parliament clash ahead of swearing in', July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² Sampson Kwarkye, Paul Nana Kwabena Aborampah Mensah, 'Ghana's Akufo-Addo faces a gruelling second term', Institute for Security Studies, March 2021. [here](#).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Al Jazeera, 'ECOWAS suspends Mali over second coup in nine months', May 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Tomomi Tanaka, Camille Nuamah, Michael Geiger, 'Ghana's challenges widening regional inequality and natural resource depreciation', World Bank Blogs, Consulted in October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


⁶ Kwabena Adu-Ababio, Robert Darko Osei, Jukka Pirttila, Pia Rattenhuber, 'Distributional effects of the Covid-19 pandemic in Ghana', UNU WIDER, October 2021, Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Simone Schotte, Michael Danquah, Robert Darko Osei, Kunai Sen, 'How Covid-19 is affecting workers and their livelihoods in urban Ghana', UNU WIDER, March 2021, Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Jean Marie Takoulevu, 'IFC supports the development of the green bond market', Afrik21, May 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

5.5.2. THE EUTF IN GHANA

Figure 38: EUTF portfolio in Ghana, June 2021 ^{1,2}




The EUTF has contracted €24.6M in projects in Ghana. Employment-related projects (SO1) account for 80% of this funding, and the remaining 20% deals with migration management (SO3). All national projects were contracted at the end of 2019 as part of two programmes. The GrEEn programme (GH-02) focuses on supporting the creation of green employment and enterprise opportunities, and the Border Security programme (GH-01) works to strengthen local and national capacity for migration and border management.³ The first half of 2021 marks the second semester that these projects are reporting outputs, as their inception phases were interrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic in S1 2020. Programmes in Ghana have spent approximately half of the EUTF contracted budget to the country.

¹ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

² This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

³ Boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in Ghana; Strengthening Border Security in Ghana

Figure 39: Selected EUTF outputs in Ghana, June 2021



This year marked the beginning of the implementation period for Ghana’s National Green Jobs Strategy (2021-2025), outlined by the Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations. The strategy sets out priorities for propping up sustainable enterprises and developing skills for green jobs so that the green economy develops without leaving behind local economies.¹ In 2020, the GrEEn programme (GH-02) signed a Memorandum of Understanding to support the Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations to operationalise this national strategy.² Implemented by the UNCDF and SNV, the programme seeks to equip individuals and green enterprises with the skills and resources necessary to develop income generating activities (IGAs) that contribute to environmental sustainability.

During the first half of this year the programme supported 5,011 people to develop IGAs (indicator 1.3). Compared to data reported in December 2020, this represents a tenfold increase in recipients of support which may be due to the programme gaining momentum after initial programming was disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic.


The majority of IGA beneficiaries (86%) totalling 4,294 people were helped to access financing. UNCDF worked with financial service providers to help them adapt their services to the needs of youth, women and returnees. As a result, 4,036 individuals accessed financial services such as matched savings accounts for the development of their business activity. UNCDF also linked 258 individuals with diaspora crowdfunding platforms that provide funds for local community investments. The project found it challenging to prove to private sector funding partners that these rural and relatively nascent projects

¹ Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations, ‘National Green Jobs Strategy 2021-2025’, ILO, March 2021, Consulted October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² Boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in Ghana

were strong and sustainable investments but noted that this issue improved over time. UNCDF also provided training on financial skills and pitching one’s business (1.4) to 368 people (12% women, and 49% youth). Overall, recipients of these funds created 501 jobs (1.1), of which 64% went to women.

Figure 40: EUTF indicator 1.3, in Ghana, June 2021



In addition, 717 vulnerable people received employability and entrepreneurship training, coaching, and mentoring services (indicator 1.3). Beneficiaries were mostly youth (91%) and women (67%), and the goal of these trainings was to boost entrepreneurs’ ability to earn income in agriculture (22%), services (42%) and other sectors (36%). This support benefits enterprises that are part of the green circular economy, in fields such as organic farming or compost production, or businesses using recycled goods as inputs. SNV informed their programming through a comprehensive market scan that identified sectoral needs and existing programmes in the main return areas (5.3).

Generating green livelihood opportunities sustainably requires coordination with local government and private sector partners. In January, GrEEn organised an international green investment forum that brought together private sector actors and green MSMEs (indicator 5.1). Entrepreneurs were able to learn about the green investing landscape and network with banks, green investors, and members of the diaspora. The programme also developed a web platform to link entrepreneurs with potential investors, employers, and mentors and to disseminate news related to the green and circular economy (indicator 5.2). In addition, GrEEn held meetings with Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Assemblies to support the creation of ten local development plans that integrate considerations on climate change adaptation and strengthen local governments’ capacity for climate change adaptation and gender sensitive local development (indicator 2.1). Finally, UNCDF and SNV have also been making efforts to coordinate between with each other to maximise results on interlinked activities.

5.5.3. GHANA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 7: EUTF common output indicators for Ghana, June 2021

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	0	2	545	547	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	0	5	95	100	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	0	0	451	5,011	5,462	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET)...	0	5	307	764	1,076	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	0	0	0	10	10	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	3,110	24,855	826,738	2,031	856,734	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	0	0	5	0	5	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	875	266	518	309	1,968	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	212	449	303	186	1,151	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	200	20	220	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	5	88	64	54	211	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	29	57	204	6	296	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	0	31	0	31	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	140	40	49	374	603	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	0	19	6	25	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	0	0	3	2	5	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	0	13	2	15	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created...	1	0	0	1	2	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	32,000	0	32,000	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	7,000	182,763	189,763	
6.3 Number of entities benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	10	10	20	

5.6. GUINEA

5.6.1. GUINEA IN S1 2021

Figure 41: Guinea – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021



The Guinean economy proved more resilient than many of its African counterparts in 2020, a situation that is set to remain unchanged in 2021. The economy is forecast to grow by 5.6% in 2021,¹ essentially driven by continued external demand for bauxite, gold, diamonds, as well as the recovery in non-mining sectors.² Yet, the benefits do not extend to people working in the informal sector who make up most of the population and remain very exposed to poverty. In June 2021, 55% of the country's population lived below the poverty line.³ On 16 April in Kouroussa in the East, clashes between gold miners and security forces left two people dead and eight injured, an event that became symptomatic of the precarious socio-economic conditions endured by the working class.⁴

The country faced two epidemics over the first semester of 2021: COVID-19, with 10,032 cases and 90 deaths officially reported between 1 January and 30 June,⁵ and Ebola. During the Ebola outbreak between 14 February and 19 June 2021 – the day the government declared victory over the disease –, a total of 16 confirmed and 7 probable Ebola cases were reported, 12 of whom died.⁶ Guinea re-opened its borders in February 2021, five months after it had closed them in September 2020.⁷

¹ AfDB, 'Guinea Economic Outlook', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² The Economist, The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 'Guinea'. Retrieved [here](#).

³ WFP, 'Guinea Country Brief', June 2021. Retrieve [here](#).

⁴ Jeune Afrique, 'Orpaillage en Guinée : et si Kouroussa n'était qu'un début ?'. Retrieved [here](#).


⁵ OWID, 'COVID-19 data'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ WHO, 'Ebola N'Zerekore, Guinea, 2021'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Jeune Afrique, 'Orpaillage en Guinée : et si Kouroussa n'était qu'un début ?'. Op. Cit.

5.6.2. THE EUTF IN GUINEA

Figure 42: EUTF portfolio in Guinea, June 2021^{1,2}



The EUTF has committed €73.0M in Guinea, up from €68.0M in December 2020. Most of the funding contracted in the country (€60.0M) aims to create jobs, train people, and enhance economic opportunities for the Guinean youth (SO1) through the INTEGRA programme (GN-01).³ The EUTF also focuses on resilience, malnutrition prevention, and food security (SO2) through the €8.0M RESIGUI programme (GN-04).⁴ Finally, the newly signed €5.0M *Etat Civil* programme (GN-05)⁵ aims to strengthen the institutional and operational frameworks of civil registry processes in Guinea, through digitisation and capacity-building to national actors (SO4).

¹ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.


² This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implementing in the country.

³ *Programme d'appui à l'intégration socio-économique des jeunes en République de Guinée.*

⁴ *RESIGUI – Améliorer la résilience des populations vulnérables de Guinée.*

⁵ *Projet pilote d'amélioration des performances de l'état civil guinéen par le recours à la digitalisation.*

Figure 43: Selected EUTF outputs in Guinea, June 2021



Using TVET to strengthen entrepreneurship and self-employment and to facilitate professional insertion

Professional insertion and formal business creation remain challenging in Guinea's weak labour market, especially for young people. Youth aged 15-24 not in employment, education or training make up 22% of Guinean youths, while the rest usually suffer from underemployment and precarious work conditions.¹

EUTF-funded programmes focus on skills development, self-employment, entrepreneurship training, and the creation of networks of economic actors from the informal sector with the aim to create and provide quality jobs to unemployed and underemployed people. In S1 2021, 7,168 people benefitted from professional trainings (TVET) and/or skills development through EUTF-funded programmes (indicator 1.4), more than the total reached at the end of 2020, and bringing the new total to 13,745. EUTF-funded SO1-priority programmes in Guinea focus on two groups: youths, and small farmers from rural areas.

The INTEGRA programme (GN-01)² aims to develop youths' skills, promote entrepreneurship and enhance socio-professional insertion by working in close collaboration with Guinea's national training structures to strengthen TVET programmes, including the Ministry of Youth and Youth Employment and the Civic Service Action for Development Agency (*Agence du service civique d'action*


¹ ILO, 'Youth Labour statistics – Share of youth aged 15-24 not in employment, education or training (NEET), modelled estimates for 2018'. Retrieved [here](#).

² Programme d'appui à l'intégration socio-économique des jeunes en République de Guinée.

pour le développement or ASCAD) which delivers vocational training courses in its two Conakry and Kindia centres (on security, building and public works, hotel management, truck driving in Conakry, and agriculture in Kindia).¹ In S1 2021, INTEGRA provided TVET and skills development to 4,209 people, a 64% increase from the total achieved by December 2020. While the programme was delayed by the repercussions of the 2020 Guinean presidential election and COVID-19, activities resumed in S1 2021 with 1,334 people trained through technical TVET trainings.² In addition, 1,325 people received an entrepreneurship training and 70 were trained on commercial prospection and investors' screening for their start-ups and small enterprises. 1,205 people completed the high-intensity course in field schools³ in S1 2021.⁴ Women represented 31% of INTEGRA's beneficiaries and men 54%.⁵

An additional 2,959 people benefitted from TVET and skills development from the RESIGUI programme (GN-04)⁶ during the first half of 2021. The programme focuses on farmers from rural areas,⁷ and targets farmers' self-sufficiency, enhanced livelihoods, and improved living standards overall. RESIGUI reached farmers with practical training to enhance diversification of production and livelihoods (indicator 1.4); 49% of the beneficiaries were women. Farmers were given tools and equipment and were trained on the use of quality varieties and seeds and on the structuring of cooperatives.

Figure 44: EUTF indicator 1.4, in Guinea, June 2021



¹ ASCAD, 'Présentation de l'ASCAD'. Retrieved [here](#).

² Including 574 through the partnership with ASCAD.

³ Chantiers-écoles in French.

⁴ Parcours d'intégration HIMO/chantier-école.

⁵ Gender for the remaining 15% of beneficiaries could not be disaggregated from data collection.

⁶ RESIGUI – Améliorer la résilience des populations vulnérables de Guinée.

⁷ More precisely, located in six municipalities in the four regions of Boké, Kankan, Labé, and Nzérékoré.

Enhancing the long-term nutritional status, resilience and food security of the most fragile people

Nutrition remains a topic of concern in the midst of a food security crisis in Guinea. Over the June-August lean period,¹ 2.17 million Guineans were projected to be in a situation of food security stress (phase 2), and 680,000 in a situation of crisis (phase 3),² about 2.5 times last year's numbers.³

RESIGUI articulates activities around three phases to counter the negative effects of the food crisis and deliver nutritional and resilience support to Guinea's most vulnerable populations in four provinces⁴. First, through an emergency relief phase that ended in the spring of 2021, the programme handed out unconditional cash transfers and distributed nutritional supplements to pregnant and lactating women and infants under five to prevent global acute malnutrition and spur children's growth. During the first quarter of 2021, the programme also launched its second and third recovery phases, delivering conditional cash transfers, creating community productive assets, training smallholder farmers organised in groups, and strengthening the resilience of communities.

Despite some delays due to technical issues faced by the mobile operator used for cash transfers and the late procurement of food items, the first relief phase was completed in May 2021. In S1 2021, 17,996 people received nutrition assistance (indicator 2.3). Infants from 6 to 23 months old⁵ represented 51% of the beneficiaries (9,248 infants, including 51% girls and 49% boys), while pregnant and lactating mothers made up the rest (8,748, including 18% under 18). The distributed products were nutrient and protein-rich items such as super-cereals and peanut paste.

During the first half of 2021, 65,920 people received cash or food transfers (indicator 2.9). This represented 90% of the beneficiaries reached since the inception of RESIGUI. Cash and product distributions were also used to provide sensitisation on good nutrition and hygiene practices. Over S1 2021, 14,643 people were sensitised on nutrition and hygiene practices, infant feeding, and practices related to resilience overall (indicator 2.7),⁶ representing 62% of the people reached since RESIGUI's inception. Women accounted for 82% of the beneficiaries sensitised in S1 2021, reflecting RESIGUI's understanding of women's crucial role to promote changes in hygiene and nutritional practices.

¹ Data from the *Cadre Harmonisé* could not be obtained for Guinea for the March-May reference period.

² CILSS, '*Cadre Harmonisé d'identification des zones à risque et des populations en insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle*', April 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


³ Indeed, 0.27M Guineans were in a situation of food security crisis (phase 3) between June and August 2020. WFP, 'Food security highlights West and Central Africa', December 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Boké, Kankan, Labé and Nzérékoré.

⁵ That is, above six first months old when breastfeeding is sufficient for the infant, and before 23 months which is the age when malnutrition damages become irreversible.

⁶ Beneficiaries were reached by WFP in partnership with 12 national NGOs, based on regions and subjects of sensitisation.

Figure 45: EUTF indicator 2.3, in Guinea, June 2021



5.6.3. GUINEA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 8: EUTF common output indicators for Guinea, June 2021

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	55	1,363	426	1,844	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	444	1,058	333	1,835	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	0	1,246	1,278	0	2,524	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET)...	0	2,026	4,551	7,168	13,745	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed,....	0	3	2	1	6	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	1	0	0	85	86	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	0	0	17,996	17,996	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	0	0	0	479	479	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	0	8,787	14,643	23,430	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	0	74	0	382	456	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	0	6,975	65,920	72,895	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs...	0	0	0	111	111	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	21,155	21,161	6,432	1,001,821	1,050,569	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	0	76	11	6	93	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	8,280	3,637	2,269	3,311	17,498	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	1,832	2,206	1,836	2,455	8,328	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	174	0	1	175	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	220	150	375	745	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	672	107	92	30	901	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	0	0	0	2	2	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	8	1	2	11	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	0	8	1	4	13	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	15	1	0	16	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created...	0	36	0	1	37	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	23,015	2,106	25,121	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	4,035	1,053	5,088	

5.7. MALI

5.7.1. MALI IN S1 2021

Figure 46: Mali – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021



Political instability persisted in the first half of 2021 in Mali. On 24 May, a coup d'état was carried out by Colonel Assimi Goïta against Malian transition President Bah N'Daw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane.¹ This second coup in less than nine months destabilised the country and it now seems unlikely that elections will be held in February 2022 as originally planned by the transition.² Soon after the coup, statements from France, the main military force engaged in the Sahel, mentioned the withdrawal of French troops from the Barkhane operation in the Sahel.³

The security situation in Mali remained precarious during the first half of the year. During the period, 396 attacks were recorded (791 reported fatalities), a slight decrease from the 418 reported in S1 2020.⁴ 948 civilians were killed, injured, or abducted in S1 2021. These violations and abuses of human rights and/or international humanitarian law are attributable to jihadist groups (50%), but also to community militias (33%) and Malian and international armies (respectively, 11% and 6%).^{5, 6} Central Mali (Mopti) remains the region most affected by the violence, but there is an increase in incidents of violent extremism in several regions of southern Mali.

The humanitarian situation in Mali deteriorated during the period. The number of internally displaced people increased, even exceeding the peak of June 2013, as did protection incidents.⁷ As of June 2021, the country hosted 386,454 IDPs against 322,957 in December 2020.⁸

¹ Jeune Afrique, 'Mali : pourquoi Bah N'Daw et Moctar Ouane sont toujours retenus à Kati', 24 May 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² IRIS, 'Coup d'État au Mali : un bouleversement bien au-delà des frontières ?', 3 June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Le Monde, 'Après le coup d'État au Mali, Macron réitère son souhait de « retirer » les soldats de Barkhane', 31 May 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event data project dashboard', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ MINUSMA, 'Note sur les tendances des violations et abus de droits de l'homme au Mali, 1er janvier - 31 mars 2021', May 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


⁶ MINUSMA, 'Note sur les tendances des violations et abus de droits de l'homme au Mali, 1er avril - 30 juin 2021', August 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ OCHA, 'Mali : Tableau de bord humanitaire au 30 juin 2021', August 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ UNHCR, 'Mali: Country report', accessed in June 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

5.7.1. THE EUTF IN MALI

Figure 47: EUTF portfolio in Mali, June 2021^{1,2}



The EUTF has contracted €213.6M in Mali, primarily to programmes working on resilience (SO2, 42%) or security, governance and conflict prevention (SO4, 31%). The PROJES programme (ML-10)³ is the main contributor to the SO2 budget, at €43.5M, while PARSEC (ML-06)⁴ constitutes over a third of the SO4 budget. Since December 2020, one programme, POC ML (ML-13),⁵ was contracted to contribute to the fight against criminal networks involved in irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings in Mali. Many programmes are reaching the end of their implementation period.

¹ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.


² This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

³ Programme Jeunesse et Stabilisation – régions du centre du Mali.

⁴ Programme d'Appui au Renforcement de la Sécurité dans les régions de Mopti et de Gao et à la gestion des zones frontalières.

⁵ Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint, de lutte contre l'immigration irrégulière, le trafic de migrants et la traite des êtres humains.

Figure 48 : Situation in Mali and EUTF outputs – as of June 2021



Increasing the food and nutrition security of vulnerable people

EUTF-funded programmes aim to improve the nutritional situation of the population and to reduce food insecurity in Mali, where the food sector remains precarious and fragile. The COVID-19 pandemic led to a decline of income for 47.3% of households.¹ This, combined with the after-effects of insecurity, particularly in the central and northern regions of the country, meant that more and more households had a reduced ability to access adequate food in the first half of 2021.² As of June 2021, it was estimated that 1.3 million people were food insecure (phases 3 to 5), and 1.1 million people were in need of nutrition assistance.³ In this context, the regional programmes PDU and CRIALCES, as well as the national programme SDNM2, aimed to improve the living conditions and resilience of vulnerable populations (respectively, REG-18,⁴ REG-24,⁵ and ML-04⁶). In S1 2021, 7,240 people received food security assistance (indicator 2.4), and 6,588 people received nutrition assistance (indicator 2.3).

The PDU programme contributed to addressing the crisis by providing community-based malnutrition solutions and cash transfers in S1 2021. The overall objective of the PDU programme is to improve the living conditions and resilience of vulnerable populations. In S1 2021, the programme revitalised community-based malnutrition prevention groups, training 116 specialists (including 83 women) on infant and young child nutrition (indicator 2.8). These groups led to the sensitisation of 6,820 people (including 6,518 women) on screening children for malnutrition (indicator 2.7). Also, through community-based malnutrition prevention groups, 5,572 children under the age of five were screened during the period (indicator 2.3). 1,016 additional children were screened through community referral systems, bringing the total to 6,588 children screened for malnutrition in S1 2021. The programme conducted screening activities mostly in Mopti (70%) and Gao (15%), which are the most food insecure

¹ Few's Net, 'Mali – Perspectives sur la sécurité alimentaire – Février à Septembre 2021', September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ OCHA, 'Mali : Tableau de bord humanitaire au 30 juin 2021', August 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


⁴ Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.

⁵ Réponse à la crise alimentaire au centre Sahel : support nutritionnel et relèvement.

⁶ Sécurité et Développement au Nord du Mali – phase 2.

regions in Mali.¹ PDU also supported the dissemination of awareness-raising messages on the themes of infant and young child nutrition, hygiene and sanitation, and the importance of using primary health care services for pregnant and lactating women and their children under the age of two. These messages reached 446 people in S1 2021 (indicator 2.7). The provision of cash transfers for improved nutrition and food security to 5,400 people (indicator 2.9) further strengthened community resilience.

Figure 49: EUTF indicator 2.4, in Mali, June 2021



In the first half of 2021, EUTF-funded programmes and especially the recently launched CRIALCES (REG-24) also enhanced food security in Mali by supporting farmers. As of June 2021, a total of 171,860 people had received food security-related assistance (indicator 2.4) in Mali, including 7,240 in S1 2021. CRIALCES reached most of the S1 2021 beneficiaries (84%). The programme, which started in July 2020 and is implemented by WFP, aims to strengthen the food security of people in the most vulnerable situations in areas of the central Sahel. In Mali, all 6,102 beneficiaries were farmers who received technical and material support to strengthen their production and processing of nutritious food. Farmers were also supported through SDNM2, which provided 1,050 farmers in Mopti, Tombouctou, and Kidal with improved irrigation services, and the PDU programme (REG-18) which supported 88 female farmers and agro-pastoralists in Gao through livestock distribution.

Outcome analysis 3: KEY ARC programme in Mali



¹ Few's Net, 'Mali – Perspectives sur la sécurité alimentaire – Février à Septembre 2021', September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

The KEY ARC programme aimed to improve the nutrition and food security of vulnerable households by i) providing cash transfers, ii) boosting nutrition outcomes by promoting good practices and preventative testing, iii) increasing agricultural output and incomes for better nutrition access, and finally, iv) targeting communities and institutions to sustainably improve food security and nutrition governance.

The programme measured the outcomes of their activities relative to baseline figures, seeing some positive changes on high-level indicators as well as some mixed results. The average dietary diversity score for infants (6-23 months) increased from 1.6 to 2.5, but the proportion of infants with the minimum acceptable score did not reach the 15% target, instead dropping from 5% to 1%. Another key outcome was the proportion of women of child-bearing age with a minimum nutritional diversity, which rose from 10% to 48%, beyond the target of 20%. The proportion of household spending going toward food fell from 61% in 2016 to 56% after interventions to improve livelihoods sought to increase households' ability to absorb shocks affecting their nutrition and food security. Outcomes linked to each of the four programme pillars are further detailed below.

Reinforcing nutrition and food security of vulnerable households: With regard to food security programming, beneficiary households saw a reduction in the average Coping Strategy Index score, which fell from 15 at baseline to 6.6 after the intervention. This decrease shows a reduction in harmful coping behaviours in the face of limited access to food, such as purchasing food on credit or reducing food consumption, suggesting that the food security of these households improved during the project. This result followed unconditional seasonal cash transfers of CFA120,000 each year to 9,570 vulnerable households.

The proportion of beneficiary households with an acceptable food consumption score increased from 51% at baseline to 97%. This outcome was measured among beneficiaries who received socio-economic support for agricultural activities and other income generating activities. Recipient households saw a 65% increase in revenues from baseline to endline, far beyond the programme target of a 25% increase.

ARC set up 103 nutrition support groups to raise awareness on nutritional practices and conduct testing for malnutrition, reaching 12,732 households in 14 communes to reinforce household nutrition. Regarding improved practices, breastfeeding among mothers of infants aged less than six months reached 71% (initial target of 35%). Additionally, 27% of mothers of children under five adopted at least four of eight essential family practices compared to the baseline of 8% and target of 16%.

Best practices

- **A multi-domain approach** that combined urgent response with long term support allowed the programme to respond to urgent needs during the lean season while helping communities and households to strengthen their ability to reinforce their own livelihoods and food security.
- **Inclusion** - the programme found it important to strike a balance between not leaving behind people with specific needs and not stigmatising groups by targeting them based on their vulnerability.

Challenges

- **Timing activities** in rhythm with the agricultural calendar and lean season was difficult for cash transfers and other programming given the changing context and instability.

Supporting communities and state institutions on food security governance: All five communes participating in the programme activities regularly completed and provided monthly early warning reports at the end of the project. Additionally, 57% of the targeted communes were integrated into social and economic development plans. ARC targeted key institutions with an

advocacy paper and three research reports to inform policies around social protection, nutrition, and food security. The programme also supported updates to six municipal contingency plans and provided training to 135 local institutions on conflict mediation.

Best practices

- **Finding the right level of governance to support.** Supporting at the local level is not enough for a complex crisis. At the same time, a programme cannot replace the role of the state structures. Thus, developing advocacy at the national level for social protection required a profound understanding of governance dynamics and the systems in place.

Challenge

- **Sustainability** is a key concern in an unstable context in which local authorities do not have the means to continue these interventions beyond the three years of the programme.

Building infrastructures to support the provision of basic services

Strengthening the resilience of Malian communities has also involved supporting access to basic services, especially through the construction of infrastructures. The persistent weak presence of the Malian state in parts of the central and northern regions has resulted in limited access to basic social services for the population, increasing pressure on the limited number of services available to communities in the host areas.¹ In June 2021, an estimated 2.2 million people were estimated to need water and sanitation services, while 1.8 million people were lacking health services, in part due to degradation or lack of infrastructures.² EUTF-funded programmes in the country have mostly supported improved access to basic services for populations through the construction of infrastructures. As of June 2021, 2,338,889 people benefitted from improved access to basic social benefits, including 48,402 in S1 2021 alone (indicator 2.9). 87% of the S1 2021 beneficiaries were supported through the construction of infrastructures, the rest being cash transfers and training of service providers.

The national programmes SDNM2 (ML-04)³ and Diaspora Mali (ML-05)⁴ contributed the most to improving access to basic services in S1 2021. SDNM2, implemented by AFD, has built 127 infrastructures as of June 2021 (indicator 2.1 bis), servicing a total catchment area of 239,626 people. SDNM2 intervened in Gao, Kidal, Mopti, and Tombouctou. Diaspora Mali, also implemented by AFD and organised in cooperation with the Ministry for Malians Abroad, aims to catalyse and support investments from the diaspora into development projects in their regions of origin. The programme is currently co-funding 21 projects (indicator 3.1), of which three were completed in S1 2021. These three infrastructures (drinking water supply, vegetable garden and agronomic orchard, multifunctional cooperative) brought 20,750 people improved access to services, including 15,750 to water and sanitation services (indicator 2.9). Implementing partners report implementation difficulties in conflict-affected areas of Mali, with problems such as local distrust of the central government, reduced ability to supervise and limited local partners' capacity. On the first challenge, SDNM2 indicated that the fact that the project is carried by the regional councils and that local companies are doing the construction has facilitated acceptance in the communities.


¹ OCHA, 'L'accès aux services de base', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

² OCHA, 'Mali : Tableau de bord humanitaire au 30 juin 2021', August 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Sécurité et développement au Nord du Mali – Phase 2.

⁴ *Projet d'appui aux investissements de la diaspora malienne dans les régions d'origine.*

Figure 50: EUTF indicator 2.9, in Mali, June 2021



Supporting the construction of infrastructures also allows projects to bring short-term relief to vulnerable populations through cash for work activities. In S1 2021, 105 people were employed on Diaspora Mali construction sites, working for the equivalent of 18 full-time jobs (indicator 1.1).

Outcome analysis 4: RELAC II programme in Mali^{1,2}

RELAC II

Relance de l'Economie locale et Appui aux Collectivités dans le Nord du Mali

IP: LuxDev

Budget: €10M

From September 2016 to June 2019

Objective: Support stabilisation and reconstruction efforts in post-conflict areas through the improvement of basic service provision and economic opportunities.

Main targets

- Households, through support to their economic projects
- Municipalities, through the improvement of services to the population.

A final evaluation concluded that the RELAC II project overall objective was ambitious and complex in view of the institutional and security situation in the north of the country and the magnitude of the financial and social service needs.

Strengthening the local economy through micro-projects: The project financed 98 micro-projects for a total value of €3.2M. At the end of the project, 56.7% of the respondents in Gao and Tombouctou stated that they could not buy what they wanted at all or hardly at all, compared to 28.8% of micro-project beneficiaries. Additionally, the project supported three local operators to manage the micro-projects. According to indicators set by the project, the performance of the

¹ 'Rapport d'évaluation Finale - MLI/803 - Relance de l'économie locale et appui aux collectivités II', October 2019.

² Tounkara M. Haidara A., Coulibaly L., Sogoba A., 'Mission de suivi-évaluation finale du projet RELAC II dans la région de Toubouctou et Gao – Rapport Final', September 2019.

management structures, whose improvement was supposed to contribute to the betterment of the local economy, went from 1/10 to 5.2/10.

Best practice

- By **financing a variety of micro-projects**, the project contributes to diversifying production of rice, market garden produce, meat, and milk.
- **Beneficiaries' contributions** (in cash and in kind) for the implementation of micro-projects were a sign of the population's commitment to take over the management of investments in the future. Indeed, when beneficiaries participate in the actions, it is highly likely that they will commit themselves to the sustainability of the results.

Challenges

- **The management of the micro-projects** was not always conducive to their sustainability, particularly the distribution of revenues from micro-projects among participants.
- **Lack of intervention at the structural level** – the revival of the local economy requires the implementation of structuring programmes with substantial resources and the development of value chains that a single project cannot provide.

Enhanced capacity of supported communities to fulfil their mandates: Despite the equipment of local authorities, the rehabilitation of buildings and the strengthening of the capacities of elected officials and civil servants, the activities remained insufficient overall to enable local authorities to better fulfil their missions in service of the population. Indeed, local authorities must have their own resources to contribute sustainably to the financing of their social, economic, and cultural development plans and ensure the maintenance of their equipment and infrastructure. Beneficiaries reported a better perception of the level of accessibility of health services compared to non-beneficiaries at the end of the project (25.7% of beneficiaries reported that health services were not or not very accessible, compared to 39.8% of non-beneficiaries).

Best practices

- **Community anchoring of development actions** – this contributes to the sustainability of the project as does the involvement of stakeholders in the whole process of identification, formulation, and implementation of interventions.
- **Stakeholder training for sustainability and maintenance of infrastructures** – the project provided training for local elected officials and local government staff as well as for local artisan-repairers responsible for maintaining the equipment acquired under the project. Awareness-raising sessions were organised for local elected officials to make allocations for the renewal of equipment.

Challenge

- **The weak financial capacity of the communes to properly assume the competencies that have been transferred to them in the areas of education, health and water** – they had hardly collected any taxes since the onset of the crisis and were unable to make budgetary allocations to ensure the maintenance and renewal of equipment and infrastructure rehabilitated by the project.


Supporting community-based conflict prevention and resolution

In the first half of 2021, Mali's security situation remained critical, and violence increasingly extended to the community level. Since 2012, insecurity in Mali has included attacks by Islamist armed groups, ethnic self-defence groups, and Malian security forces. In 2021, violence in the area south and south-east of Mopti became increasingly community-based, and civilians, men and women

of all ages, were more frequently targeted based on their ethnicity alone.¹ In this context, rebuilding trust between populations, and between population and state institutions is key to the peace-making process.

In the first half of 2021, EUTF-funded programmes continued to support local civilian institutions and community representatives to increase opportunities for peaceful conflict resolution at the community level. As of June 2021, 5,939 staff have been trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights in Mali, including 2,090 in S1 2021 (indicator 4.2). Half of those trained in S1 2021 (1,097, 52%) were trained on civil registration by the PAECISIS programme (ML-08)² whose objective is to contribute to the universality of civil registry records by setting up a secure information and management system for use by administrations. This is critical to strengthen people’s rights to basic services as well as to strengthen governance, which are both key to avoiding marginalisation and community violence. 554 civil registrars and 503 community actors involved in the production of civil status records were trained in S1 2021. In addition, 40 court officials were trained, and the programme supported the local civilian institutions with 405 items of equipment during the same period (indicator 4.1bis).

Figure 51: EUTF indicator 4.2, in Mali, June 2021



In the first half of 2021, the second most common training topic was conflict prevention and peacebuilding, with 792 people trained. Most of these (423, 53%) were community representatives (including 39 women) trained by the PDU programme to be mediators. The role of these mediators is to support the peaceful resolution of farmer-herder conflicts. In June 2021, mediators in Mali resolved 19 conflicts, and helped recover and return 250 sheep and 6 camels to their owners. Such mediations are particularly important as property conflicts are often the root cause of inter-communal violence in Mali.³ In addition, PDU trained 300 community actors and civil authority representatives on regulatory texts related to local governance and 53 members of local civilian institutions on conflict sensitive and participatory approaches. The mediation approach to resolving micro-conflicts was complemented by larger reach awareness campaigns: 2,947 people participated in conflict prevention and human rights activities organised by PDU in S1 2021 (indicator 4.3). Notably, 43 peace clubs set up in S2 2020 to

¹ International Crisis Group, 'Reversing Central Mali's Descent into Communal Violence', 9 November 2020. Retrieved [here](#).
² Programme d'appui au fonctionnement de l'état civil au Mali : appui à la mise en place d'un système d'information sécurisé.
³ International Crisis Group, 2020. Op. cit.

strengthen community mechanisms for cohesion and conflict prevention (indicator 5.1) started their work in S1 2021 and sensitised 1,621 people on peacebuilding and conflict resolution.

5.7.2. MALI AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 9: EUTF common output indicators for Mali, June 2021

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	1,778	1,167	815	3,759	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	950	1,664	712	425	3,751	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	18,499	30,766	20,574	17,191	87,030	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET)...	3,689	5,511	5,998	2,272	17,470	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed,...	7	58	19	34	118	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	258	323	122	169	872	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	3,813	2,344	1,290	0	7,447	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	108,815	190,481	62,641	6,588	368,525	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	38,880	69,426	56,314	7,240	171,860	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	10	2	0	0	12	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	5,133	4,736	4,152	1,151	15,172	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	31,343	176,408	311,027	305,366	824,144	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	586	5,069	364	116	6,135	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	1,749,378	308,089	233,020	48,402	2,338,889	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	0	0	21	0	21	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs...	224	156	530	2,606	3,516	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	0	91,476	42,729	19,043	153,248	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	1,882	977	349	176	3,384	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	9,863	6,132	1,581	2,219	19,795	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	1,532	5,688	2,577	733	10,530	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	3	19	18	23	63	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	25	0	54	414	493	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	2	14	6	3	25	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	0	0	31	17	48	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	3	2	3	0	9	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	837	6	1,318	410	2,571	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	610	2,168	1,071	2,090	5,939	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	265	1,753	1,987	2,947	6,952	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	37	381	134	5	557	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	12	26	53	120	211	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	17	16	814	18	865	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	34	26	13	10	83	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created...	8	0	8	2	18	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	102,641	0	102,641	

5.8. MAURITANIA

5.8.1. MAURITANIA IN S1 2021

Figure 52: Mauritania – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021



This semester President Ghazouani's concluded his year-long presidency of the G5 Sahel, which saw the creation of the 'Coalition for the Sahel' framework for combatting terrorism in the region.¹ Though Mauritania has not witnessed any terrorist attacks since 2011, a hijacking attempt was prevented by security forces in Nouakchott Airport in March. The government of Mauritania has applied a holistic counter-terrorism approach to prevent and repress risk factors for crime and radicalisation.²

Measures to contain the spread of COVID-19 in Mauritania were gradually lifted from March 2021.³ Before the pandemic, Mauritania had reached its highest growth in a decade at 5.9%, but the COVID-19 crisis led to the country's first economic contraction since 2008.⁴ Though Mauritania's GDP fell by 1.5% in 2020,⁵ growth is projected to rebound to 2.8% in 2021 and 4.2% in 2022 as the pandemic subsides.⁶ Rebounds in the mining and non-extractive sectors indicate that a promising economic recovery is likely.⁷

Mauritania still contends with issues of poverty and food insecurity. About half of Mauritania's population experiences multidimensional poverty, and the country ranks 157th on the Human Development Index.⁸ Three-quarters of households in Mauritania reported a decrease in income in 2020.⁹ Droughts and the pandemic threaten food security, and 484,150 people were expected to be food insecure during the next lean season (June – August 2021).¹⁰

Mauritania is a transit point for migrants attempting to reach Europe via the Atlantic Route. Migrants are increasingly attempting this route, with 6,555 people arriving in the Canary Islands in the

¹ G5 Sahel, 'Les questions de la sécurité, de la stabilité et de l'annulation de la dette au centre de la visite du Président de la République à Bruxelles' January 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² Hassane Koné, 'Comment la Mauritanie échappe-t-elle aux attentats terroristes?', ISS Africa, 06/12/2019. Retrieved [here](#).

³ IOM, 'Mauritanie: COVID-19 – Restrictions de mobilité', Consulted September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ World Bank. 'Rapport sur la situation économique en Mauritanie', June 2021, Consulted September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ AfDB. 'Mauritania Economic Outlook', Consulted September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ World Bank. 'Rapport sur la situation économique en Mauritanie', June 2021, Consulted September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Ranking is 157/189 countries.

UNDP. 'Human Development Report 2020: Mauritania', Consulted September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


⁹ World bank. 'Rapport sur la situation économique en Mauritanie', June 2021, Consulted September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ WFP, 'Mauritania Country Brief, June 2021', Consulted September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

first half of 2021.¹ Deportation flights from the Canary Islands to Mauritania resumed in 2021,² which raised questions about whether these expulsions protected fundamental rights of migrants under international law and EU directives for returning third-country nationals.³ Once in Mauritania, expelled migrants are in some cases forcibly returned to the borders of Senegal and Mali.⁴ Mauritania continues to host the largest number of Malian refugees in West Africa. This year, the Government of Mauritania decided to include refugee households in the national Social Registry of Mauritania to allow eligible refugees to benefit from social protection programs.⁵

5.8.2. THE EUTF IN MAURITANIA

Figure 53: EUTF portfolio in Mauritania, June 2021^{6,7}



The EUTF contracted €77.3M in projects in Mauritania. Now that approximately three-quarters of this budget is spent, most projects are nearing the end of their implementation. Security, governance, and conflict prevention comprise 38% of these funds (SO4). The CORIM programme (MR-06)⁸ supports the government's strategy to prevent radicalisation, and the Nexus SRD programme (MR-08)⁹ supports Mauritania on governance for the security-resilience-development nexus. Another 35% of the budget is contracted to programmes supporting economic and employment opportunities (SO1). These programmes, notably SAFIRE and Promopêche (MR-07¹⁰ and MR-04,¹¹ respectively), aim to support job access and creation as well as technical training focusing on high-potential sectors such as fishing and construction.

¹ IOM, Garcia Borja, Merna Abdelazim, 'Migrant deaths on maritime routes to Europe in 2021', Consulted September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² Sophie Eastaugh, 'In Canary Islands, Tensions are High Over African Migration', NPR, March 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ European Parliament, 'Deportation flights from the Canary Islands to Morocco and Mauritania', March 2021, Consulted September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ MMC, Jessamy Garver-Affeldt, Mackenzie Seaman, 'A gateway reopens', February 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ UNHCR / WFP, 'Mauritania: Supporting inclusion of refugees in the national social safety net', March 2021, Consulted September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁷ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.


⁸ *Résilience pour la cohésion sociale et culturelle en République Islamique de Mauritanie*

⁹ *L'UE pour le nexus sécurité-résilience-développement en Mauritanie*

¹⁰ *Programme de renforcement de la résilience des communautés urbaines et rurales vulnérables en Mauritanie ;*

¹¹ *Promotion de l'emploi et amélioration des conditions de vie des pêcheurs artisanaux côtiers, jeunes et femmes aux alentours des espaces naturels protégés du secteur nord de Mauritanie; Création d'emplois décents et consolidation de l'emploi existant pour les jeunes et potentiels migrants dans le secteur de la pêche artisanale*

Figure 54: Selected EUTF outputs in Mauritania, June 2021¹



Generating economic opportunity and preventing conflict through support for MSMEs

Mauritania faces high youth unemployment (26%), a weak education system, and a large informal sector.² Improving the business climate and supporting MSMEs are priorities for tackling unemployment.³ EUTF-funded programmes supported 532 MSMEs (262 created and 270 supported) in S1 2021 (indicator 1.2), more than in any previous semesters.

MSMEs were supported with enterprise development support and training (48%), package support (33%) and access to finance (19%). SAFIRE (MR-07),⁴ PECOBAT (MR-01),⁵ and CORIM (MR-06)⁶ contributed to this indicator. A considerable portion of MSME creation this semester was driven by CORIM, which supported the creation of 254 MSMEs.

¹ Please note that results for indicator 3.2 do not include IOM Joint Initiative data.

² ILO, 'State of Skills: Mauritania', accessed October 2021. Retrieved [here](#). ; World Bank, 'Poverty & Equity Brief', October 2020. Retrieved [here](#).


³ World Bank, 'Mauritania: Transforming the jobs trajectory for vulnerable youth', November 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Programme de renforcement de la résilience des communautés urbaines et rurales vulnérables en Mauritanie

⁵ Amélioration de l'employabilité des jeunes et des capacités des PME par le développement du sous-secteur du BTP

⁶ Résilience pour la cohésion sociale et culturelle en République Islamique de Mauritanie

Figure 55: EUTF indicator 1.2, in Mauritania, June 2021



CORIM's work on MSMEs targeted former Salafist prisoners and their families, highlighting how improved economic opportunity reduces risks of radicalisation. This activity began as IGA support (indicator 1.3) for 491 people in S2 2020, out of which 254 beneficiaries were able to successfully transform their income generating activity into an enterprise in S1 2021 (indicator 1.2). CORIM also reported 74 people having found employment following professional training provided by the project (indicator 1.1). The link between socio-economic marginalisation and a propensity for violence or extremism is well researched,¹ and CORIM outlines alternative socio-economic opportunities as one of the building blocks for preventing violent extremism. CORIM held an international conference (indicator 5.4) with 70 members of NGOs from Morocco, Mali, and Mauritania to hold discussions around three pillars of countering violent extremism: using religious dialogues to counter extremist narratives, strengthening civil society to prevent violent radicalisation, and providing professional support to vulnerable groups.

In Mauritania, where the population is predominantly young and urban-dwelling, about 39% of youth are neither in education, employment, or training.² The SAFIRE programme seeks to improve the economic integration of vulnerable people who migrate to Nouakchott in search of better livelihoods. In S1 2021, OXFAM supported 235 MSMEs with training, financing, and mentoring. The programme also linked conflict prevention with livelihood improvements, as they sought to reinforce social cohesion between urban and rural youth. This year, they reached 792 young people by providing spaces for youth from Aioun, Nema, and Nouakchott to connect at a cultural festival (indicator 4.3).

A critical moment for migrants in transit through Mauritania

Migrants increasingly transit through Mauritania in an effort to reach Europe via the Atlantic Route, and most often fail to reach or are expelled from Spain. For migrants, this boat journey to the Canary Islands presents severe physical and psychological risks, as the Atlantic Route is the


¹ UNDP, 'Preventing violent extremism through promoting inclusive development, tolerance, and respect for diversity', 2016. Retrieved [here](#).

² World Bank, 'Mauritania: Transforming the jobs trajectory for vulnerable youth', November 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

deadliest maritime route to Europe.¹ Migrants arriving in Spain face insufficient screening and reception and lack legal support, which limits their access to asylum procedures.² Additionally, they are not systematically informed of their rights or avenues for requesting international protection.³ Mauritania is the only country for which Spain has a legal basis for deporting third-country nationals,⁴ and they have resumed deportation flights after a COVID-19 related pause.⁵

This semester, the EU-IOM JI Mauritania (MR-03)⁶ held three awareness raising events (indicator 3.11), bringing the cumulative number of people reached by information campaigns in Mauritania since the programme's inception to 22,220 (indicator 3.3).⁷ Because the Atlantic Route has recently regained popularity among migrants, it is important that people are aware of the immediate physical dangers and lack of human rights protection involved in this route.

Figure 56: EUTF indicator 3.2, in Mauritania, June 2021



The Nexus SRD programme (MR-08) assists the Mauritanian government on care and protection of migrants and supports the development of plans to operationalise the National Migration Management Strategy. **This semester, Nexus SRD (MR-08)⁸ provided urgent first aid to 308 migrants in transit** (indicator 3.2), which involved urgent medical triage and early referral for migrants, especially those intercepted or rescued at sea. The result constituted a 60% decrease compared to migrants in transit assisted during S2 2020, the first semester that the project was in implementation. IOM reported that there was a reduction in calls for assistance from December 2020, as more migrants were departing from Nouakchott and people making this shorter trip tended to have fewer medical and humanitarian

¹ MMC, Jessamy Garver-Affeldt, Mackenzie Seaman, 'A gateway reopens', February 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² MMC, Jessamy Garver-Affeldt, Mackenzie Seaman, 'A gateway reopens', February 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Ibid.

⁴ In 2003, Spain and Mauritania signed an immigration agreement that allows Spain to request that Mauritania readmit not only Mauritania migrants but also third country nationals. Global Detention Project, 'Mauritania', January/February 2021, Accessed October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ European Parliament, 'Deportation flights from the Canary Islands to Morocco and Mauritania', March 2021, Consulted September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ *Contribuer au renforcement de la gouvernance et de la gestion des migrations et des frontières, et faciliter la protection, le retour et la réintégration durable de migrants en Mauritanie*

⁷ Value for the number of people reached by information campaigns not provided for this semester (indicator 3.3).

⁸ *L'UE pour le nexus sécurité-résilience-développement en Mauritanie*

needs than those departing from Senegal. Nonetheless, the programme expected another spike in departures from August – September 2021 when the seas would be calmer.

One obstacle that Nexus SRD encountered when supporting migrants in transit was that IOM was unable to provide protection assistance in cases where migrants were taken directly to police stations where IOM's mandate does not allow intervention. This was often the case for migrants who did not require urgent medical assistance, and these detained migrants were deported without further assistance. Migrants have also documented cases of violence, extortion, and other mistreatment by Mauritanian authorities before or after the attempted crossing.¹

In general, the number of departures fluctuates in ways that are not well researched and are thus difficult to predict, which posed difficulties allocating budgets, according to IOM. **In S1 2021, Nexus SRD completed a study collecting data on the profile and presence of migrants in Nouakchott and Nouadhibou** (indicator 5.2). The programme also worked with the government to update a plan of action (indicator 4.6) for its national migration strategy, which was validated by civil society and the Ministry of Interior.

5.8.3. MAURITANIA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 10: EUTF common output indicators for Mauritania, June 2021


EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	46	325	1,939	629	2,938	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	18	465	532	1,016	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	5,160	7,678	4,205	2,328	19,371	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET)...	533	1,747	3,913	2,268	8,461	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed,...	0	0	2	0	2	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	4	11	47	9	71	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	404	204	334	92	1,034	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	3,098	40,332	587	44,017	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	0	5,422	13,367	5,116	23,905	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	8	12	14	0	34	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	87,260	298,839	4,207	390,306	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	0	170	14	122	306	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	0	2,100	0	2,100	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs...	1	826	1,603	308	2,738	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	6,550	14,120	1,550	0	22,220	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	910	2,525	374	198	4,007	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	11	12	8	21	52	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	10	7	0	19	36	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	15	76	44	0	135	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	65	773	50	0	888	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	3	0	3	6	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	13	30	7	3	53	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	2	2	0	0	4	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	31	0	1,379	52	1,462	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	223	339	972	666	2,200	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	15,250	511	72,038	9,780	97,579	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	39	10	17	16	82	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	26	122	8	156	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	13	6	269	4	292	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	5	32	32	3	72	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created...	9	0	1	1	11	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	35,207	4,889	40,096	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	6,662	2,921	9,583	
6.3 Number of entities benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	95	10	105	

¹ MMC, Jessamy Garver-Affeldt, Mackenzie Seaman, 'A gateway reopens', February 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

5.9. NIGER

5.9.1. NIGER IN S1 2021

Figure 57 : Niger – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021¹



Former interior minister Mohamed Bazoum was elected President of Niger in February 2021 with a majority of 55.75% of votes. While the opposition contested the results,² the constitutional court confirmed the election in March,³ and Bazoum was inaugurated in April, in what marked the first democratic transition of power since the independence of the country in 1958. In his inaugural speech, the new President stressed the importance of fighting terrorist groups from “neighbouring countries”.⁴

In S1 2021, almost four times more people were killed (724) in armed attacks than in the second half of 2020 (264).⁵ While conflict in Niger has been caused mostly by clashes between security forces and jihadist groups and was mainly seen as the result of a spillover of violence from Mali, recent reports suggest this might be changing as the conflict enters its tenth year. The region of Tillabéry is experimenting increased communal violence, as vigilante groups have started forming, which could lead to further ethnicisation of the conflict and an increase in casualties.⁶

Violence in Niger has caused further displacements of populations in the first half of 2021 and the country hosted 319,895 IDPs and 245,451 refugees in June 2021.⁷ The conflict and displacement crisis in Niger remained divided in two main zones: the Liptako-Gourma and the Lake Chad Basin. In Diffa, banditry and insurrection from northeast Nigeria has caused large amounts of violence and the region hosts 243,148 displaced people (refugees from Nigeria, returnees and IDPs). As the situation in the northwest of Nigeria has deteriorated, conflict has spread to the border Nigerien region of Maradi, which hosted 74,384 refugees and IDPs in July 2021. In the Liptako-Gourma, the Tillabéry and Tahoua regions hosted 57,320 refugees from Mali and 150,804 IDPs at the same date.

¹ FMPs are flow monitoring points managed by the IOM. There are seven FMPs in Niger.

² Jeune Afrique, ‘Présidentielle au Niger : Mahamane Ousmane conteste les résultats et revendique la victoire’, February 2021. Retrieved [here](#)

³ France 24, ‘Niger : l’élection de Mohamed Bazoum validée par la Cour constitutionnelle’, March 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Jeune Afrique, ‘Niger : investi président, Mohamed Bazoum dénonce la « barbarie » des jihadistes’, April 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


⁵ ACLED, ‘Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project dashboard’, consulted in September 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ ICG, ‘Murder in Tillabery: calming Niger’s emerging communal crisis’, May 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ UNHCR, ‘Operational data portal, Niger’, accessed in July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

5.9.2. THE EUTF IN NIGER

Figure 58: EUTF portfolio in Niger, June 2021^{1,2}



The EUTF in Niger has contracted 289.1M€ mainly to security, governance and conflict prevention-related (SO4) programmes (42%). Since December 2020, two programmes were contracted to support units in the Nigerien security forces, one multipurpose squadron in the national guard (EP-GNN, NE-16)³ and one joint investigation team for counter-terrorism operations (ECI CT, NE-15),⁴ built on the model of the joint investigation team for anti-smuggling and anti-trafficking operations (ECI, NE-05).⁵ The ECI CT is included in this report for the first time. The EUTF has also contracted €87.1M to programmes aiming to support employment and economic opportunities (SO1 – 30%). In Niger, most projects are planned to end in late 2021 or 2022 and 72% of the budget has already been spent. The DESERT project (NE-11-03, SO2),⁶ which aims to address climate and migration-related challenges through the creation of environmentally sustainable economic development, is included in this report for the first time.

¹ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

² This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implementing in the country.


³ Soutien à la création d'un escadron polyvalents de la Garde Nationale du Niger.

⁴ Création d'une Equipe Conjointe d'Investigation pour la lutte contre les réseaux criminels liés au terrorisme.

⁵ Création d'une Equipe Conjointe d'Investigation pour la lutte contre les réseaux criminels liés à l'immigration irrégulière, la traite des êtres humains et le trafic des migrants.

⁶ Création d'emplois et d'opportunités économiques à travers une gestion durable de l'environnement dans les zones de transit et départ au Niger.

Figure 59: Selected EUTF outputs in Niger, June 2021



Supporting communities in improving nutrition practices

In Niger, nutrition is a pressing issue, exacerbated by pandemics, climate disruptions (e.g. floods, droughts) as well as violence and displacement, which puts the resilience of populations at risk. In 2021, 2.2M people were estimated to need nutrition assistance in Niger.¹ Children and women are particularly impacted by malnutrition (respectively 65.3% and 64.8% of people in need).²

EUTF-funded activities in support of nutrition increased in S1 2021, mostly through the Shimodu and PDU programmes (NE-10 and REG-18, respectively). 3,318 people benefitted from nutrition assistance in the first half of 2021, a 93% increase from data reached at the end of December 2020 (indicator 2.3). In addition, 17,529 people were reached by nutrition-related resilience campaigns in S1 2021, representing 61% of the people reached by all resilience campaigns that semester (compared to 5% prior to December 2020, indicator 2.7). Finally, 2,500 service providers were trained in nutrition activities in S1 2021, accounting for 75% of the service providers trained in 2021 (compared to 35% prior to December 2020, indicator 2.8).

EUTF-funded programmes supported communities in preventing malnutrition through trainings and sensitisations. The activities implemented by EUTF-funded programmes in Niger followed the community-based nutritional approach, in which prevention and sensitisation on nutrition is facilitated by community representatives. The PDU programme created groups for nutritional learning (FARN)³ to identify and support households with good nutritional practices to train other members of the


¹ OCHA, 'Aperçu des besoins humanitaires, Niger', January 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ Foyers d'apprentissage et de réhabilitation nutritionnelle (FARN).

community. 1,158 people were trained in dietary practices through the FARN in S1 2021 (indicator 2.3). Similarly, in Diffa, Shimodu trained 2,108 women to form groups of volunteer women for nutrition (indicator 2.8).¹ These groups are linked to health centres and diffuse messages on nutrition in their villages. In S1 2021, the groups formed by Shimodu reached 3,596 people with messages on nutrition, infant feeding and family practices (indicator 2.7). The FARNs reached an additional 1,606 people in S1 2021 (indicator 2.7). PDU noted strong community adherence to the FARN system which allowed group members to be trusted to conduct screenings and refer children for treatments.

Figure 60: EUTF indicator 2.3, in Niger, June 2021



EUTF-funded programmes' activities to support nutrition practices also entailed improving detection and treatment. In S1 2021, PDU trained 4,138 women to screen their children for malnutrition (indicator 2.7). In addition to members of the community, 16 health agents were trained to improve their screening capacities (indicator 2.8). 1,258 people were screened for malnutrition in Niger in S1 2021, including 186 pregnant or lactating women (15%) and 1,072 (or 85%) children, all through Shimodu and PDU (indicator 2.3). In total, since the beginning of EUTF activities, 2,619 people have been screened for malnutrition in Niger.

Protecting migrants in transit and refugees in Niger

Niger is a country of transit for migration, situated along the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR) used by migrants heading to Libya and to Europe. The route is dangerous for vulnerable migrants, who are at risk of abuse along the way. According to a MMC survey, 18% of migrant respondents in Niger reported having been abused physically and 17% reported having been robbed.² **Since the beginning of EUTF-funded activities, 7,917 migrants and refugees have received protection assistance in Niger, including 4,451 people in S1 2021** (a 128% increase from numbers reached at the end of December 2020, indicator 3.2).³ Migrants in transit account for 97% of people protected in S1 2021, all of whom were reached by the Protection West Africa programme, which started activities in S2 2020 and aims to improve protection services for all vulnerable migrants along routes in the Sahel.

In S1 2021, all the 4,328 migrants in transit were assisted in Tahoua (indicator 3.2). Indeed, in Niger, the priority area of intervention for Protection West Africa is the Tahoua-Tchintabaraden-Abalak axis (Tahoua region). The route has seen an increase in movements in the last two years, because of

¹ *Groupes de femmes volontaires pour la nutrition (GFN).*

² MMC, 'A sharper lens on vulnerability (West Africa)', November 2020. Retrieved [here](#).


³ Results for indicator 3.2 (total of 7,917) do not include IOM data.

the drop in use of the Agadez route: the average daily number of travellers recorded by IOM in Tahoua reached 197 in June 2021, compared to 32 in December 2018^{1,2}.

The programme relies on the creation of mobile and fixed ‘safe points’ which provide services along the routes. Most beneficiaries (2,670) were provided with psychosocial assistance through fixed safe points habilitated as listening centres and 1,454 migrants were provided with medical assistance through mobile safe points. 60% of all the migrants assisted in S1 2021 were men (2,588 men; 1,740 women). While women on average report more protection incidents (of all types: extortion, physical abuse, kidnapping, sexual assault) than men,³ they also may be more likely to travel on less busy roads and thus miss protection services.

Despite the degrading security situation in Tahoua (where 186 fatalities were recorded in S1 2021),⁴ the programme has been able to implement activities through the national Red Cross, which benefits from longstanding relationships and presence within communities. In addition to allowing partners to operate in remote areas, the use of locally rooted NGOs enhances the trust of the migrant population, who often fear that accepting assistance from international humanitarian actors may lead to detention and deportation as they associate international actors with encouragement to return home.⁵

Figure 61: EUTF indicator 3.2, in Niger, June 2021



In addition to migrants in transit, 123 refugees and asylum seekers were assisted with refugee status determination in S1 2021 through the ETM programme (REG-04).⁶ The ETM has been organising the evacuation of refugees and asylum-seekers from Libya to Niger, where they transit in an emergency centre before being resettled. 342 evacuees from Libya departed the centre to be resettled during the period. As no evacuation flights were authorised to leave Libya in the beginning of 2021, the ETM also used its resources to support Sudanese refugees who had left Libya on their own and arrived in Agadez: 41 of them were submitted for resettlement in S1 2021.

¹ IOM, 'Flow monitoring report – Niger', December 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

² IOM, 'Flow monitoring report – Niger', June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ MMC, Op.Cit.

⁴ ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project dashboard', consulted in September 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ DIIS, 'Does information save migrant's lives?', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Enhancing protection, life-saving assistance and solutions, including resettlement for persons of concern with international protection needs in Libya and West Africa.

Outcome analysis 5: PAIERA programme (NE-08)^{1,2}

PAIERA programme		From February 2017 to March 2019	Main targets groups
 <p>Plan d'actions à impact économique rapide à Agadez</p>		<p>Objective: accompany the repressive and judicial measures of the Nigerien government on irregular migration by offering short-term economic opportunities to the population.</p>	 Former smugglers  Populations formerly benefitting more indirectly from the smuggling industry
 <p>IP: HACP (AGAPAIR), Karkara (PASSERAZ), CISP (EPPA)</p>			
 <p>Budget: €7.3M</p>			
<p>The region of Agadez, a once obligatory stop for migrants from West and central Africa towards Libya and Algeria (and onwards to Europe), has seen the number of migrants crossing daily decrease since the adoption of the Law Against Illicit Smuggling of migrants in 2016. The implementation of this law has affected not only the drivers and owners of “ghettos”, but also a broader part of the population that used to rely on the migration economy (e.g. transportation, money transfer, lodgings, food).</p> <p>IGA kits for the population (including for former smugglers as part of a reconversion plan): The economic situation of the beneficiaries of IGA kits has generally improved. Before the project, 86% of the beneficiaries of the PASSERAZ reported having to borrow money, while this number had fallen to 14% after the project ended. Beneficiaries also reported an increase in the stability of their situation: 79% reported their socio-economic situation as unstable prior to project and this number had fallen to less than 1% at the end of the project (73% of the beneficiaries reported that the IGA support was the main reason for the improvement of their economic stability). Among people specifically targeted by the reconversion plan (former actors of the migration industry, AGAPAIR), 79% of respondents indicated a will to remain in the activity supported by the project.</p> <p><i>Best practices</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Flexibility – the PASSERAZ project was able to redirect part of its budget towards the reconversion plan in support of AGAPAIR, which had used up its budget. • Trust in implementing partners – Prior to the project, the HACP (IP, AGAPAIR) had already gained the trust of important people in the migration sector, many of whom came into contact with the organisation while taking part in the Tuareg rebellion. • Involvement of local authorities – The programme’s relationship with local officials was complicated at first, as authorities believed that EU funds for reconversion would go to them rather than through outside organisations. However, involvement of authorities in all aspects of the project and renewed attention to transparency and communication allowed both parties to iron out their differences. <p><i>Challenges</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selection of beneficiaries – Committees that included representatives of both beneficiaries and authorities identified beneficiaries. This allowed a fair process but posed difficulties in accessing the “real” actors of migration. Some were prevented from applying (because they owned cars and were not considered ‘sufficiently’ vulnerable or because they were <i>de facto</i> 			

¹ The PAIERA programme comprised three projects: *Pilotage du Plan d'Actions à Impact Économique Rapide dans la Région d'Agadez* (AGAPAIR, NE-08-01), *Projet d'Appui à la Stabilité Socioéconomique dans la Région d'Agadez* (PASSERAZ, NE-08-02) and *Projet d'intégration économique et sociale des jeunes: Emploi pour le patrimoine d'Agadez* (EPPA, NE-08-03).

² This box relies on information from the evaluation of AGAPAIR (*'AGAPAIR – 1er bilan du Plan de reconversion*, July 2018), the evaluation of PASSERAZ (*'Rapport final d'évaluation externe du PASSERAZ'*, March 2019), from the midterm report of EPPA (*'Rapport narrative intermédiaire'*, June 2018) and from interviews conducted by the MLS in Agadez in October 2019.

criminals, while some feared the application process was a way for the authorities to arrest them.

- **Selection of IGAs** – 35% of beneficiaries reported issues in selling their products in their region. The second phase of the reconversion plan supported a revision of business plans for subsequent beneficiaries (project PASP), to ensure IGAs are better adapted to the needs of relevant areas. In the case of cultural IGAs (the EPPA project supported a revalorisation of craftsmanship in the region), once the CISP stopped commercialising the crafts and the project ended, beneficiaries had reduced access to quality materials and lost access to markets in Niamey.
- **Lengthy procedures** – There is a feeling that the time it took to start IGA support (almost one year passed between the beneficiary selection and the delivery of the first kits) was in part due to EU procedures, and reduced the time allocated to evaluations and studies at the end of the project.
- **Length of the project** – While it is understood that the PAIERA programme was meant as an emergency response, IPs felt it was too short to ensure a strong impact, and two out of three projects required an extension. While PAIERA was meant to bring short-term relief, the *Stabilisation Agadez* programme was built as a more long-term programme meant to continue the reconversion plan and facilitate long-lasting socio-economic changes in the region. Delays in the beginning of the three follow-up projects (one is not yet contracted and two were contracted only in September 2019) has also undermined the results of the PAIERA programme.

5.9.3. NIGER AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 11: EUTF common output indicators for Niger, June 2021

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	4,831	4,550	8,260	2,495	20,136	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	91	127	668	280	1,166	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	5,940	5,337	8,277	3,216	22,771	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET)...	6,110	7,875	3,767	1,927	19,679	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed,...	0	212	72	11	295	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	26	30	21	10	87	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	62	852	748	519	2,181	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	1,020	6,339	4,365	4,049	15,773	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	184	3,373	3,318	6,875	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	70,386	123,818	125,002	52,146	371,352	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	4,680	82,855	13,470	1,893	102,898	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	3,669	196,775	28,631	229,075	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	651	1,426	1,408	3,331	6,816	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	144,191	266,542	210,119	91,228	712,080	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs...	1,642	1,165	659	4,451	7,917	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	263,488	199,745	8,806	24,775	496,814	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	24,468	14,166	7,497	3,531	49,662	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	5,219	1,643	864	79	7,805	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	285	487	529	432	1,733	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	45	14	10	5	74	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	639	672	291	204	1,806	
3.8 Number of people of concern benefitting from evacuation and resettlement...	2,915	1,395	583	98	4,991	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	6	4	4	14	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	9,233	2,996	22	0	12,251	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	10	0	0	14	24	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	489	1,082	1,433	10,025	13,029	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	1,607	1,768	803	1,135	5,313	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	395,666	78,233	49,516	115,419	638,833	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	7	40	16	12	75	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	46	40	88	47	221	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	48	58	451	17	574	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	29	18	14	1	62	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created...	8	7	5	3	23	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	3,713	1,570	5,283	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	867	625	1,492	
6.3 Number of entities benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	20	0	20	

5.10. NIGERIA

5.10.1. NIGERIA IN S1 2021

Figure 62: Nigeria – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021



In S1 2021, Nigeria's security situation worsened and was marked by the killing of Boko Haram leader by ISWAP. There were 1,027 armed attacks causing 4,767 fatalities in the first half of 2021, respectively representing a 29% and a 94% increase from S2 2020.¹ Attacks were deadlier as bandits became more radical in the northwest and central regions and increased cooperation with armed fighters in the northeast, leading the military to renew its operation in these regions.² On 19 May, Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram's long-time leader, died during a clash with the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).³ Given Boko Haram's preference for attacking civilians, as opposed to ISWAP's focus on government and foreign targets, his death may be a relief to many north-eastern Nigeria residents.⁴ Yet, as of June 2021, the number of violent events perpetrated against civilians had not decreased.⁵

Given the continued insecurity in the first half of 2021, the number of IDPs and refugees from Nigeria further increased. As of June 2021, there were almost 2.9 million internally displaced people in Nigeria, 70% of whom were in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (BAY) states.⁶ The number of Nigerian refugees in the three neighbouring countries of Niger, Chad and Cameroon reached 322,000 (compared to 304,252 at the end of 2020).⁷

The ongoing armed conflict combined with the economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic further exacerbated the humanitarian needs of vulnerable populations. As of June 2021, an estimated 8.7 million people (out of 13.1 million inhabitants) needed humanitarian assistance in the

¹ ACLED, Retrieved [here](#).

² Al Jazeera, 'Dozens dead after deadly attacks in northeast Nigeria', September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ BBC, 'Abubakar Shekau: Nigeria's Boko Haram leader is dead, say rival militants', 7 June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ CSIS, 'Boko Haram's Leader Is Dead: What Are the Humanitarian and Security Implications?', 15 June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ ACLED, Retrieved [here](#).


⁶ UNHCR, 'Nigeria: All population Snapshot', July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Ibid.

BAY states.¹ Food insecurity and malnutrition also worsened, especially in the BAY states, where the number of food insecure people reached 9.2 million in May 2021.²

5.10.2. THE EUTF IN NIGERIA

Figure 63: EUTF portfolio in Nigeria, June 2021^{3,4}



The EUTF has contracted 125.6M€ in Nigeria, mostly to security, governance and conflict-prevention (SO4, 56%) and resilience (SO2, 32%) related programmes. Notably, €49.5M (39% of the total budget) was allocated in 2020 to SO4 to support UNDP’s implementation of the One UN Response Plan (NG-09)⁵. The MCN (NG-03)⁶ is also contributing to SO4, bringing the EUTF budget in this area to €70.5M. €39.6M are allocated to strengthening the resilience of communities and the most vulnerable (SO2), with the ongoing RRR programme representing half of this budget. Programmes such as LRRD NG (NG-01)⁷, ISING (NG-02)⁸ and PSS (NG-06)⁹, which are now completed, also contributed to address the basic needs crisis in the BAY states (SO2). Additionally, 12% of the Nigerian contracted EUTF budget is allocated to the EU-IOM Joint Initiative (NG-04),¹⁰ which contributes to migration management (SO3). Most ongoing projects are approaching the final stages of implementation, and it is estimated that 18% of EUTF budget in Nigeria are yet to be spent.

¹ OCHA, ‘North-East Nigeria: Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states - Humanitarian Dashboard – January to June 2021’, July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² CILSS, ‘Cadre Harmonisé d’identification des zones à risque et des populations en insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle’, April 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁴ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁵ EU Support to the United Nations ‘One UN Response Plan to COVID-19 in Nigeria’.

⁶ Enhancing state and community level conflict management capability in North Eastern Nigeria.


⁷ Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development and promoting the stability and safety of communities in displacement in North East Nigeria.

⁸ Investing in the Safety and Integrity of Nigerian Girls.

⁹ Strengthening Psychosocial Support, Mental Health, Reintegration and Protection Services for children in Borno, including children associated with Boko Haram.

¹⁰ Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants in Nigeria.

Figure 64 : Situation in Nigeria and EUTF outputs – as of June 2021



Addressing the worsening food security crisis in Nigeria

In the first half of 2021, food insecurity increased in Nigeria and especially in the BAY states as insecurity and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic persisted. In May 2021, *Cadre Harmonisé* data indicated 9.2 million people were food insecure in Nigeria (IPC¹ phases 3-4).² This figure is the highest in the Sahel and Lake Chad region, and all the region's zones in crisis (phase 4) are in Borno.³ The elevated level of malnutrition is largely accentuated by limited availability of food stocks and restricted access to functional markets and water, health and sanitation services.

In the first half of 2021, the EUTF-funded programme RRR (NG-07)⁴ supported vulnerable inhabitants of Borno with a wide range of food security-related assistance. In S1 2021, 158,373 people benefitted from food security-related assistance, reaching 785,144 since the beginning of EUTF-funded programmes (indicator 2.4). All S1 2021 beneficiaries were assisted by RRR. The programme, which is implemented by FAO, WFP and UN Women, aims to sustainably improve production and mitigate agro-pastoral risks through the development of small- and family-scale farming. Most of these beneficiaries were households' members provided with quality agricultural inputs (147,127, 43% women). This activity is particularly relevant in Nigeria, where agriculture is primarily rainfed and characterized by low productivity, low technology, and high labour intensity.⁵ The rest of the

¹ Integrated Food Security Phase Classification

² CILSS, '*Cadre Harmonisé d'identification des zones à risque et des populations en insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle*', April 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


³ Ibid.

⁴ EU Support to Response, Recovery and Resilience in Borno State.

⁵ International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, '*Synthesis Report of the Nigeria Zero Hunger Strategic Review*', 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

beneficiaries benefitted from livestock distribution (10,266) or were supported through the establishment of fish processing units (980). As the programme strives to not only bring relief to populations but also development, these actions were complemented with the creation of market linkages and the improvement of knowledge around agriculture. As such, in S1 2021, 141 MSMEs were equipped with processing equipment (indicator 1.2), and 150 NGO staff and community members were trained on delivering simple animal health services, including 28 women (indicator 2.8).

Figure 65: EUTF indicator 2.4, in Nigeria, June 2021



In S1 2021, RRR and the One UN Response Plan (NG-09) also aimed to strengthen vulnerable Nigerian households' resilience to food insecurity through the provision of cash transfers. Food prices further increased in S1 2021, causing damage to the purchasing power of vulnerable households. As of June 2021, the food minimum expenditure basket value had increased by over 20% from September 2020. In this context, the Nigerian Food Security Cluster recommended to increase cash transfers for food for vulnerable households.¹ 208,366 people received improved access to basic social benefits in S1 2021, all of them through cash transfers (indicator 2.9). This included 125,507 people receiving unconditional cash grants of NGN 5,000 (USD \$13) from the One UN Response Plan. Preliminary observations from the programme indicated that beneficiaries used their cash transfers mostly on food items, health care, and basic home preservation. As the programme mostly operates around Lagos, it was able to rely on banks to transfer the money, which helped increase both financial inclusion and literacy. The remaining 82,859 beneficiaries received cash transfers ranging from €85 to €140 from RRR to support their provision of farming and agricultural inputs. However, the lack of mobile infrastructure, new policies around SIM registration, and administrative requirements to open bank

¹ World Food Programme, 'Nigeria Situation Report #65', July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

accounts delayed the transfers, preventing the project from synchronising them with the rest of the assistance provided by the programme.

Outcome analysis 6: I-SING programme in Nigeria¹

I-SING		Main targets
 Investing in the Safety and Integrity of Nigerian Girls	 From September 2016 to January 2019	 Displaced or vulnerable adolescent girls and boys  Community leaders, government actors, and service providers
 IP: Mercy Corps	 Objective: Improve the safety, livelihoods and personal agency of adolescent girls in northeast Nigeria	
 Budget: €3.5M		

The final evaluation of the ISING programme suggests that concrete improvements can be attributed to the programme intervention. Notable findings include:

Sexual health of boys and girls: The programme aimed to improve sexual and reproductive health and knowledge through the creation of safe space groups for girls and for boys, the training of female and male mentors and the creation of an adapted curriculum on life skills. The endline evaluation noted a positive evolution in egalitarian indices (from 2.48 to 2.57 from baseline to endline), with girls and boys benefitting from I-SING expressing more egalitarian ideas. Besides, girls and boys were twice more aware of the existence of HIV/AIDS² after following the I-SING curriculum (44% to 86% correct answers for boys from baseline to endline, 47% to 87% correct answers for girls from baseline to endline). While the endline notes an increase in knowledge about pregnancy and menstruation (17% to 31% correct answers for boys from baseline to endline, 36% to 50% correct answers for girls from baseline to endline), these values are considered low, possibly reflecting taboos about sexual activity.

Best practice

- **Using mentors and coordinators as cornerstones of the safe space model** – the programme hired and trained 693 female mentors and coordinators, and 291 male mentors and coordinators. It was reported that all the actors involved were satisfied with the fact that groups of boys were guided by male mentors and groups of girls by female mentors, and that the enthusiasm and commitment of mentors played an important role in the success of the programme.

Challenges

- **Targeting IDPs** – the programme noted that it was difficult to conduct safe space sessions with adolescents from displaced families because schools did not allow them to come and participate in the session as they weren't enrolled. To overcome this challenge, the government addressed schools and explained the projects and its goals.
- **Targeting girls** – the focus on girls created some inter-family conflicts, as households with more than one daughter were prioritised while households with boys could not participate.

Creating a supporting environment for adolescent girls: I-SING engaged community leaders, government actors and service providers in activities related to protection issues faced by adolescent girls. I-SING was effective in promoting a supportive environment with community members and service providers. However, it is also reported that valuable actions, processes, and achievements reached were not properly monitored and evidenced: there was a lost opportunity to show some results from I-SING.

¹ Blas C., Ruiz Vallejo F., Rueda Gómez M., Acharya D., 'Evaluation report – Investing in the Safety and Integrity of Nigerian Girls – Mercy Corps Nigeria', April 2019.

² Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome

Best practices

- **Relying on community structures** – advisory committees played a fundamental role in supporting I-SING activities.

Challenge

- **Project calendar not aligned with seasons** – the rainy season was considered an obstacle preventing beneficiaries from participating in some activities and hindering monitoring. The evaluation team recommended taking into consideration the seasons and other weather restrictions for the schedule of activities in the future.


Promoting peace through community dialogue and sensitisation

As the security situation remained highly volatile in the northeast, addressing divisions through dialogue and mediation activities to stabilise communities remained a priority for the government and for the EUTF in S1 2021. As of June 2021, 120,293 people had participated in conflict prevention and human rights activities organised by EUTF-funded programmes, including 16,061 in S1 2021 (indicator 4.3). In the first half of 2021, the main contributor to this indicator remained the MCN (NG-03), with 10,945 participants. The RESILAC programme (REG-05)¹ contributed the remaining outputs. In S1 2021, activities remained mostly implemented in Borno (65%) and Yobe (34%), which are at the epicentre of the conflict.

In the first half of 2021, MCN conflict-prevention activities focused on community dialogues and civil mediation activities, while RESILAC engaged in awareness raising. In S1 2021, MCN engaged 10,322 people in community dialogues, while its remaining 173 beneficiaries were involved in civil mediation activities through various platforms such as Community Peace and Safety Partnerships at local councils (indicator 4.3), for which 201 staff have been trained in S1 2021 in all three BAY states (indicator 4.2). The programme aims to enhance communities' resilience to conflicts by engaging and training traditional rulers and leaders to ensure that informal conflict resolutions mechanisms are properly functioning. In 2020, RESILAC developed guidelines on raising awareness on social cohesion and living together. Activities subsequently implemented in 2021 allowed for the sensitisation of 5,566 people. As in S2 2020, awareness-raising activities implemented in the first half of 2021 were adapted to comply with COVID-19 related social distancing measures. RESILAC awareness raising therefore consisted of the broadcast of 12 radio episodes open to calls from listeners in Hausa and Kanouri, door-to-door sensitisation and sketches. The programme reported being able to reach double its initial targets thanks to these adaptations.

¹ RESILAC – Redressement économique et social inclusif du Lac Tchad.

Figure 66: EUTF indicator 4.2, in Nigeria, June 2021



5.10.3. NIGERIA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 12: EUTF common output indicators for Nigeria, June 2021

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	4,575	75	0	0	4,650	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	257	27	37	141	462	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	17,101	5,511	5,386	252	28,250	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET)...	774	1,322	286	24	2,406	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	12	0	0	0	12	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	431	24	1	2	458	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	186,085	315,828	67,028	5,491	574,432	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	0	10,000	0	10,000	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	170,961	200,430	255,380	158,373	785,144	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	0	600	740	0	1,340	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	114,224	9,388	#####	93,700,931	#####	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	5,624	1,774	404	220	8,022	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	169,560	17,965	118,327	208,366	514,218	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	1,196	10,415	55,316	3,193	70,119	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	0	0	7	5	12	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	11,451	4,450	920	817	17,638	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	5,203	4,773	1,267	486	11,728	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	0	3	0	3	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	45	46	91	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	41	71	12	124	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	10	65	129	149	353	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	4	17	3	0	24	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	0	60	0	60	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	9,093	4,612	3,248	552	17,505	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	24,587	16,939	62,706	16,061	120,293	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	9	2	6	1	18	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	33	1	23	0	57	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	16	12	4	2	34	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	28	9	6	0	44	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	10,769,181	1,973,249	12,742,430	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	425,784	0	425,784	
6.3 Number of entities benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	502	215	717	

5.11. SENEGAL

5.11.1. SENEGAL IN S1 2021

Figure 67: Senegal – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021



Unprecedented protests erupted in March 2020 over calls for more social justice after the arrest of Ousmane Sonko, main political opposition figure and leader of PASTEF.¹ His supporters and members of civil society claimed that his arrest was orchestrated with intent to exclude him from the next presidential elections.² As a result, protests erupted in Dakar and other cities across the country against what was perceived as an attack on democracy, resulting in the death of at least eight people.³ The Government suspended two public TV channels for 72 hours due to their coverage of the issue and warned public media against “biased coverage of a nature to instigate hatred and violence”,⁴ further exacerbating tensions.

Although socio-political motives motivated the protests, their scale and intensity suggest that economic hardship is a deeper issue driving discontent. In 2020, Senegal's GDP increased by only 1.5%, compared to 4.4% the year before.⁵ COVID-19 measures severely affected vital sectors of the Senegalese economy, such as tourism and its auxiliary activities.⁶ The particularly hit youth was overwhelmingly represented in the protestants that took over the streets in March 2021. Following the protests, President Macky Sall announced in his message to the nation on 8 March that he would reduce measures in place. He completely lifted the curfew and the nation-wide state of emergency on 19 March.⁷ In April, the President also announced the creation of the *Programme d'Urgence pour L'Insertion Socio-économique et l'Emploi des Jeunes*⁸ in response to the protests.

The economic situation led to an increase in departures on the Atlantic Route and repressive measures from the Government on migrant smuggling. In May 2021, for the first time in Senegalese history, a man was charged for smuggling migrants and sentenced to two years in prison for organising

¹ *Patriotes du Sénégal pour le travail, l'éthique et la fraternité*, or Patriots of Senegal for work, ethics and fraternity

² Sonko was allegedly accused of raping a woman in a massage parlour and threatening her. He was arrested along with members of his party in March 2021 on his way to the tribunal for 'public order offence' and 'unauthorised protest'.

³ Amnesty International, 'Sénégal. Appel à manifester après la mort de huit personnes la semaine dernière : les forces de sécurité doivent faire preuve de retenue', March 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Présidence du Sénégal, 'Communiqué du gouvernement', March 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ RFI, 'Le FMI débloque 650 millions de dollars pour soutenir l'économie du Sénégal', May 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Ibid


⁷ TV5 Monde, 'Sénégal : la levée de l'état d'urgence sanitaire accueillie avec soulagement', March 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Emergency Program for Socio-Economic Integration and Youth Employment

the crossing of Doudou Faye, a 14-year-old boy who died trying to reach the Canary Islands by boat in October 2020,¹ after the boy's father testified to having paid the smuggler to transport his son.²

5.11.2. THE EUTF IN SENEGAL

Figure 68: EUTF portfolio in Senegal, June 2021^{3,4}



The EUTF has contracted €165.4M to Senegal, 56% of which goes to employment-related projects (SO1), followed by security, governance and conflict-prevention (SO4 – 22%) and migration-related projects (SO3 – 17%). The EUTF aims to create economic opportunities and jobs, as well as support populations' resilience to food and nutrition insecurity through food diversification initiatives and access to basic services, notably with the *Développer l'Emploi au Sénégal*,⁵ PARERBA,⁶ PASPED⁷ and PACERSEN⁸ programmes (SN-04, SN-08, SN-09 and SN-05, respectively). It also aims to assist returning migrants and support their sustainable reintegration with the Migration SN programme (SN-06). In Senegal, preventing irregular migration, smuggling of migrants and human trafficking are also priorities which are supported by the *Etat Civil SN* and POC programmes (SN-07 and SN-10, respectively), which pertain to SO4. Most of the EUTF contracted budget in Senegal (80%) has been spent and it is estimated that 20% are yet to be spent by 2024.

¹ RFI, 'Sénégal : un passeur jugé dans l'affaire « Doudou Faye » condamné à deux ans de prison', May 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² Doudou Faye's father was sentenced to two years in prison for endangering the life of others in December 2020. See MLS Annual Report 2020 for more information.

³ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁴ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implementing in the country.


⁵ *Développer l'emploi au Sénégal : renforcement de la compétitivité des entreprises et de l'employabilité dans les zones de départ*.

⁶ *Projet d'Appui à la Réduction de l'Emigration rurale et à la Réintégration dans le Bassin Arachidier par le développement d'une économie rurale sur base des périmètres irrigués*.

⁷ *Programme de contraste à la migration illégale à travers l'appui au Secteur Privé et à la création d'emplois au Sénégal*.

⁸ *Projet d'Appui à la réduction de la migration à travers la Création d'Emplois Ruraux au Sénégal*.

Figure 69: Selected EUTF outputs in Senegal, June 2021



Understanding the migration phenomenon in its multi-dimensional nature

Senegal is both a country of origin and transit for irregular migration. In the first semester of 2021, Senegal had one of the highest departure rates for irregular migration in S1 2021.¹ Most potential migrants are Senegalese and nationals from other ECOWAS countries who can transit through Senegal without a visa to embark on the Atlantic Route (from the Senegalese coast to the Canary Islands) or over land via Libya and other crossing points.

Trust Fund programmes aim to prevent irregular migration by sensitising potential migrants on the risks of irregular migration and informing them about existing alternatives and professional opportunities. In total, 1,373,023 potential migrants were reached by EUTF-financed sensitisation campaigns (indicator 3.3), including 670,445 in S1 2021. This was largely driven by the *Développer l'Emploi au Sénégal* programme (SN-04),² which had reached 1,361,959 potential migrants as of June 2021, including 665,130 in S1 2021. The *Tekki Fii*³ initiative ran radio broadcasts and communication caravans throughout the country to sensitise potential migrants and their families on the risks of irregular migration but also to inform them on existing opportunities in their region of residence where departure rates are the highest.⁴ In total, *Tekki Fii* held 121 events in S1 2021 on awareness-raising (indicator 3.11), bringing the total events since the beginning of activities in Senegal to 660. Another 2,596

¹ FRONTEx, 'Migratory Map', consulted in October 2021.

² *Développer l'emploi au Sénégal : renforcement de la compétitivité des entreprises et de l'employabilité dans les zones de départ.*

³ "Succeed here" in Wolof.

⁴ *Tekki Fii* operates in Kédougou, Kolda, Louga, Matam, Saint-Louis, Sédhiou, Tambacounda and Ziguinchor.

potential migrants were reached this semester through awareness-raising events organised through the EU-IOM Joint Initiative.

The EUTF helps local authorities to dismantle migrant smuggling networks. The POC programme (SN-10),¹ which aims to prevent irregular migration, smuggling of migrants and the trafficking in persons in Senegal, supports national authorities with capacity building: 596 justice officials, national security forces and members of national civil institutions have been trained (indicator 4.2) as of June 2021, including 455 in S1 2021. The programme works closely with national counterparts, most importantly the *Division nationale de Lutte contre le Trafic de Migrants* (DNLT),² created as a specialised unit within the Senegalese border police in 2018. The DNLT has been active in fighting migrant smuggling and human trafficking, preventing irregular departures on the Atlantic Route, as well as in dismantling fraudulent documentation networks. In February 2021, a network was dismantled in France after authorities identified false Senegalese documentation.³ 255 of the 596 agents trained by POC were sensitised on documentary fraud, including 144 in S1 2021.

The migration phenomenon in Senegal is also characterised by the existence of a large diaspora. There are officially 533,000 of Senegalese outside Senegal, mainly in Europe (France, Italy, Spain) and in West Africa (Mauritania, The Gambia),⁴ but unofficial estimates range between 2.5 and 3 million across the globe.⁵ The diaspora is a driving force of the country's socio-economic development: their remittances account for close to 10% of GDP.⁶ Their recognition is a priority for the Senegalese Government, which aims to involve Senegalese abroad in national development efforts by disseminating productive investment opportunities.⁷

EUTF-funded programmes in Senegal aim to harness the potential of the diaspora by facilitating their investments. Senegalese migrants often face difficulties investing back home, because of distorted perceptions of the business environment, a lack of knowledge of investment opportunities in the country, and difficulty in accessing/preserving land. Promoting their economic investment therefore requires specific support. In S1 2021, the Migration Senegal programme (SN-06)⁸ helped the diaspora carry out 44 projects in Senegal (indicator 3.1) which resulted in 24,189 persons benefitting from improved access to basic services (indicator 2.9, 62% of the total since the beginning of EUTF-funded activities in the country). The programme is implemented by the AFD and co-managed by the Senegalese Government and aims to help the diaspora in Europe (France, Italy, Belgium and Spain) invest in health, water and education projects in their regions of origin. Projects are first selected by an online selection platform, and then benefit from technical and financial support during launch and implementation.⁹

Initiatives are developed at the regional level, in areas that are at cross-roads of migration issues. In 2014, President Macky Sall went on an economic tour in the Senegal River region and encouraged the Government and diaspora associations to reinforce their productive investments in job-creating sectors.¹⁰ In Matam, located in the Senegal River region near the Mauritanian border, 16,765 people benefitted from improved access to health and education services (indicator 2.9) from projects carried out by the diaspora through Migration Senegal during the first semester of 2021, over twenty times more than during S2 2020. The President also identified the region of Casamance as a 'priority' for diaspora investments. In Kolda, in Upper-Casamance, 1,128 people received improved access to

¹ *Partenariat opérationnel conjoint de lutte contre l'immigration irrégulière et le trafic de migrants et de la traite des êtres humains au Sénégal.*

² National division against the smuggling of migrants.

³ Le Figaro, 'Démantèlement d'un trafic d'immigration irrégulière et d'escroquerie dans le Grand Est', February 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ IOM & ANSD, 'Profil Migratoire 2018', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ EU, 'Convention de délégation', 2017.

⁶ EUDI, 'Diaspora engagement mapping – Senegal', 2020.

⁷ Government of Senegal, 'Plan Sénégal Emergent', 2014. Retrieved [here](#).


⁸ *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Sénégal et accompagnement des investissements de la diaspora sénégalaise.*

⁹ Capitalising on the platform set up by the World Bank during a Business Plan contest in Senegal.

¹⁰ Senegalese Government, 'Conseil des Ministres du mercredi 12 novembre 2014', 12 November 2014. Retrieved [here](#).

education services in S1 2021 (100% of the total since inception) through diaspora investments. Lastly, in Tambacounda, where poverty rates can reach 92% (in Ndogo Babacar, for instance),¹ 6,296 people benefitted from improved access to health, water and education services in S1 2021.

Figure 70: EUTF Indicator 2.9, in Senegal, June 2021



Intervening in rural areas to promote job creation and facilitate access to water

In Senegal, rural areas have some of the highest poverty and unemployment rates in the country. In spite of positive growth rates over the last years, progress has been uneven. According to a national survey conducted in late 2020 by the National Statistics and Demography Institute, employment is at 48% in urban areas compared to 37% in rural areas.² Whilst agriculture is a major employment source in the country, it continues to be dominated by informal jobs (64% of total jobs in rural areas),³ and the stakes are high for the Senegalese Government to create attractive and productive employment to maintain labour force in rural areas, including young people.

EUTF-funded programmes aim to help provide decent employment and income generating opportunities for the inhabitants of rural areas. The PARERBA programme (SN-08),⁴ which aims to develop the rural economy, has contributed to the creation of 5,132 jobs as of June 2021 (indicator 1.1), including 982 in S1 2021 – a significant increase from 178 in S2 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic had slowed down the programme’s activities. It also assisted 72 people to develop income generating activities in S1 2021 (indicator 1.3). In Senegal, gender disparities persist, with 56% of men being employed compared to 31% of women.⁵ The PARERBA programme also targeted gender, with over 52% of all jobs and 40% of income generating activities created by the programme held by women. Additionally, 27 MSMEs were created and supported (indicator 1.2) by the programme through support to micro-entrepreneurship and vegetable/rice production in S1 2021, 20% of the total achieved since the beginning of implementation. Similarly, the PACERSEN programme (SN-05),⁶ which aims to reduce migration through the creation of employment in rural areas, contributed to the creation of 557 jobs in S1 2021 (36% of the total since the beginning of EUTF-funded operations), almost all of which involve

¹ ANSD, *Cartes de pauvreté 2011*, 2011. Retrieved [here](#).

² ANSD, *Enquête nationale sur l'emploi au Sénégal, quatrième trimestre 2020*, January 2021. Retrieved [here](#)

³ Ipar, *L'agriculture une alternative pour que le chômage des jeunes ne continue d'être une bombe à retardement*, April 2015. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ *Projet d'Appui à la Réduction de l'Emigration rurale et à la Réintégration dans le Bassin Arachidier par le développement d'une économie rurale sur base des périmètres irrigués*.

⁵ ANSD, 2021. op. cit.


⁶ *Projet d'Appui à la réduction de la migration à travers la Création d'Emplois Ruraux au Sénégal, par la mise en place de fermes agricoles villageoises et individuelles*.

permanent or long-term employment in agriculture, fishing and livestock production and processing, and helped develop 596 income generating activities in Q1 2021.

Agriculture is the main economic activity in rural areas, but access to water for irrigation is a challenge. In Senegal, the exploitation of water resources for agricultural purposes uses over 93% of the available fresh water but access and management of water has become increasingly problematic in recent years.¹ This scarcity is particularly acute in the *zone du bassin arachidier*,² characterised by high population densities in large urban centres but also by intensive agricultural activities.³

In the *zone du bassin arachidier*, EUTF-funded programmes facilitate households' access to water. In S1 2021, 330 hectares of land benefitted from sustainable management practices (indicator 2.6), entirely through PACERSEN and PARERBA, a 175% increase compared to what was achieved in S2 2020. Both programmes operate in the *zone du bassin arachidier*. PACERSEN works towards the construction of agricultural farms (which include hydraulic infrastructure) and supports individual and village farms. PARERBA works to set up irrigated areas but also supports the creation of micro-enterprises in agri-business and professional training services for the youth. As a result of both programmes' efforts, 20,520 people received food security-related assistance (indicator 2.4) in S1 2021, compared with 1,582 in S2 2020. Most (86%) of the support provided in S1 2021 was in the form of improved irrigation or water access.

Figure 71: EUTF Indicator 2.6, in Senegal, June 2021



¹ Enabel, 'De l'eau pour l'agriculture – Sénégal', consulted in October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² The *zone du bassin arachidier* ('groundnut basin') extends across Diourbel, Fatick, Kaffrine, Kaolack and Thiès.

³ EUTF, 'Fiche d'action, projet PARERBA', consulted in October 2021.

RSAN Matam		Main targets	
 <p>Projet de renforcement de la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle dans la région de Matam</p>	 <p>Budget: €1.1M</p>	 <p>Adults from poor households</p>	 <p>Children and teenagers</p>
 <p>From January 2017 to April 2019</p>	 <p>IP: ACTED</p>	 <p>Children under five</p>	
 <p>Objective: Strengthen food and nutritional security of very poor households in the Matam region</p>			
<p><i>RSAN Matam aimed to strengthen the food and nutritional security of very poor households in the Ferlo and Diéri zones of the Matam region. It closely links agriculture and nutrition and bases its operations on the four pillars of food security: availability, access, quality of food and regularity.</i></p> <p>Findings of report evaluation indicate that target groups and beneficiaries benefitted from strengthened access, availability and diversity of foods consumed in rural areas. RSAN Matam also disseminated knowledge to the communities about good nutrition practices through initiatives that permitted to increase production for self-supply and nutritional diversity (for instance, through the development of vegetable growing and awareness-raising initiatives).</p> <p>Overall indicators. The individual food diversity score for pregnant and lactating women reached 14% against an initial target of 70%. This is due to the fact that pregnant and lactating women follow a specific diet (see last section of the box) that is highly nutritive but that does not guarantee high diversity of food products consumed. In addition, the percentage reached for the indicator average increase of individual food diversity score of beneficiaries was at 24% at project closing, below the target of 70%. The target was not reached because the baseline (score of 5.5 food groups) was already well above the acceptable threshold (between 4 and 4.5). As such, an increase of 70% would have meant that beneficiaries reached a score higher than 9, which is unlikely given the context in the Matam region.</p> <p>Increasing availability and access to foods to very poor households: by April 2019, the project had provided subsidised food acquisitions to 3,300 poor households, which had a usage rate of 100%. Of these recipient households, 40% increased food production after the first agricultural campaign, which is below the 70% target. The project, however, surpassed their 50% target for beneficiaries reporting improved agricultural production, (68% reported an increase during the lifetime of the project). Additionally, 13% of beneficiaries reported an increase in the surface cultivated (30% target). One concerning result, at the end of the project, households reported having had to deal with less food supply (instead of more), mostly due to climate constraints (see in the Challenge section below).</p> <p>Best practices</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The support and widening of a network of service providers (APS)³ allowed to ensure the availability of inputs for 3,300 farmers in the area. APSs played a major role in subsidising agricultural inputs and tools for very poor households during the rainy season; they strengthened the capacities of producers in cultivation techniques. • Involving communities and local authorities to identify active community initiatives to improve the quality of nutrition, for instance by involving women's groups, major actors in promoting local development. 			

¹ *Projet de renforcement de la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle dans la région de Matam (RSAN Matam).*

² *Rapport narratif final – projet RSAN Matam*, 2020.

³ *Agents Prestaires de Service – service providers*

Challenge

- **Climate constraints, including low rainfall, especially in the years 2017-2018.** This explains why the coping strategies index, instead of dropping, saw an important increase. Households adapted by adopting strategies to ensure they were able to receive some level of food consumption necessary for their subsistence. It also contributed to households not being able to increase their agricultural production after the first agricultural campaign.
- The indicator on *percentage of beneficiaries benefitting from an increase in the surface cultivated* was reported at 13% during a survey conducted, compared to a target of 13%. The reason for that lies in the fact that (i) households did not have sufficient manpower to work the land (79% of households) or (ii) financial resources (54%) in order to be incentivised to increase the surface of work. At project closing, a recommendation was made to conduct awareness-raising with local actors to encourage young people to be more active in agriculture.

Supporting food initiatives in rural areas: 30 village initiatives were supported materially and accompanied. The initial target of 80% share of initiatives with a clearly identified impact on the nutritional quality of the diet of its holders was not met.

Best practices

- **Capacity building and technical support.** The local village initiatives received support from an ASDEN¹ engineer. The recruitment of an additional assistant to the technical coordinator allowed to strengthen the support provided.

Challenge

- **Complexity of indicator formulation.** The indicator 'share of initiatives with a clearly identified impact on the nutritional quality of the diet of its holders' includes characteristics such as the quality of the food for an individual person; the food production process; and the way revenues of each initiative are being directed. For the indicator to be met, all characteristics had to be validated, but looking at individual sub-characteristics revealed that an adequate diet has in fact been met.

Promoting food diversity: the project improved 625 households' access to gardening equipment and seeds for land exploitation. RSAN Matam also enhanced good nutritional practices by communicating key messages around good practices to beneficiaries. At project close, 82% of the beneficiaries knew three key messages in terms of nutritional practice and good hygiene. Additionally, 73% of the beneficiaries reported an increase in the production of their market gardens from the first market gardening season. Thirty village initiatives were supported materially and accompanied, although the project reached 20% of initiatives with a clearly identified impact on the nutritional quality of the diet of its holders, below the 80% target.

Challenge

- **Prevailing local practices.** Practices linked to cultural realities (such as a diet based on porridge and rice for women who just gave birth) was a barrier to the adoption of more diverse nutritive practices.

¹ Association pour le développement de Nguendar et villages environnants

5.11.3. SENEGAL AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 13: EUTF common output indicators for Senegal, June 2021

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	553	3,344	9,102	5,568	18,567	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	1,688	1,146	4,218	524	7,576	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	6,207	7,356	3,194	743	17,501	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET)...	9,757	7,109	2,505	237	19,609	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	6	11	7	0	25	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	3	56	13	27	99	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	5,378	2,781	304	0	8,463	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	67,575	327,702	168,358	0	563,635	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	23,153	20,052	15,709	20,520	79,434	
2.5 Number of insitutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	0	40	0	0	40	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	23	658	588	330	1,600	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	42,939	104,275	208,407	0	355,621	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	194	1,997	99	0	2,290	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	2,400	10,737	15,933	24,189	53,259	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	19	36	15	44	114	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs...	0	0	442	1,272	1,714	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	103,918	506,419	92,241	670,445	1,373,023	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	0	7	119	30	156	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	3,104	789	371	619	4,883	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	1,139	1,043	18,287	2,053	22,522	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	8	0	0	8	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	147	160	71	378	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	36	50	41	127	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	221	73	548	121	963	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	34	0	702	155	891	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	150	50	141	455	796	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	8	28	10	8	54	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	44	9	6	59	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	8	9	3	2	22	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	14	5	16	1	36	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	84,525	0	84,525	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	252,686	0	252,686	
6.3 Number of entities benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	93	0	93	

5.12. THE GAMBIA

5.12.1. THE GAMBIA IN S1 2021

Figure 72: The Gambia – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021



President Adama Barrow officially launched his political party, the National People's Party (NPP) on 30 January 2021, sending a strong signal about his participation in the December 2021 presidential elections. Upon running for office in 2016, Adama Barrow had said he would serve only a three-year transitional term and would not complete the five-year mandate, which reportedly helped him win the elections in December 2016 despite being mostly unknown by the Gambians.¹

The pandemic severely affected socio-economic indicators in the country, particularly due to the drop in activity in the tourism sector, lifeblood of the Gambian economy. The COVID-19 pandemic led The Gambia's GDP to contract by an estimated 2.4% in 2020, after growing 6.2% in 2019, and contributed to the loss of around 20,000 jobs.² Tourism (around a third of the GDP)³ was one of the most hardly hit sectors due to travel restrictions. Women, who are overwhelmingly represented in the tourism sector, were disproportionately affected.⁴ Real GDP is projected to grow by 3.2% in 2021.⁵

In early 2021, new evidence linked former President Yahya Jammeh to the killing of West African migrants in the country in 2005. Fifty-nine migrants from Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo aiming to reach Europe by the sea through The Gambia were allegedly killed by "Junglers", a military unit receiving orders from the former president.⁶ From 24 February to 11 March 2021, witnesses testified before the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission, accusing Yahya Jammeh of orchestrating the killings. The Gambia remains both an origin and a transit country for irregular migrants in the region.⁷

¹ Africanews, 'Gambian President Adama Barrow Officially Launches His Political Party', January 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² African Development Bank, 'Gambia Economic Outlook', consulted in August 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Bloomberg, 'Gambia's Record Remittances Make Up for Tourism Losses, IMF Says', February 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ The Point, 'Untold stories of women affected by covid19 in tourism', April 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


⁵ African Development Bank, 2021. Op. Cited.

⁶ HRW, 'Gambie : L'ancien président impliqué dans le meurtre de 59 migrants', March 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, 'Study on Migration Routes in West and Central Africa', October 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

5.12.2. THE EUTF IN THE GAMBIA

Figure 73: EUTF portfolio in The Gambia, June 2021^{1,2}



The EUTF has contracted €37.4M to The Gambia, of which employment-related projects (SO1) account for 90%, followed by migration-related projects (SO3 – 10%). Through the YEP (GM-01)³ and MIITG (GM-03)⁴ programmes, the EUTF aims to create economic opportunities and jobs, particularly for the youth and people in rural areas. The EU-IOM Joint Initiative in The Gambia (GM-02) provides post-arrival support and reintegration assistance to returning migrants and raises awareness on the risks of irregular migration.⁵ Projects in The Gambia are nearing the later phases of implementation, and it is estimated that 15% of EUTF contracted budget in the country are yet to be spent.

¹ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.


² This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implementing in the country.

³ Youth Employment Project

⁴ Building a future - Make it in The Gambia

⁵ European Commission. 'EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, The Gambia'. Retrieved [here](#).

Figure 74: Selected EUTF outputs in The Gambia, June 2021



Creating employment for the Gambian youth as alternatives to migration

The Gambia's economy relies on tourism and agriculture, two sectors that are highly vulnerable to external shocks. Unemployment rates are high. According to the latest Gambian Labour Force Survey in 2018, unemployment rate was at 35.2% in 2018.¹ Youth are particularly affected, with youth unemployment rates standing at 41.5% as of 2018.²

Lack of job opportunities contributes to high migration rates within and outside The Gambia. About a quarter of the Gambian population are internal migrants who move to Banjul in search of job opportunities or to embark on an external migration journey.³ Overall, external migration rates from The Gambia also remain high, although arrivals of irregular Gambian migrants in Europe have decreased since 2015-2016. In S1 2021, there were 125 reported arrivals of Gambians to Europe.⁴ As a comparison, 163 arrivals of Senegalese nationals were reported during the same time period,⁵ even though Senegal's population is eight times larger. Lack of work accounts for 81% of reasons for external migration, and lack of work associated with irregular migration for 60% of all departures.⁶

EUTF-funded programmes in The Gambia support the development of the local economy through job creation and vocational training / skills development. In The Gambia, the absence of skilled labour and the weakness of links between skills development and the labour market hinder youth employability. The MIITG (GM-03)⁷ and YEP (GM-01)⁸ programmes work to develop technical and vocational skills for young people in order to improve their employability and self-employment prospects. To address the skills gap, YEP and MIITG develop the capacity of professional centres and strengthen existing technical and vocational skills programmes to match the needs of businesses in

¹ The Gambia Bureau of Statistics, 'Gambia Labour Force Survey', consulted in October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Frontex, 'Detections of illegal border-crossings statistics', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Ibid.


⁶ The Gambia Bureau of Statistics. op. cit.

⁷ Building a future - Make it in The Gambia.

⁸ Youth Employment Project.

specific sectors. As of June 2021, 5,244 young people have benefitted from TVET training and/or skills development (indicator 1.4), including 625 in S1 2021 (including 44% women), and 1,976 jobs have been created (indicator 1.1). The programmes aim to link the training, including in entrepreneurship, to starting a business or an income generating activity, which helps make the technical training more attractive. As a result, 2,065 income generating activities (indicator 1.3) were supported in S1 2021, 62% of beneficiaries being women, and 959 MSMEs were created or supported (indicator 1.2)

Figure 75: EUTF Indicator 1.4, in The Gambia, June 2021



Increasing efforts in the fight against COVID-19 as vaccination rollout remains slow

Over a year after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in the country in March 2020, the situation seems to be under control, but low vaccination rates call for caution. As of June 2021, the country had lifted most restrictive measures and the spread of the virus seemed to be under control: there were 2,279 additional contaminations in S1 2021, compared with 3,748 new contaminations in S2 2020.¹ Nevertheless, vaccination rates were very low, with less than 50,000 doses administered² and the country running out of its limited vaccine stocks.³

EUTF initiatives in The Gambia intensified their efforts to support the fight against COVID-19. In S1 2021, 1,548 people directly benefitted from COVID-19 activities (indicator 6.2), a 214% increase compared to the results reported for S2 2020, and 80,114 COVID-19 pandemic-related supplies were provided and/or distributed (indicator 6.1), compared with 51,820 in S2 2020. The distribution of supplies was largely conducted by YEP, which produced and distributed 80,000 facemasks. The programme supported seven technical and vocational training institutions in the country to produce the facemasks and helped the Gambia Standards Bureau provide the inspection and certification of the facemasks. As part of the production process, young people were temporarily employed in the TVET institutions, and tailoring students were also able to benefit from an opportunity for on-the-job training.

¹ Our world in data, 'Coronavirus source data', consulted in October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² Reuters, 'Covid-19 tracker', consulted in October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Bloomberg, 'Gambia Says It's Run Out of AstraZeneca's Covid-19 Vaccines', June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

5.12.3. THE GAMBIA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 14: EUTF common output indicators for The Gambia, June 2021

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	370	1,681	1,514	1,976	5,542	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	335	306	1,633	959	3,233	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	1,770	2,956	3,114	2,065	9,905	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET)...	767	2,877	955	625	5,224	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed,....	0	5	8	4	17	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	0	0	7	4	11	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	0	21	42	52	115	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	0	241,939	5,450	247,389	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	0	42	257	51	349	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	688	2,400	760	3,848	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs...	0	0	69	409	478	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	8,775	73,378	97,530	210,756	390,439	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	0	3	2	3	8	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	3,440	729	217	405	4,791	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	2,028	1,324	835	257	4,445	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	120	153	273	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	10	5	0	15	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	65	208	292	82	647	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	4	1	1	0	6	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	4	4	3	0	11	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	0	0	1	0	1	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	1	7	2	10	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	112,796	80,114	192,910	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	40,744	1,548	42,292	
6.3 Number of entities benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	402	738	1,140	

CONCLUSIONS


The situation in the SLC region kept deteriorating in the first half of 2021 as the insecurity that has been affecting the Liptako-Gourma and the Lake Chad Basin for a decade intensified and expanded to other regions. Displacement figures further increased, and the two areas hosted almost 1M refugees/asylum seekers and 4.6 million IDPs at the end of the semester. Mass displacement, combined with the effects of climate change, endemic poverty and the consequences of the COVID-19-related preventive measures resulted in a rising number of people in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, reaching 21.3 million by June 2021.

THE EUTF PORTFOLIO IN S1 2021

The EUTF contracted portfolio in the SLC window grew by 5% in S1 2021 in number of projects and 4% in funding, from 193 operational contracts worth €1.90B at the end of 2020 to 202 contracts worth €1.98B in September 2021. The Trust Fund reached its peak in spending during the first half of 2020, but a significant amount of budget remains to be implemented.

New projects were contracted to cover all Strategic Objectives. Six additional projects were contracted to support governance, peace and security (two in Burkina Faso, two at the regional level, one in Niger and one in Guinea); and another two contracts were signed to support the resilience of populations (both at the regional level). One project was signed to support the fight against smuggling of migrants in Senegal (contributing to SO3), and one project was signed to support the recovery of companies in the wake of COVID-19 in Côte d'Ivoire (contributing to SO1).

The EUTF also reacted to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on SLC countries by reorienting some of its funding towards the COVID-19 response. In total, 59 projects redirected funds, accounting for €99.8M towards a COVID-19 response; 56 projects had implemented COVID-related activities as of end June 2021 (up from 53 in S2 2020).²



THE MLS

This report is the outcome of the eighth round of data collection conducted by the MLS team for the EUTF's SLC window. In 2020, the MLS shifted from a quarterly to a biannual reporting schedule, initially to accommodate the methodological changes process conducted in 2020, and later to make room for other complementary work streams that aim to support the EUTF and the EU in the medium- to long-term future. The format of this report largely follows the S1 2020 report, which adopts a more narrative approach compared to earlier quarterly reports by linking project outputs to contextual data.

Data collection for the S1 2021 report lasted from the end of August to the end of September 2021. In addition to the standard data collection requests, IPs were asked to update their COVID-19 budget and response data when relevant. A number of IPs also provided the MLS team with more qualitative

¹ Estimates based on known contracts' budget, start and end dates. Only contracted and operational projects are included.

² The 59 projects with funds allocated to the COVID-19 response and 56 projects with COVID-19-response outputs are not necessarily the same projects, as some projects have reported COVID-19-response outputs but not reallocated funds and some projects with funds allocated to the COVID-19 response have not yet generated COVID-19-related outputs that are relevant to the EUTF indicators.

information on programme implementation, which allowed to add further qualitative details and explanations to the data collected.

This report includes data for 178 projects, a number that has been gradually increasing from 71 projects in the first report for 2018, to 129 at the end of 2019 and 166 at the end of 2020.

S1 2021 KEY ACHIEVEMENTS

Substantial outputs were reported against all Strategic Objectives in S1 2021.

- **Economy and employment:** The EUTF supported the creation of 14,335 jobs in the SLC region in S1 2021, for a total of 88,062 jobs created or supported since the beginning of activities (indicator 1.1). In addition, 39,414 people benefitted from assistance to income generating activities (indicator 1.3), and 19,187 people benefitted from TVET and/or skills development (indicator 1.4). 3,318 MSMEs were also created or supported in S1 2021 (indicator 1.2). Finally, 77 business and productive infrastructures were built or rehabilitated in the first half of the year (indicator 1.5).
- **Resilience:** EUTF-funded programmes supplied 378,542 people with food security-related assistance (indicator 2.4) and 107,284 with nutrition assistance (indicator 2.3) in S1 2021. EUTF-funded programmes also supported the delivery of 12,668 basic social services (indicator 2.2), improved access to basic services for 449,012 people (indicator 2.9) and built or rehabilitated 948 social infrastructures (indicator 2.1 bis) in S1 2021.
- **Migration:** EUTF-funded activities assisted 4,096 voluntary returns and humanitarian repatriations (indicator 3.4), supported 9,761 returnees with post-arrival assistance (indicator 3.5) and 9,059 with reintegration assistance (indicator 3.5 bis) in S1 2021. EUTF-funded programmes also provided assistance or protection to 22,860 migrants in transit, refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs in S1 2021 (indicator 3.2). To improve migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination, programmes also provided capacity building or operational support to 32 institutions and non-state actors (indicator 3.6) and 1,798 staff (indicator 3.7) in S1 2021. 1,952,811 migrants and potential migrants were reached by campaigns on the risks of irregular migration in the first half of the year.
- **Governance, security and conflict prevention:** EUTF-funded programmes supported the drafting of 128 laws, plans and policy documents aimed to support governance and policymaking efforts in S1 2021 (indicator 4.6). Furthermore, 265,651 individuals participated in peacebuilding activities centred around social cohesion, conflict resolution and management in S1 2021 (indicator 4.3). EUTF-funded programmes also delivered conflict prevention- and security-related training to 9,601 staff and members of key actors involved in social cohesion and peace dynamics in the first half of the year (indicator 4.2). Finally, 18 infrastructures were built (indicator 4.1) and 10,668 pieces of equipment (indicator 4.1 bis) provided to support governance and security in S1 2021.
- **COVID-19 response:** To mitigate the impact of the pandemic in the SLC region, 2,061,929 COVID-19 supplies were provided with EUTF funding in S1 2021 reaching a total of 13,527,846 since the beginning of the pandemic (indicator 6.1). Furthermore, 188,910 individual beneficiaries and 974 entities benefitted from specific COVID-19 response activities in S1 2021, for a total of 935,197 and 2,095 respectively (indicators 6.2 and 6.3).

6. INDEX

6.1. TABLES

Table 1: Projects newly added to the MLS for the S1 2021 report, June 2021	11
Table 2: EUTF common output indicators for all SLC projects, June 2021	19
Table 3: EUTF common output indicators for Burkina Faso, June 2021	52
Table 4: EUTF common output indicators for Cameroon, June 2021	58
Table 5: EUTF common output indicators for Chad, June 2021	67
Table 6: EUTF common output indicators for Côte d'Ivoire, June 2021	71
Table 7: EUTF common output indicators for Ghana, June 2021	76
Table 8: EUTF common output indicators for Guinea, June 2021	82
Table 9: EUTF common output indicators for Mali, June 2021	92
Table 10: EUTF common output indicators for Mauritania, June 2021	98
Table 11: EUTF common output indicators for Niger, June 2021	105
Table 12: EUTF common output indicators for Nigeria, June 2021	112
Table 13: EUTF common output indicators for Senegal, June 2021	121
Table 14: EUTF common output indicators for The Gambia, June 2021	126

6.2. FIGURES

Figure 1: Contracted budget breakdown by country and Strategic Objective, September 2021	5
Figure 2: Projects eligible for outcome analysis, October 2021	9
Figure 3: Projects and budget covered by the current S1 2021 MLS report, June 2021	11
Figure 4: Evolution of projects and budgets covered by the MLS in SLC, September 2021	13
Figure 5: EUTF SLC contracted projects by budget and implementation status, September 2021	14
Figure 6: Budget distribution by country and implementing partner, September 2021	15
Figure 7: Contracted budget breakdown by Strategic Objectives, September 2021	16
Figure 8: Budget allocated to the COVID-19 response in the SLC, June 2021	17
Figure 9: Strategic Objective 1 dashboard, SLC, June 2021	20
Figure 10: Strategic Objective 2 dashboard, SLC, June 2021	26
Figure 11: Food security situations in the SLC region in January – May 2020 & 2021	28
Figure 12: Strategic Objective 3 dashboard, SLC, June 2021	31
Figure 13: Strategic Objective 4 dashboard, SLC, June 2021	35
Figure 14: EUTF indicator 4.2, security forces, SLC, June 2021	38
Figure 15: COVID-19, key facts and figures dashboard, SLC, June 2021	40
Figure 16: Burkina Faso – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021	44
Figure 17: EUTF portfolio in Burkina Faso, June 2021	45
Figure 18: Selected EUTF outputs in Burkina Faso, June 2021	46
Figure 19: EUTF indicator 2.4, in Burkina Faso, June 2021	47
Figure 20: EUTF indicator 4.2, in Burkina Faso, June 2021	50
Figure 21: EUTF indicator 3.2, in Burkina Faso, June 2021	51
Figure 22: Cameroon – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021	53
Figure 23: EUTF portfolio in Cameroon, June 2021	54

Figure 24: Selected EUTF outputs in Cameroon, June 2021	55
Figure 25: EUTF indicator 1.1, in Cameroon, June 2021	56
Figure 26: EUTF indicator 3.5, in Cameroon, June 2021	57
Figure 27: Chad – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021	59
Figure 28: EUTF portfolio in Chad, June 2021	60
Figure 29: Selected EUTF outputs in Chad, June 2021	61
Figure 30: EUTF indicator 1.4, in Chad, June 2021	62
Figure 31: EUTF indicator 4.2, in Chad, June 2021	64
Figure 32: EUTF indicator 2.4, in Chad, June 2021	65
Figure 33: Côte d'Ivoire – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021	68
Figure 34: EUTF portfolio in Côte d'Ivoire, June 2021	69
Figure 35 : Selected EUTF outputs in Côte d'Ivoire, June 2021	69
Figure 36: EUTF Indicator 3.2, in Côte d'Ivoire, June 2021	70
Figure 37: Ghana – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021	72
Figure 38: EUTF portfolio in Ghana, June 2021	73
Figure 39: Selected EUTF outputs in Ghana, June 2021	74
Figure 40: EUTF indicator 1.3, in Ghana, June 2021	75
Figure 41: Guinea – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021	77
Figure 42: EUTF portfolio in Guinea, June 2021	78
Figure 43: Selected EUTF outputs in Guinea, June 2021	79
Figure 44: EUTF indicator 1.4, in Guinea, June 2021	80
Figure 45: EUTF indicator 2.3, in Guinea, June 2021	82
Figure 46: Mali – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021	83
Figure 47: EUTF portfolio in Mali, June 2021	84
Figure 48 : Situation in Mali and EUTF outputs – as of June 2021	85
Figure 49: EUTF indicator 2.4, in Mali, June 2021	86
Figure 50: EUTF indicator 2.9, in Mali, June 2021	89
Figure 51: EUTF indicator 4.2, in Mali, June 2021	91
Figure 52: Mauritania – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021	93
Figure 53: EUTF portfolio in Mauritania, June 2021	94
Figure 54: Selected EUTF outputs in Mauritania, June 2021	95
Figure 55: EUTF indicator 1.2, in Mauritania, June 2021	96
Figure 56: EUTF indicator 3.2, in Mauritania, June 2021	97
Figure 57 : Niger – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021	99
Figure 58: EUTF portfolio in Niger, June 2021	100
Figure 59: Selected EUTF outputs in Niger, June 2021	101
Figure 60: EUTF indicator 2.3, in Niger, June 2021	102
Figure 61: EUTF indicator 3.2, in Niger, June 2021	103
Figure 62: Nigeria – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021	106
Figure 63: EUTF portfolio in Nigeria, June 2021	107
Figure 64 : Situation in Nigeria and EUTF outputs – as of June 2021	108
Figure 65: EUTF indicator 2.4, in Nigeria, June 2021	109
Figure 66: EUTF indicator 4.2, in Nigeria, June 2021	112
Figure 67: Senegal – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021	113
Figure 68: EUTF portfolio in Senegal, June 2021	114

Figure 69: Selected EUTF outputs in Senegal, June 2021.....	115
Figure 70: EUTF Indicator 2.9, in Senegal, June 2021.....	117
Figure 71: EUTF Indicator 2.6, in Senegal, June 2021.....	118
Figure 72: The Gambia – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2021	122
Figure 73: EUTF portfolio in The Gambia, June 2021.....	123
Figure 74: Selected EUTF outputs in The Gambia, June 2021	124
Figure 75: EUTF Indicator 1.4, in The Gambia, June 2021	125
Figure 76: Spending of EUTF SLC funds	127