THE EUROPEAN UNION EMERGENCY TRUST FUND FOR STABILITY AND

ADDRESSING THE ROOT CAUSES OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND

DISPLACED PERSONS IN AFRICA

Action Fiche for the implementation of the Horn of Africa Window
T05-EUTF-HOA-KE-34

1. IDENTIFICATION

Title/Number	Kenya-EU Partnership for the implementation of the Kenya CVE strategy
Total cost	Total estimated cost: EUR 5 500 000 Total amount drawn from the Trust Fund: EUR 5 500 000
Aid method / Method of implementation	Direct Management - Direct grant with the National Counter Terrorism Centre of Kenya Service contracts for monitoring, evaluation and audits
DAC-code	150	Sector	Multi-sector

2. RATIONALE AND CONTEXT

2.1. Summary of the action and its objectives

This action contributes to the **EU Trust Fund (EUTF) objective (4)** improved governance and conflict prevention; it is also aligned with the **Valletta Action Plan priority domain (1)** on the development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement. The action complies with the EU and Kenya's commitment to the Counter Terrorism (CT) related **UN Security Council resolutions** and conventions as well as the UN action plan on preventing violent extremism.

The **geographical scope** of the action is country wide with emphasis on recruitment zones. These locations are areas where the vulnerabilities and risks are significant. The choice of location for activities will be informed by research as well as early warning and response opportunities and will also take into account initiatives undertaken under other programmes, assessing whether more (or less) should be done in those zones.

This project is seen by both the EU and the Government of Kenya as instrumental in strengthening their security and development partnership. A direct engagement on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) issues is expected to elevate the EU-Kenya relations to a more strategic level, whilst at the same time lending to the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC or the Centre) the vast expertise gained by the EU in CVE. The proposed action is the first direct targeted support of its kind through which the EU will entrust a Kenyan institution to carry out activities addressing violent extremism. This is considered necessary for the efficiency

and sustainability of CVE approaches, which otherwise run the risk of remaining fragmented.

The **intervention logic** of the action is that if the partnership between the EU and Kenya also focuses on and is geared towards the transformation of the Kenyan approach to CVE, it will deliver a more transparent, accountable, inclusive and integrated approach to violent extremism, and therefore the risks and negative implications of violent extremism on national and regional security and stability will be reduced. By addressing sources of grievances, such whole-of-society approach to violent extremism would also contribute to the reduction of primary and secondary movements caused by instability and conflict, and to greater security in, amongst others, refugee-hosting communities.

It is based on two main assumptions: (1) if the Centre, as the body mandated with the coordination of the implementation of the national CVE Strategy, is strengthened, the country will be better equipped to prevent and counter violent extremism in an efficient and sustainable way, doing no harm and respecting human rights; and (2) if key state and nonstate actors accept favouring peaceful and political solutions to grievances, and recognise the importance of working together to further develop Kenya's security, then there will be a reduction in existing violence, and a reduced risk of instability.

The **overall objective** of the action is the operationalisation of the recently adopted Kenya National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism with particular emphasis on preventative aspects.

The **specific objective** of the action is that the Centre fulfils its mandate of coordinator of all actors involved in the implementation of the strategy, to deliver a transparent, accountable, inclusive and integrated approach to CVE, which respects human rights and is conflict- sensitive.

2.2. Context

2.2.1. Country context

Kenya is regarded as the economic powerhouse of East Africa, and more generally considered a beacon of stability in the wider Horn of Africa region. Under the surface, however, a number of issues are brewing that may pose challenges to the long-term stability of the country and its neighbours. The general challenges of income inequality, youth unemployment, and the impact of climate change can easily combine with perceived tribalism, corruption, impunity, and a number of unresolved historical grievances to fuel unrest. The upcoming elections in August 2017, as the political highlight of the year, might create opportunities for exploitation by violent groups. In addition, the regional situation exposes Kenya to large inflows of refugees and the threat of mutating terrorist groups including Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda and Daesh.

Across East Africa more broadly, challenges and conflicts have long been interlinked with the Somali Islamist extremist group Al-Shaabab as the force promoting violence in the region. Al-Shabaab emerged as the most militant faction of the Islamic Courts Union in 2006 and has since expanded beyond its traditional battleground in Southern Somalia. It has done so largely by extending its focus and operations across Kenya, particularly since 2011 when Kenyan troops were deployed to Somalia to suppress it.

Al-Shabaab's aims in Kenya have not always been clear or explicit. In its early years, the group's activities in the Somali-dominated northeast and in Nairobi's slums appeared to support the end goal of a caliphate in Somalia. To this end, its growing fundraising and support networks drew on strong cross-border ethnic ties and a Kenyan history of grievances. However, since Kenya's deployment to Somalia and former leader Ahmed Abdi Godane's 2013 internal purge of nationalist-orientated leaders, Al-Shabaab's ambitions appear to be influenced by a regional Salafi-jihadist agenda.

In Kenya, Al-Shabaab has found fertile ground not only for fundraising but also for radicalising and recruiting.

Since 2008, hundreds of Kenyan nationals have travelled to Somalia to fight for, or otherwise support, the organisation. In Kenya, meanwhile, a surge in jihadist activity has seen a surge in extremist violence since 2011. This has ranged from small-scale violent incidents to the high-profile attacks seen on Westgate Mall in 2013, Garissa University College in 2015 and 14 Riverside Drive in 2019. The violent actions of few individuals can shake the social fabric of an area and ultimately lead to instability of a country and region. As attacks have proliferated, the factors driving Kenyan nationals to violent extremism have attracted growing scrutiny from government, academics and civil society alike.

Following the latest attacks at Riverside Drive, the NCTC acknowledged the need to drastically increase public awareness in order to prevent radicalisation, promote disengagement and strengthen citizen resilience against terrorism. In this respect, the NCTC has confirmed its view of the EU being a strategic partner in its efforts to counter violent extremism

2.2.2. Sector context: policies and challenges

In recent years, the Government of Kenya has put a lot of emphasis on security. H.E. President Uhuru Kenyatta launched the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism in Kenya in September 2016 to sustain these efforts. At the county level, County Action Plans to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism are also being rolled out across the country[1]. As highlighted by H.E. President Uhuru Kenyatta during the State-of-the-Nation address[2] on 15 March 2017, the counter terrorism effort of the Government of Kenya has delivered a sharp reduction in the number of fatalities, attacks and attempts by terrorist entities. In addition to the strong efforts to dismantle terrorists' operational capabilities, the government has increased its focus on preventing and reducing the motivations underlying radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism. Kenya's National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism is bearing fruit. This strategy is addressing radicalisation by combining the efforts of diverse actors including the state, civil society, the private sector, and religious organisations.

This has placed Kenya among the first countries in Africa to pursue national level coordination of all CVE efforts. Thematically speaking, the CVE response covers almost all angles including psychosocial, political, faith based, capacity building, arts and culture, legal, and policy and media aspects. In terms of stakeholders it refers to all key players including government agencies, county governments, religious leaders, civil society, the private sector, the research community as well as regional and international partners.

While the CVE strategy reflects a comprehensive and inclusive response to violent extremism in Kenya, dedicated support is needed in key target areas for the strategy to be effectively implemented and with sustainable impact. These areas include collection and sharing of context-specific evidence, the collaboration of key partners such as civil society and county- level state actors, the management of the disengagement and rehabilitation processes of foreign terrorist fighters, and the advice and referral support to communities who are exposed to radicalisation and violent extremism. In order to smoothly orchestrate the implementation of the various components of the strategy, the role of the Centre in this effort as a coordinating and policy body engaging the other stakeholders needs to be reinforced. Indeed, while the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of the National Government has been tasked as the government's lead implementing agency for the CVE Strategy (with the County Security and Intelligence Committees playing a key role at the county level), the strategy is owned by the Centre, which is the "lead agency coordinating all actors (state, non-state and bilateral and multilateral partners) involved in the implementation process of the strategy"[3].

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[1] http://www.president.go.ke/2019/04/04/speech-by-his-excellency-hon-uhuru-kenyatta-c-g-h-president-of-the-republic-of-kenya-and-commander-in-chief-of-the-defence-forces-during-the-2019-state-of-the-nation-address-at-parliament-building/

[2] http://www.president.go.ke/2017/03/19/speech-bY-his-excellencY-hon-uhuru-kenYatta-c-g-h-president-of-the-republic-of-kenya-and-commander-in-chief-of-the-defence-forces-during-the-2017-state-of-the-nation-address-parliament-buildings/

[3] Kenya CVE Strategy, page 32

The Centre is a multi-agency instrument primarily composed of security agencies headed by a diplomat and built to strengthen coordination in counter terrorism, including CVE. The Centre was established in law by the Security Law Amendment Act 2014; however, it has existed since 2004 when it was created by a decision of the Cabinet. By law, the National Security Council[4] plays a special role in the civilian oversight of the Centre. The Centre's coordinating and advisory role is furthered by the fact that it is embedded within the Executive Office of the President. The mandate of the Centre includes coordinating national counter terrorism efforts, conducting public awareness on prevention of terrorism, developing strategies to counter radicalisation and foster de-radicalisation, and facilitating capacity building in countering terrorism and prevention. The policy functions of the Centre make it the central point for developing and continually updating Counter Terrorism strategies and policies, engaging the public for counter radicalisation, coordinating the implementation of the Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (Prevent Pillar of national CT strategy), designing efforts to delegitimise violent extremist ideology and aims, serving as the government focal point for engagement with CT & CVE initiatives - at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels, as well as raising private sector CT standards.

As such and in order to improve inter-agency cooperation, the Centre organises monthly stakeholder meetings.

2.3.   Lessons learnt

"Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism (STRIVE I) Horn of Africa" (mostly implemented in Kenya, starting in January 2014 and ending in January 2017) constituted the first dedicated effort by the European Commission to implement a specifically designed Countering Violent Extremism programme in the region. Given the relative novelty of this field of intervention at the time, this action sought to develop best practices to implement and monitor programmes that have a demonstrable impact on strengthening resilience against violent extremism in the Horn of Africa. Some of the lessons learnt include the requirement of a flexible approach, heavy management in terms of time and resources, and willingness to take risk and to engage with politics. The final evaluation finds that STRIVE has contributed to learning and as such provides useful recommendations which were taken on board for the design of this action[5].

While current efforts to Counter Violent Extremism are no silver bullet, there are essential best practices and lessons learnt which are being increasingly shared within the EU and more widely through the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF).
These lessons will be shared with the Centre for instance through familiarisation visits, exchanges and specific knowledge management and sharing events.

2.4.   Complementary actions

Socio-economic structural and enabling factors to violent extremism are addressed through several of the EU development projects in Kenya. The EU is also already involved in CVE- specific projects in Kenya, directly targeting populations identified as at risk of radicalisation.

The most relevant initiatives with which this project should act in complementarity and develop synergies are: 1) the on-going Collaboration in Cross Border areas programme of the EUTF Horn of Africa which, amongst other activities, will support local conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and livelihood opportunities for youth in the cross-border areas between Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia (including Mandera, Gedo, Doolow, Marsabit and Turkana counties)[6]; 2) the EUTF-funded action "Conflict prevention, peace and economic opportunities for

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[4] The National Security Council, NSC, is the supreme organ mandated by the new Constitution to be responsible for the security of Kenya and her people. It is a (largely) civilian outfit expected to perform supervisory control over the functions of the top security organs in the country
[5] The full evaluation report of STRIVE can be found on-line at http://ct-morse.eu/
[6] EUTF funded programme: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/regional-collaboration-in-cross-

youth" project[7] currently being implemented in areas of northern and coastal Kenya, which includes research on sources of conflict and exclusion, support to skills development and employability of youth, as well as a CVE specific component (**STRIVE II)** which addresses violent extremism through various approaches, building on STRIVE I. It focuses on support to communities, in particular youth at risk of radicalisation, as well as on building trust between law enforcement agencies and civil society. Joint activities between the present action and STRIVE will focus on the training of law enforcement and security officers as well as CVE sensitive public awareness efforts to jointly address the diversification of locations and perpetrator profiles.

The EU also supports community-led CVE relevant activities through the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (**GCERF**), for which Kenya is a pilot country, as well as via an upcoming call for non-state actors focusing on support to **conflict prevention**, peacebuilding, and crisis preparedness in Kenya. A directly CVE-specific project under the Instrument contributing to Peace and Stability has also recently started in the **Dadaab and Kakuma** Refugee Camps, supporting formal and community policing set-ups and preventing radicalisation through youth inclusion[8].

The above actions mainly support the capacities of communities and civil society actors (including their interactions with law enforcement agencies) by building their resilience and empowerment.

The proposed action is the first direct targeted support of its kind through which the EU will entrust a Kenyan institution to carry out activities addressing violent extremism. This is considered necessary for the efficiency and sustainability of CVE approaches, which otherwise run the risk of remaining fragmented, with a lost opportunity for replication. It is however important that the above-mentioned actions and the direct support to the Centre be coordinated and directed towards the same objective.

At a regional level, the Kenyan CVE stakeholders should also be able to benefit from and contribute to a CVE short-term facility[9] providing **advisory support** on CVE to interested governments of the Horn of Africa. It will provide services of high-level experts and policymakers from other regions who can contribute and lend their experience to the Kenyan Government in sensitive matters of policy, particularly by connecting the Government of Kenya's efforts to its counterparts globally.

Finally, Kenya could also benefit from the envisaged support to some of the activities included in the regional IGAD CVE strategy under the "Promoting Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa Region" project.

2.5. Donor co-ordination

The initial CVE donor group coordination for Kenya was established in 2014, and has since grown to reflect rising interest as well as planned activities by other donors and international organisations. The most active donors include Denmark, the EU, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom (UK) as well as Australia, Canada, and the United States.

The CVE Donor Matrix which has been developed by this group facilitates close coordination with other related programmes, such as Japan's indirect support to the Centre through UNDP, Denmark's agency-to-agency partnership between the Centre and the Danish Security and Intelligence Service seeking to transfer Denmark's CVE experiences in CVE to Kenya; and UK's upcoming cooperation with the Centre on counter narratives. These efforts are complemented by a set of projects addressing community resilience. The Netherlands is planning to support the Centre in developing and coordinating the assessment framework on the

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border-areas en.pdf

[7] http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eutf05-hoa-ke-18-kenva-vouth-opportunities en.pdf The

[8] This is funded through the Instrument Contributing for Stability and Peace (under the Foreign Policy Instrument)

[9] To be funded under the Instrument Contributing for Stability and Peace (under the Foreign Policy Instrument)

impact of bilateral and multilateral CVE funding and efforts on national security and human security in Kenya, which will be highly relevant for the M&E framework of this proposed project. EU support adds value to the ongoing and planned activities as it is the only one most directly targeting Kenya's institutional capacity to address violent extremism.

In the framework of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, Kenya is one of the pilot countries with an International Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism Capacity-Building Clearinghouse Mechanism (ICCM) platform which provides an overview of CVE and CT projects in Kenya, Nigeria, and Tunisia.

3. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

3.1. Objectives

The **overall objective** of the action is the operationalisation of the recently adopted Kenya National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism with particular emphasis on preventative aspects.

The **specific objective** of the action is that the Centre fulfils its mandate of coordinator of all actors involved in the implementation of the strategy, to deliver a transparent, accountable, inclusive and integrated approach to CVE, which respects human rights and is conflict- sensitive.

3.2. Expected results and main activities

The action will aim to achieve five result areas including the following tentative activities:

Result 1: The Centre guides state and non-state interventions that are research informed and can produce early warning and response opportunities throughout the country

1.1.   Conduct baseline polling and focus groups to provide early warning, trend indications and response opportunities that inform the national leadership on the ideological appeal of violent extremist groups and possible policy orientations to guide interventions of CVE practitioners;

1.2.   Convene quarterly research and local knowledge forums at county level to build a radicalisation information network able to inform preventative and early response efforts by local administrators, communities and leaders;

1.3.   Identify knowledge gaps and commission research that informs CVE efforts of the government and CVE practitioners.

Result 2: The Centre catalyses, connects, and coordinates a national network of state and non-state actors united in their determination and credibility in preventing and resisting violent extremism.

2.1.   Convene inter- and intra-faith dialogue meetings which benefit from two-way crossfertilisation and exchange of experiences, notably from Muslim countries;

2.2.   Conduct public awareness on prevention of terrorism through the development and implementation of a strategic communications plan that enhances transparency of the programmes and communicates them in a manner that is suitable to the context, demystifying the programmes and building local awareness about the threat as well as recruitment strategies; In order to implement the NCTC's whole of society approach as per revised National CVE Strategy and follow best practice (in particular the

"GCTF Guidelines and Good Practices for Developing National CVE Strategies"[10]), there is a need to address the diversification of locations and perpetrator profiles by enabling NCTC to scale up country-wide public awareness efforts. This will facilitate reaching and mobilising the wider public to join government efforts to counter violent extremism by reducing misinformation, demystifying key actors, increasing awareness about the threat and recruitment strategies.

According to NCTC plans, the aim of the strategic communication campaign include: a) making the concept and aims of terrorism known to Kenyans; b) equipping the public with relevant knowledge when reacting to terror attack; c) equipping the public with relevant knowledge on how to identify radicalisation and incitement and how to respond appropriately and safely; d) increasing public alertness and reporting of relevant suspicious activity; e) reducing the number of misleading information during an attack.

2.3. Train frontline government workers (law enforcement, national administration officers, county government workers, teachers and public health officers) in identifying and responding to radicalisation and violent extremism - as feasible, following the STRIVE methodology, and adopting a "do no harm" approach;

2.4. Enhance the Centre's connecting and coordinating capabilities to build partnerships with CVE practitioners that add concrete value to CVE efforts, including non-state actors, county level as well as regional local authorities.

Result 3: The Centre supports effective disengagement and rehabilitation of returning foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) in prisons, as well as of those who are not part of the criminal justice process but require direct intervention.

3.1. Ensure a standardised process of effective rehabilitation for returning FTFs in three Rehabilitation Centres, which is protective of human rights;

3.2. Ensure a standardised process of effective disengagement and rehabilitation of returning FTFs in prisons, which is protective of human rights;

3.3. Improve the Centre's capacities to contribute to international cooperation and joint investigations regarding online recruitment and facilitation of FTF.

Result 4: Provide early warning, information and advice to communities exposed to Al-Shabaab, Daesh and Al-Qaeda radicalisation.

4.1. Deploy a national radicalisation support hotline for communities to raise concerns relating to extremism and get support;

4.2. Develop peer-to-peer forums for youth, women and religious leaders through which community relationships are reinforced and extremism is challenged.

Result 5: Empower the Centre to fulfil its mandate according to the highest standards of accountability.

5.1. Recruit civilian experts for research, communications, IT, M&E, support functions for inter-agency cooperation and European Commission financial/accounting procedures;

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[10] https://toolkit.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/En/guidelines-and-good-practices-for-developing-national-cve-strategies.pdf

5.2.	Provide equipment, software, and training for the Centre to improve coordination and policy tasks.

3.3. Risks and Assumptions

The **assumptions for the success** of the action and its implementation include that (1) key stakeholders retain an interest in supporting the action; (2) support from different entities within the Government of Kenya will continue and (3) willingness of all key stakeholders to move from a security based approach towards a more inclusive process of CVE in Kenya.

The main risks are:	Risk level (H/M/L)	The mitigating measures for the action are:
Project beneficiaries or other stakeholders are physically targeted or threatened as a result of their involvement in the action;	M	Visibility should be kept to the strict minimum, bearing in mind the overall sensitivity and objective of effectively countering violent extremism. Information and communication on the action should only be shared on a need to know basis.
Communities are stigmatised if activities appear to target them specifically;	M	Visibility should be kept to the strict minimum, bearing in mind the overall sensitivity and objective of effectively countering violent extremism. Information and communication on the action should only be shared on a need to know basis.

The political situation, e.g. the national elections scheduled in 2017, could create uncertainties adversely impacting progress in implementation;	M	Recognise the risks and the need to be flexible in terms of both geography and implementation activities. To be monitored very closely by the Programme Board including possibility of ad hoc meetings to swiftly adjust to changing situations. Continued engagement at political level.
Key stakeholders' political agendas derail the programme through a variety of means;	L	Recognise the risks and the need to be flexible in terms of both geography and implementation activities. To be monitored very closely by the Programme Board including possibility of ad hoc meetings to swiftly adjust to changing situations.
Lack of experience with EC procedures and receiving grants of this scale leading to ineligible costs and thus spoiling the nascent political dialogue;	M	Recruit a dedicated staff member in charge of compliance with EC finance and accounting requirements. A technical assistant will be recruited prior and during contract negotiation to assist NCTC with the drafting of the contract.
Disruption of programme due to proven evidence of allegations against Kenyan state apparatus;	M	Build on EU and GCTF best practice. Discuss issues and allegations first at the Programme Board among the Centre and EU. Invite other relevant stakeholders to discuss these issues and agree on next steps.
Lack of appetite or capacity from key stakeholders to move from a security based approach towards a more inclusive process of CVE in Kenya (both in terms of the citizen-government linkages as well as at inter-agency level).	L	Build on EU and GCTF best practice for whole of society approach. Support inter-agency confidence and trust building with CVE practitioners as well as inter-agency functions.

3.3. Cross-cutting issues

As indicated in the Kenya CVE national strategy, no effort should be spared to ensure that CVE is protective of the human rights and civil liberties of Kenyans. Emphasis is thus placed on supporting activities contributing to a framework of good governance, rule of law, as well as respect for human rights according to the international standards and norms.

Given the obvious relevance of the role of women, youth, and civil society, all result areas of this project will include empowerment aspects and will have a special attention to their voice.

Specific project activities will use an evidence-based approach to allow informed decisions and to feed lessons learnt back into ongoing and planed activities.

3.4. Stakeholders

Stakeholders include government agencies, county governments, religious leaders, civil society, the private sector, the research community as well as regional and international partners. They are similar to those identified in the national CVE strategy:

The Kenyan national leadership, i.e. the President's Office, the National Security Advisory Committee and the Executive Office of the President, who will receive regular updates on the progress of implementation of the strategy.

Communities, citizens and elected leaders, who are the first concerned by the plight of violent extremism and need to be engaged to counter it effectively.

Government ministries, departments, and agencies, to ensure government-citizen linkages at all levels. The role of county security and intelligence committees will play a particular role in this regard.

The private sector and within it the media, both because it is a direct victim of violent extremism, but also because it can contribute greatly to some activities foreseen under this initiative (in terms of messaging, use of IT, or CSR projects).

Civil Society, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community based organisations (CBOs) to contribute to the building of trust between citizens and the state in the CVE approach.

4. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

4.1. Financing agreement

It is not foreseen to conclude a financing agreement with the partner country.

4.2. Indicative operational implementation period

The implementation period will be 48 months, whilst the overall execution period (including a closure phase of no more than 12 months) will not exceed 60 months from the date of approval of this Action Document by the Operational Committee of the EU Trust Fund.

4.3. Implementation components and modules

The contracting modalities will be based on flexible procedures with a direct award applicable in crisis situations as defined by the Financial Regulation.
The action will be implemented in **direct management** through the direct award of a grant to the Centre.

The recourse to the award of a grant without a call for proposals is justified because the Centre has a de-facto monopoly for the coordination of the CVE strategy. Regarding the financial and operational

capacity of the applicant, the Centre has an annual budget of about EUR 4.5 million[11] from the national budget through the Treasury, complies with Government of Kenya regulations and is subjected to the public procurement and disposal authority act. The Centre has 30 core staff members and a flexible pool of additional staff members due to its inter-agency nature. Even though the Centre has received external funding in the past, it is the first time the Centre would directly manage donor funding. Given the nature of the Centre's activity, the audit reports are confidential.

The **governance mechanism** of the action involves a Programme Board composed of representatives from the Centre and the EU. The permanent members will jointly decide to invite other entities to join the board as observers. The Board will ensure strategic direction of activities, and as such, will oversee, pilot, and readjust the action, if need be, as well as act as a forum for discussing and agreeing on wider issues. In terms of periodicity it will meet every 3 months to allow adapting and adjusting in real time.

4.4 Indicative budget

Component / Result Areas	Total amount in EUR
Result 1: Research and early warning	
Result 2: Establishing a national network of state and non-state actors	**1 460 000**
Result 3: Addressing foreign terrorist fighters	**960 000**
Result 4: Engaging with communities	**960 000**
Result 5: Empowering the Centre in terms of human resource and equipment	**960 000**
Monitoring, Evaluation and Audit	**960 000**
Total	**5 500 000**

4.5. Monitoring, evaluation and audit

Monitoring and evaluation arrangements will ensure that progress towards the intended results is measured in a consistent and regular manner. In order for the indicators mentioned in the logical framework to be measured, sources of verification will have to be developed where they do not yet exist. This will have to be done in line with the assessment framework of the national CVE strategy itself. In some cases, specific project surveys will have to be set up to measure the perception or capacity of individuals. Baselines and targets will be developed during the inception phase of the project.

Additionally, a Mid Term Review and a final evaluation are foreseen.

Ad hoc audits or expenditure verification assignments could be contracted by the European Commission. Audits and expenditure verification assignments will be carried out in conformity with the risk analysis in the frame of the yearly Audit Plan exercise conducted by the European Commission.

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[11] Or 500 million Kenyan shillings.

Evaluation and audit assignments will be implemented through service contracts; making use of one of the Commission's dedicated framework contracts or alternatively through the competitive negotiated procedure or the single tender procedure.

4.6. Communication and visibility

EU visibility should be kept to the strict minimum, bearing in mind the overall sensitivity and objective of effectively countering violent extremism. Information and communication on the action should only be shared on a need to know basis.

A **logical framework** is attached.

EU Trust Fund Strategy	Valletta Action Plan	United Nations Sustainable Development Goals
Four main areas of intervention	**Five priority domains, and 16 initiatives**	**17 goals**

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1) <mark>Greater economic and employment opportunities</mark>

2) <mark>Strengthening resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable, as well as refugees and displaced people</mark>

3) <mark>Improved migration management in countries of origin and transit</mark>

4) <mark>Improved governance and conflict prevention, and reduction of forced displacement and irregular migration</mark>

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1) Development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement
   1. enhance employment opportunities and revenue-generating activities
   2. link relief, rehabilitation and development in peripheral and most vulnerable areas
   3. operationalise the African Institute on Remittances
   4. facilitate responsible private investment and boost trade

2) Legal migration and mobility
   5. double the number of Erasmus scholarships
   6. pool offers for legal migration
   7. organise workshops on visa facilitation

3) Protection and asylum
   8. Regional Development and Protection Programmes
   9. improve the quality of the asylum process
   10. improve resilience, safety and self-reliance of refugees in camps and host communities

4) Prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking of human beings
   11. national and regional anti-smuggling and anti-trafficking legislation, policies and action plans
   12. strengthen institutional capacity to fight smuggling and trafficking
   13. pilot project in Niger
   14. information campaigns

5) Return, readmission and reintegration
   15. strengthen capacity of countries of origin to respond to readmission applications
   16. support reintegration of returnees into their communities

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1) End poverty in all its forms everywhere
2) End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture
3) Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages
4) Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all
5) Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
6) Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all
7) Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all
8) Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all
9) Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation
10) Reduce inequality within and among countries
11) Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable
12) Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns
13) Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts
14) Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development
15) Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss
16) <mark>Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels</mark>
17) Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development

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APPENDIX 1: LOGFRAME MATRIX OF THE PROJECT

The activities, the expected outputs and all the indicators, targets and baselines included in the logframe matrix are indicative and may be updated during the implementation of the action without an amendment to the action document. The indicative logframe matrix will evolve during the lifetime of the action: new lines will be added for listing the activities as well as new columns for intermediary targets (milestones) when it is relevant and for reporting purpose on the achievement of results as measured by indicators.

Please note that baselines and indicators will be further defined during the inception phase.

	Intervention logic	Indicators	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions
Overall objective	The overall objective of the action is to support the operationalisation of the recently adopted Kenya National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (CVE).	• Reduced incidents of violent deaths caused by radicalisation in intervention areas due to more efficient approach to prevention; • % of respondents who feel safe in intervention areas due to more efficient approach to prevention; • % of CVE practitioners within target areas changing their engagement and behaviour in relation to CVE.	M&E component to be developed under the project.	■ Key CVE practitioners retain an interest in supporting the project; ■ The security context continues to allow for the project to occur; ■ The political and/or social and/or economic and/or environmental conditions permit the achievement of the intended impact.
Specific objective	The **specific objective** of the action is that the Centre fulfils its mandate of coordinator of all actors involved in the implementation of the strategy, to deliver a transparent, accountable and integrated approach to CVE, which respects human rights.	• Improved knowledge and practise of CVE practitioners on CVE (to be measured through surveys at the beginning and the end of the project); • Fostered collaboration between CVE practitioners and NCTC (i.e. number of initiatives under the 5 result areas that include a) the collaboration of state and non-state actors; b) the collaboration of several MDAs.	M&E component to be developed under the project.	■ Key CVE practitioners retain an interest in supporting the project; ■ The security context continues to allow for the project to occur; ■ The political and/or social and/or economic and/or environmental conditions permit the achievement of the intended impact.

	Intervention logic	Indicators	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions
Result 1	The Centre guides state and non-state interventions that are research informed and can produce early warning and response throughout the country	• Number of CVE practitioner's interventions that have acted on evidence and early warning produced and disseminated by NCTC; • Evidence that this intervention has adjusted objectives as a result of research and early warning to improve effectiveness.	M&E component to be developed under the project.	■ CVE practitioners are motivated to receive research and early warning findings; ■ CVE practitioners are able to adapt activities in light of research and early warning findings.
Result 2	The Centre catalyses, connects and coordinates a national network of state and non-state actors united in their determination and credibility in preventing and resisting violent extremism.	% CVE practitioners demonstrating improved ability to recognise and address early signs of violence; • Presence of feedback mechanisms between NCTC and CVE practitioners. • Frequency/number of intra-religious/inter-religious group conflicts • % of the population that reports having changed one of the three good practices for CVE (understand roles and responsibilities of different government agencies, be aware of general recruitment patterns and be aware of reporting mechanisms)	M&E component to be developed under the project.	■ CVE practitioners are motivated to engage with NCTC; VE practitioners united in their determination and credibility in preventing and resisting violent extremism.
Result 3	The Centre supports effective disengagement and rehabilitation of returning foreign terrorist fighters in prisons, and those who are not part of the criminal justice process but require direct intervention.	• Use of standardised approach to FTF in rehabilitation centres and prisons; • Number of cases where NCTC contributes to international cooperation and joint investigations regarding online recruitment and facilitation of FTF	M&E component to be developed under the project.	■ Rehabilitation centres and prisons hosting FTF are motivated to engage with NCTC; ■ Rehabilitation centres and prisons hosting FTF willing to approach CVE in a standardised way.
Result 4	Provide early warning, information and advice to communities exposed to Al-Shabaab, Daesh and Al-Qaeda radicalisation.	• Number of community members with individuals exposed to radicalisation calling and recommending to call the national radicalisation support hotline; • Number of community members with individuals exposed to radicalisation attending and recommending to attend peer-to-peer forums.	M&E component to be developed under the project.	■ Willingness of family and community members with individuals exposed to radicalisation to call the national radicalisation support hotline. ■ Willingness of family and community members with individuals exposed to radicalisation to attend peer-to-peer forums.

	Intervention logic	Indicators	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions
Result 5	Empower the Centre as an effective catalyst and connector in the development of CVE networks.	• Level of transformation from a security based approach towards a more inclusive process of CVE in Kenya (to be assessed through project final evaluation); • Level of confidence in the transformation process expressed by CVE practitioners in project locations. (to be assessed through surveys throughout the project implementation)	M&E component to be developed under the project.	• Willingness of all key stakeholders to move from a security based approach towards a more inclusive process of CVE in Kenya; • NCTC further builds confidence with all key stakeholders.