

**THE EUROPEAN UNION EMERGENCY TRUST FUND FOR STABILITY AND  
ADDRESSING THE ROOT CAUSES OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND  
DISPLACED PERSONS IN AFRICA**

**Action Document for the implementation of the Horn of Africa Window  
T05-EUTF-HOA-SS-61**

**1. IDENTIFICATION**

Title	<b>Building Sustainable Peace and Reconciliation in South Sudan</b>		
Total cost	Total estimated cost: 4 975 000 EUR Total amount drawn from the Trust Fund: 4 975 000 EUR		
Aid method / Method of implementation	Direct Management (grants, procurement of services)		
DAC-code	15220	Sector	Civilian peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution
Derogations, prior approvals, exceptions authorised	Prior Approval 20.a and 20.f		

**2. RATIONALE AND CONTEXT**

**2.1. Summary of the action and its objectives**

The action contributes to **Strategic Objective 4** of the EUTF, **Priority Domains 1 and 2** of **Valletta Action Plan**, and **Sustainable Development Goal 16**.

The target **beneficiaries** of the action are the South Sudanese people affected by conflicts and instability. The geographical coverage of the action is country-wide. The **intervention logic** of the action is that addressing interlinked problem areas and local challenges like a complex conflict system, multiple layers and types of conflicts, absence of accountability, culture of impunity, "enforcement" of peace agreements, absence of "dealing with the past" / "transitional justice" processes and mechanisms, will contribute to building sustainable peace and reconciliation in South Sudan.

The **overall objective** is to contribute to building sustainable peace and reconciliation in South Sudan.

The **specific objectives** are to:

1. Facilitate reconciliation, with a focus on grass-roots / local level

2. Support oversight, monitoring and accountability mechanisms of peace agreement / peace process
3. Promote a comprehensive approach to transitional justice

The formulation of this action takes into account evolution on the South Sudanese peace process until the signature of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (Addis Ababa, 12 September 2018).

## **2.2. Context**

### **2.2.1. Country/regional context, if applicable**

At least three generations of people in South Sudan experience chronic insecurity as a result of repeated wars and armed conflict at multi levels. The crisis affecting the people of South Sudan is in 2018 more acute than in previous years, with 6.1 million people affected by severe food insecurity (IPC) and more than one third of the population (4.5 million) being refugees or internally displaced people. The situation in the country remains a serious challenge for the region and the international community. On 12 September 2018, the conflicting parties - Transitional Government of National Unity of the Republic of South Sudan (TGoNU), the Sudan People's Liberation Movement / Army -in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), Former Detainees (FDs), Other Political Parties (OPP) - signed the Revitalised Agreement on the resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS). This marked the end of a process to revitalise the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan, instituted by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Heads of State in June 2017 because of lack of implementation and the further fragmentation of conflict following the July 2016 outbreak of fighting. Overall the R-ARCSS is viewed as a positive step forward, though some parties continue to have some reservations including in relation to the number of states, state boundaries, protection of VIPs, and the constitutional making process.

### **2.2.2. Sector context: policies and challenges**

The action will address the following interlinked problem areas and local challenges:

#### ***1. Complex conflict system, multiple layers and types of conflicts:***

Conflict is resolved through violence and/or the threat of violence. Violence is used to acquire power over resources (political power, land, cattle, water). Conflict can be centrally driven by state elites, supported by regional actors; and can also be triggered by local disputes. Violence is occurring in a state where the structures that facilitate dialogue and mediation are either weak or dysfunctional, where political leadership is generally viewed as weak and corrupt and the democratic institutions at all levels of the state are failing and ineffectual.

The principal driver in creating central government and elite-level instability is political and military competition over control of highly centralised and personalised revenue flows (from oil, trade, and resources) and the small elite state system in the capital of Juba that controls these revenues. This is matched by competition over resources, and over positions of power created by this elite system, at regional and local levels. At the local level, political and military elites engaged in this competition often weaponise local populations' disputes over land and water access, cattle, and historical grievances (mobilised often on crude ethnic lines).

This exacerbates local instability and community-level conflicts over extremely limited resources, social services, and rights to land.

Political objectives are frequently pursued in South Sudan through resort to violence. Leadership and control of an armed group remains a proven, and perhaps the most reliable, means of guaranteeing a stake in the political process.

Several experiences show that violence pays, and that violence is the most effective way to achieve political goals. A political constituency that remains peaceful can simply be ignored, while those who have chosen violence will gain a seat at the table where patronage is dispensed, and their political ambitions will be advanced. In addition, political-military elites often maintain their regional power through violence and the threat of violence, including over valuable regional resources such as oilfields. This reinforces the “necessity” for significant government spending on security services, to the detriment of funding basic social services that are deemed to be of lower political importance.

The long-running civil wars, since the 1960s, have created massive social and economic instability, caused trauma, and entrenched grievances. Urbanisation and pressures on agricultural and pastoral livelihoods have encouraged small- and large-scale conflicts over land rights, where ethnicity is often used as a pretext for exclusion. Historic patterns of inter-community cattle-raiding are hugely exacerbated by the proliferation of light arms and by the exploitation of conflict by political elites for personal ends. Conflict, displacement, the centralisation of investment, and wartime destruction of social services and industry have left many communities impoverished and frustrated.

*Effects:* Civilians, including the most vulnerable, bear the brunt of the conflict(s). Indiscriminate attacks, revenge killings, torture, abduction of women and children, forced displacement, property looting and burning, starvation, rape and other forms of sexual and gender based violence are some of the human rights violations that have been documented including in the African Union Commission of Inquiry (CoI) report of October 2015 and the February 2018 report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan (CHRSS).

Generations of conflict, insecurity and fear, governments ruling through violence and coercion, and the availability of arms have resulted in a militarisation of South Sudan’s society. After decades of conflict, wartime economies have been institutionalised. There are few paths for engagement, self-defence or resistance in South Sudan’s political landscape that do not involve some form of military labour or armed action. Military labour is a coping strategy for impoverished youth with few alternatives.

In addition, the population has to organise their own local protection. This has produced generations of militias and armed youth who organise (and are organised within the community) on the basis of mostly local rather than national economic and political motives.

## ***2. Absence of accountability, culture of impunity, "enforcement" of peace agreements"***

There is an almost complete absence of accountability. The national justice system is weak. Intimidation, pervasive corruption and impunity undermine trust in the justice system. Most South Sudanese rely on local mediation, often biased towards the more wealthy and powerful in the community, to resolve familial and local disputes. Criminal acts by those associated with wealthy and/or militarily-powerful elites are often unpunishable. A culture of impunity prevails. Despite a strong culture and extensive history of inter-communal conflict resolution

and restitution, large-scale atrocities and war crimes are generally poorly-recorded and not addressed. Justice providers and law enforcement actors are often unable to execute and enforce decisions, or prevent a recurrence of a dispute. Customary and informal systems rely on social pressure and unarmed enforcement officials. Police and prison officials struggle to intervene in cases involving military and security actors, or in detaining well-connected suspects or convicts. Litigants with access to military or state-backed justice systems often have the means to operationalize force or the threat of force in their favour.

This culture of impunity has also had an impact on the enforceability of peace agreements. Following the December 2013 outbreak of conflict, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) led a mediation process which resulted in August 2015 in the signature of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS). The agreement provided for a Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), responsible for monitoring, overseeing and supporting the implementation of the Agreement and the mandate and tasks of the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU), including adherence of the Parties to agreed timelines and schedules. In the event of non-compliance, JMEC was to recommend appropriate corrective action to the TGoNU. Furthermore, the agreement provided for a Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM), which was mandated to report on the progress of the implementation of the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements (PCTSA), monitor compliance and report directly to the JMEC on the progress of the implementation of the PCTSA.

Despite this comprehensive framework, timelines were not met from the beginning; key provisions such as the incorporation of the agreement into the transitional constitution of South Sudan were not implemented; the ceasefire was not observed as documented in CTSAMM reports. A new politically driven conflict broke out in Juba in July 2016, only two months after the formation of the TGoNU.

While the monitoring mechanisms provided information on lack of implementation and violations of the permanent ceasefire, the agreement did not provide for sanctions in case of non-compliance. Given the apparent lack of progress in implementation of the ARCSS, the JMEC chairperson recommended in June 2017 to the IGAD Summit a High Level Revitalisation Forum.

The Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) signed on 12 September 2018 reconfirmed the overall monitoring and oversight mechanism, i.e. a revitalised JMEC. A new provision of the R-ARCSS is that the Chairperson of the R-JMEC shall report all serious incidents of violations and critical issues that may arise in copy to the chairperson of the IGAD Council of Ministers (CoM). Subsequently, the IGAD CoM shall convene within 14 days an extra-ordinary meeting to decide appropriate timely remedial actions. This provision could contribute to the enforcement of the agreement as IGAD should decide on the necessary action to be taken.

### ***3. Absence of "dealing with the past"/"transitional justice" processes and mechanisms***

Transitional justice is a poorly understood subject in South Sudan, many stakeholders are not familiar with its concepts and the role it can play in promoting sustainable peace. Much of the articulation of positions on transitional justice comes from the urban educated elite or the

international community and it is not clear how far this reflects the feelings of the wider population, which will differ from place to place and between different elements of society.

Transitional justice is dealing with a society's abusive past to build a better future, particularly to prevent the same massive human rights and humanitarian law violations from happening again. Transitional justice combines a range of measures that uphold the principles of justice and provide as much justice as possible under the exceptional circumstances of a transition. These measures are based on international law and include, but are not limited to, the following four key elements: 1) truth-seeking efforts such as state-led truth commissions, processes to trace missing persons, or commissions of enquiry; 2) accountability mechanisms such as criminal prosecutions of those most responsible for the violations, as well as community-based accountability processes; 3) reparation programmes that offer a range of material and non-material remedies to victims; and 4) guarantees of non-recurrence such as the reform of the institutions responsible for the most serious violations.

In South Sudan, transitional justice has for a long time been neglected. It was not explicitly addressed in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, which referred only to "national healing and reconciliation". The post-CPA period was marked by a persistent culture of impunity, which paved the way for continued violence and abuses. The Transitional Constitution of South Sudan of 2011 called for a "genuine national healing process and the building of trust... through dialogue" (Art. 36) but gave few details and did not provide for any transitional justice measures.

For the first time, the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) signed on 17<sup>th</sup> August 2015 has a specific section (Chapter V) on transitional justice, accountability, reconciliation and healing that provides for the establishment of three transitional justice institutions: a Commission for Truth, Reconciliation and Healing (CTRH), an independent hybrid judicial body, to be known as the Hybrid Court for South Sudan (HCSS); and a Compensation and Reparation Authority (CRA). In addition, the ARCSS foresees a limited vetting process stipulating that individuals indicted or convicted by the HCSS shall not hold government positions. However, the Parties to the ARCSS have not adhered to the timelines set out in the agreement. So far, none of the mechanisms provided for in Chapter V has been established. There has been some (limited) progress with regard to initiating the establishment of both the CTRH and the HCSS. The Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) signed on 12<sup>th</sup> September 2018 reconfirmed the provisions of chapter V in the 2015 ARCSS (the content remains unchanged).

### **2.3. Lessons learnt**

There is insufficient comprehensive data and overall evidence-based analysis to inform donors and other development partners on the best strategies for promoting peace and reconciliation. However, some lessons can be drawn from the EU's current and past involvement in support to peace building and reconciliation, peace agreement monitoring mechanisms and justice<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Including the projects: "Support for implementation of South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC) Action Plan for Peace", 2 MEUR (July 2016 – April 2019) grant implemented by Norwegian Church Aid; "Support to South Sudan Peace Agreement", 2,6 MEUR (May 2016 – December 2018), direct

The history of peace agreements at various level shows that peace and reconciliation cannot be made simply from a bottom up, nor only from the top down but an approach that combines both is required.

There are no quick fixes and short-term solutions. Given the protracted nature of the conflict and legacy of previous wars, local and regional actors need to dialogue and negotiate resolutions over specific grievances so that issues have more opportunity to progress than national or top-down endeavours.

Investment in political economy analyses and understanding of local dynamics is essential particularly given the increasing evidence of fragmentation in the current phase of the conflict since December 2013.

Broad interaction is essential and at local level engagement should go politically and intellectually beyond the small group of English-speaking civic activists.

Given the volatile environment, a flexible approach is needed. Too detailed descriptions of activities at action document and contracts' level risk becoming outdated and limiting the possibility to respond to emerging and changing needs. A general approach facilitates flexibility; at the same time risk mitigating measures included in implementation agreements ensure that actions are adapted when necessary (e.g. conversation points with grant beneficiaries, coordination with other donors, joint donor approach etc.).

Supporting national/local “processes” with “project” type interventions brings additional challenges and requires a careful project design. Donors need to be mindful of the delicate work involved in such processes and should avoid undermining this work by politicising or instrumentalising local initiatives for their own political objectives.

The challenge of multiple funding of donors with specific and sometimes competing requirements can be mitigated by open dialogue amongst donors and with beneficiaries of projects.

#### **2.4. Complementary actions**

In the area of peace building/reconciliation there are multiple interventions, some of which address reconciliation and dialogue. The European Union (EU) and its Member States present in South Sudan agreed to map EU and its Member States cooperation and to consider possibilities for joint analysis of development needs and opportunities in view of a better coordinated response. The mapping will encompass development and humanitarian aid of EU

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grant agreement with the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, "Access to justice" 5.5 MEUR (April 2015-March 2020), delegation agreement with the British Council, "Strengthening the Rule of Law in South Sudan" 3.5 MEUR (December 2017-December 2020), grant agreement with Max Planck Foundation for International Peace and Rule of Law; "Holy Trinity Peace Village (HTPV) in Kuron Support" 1,5 MEUR, grant agreement with Norwegian Church Aid (December 2017-December 2020); Projects and activities implemented between December 2014 and February 2018 within the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace decision 2014 / 37573 "Support to peacebuilding and stabilisation in South Sudan" including the contract "Services in Support to reconciliation activities in South Sudan"

and its Member States in South Sudan; to put the EU aid in the national context it will also include information from other donors.

Some nation-wide initiatives/larger scale projects/donor funding mechanisms are to be highlighted:

The *South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC)* created in 2015 the *Action Plan for Peace*, a home-grown and church-led strategy, comprehensively addressing the root causes and long-term effects of conflict through Advocacy, Neutral Forums, Healing and Reconciliation. The implementation of the Action Plan is supported with funding from the EU<sup>2</sup>, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. The support is channelled via faith based non-governmental organisations: Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Finn Church Aid (FCA), CAFOD & Trocaire Partnership (CTP), PAX, and Christian Aid.

Some donors (United States, United Kingdom) have specific "*Stabilisation funds*" envelopes, which can support initiatives at national and local level.

Sweden funds the Peace and Community Cohesion Project implemented by UNDP which seeks to contribute to the reduction and mitigation of community level conflict and insecurity.

The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is supporting some stabilisation activities at local level, e.g. through its civil affairs division and officers in the field missions.

**Oversight and monitoring mechanisms of ARCSS and revitalisation** (ongoing support 2018): The **Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC)** secretariat received kind and cash contributions from: US, UK, Norway, EU (2.6 million EUR from the EDF<sup>3</sup>), Germany, China, Canada; the **Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM)** operations are supported with in kind and cash contributions from US, UK, EU (9.3 million EUR in 2016-2017 and 5 million EUR in 2018 through the African Peace Facility), Germany, Denmark, China, Japan, Norway; the **IGAD High Level Revitalisation Forum** received support from EU (0.7 million EUR through the Early Response Mechanism of the African Peace Facility), Denmark, China, Japan. Funding decisions of some donors are pending / in consideration. A joint dialogue and exchange with the mechanisms to determine results / lesson learned and actions for improvement is underway.

**Transitional justice:** Initiatives from civil society organisations in South Sudan, as well as the civil society Transitional Justice Working Group (TJWG) receive funding from some donors. The African Union Commission in Addis Ababa received some external technical assistance in view of its tasks in setting up the hybrid court.

In addition to national actions complementarity and synergies with regional programmes will be ensured, e.g. with the EUTF programme "IGAD Promoting Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa Region - IPPSHAR" (43.1 million EUR) which started in March 2018.

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<sup>2</sup> Within the Financing agreement "Support to the Rule of Law, Access to Justice and Reconciliation in South Sudan" (FED/24526)

<sup>3</sup> Idem

The contribution of the EU to some of the initiatives and activities as outlined above has been an added value and contributed to the achievement of results. There is substantial need for support to ongoing and new activities in the areas covered by the action.

#### **2.4.1. Justification for use of EUTF Africa funds for this action**

South Sudan does not have access to programmable bilateral EDF funds.

Under the EUTF several funds are allocated to South Sudan. Specifically relevant for this action, in 2017, by Commission Decision 2017/8337, 24.5M € were transferred from expired EDF financing decisions to the EUTF. Part of those funds originated from financing agreement "Support to the Rule of Law, Access to Justice and Reconciliation in South Sudan" (FED/24526) which could not be committed within the three years deadline to contract because the outbreak of fighting in 2016 and subsequent disruption of EU Delegation staff presence on the ground required a reassessment of priorities and possibility to achieve results.

This action addresses essential stabilisation in South Sudan, root causes for displacements and migration. The action will provide for support to medium and long term national activities which cannot be covered by the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace which provides for short-term assistance, for example in countries where a crisis is unfolding, or long-term support to global and trans-regional threats. Given the protracted nature of the crisis in South Sudan an EU funding source which allows for a medium to long term actions and activities is required.

#### **2.5. Donor co-ordination**

There is a limited resident donor community in Juba, including seven EU Member States (France, Germany, Italy, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom) and two more members of the European Economic Area (Norway and Switzerland). Other donors include United States, Canada, Japan, China.

Coordination will be managed through existing coordination mechanisms:

- Political: weekly EU Head of Missions meeting and extended EU Head of Mission meetings (extend participation to UNMISS, African Union, World Bank, US, China, Japan, Canada, Switzerland, Ethiopia, South Africa etc.). Both meetings are chaired and hosted by EU Delegation.
- Operations: monthly European Heads of Cooperation meetings chaired by EU Delegation, bi-weekly Heads of Cooperation meetings chaired by United Kingdom.
- At technical level ad hoc coordination takes place for actions which are supported by several donors (e.g. South Sudan Council of Churches Action Plan for Peace support).

Coordination at all levels facilitates information exchange and the development of a shared understanding of the context as well as to gather lessons and recommendations which can be fed into dialogue and adjustments to ongoing programming and the formulation of planned intervention.



### **3. DETAILED DESCRIPTION**

#### **3.1. Objectives**

The **overall objective** of the programme is to contribute to building sustainable peace and reconciliation in South Sudan.

The **specific objectives** are to:

1. Facilitate reconciliation, with a focus on grass-roots / local level
2. Support oversight, monitoring and accountability mechanisms of peace agreement / peace process
3. Promote a comprehensive approach to transitional justice

#### **3.2. Expected results and main activities**

The expected results are:

##### **SO "Reconciliation":**

- 1.1. Peace advocacy at national and community level mobilised
- 1.2. (Long term) community mediation, peace building and healing / counselling initiatives / services in place
- 1.3. Capacity / enabling environment to carry out reconciliation work of selected stakeholders strengthened / enhanced

Activities: support reconciliation initiatives at grass-roots / local levels; intra and inter community dialogues and conversations; healing and counselling at various levels; trust and confidence building measures. Targeted initiatives could include the South Sudan Council of Churches Action Plan for Peace. Special attention will be ensured to promoting women and youth initiative.

##### **SO "Oversight, monitoring and accountability of peace agreement / peace process":**

- 2.1. Robust monitoring of peace agreement implementation: assessment of progress towards implementation, recommendations for corrective measures available.

Activities: provide support to assessing progress of the implementation of the peace agreement / peace process

##### **SO "Transitional justice":**

- 3.1. Increased awareness of national stakeholders on concepts of transitional justice
- 3.2. Selected preparatory actions for national transitional justice mechanisms / processes piloted.

Activities: facilitate exchange between stakeholders; support learning on transitional justice including peer to peer support from other countries transitional justice processes and mechanisms; support preparatory actions e.g. sensitisation and purpose oriented documentation efforts.

The action is realistic and flexible enough to adjust to the volatile political and security environment.

### **3.3. Risks and assumptions**

The main risks are:

- Spoilers attempt could slow or halt the activity implementation, intermittently or severely (H)
- Limited number of implementers in remote areas / insufficient capacities of local organisations to manage projects (M)

The assumptions for the success of the project and its implementation include:

- Implementation of the R-ARCSS and sufficient political will to advance agreement objectives
- Project / activity implementers can access targeted locations and interlocutors.

Mitigating measures have been considered, including:

- Wide-ranging and regular communication will be conducted at all levels with stakeholders, e.g. with parties and stakeholders of R-ARCSS in the framework of R-ARCSS oversight mechanism meetings, in close coordination with international community and donors.
- Flexible procedures under the country wide crisis declaration facilitate the contracting using the negotiated procedure with organisations and entities able to work in South Sudan

### **3.4. Cross-cutting issues**

The action includes a strong focus on human rights, addressing the violation of rights, sexual and gender based violence and grievances of the population caused by the conflicts. The role of women as peacemakers will be taken into account in the action activities. The particular situation and needs of women and girls will be considered. Gender disparities will be analysed and addressed in the activities. Indicators will be gender and age disaggregated whenever possible.

### **3.5. Stakeholders**

#### **Civil society**

In South Sudan, civil society does not have a strong tradition. Civil society organisations (CSO) could be an important stakeholder to the peace efforts; however their existence, scope and prospects are rather precarious within the context of the country. In recent years, the work of some national CSOs has been subject to restrictions and growing scrutiny. The government has not been facilitating their registration in the country. The heavy reliance on, and

competition for scarce donor resources has contributed to the inability of many South Sudanese NGOs to define an independent agenda, while undermining the prospects for collaboration among them.

Churches are an important stakeholder in South Sudan, being present and reaching out to the population throughout the country, including to remote and difficult accessible areas. The Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC) is an ecumenical body comprised of seven member churches and associated churches in South Sudan with a strong legacy of peacebuilding, reconciliation and advocacy. The SSCC is to be considered as an influential stakeholder in South Sudan while being perceived as neutral, and with a network covering the whole country.

**National accountability institutions:** the independent commissions and institutions provided for in the transitional constitution of South Sudan, e.g. Human Rights Commission, Anti-Corruption Commission are weak (insufficient human and financial capacities, e.g. Human Rights Commission).

### **Parties and stakeholders to the Revitalised Agreement on the resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS)**

- Parties: Transitional Government of National Unity of the Republic of South Sudan (TGoNU), the Sudan People's Liberation Movement / Army-in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), Former Detainees (FDs), Other Political Parties (OPP)
- Stakeholders: faith-based leaders, women's block and women's coalition, civil society alliance and civil society forum, eminent personalities, business groups, academia, youth

The **Revitalised Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (R-JMEC)**, chairperson and secretariat could play a reinforced role, taking into account the experience and lessons learned from 2015-2018.

The **Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)** under the auspice of the African Union (AU), and individual IGAD Member States played a key role in mediating between the South Sudanese parties. IGAD stepped up its involvement in 2017 through its establishment of the High Level Revitalisation Forum process. The IGAD Special Envoy for South Sudan Ismail Wais facilitated negotiations during the High Level Revitalisation Forum and in the later stages he and his team supported the chief mediators Sudan and Uganda.

The Ceasefire Transitional Security Arrangement, Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM) will report directly to IGAD Council of Minister and R-JMEC on the progress of the implementation of the Permanent Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements.

The **international community** as a whole has had long engagement in South Sudan particularly in the pre-independence era. The international community remains engaged in South Sudan particularly in relation to efforts to resolve the conflict with a focus on mediation and peacekeeping. The R-ARCSS provides for the participation of "International Partners and Friends of South Sudan" in the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission with the following representatives: China, Norway, United Kingdom, United States, United Nations, European Union, International Partner Forum.

The **United Nations** (UN) has deployed the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). UNMISS is involved in the monitoring of human rights abuses and violations, the creation of a conducive environment for humanitarian work as well as providing support in the implementation of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict and Peace-building.

**4. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES**

**4.1. Financing agreement, if relevant**

Financing agreements are not envisaged.

**4.2. Indicative operational implementation period**

The implementation period will be 60 months from the date of contract signature.

**4.3. Implementation components and modules**

The action will be implemented via service contracts and grants to be concluded according to established EC rules and procedures. Following the renewal of the declaration of crisis situation for South Sudan the application of flexible procedures in South Sudan remains possible (in particular Use of direct award for grants without call for proposals, type 20.a *Exceptional and duly substantiated emergencies (urgency)* and type 20.f *Actions with specific characteristics that require a particular type of body on account of its technical competence, its high degree of specialisation or its administrative power.*

Specific rules for grants: the maximum possible rate of co-financing may be up to 100 % if full funding is essential for the action to be carried out. The essentiality of full funding will be justified by the responsible authorising officer in the award decision, in respect of the principles of equal treatment and sound financial management.

**4.4. Indicative budget**

In the current context of South Sudan, flexibility in the allocation of funds is necessary. Consequently, there is no pre-determined division between the results. The overall amount of 5 000 000 EUR will allow to implement similar sized actions and type of activities as in the "reconciliation" component of the project "Support to the Rule of Law, Access to Justice and Reconciliation in South Sudan" (FED/24526)" referred to in section 2.4.1.

Component	Amount in EUR
Results 1, result 2 and result 3	<b>4 800 000</b>
Monitoring, audit and evaluation	125 000
Communications and visibility	50 000
<b>Total</b>	<b>4 975 000</b>

#### **4.5. Monitoring and reporting**

All components of this action will have to be integrated with the EUTF Monitoring and Learning System (MLS)<sup>4</sup> for the reporting of selected output and outcome indicators, and project implementing partners must take part in case study exercises and the learning strategy developed by the MLS. Project implementing partners will be expected to provide regular (at least quarterly) data to the MLS in a format which will be introduced during the contract negotiation stage.

Project implementing partners will have to report against a selected number of the MLS output indicators (see full list in annex IV). The monitoring of these indicators will therefore have to be included in the M&E systems of each component (in addition to the indicators already existing in the project logical framework, see annex III).

#### **4.6. Evaluation and audit**

If necessary, ad hoc audits or expenditure verification assignments could be contracted by the European Commission for one or several contracts or agreements.

Audits and expenditure verification assignments will be carried out in conformity with the risk analysis in the frame of the yearly Audit Plan exercise conducted by the European Commission. The amount allocated for external evaluation and audit purposes should be shown in the budget at section 4.4. Evaluation and audit assignments will be implemented through service contracts, making use of one of the Commission's dedicated framework contracts or alternatively through the competitive negotiated procedure or the single tender procedure.

#### **4.7. Communication and visibility**

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU. This action shall contain communication and visibility measures which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be included in the procurement contracts. The Communication and Visibility Manual for European Union External Action<sup>5</sup> shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan and the appropriate contractual obligations.

The Akvo RSR<sup>6</sup> on-line reporting platform, which is available to the public, will be used to communicate and report on this action as well as on all project components. Akvo RSR links directly to the EUTF website. The project logical frameworks will be encoded in their respective Akvo pages and regular reporting of project activities and outputs will take place on this platform.

Some of the activities will address sensitive areas, requiring a specific visibility and communication approach. The contracting authority will include specific provisions in the contracts to agree on a case by case basis which information can be shared. Consequently, not all information will be publicly accessible.

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<sup>4</sup> T05-EUTF-HOA-REG-28

<sup>5</sup> <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/17974>

<sup>6</sup> Akvo Really Simple Reporting

Annex I: Alignment with EUTF objectives, Valletta Action Plan and Sustainable Development Goals		
EU Trust Fund Strategy	Valletta Action Plan	United Nations Sustainable Development Goals
Four main areas of intervention	Five priority domains, and 16 initiatives	17 goals
<p>1) Greater economic and employment opportunities</p> <p>2) Strengthening resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable, as well as refugees and displaced people</p> <p>3) Improved migration management in countries of origin and transit</p> <p>4) Improved governance and conflict prevention, and reduction of forced displacement and irregular migration</p>	<p>1) Development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. enhance employment opportunities and revenue-generating activities</li> <li>2. link relief, rehabilitation and development in peripheral and most vulnerable areas</li> <li>3. operationalise the African Institute on Remittances</li> <li>4. facilitate responsible private investment and boost trade</li> </ol> <p>2) Legal migration and mobility</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. double the number of Erasmus scholarships</li> <li>6. pool offers for legal migration</li> <li>7. organise workshops on visa facilitation</li> </ol> <p>3) Protection and asylum</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>8. Regional Development and Protection Programmes</li> <li>9. improve the quality of the asylum process</li> <li>10. improve resilience, safety and self-reliance of refugees in camps and host communities</li> </ol> <p>4) Prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking of human beings</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>11. national and regional anti-smuggling and anti-trafficking legislation, policies and action plans</li> <li>12. strengthen institutional capacity to fight smuggling and trafficking</li> <li>13. pilot project in Niger</li> <li>14. information campaigns</li> </ol> <p>5) Return, readmission and reintegration</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>15. strengthen capacity of countries of origin to respond to readmission applications</li> <li>16. support reintegration of returnees into their communities</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) End poverty in all its forms everywhere</li> <li>2) End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture</li> <li>3) Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages</li> <li>4) Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all</li> <li>5) Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls</li> <li>6) Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all</li> <li>7) Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all</li> <li>8) Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all</li> <li>9) Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation</li> <li>10) Reduce inequality within and among countries</li> <li>11) Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable</li> <li>12) Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns</li> <li>13) Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts</li> <li>14) Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development</li> <li>15) Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss</li> <li>16) Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels</li> <li>17) Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development</li> </ol>

## Annex II: Logical Framework

The indicative logframe matrix will evolve during the lifetime of the action and can be revised as necessary:

*Additional note:* The term "results" refers to the outputs, outcome(s) and impact of the Action (OECD DAC definition).

	<b>Results chain: Main expected results (maximum 10)</b>	<b>Indicators (at least one indicator per expected result)</b>	<b>Sources and means of verification</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>
<b>Impact (Overall objective)</b>	Contribute to building sustainable peace and reconciliation in South Sudan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Respect for ceasefire by the parties</li> <li>- Absence of political elite level motivated fighting</li> <li>- Return of refugees and internally displaced persons</li> <li>- Fragile States Index improvements</li> </ul>	United Nations reports including those of special rapporteurs African Union and IGAD reports	<i>Not applicable</i>
<b>Outcome(s) (Specific Objective(s))</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Facilitate reconciliation, with a focus on grass-roots / local level</li> <li>2. Support oversight, monitoring and accountability mechanisms of peace agreement / peace process</li> <li>3. Promote a comprehensive approach to transitional justice</li> </ol>	<p>In areas supported by the action:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- # of local agreements observed</li> <li>- # of nonviolent resolutions of conflicts</li> </ul> <p>Reports to IGAD, AU, United Nations Security allow assessment and corrective measures.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Preparations for design and implementation of transitional justice cover all mechanisms/elements of transitional justice and inclusively involve all groups of society</li> <li>- Legislation and policies taking a comprehensive approach are put in place</li> </ul>	<p>UN field mission reports</p> <p>IGAD / AU / UN reports</p> <p>Legislation and policies</p> <p>United Nations reports</p>	Implementation of the R-ARCSS and sufficient political will to advance agreement objectives

	<b>Results chain: Main expected results (maximum 10)</b>	<b>Indicators (at least one indicator per expected result)</b>	<b>Sources and means of verification</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>
<b>Other Results (Outputs and/or Short- term Outcomes)</b>	1.1. Peace advocacy at national and community level mobilised	- # of advocacy messages disseminated - # of persons reached	Reports by project / activity implementers	Project / activity implementers can access targeted locations and interlocutors
	1.2. (Long term) community mediation, peace building and healing / counselling initiatives / services in place	- # of initiatives - # of communities benefiting from activities		
	1.3. Capacity / enabling environment to carry out reconciliation work of selected stakeholders strengthened / enhanced	Structures for rolling out nationwide grass-root reconciliation activities in place		
	2.1. Robust monitoring of peace agreement implementation: assessment of progress towards implementation, recommendations for corrective measures available.	Progresses reported and communication of corrective measures		
	3.1. Increased awareness of national stakeholders on concepts of transitional justice	- Public debates and events on transitional justice (parliament, town hall meetings, advocacy by victims' and other civil society organisations etc.) - Media reports on transitional justice		
	3.2. Selected preparatory actions for national transitional justice mechanisms / processes piloted	- Purpose-oriented documentation ongoing - Sensitisation activities ongoing, including at grass root level		



## Annex III: EUTF indicators as part of the Monitoring and Learning System

EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS *					
1. Greater economic and employment opportunities		Optimal disaggregation (in addition to geographical location)	3. Improving Migration Management		Optimal disaggregation (in addition to geographical location)
1.1	Number of jobs created	Gender Target groups (refugee, IDP, Host community, returnee, migrant in transit) Age group Types of Job (permanent, short term, cash for work, etc.) Location	3.1	Number of projects by diaspora members	Type of projects
1.2	Number of MSMEs created or supported	Type of support (access to finance, business development, training, equipment, market access, etc.)	3.2	Number of migrants in transit, victims of human trafficking, children in the mobility, IDPs and refugees protected or assisted.	Gender Target groups (refugee, IDP, returnee, migrant in transit) Age group Types of Protection (protection measures, medical and psychosocial, shelter, food, legal, etc.)
1.3	Number of people assisted to develop economic income-generating activities	Gender Target groups (refugee, IDP, Host community, returnee, migrant in transit) Age group Types of support (funding, finance education, entrepreneurship prog., business dev service, etc.)	3.3	Number of migrants, or potential migrants, reached out by information campaign on migration and risks linked to irregular migration	Gender Target groups (refugee, IDP, returnee, migrant in transit) Age group
1.4	Number of people benefiting from professional trainings (TVET) and/or skills development	Gender Target groups (refugee, IDP, Host community, returnee, migrant in transit) Age group Types of TVET (professional training, skills dev scheme, internship, other)	3.4	Number of voluntary returns or humanitarian repatriation supported	Gender Age group Types of assistance (transportation, pre-departures counselling assistance to obtain documents, return tickets, travel escorts, assistance upon arrival, etc.)
1.5	Number of job placements facilitated and/or supported	Gender Target groups (refugee, IDP, Host community, returnee, migrant in transit) Age group Types of Job (permanent, short term, cash for work, incentive, etc.)	3.5	Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	Gender Age group Types of assistance (Income generating, medical, education, housing support etc.)
1.6	Number of industrial parks and business infrastructure created, expanded or improved		3.6	Number of institutions and non-state actors strengthened through capacity building or operational support on protection and migration management	Types of support (capacity building, operational support, etc.)
1.7	Financial volume of new funding instruments for scholarships or self-employment		3.7	Number of individuals trained on migration management	Target groups (state, non-state)
1.7 bis	Financial volume granted to individual recipients		3.8	Number of refugees and forcibly displaced persons receiving legal assistance to support their integration	Gender Target groups (refugee, IDP) Age group
2. Strengthening resilience		Optimal disaggregation (in addition to geographical location)	3.9	Number of early warning systems on migration flows created	
2.1	Number of local development plans directly supported		3.10	Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	Gender Age group
2.1 bis	Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	Use of infrastructure (health, education, water, sanitation, housing, domestic energy, legal, etc.)	3.11	Number of activities/events explicitly dedicated to raising awareness and sensitivity of general public regarding all aspects of migration	Types of activity (media campaigns, etc.)
2.2	Number of people receiving a basic social service	Gender Target groups (refugee, IDP, Host community, returnee, migrant in transit) Age group Types of Service (health, education, water, sanitation, housing, energy, legal, nutrition, etc.)			
2.3	Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	Gender Target groups (refugee, IDP, Host community, returnee, migrant in transit) Age group	4. Improved governance		Optimal disaggregation (in addition to geographical location)
2.4	Number of people receiving food security related assistance	Gender Target groups (refugee, IDP, Host community, returnee, migrant in transit) Age group Types of assistance (social protection schemes, training on agri practice, agri inputs, land dev, etc.)	4.1	Number of border stations supported to strengthen border control	
2.5	Number of local governments and/or communities that adopt and implement local disaster risk reduction strategies		4.2	Number of staff from governmental institutions, internal security forces and relevant non-state actors trained on security, border management, CVE, conflict prevention, protection of civilian populations and human rights	Gender capacity building Type of
2.6	Hectares of land benefiting from improved agricultural management	Types of support (Irrigation, rehabilitation, improved management, etc.)	4.2 bis	Number of Institutions and Non-State actors benefiting from capacity building and operational support on security, border management, CVE, conflict prevention, protection of civilian populations and human rights	Gender capacity building Type of
2.7	Number of people reached by information campaigns on resilience-building practices and basic rights	Gender Target groups (refugee, IDP, Host community, returnee, migrant in transit) Age group Types of practices and rights (health, education, water, energy, rights, etc.)	4.3	Number of people participating in conflict prevention and peace building activities	Gender Target groups (refugee, IDP, Host community, returnee, migrant in transit) Age group Types of Activities (community dialogue, civilian mediation, peacebuilding, awareness raising, etc.)
2.8	Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers benefiting from capacity building for strengthening services delivery	Type of service (health, education, etc.)	4.4	Number of victims of trafficking assisted or referred to assistance services	Gender Target groups (refugee, IDP, Host community, returnee, migrant in transit) Age group Types of Services (medical assistance, psychosocial assistance, counselling, accommodation, legal counselling, family tracking, travel docs, assistance to voluntary return, etc.)
2.9	Number of people having improved access to basic services	Target groups (refugee, IDP, Host community, returnee, migrant in transit)	4.5	Number of cross-border cooperation initiatives created / launched or supported	
CROSS-CUTTING		Optimal disaggregation	4.6	Number of strategies, policies and plans developed and / or directly supported	Types of output
5.1	Number of multi-stakeholders groups and learning mechanisms formed and regularly gathered	Type of actors (state-level, local authorities, civil society) Goal of the group/platform (coordination or learning)	4.7	Number of refugees benefiting from an Out-of-Camp policy	
5.2	Number of planning, monitoring, learning, data-collection and analysis tools set up, implemented and / or strengthened	Types of tools (studies, needs assessment, market assessments, reporting and statistics, etc.)	4.8	Number of national/regional/local networks and dialogues on migration related issues newly established or functionally enhanced	
5.3	Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	Focus of research	* Definition and methodology will be introduced to the implementing partners of the action		