



Learning Lessons from the EUTF

- Phase 2 -

*Paving the way for future programming on migration,
mobility and forced displacement*

Altai Consulting for the European Union – February 2021



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Executive summary

Introduction¹

At the end of 2021, the last contracts of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTF for Africa, hereafter EUTF or Trust Fund) will be signed, bringing an end to an instrument that has so far funded over 500 projects in more than 25 countries in Africa, with a total of over €4.8B committed since 2016.

The next multi-year funding instrument, known as the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), is currently expected to dedicate 10% to migration-related activities. The transition phase between the two instruments offers a unique opportunity to take advantage of the significant experience gained through the EUTF as well as through other migration activities supported by the international community, often in complementarity with the EUTF. **This report therefore aims to provide an analysis of the migration, mobility and displacement programming in EUTF target countries and highlight best practices (both by the EUTF and other interventions) and opportunities to inform future programming.**


Background, objectives and methodology

The *Learning lessons from the EUTF* exercise was initiated at the end of June 2019 as a light, forward looking exercise, intended as an internal and informal reflection on what could be learned from the implementation of the EUTF on the topics of migration and forced displacement. The initial findings of this exercise were delivered in January 2020 in a first draft report.

The second phase of the *Learning lessons from the EUTF* exercise, which lasted from June 2020 to February 2021 pursued the following objectives: pave the way for a post-2020 strategy on migration, mobility and forced displacement; update the EUTF portfolio assessment and contextual data developed in phase I; further analyse the eight thematic areas identified and deliver an updated *Learning lessons from the EUTF* report at the beginning of 2021 to support future programming.

The research was based on the analysis of: materials from implementing partners working on EUTF projects; in-depth secondary research on migration, mobility and forced displacement in general and on each of the eight identified thematic areas represented in the diagram below; and key informant interviews with over 350 stakeholders from a variety of organisations including EU agencies, most EU Delegations (EUDs) covered by the EUTF, implementing partners, member states, the United Nations (UN) and other international organisations as well as members of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), think tanks, academia and civil society. The report was also based on case studies that were conducted in parallel on relevant topics and projects.

Figure 1: Eight thematic areas in the scope of the study



¹ Sources for all information mentioned in the Executive Summary can be found in footnotes in the relevant sections of the main report.

Migration and displacement trends

Irregular arrivals from Africa to Europe have sharply decreased since the migration ‘crisis’ of 2015, which was itself mostly attributable to increased mixed migration from the Middle East, not Africa. Conversely, and perhaps most importantly, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the three EUTF windows, combined with the number of refugees from these countries living in Africa, increased by a third between 2015 and 2019 – from 13.3 million to 17.7 million, including many children. In fact, the number of displaced persons in the SLC region increased by 1.5 million between 2018 and 2019 alone.

The COVID-19 crisis will continue to have a significant influence on migration in the short to medium term. The main migration-related consequences of the pandemic will likely consist in a significant impact on remittances as well as a deterioration of already poor and crowded living conditions for migrants and refugees and worsening access to education and socioeconomic conditions.

In the coming decades, migration, mobility and forced displacement-related challenges are likely to increase, driven mainly by factors such as demographic growth, economic development and climate change. The combination of these factors will, above all, exacerbate pressures on African cities: the number of urban residents in Africa is expected to increase from 550 million in 2018 to 825 million in 2030 and 1.5 billion in 2050, with migration currently contributing to around a third of the increase in the urban population.


All of this suggests a need for a sustained and even increased EU response to migration, forced displacement and mobility-related challenges in Africa, including in cities which will likely be on the frontline of the response to migration pressures, and between Africa and its neighbours, including Europe.

EUTF portfolio analysis

1. Overall EUTF funding dedicated to migration

An analysis of the EUTF portfolio conducted for this report shows that, overall, 51% of EUTF funding is estimated to be directly ‘migration-related’¹ (€1.95B out of a total mapped budget of €3.80B for contracted projects).

Figure 2: Perimeter of migration, mobility and forced displacement-related activities across the four Strategic Objectives of the EUTF




The percentage of EUTF funding per region that is directly related to migration is highest in the North of Africa (NoA) with 84%, followed by the Sahel and Lake Chad region (SLC) with 48% and the Horn of

¹ Throughout this report, ‘migration-related’ refers to migration, mobility and forced displacement, which is not always spelled out for ease of reading.


Africa (HoA) with 39%. **34% of the EUTF’s migration-related budget is spent on support to displacement-affected communities (DACs)** – including resilience, livelihoods and conflict prevention –, around 40% of which is directed to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and their associated host communities.

Figure 3: Migration-related EUTF funding as of September/November 2020 by thematic area



Contrary to perceptions held by some (and to analyses of the overall portfolio where EU member state agencies do tend to have a larger share), only **31% of the EUTF’s migration, mobility and forced displacement-related budget is implemented by member state agencies**. UN agencies actually implement the largest share, with 33% of EUTF migration, mobility and forced displacement-related activities. IOM received almost €400M in EUTF migration, mobility and forced displacement-related funding (€394M), largely through the EU-IOM Joint Initiative, while UNHCR received €181M.

Figure 4: Migration-related EUTF funding as of September/November 2020 by implementing partner



NGOs directly implement a non-negligible proportion of EUTF migration, mobility and forced displacement-related activities, at 14%, with large regional differences (24% in the HoA against only 2% in NoA). It should be noted, however, that this figure does not include the share of projects that are sub-contracted to NGOs by member state agencies and UN agencies. The EUTF mid-term evaluation indicates that NGOs actually represent 25% of total (not only migration-related) contracting when sub-contracts are considered.

Although the ‘peak’ of disbursement of EUTF funding occurred around the summer of 2020, a significant amount of programming remains and will continue to be rolled out until the end of 2024. In addition, contracts ‘in the pipeline’ are expected to increase disbursements of funds to come.

2. Monitoring EUTF results and impact

The EUTF Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) was contracted to design a regional ‘meta-monitoring’ system of EUTF outputs which are analysed in quarterly reports.¹ At this stage, the most visible achievements of the EUTF are these very tangible outputs. This is already meaningful as millions of people of concern have access to improved basic services and benefit from nutritional support, over 100,000 migrants have been supported to return home and are receiving employment reintegration support, many frameworks and systems have been created to manage migration better, civil servants have been mobilised and trained, migrants smugglers are being prosecuted, etc.

Beyond output monitoring, outcomes are also being measured by projects, and the MLS initially attempted to aggregate these. But because these numbers depend on the methodological choices

¹ Available on the EUTF Website.

made by implementing partners, and because the intensity of the changes cannot be summed up, EUTF management and the MLS decided not to go forward with a quantitative aggregation of outcome indicators, and to analyse individual project outcomes as they emerge.

The broader impact of the EUTF is even more difficult to capture, but will have to be considered and analysed over the next few years. Perhaps more importantly, our research suggests more ‘intangible’ but highly significant effects generated by the EUTF, including the new dynamics of collaboration being created across governments and the improved capacity and influence of institutions (e.g. IGAD); the information networks and linkages being established across police and intelligence agencies (e.g. ROCK); the political access being gained with governments and new dynamics of collaboration around subjects that were until recently deemed too sensitive or EU-centred.


These effects will have to continue to be measured in the future as projects funded by the EUTF come to maturity. This longitudinal analysis should be integrated into the design of future programmes.

Migration governance

For this thematic review and portfolio analysis, support to migration governance includes: i) support for the development of migration governance norms, policies, frameworks, strategies, etc. (hereafter ‘frameworks’), and the integration of migration-related issues into existing sectoral frameworks; ii) capacity building for government staff on policymaking (vs. operational) purposes; and iii) support for coordination between countries, and within countries (between policymakers).¹ **Frameworks specific to migration are not the only way forward** when it comes to migration governance. However, key good practices include ‘whole-of-government’ approaches and the inclusion of local governments and civil society. **Studies have been conducted on migration governance frameworks in Africa but research on their implementation is almost non-existent.**

1. Situation across Africa

Figure 5: Selected migration governance frameworks in Africa (cross-country level)



2. Key non-EUTF interventions

At least €110M were identified as spent on migration governance programming by non-EUTF donors in the EUTF regions, dealing with a diverse range of themes but tending to focus on the regional level.² Beyond the EU, prominent donors include Germany and to a lesser extent Sweden and Switzerland. **Innovative approaches** identified include: demand-driven facilities that ensure stronger

¹ The term ‘policymakers’ can include non-traditional actors such as NGOs, CSOs, even the private sector, as long as they are part of a group making policy decisions for example.

² However smaller programming focused at the national and local level was certainly missed by this thematic review.

ownership of donor programming (which is especially key in the field of governance – for example as part of the German agency GIZ's 'Support to the African Union on migration and displacement' or the EU's FMM¹ projects) and the 'Swiss approach', which focuses on specific countries (e.g. Tunisia) and attempts to build migration governance systems over a number of years and at various levels (both national and local).

3. EUTF portfolio

About €75M in EUTF funding is dedicated to migration governance, over half of which is spent in the Horn of Africa. Key implementers include GIZ (€24M) and IOM (€12M). **In general, the EUTF has so far not adopted a comprehensive approach of support to migration governance**, instead tending to support specific governance structures with the objective of facilitating the implementation of its projects.

Main themes covered include, with around €15M each: overall migration policies at the national or local levels; policies related to **forced displacement**, mostly to improve the inclusion of refugee- and IDP-related considerations into local governance systems in HoA; **smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons**, again focused on the HoA, with the Better Migration Management (BMM) programme in particular; and **legal and labour migration** to a slightly lesser extent (about €12M), mostly through support to IGAD's Protocols on Free Movement and the THAMM² programme in NoA. In addition, €5M were allocated to addressing governance related to **returns and reintegration**, and a few projects across the three windows aim to address governance on **protection**.

4. Perspectives and areas of opportunities

The next funding cycle should be an opportunity to adopt a more ambitious and systematic approach to supporting migration governance across Africa.

Good practices are highlighted in the Migration governance section of this report, such as the EU FMM initiative in West Africa and its demand driven facility. Following a similar cross-country and multi-annual logic, a new ambitious EU-funded programme could be put in place at the cross-country level to support the development, coordination and harmonisation of migration governance systems across Africa.

Such a programme would be designed and managed to: i) keep track of the development of migration governance systems over the next decade; ii) respond rapidly to partner governments' needs with a customised approach; iii) map, track and share good practices in migration management support initiatives across countries; and iv) complement these support initiatives and foster coherence between approaches while minimising overlap (given that other donors will continue to run their own migration governance support programmes).

This combination of analytical and technical support should be ensured in the medium term to accelerate efforts currently taking place in many countries.

To pave the way for such a programme, the EU should engage in a comprehensive exercise aimed at assessing both the situation – including gaps – in migration governance legislation and in its implementation, as well as the current structures in place (coordination agencies, secretariats, focal points in ministries and at local level) and the absorption capacities of partner countries, as of 2021. This assessment would also set a strong baseline for future programming.

Labour migration & migration for development

This thematic review covers activities supporting labour migration (as well as student mobility) **and the positive impact of diasporas** in countries of origin (often referred to as 'migration for

¹ FMM is the 'Support to Free Movement of Persons and Migration in West Africa' project.

² THAMM stands for 'Towards a Holistic Approach to Labour Migration Governance and Labour Mobility in North Africa.'

development'). It therefore covers mobility schemes (for workers and students) and other activities that directly contribute to the safe mobility of new migrants, as well as programming that aims to increase the contributions of existing migrant populations to their countries of origin. **Identity (ID) systems** are also considered in this thematic review as the lack of foundational identity systems is a major challenge to free movement.

1. Situation across Africa

The AU Protocol on Free Movement of Persons (FMP), adopted in 2018, requires 15 ratifications to enter into force but has so far only been ratified by four states. Though most RECs have either adopted or proposed protocols for the free movement of persons between states, in practice, implementation has only started in ECOWAS and the EAC. Inspired by the ECOWAS and EAC protocols, IGAD's Protocol on FMP was endorsed in February 2020 with EUTF support. It is important to keep in mind that **Protocols on FMP are a necessary condition for the continent to fully benefit from migration, but, alone, they are insufficient.** Investments in infrastructure connecting countries with each other, as well as strong ID systems will also be needed.

Three main types of labour migration were identified: 1) **within Africa** - In 2017, there were around 13 to 14.4 million migrant workers across Africa, of whom almost 30% were working in southern Africa. In addition, although numbers are difficult to find, cross-border transhumance and nomadic pastoralism may well turn out to constitute the bulk of 'labour migration' occurring within the continent; 2) **to the Middle East** - Estimates of African migrant workers in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and Lebanon vary between 2 and 4.5 million. Low-skilled migrant workers are vulnerable to exploitation, and faced with mass expulsions and trafficking; 3) **to the EU** to a lesser extent - In the EU, 61,000 first-time residence permits were issued to African citizens in 2019 for work reasons, though this represented only 12% of all permits issued. A significant proportion of irregular flows to Europe can however also be qualified as labour migration.

Student mobility is still low. 'Only' 130,000 African students (tertiary level) were studying in other African countries in 2017, while over 400,000 were studying in non-African countries, including 245,000 in Europe. Lack of universal recognition of university degrees constrains the mobility of students across Africa.

Migration for development – Remittances represent a significant proportion of GDP, and in some countries, they represent more than ten times the amount of development aid. While **it is unclear to what extent remittances contribute to economic growth,** they can support communities' resilience and help to reduce their economic vulnerability. **Diasporas are a growing topic:** though only a minority of African states have national labour and/or diaspora policies, over two thirds of those that do have adopted them in the past four years.

2. Key non-EUTF interventions

This thematic review identified projects worth around €110M currently funded by non-EUTF actors in the fields of labour migration and migration for development, including about €70M from other EU sources such as the European Development Fund (EDF) and the EU Pan-African Programme. Other **key donors include the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) and GIZ/Germany.** Thematically, funding is largely targeted at small-scale mobility schemes, efforts to protect migrant workers (which are mostly implemented by the ILO), and increasing contributions of migrant workers to their countries of origin.

3. EUTF portfolio

EUTF funding for labour migration and migration for development is limited compared to other thematic areas, accounting for about €75M (with an additional €10M if one includes support to IGAD's Free Movement Protocol, which is counted in the thematic review on *Migration governance*), or about

2% of total EUTF funding, of which almost half is allocated to the NoA window. Senegal and Morocco received particularly significant funding. **The largest amounts are dedicated to promoting diaspora investments (about €35M), to mobility schemes** for students and university staff (Erasmus+, €16M) and for workers (THAMM, €15M). In addition, €57M were used to support **identity systems**, mostly in Mali and Senegal).

4. Perspectives and areas of opportunity

Making free movement protocols a reality and preparing infrastructures to support mobility in Africa should be a priority.

This should be connected to the broader efforts on supporting migration governance frameworks and capacities across Africa and will also require the development of a realistic roadmap and investment plans to put robust ID systems in place across the continent.

Protocols on transhumance and their implementation should also be supported, especially given the challenges related to herder-farmer conflicts in the SLC area. Key lessons learned can be drawn from FMM research on the implementation of the ECOWAS transhumance protocol.

Donors should continue to focus on supporting the development of intra-Africa transport, connectivity infrastructure and hubs of economic development, as the real benefits of free movement can be multiplied if migrants can access favourable economic environments.

Intra-country mobility should also be looked at with great attention, especially in the context of climate change, with rural workers increasingly likely to move to cities (as opposed to other countries) due to decreasing agricultural returns.

Migrant workers' specific needs should be streamlined into employment policies and planning, particularly regarding access to social services and protection. The EU could also help African states, most likely through Regional Economic Communities (RECs), **to develop regional positions and measures to negotiate with other states who receive labour migrants.**

In the short term, concrete gaps and complementarities should be identified between labour markets in Africa. As labour market information systems are likely to remain limited in the short term, efforts should focus on the most promising sectors where numbers are likely to be significant.

Pilot initiatives for mobility schemes toward Europe should be scaled up, building on the experience of existing schemes.

To further develop student mobility and based on its relevant experience, the EU could strengthen its support to the AU and RECs **to facilitate recognition (and portability) of qualifications (including for TVET)** across Africa. It could also step up its support to intra-Africa student mobility (access to full degrees, building the capacities of institutions). Lessons could be drawn from the EU-funded 'Intra-Africa Academic Mobility Scheme' and pilot projects between TVET institutions.

Finally, the EU could support increased and more profitable diaspora involvement in Africa's mid/long-term development, in part by adopting 'systemic approaches' to reducing the cost of remittances as well as through efforts to encourage diaspora entrepreneurship. **In parallel, the EU could assist countries to develop positive relations of trust with their diasporas**, which should ultimately allow for more development-oriented diaspora investments.

Response to forced displacement

Forced displacement is not a legal term but rather a commonly accepted way of describing the movement of populations protected by international conventions and frameworks. It is defined as *'the movement of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters.'*

1. Situation across Africa

The HoA region is characterised by large numbers of forcibly displaced people (accounting for 61% of all displaced people in EUTF countries), most of whom are hosted in camps. **In SLC**, which accounts for 33% of all displaced people in EUTF countries, **increased violence in the last few years has provoked additional displacement** around the Liptako-Gourma region and the Lake Chad Basin. **In NoA**, the escalation of hostilities in Libya and the Syrian crisis have led to an increase in the number of IDPs, refugees and asylum seekers.

In SLC and HoA, governments have progressively adopted laws to protect forcibly displaced people and to implement international and regional conventions at the national level, with Uganda considered a model country for refugee policy in HoA, and Niger standing out in SLC for having passed a law protecting IDPs (in 2018) by making the government responsible for assisting them. **Conversely, most NoA countries have not yet adopted domestic measures to ensure the implementation of frameworks on refugees and IDPs.** However, Morocco stands out with the introduction in 2014 of the National Immigration and Asylum Policy.

2. Key non-EUTF interventions

Humanitarian funding for forcibly displaced people is highly dependent on a small share of donors and actors. In all three regions, UNHCR is the main recipient of donor funding, and the US government is the main donor. In terms of UNHCR funding, most situations that are considered protracted are lacking more than 50% of required funding, possibly indicating donor fatigue. **Targeted development assistance for forced displacement has grown rapidly since 2016**, thanks in large part to the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, which launched the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) approach and to increased involvement from multilateral development banks. UNHCR has positioned itself as a catalyst for engagement of development funding, and multi-donor initiatives (like the FCDO-UNHCR-World Bank programme 'Building the Evidence on Forced Displacement') and private sector actors (such as the IKEA Foundation) are also emerging as key players in this field.

3. EUTF portfolio

The EUTF has funded a large and diverse range of projects to support DACs, with €638M used to implement various strategies across the three windows, from support to international frameworks for DACs in HoA (such as the CRRF projects in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda) to resilience-building LRRD (Linking relief, rehabilitation and development) approaches in SLC. **Most stakeholders claim that the EUTF has created space, learning and funding for a significant number of innovative 'pilot' projects to support DACs**, and such risk-tolerant funding seems to have encouraged other development partners to pursue similar approaches. Examples of this include the RDPP Kenya project, which acted as a catalyst to attract additional donors and programmes to Kalobeyei (such as the IFC's Kakuma Kalobeyei Challenge Fund).

4. Perspectives and areas of opportunity

4.1. General principles

Donor coordination is critical in forced displacement programming. The creation of joint funds should be considered to ensure a common strategy and approach to forced displacement in each country or area of intervention. Furthermore, to support **evidence-based approaches**, multi-donor mapping, vulnerability assessments and political economy analyses should be commissioned, and **real-time monitoring of activities** should be used to adjust interventions to rapidly evolving contexts and integrate lessons and best practices. Political dialogue and cooperation with local government and sectoral systems should be prioritised, and the EU's political clout offers an opportunity to **bridge the**

gap between development and political actors. Finally, further engagement with the private sector should be considered where possible, notably through **public-private partnerships**.

4.2. Programme design

Agility and flexibility (such as through crisis modifier funds) should be prioritised in programme design so that interventions can better respond to the volatility of displacement situations and concomitant humanitarian and development needs. **Continuity** should also be promoted through longer multi-year programming cycles. Where possible, **a nexus approach** should be adopted, for example by conducting joint assessments with ECHO where possible. DACs should themselves be integrated into programme design through **participatory approaches**, and **area-based approaches** should be employed where appropriate. Livelihoods interventions should be based on strong **value chain analyses** and take into consideration beneficiaries' aspirations. **Targeting** methodologies should be primarily vulnerability- and needs-based, though additional vulnerabilities arising from status alone must also be considered. **Support to urban areas** hosting many forcibly displaced people should be extended where possible. **Finally, ensuring that all implementing partners include and effectively implement an appropriate exit strategy** is key to ensuring the sustainability of their approach.

4.3. Evidence-based and data-driven approach

Collaboration with learning partners should continue to foster the identification of best practices and lessons learned for future interventions (e.g. ReDSS for RE-INTEG, URD for KEY in Mali). **Investments should be made in research and learning on support to DACs in insecure and hard-to-reach areas**, as methods of implementation and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) often need to be adapted to them. **Data collected on forced displacement, beneficiary profiles and needs should be harmonised and centralised** to better inform policy and programming. The impact of projects should be monitored as they unfold to be able to scale up promising activities and ensure alignment with durable solutions frameworks. Finally, the **inclusion of additional groups in the definition of forced displacement should be considered** to take into consideration some groups that are left in a 'grey area', such as forced returns, and to adapt to the evolution of the migration context.


Protection

There is no universally agreed definition of protection, but, for the purpose of this study, we use that of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), according to which protection refers to *'all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law (human rights law, humanitarian law and refugee law)'*. This definition also applies to **people on the move**, who will be the focus of this section.¹

1. Situation across Africa

Conflict-related violence, combined with poor protection governance and the COVID-19 pandemic, are contributing to higher protection needs across the region, especially in NoA and SLC.

Figure 6: Main protection needs for people on the move in the three EUTF windows



2. EU and non-EU interventions and actors

The US is currently the largest contributor of **humanitarian funding** to protection activities in the EUTF regions between 2016 and 2020. It is especially active in the HoA, where it has provided nearly USD 194M in protection funding, of which 47% has been allocated to the UN. Similarly, **the EU** – currently the third largest donor of humanitarian funding to protection activities in the EUTF regions² after the UN – has allocated half of its humanitarian protection funds in the past four years to HoA. **Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBPF)** in Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia allocated USD 188M to protection activities between 2016 and 2020. **Switzerland** is the fifth largest donor with USD 142M allocated to protection between 2016 and 2020.

The NoA window leads with the highest amount (€170M) and proportion (24%) of EUTF funding allocated to protection activities, as the protection of vulnerable migrants is one of the four priority areas for the region according to the EUTF's Strategic Board. **The portfolio analysis indicates smaller proportions of EUTF funds allocated to protection in SLC (4%) and HOA (3%).** However, this is partly because in SLC, many protection activities are included in the 'return and reintegration' and 'forced displacement' categories of the portfolio analysis. Similarly, in the HoA context, protection

¹ IOM and UNHCR use the IASC definition.

² As of November 2020, the EU is the first contributor in Libya with USD 30M. OCHA website, Libya. Retrieved [here](#).

needs are less urgent and more likely to be addressed through longer-term support to displacement-affected communities.

3. Protection response and main challenges

Protection responses can range from **flexible interventions to quickly stop, limit or alleviate the impact of violence on people on the move; the provision of services along migration routes; awareness raising (AR) campaigns** (which mostly focus on the risks of irregular migration, rather than providing information on alternatives to irregular migration); **and durable solutions approaches** (e.g. voluntary returns, local integration and resettlement).

Interlocutors reported several **challenges** associated with implementing protection interventions. For example, **the targeting of beneficiaries within mixed migration flows in emergency contexts** represents a significant challenge, in part because refugees, IDPs and migrants all have different needs and protection frameworks. **Cooperating with local and national actors**, while essential, can also be challenging if their understanding of protection incidents and their capacity to address the protection needs of people on the move is limited. Finally, although **resettlement** is an effective and durable protection solution, **it targets a very limited number of refugees, and is an expensive and complex mechanism as seen with the Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM)**. Funded by the UNHCR and the EU, it was launched in late 2017, to evacuate the most vulnerable refugees from Libya to Niger and Rwanda, where support to resettlement and complementary pathways are meant to be provided. Though 3,833 persons have been evacuated as of December 2020, political and security constraints in Libya, bottlenecks in the resettlement process and a lack of alternative regular pathways to Europe can limit the positive impact of the programme in the long run.

4. Perspectives and areas of opportunity

Flexible interventions that provide protection services in emergency contexts should support an inclusive approach to protection while also maintaining adapted protection services for different migration profiles. **Knowledge of local dynamics** should be strengthened to ensure interventions adapted to the context, while strengthened **cooperation with national and local actors** will help to ensure continuity. **Mobile interventions and search and rescue operations along fast changing migration routes should continue**, and should be supported by effective referral systems to more/better equipped protection actors. The **network of Migrant Resource Centres (MRCs) should also be strengthened** by building the capacity of their staff and promoting mobile clinics and protection monitoring patrols. Information sharing, data collection and analysis on protection needs, **especially regarding women and children on the move**, should be strengthened.

AR campaigns should not only focus on the protection risks along the route, but should also provide information about alternatives to irregular migration, local opportunities, and how to best prepare for the risks for those who still wish to continue to migrate.

Capacity building and cooperation efforts to reinforce the protection environment should focus on **national protection laws and frameworks** for people on the move, **capacity building in the psychosocial sector (PSS)**, **cooperation between state actors**, and **sensitisation of national and local authorities on protection issues**, especially regarding children and women. **Long term funding** for this should be ensured, as well as closer coordination between humanitarian and development actors in the protection sector.

Several areas of opportunity were also identified for **durable protection solutions**.

With regards to the ETM, the local footprint and knowledge of the Libyan context should continue being strengthened to ensure access to detention centres and effective cooperation with the most relevant local and international actors on the ground in a very fluid environment. **If ETM activities are scaled up to other countries, transparency and realism on the transit centres' absorption capacities and resettlement opportunities** should be assured when making the initial

agreement with government partners. **Communication efforts with beneficiaries** should be improved to avoid pull factors in detention centres or tensions and disappointment, including during transit, and make sure beneficiaries' expectations are realistic. **Advocacy efforts** should be continued in favour of more resettlement spots and swifter and remote resettlement (RST) selection processes.

Durable protection solutions should also continue to be provided directly **from Libya**, through stronger cooperation between the EU and Libyan authorities to include people on the move in the country's reconstruction phase in the future. Good practices of countries like Sweden and Canada which select RST beneficiaries located in Libya or Italy which operates humanitarian evacuations directly from Libya can also be replicated.

Finally, **complementary pathways** should be encouraged in parallel: stronger Refugee Status Determination (RSD) capacities could be put in place in countries along the migration routes for potential asylum seekers to apply before they reach Libya; local livelihood opportunities could be more systematically offered to migrants and asylum seekers in all countries along the route (as currently being piloted in Mauritania by the UNHCR with EUTF funding), as an alternative to heading north.

Return & reintegration

This section provides an analysis of the landscape of return to and reintegration (RR) in Africa, building on a thorough review of the EUTF-funded return and reintegration activities (from Africa to Africa), as well as on insights from non-EUTF interventions (including returns from Europe to Africa) to gain a comprehensive overview of the actors and approaches at stake, and of best practices in this field. Resettlement is covered in the thematic review on *Protection*.

1. Situation across Africa

Returns from the EU: From 2014 to 2019, a total of 11,940 migrants benefitted from assisted return (mainly voluntary) from the EU (28 countries) to Africa, with 58% returning to Algeria, Nigeria, Morocco and Tunisia. During the same timeframe, 221,560 were forcibly returned following an order to leave.

Returns from Africa: From May 2017 to November 2020, IOM assisted 88,949 people with their voluntary return from Africa and 101,027 migrants with reintegration assistance, with a sharp increase in the number of third-country nationals being forcibly returned from Algeria to neighbouring countries such as Mali and Niger in 2019.

Returns from the Middle East: Over four years (2013-2014 and 2017-2020), the approximate number of returns from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) (total 437,509) is almost twice the total number of forced returns from the EU recorded in five years (221,560).

With the onset of **COVID-19 and the suspension of AVR services, returns were mostly spontaneous** from March 2020 through the following six months, meaning without external assistance, protection or health control.

Migrants face numerous socioeconomic challenges in the context of reintegration. Migrants moving within Africa often undertake dangerous journeys and are at risk of a range of human rights violations and abuses. Minimally integrated and low-skilled migrants returning to Africa from Europe face loss of social status, shame and self-stigmatisation in their communities of return, and may have to reimburse family members for financial support provided on the initial migration journey.

2. EUTF portfolio

Within the EUTF portfolio, over €306M are dedicated to RR across the three windows through a total of 33 projects. The SLC window receives most of this funding (55%) due to the EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration (EU-IOM JI) and to the main return route from northern Africa to the SLC, followed by NoA (27%) and HoA (18%). With over 100 000 migrants

supported in their return and / or reintegration process, the Joint Initiative is **the only large-scale programme dealing with south-south RR flows and is unique in its magnitude.**

The **amount and form of assistance** provided to individual returnees varies depending on vulnerabilities and needs. In its initial phase, the EU-IOM JI experienced a much larger than expected caseload, which generated delays in the provision of economic reintegration assistance, creating a degree of dissatisfaction among returnees and some attrition. The outbreak of COVID-19 has further complicated the provision of in-kind assistance which has often been replaced by cash or mobile money.

The need for **psychosocial support** (PSS) is widespread among returnees, particularly minors. The EU-IOM JI offers PSS but returnees' needs are only partially met, with persisting challenges in identifying needs and ensuring accessibility, quality and continuity of care. To address the EU-IOM JI's PSS weakness, IOM is mobilising medical NGOs where possible but few referral mechanisms are yet in place.

IOM has started to offer a broader range of **economic reintegration options**. **Job creation:** the EU-IOM JI assists many returnees to set up their own businesses but the constrained reintegration budget per beneficiary limits the necessary pre-assessments and follow-up. **Job placements** or the orientation of returnees towards concrete jobs has not been very developed through the EU-IOM JI yet as they require a robust knowledge of the job market, a network of private sector actors and local employers, and specific expertise that IOM is yet to build. **Referrals** are still few but increasing under the JI. Referring to other EUTF projects has been done to a limited extent due to a variety of obstacles.

Community-based projects: In practice, the evolution toward more community support did not happen to the extent originally intended by IOM, and the **approach faces considerable operational challenges and delays**. The level of engagement in, experience with and opinions about collective and community assistance vary significantly. There seems to be a contrast between implementing partners and governments' enthusiasm on the one hand and the limited returnees' interest on the other.

National ownership and sustainability of the RR process requires policy development and institutional strengthening as well as the involvement and capacity building of national actors. EUTF funding has been essential to open a dialogue with national authorities on migration issues such as RR. The EU-IOM JI has so far made considerable progress enhancing these governance dimensions to increase empowerment, ownership and leadership. IOM has invested commendable efforts in formal and informal capacity building of governments and field partners. However, significant challenges persist and questions related to the end of the project and funding remain, such as how to institutionalise technical committees and coordination bodies. Further, the **involvement of national institutions remains limited and, in some countries, they demand to play a more central role.**

While the EU-IOM JI plans to continue strengthening capacity building with different partners, other EUTF-funded programmes are pushing for national appropriation of the RR process through capacity building of national authorities that are entirely in charge of managing RR. Projects supporting national ownership of the RR process include the 'Sustainable reintegration support to Ethiopian returnees from Europe' and '*ProGreS Migration Tunisie*', a reintegration project in Tunisia whose objective is to support a Tunisian-led common reintegration mechanism ('Tounesna') for a selected number of Tunisian returnees from four European countries. So far, this is the only identified platform exclusively dedicated to reintegration in EUTF countries. Essential to the development of such platforms is the **willingness and interest of the government to own the process**. Efforts are also ongoing to strengthen cooperation on RR between authorities across EUTF windows, including through the cross-window programme '*Action de Coopération Sud-Sud en matière de migration*'.

Emergency returns and Voluntary Humanitarian Returns (VHR) from Africa to Africa – VHRs offer tailored approaches to migrants impacted by conflict or natural disaster-related displacement. IOM is one of the few actors with tangible results on VHR as they also occur under the EU-IOM JI. VHR and

reintegration from Libya is also one of the specific objectives of the EUTF-funded 'Managing mixed migration flows in Libya' project.

3. Return and reintegration from Europe (non-EUTF)

This section describes the **key return flows** from the EU to Africa in the last ten years and the **evolution of key RR-related policies, actors and funding** since the 1970s. It further draws attention to partnerships between and approaches by EU member states. **AVR** has gained substantial appeal as it is perceived as a **cost-effective and more humane alternative to deportations**. **IOM** has become the main agency for AVRR, benefitting from strong financial backing from EU funds and member states. In parallel, **Frontex** was created in 2004, but its mandate only expanded to cover return management in 2016 and reintegration in 2019.

4. Perspectives and areas of opportunity

The magnitude of return flows should be assessed and anticipated to calibrate future return programmes. Although the available data is incomplete, several major flows of return to Africa from Africa, Europe and the Middle East were identified over the last five years. Future trends should be assessed based on a combination of datasets that include data collected by IOM (e.g. Displacement Tracking Matrix or DTM) and by the DRC through the Mixed Migration Centre, as well as data available from Frontex and EU member states' interior ministries on irregular migrants in the EU. Using this data to monitor trends should allow the EU and other relevant actors to properly calibrate the systems to be maintained or put in place to support future returns.

Returns from Africa to Africa are likely to remain a key focus area for the EU, and the number of returnees to be supported in the future is expected to remain significant as most are low-skilled or otherwise vulnerable. Thus, a robust system of assistance should be maintained, and **lessons from the EU-IOM JI and other relevant projects should be integrated.**

The capacity of local reintegration platforms should continue to be reinforced, taking advantage of best practices developed by other agencies under the European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) and EUTF funding. While the EU-IOM JI mostly focused on the national adaptation of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for RR, the next step of building local capacity and a platform for reintegration was not delivered through the EU-IOM JI. **The next cycle of EU funding could support the long-term establishment of national platforms for RR** that are integrated into local frameworks.

Returns from Europe should take advantage of the experience gained through ERRIN and the EU-IOM JI to be progressively harmonised and use the national platforms as they emerge, while remaining cognizant of the member states' preference to remain owners of their RR process. The EU would benefit from a more coherent return strategy, based on a thorough analysis of RR actors, their purposes and areas of focus. This would provide a basis to move away from project-based organisation towards **robust, long-term relationships between partners with strong coordination procedures.**

The **complexity of creating job opportunities in most African countries**, for returning migrants as well as the local population, should not be overlooked in future programming, and will require well-structured or more organic (community-based) approaches to job creation that adopt a long-term view of labour market needs, as well as a higher level of funding per capita – than currently being proposed through the EU-IOM Joint Initiative, with an average €1,500 per returnee –, to ensure the sustainability of the reintegration process.

Finally, **RR programmes should continue to be assessed, best practices should be built on and areas for further research should be identified.** For example, lessons learned from ILO's support to major waves of returns from the Gulf States to Africa should be examined to identify best practices and challenges and support future returns from the same region.

Response to trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants

This report defines **Trafficking in persons (TIP)** as ‘the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.’¹ **Smuggling of migrants (SOM)** is defined in one of the Palermo protocols as ‘procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.’

TIP and SOM are fundamentally distinct crimes under international law and require different policy responses (while some smuggling may end in trafficking, most of the time, it does not). For different reasons, **both TIP and SOM can have connections to other types of criminal activities**, though the association is more systematic in the case of cross-border TIP networks. However, despite being different crimes both practically and under international law, **the concepts of migrant smuggling and trafficking are often conflated**. Placing TIP and SOM on equal footing puts **excessive emphasis on the criminal exploitation aspect**, which is stronger in trafficking, while neglecting the agency of migrants seeking smuggling services. This tends to lead to a response focused on a law enforcement approach, with disproportionate attention paid to border controls and to the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators, as well as the criminalisation of victims and a **lack of attention to their protection needs**.

1. Situation across Africa

In Africa, the extent and persistence of TIP and SOM are rooted in state fragility (including total state collapse in Libya), mass conflict-driven forced displacement, limited legal migration options and poverty. In SLC, smuggling and trafficking itineraries mainly go through countries like Mali or Niger to reach the Maghreb and Europe.² In HoA, routes follow the three main migration paths (northern, eastern and southern). Many migrant smuggling and human trafficking criminal networks operate in countries in NoA due to their strategic location between sub-Saharan Africa and Europe, their status as origin, transit and destination countries for migration, and the civil war in Libya. **While many frameworks on anti-trafficking can be observed at the continental, regional, and national level, few exist on smuggling.**

2. Key non-EUTF interventions

This study identified more than €69M of non-EUTF funding dedicated to ongoing projects in the areas of anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling, including more than €46M by other EU instruments. **Few donors and relatively small amounts appear to be dedicated to these actions. The EU is currently funding three projects on these issues in West Africa:** A-TIPSOM and OCWAR-T³ and the FMM project with ECOWAS. Some EU member states are also taking independent action against SOM and TIP. Apart from the EU, two of the main donors are the UK and the US, which, for example, contribute a combined €42.7M to the Global Fund to End Modern Slavery. **The types of interventions identified demonstrate that donors are increasingly opting for integrated approaches to TIP and SOM.**

¹ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons especially women and children’, Article 3a, 2000. Retrieved [here](#).

² GAR-SI Description of Action.

³ A-TIPSOM is the “Action Against Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants” project and OCWAR-T is the “Organized Crime: West African Response to Trafficking” project.

3. EUTF portfolio

EUTF funding for anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling activities represents 5% of the EUTF's migration-related budget. According to our portfolio analysis, a total of €95M of the EUTF's contracted budget is allocated to activities tackling TIP and SOM, of which 51% or €49M is allocated to SLC, 27% (€25M) to NoA, and 22% (€21M) to HoA. **28 projects deal with anti-trafficking across the three windows, including 20 in SLC, five in HoA and three in NoA.** Projects in NoA are mainly dedicated to law enforcement and security activities. In SLC, anti-trafficking efforts aim to protect victims and better regulate human trafficking in transit countries, such as Niger and Mali. In HoA, the EUTF supports strengthening of national capacities as well as cooperation between countries on sharing information and dismantling criminal organisations operating in the region (e.g. ROCK).

4. Perspectives and areas of opportunities

4.1. Strategic focus

The difference between TIP and SOM should be clarified at both the strategic and programming level through awareness raising, information and training activities, as the understanding of and response to TIP and SOM are undermined by a common tendency to conflate the two concepts.

African countries and organisations generally have structures in place to deal with TIP, but these often require expansion, enforcement or updating. It would therefore be beneficial to **support the implementation of existing frameworks and plans, though donors should always ensure that they are appropriately tailored to national needs and dynamics:** a bad law can be worse than none.

Information sharing, data collection and research on trafficking and smuggling should continue to be funded, and should be used in real time to adjust programming in a fast-changing environment.

The **sheltering, protection and reintegration of victims of trafficking (VOT)** remain a significant gap in anti-trafficking actions. Increased funding to extend and renovate transit centres is therefore key. Donors should also invest more in psychosocial support for VOTs, which is a prerequisite for further longer term reintegration activities (such as help with finding a job).

More effort should be invested in domestic TIP and in **coordinating with anti-money laundering activities.** The EUTF's AML/THB¹ programme in HoA is a significant achievement for the EU, but it would be advisable to **strengthen cooperation in this field with actors such as UNODC,** as observed in BMM, to maximise synergies.

4.2. Modalities of intervention

Many projects seeking to address TIP only receive short-term, limited funding to act on specific issues. **Encouraging more holistic approaches** through larger grants would likely be beneficial. Building partnerships with **influential local voices / civil society organisations (CSOs)** to convey prevention messages on anti-trafficking is recommended. There is also a reported need for **increased gender sensitivity in projects that seek to combat TIP and SOM.** **Local ownership** should also be enhanced across all levels by, for example, **developing co-decided projects** such as with FMM in West Africa. There is also reportedly room for improvement for donors to **strengthen coordination, advocacy and political dialogue** in order to ensure the most appropriate analysis and approaches.

Border management

There are several definitions of and approaches to border management, but most are related to border controls – that is, monitoring, regulating and/or facilitating the flows of people, goods, services,

¹ The full name of the programme is the 'Disrupting Criminal Trafficking and Smuggling Networks Through Increased Anti-Money Laundering and Financial Investigation Capacity in The Greater Horn of Africa.'

money, animals, etc. Border management is therefore relevant to security concerns such as counterterrorism and trafficking, and extends into areas such as integration, customs, trade and transport. Against this backdrop, the concept of **Integrated Border Management (IBM)** was coined by various actors, including the EU and the IOM, **stressing the need for inter-agency and inter-country cooperation and adopting a holistic view of addressing border challenges.**

1. Situation across Africa

Despite progress made since the 1960s, formal border delimitation in Africa remains unachieved: in 2011, only about a third of African borders were properly demarcated. **Most African borders are fluid and integrated to some extent**, in part due to the presence of the same communities and tribes across borders.

Frameworks and policies on border management involve different actors at the international, continental, regional and national levels that often have differing interests and priorities regarding security, migration and regional integration. The **AU has committed to a progressive border agenda that emphasises border cooperation and joint governance.** However, **regional cooperation and the implementation of key frameworks remain challenging**, with differing priorities and limited human and financial resources, data sharing, and member state ratifications of key documents.

2. Key non-EUTF interventions

This review identified several ongoing border management projects funded by non-EUTF actors in the EUTF regions, including at least €108M in funding from other EU sources. **Apart from the EU, key identified donors include EU member states, notably France and Germany, which along with the UK and USAID** promote border management efficiency by facilitating regional integration and trade, and strengthening border security and anti-trafficking, as well as Japan, which provides support to equipment, infrastructure, technology and information systems in Uganda, for example.

3. EUTF portfolio

Border management represents the second-largest thematic area in terms of EUTF funding (after support to DACs, and on an equal basis with Protection and RR) **and accounts for 16% of the EUTF's** migration, mobility and forced displacement-related budget, or 8% of the total EUTF budget. According to our portfolio analysis, **a total of €320M has been contracted to border management interventions** through 32 EUTF projects (23 in SLC).

Border management funding is mostly attributed to NoA, with **€160M**, or 50% of the total spending, followed by **SLC with €145M** (45%). In **HoA**, border management (**€15M**, 5%) is only a secondary topic that places far behind economic and resilience efforts for displacement-affected communities.

4. Perspectives and areas of opportunity

Border management tends to be treated by many stakeholders solely from the security point of view. However, the significance of cross-border trade and informal flows of people and goods means that it is important to tap into the benefits of supporting borders for economic development, and to **de-securitise the border management agenda. It would be hugely beneficial to take a positive view of borders and borderlands** and to create a limited number of organised, sustainable crossing points that support free movement, legal trade and security, without hindering traditional informal movements.

Excessively strict border management can increase borderland communities' vulnerabilities and foster mistrust of border management actors. When the pros of a potential intervention do not clearly outweigh the cons, the do no harm principle should prevail, to avoid disrupting informal cross-border ecosystems and livelihoods of border communities. More effort should also be invested in

mitigating corruption at border posts through **awareness-raising, specialised training on prosecuting corruption, and monitoring tools** for border authorities.

Combining ‘hard’ (equipment, construction of border posts, security) **and ‘soft’** (protection of migrants, human rights at the border) **aspects of border management is key for project sustainability and impact.** More funding should also be allocated to supporting **cross-border trade and long-term solutions for pastoralist, nomadic and semi-nomadic lifestyles.**

RECs could be supported through **efforts to harmonise travel documents and procedures to facilitate legal migration,** as well as through interventions to tackle various types of trafficking.

Choosing the appropriate receiving institutions and beneficiaries according to the objective and ensuring ownership of these objectives by the institutions or beneficiaries is key. To ensure continuity, programmes should: **integrate trainings of officials into the national authorities' curricula, obtain budgetary guarantees for structures and institutions created or reinforced, making authorities accountable for every result,** and favour support to authorities over direct action.

The reorientation of funds from one border point to the other could be facilitated when needed (e.g. from management of land borders to building capacities in airports or ports, or vice versa). To facilitate this, projects could **use mechanisms such as demand-driven facilities.**

The establishment of **one-stop border posts** (OSBPs) facilitates the movement of goods and persons across borders by creating a single stop for border control between two countries. However, OSBPs should be established only when the potential for border cooperation meets minimum standards.

A multilateral approach, instead of a bilateral one, could be encouraged in future EU funding, in order to address border management needs regionally.

The **mandates of EU instruments that contribute to border management** (e.g. IcSP, EUTF, some DG Home instruments) should be clearly **demarcated** to avoid potential overlaps in programming.

Triple nexus

1. Introduction

The objective of the triple nexus is to maximise the effectiveness, efficiency and impact of coordination between humanitarian, development and peace actions. In practical terms, for the purposes of this study and in accordance with the OECD DAC ‘Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus’, this means implementing joint analysis, shared strategic planning and programming, and collective outcomes among humanitarian, development and peace actors, all of which should be supported by predictable, flexible, multi-year financing and a comprehensive, adaptable and coherent donor strategy.

2. Triple nexus approaches in SLC, HoA and NoA

In SLC, the combination of the first Libyan civil war in 2011, the political crisis in Mali in 2012 and the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency led to a significant destabilisation of the Sahel and Lake Chad region in the early 2010s. As terrorist activities spilled over from Mali to neighbouring Niger and Burkina Faso, unprecedented waves of forced displacement and humanitarian needs emerged in 2019. Protracted conflicts, coupled with recurrent droughts and food crises that were particularly severe in 2011-12, increasing the need for stronger cooperation between humanitarian, development and peace actors, leading to a push for nexus approaches among the three sectors. For example, **in Mali, the international community has tried to support an integrated approach with initiatives such as the multi-sector and multi-donor Sahel Alliance.**

In HoA, the 2010-2012 East Africa drought was a humanitarian disaster that contributed to the deaths of over 250,000 people in Somalia alone. **Failure to mitigate the crisis was partially attributed to**

the international community's focus on short-term humanitarian responses instead of building long-term resilience, triggering a serious reconsideration of the way the international community operates in the region. A concerted, effective push for a resilience agenda followed in the early to mid-2010s, which has naturally evolved into a triple nexus agenda in recent years. Examples include the rollout of the CRRF in Uganda, supported by the EU nexus action plan for the country.

Overall, the international agenda in the NoA region tends to be more focused on migration management and development than humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding. As such, **Libya is the only country in the region with serious multi-sectoral needs and where concrete attempts to implement the triple nexus are in place.** Efforts by the UN and other stakeholders to develop and operationalise a triple nexus strategy in the southern region of Libya have been ongoing since 2018.

3. Nexus interventions in the EUTF portfolio

Examples of triple nexus interventions in the EUTF portfolio include the RESILAC programme in SLC, which is a flexible resilience programme that includes support to local actors and social cohesion activities, and the REINTEG programme in Somalia, which delivers basic services, improves livelihoods and supports conflict resolution related to housing, land and property. There are also numerous examples of double nexus interventions throughout the portfolio, such as the RESET II programme in Ethiopia (humanitarian-development nexus), which takes an LRRD approach and includes a crisis modifier component, and the PEV programme in Burkina Faso (peace-development), which combines community dialogue, mediation and support to income-generating activities to support the stabilisation of border regions.

4. Perspectives and areas of opportunity

There is no universally applicable triple nexus approach, and the inclusion of the peace component must be carefully adapted to each context. Peace should therefore be systematically integrated from the beginning of any nexus discussion or joint planning process in conflict-affected contexts. The *'Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel'*, which is implemented in all G5 Sahel countries and was designed as a pilot project for the implementation of the triple nexus, is a positive example of this approach.

Humanitarian and development actors should be thoroughly familiarised with the different approaches to peace (from 'hard' security interventions to softer peacebuilding actions such as social cohesion), and similarly, there should be a strong understanding among peace actors of the impact of their activities on the humanitarian and development sectors. Donors could support this by encouraging and facilitating discussions and brainstorming, particularly if they contract humanitarian, development and peacebuilding projects in the same area.

Several EUTF programmes strengthened cooperation among the humanitarian, development and peace sectors through a consortium approach, which brings together actors from across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus through the development of a joint response to the call for proposal, joint design and planning of the project, and a common logical framework. It is worth noting that this approach, though effective, requires the allocation of additional budget and time for coordination that must be realistically planned for.

Despite reports of recent advances since the launch of the EU nexus strategy, there remains **room for improvement with regard to collaboration between ECHO and DEVCO,** as the level of cooperation in each country depends largely on motivated individuals and the strength of personal relationships. One practical suggestion is simply to consider office space and location, as multiple stakeholders noted that it is easier to promote collaboration between staff who work together physically.

One of the main barriers to EU coordination, particularly in countries where all EU development funding is channelled through the EUTF, is the misalignment of planning and funding cycles. ECHO responses are planned on an annual basis, whereas EUTF decisions are made throughout the

year with little predictability as to the amount of funding that will be allocated to any given country, inhibiting higher-level coordination and joint planning. **Funding cycles should be aligned where possible to facilitate joint planning and coordination across the humanitarian and development sectors.** When this is not possible, flexibility should be built into funding processes to allow for coordination.

Flexibility, adaptability and risk tolerance are key to effective nexus-supportive financing. This is one area where the EUTF stands out, by being flexible enough to finance projects that span the nexus, including in areas that have traditionally had a strong humanitarian or development focus, and by incorporating adaptive components into programming such as crisis response modifiers.

Finally, **more patience and flexibility may be required from donors to ensure that capacity building interventions are provided with the time and resources required to produce results.** For example, the EUTF-funded programme RESILAC, which operates in the Lake Chad Basin countries, has adopted the CARE approach to the triple nexus, which stresses the need for an intervention grounded in local realities and that integrates local responses. RESILAC conducts needs assessments with the most relevant CSOs and community-based organisations across the humanitarian, development and peace sectors, and also reinforces their local project management skills.

EUTF strengths and weaknesses

This section presents a combination of the main comments from key stakeholders from the fields of migration, mobility and displacement on the EUTF approach. It includes views received from consultations with EUDs from the three EUTF windows, several EU member states and partner states, as well as a broad range of implementing partners of the EUTF, and a summary of the main strengths and weaknesses that appeared through the above thematic reviews. It is largely based on stakeholders' perceptions and is not meant as a formal evaluation of the Trust Fund.

1. Scope and ambitions

The **exceptional visibility and magnitude** of the EUTF (with €4.8B in approved programming, representing about 30% of the total DEVCO (now INTPA) effort in the EUTF area of operations) has had several positive outcomes. For example, the Trust Fund has helped some of its stakeholders (such as IOM) to pursue a more strategically coherent vision than was previously possible by offering larger, longer term, and more predictable funding. The magnitude of the EUTF also promoted a high degree of visibility that, in many cases, helped to publicise projects and attract other funders, as exemplified by EUTF funding to the Kalobeyei and Kakuma camps in Kenya. On the other hand, in specific geographic and thematic areas (such as protection in Libya, for example), the magnitude of the EUTF reportedly led to increased competition between potential implementing partners, preventing much needed coordination and synergies. It also led to 'too many large' contracts that may not have been the best fit for purpose.

In parallel, the magnitude and visibility of the EUTF also gave rise to a number of **misunderstandings and misconceptions**. The broad scope of the Trust Fund, which was not always fully understood, and gave the impression that it intended to address too many issues, resulting in what was sometimes seen as a 'collection of projects' without a clear strategy or end goal. Additionally, given the 'emergency' nature of the instrument, the focus on 'root causes' was not deemed appropriate for the long-term efforts required.

Both EUDs and member states were generally quite positive about the **Trust Fund's success in positioning migration on the agenda of most partner countries** as it had never been before, and in showing that the EU was united and truly committed on migration and mobility. Some interlocutors, however, did mention that the message implied in the EU's increased attention to migration was not necessarily always positive or helpful to development work and had led to some 'difficult conversations'.

Some EUDs also felt that they and some of their projects **could have benefitted from more active involvement and political support from the EU**.

Some EUDs and member states noted that **some countries benefitted more than others** from the EUTF. Several interlocutors warned that through these imbalances, especially with regard to migration governance and border management interventions, the EU and the donor community as a whole were creating or **worsening regional / continental imbalances** that could in turn worsen the mobility and migration situation in Africa.

Although at the beginning the EUTF was often criticized for lack of **local ownership (including by beneficiary states)**, **this seems to have improved over time**. **Looking forward, partner states recommended: more implication of national** (and local) authorities, the need for more needs assessments and situation analyses (at national and regional levels) before making decisions on programming, basing actions on national and local plans, and working more with local NGOs and CSOs to ensure sustainability and increased transparency in data sharing.

Finally, most of the interviewed EUDs, some of the member states and partner countries and many of the other interviewed stakeholders regretted that **too much focus had been placed on the ‘negative’ aspects of migration**, such as irregular migration and return & reintegration. Accordingly, some EUDs (and other interlocutors) lamented the lack of projects that aim to provide better and more opportunities for legal migration, to address issues related to labour migration, and to make the most of migration for development.

2. The EUTF in practice and implementation

The EUTF is recognised by several interlocutors as **having changed ‘how work is done’**, partly in that it brings the partner states to the table at the Operational Committees. (At the same time, other stakeholders criticise a supposed lack of partner state involvement on the ground.) EUDs notably mentioned the **ability to develop regional and cross-border projects** (for example, the ROCK, BMM or the Cross-Border programme in the HoA) and particularly valued the idea of trying to foster further collaboration between, across and among countries in the region and, in this case, with IGAD.

In another reflection of its innovative approach, the EUTF is also recognised for having **encouraged and facilitated work in the humanitarian-development nexus**. This has also, however, increased the risk (raised by several interlocutors) that increasing numbers of traditionally humanitarian partners will try (and have started) to move away from short term, humanitarian work to ‘follow the money.’ Furthermore, the degree of effectiveness of implementation of the nexus varied across regions, with some DG ECHO interlocutors in particular regretting insufficient coordination and lack of joint programming. The **security-development nexus also remains underdeveloped**, and requires a longer term, more politically oriented approach.

Decision making within the EUTF was an initial area of concern for several stakeholders but seemed to also have improved over time. Several stakeholders – both internal and external to the EU – described the decision-making process as highly Brussels-led, with little chance or time to provide input or collaborate (in the case of other EU financial instruments) before the decision was taken, and with possible negative repercussions on the design of the project or lack of ‘on the ground context and information’. Several member states however seemed rather positive about the Operational Committees and hoped to have a similar mechanism in the new instrument that would allow them to be involved in the selection and implementation of programmes.

Many interlocutors, notably from the EUDs, pointed out that changes in the fields of migration, mobility and displacement take time, and that the **EUTF’s time frame was too short** to show concrete achievements and even more so for desired systemic change. Related to this, there was a concern with the lack of exit strategies and/or continuity for some EUTF projects and for their sustainability.

Many of the above (and other) criticisms made of the EUTF are related to its genesis: set up in the midst of a crisis, with a sense of emergency, with little time or – at the beginning – human resources

and in a very politically sensitive setting. As a result of these early dynamics, EUDs confirm that, at the beginning, they sometimes had to formulate programmes 'in a rush', that they did not have enough time to consult with the partner country or to do the appropriate research beforehand, and that they generally 'paid for it' during implementation when aspects of the programme took longer than planned or had to be corrected. Several EUDs also mentioned that the pressure to disburse had led to 'too many big contracts' to IPs who, in any case, reverted to sub-contractors, thus increasing money spent on overheads and delays.

While it was generally accepted that **programming / decision-making and contracting was faster and more flexible than for standard EU projects, the rest of the process did not seem to be significantly faster**, in part because the Trust Fund works with the "usual" implementing partners (IPs) and in often more difficult settings than other instruments. Some interlocutors also noted that **many contracts were not allocated based on a solid analysis of IPs** that would consider their core competencies, field presence, ability to deliver in complex and remote situations, existing relations with the government and proven track records.

3. Communication

An active communication strategy could have helped address some of the strongest and often erroneous criticism, but the EUTF's communication is often considered inexistent outside the official website, too timorous and lacking resources.

On the other hand, the EUTF was considered innovative – especially compared to the EU's traditional development approach – in placing an accent on **evidence and transparency** more than had previously been done by the EU (or even other donors), such as through the REF (though it was not always considered as successful and operationally relevant as it could have been).

Similarly, the attempt to show results in a transparent fashion through the Monitoring and Learning Systems is appreciated, even though there is clear impatience for 'more than numbers' and 'real results,' which will hopefully be addressed by the work on outcomes once enough projects complete and are thus able to deliver outcome results. It should also be noted that criticism regarding transparency was generally related to the awarding of contracts rather than the results.

Recommendations for future programming

1. Strategy, objectives and mobilisation around the next phase of programming

Redefine the purpose of the EU's migration, displacement and mobility programming in Africa at the crossroads of the different priorities at stake

The overall purpose could be aligned with the objectives expressed through the Global Compact for Migration regarding safer, better informed, more orderly and better managed migration. The more specific objectives should aim at a balanced approach to migration, displacement and mobility that takes into account the needs of the most vulnerable, as well as the priorities of both partner countries and the EU as they relate to migration, mobility and displacement.

Carefully define the boundaries of the migration, mobility and displacement portfolio

Root causes should not be addressed through the *migration 10%* funding line, but rather through the main part of the NDICI portfolio (the other 90%). In parallel, migration should be mainstreamed in development portfolios as a general principle, but should only be accounted in the 10% when they directly benefit migrants, refugees, IDPs, returnees or victims of trafficking.

Move away from the emergency mode and establish a mid-term strategy

In each thematic area, a multi-stage approach should be defined, with realistic hypotheses of

completion and impact, while continuity, handover / exit strategies and sustainability options should be envisioned and properly timed. This multi-stage approach might have to be spread across several funding cycles.

Integrate current and future mobility trends, and the risks of shocks in the design of flexible systems and tools

Resources should be dedicated to the tracking of population movements (IDPs, refugees and migrants) and the monitoring of the origin, destination and profile of people on the move to better inform programming, with a high level of reactivity (early warning systems) and a depth allowing for the identification of protection needs and their evolution.

Return beneficiary states to the driver's seat with regards to migration policy wherever possible

Interviewed partner states have shown interest in managing migration and mobility-related policy, at least when it comes to their own nationals. Some advocated for a specific migration funding line or facility to be maintained to ensure continuity in the efforts undertaken under the EUTF. Some asked for more involvement, more and better information sharing and more coordination organised around their existing plans.

Establish roadmaps for donor cooperation involving the key institutions (AU, RECs) and expert agencies in each sub-thematic area to ensure a coherent programming in each region / country and to better align donor support

Momentum has been built, and at the same time tensions around migration and mobility have decreased enough that there is a window of opportunity to gather the multiple stakeholders of migration, displacement and mobility and build on the lessons learned from the EUTF and other programmes to plan for the future in a coordinated fashion. A series of thematic roadmap consultations could be organised in early 2021 to develop an agreed-upon matrix of priority interventions and objectives in each sub-theme, and establish coordination mechanisms if necessary.

Establish meaningful partnerships with other donors and agencies, leverage the leadership of some stakeholders in specific thematic areas, and develop complementarities of programming – enhancing the Team Europe approach

Some donors and agencies have positioned themselves on certain thematic areas and geographies. Complementarities should be highlighted and built upon. Team Europe principles should be adopted and strengthened in each country. Partners and implementers should be reviewed on a case by case basis. It may be necessary to diversify the pool of available implementers to avoid overreliance, encourage innovation and ensure the right fit with specific projects and contexts.

Continue to develop a culture that encourages innovation and learning

One of the EUTF's strengths has been to innovate and develop new types of projects (some of the most criticised projects at the beginning might yet turn out to be some of its key successes). Such new, evidence-based approaches should be further encouraged, including with new partners. But, more importantly, a system that allows for lessons to be learned from these approaches should be built.

Build a strong communication strategy – overall, by country and by project

While the EUTF brought migration and mobility issues into the limelight, it was also criticised for its lack of control over its messaging and its lack of responsiveness to criticism. When developing innovative approaches, it will be important to support them with strong communication, which should be implemented by a strategic communication team and accompanied by political support when needed.

Post-EUTF transition: Ensure continuity on the most successful initiatives while defining a new ambition and vision; both should not be contradictory

In parallel with the new programming cycle and instruments, many EUTF projects will continue implementing during the next three to four years and will need to continue to benefit from EU support, with regard to human resources and systems but also to visibility and political support. A bridging system should be set up so that their achievements (and failures) continue to be documented and feed into the parallel NDICI programming and vice versa.

Geography: Extend migration, displacement and mobility strategies to other African countries affected by migration and displacement flows

Particularly in the case of forced displacement, where movements and solutions should be looked at from a wide, regional angle, as well as in cases of cross-border issues such as trafficking and international crime and of international migration routes in general. This is also important in order to avoid creating further imbalances within the continent by focusing on certain areas more than others.

Pay greater attention to migration and displacement caused by climate change and environmental disasters

The dramatic impacts of climate change risk causing mass migration to neighbouring countries and Europe, as well as mass internal displacement. This trend should be carefully monitored in future funding instruments and built into programming and long-term planning to promote communities' resilience and facilitate safe and regular migration as a positive adaptive measure.

2. Programming and implementation modalities

Transition phase: Allocate time and resources to design the next programming cycle in a coordinated manner to give migration and mobility programming its full place

Time and resources should be allocated to assessments, solid strategies, well thought-through theories of change, and consultations with partner countries' governments, all of which should build on evidence and lessons learned from the EUTF. Time and space should be given to the EUDs in 2021 to develop their strategies by following, where relevant, a nexus approach, where the different units and DGs work together, based on the same information, assumptions and objectives.

Take into account the partner countries' limitations and absorption capacity – project ambitions need to be adjusted, and technical support increased in some countries

Project phasing and milestones should take the capacity of partner countries' governments, regional organisations and local partners into account in a realistic manner. While systems should be put in place relatively quickly to generate change, they must be accompanied by adequate capacity building, mentoring and handover phases.

Build sustainability into programming from the beginning

As EUTF contracting comes to an end, it would be advisable to conduct a longitudinal assessment of the ongoing / completed programmes to ascertain where the intended goal is reached in the longer term. This may help highlight the most efficient and effective ways to build capacity.

Implementing partners (member state agencies, UN, NGOs, consortia and coordination mechanisms): efficiency, continuity, access and diversification need to be balanced

A balance needs to be established between global or continental partnerships and the need for efficiency, continuity, innovation and the diversification of partners based on their strengths. At both the global and country levels, lists of potential IPs should be made and regularly maintained, based on an overall and country-level assessment of their presence, strengths and weaknesses and comparative advantages in order to be able to pick from them faster when the need arises. This would be particularly

useful in identifying NGOs and CSOs at country level. It would also help build on the capacities and systems already created by some organisations.

NGOs and CSOs can be particularly useful in specific contexts but working with them, given their often limited size, can be labour intensive for EUDs: it is therefore important to carefully consider the need for consortia and which partners to include. Consortia (and their coordination mechanisms) need to be well built, supported and budgeted for to really deliver synergies.

Think out of the EUTF box and diversify the migration portfolio in exploring all thematic areas in light of changing contexts in each country

In the early stages of the new programming phase, the entire spectrum of migration, mobility and forced displacement-related thematic areas should be considered in each country. Priorities should be adjusted to each country's situation and should achieve an adequate balance between the partner government's priorities and the EU's agenda.

Work across EUDs to coordinate regional programming and share lessons and good practices

As already initiated for the pre-programming phase in some EUTF countries (but insufficiently done in the past), cross-EUD consultation will be necessary to align objectives and lines of programming across countries in each thematic area. This coordination should be given time and space in the next few months.

HR and institutional knowledge: build on knowledge gained through the EUTF management teams and position at least one dedicated migration and mobility portfolio coordinator in most EU delegations, as relevant

Continuity needs to be ensured as much as possible in the teams in both HQ and on the ground to support the transition phase and avoid reinventing the wheel in countries of high turnover. In the future, it would be important to continue to recruit specialists on migration and displacement and related topics (e.g. protection) and embed them in EUD teams. More systematic knowledge transmission and management tools or checklists on migration, displacement and mobility should be developed at the country level, as well as at the central (cross-window) level, including to centralise knowledge that is currently divided across windows and encourage synergies between existing programmes.

Regional programmes vs customised national approach: integrate best practices

Developing programmes at a regional level has proven to be the right scale for a number of (though not all) thematic interventions. However, to gain the full benefit from some interventions, it is important to keep the relevant EUDs fully involved and to establish and maintain close management that allows for quick reactions and high-level political support to be applied at the right moments in the project.

3. Monitoring, evaluation and learning and data systems

Continue enhancing an evidence-based and real-time learning approach grounded in several layers of monitoring and data tracking

A dedicated Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning strategy should be developed, and its main objective should be to ensure that the information gathered is in fact used to adapt existing and/or build better new programmes. Real-time monitoring and learning should be ensured. The EU should continue aggregating project outputs and developing visualisation tools to create a strong basis of information that will allow for better coordination and analysis. Attempts to measure effects and impact should continue to be encouraged as EUTF outcomes start coming to the surface in the next few years.

Use solid M&E tools to ensure that, when migration and mobility-related programming is mainstreamed, it is done accurately and in such a way as to have real impact

Mainstreaming what are considered cross-cutting issues often turn into 'tick the box' situations. Even with a marker system, if mainstreaming is to be done in an effective way, programme managers must be given the right tools and training to do so.

Establish new baselines / updated assessments in 2021 in each thematic area

Updated assessments of the effective implementation of frameworks and capacities in place are needed, particularly in areas such as migration governance, free movement / legal migration, countering trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants and protection along the migration routes.

Continue holding implementing partners to the highest standards not only for implementing activities but also for collecting and sharing information

The EU's (and the EUTF's) M&E systems and ability to learn from its actions and improve programming along with time will always be limited by what it is able to gather from its implementing partners. It will be important to continue to hold them to the highest standards with regards to their M&E systems, how they are built, what they collect, what they share and with whom.

Ensure the funding mechanism allows for rapid contracting and flexibility in contracts

This specific aspect of the EUTF was praised by most stakeholders, and was very well adapted to the migration and displacement issues at stake. Some flexibility should be maintained in the NDICI migration programming, including through the use of crisis modifiers when necessary.

Beyond these general recommendations, specific areas of opportunities and priorities for future programming were identified in each thematic area of this report.

Conclusion

The EUTF has been described by many as a game changer in positioning migration and forced displacement much higher on the agenda of partner countries and RECs and creating new dynamics in the sector. Initially designed to bring an emergency response to the 2015 migration crisis and support the Joint Valetta Action Plan, the EUTF gave birth to a much more ambitious and long term-oriented matrix of interventions, and the beginning of a coordinated response to many of the critical issues and challenges that have been identified along the mixed migration routes in East, West and North Africa, including major vulnerabilities and protection needs which had been identified but not addressed until then with this level of magnitude.

The approaching end of the official contracting period of the Trust Fund offers a moment to take a step back and place the EUTF interventions in the broader context of migration and development. Consulted stakeholders largely acknowledged the value created by the Trust Fund, the role the EU has had and should continue to have in migration, displacement and mobility-related programming and expressed interest in contributing to the next phase of programming, if given the opportunity to do so.

This next phase of programming should not be developed in isolation, and more space and time should be given to the design phase than what was allocated during the early days of the Trust Fund. With 10% of the NDICI dedicated to migration, displacement and mobility programming, this transition phase opens a great window of opportunity to continue building on the dynamics initiated and avoid losing the gains achieved and the momentum built so far.

This report hopefully provides a useful layer of knowledge and some ideas and directions to consider in future discussions and formulations of strategies. Further, more specific assessments will be needed to lay the foundations for future programming, in consultation with other donors and partner countries.

While migration, forced displacement and mobility dynamics in Africa remain a very complex subject, the options available to address the topic are now a bit better known and understood, and can be taken to the next level if rigorously informed, organised and tracked over the next 10 to 15 years.

Introduction

By the end of 2021, the last contracts of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTF for Africa, hereafter EUTF or Trust Fund) will be signed. While the Trust Fund is now at the peak of activity implementation and a number of projects will continue rolling out their activities until the end of 2024, the EUTF is now entering its landing phase, after funding over 500 projects in more than 25 countries in Africa, with a total of over €4.8B committed since 2016 – a magnitude that has no precedent in migration, mobility and forced displacement-related programming for the EU.


The next multi-year funding instrument, known as the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), is currently expected to dedicate 10% to migration-related activities, though its key principles of programming are still being finalised.

The transition phase between the two instruments offers a unique opportunity to take advantage of the significant experience gained through the EUTF over the last five years, as well as through other migration activities supported by the international community, often in complementarity with the EUTF. It is also an opportunity to revisit the strategic objectives of DG DEVCO¹, DG NEAR and their partner countries in terms of migration, mobility and the response to forced displacement.

This report was designed to be as practical as possible, with concrete examples, best practices and recommendations to support this transition phase and foster the integration of knowledge gained, lessons learned and best practices into the next programming phase.

It aims to provide an analysis of the migration, mobility and displacement programming in EUTF target countries. The analysis is broken down into seven different thematic areas and one cross-cutting topic, as represented below, and based on in-depth secondary research and interviews conducted between May 2020 and January 2021 with over 375 informants comprised of a broad range of experts and project managers, as well as representatives from EU delegations, EU member states and African partner countries.

Figure 7: Thematic areas, geography and stakeholders integrated in the analysis



Each thematic review can be considered independently from the others and used as a guide, for each theme, of key reference frameworks and issues at stake, the identification of key areas of

¹ As of January 2021, DG DEVCO has become DG INTPA.

intervention, a mapping of the main projects and stakeholders involved, as well as the main gaps in programming and priorities for activities to be developed over the next five to ten years. They are followed by a synthesis of lessons learned from the EUTF as an instrument, and a set of recommendations that are applicable across all thematic areas.

The information provided is intended to enrich and complement project reports and pieces of research to **foster future cross-country dialogues, the development of regional roadmaps in the different thematic areas, and eventually future programming.**

1. Background and objectives

The *Learning lessons from the EUTF* exercise was initiated at the end of June 2019 as a light, forward looking exercise, intended as an internal and informal reflection on what could be learned from the implementation of the EUTF on the topic of migration and forced displacement.

The initial findings of this exercise were delivered in January 2020 in a first draft report, and presented to the EUTF Operational Committee for the Horn of Africa (HoA) in February. Key findings of the *Learning lessons* exercise were also shared with EUD delegations in a March 2020 workshop organised in Brussels by the HoA and Sahel and Lake Chad (SLC) windows, which generated interesting feedback and suggestions that were taken into account for the proposed next steps.

The second phase of the *Learning lessons from the EUTF* exercise pursued the following objectives:

1. Overall objective: Pave the way for a post-2020 strategy on migration, mobility and forced displacement

This followed one of the main recommendations of the first Learning from the EUTF report, which was to use the year 2020 to continue harvesting lessons from the EUTF projects as many of them came to maturity, and to start identifying priorities and opportunities for each key thematic area, in consultation with key experts and organisations involved in each sector, to contribute to the design of post-2020 strategies to be used with whatever new financial instruments would be put in place starting in 2021.

2. Specific objectives:

- **Update the EUTF portfolio assessment and contextual data** included in the December 2019 report;
- **Further analyse the seven thematic areas** that were identified in the January 2020 report as well as the cross-cutting implementation of the triple nexus, with more space given to examples of projects (best practices), mapping of EUTF projects as they continue unfolding, and mapping of other donors' projects to better identify gaps and synergies;
- **Deliver an updated *Learning lessons from the EUTF* report** at beginning of 2021 to support, *inter alia*, the work of EU delegations in the new programming phase, technical-level meetings with the EU member states in Brussels, as well as thematic discussions that could possibly be organised in Q1 2021, involving a broad range of stakeholders to develop post-EUTF strategies.


2. Methodology

The second phase of the lessons learned exercise took place between June and October 2020 and consisted of:

- collecting material from as many of the implementing partners working on EUTF projects as possible in order to update the EUTF portfolio assessment;
- in-depth secondary research on migration, mobility and forced displacement in general and on each of the seven specifically identified areas as well as the cross-cutting implementation of the triple nexus;

- key informant interviews with over 375 stakeholders from a variety of organisations including EU agencies, most EU Delegations covered by the EUTF, implementing partners, member states, UN and other international organisations as well as members of NGOs, think tanks, academia and civil society in Africa, Europe and in some instances other parts of the world.

Figure 8: Detail of Key Informant Interviews



The report was also based on case studies that were conducted in parallel on a number of relevant topics and projects, including:

- For the HoA window, implementation of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) and Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) in the region, the EUTF's support to IGAD's Free Movement Protocol, the Regional Operation Centre in Khartoum (ROCK), and the Cross-Border Programme;
- For the SLC window, the IOM Border Management programme in Mauritania, the EU FMM (Support Free Movement of Persons and Migration in West Africa), and the EU's efforts to counter trafficking in persons in and around the Gulf of Guinea;
- In the North of Africa (NoA) window, a study on the labour migration programme 'Towards a Holistic Approach to Labour Migration Governance' (THAMM), community stabilisation programmes in Libya, and the EUTF's support to Tunisia's migration strategy, and;
- Two cross-window case studies, one on the EU Emergency Transit Mechanism from Libya and another on the EUTF's implementation of the triple nexus approach.

Finally, the report incorporates findings from Altai's Third Party Monitoring and Learning (TPML) reports for the SLC window, an assignment that focused on return and reintegration, migration governance and awareness raising in the SLC region.

3. Value and limitations of the exercise

Despite the time and resource limitations, the main added value of this lessons learned exercise should be to provide an analytical review of the key thematic areas covered by the EUTF in the fields of migration, mobility and response to forced displacement at a critical time in the lifetime of the Trust Fund, and to support the transition to the next funding phase.

All key informants contacted showed great interest in contributing to the exercise, which was not seen as another evaluation of the Trust Fund, but rather a forward-looking exercise aiming at identifying the most relevant projects in each thematic area and gathering the views and recommendations of a broad range of stakeholders. This exercise was therefore an opportunity to mobilise a great body of experts and practitioners who could be further consulted in the next phase of programming to support future dialogues, the design of sectoral roadmaps, and potentially future projects.

This second phase was also an opportunity to present an updated picture of the Trust Fund's activities, by aggregating the available budget information for as many projects as possible, along the core migration and forced displacement themes and across strategic objectives and windows, and therefore correct some unfounded opinions and misconceptions about what the EUTF is or is not doing.

A number of limitations need to be highlighted given the constraints in time and resources allocated to the exercise:

- Key informant interviews with partner countries: The broad consultation of experts, organisations, member states and EU delegations led to the identification of a range of representatives of partner countries who are directly involved in the governance of migration or the coordination of one of the related sub-thematic areas at the country level. Some of these representatives could be interviewed and their views are directly reflected in this report. However, many were not available to speak at the time of conducting this study, or had changed positions, and it is highly recommended that this consultation continue in 2021 with all partner countries, as a follow up to this report.
- Portfolio analysis: Although data related to budget allocation was generally available at the project level, some implementing partners (IPs) did not share this data, especially in the NoA window, and the necessary level of detail for a number of projects and their specific activities was still missing when writing this report.
- Thematic reviews: Thematic reviews were developed to provide an overview of the issues at stake, typologies of intervention, gaps, and opportunities to be considered for future programming. Each of these thematic sections could have been the subject of a much more detailed report, with a much more detailed analysis of all project activities. However, taking into account the time available and the requirements of the exercise, and to remain digestible and actionable, the thematic reviews remain relatively high-level.

However, a broad range of research papers and several case study reports will be made available to readers who might be interested in specific themes, and further research is suggested in each section to explore a number of sub-themes that were identified as critical and to be further explored.

In light of the above, this synthesis should be considered a snapshot of migration, mobility and forced displacement programming in EUTF partner countries at the end of 2020, with a depth of assessment that could be further developed in 2021 in the areas judged relevant to support future programming.

Recent and future migration and displacement trends

While irregular arrivals in Europe have sharply decreased since 2015, it is important to keep in mind that the displacement crisis *within* Africa is worsening and that demography, economic growth and climate change will contribute to increasing migratory pressures in the coming years.

1. Recent trends in migration and displacement

1.1. Irregular flows from Africa

The migration ‘crisis’ of 2015 can mostly be explained by increased mixed migration from the Middle East, as opposed to Africa. As illustrated in Figure 9 on the right, the number of irregular migrants from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq was multiplied by over twenty between 2013 and 2015, as opposed to by less than two for migrants from EUTF countries.¹ Following a sharp decrease in irregular arrivals by sea² to the EU from EUTF countries since 2016, recent data (Figure 10 below) shows that, in 2020, arrivals from these countries increased slightly compared to 2019, mostly due to countries in the NoA window. Arrivals in 2020 (40,000) nevertheless represented less than a quarter of what they had been in 2016.

Figure 9: Number of migrants found to have irregularly entered or be illegally present in the EU, by country of origin (Eurostat)





Figure 10: Irregular arrivals by sea to the EU (2020: until November only)



The drop in irregular sea arrivals observed since 2015-16 varies sharply across windows: irregular sea arrivals from SLC and the HoA both dropped drastically (divided by 11 and by 16, respectively) while numbers from NoA remained comparatively stable throughout 2016-2020.³

Routes are shifting very rapidly. Initially, the decrease in irregular arrivals by sea⁴ to Italy in 2017-2018 was accompanied by a significant increase in arrivals to Spain. More recently, the Western African Maritime route to the Canary Islands seems to have been reactivated (see Figure 11 below), with over 23,000 arrivals and

¹ Eurostat, Asylum and Managed Migration Database, accessed [here](#) in December 2020.

² UNHCR Mediterranean arrival data, accessed [here](#). This data refers to the number of irregular migrants having crossed the Mediterranean (plus those, in the case of Spain, who crossed into the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla or who took a boat to the Canary Islands) identified by national authorities.


³ Ibid.

⁴ UNHCR Mediterranean arrival data, accessed [here](#).

at least 500 deaths and disappearances recorded in 2020.¹ Other recent trends include a sharp increase in the flow of irregular arrivals by sea of Tunisian nationals, with 12,800 arrivals recorded in the first eleven months of 2020, representing 20% of all irregular arrivals by sea to Europe recorded in 2020.²

Though irregular flows from Africa temporarily declined during the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, they continue to take place, especially toward the Middle East, and they remain deadly. Over 90,000 movements from the HoA to Saudi Arabia were recorded in the first half of 2020 (over 20% of whom were women), against less than 1,000 movements to Europe.³ Flows from the SLC region to Europe seem to be higher than those from the HoA: DTM data accounts for 38,000 movements heading from West and Central Africa to Italy or Spain during the first three months of 2020 alone⁴ (see Focus box 1 on DTM data below). The number of deaths also remains very high: over 2,300 deaths were recorded in 2020 in Africa and the Mediterranean.⁵ Women and children can be particularly vulnerable, and they represent a small but significant proportion of the irregular entries and stays in the EU from EUTF countries: 11% for women and 9% for children (1% for children below 14).⁶

Figure 11: Irregular arrivals to the Canary Islands



Focus box 1: The IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix

The collection of migration-related data represents about €40M in the EUTF portfolio,⁷ a significant part of which funds the IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), which collects important data on migration and displacement across Africa:

- The Flow Monitoring component captures the number of migrants passing through specific ‘flow monitoring points’, and interviews a sample of them to get more detailed information, particularly about their origin, destination and reason for migration.
- The Mobility Tracking component collects data on IDPs (number, locations, living conditions), or in some countries (e.g. Libya) on the total number of migrants, from key informants. In some countries, this data is the main, or only, source of information for IDMC’s annual IDP estimates.
- The newly established Transhumance Tracking Tool, built partly to respond to concerns about mounting farmer-herder tensions in the SLC, includes the setup of an early warning system in coordination with local transhumant pastoralist associations.

The EUTF funded the majority of the flow monitoring component of the IOM DTM in the SLC area, and many flow monitoring points are now closing as the funds come to an end. Several opportunities for the development of future migration and displacement tracking tools are further discussed in the recommendations section of this report.

¹ UNHCR Mediterranean arrivals portal, Spain, accessed [here](#). IOM, ‘Irregular migration towards Europe – Western Africa, Atlantic Route’, 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

² UNHCR Mediterranean arrivals portal. Accessed [here](#).

³ IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, ‘A Region on the Move: Mid-year Mobility Overview January to June 2020’, 2020. Accessed [here](#).

⁴ FM surveys suggested that 12% of the 320,000 movements recorded had Italy or Spain as a destination. The same person could have been counted at several FMPs. IOM DTM, ‘Quarterly migration report: West and Central Africa, January – March 2020’. Accessed [here](#).

⁵ IOM, Missing migrants website. Accessed [here](#).


⁶ Eurostat, Asylum and Managed Migration Database. Accessed [here](#). This data refers to the number of irregular entries and stays in EU countries as identified and recorded by national authorities, computed over the period 2015-2019.

⁷ Based on a portfolio analysis conducted by the MLS, see next section.

1.2. Displacement flows within and from Africa

Since 2015, the combined number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees remaining on the continent¹ increased by a third for EUTF countries: between 2015 and 2019, the number of forcibly displaced persons from these countries remaining in Africa increased from 13.3 million to 17.7 million. Many of them are children (see Focus box 2). The increase was mostly driven by internal displacement, with about three million more IDPs in 2019 compared to 2015. In just one year, between 2018 and 2019, the number of IDPs and refugees in the SLC region increased by 1.5 million.

Figure 12: Number of displaced persons in Africa (on the right: number of IDPs, refugees and asylum seekers in each geographical area)



African countries not initially included in the three EUTF windows are also facing major displacement challenges. Over six million IDPs reside in these countries² (including 5.5 million in the DRC), and two million refugees living in Africa originate from them.³

Focus box 2: Migrant and forcibly displaced children

Overall, 25% of migrants across Africa are children (under 18),⁴ and the proportion is higher among displaced populations. 57% of refugees⁵ and 50% of IDPs⁶ in Africa are children, which is higher than the overall proportion of children in Africa (47%). Migrant and forcibly displaced children face unique challenges in terms of access to schooling and protection services. For example, globally, refugee children are five times more likely to be out-of-school than other children: for primary school, 50% of refugee children are out of school (against 9% for all children); for secondary school, 75% are out-of-school (against 17% for all adolescents).⁷ The thematic review on *Forced Displacement* includes additional findings on forcibly displaced children.

Children also make up a significant portion of the migrants encountered on deadly mixed migration routes. 9% of movements observed on the Eastern route (mostly from Ethiopia and Somalia to Saudi Arabia through

¹ Refugees and asylum-seekers from EUTF beneficiary countries remaining in Africa.

² The main ones being the DRC and the Central African Republic.

³ Note the recent contracting of a project addressing the Burundian refugee situation (in the Mahama camp in Rwanda), as well as a project supporting South Sudanese refugees in the DRC.

⁴ Migration data portal, 'Child and young migrants', accessed [here](#).

⁵ UNICEF, 'Data snapshot of migrant and displaced children in Africa', 2018, accessed [here](#).

⁶ IDMC, 'Number of IDPs by age at the end of 2019', 2020. Retrieved [here](#). Are only included persons displaced by violence and conflict.

⁷ UNHCR, 'No more excuses: Provide education to all forcibly displaced people', 2016. Retrieved [here](#).

Yemen) were unaccompanied children,¹ while on the route to the Canary Islands, 12% of identified irregular migrants are children.

1.3. Impact of COVID-19

One of the most important migration-related consequences of the COVID-19 crisis will likely be the impact on remittances, with a predicted shortfall of USD 10B for 2020-2021 for sub-Saharan Africa.²

Other consequences of the pandemic include:

- Conditions for a health crisis (due to a deterioration of already poor and crowded living conditions for migrants and refugees, combined with limited access to health care);³ a socioeconomic crisis as migrants often work in the informal sector with no social protection; and a protection crisis related to increased xenophobia and border closures.⁴ Border closures have contributed to a large number of stranded migrants (over 100,000 in sub-Saharan Africa in July according to IOM)⁵ – a situation that was worsened by the temporary interruption of humanitarian returns from Libya and of resettlement operations.
- The closure of schools and inability of migrant and refugee children to access distance education. According to some estimates, 10 million children, 40% of whom are refugees or asylum seekers, may never return to school, having dropped out during the pandemic.⁶
- The possibility of massive returns of African labour migrants to their country of origin – although no evidence yet exists for such massive returns – could, according to some, contribute to a possible decline in the number of international migrants in 2020 for the first time in recent history.⁷

Concerns were also raised about reallocating too much funding too quickly to emergency COVID-related activities at the expense of addressing the longer term implications of the pandemic.⁸

2. In the longer term

Migration-related challenges in Africa are likely to increase in the coming decades, particularly due to:

- **Demographic growth.** According to a recent paper by the EU Joint Research Centre, the number of Africans leaving their country of origin could increase from 1.4 million in 2015 to 2.8 million per year in 2050 due to demographic growth alone⁹ – including around 600,000 migrants aiming to reach the EU every year by 2050, according to our calculations (which are based on the JRC's assumptions).¹⁰ It is important to keep in mind that different assumptions can yield vastly different

¹ IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, 'A Region on the Move: Mid-year Mobility Overview January to June 2020', 2020. Accessed [here](#).

² From USD 48 billion in 2018 and 2019, remittances to sub-Saharan Africa are expected to decline to 44 billion in 2020 and 41 billion in 2021. Source: KNOMAD, 'Phase II: Covid-19 through a migration lens', 2020, accessed [here](#). Other sources however suggest that the impact of the pandemic on remittances could be more nuanced, showing that after an initial dip in the spring, remittances seem to have rebounded at least in some countries; see for example [here](#).

³ As of June 2020, 60% of the migrants and refugees interviewed by 4Mi in the HoA believed they could not access to healthcare. MMC, 'Impact of COVID-19 on refugees and migrants', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ UN, 'Policy Brief: COVID-19 and people on the move', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ IOM, 'Covid-19 impact on stranded migrants', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Save the children, 'Save our education - Protect every child's right to learn in the COVID-19 response and recovery', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ World Bank, 'COVID-19: Remittance Flows to Shrink 14% by 2021', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ International Peace Institute, 'What happened to the nexus approach in the COVID-19 response?', June 2020. Retrieved [here](#). NRC, 'Make it or break it: the implications of covid-19 crisis financing', July 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ JRC, 'Many more to come? Migration from and within Africa', 2018.

¹⁰ Assuming that migration rates and countries of destination will remain the same as they were between 2010 and 2015.

predictions: another source forecasts less than 300,000 African migrants to the EU annually by 2040.¹

- **Economic development.** Migration rates from poor countries tend to *increase* in the first phase of development. Out of 54 countries in Africa, there are currently only 12 whose GDP is above the threshold at which migration is statistically found to decrease with development – and none of these countries are in the EUTF SLC or HoA windows.² Micro-economic surveys tend to confirm this finding (see Focus box below).

Focus box 3: Economic development and migration – survey findings

The academic literature does not support the hypothesis that increased income will contribute to decreased irregular migration, and some research indeed suggests the opposite: that increased income is likely to increase aspirations and capacities to migrate (both regularly and irregularly). A UNDP survey of 2,000 irregular economic migrants from Africa to Europe found that in their country of origin, they earned 60% more than the national average salary, and that only 24% thought that improved economic circumstances back home would have made them change their mind about coming to Europe.³ Another study conducted in The Gambia similarly suggested that modest income increases are unlikely to discourage potential migrants from migrating irregularly: it found that in order to forgo migrating irregularly, respondents would on average ask for about €525 per month, or about 15 times the median monthly income in The Gambia.⁴ An OECD study found that Nigerians' domestic economic status did not have a significant effect on desire to migrate, but that well-educated Nigerians who are dissatisfied with the state of their democracy and have low levels of trust in the police were more likely to want to migrate.⁵ A qualitative study conducted in Senegal highlighted two key push factors: family and frustrations related to the lack of social mobility in the country.⁶

These different studies highlight the fact that drivers for migration vary based on a number of factors including, but not limited to, nationality, economic wellbeing, level of education, religion and perceptions – including concerns and grievances – of their country and institutions. **Having a clear and precise understanding of these factors at the country and even sub-country level, rather than trying to address vague 'root causes', will be crucial to understanding future migration patterns and to support governments to better address and manage them.**

- **Climate change.** Though it is unclear whether climate change will necessarily lead to major migratory pressures to the EU (because it will deprive people of resources that are needed to finance the expensive international trip), between 17 and 86 million people could be *internally* displaced in sub-Saharan Africa due to decreased water availability and crop productivity by 2050.⁷ Climate change will also generate important challenges related to forced *immobility* as its negative impacts on livelihoods could limit the capacity of households to finance migration as a coping mechanism.⁸ Also, by 2050, the risk of civil conflict in Africa could increase by a third because of climate change,⁹ further fuelling conflict-induced displacement.

The combination of these factors will, above all, exacerbate pressures on African cities. The number of urban residents in Africa is expected to increase from 550 million in 2018 to 825 million in 2030 and 1.5

¹ ISPI, 'The Future of Migration to Europe', 2020. Accessed [here](#).

² The 11 countries do include most NoA countries: Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. Joint Research Centre, 'Many more to come? Migration from and within Africa', 2018.

³ UNDP, 'Scaling Fences: Voices of Irregular African Migrants to Europe', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Bah T., and Batista, C. 'Understanding Willingness to Migrate Illegally: Evidence from a Lab in the Field Experiment', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ OECD, 'Identifying the factors driving West African migration', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Robin, N. 'Social immobility versus social mobility: the root causes of international emigration', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ World Bank, 'Groundswell - Preparing for internal climate migration', 2018.

⁸ DFID, 'Understanding the impact of livelihood opportunities and interventions on migration patterns – rapid evidence assessment', 2018; Borderon et al., 'A systematic review of empirical evidence on migration influenced by environmental change in Africa', 2018.

⁹ Burke, Hsiang and Miguel, 'Climate and conflict', 2015.

billion in 2050¹, with migration currently contributing to around a third of the increase in the urban population.² A key question will be whether the growth of cities in regional economic hubs, such as Nigeria, can be sustainable so that they can effectively absorb all these rural-to-urban migrants. In any case, African cities will likely be on the frontline of the response to migration pressures, and will need particularly strong support.

When added to future demographic growth, economic development and the predicted impact of climate change in the coming decades, **the challenges outlined in the previous section above suggest a need for a sustained and even increased EU response to migration, mobility and forced displacement-related challenges in Africa, while root causes should be better analysed, but are unlikely to be addressed in the short term.**

The two efforts (strengthening migration management and addressing root causes) should run in parallel, as major migration flows and crises are likely to continue while the continent is slowly developing and progressively offering better life options to its citizens – but this can only happen over several decades and will require strong development support from the European Commission and other donors. In other words, we should not expect that the root causes will be solved in the short term and through migration and mobility funding lines, but rather through the rest of the DG INTPA funding, which will contribute to the development and stabilisation of the continent over the long term.

¹ UNDESA, 'World Urbanization Prospects 2018', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

² The remaining urban growth can be explained by the natural increase of the population (fertility). See IOM, 'World Migration Report' 2015. Retrieved [here](#).

EUTF portfolio analysis – migration and forced displacement in the EUTF


An analysis of the EUTF portfolio conducted by the MLS shows that half of the total EUTF budget is allocated to interventions directly addressing migration and forced displacement. The remaining budget aims to address the so-called ‘root causes’ of migration: 37% is dedicated to livelihoods and resilience programmes that are *not* targeted at displacement-affected communities (DACs), and 12% to ‘pure’ stabilisation activities. The analysis below first looks at the breakdown of activities across the overall EUTF portfolio, then focuses on the migration, mobility and forced displacement-related part of the portfolio, which is further analysed by geography, thematic areas and finally implementing partners.

1. EUTF portfolio mapping

1.1. Introduction and limitations

This portfolio analysis focuses on EUTF-funded activities directly related to migration, mobility and forced displacement. This includes all activities covered by Strategic Objective 3 (SO3), some activities partly in SO4 (e.g. border management), as well as a percentage of the livelihoods and resilience activities (under SO1 and SO2) and conflict prevention activities (under SO4), when they directly benefit DACs. The sum of these activities will hereafter be referred to as ‘migration, mobility and forced displacement-related’ (this will sometimes be shortened to ‘migration-related’ in the report for the sake of brevity) and are detailed below. Importantly, they do not include livelihoods and resilience activities targeted at ‘potential migrants’.

Figure 13: Perimeter of migration, mobility and forced displacement-related activities across the four Strategic Objectives of the EUTF



386 projects worth €3.80B were mapped as part of the analysis (see Table 1 below). Only contracted and operational¹ projects were included. Limitations include the unavailability of disaggregated budgets

¹ Projects considered ‘non-operational’ are excluded from the analysis. They are mostly evaluations and audits; air services; mappings and plans; reports; communications and events.

and the challenge of estimating the proportion of DACs among project beneficiaries (see focus box below).

Focus box 4: Methodology for mapping EUTF activities related to migration, mobility and forced displacement

In order to map EUTF-funded 'migration, mobility and forced displacement'-related activities, the MLS team first defined the main sub-topics and activities in which the EUTF could be involved:

- Migration governance, defined as the support to the development of migration norms and to the capacity building of and coordination among migration governance actors in their policymaking capacity;
- Support to returns (evacuations and humanitarian returns not included)
- Support to reintegration of returned migrants
- Protection of migrants, including under the Evacuation and Transit Mechanism (ETM);
- Support to legal migration (labour migration and free movement)
- Support to the contributions of migration for development (e.g. diaspora involvement)
- Border management
- Activities related to combatting trafficking in persons (TIP) and smuggling of migrants (SOM);
- Collection, analysis and dissemination of migration, mobility and forced displacement-related data;
- Support to identity systems;
- Support for DACs, including support related to livelihoods, resilience and conflict prevention (under SO1, SO2 and SO4). For the purpose of the portfolio analysis, DACs include refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs); returned displaced persons; mixed migrants in specific countries (Niger and North of Africa countries); and host communities to all of the aforementioned categories.

The team then assessed the approximate proportion of the budget of each project dedicated to each of the categories.

- For most categories, budgets disaggregated by activity were used whenever they were available (55% of cases). For example, in the case of the category 'migration, mobility and forced displacement-related data', for each project the team added up all budget lines dedicated to activities related to the collection, analysis or dissemination of migration data, and divided this sum by the total budget for all activity lines. In cases where no disaggregated budgets were available, the MLS team had to make approximations based on the qualitative description of project activities (often using the Description of Action documents).
- In order to compute the support to DACs, the MLS used either the target or actual proportion of beneficiaries when it was available for projects, or regional averages, with the assumption that the percentage of DACs is equal to twice the percentage of displaced persons to account for host communities.

Amounts included in the analysis exclude co-funding. Budgets by country presented in the next sections reflect the allocated amounts of regional projects, based either on the actual funding split between countries when the information was available, or on the number of countries covered by the regional project when it was not.¹

¹ Therefore, for a project active in four countries with no further information, each country would be allocated 25% of the funding of the regional project.

Table 1: Projects included in the analysis as of September/November 2020,¹ by window ('contracted and operational')


	HoA		SLC		NoA		Total	
	Nb of projects	Amounts	Nb of projects	Amounts	Nb of projects	Amounts	Nb of projects	Amounts
Approved	99 decisions	€1.81B	113 decisions	€2.12B	40 decisions	€898M	252 decisions	€4.83B
Contracted	256	€1.35B	236	€1.81B	59	€715M	506	€3.88B
Contracted and operational	160	€1.32B	177	€1.78B	49	€707M	386	€3.80B

1.2. Overall EUTF funding dedicated to migration and forced displacement

Overall, 51% of EUTF funding is estimated to be directly related to migration, mobility and forced displacement as defined above (€1.95B out of a total mapped budget of €3.80B), compared with 23% of funding dedicated to the 'traditional' SO3. The remaining funds are split between activities related to economic resilience or development aid not targeted at DACs (37%) and 'pure' governance and rule of law-related activities² (12%).

The percentage of EUTF funding per region that is directly related to migration, mobility and forced displacement is highest in the North of Africa (84%, see Figure 15 below), followed by SLC (48%) and the HoA (39%), which reflects the larger proportion of projects related to migration management implemented in NoA compared to the two other windows. In the HoA, funds not directly related to migration are mostly spent in countries where 'traditional' development cooperation funding was channelled directly through the EUTF (Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan): funds not related to migration spent in these three countries represent 33% of total HoA funding. A quarter of all EUTF funding not directly related to migration is spent in these three countries.


Figure 14: SO3 and migration, mobility and forced displacement-related activities



¹ Committed decisions updated as of November 2020; contracted decisions as of October 2020 for HoA and SLC and September 2020 for NoA.

² 'Pure' stabilisation activities relate to governance and conflict prevention activities *not* related to smuggling of migrants, border management or dialogues between displaced communities and host communities. This would mostly include training and equipment of general law enforcement agencies, counterterrorism, and conflict prevention activities not targeted at DACs.

Figure 15: Migration, mobility and forced displacement-related EUTF funding as of September/November 2020¹



The countries with the highest amounts of EUTF funding related to migration, mobility and forced displacement are **Libya** (€258M out of a total of €328M), **Morocco** (€230M, all EUTF funding in the country) and **Niger** (€189M out of €341M).


1.3. Disaggregation by type of activities

34% of the EUTF’s migration, mobility and forced displacement-related budget is for support to DACs (resilience, livelihoods and conflict prevention specifically addressing displacement-affected communities), around 40% of which is directed to IDPs and their associated host communities.

Return and reintegration, protection of migrants, and border management each account for 16%.

¹ September 2020 for NoA activities, and November 2020 for SLC/HoA. The map does not include the few projects recently signed in the DRC and Rwanda.

Figure 16: Migration, mobility and forced displacement-related EUTF funding as of September/November 2020,¹ by sub-theme²



More than half of the migration, mobility and forced displacement-related funds in the HoA are dedicated to supporting DACs, in line with the current challenges facing the 11.8 million refugees and IDPs in the region. In SLC, returns and reintegration represent 20% of funds, also reflecting current dynamics (migrants from SLC represent the largest proportion of African migrants reported to be crossing the Mediterranean). In the North of Africa, a quarter of migration-related funds are dedicated to border management; by contrast, in the HoA border management accounts for less than 5% of funds.

1.4. Disaggregation by type of implementing partner

Contrary to perceptions held by some³ (and to analyses of the overall portfolio where EU member state agencies do tend to have a larger share)⁴, only 31% of the EUTF's migration, mobility and forced displacement-related budget is implemented by member state agencies. UN agencies actually implement the largest share, with 33% of EUTF migration-related activities.

The UN agencies' relatively large share of the migration, mobility and forced displacement-related portfolio is largely linked to the mandate of some agencies, such as IOM with migration and UNHCR with refugees and asylum seekers, in addition to expertise, presence on the ground in most countries, contacts with relevant actors and an ability to mobilise a network of local partners in the implementation of large projects.

IOM received almost €400M in EUTF migration, mobility and forced displacement-related funding (€394M), largely through the EU-IOM Joint Initiative, while UNHCR received €181M. In SLC and NoA, about a quarter of EUTF migration-related activities were implemented by IOM. For activities targeting livelihoods and resilience of DACs, UNHCR was the main IP, while 90% of activities on returns and reintegration were implemented by IOM.

Member state agencies follow with about 31% of the migration, mobility and displacement-related portfolio. Around €175M of migration-related funding is implemented by GIZ, and €50M each by Enabel (Belgium), AFD (France) and FIIAPP (Spain), while AICS (Italy) implements slightly over €25M of migration-related activities. Member state agencies are slightly more likely to implement activities not

¹ September 2020 for NoA activities, and November 2020 for SLC/HoA.

² Displacement affected communities (DACs) include refugees, IDPs, displaced returnees as well as their host and transit communities; in specific areas (e.g. Niger, North of Africa), they also include mixed migrants. Amounts were computed based on budgets that were sometimes not reflecting the reality on the ground as of November 2020, and therefore represent an under-estimation of actual funding going towards migration-related COVID 19 response.


³ For example, Castillejo, C. 'The European Union Trust Fund for Africa: what implications for future EU development policy?', Briefing Paper, No. 5/2017, *Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)*, 2017; CONCORD, 'Partnership or Conditionality? Monitoring the Migration Compacts and EU Trust Fund for Africa', 2018.

⁴ GDSI, 'Mid-term Evaluation of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa 2015-2019', October 2020.

related to migration (33% of all EUTF activities are implemented by MS agencies). In particular, GIZ implemented €327M worth of EUTF-funded activities (both migration- and not migration-related), making it the second largest implementer of overall EUTF programming after IOM (€398M). According to the EUTF mid-term evaluation, ‘one argument for using MS agencies was that this might provide an incentive for the MS to provide additional funding’, as has occurred for Germany, which provided about 37% of the €620M worth of contributions from member states and other donors (Switzerland and Norway). By contrast, Belgium, France and Spain each provided less than 2% of these contributions, while Italy provided 20%.¹

NGOs also implement a non-negligible proportion of EUTF migration, mobility and forced displacement-related activities, at 14%, with large regional differences (24% in the HoA against only 2% in NoA). It should be noted, however, that this data does not include projects that are sub-contracted to NGOs, and that the EUTF mid-term evaluation indicates that NGOs actually represent 25% of total (not only migration-related) contracting when sub-contracts are considered. Therefore, actual implementation by NGOs (both international and local) is likely to be higher in many cases (particularly in Libya,² for example).

Figure 17: Migration-related EUTF funding as of September/November 2020,³ by implementing partner



The portfolio analysis can also add nuance to existing perceptions that a very small number of organisations receive disproportionately large amounts of funds. The five largest implementing partners of EUTF migration-related activities (IOM, UNHCR, GIZ, Enabel and FIIAPP⁴) received 44% of the total budget for migration-related activities. For all EUTF-funded activities, the five IPs that received the most funding actually ‘only’ received 31% of total funding.

¹ Excluding co-funding of specific projects. EUTF State of Play and Financial Resources. Accessed on 18/01/2021 [here](#).


² Where the proportion of implementation done by international and Libyan NGOs is reported to be 12%.

³ September 2020 for NoA activities, and November 2020 for SLC/HoA.

⁴ Excluding the government of Morocco which is, with €100M in budget support, actually the fourth main implementer of EUTF migration-related activities.

1.5. Portfolio analysis amounts – looking back and forward

Figure 18: Monthly disbursements of EUTF funding by window



Although the ‘peak’ of disbursement of EUTF funding occurred around the summer of 2020, a significant amount of programming remains, as illustrated above.¹ In addition, the figure only includes signed contracts as of the autumn of 2020, but contracts ‘in the pipeline’ are expected to increase disbursements of funds to come.

¹ Only contracted and operational projects are included.

2. Monitoring EUTF results and impact

Several layers of monitoring and evaluation were developed around the EUTF to capture and aggregate results throughout the life of the Trust Fund (Monitoring and Learning System), monitor individual projects (ROM missions), and evaluate the performance of the portfolio at an intermediate stage of implementation (mid-term evaluation). As the objective of this report is not to duplicate these tools, the enclosed section provides a rapid overview of the way results are currently being tracked at the portfolio level, and some perspectives on outcomes and impact tracking, that will require a stronger focus as the EUTF projects continue to unfold.

2.1. EUTF aggregated outputs

The EUTF Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) was contracted to design a regional ‘meta-monitoring’ system of EUTF outputs (e.g. number of returns supported) and low-level outcomes (e.g. number of jobs created), as well as complementary learning activities based on more qualitative analysis. The main challenge faced by the MLS was the absence of a common results framework across the 300+ projects under consideration. EUTF management and the MLS therefore first developed a set of common indicators (now 38). The MLS then connects each activity in each project with one of the 38 EUTF indicators, which are then analysed in quarterly reports, as illustrated on the right.

At this stage, the most visible achievements of the EUTF are these very tangible outputs, which is already meaningful as millions of people of concern have access to improved basic services and benefit from nutritional support, over 100,000 migrants have been supported to return home and are receiving employment reintegration support, many frameworks and systems were created to better manage migration, civil servants were mobilised and trained, migrant smugglers are being prosecuted, etc.

Figure 20: Example of visual from HoA monitoring report (December 2019 – 3.4 # of returns to supported in the HoA)





Figure 19: Example of visual from SLC monitoring report (June 2020 – 1.1 # Jobs created in Burkina Faso)



For further information, all updated MLS reports are available on the EUTF website, referenced below.¹

2.2. Beyond output monitoring

In parallel, outcomes are being measured by projects, and the MLS began to track these. Analyses based on 35 pilot projects suggested, for example, that over 100,000 people experienced decreased poverty, or that 45,000 migrants and potential migrants were better informed about the risks of irregular migration and existing alternatives. But because these numbers depend on the methodological choices made by implementing partners, and because the intensity of these changes cannot be captured,² EUTF management and the MLS decided not to go forward with a quantitative aggregation of outcome indicators, and to instead analyse individual project outcomes as they start to emerge with the most advanced projects. This will be further developed in the upcoming MLS biannual reports.³

The broader impact of the EUTF is even more difficult to capture, but will have to be considered and analysed over the next few years. The combination of a variety of EUTF interventions is likely to have contributed to the decrease in irregular migration to the EU illustrated in the previous section. However, identifying the respective impact of each type of intervention in a very fluid environment is a highly complex task that has not yet been undertaken at the portfolio level.

Perhaps more importantly, our research suggests more ‘intangible’, but highly significant, impact made by the EUTF, including the new dynamics of collaboration being created across governments and the improved capacity and influence of institutions (e.g. IGAD); the information networks and linkages being established across police and intelligence agencies (e.g. WAPIS, ROCK); the political access being gained with governments and new dynamics of collaboration around subjects that were until recently deemed too sensitive or EU-centred; and, in general, the fact that migration, mobility and displacement issues have become a priority for many actors and has come to the fore of key agendas over the past five years.

These developments, as well as the sustainability of assisted returns of migrants, the viability of legal pathways to Europe, the implementation of free movement frameworks, and the ability of response systems to absorb future shocks and population movements, among others, will have to continue to be measured in the future. This continuous analysis should be integrated into the design of future programmes, in order to make the necessary adjustments to future interventions.⁴

¹ See full reports [here](#).

² See more details on the work of the MLS on outcome indicators [here](#).

³ Next MLS annual report to be published in May 2021.

⁴ See the work of the MLS on ‘high-level indicators’, capturing the high-level trends that the EUTF contributed to (irregular migration, forced displacement, etc.) [here](#).



Woman and child receiving primary medical care and NFIs at IOM's Migrant Response Centre in Bosaso, Somalia

Photo credits: IOM

Migration governance

Labour migration & migration for development

Response to forced displacement

Protection

Return & reintegration

Response to trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants

Border management

Triple nexus

1. Introduction

Migration governance is a specific cross-cutting thematic review, in that it covers specific activities that could also be considered part of the other thematic reviews, as detailed in the Focus box below.

Focus box 5: Migration governance – definition for this thematic review

For this thematic review and portfolio analysis, support to migration governance will cover:

- Support for the development of migration governance norms, policies, frameworks, strategies, etc. (hereafter ‘frameworks’) or the integration of migration-related issues into existing sectoral frameworks. Therefore, in the context of this thematic review, migration governance frameworks will refer to any document or more informal agreement structuring and delineating roles when it comes to governing migration, setting rules, procedures, and guidelines related to migration, and/or setting, providing or enforcing these processes.
- Capacity building for policymakers for policymaking (vs. operational) purposes.
- Support for coordination between countries, and within countries (between policymakers).¹


The definition adopted can therefore be viewed as relatively restrictive; for example, programme-level standard operating procedures, or capacity building of public entities to strengthen their operating abilities, will not be included in this review, but will instead be considered in the other thematic reviews.

It is important to note that frameworks specific to migration are not the only way forward when it comes to migration governance (see figure on the right). However, common key good practices include a whole-of-government approach and the inclusion of local governments and civil society.

There are studies that provide an overview of migration governance frameworks in Africa but research on their implementation is almost non-existent. A measure of migration governance at the national level was developed by IOM in the form of ‘Migration Governance Indicators’ (MGIs), but they do not measure to what extent the governance frameworks are actually being implemented.

An important IOM/ICMPD study on governance frameworks in West African countries was conducted in 2015, but it too does not address their implementation, and given the speed of change on the ground (see next section), the findings are already outdated.² Migration profiles, developed by IOM, exist for most African countries,³ and in theory assess the implementation of migration frameworks in specific countries, but they are not regularly updated and their comprehensiveness varies. Exceptions include the US Department of State’s ‘Trafficking in Persons’ (TIP) country reports, which include in-depth assessments of the state of implementation of TIP frameworks. Promisingly, the upcoming project *Coordination Régionale des Politiques Migratoires* (funded by AFD and implemented by Expertise France) will support seven African

Figure 21: Approaches to migration governance




¹ The term ‘policymakers’ can include non-traditional actors such as NGOs, CSOs, and even the private sector, as long as they are part of a group that makes policy decisions.
² ICMPD, ‘A survey on migration policies in West Africa’, January 2016. Retrieved [here](#).
³ See IOM, ‘Migration profiles: a useful tool for understanding and improving governance of migration’. Retrieved [here](#).

countries¹ in developing their own indicators to measure progress made toward the implementation of their migration policies.

2. Situation across Africa

2.1. Overview



2.2. Main international frameworks

One of the first major international migration frameworks is the **UN Convention on Refugees**, to which most, but not all, African states are party. It was adopted in 1951 and amended by a 1967 Protocol. Libya and Eritrea are two notable non-signatories.

The **Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration** is the first intergovernmental agreement to cover all dimensions of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner.³ The Global Compact on Refugees, also adopted in 2018, reflects the international will to strengthen cooperation with refugees and host countries. It includes the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), a set of commitments to be implemented in situations involving large-scale movements of refugees and asylum seekers. The CRRF has resulted in some important changes on the ground, especially when combined with pre-existing regional initiatives such as the Nairobi process. Examples include new legislation on refugees in Ethiopia and Djibouti (for more details on the CRRF, see thematic review on the *Response to forced displacement*). However, not all EU member states have endorsed the Compacts.

In terms of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons, key frameworks include the **UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime** (also known as the Palermo Convention) and its two additional Protocols (2000), but there are many gaps in their implementation. Progress made

¹ Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Senegal, Tunisia.

² The full names of the frameworks are as follows: Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration; Global Compact on Refugees; Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework; United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime; Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children; Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa; Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children.

³ Migration data portal. Accessed [here](#).

with regard to changing the legislation to prosecute smuggling of migrants is reported to be minimal,¹ with some recent exceptions – for example, in Mauritania (also see thematic review on *Response to trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants*).

2.3. Main continental stakeholders and frameworks

Although a number of important frameworks have been developed at the African Union (AU) level, their implementation remains limited. It has been argued that ‘*the vast majority of AU protocols and agreements are never implemented, and AU member states often feel little ownership of these*’.² There are also limited human resources working on migration governance within the AU Commission.³

The AU **Kampala Convention** on IDPs, of which 30 African states are now party, is legally binding, and indeed many states have adopted domestic legislation or policies to implement its provisions, but implementation is lacking in some respects (also see thematic review on *Response to forced displacement*).⁴

Similarly, a 2019 evaluation of the AU **Ouagadougou Plan of Action** to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings (2006) found ‘glaring gaps’ in its implementation, including the lack of a monitoring framework, and low awareness among, and limited implementation by, member states.⁵

2.4. Main regional stakeholders and frameworks

The involvement of most Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in migration governance tends to focus on free movement, since they were created with the goal of fostering regional economic integration. IGAD was a notable exception to this until recently, as its work on migration governance was mostly related to displacement.

2.4.1. ECOWAS

ECOWAS has one of the most advanced regional free movement regimes in Africa, with the adoption of a Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment in 1979,⁶ the implementation of the rights of entry to (1980) and residence in (1986) other ECOWAS member states for community citizens, the issuance of a uniform ECOWAS passport (2000) in all but one member state, and the development of an ECOWAS biometric ID card (2013) in six member states. The implementation of ECOWAS free movement frameworks remains unequal across member states, due to a lack of awareness of the documents needed and limited civil registries resulting in low uptake of documents needed to cross borders; corruption at the borders; and overall poor capacities of states for implementation.⁷ ECOWAS’ initial focus on free movement was complemented by a Common Approach

¹ IBF International Consulting, ‘Needs assessment study for the development and implementation of legislation and strategies to counter migrant smuggling covering Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Guinea and ECOWAS’, 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

² German Development Institute (DIE), ‘The influence of EU migration policy on regional free movement in the IGAD and ECOWAS regions’, 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Interview with a key informant from an African regional organisation.

⁴ ICRC, ‘The Kampala Convention: key recommendations, 10 years on’, 2019. Retrieved [here](#). The report mentions for example additional efforts necessary to have quality data and analysis on internal displacement, the need to have states assist IDPs themselves, and the fact that authorities often tend to focus on the return of IDPs to their place of origin as the primary or only solution.

⁵ AU, ‘Draft report of the evaluation of the implementation status of the African Union’s Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, especially Women and Children (2006) in Africa’, 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Dick, E., Schraven, B., ‘Regional cooperation on migration and mobility: insights from two African regions’, 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Interviews with key informant from research institutions and donor organisation

on Migration (2008) with provisions regarding protection, TIP and gender.¹ Less focus is placed on irregular migration (which is a recent priority [2018]),² return and reintegration, SOM,³ and refugees.⁴

Focus box 6: FMM West Africa

‘Support to Free Movement of Persons and Migration in West Africa’ (FMM West Africa) is a €26M project running from 2013 to 2021. It is co-funded by the European Development Fund (EDF) and the ECOWAS Commission and implemented by an IOM-led consortium that includes ICMPD and ILO. The project works at the regional, national, and local levels to, respectively: 1. Strengthen the capacities of the ECOWAS Commission, the Migration Dialogue for West Africa (MIDWA), its seven Technical Working Groups and other regional/data forums to lead intra-regional dialogues and act as platforms for policy development and harmonisation; 2. Build the capacities of member states in the realms of migration policy development and harmonisation, migration data management, labour migration, border management, and counter-trafficking; and 3. Promote the active engagement of non-state actors and local authorities in implementing migration policies and migration activities.

Major achievements include the development and approval of the Regional Migration Policy together with national migration policies, profiles, migration data guidelines, as well as various thematic frameworks. Through its support to MIDWA, FMM also provided a platform for the ECOWAS Commission and its member states to collaborate on regional migration priorities. Overall, the programme was praised for its holistic cross-level and multi-stakeholder approach to furthering regional integration, but this all-encompassing approach was also considered overambitious by others, in terms of the existing capacity of stakeholders to be involved and of the number of migration-related sub-themes to be covered.

After the completion of FMM West Africa in 2021, further EU support for regional migration governance and free movement is uncertain and will depend on programming decisions. The EU acknowledges that this could be a major gap and that there is a risk that the progress that has been generated by FMM West Africa will stall.⁵ Therefore, maintaining continuity for some of the activities of the FMM could be discussed, as detailed in a case study to be published by the MLS.

2.4.2. IGAD

IGAD’s focus on migration governance is more recent than that of ECOWAS. The organisation’s Migration Programme was created in 2006.⁶ IGAD was the first REC in Africa to adopt a comprehensive regional migration policy framework (RMPF, 2012), which was based on the AU Migration Policy Framework. In order to implement the RMPF, the IGAD Secretariat developed the Migration Action Plan 2015-2020. However, IGAD’s regional migration policy frameworks are non-binding, and their implementation is left to member states. All programming on migration within IGAD is donor-funded, which limits its ability to act autonomously.⁷ Nevertheless, IGAD’s engagement on forced displacement has recently proved particularly successful; for example, notably, IGAD member states recently adopted the Djibouti Declaration and Plan of Action on Refugee Education, following which many of them adopted policies and legal frameworks to allow refugees equitable access to education and training.⁸

¹ ECOWAS Commission, ‘ECOWAS common approach on migration’, 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

² German Development Institute (DIE), ‘The influence of EU migration policy on regional free movement in the IGAD and ECOWAS Regions’, 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

³ IBF International Consulting, ‘Needs assessment study for the development and implementation of legislation and strategies to counter migrant smuggling covering Côte d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Guinea and ECOWAS’, 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Although refugees were formally added to ECOWAS policies in 2008, relatively little action has followed. See, Dick, E., Schraven, B., ‘Regional cooperation on migration and mobility: Insights from two African regions’, 2019. Retrieved [here](#). Geddes, A. et al., ‘The dynamics of regional migration governance’, 2019. Retrieved [here](#). Dick, E. (DIE), ‘Analytical framework for regional migration governance in Africa: key features, patterns and impacts in the ECOWAS and IGAD regions’, 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ German Development Institute (DIE), ‘The influence of EU migration policy on regional free movement in the IGAD and ECOWAS Regions’, 2019. Retrieved [here](#). And key informant interview with key informant from UN agency.

⁶ IGAD was initially not focused on migration. The REC was created in 1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), focused on droughts and humanitarian issues, and the three new priority areas of its mandate did not include migration.

⁷ Geddes, A. et al., ‘The dynamics of regional migration governance’, 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Tsegaye, K. K., ‘Implementing the Djibouti Declaration: Education for refugees, returnees & host communities’, 2020. Accessed [here](#).

IGAD's focus on free movement is also more recent than that of ECOWAS, with endorsement of the Free Movement Protocol only occurring in February 2020.

2.4.3. Other RECs

Most RECs have drafted or adopted agreements on regional free movement, but implementation is only a reality in the East African Community (EAC),¹ where the Common Market Protocol adopted in 2009 includes 'free movement of workers', though implementation varies across countries and categories of workers (low-skilled workers are generally excluded from the agreement). **REC involvement in other aspects of migration governance tends to be limited in most cases.** For the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (**CEN-SAD**), migration has been reported as not being a central focus (compared to issues like conflict management). The Economic Community of Central African States (**ECCAS**) has a regional migration policy but it has not been adopted at the ministerial level² and '*there is little evidence of its implementation*'.³ For the Southern African Development Community (**SADC**), migration governance is primarily viewed from a security lens. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (**COMESA**) is focused on the free movement of goods, but its migration-related work is underdeveloped.⁴ As for the Arab Maghreb Union (**AMU**), activities have been 'frozen' for the past few years.⁵

2.5. Cross-continental stakeholders and processes

2.5.1. Africa – EU

In December 2020 a political agreement was reached on the text for a new Partnership Agreement that will succeed the Cotonou Agreement (signed in 2000 and revised in 2010) between the EU and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS). Once the agreement is signed and ratified in 2021, it will guide political, economic and cooperation relations (migration being one of the themes covered) between the EU and the OACPS for the next 20 years.

The next EU-African Union Summit will be an opportunity to discuss the upcoming 'comprehensive strategy with Africa', which should replace the Joint Africa-EU Strategy⁶ (2007) that has been guiding the Africa-EU Partnership (the overarching political framework of EU-Africa cooperation relations) since 2007. The new comprehensive strategy proposes to work together on five key partnerships, one of them being 'a partnership on migration and mobility'.

The Africa-EU Migration and Mobility Dialogue (MMD) comprises three dialogues (the Rabat Process, the Khartoum Process and the Continent-to-Continent Migration and Mobility Dialogue), which are all political processes that entail regular cross-continental meetings, as well as the follow up to the Joint Valletta Action Plan. While the Khartoum Process focuses on issues of smuggling of migrants and trafficking of persons (though it has recently successfully broadened its scope),⁷ the Rabat Process is considered to pay equal attention to topics related to legal migration.⁸

In addition, the EU has also established bilateral partnerships with various African states, including mobility partnerships, Common Agendas for Migration and Mobility (CAMM) and the Migration

¹ Even though implementation is only a reality in ECOWAS and the EAC. Wood, T., 'The role of free movement of persons agreements in addressing disaster displacement: a study of Africa', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

² African Union, 'Report of the second member states/RECs training workshop on migration governance', 2020.

³ Urso, G. and Hakami, A., 'Regional migration governance in Africa: AU and RECs'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ African Centre for Migration & Society, University of the Witwatersrand and Samuel Hall, 'Free and safe movement in East Africa', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Urso, G. and Hakami, A., 'Regional migration governance in Africa: AU and RECs', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Website of the Africa-EU Partnership accessed [here](#).

⁷ Interview with key informant from international organisation.

⁸ Rabat Process, 'Stocktaking of progress on the implementation of the Marrakesh Action Plan (2018-2020) and future prospects'. Retrieved [here](#).

Partnership Framework (MPF), launched in 2016 with Nigeria, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Ethiopia. EU member states also have their own bilateral agreements.

2.5.2. Africa – Middle East

A number of African countries have signed bilateral labour agreements with Middle Eastern countries, a process which has been described by some stakeholders as unbalanced because African states are faced with a 'take it or leave it' position from Middle Eastern countries.¹ Several stakeholders mentioned the potential for IGAD to negotiate a uniform agreement for the whole HoA region (similar to the Colombo Process for Asian states, for example), and IGAD recently expressed an interest in doing so. It can also be noted that within the framework of the AU Horn of Africa Initiative, the AU has dialogues on migration with the League of Arab States.

2.6. Country level stakeholders and processes

It is difficult to compare migration governance needs across countries because, as underlined in the first section, little to no public information is available on the extent to which migration governance frameworks are actually implemented, with presumably many 'empty shells'. Nevertheless, the following trends and challenges appear to be evident.

2.6.1. Major trends in migration governance at the country level

Beyond the subject of diasporas, migration was not a major topic for African countries before the involvement of the EU and the launch of the EUTF,² with some exceptions (for example, in South Africa immigration has been an important topic for a long time). Even today, a recent survey of 39 African states reveals that their top three 'major migration challenges faced by the country' are related to engaging the diaspora, labour migration out of the country, and remittances.³

Over three quarters of African national migration policies were adopted within the past four years.⁴ As of 2018, 46% of African states had a migration policy.⁵ According to some, one important successful outcome of the effort to draft migration policies is that '*now a real dialogue is possible*' with EU countries, compared to ten years ago when only one party to the discussion had policies in place.⁶ However, policies specific to migration are not the only way forward when it comes to migration governance (see Figure 21 in the introduction). 'Migration' encompasses very different issues (e.g. diaspora vs forced displacement), and in some cases they should not necessarily be considered together.

Whatever the approach selected, a whole-of-government approach as well as the inclusion of local governance structures remain necessary. Developing migration governance initiatives at the local level has become a trend among many donors in very recent years,⁷ and with very good reason. Sub-national authorities may be the best placed to meet the needs of migrants and may have more

¹ Interview with key informant from UN agency.

² Interview with key informant from research institution.

³ 'Report of the assessment of the capacity building needs of African Union member states and Regional Economic Communities to manage migration', 2018.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Interview with key informant from EUTF implementing partner.

⁷ Interview with key informant from EUTF implementing partner.

innovative approaches,¹ but so far remain insufficiently involved,² and existing local development plans can be overlooked by donors.³

2.6.2. Major gaps and challenges

Though the extent to which migration governance frameworks are implemented has not been assessed, partly because they are of course very new,⁴ some data suggests that implementation is very limited, as only 61% of migration policies have plans of action, and only 50% have monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.⁵ As underlined by the AU and illustrated in Figure 21 in the introduction, migration policies will also need to be mainstreamed into sectoral policies as *'while it is laudable for member states to adopt migration policies, stand-alone migration policies have limited impact and are not sustainable'*.⁶ Then, of course, they will need to be implemented on the ground.

This has a knock-on effect on specific aspects of migration policies, such as gender and climate change. National migration policies often have sections on *'migration and gender'* or *'migration and climate change'*, but associated sectoral policies have yet to be implemented or even developed, and climate-related migration in particular is insufficiently built into development planning.⁷

Lack of coordination among the different organisations involved in migration governance can also be an impediment. According to a 2018 survey,⁸ less than 18% of African states have national coordinating forums for coordinating migration, with 29% meeting infrequently (less than quarterly). In West Africa, 14 out of the 15 ECOWAS member states have created inter-ministerial committees or agencies on migration, but the vast majority are specifically dedicated to TIP and child exploitation, with only some also focusing on legal/labour migration.^{9,10}

Lack of ownership can also be an issue, especially if donors attempt to influence the content of the migration policies that they provide funding and technical assistance for. For example, it was suggested that references to reintegration policy in national strategies of origin countries is not necessarily a sign of political ownership, but rather a reflection of destination countries' support for the development of migration policies that *'[guarantee] inclusion of reference to reintegration'*.¹¹ Stakeholders also underlined that donor-funded initiatives should make sure not to propagate a 'western' vision of migration governance.¹² For example, on TIP, *'some needs-driven practices, particularly related to child work, often fall within the internationally accepted definition of TIP, reducing the willingness of states to respond to these practices as a 'crime'*.¹³

Most importantly for migration governance programming, the absorption capacity of governance actors (precisely because migration is a new topic for most countries) and a lack of coordination among donors present further challenges.¹⁴ Stakeholders mentioned cases of administrations being 'overwhelmed' by funding on migration in Senegal, Tunisia and Morocco.

The following country examples illustrate some of the above-mentioned points:

¹ EU Practitioners' network, 'Report of the preparatory online sessions for the expert workshop: Migration and Development: &n inclusive and comprehensive approach on human mobility', 2020. Retrieved [here](#). Also interviews with key informants from INGO, donor organisation, EU.

² Migration Policy Institute, 'Africa deepens its approach to migration governance, but are policies translating to action?', April 2020. Retrieved [here](#). Also see interviews with key informants from EU, EUTF implementing partner.

³ *Secrétariat Permanent du Cadre de Concertation sur la Migration, 'Bilan Migration Niger 2018-2019'*, 2020.

⁴ Interview with key informant from UN agency.

⁵ 39 African countries surveyed, self-report. 'Report of the assessment of the capacity building needs of African Union member states and Regional Economic Communities to manage migration', 2018.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ World Bank, 'Goundswell – Preparing for internal climate migration', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ 'Report of the assessment of the capacity building needs of African Union member states and Regional Economic Communities to manage migration', 2018.

⁹ Adepoju, A., 'International migration and national development in Sub-Saharan Africa', 2008. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ ICMPD, 'A survey on migration policies in West Africa', January 2016. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ OECD, 'Sustainable reintegration of returning migrants: a better homecoming', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

¹² Lavenex, S. et al., 'Regional migration governance', 2015. Retrieved [here](#).

¹³ Bird, L. and Reitano, T., 'Trafficking in persons in conflict contexts: What is a realistic response from Africa?', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁴ Interview with key informant from UN agency, the EU, African government, EUTF implementing partner.

- **Niger.** The process of drafting a National Migration Policy, which started in 2014, finally bore fruit with the adoption of a document in September 2020 with support from GIZ. In parallel, the EUTF made a notable contribution both to the drafting and to the implementation of the country's first national border policy and action plan with the €90M '*Appui budgétaire à la justice, sécurité et à la gestion des frontières au Niger*' (2016-2024). Going forward, funding will also be required for the other priorities of the National Migration Policy - its plan of action for 2020-2025 includes activities worth around €400M.
- **Nigeria.** The country has a sophisticated governance framework, with multiple policies supported by the EUTF (see section 4), which was able to build upon the work done under the 10th EDF. In particular, a National Migration Strategy was adopted in 2015. However, implementation of policies remains dependent on donors' programming, with a lack of federal budgeting for migration activities.¹
- **Uganda.** This is an example of a country that chose to streamline migration into existing policies (as it is currently doing with its employment policy, for example), rather than drafting specific 'migration policies'. Overall, its migration governance system has been praised, especially with regard to refugees, though limitations remain² (see the thematic review on *Forced Displacement* for more details).
- **Morocco.** The 2014 National Strategy on Immigration and Asylum (SNIA) took a 'humanitarian' approach to migration and asylum, with the regularisation of 50,000 (mostly sub-Saharan) migrants. It planned for the adoption of three laws (on immigration, asylum and trafficking in persons), but so far only the third one has been adopted. This is likely in part because of the budgetary commitments the government expect it to entail,³ and in part because the SNIA has to be balanced against other strategies on Moroccans abroad and on border management.⁴
- **Tunisia.** A National Strategy on Migration (NSM) was drafted in 2012, revised in 2015 and 2017, and is still not adopted, probably partly because of funding requirements regarding the 'immigration' aspect of the NSM, as well as disagreements between the Ministries involved.⁵

Focus box 7: ProGreS Migration Case Study

As detailed in a case study to be published by the MLS, ProGreS Migration is a €12.8M EUTF-funded programme with four components: 1. support the operationalisation of the National Strategy on Migration and the implementation of a major national survey on migration (component implemented by ICMPD); 2. support the involvement of the Tunisian diaspora (component implemented by GIZ); 3. create a single reintegration platform hosted by the Tunisian authorities and coordinating returns from four European countries (implemented by Expertise France); and 4. support youth employability and local migration governance in three governorates (implemented by AFD). Lessons learned from the programme illustrate the following points made in this thematic review:

- **Partner countries tend to prioritise financial contributions by their diaspora.** Two out of the five priorities laid out in the 2017 draft National Strategy on Migration are about the Tunisian diaspora. ProGreS Migration clearly responded to this concern with activities implemented by GIZ and GRDR.

¹ Migration Policy Institute (MPI), 'Africa deepens its approach to migration governance, but are policies translating to action?', 2020. Retrieved [here](#). Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration (MEDAM), 'Nigeria at a crossroads: the political stakes of migration governance', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

² In Uganda's refugee settlements, which are designed to encourage self-sufficiency, refugees are given access to land on which they can engage in agricultural activity (but the plots are reportedly too small) and access the same services as host communities (though in practice limitations remain, e.g. for refugees to access education in their native language). But beyond these settlements refugees are generally not entitled to any assistance and require a specific permit in order to work, just like 'economic' migrants do. Oloka-Onyango, J. 'Exploring the multiple paradoxes and challenges of Uganda's refugee law policies and practices', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Interview with key informant from an INGO.

⁴ Interview with key informant from the EU.

⁵ Interview with key informant from an INGO.

- **Programming works best when responding to needs clearly expressed by governments.** This was a key factor in ProGreS's success according to stakeholders. ProGreS component 3 establishes a reintegration platform for returned Tunisians, hosted by the government (also see the TR on *Return & reintegration* for further details on this innovative platform).
- **Ambiguous importance of 'unified' migration governance frameworks.** The non-adoption of the National Strategy on Migration is not significantly slowing down ProGreS activities, and legislation on specific themes (diaspora, integration of immigrants) is being adopted and implemented.
- **Lack of coordination and limited absorption capacity of governments.** Most of the programme components faced significant delays due to disagreement over which institution should be the lead for projects. There are eight institutions in charge of migration governance in Tunisia,¹ of which three were only created within the past six years.² The large number of migration-related donor programmes in the country can be a challenge (in terms of coordination by and absorption capacity of the government) as well as an opportunity: ProGreS IPs were able to build on several other migration-related projects implemented in Tunisia (e.g. Euromed, LEMMA)
- **Opportunities and challenges related to working on local migration governance.** The decentralisation process in Tunisia is extremely recent, and it is difficult for ProGreS to produce results on migration when gaps in local governance remain at every level (awareness, willingness, mandate, capacities, coordination, etc.).

3. Key non-EUTF interventions

This thematic review identified at least €110M spent on migration governance programming by non-EUTF donors, dealing with a diverse range of themes but tending to focus on the regional level.³ Beyond the EU, prominent donors include Germany and to a lesser extent Sweden and Switzerland, as illustrated in the next figure.

Innovative approaches identified include:

- **Demand-driven facilities that ensure stronger ownership of donor programming**, which is especially key in the field of governance – for example as part of the GIZ-AU project, or the FMM project (for which IPs 'have had to hold back' as there was not enough funding to answer the demands of states);⁴
- **The 'Swiss approach'** which, instead of 'spreading' funds over a number of countries, focuses on specific countries (e.g. Tunisia) and attempts to build migration governance systems over a number of years and at all levels (both national and local), while also emphasising the need for government ownership.⁵

¹ ICMPD, 'Note d'analyse contextuelle sur la migration dans la région Afrique du Nord Moyen Orient'.


² ICMPD, 'Note méthodologique régionale pour la mise en place effective d'un processus de gouvernance de la migration'.

³ However, smaller programming focused on the national and local level may well have been missed in this thematic review.

⁴ Interview with key informant from a regional organisation.

⁵ Interviews with key informants from a donor organisation.

Figure 23: Selected non-EUTF projects active on migration governance¹



¹ Abbreviations detailed in the annex. The top part of the figure relates to continental and cross-continent programming, while the bottom part relates to regional, national and sub-national programming. Budgets are provided when publicly available.

4. EUTF portfolio

About €75M of EUTF funding is dedicated to migration governance, over half of which in the Horn of Africa. Key implementers include GIZ (€24M) and IOM (€12M). In total, €31M are allocated to projects implemented by EU member state organisations.

As illustrated in The portfolio analysis used project budgets disaggregated by activity (and other relevant project documents) whenever they were available to estimate amounts dedicated to each thematic area. Thus, in this case, the budgets referred to correspond to the amounts estimated to be dedicated to migration governance in each project, and not total budgets.

Main themes covered include the following, with around €15M each:

- **Overall migration policies** at the national or local level, particularly in Niger with ProGEM and Nigeria with the IOM-EU JI. ProGEM supports local governments with regard to the inclusion of migration flows in development planning and was praised by the Nigerien government for the setup of local ‘migration observatories’, allowing for the identification of population needs – in contrast to some other EUTF-funded projects in Niger, which had reportedly failed to take into account local development plans. In Nigeria, the IOM-EU Joint Initiative (JI) supports a ‘360°’ approach to migration governance, building on what was already achieved under the 10th EDF. In particular, it supports the drafting and/or reviewing of a National Migration Policy, its action plan and a National Diaspora Policy, supports Technical Working Group meetings on migration, and created state-level reintegration committees. In the HoA, the Better Migration Management (BMM) programme also contributed to the development of national migration policies and action plans (see Focus box 8 below).
- **Forced displacement**, mostly to improve the inclusion of refugees and IDP considerations in local governance systems in the Horn of Africa, such as the IDLO component of the Somalia RE-INTEG programme, which supported the drafting of the new national policy on IDPs, refugees and returnees that was adopted in 2019. The new policy is considered a key milestone in the management of migration and displacement in Somalia: in it, the federal government acknowledges for the first time its primary responsibility to find durable solutions for IDPs, returnees and refugees in the country, and clarifies the roles of central and state governments in relation to migration management.
- **Smuggling and TIP**, again focused on the HoA, with the BMM programme and other projects targeting regional frameworks;
- **Legal and labour migration** to a slightly lesser extent (about €12M), mostly with the Free Movement programme with IGAD and the THAMM programme in NoA.

Finally, €5M have been allocated to address governance related to **returns and reintegration** with regional projects, while a few projects scattered across the three windows have attempted to address governance in **protection**.

Figure 24: EUTF funds dedicated to migration governance




Figure 25 below, in general, the EUTF has so far not adopted a comprehensive approach of support to migration governance, instead tending to support specific governance structures with the objective of facilitating the implementation of specific projects. The portfolio analysis used project budgets disaggregated by activity (and other relevant project documents) whenever they were available to estimate amounts dedicated to each thematic area. Thus, in this case, the budgets referred to correspond to the amounts estimated to be dedicated to migration governance in each project, and not total budgets.


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¹ Secrétariat Permanent du Cadre de Concertation sur la Migration, 'Bilan Migration Niger 2018-2019', 2020.

Figure 25: Main projects funded by the EUTF in the field of migration governance (amounts are those specifically dedicated to migration governance, *not* projects' total budgets)¹



¹ As of October 2020; only contracted projects with over €150,000 dedicated to migration governance are included; abbreviations detailed in the annex; amounts for GIZ projects purposefully not indicated. LY-01 refers to the programme 'Strengthening protection and resilience of displaced populations in Libya' (DRC), LY-03-04 to 'Managing Mixed Migration Flows' (UNHCR) and LY-10 to 'Managing Mixed Migration Flows' (GIZ).

Focus box 8: The Better Migration Management (BMM) programme

BMM's work on migration governance focuses on the following aspects:

- Support **whole-of-government** approach to migration, including support to national coordination mechanisms on migration, SOM and/or TIP, depending on the country.
- Support the development of **migration policies** (BMM I supported the development of draft migration policies in Kenya and South Sudan), of action plans (developed or validated in three countries) and the domestication of the **Palermo Protocols on TIP and SOM** (with support from BMM I, the SOM Protocol was ratified by Sudan, and a TIP Act was finalised in Somalia). In Uganda, BMM I also supported the revision of regulations on the protection of migrant workers to the Middle East.
- Support **cross-border dialogues**, with nine bilateral exchanges facilitated by BMM I, on TIP and SOM, but also on seasonal labour migration between Sudan and Ethiopia.

The EUTF mid-term evaluation highlighted that the migration governance capacity building efforts conducted under the EUTF '*ensure some longer-term effects*' but that it was unlikely that recipient governments would fund the continuation of migration management activities given '*the weak fiscal and institutional environments within which they are carried out*'.¹

5. Perspectives and areas of opportunities

The next funding cycle should be an opportunity to adopt a more ambitious and systematic approach to supporting migration governance across Africa. A number of good practices were highlighted in this section, such as the FMM initiative in West Africa and its demand driven facility. Following a similar cross-country and multi-annual logic, a new ambitious EU-funded programme could be put in place at the cross-country level to support the development, coordination and harmonisation of migration governance systems across Africa.

This programme could be based on:

- a pool of technical experts and trainers, selected for their experience on migration governance and if possible largely from African countries, who are able to support the development of migration governance frameworks and build capacities where needed and 'on demand', for a definite period or on a regular basis depending on needs. This pool of experts would be used as a demand driven facility to respond to specific needs (see FMM).
- a country-based coordinator could be appointed in each target country to support and monitor migration governance activities at the country level, and create a link between governments and implementing partners involved in migration governance activities. The coordinator would map out systems and activities in place, track progress, and identify priorities and gaps in real time. The same person (with a potential support team) would be in charge of creating a body of data and knowledge at the country level (similar to migration profiles, but in a more dynamic and sustainable manner) and building the capacity of one or several migration governance analysts at the local level (within the relevant government body) who would be able to take over the tools and mission after three to five years, depending on local capacities and complexities.

Such a programme would be designed and managed to:

- keep track of the development of migration governance systems over the next decade;
- respond rapidly to partner governments' needs with a customised approach;
- map, track and share good practices in migration management support initiatives across countries;

¹ GDSI, 'Mid-term Evaluation of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa 2015-2019', October 2020.

- complement these support initiatives and foster coherence between approaches while minimising overlap (given that a number of EU member states will continue to run their own migration governance support programmes based on their own political and technical priorities, and all inputs will be useful provided they are well coordinated).

This combination of analytical and technical support should be ensured in the medium term to accelerate efforts currently taking place in many countries.

To pave the way for such a programme, the EU should engage in a comprehensive exercise aimed at assessing both the situation and the gaps in migration governance legislation *and* in its implementation, as well as the current structures in place (coordination agencies, secretariats, focal points in ministries and at local level) and the absorption capacities of partner countries.

This exercise could be done along the year 2021 as a funnel assessment that starts with an initial mapping of the situation across countries (not limited to current EUTF beneficiary countries) to identify priority countries presenting specific governance gaps compared to their migration and mobility needs, based on which a second, more in-depth assessment could be conducted to identify priority activities to be undertaken in the selected countries.

The in-depth assessment could make full use of existing research (e.g. Migration Profiles, Migration Governance Indicators) while going deeper in assessing: 1. how well the migration priorities in each country have been streamlined into the relevant sectoral policies, 2. how well they have been streamlined into local governance systems, and 3. to what extent they are implemented and making a difference on the ground for each sub-thematic area. It is suggested that specific attention be paid to climate-induced migration (particularly internal migration which is likely to constitute the bulk of it), and how current policies are on one hand helping communities stay in place when adaptation is possible, and on the other hand facilitating mobility both in places of origin (e.g. strengthening land rights) and destination (e.g. strengthening portability of social security and access to services) when migration can be a useful adaptive strategy. Such an assessment could also pay particular attention to policy gaps and practices that may marginalise or hinder the resilience of women and children in displacement, particularly with regard to access to land rights, inheritance rights or access to justice for women, and education rights for children.

This research would have to be built on strong collaboration with the highest levels of government, as well as with the EUDs and implementing agencies involved in these countries, since the objective would be to pave the way for future programming or to extend ongoing activities.¹ The assessment would serve as a baseline for the future programme, but also be an opportunity to evaluate the willingness of the partner countries to continue developing migration governance systems and capacities, and their priorities in this field.

¹ Interview with key informant from UN agency.



Ethical Fashion Initiative in Burkina Faso

Photo credits: Fanny Kabre for the European Union

Migration governance

Labour migration & migration for development

Response to forced displacement

Protection

Return & reintegration

Response to trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants


Border management

Triple nexus

1. Definition

This thematic review covers activities supporting labour migration (as well as student mobility) and the positive impact of diasporas in their countries of origin (often referred to as ‘migration for development’). It therefore covers mobility schemes (for workers and students) and other activities that directly contribute to the safe mobility of new migrants, as well as programming that aims to increase the contributions of existing migrant populations to their countries of origin. **Identity systems** are also considered in this thematic review as the lack of foundational identity systems is a major challenge to free movement. However, although **internal movement and urbanisation** can also be considered largely as labour migration flows, they will only be briefly mentioned.

Figure 26: Labour migration and Migration for development – setting the scene¹



2. Situation across Africa

2.1. Labour migration & student mobility

2.1.1. Overall frameworks: Free Movement Protocols


The AU Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, adopted in 2018, requires 15 ratifications to enter into force but has so far only been ratified by four states.² By comparison, its sister agreement, the treaty of the African Continental Free Trade Area, has been ratified by at least 27 African countries. This suggests that despite the AU’s ambitions, with initial plans for an African passport to be rolled out by the end of 2020, many African governments may have limited interest in free movement, which is likely compounded by concerns about security and job protection.³

¹ Sources for the data: Remittances: 2018, World Bank and 2020, IOM. Work permits in the EU: as of end 2019, Eurostat. Students: 2017, UNESCO. Migrant workers in Africa: 2017, ILO. Migrant workers in Gulf States: various years (2012-2017), Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population country notes.

² African Union, ‘The governance of labour migration in the context of changing employment landscapes’, 2020. Accessed [here](#).

³ For example, South Sudan required a special provision in the IGAD Free Movement protocol, as it considered its local workforce unable to compete with foreigners.

Figure 27: Regional free movement in Africa



Though most RECs have either adopted or proposed protocols for the free movement of persons between states (see figure above), in practice, implementation has only started in ECOWAS and the EAC.¹ ECOWAS adopted a Protocol on Free Movement of Persons (FMP), Residence and Establishment in 1979, but the right to establish businesses has yet to be ratified,² and the right of residence is not yet fully implemented either.³ It introduced a uniform passport and a biometric ID card, but uptake by the population remains low due to a lack of knowledge, the prohibitive cost of the relevant documents, and limited ID systems. As a result, visa costs tend to be replaced by informal fees paid directly to border controllers,⁴ which greatly hamper free movement at land crossings.⁵ The EAC adopted a Common Market Protocol in 2009, but its implementation varies with Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda ahead of the others⁶ thanks to a 'variable geometry' principle, which allows some community members to move faster than others on specific matters not all members agree upon, which can lead for example to bilateral preferential agreements (that can hopefully be extended to all later on). Furthermore, although the Protocol includes 'free movement of workers', low-skilled workers are generally excluded from the agreement.⁷

Inspired by the ECOWAS and EAC protocols, IGAD's Protocol on FMP was endorsed in February 2020 with EUTF support. As IGAD works towards ratification, domestication and implementation, support to the development of sectoral policies derived from the protocol will be needed.⁸ Indeed, the experience of other RECs illustrates the importance of continuous support: in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the 2005 Protocol on FMP remains unenforced because the required minimum ratifications have not yet been achieved.⁹ The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) adopted a Protocol on FMP in 1983, but 'implementation has been negligible'.¹⁰ In the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), as of 2017, only one state had ratified the 2001 Protocol on FMP.¹¹ The draft Protocol on FMP of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States

¹ Wood, T., 'The role of free movement of persons agreements in addressing disaster displacement: a study of Africa', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

² Dick, E., Schraven, B., 'Regional cooperation on migration and mobility: insights from two African regions', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Interview with key informant from a UN agency.

⁴ Zanker, F., 'The politics of EU and African migration governance: from rhetoric to practice', 2017. Retrieved [here](#). Castillejo, C. 'The influence of EU migration policy on regional free movement in the IGAD and ECOWAS regions', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Interview with key informant from a UN agency. 63% of Gambians find it difficult to cross international borders to work/trade in other WA countries (Afrobarometer, 'Gambians see sharp decline in emigration, though interest in leaving remains high', 2018, accessed [here](#))

⁶ IOM, 'Study on the benefits and challenges of free movement of persons in Africa', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ 'The Schedule for the Free Movement of Workers (CMP Annex II) contains the types of skilled workers who have market access and to which Partner States, and largely excludes low-skilled workers'. ILO, 'An assessment of labour migration and mobility governance in the IGAD region: regional report', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Interview with key informant from a donor institution.

⁹ SEF, 'Regional migration governance in the African Continent - current state of affairs and the way forward', 2016. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ Wood, T., 'The role of free movement of persons agreements in addressing disaster displacement: a study of Africa', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ Ibid.

(CEN-SAD) was never adopted, while in the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), only Tunisia has fully opened up its borders to the other member states.¹

It is important to keep in mind that Protocols on FMP are a necessary condition for the continent to fully benefit from migration, but that this alone is insufficient. Investments in infrastructure connecting countries with each other, as well as strong identity (ID) systems (as detailed in Focus box 9 below) will also be needed.

Focus box 9: ID systems


A World Bank analysis covering 17 African countries suggests that less than 30% of their population are covered by national ID systems,² and this is a major impediment to free movement (among many other concerns). Ethiopia, Malawi and Somalia have birth registration rates below 10%. Often, so-called ‘functional’ ID systems, such as voter IDs, have filled the gap, but they do not cover those who turned 18 after the last election, minors, or non-citizens.³

In addition, though all countries surveyed by the Bank have moved towards (or have plans for) *digital* national ID systems, over half still have paper-based civil registration systems that are vulnerable to destruction and fraud, and the security of many ID systems may be hampered by the insecurity of the so-called ‘breeder documents’ (e.g. birth certificates) on which they are based. The costs associated with registration and identification are often higher for vulnerable populations such as refugees and women, though there are no significant gender gaps in the registration rates of most countries.

Expanding ID coverage will require massive funding, with the World Bank estimating the cost to be USD 4-11 per person (maintenance of the system not included). It is estimated that the cost of Nigeria’s ID system would be over USD 4B, for example,⁴ and this does not include the costs associated with the ‘breeder’ documentation. As such, it will take years to build civil registration systems.⁵ Expanding ID coverage will also require a revision of governance systems: the World Bank noted that ‘a majority of the surveyed countries lack adequate legal frameworks to support and regulate modern identity management systems. This includes overlapping mandates for identity providers, inadequate privacy and data protection laws, and out-of-date regulations that do not sufficiently cover digital identity’. Privacy laws could, for example, be modelled on the 2008 ECOWAS treaty and 2010 supplementary act on privacy, as the Ivory Coast did in 2013.⁶

The lack of solid ID systems has major implications for irregular migration and forced displacement as well. The use of fraudulent travel documents is reportedly widespread, though Frontex reported fewer than 150 detected fraudulent document users for most African countries, except Morocco (with over 700 cases).⁷ For forcibly displaced persons, the lack of ID makes it more difficult to obtain refugee status, to access basic services, and eventually to return home.⁸

Figure 28: Birth registration rate (left) and ID registration rate (right).
Source: World Bank, 2018



¹ IOM, ‘Study on the benefits and challenges of free movement of persons in Africa’, 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

² World Bank, ‘The state of identification systems in Africa: a synthesis of country assessments’, 2018. Accessed [here](#).

³ In addition, the conduct of costly mass enrolment campaigns for each election wastes opportunities to establish a continuous register.

⁴ World Bank, ‘The state of identification systems in Africa: a synthesis of country assessments’, 2018. Accessed [here](#).

⁵ Interview with key informant from research institution

⁶ World Bank, ‘The state of identification systems in Africa: a synthesis of country assessments’, 2018. Accessed [here](#).

⁷ Frontex, ‘2020 Risk Analysis’. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Manby, B., ‘Identification in the Context of Forced Displacement’, 2016. Retrieved [here](#).

2.1.2. Labour migration from Africa

Labour migration within Africa

In 2017, there were around 13 to 14.4 million migrant workers across Africa,¹ of whom almost 30% were working in southern Africa. Other important destinations for African migrant workers are Côte d'Ivoire, and to a lesser extent Libya (see Focus box 10 below). Migrant workers represent approximately 3% of all workers on the continent, which is less than the global average.² These estimates, however, fail to capture the large number of circular migrants and short-term local movements, many of which occur for labour purposes.³ 42% of labour migrants are women, who are more commonly employed in low skilled and low paid employment, with gender pay gaps among migrants reaching 80% in some countries.⁴

Focus box 10: Labour migrants in Libya

Most of the 600,000 migrants estimated to be present in Libya reportedly came to find employment and do not intend to cross the Mediterranean. Prior to the 2011 revolution, Libya was a key destination for labour migration in North Africa with an estimated 2 million migrant workers present.⁵ As of October 2020, the IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix identified 574,000 migrants in Libya, two thirds of whom were from neighbouring countries (Niger, Egypt, Chad, and Sudan). The available data suggests that the majority of them do not intend to make the crossing to Europe.⁶ Only 10% are women, while 9% are children. Three quarters of migrants in Libya report being employed, and each of them has sent an average of USD 2,500 in remittances since their arrival.⁷

COVID-19 and the continuation of the armed conflict have however worsened migrants' already strained situation. In October 2020, the unemployment rate among migrants was estimated at 21%, or four percentage points higher than before the pandemic (though it was lower than the 27% reported in August).⁸ A decline in remittances sent by migrants to their country of origin is also expected. However, in the medium term the situation of migrants could improve with the establishment of Bilateral Labour Agreements between Libya and neighbouring countries – a process that has been supported in particular by the EUTF-funded RDPP II regional programme. For example, in 2019, Libyan authorities started negotiations with the Government of the Niger to conclude a bilateral labour agreement. Such developments will be key also because, were there to be peace and reconstruction in Libya, there would be a high need for migrant workers – potentially between 2 and 3 million.⁹

Programmatic needs and responses to labour migration within Africa can be broadly divided into: 1. the protection of existing migrant workers and 2. the facilitation of additional intra-continental labour migration.

¹ An uncertainty due to the fact that, for example, less than 30 African countries report data on international migrants in the labour force. AU, 'Report on Labour Migration Statistics in Africa, second edition', 2017. Accessed [here](#).

² ILO, 'ILO Global estimates on international migrant workers', 2018. Accessed [here](#).

³ For example, in the first three months of 2020 only, the DTM in West Africa captured 90,000 short-term local movements and 33,000 seasonal movements.

⁴ In Ghana, Mali and Tanzania, female migrant workers earn around 80 per cent less than their male counterparts. Rakotonarivo, A., 'Who are the women on the move? A portrait of female migrant workers', 2020. Accessed [here](#).

⁵ IOM, 'Labour migration dynamics in Libya', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ IOM DTM round 12 and before (2017) reported on intended destination for selected groups of migrants. See for example round 12 [here](#).


⁷ IOM, 'Labour migration dynamics in Libya', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ IOM, 'Libya's migrant report – Mobility tracking round 33', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Interview with key informant from UN agency.

Protection of migrant workers in Africa should be considered part of the protection responses targeted at all African workers, according to most stakeholders interviewed for this review. Though migrant workers within Africa have specific vulnerabilities related to their status, and despite the fact that ILO and UN Conventions on migrant workers¹ have not yet been ratified by the majority of African countries, as illustrated on the right, stakeholders suggested that national legislation on migrant workers was satisfactory overall (with some exceptions).² According to them, what is needed now is a push to implement existing frameworks at the country level, and to focus on measures targeted at all workers, such as formalisation of employment conditions, social security coverage, access to labour unions, funding for labour inspectorates, etc. These universal measures should then be supplemented with the required additional support for migrant workers based on their vulnerability.

Figure 29: Number of main conventions (ILO 97, 143, 181, UN) ratified



The promotion of *additional* labour migration should consider:

- **The existence of efficient labour market information systems (LMIS)**, to identify sectors with surpluses of skills in one country that match employer demand in another. However, because of the lack of resources, the data included in the LMISs used by African countries (when they exist) tend to be out of date and unreliable.³ A 2014 study estimated that none of the ECOWAS countries had a functional LMIS.⁴
- **Skills recognition.** The AU developed a framework for the harmonisation of higher education in Africa, and some RECs have also invested in regional frameworks (for example the Djibouti Declaration on Refugee Education, adopted under the Nairobi process, envisions a regional skills recognition framework)⁵ but they do not always function properly.⁶ One example of a recent advancement is the introduction in Djibouti of an English language education curriculum that is certified by the government and available for migrants and refugees.⁷ Validation of non-formal and informal learning is also essential, particularly for populations such as refugees, but frameworks of this type often do not even exist for non-migrants.⁸

Though numbers are difficult to come by, cross-border transhumance and nomadic pastoralism⁹ may well turn out to constitute the bulk of 'labour migration' occurring within Africa, as detailed in the focus box below.

¹ ILO Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97), ILO Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143), ILO Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181), International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.

² Tanzania was mentioned, for example.

³ Askitas, N. et al., 'Labour market data sources towards digital technical and vocational education and training (TVET)', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Awumbila, M. et al. 'Across artificial borders: an assessment of labour migration in the ECOWAS region', 2014. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ IGAD, 'IGAD and partners discuss implementation of the Djibouti Declaration on Refugee Education', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ ILO, 'An assessment of labour migration and mobility governance in the IGAD region: Regional report', 2020.

⁷ UNHCR, 'UN refugee chief praises Djibouti new refugee laws', 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ ILO, 'The potential of skills development and recognition for regulated labour mobility in the IGAD region', 2020.

⁹ Transhumance is a form of mobile livestock farming based on regular, seasonal movement, while strictly speaking 'nomadic pastoralism' is characterised by continual and unpredictable movements.

Focus box 11: Cross-border pastoralism

Little data exists on cross-border pastoralists, even though they could constitute large numbers of 'labour migrants'. One study estimated the number of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists in sub-Saharan Africa at 50 million,¹ though of course not all of them cross borders and therefore do not all fall under the scope of this thematic review. Most agro-pastoralist communities practice semi-transhumance: a few people move depending on the season, while most of the group practices sedentary farming. Cross-border pastoralism is particularly prevalent between the Sahel and the coastal states of West Africa, and in the Horn of Africa at the borders between Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya.² However, overall there is a lack of information on pastoralist movements that would allow governments to steer pastoralist transhumance in a way that avoids overcrowding and conflict,³ though the IOM DTM has started collecting information on cross-border pastoralists in four countries in SLC.

Until recently, ECOWAS was the only REC that had passed specific legislation to facilitate regional cross-border pastoralism (in 1998). However, a study by IOM under the FMM showed that most existing frameworks at the AU and ECOWAS level regard transhumance as '*backward and inherently problematic*', resulting in limited flexibility towards pastoralists. Meanwhile, national legislation in ECOWAS coastal states sometimes contradicts the provisions of the protocol on transhumance, and the infrastructure required for its implementation (e.g. demarcation of grazing routes, specialised border points with qualified veterinary personnel) is still lacking. Furthermore, where it does exist, it seems that the provisions of the Protocol (i.e. that herders have to pass through authorised border points) tend to be used for rent-seeking.⁴

IGAD also adopted a Protocol on Transhumance in February 2020, though the event was overshadowed by the adoption of the Free Movement Protocol. Further support to the ratification and endorsement of IGAD's Transhumance Protocol could benefit from making full use of the recommendations drawn under the FMM study on ECOWAS.

Labour migration to the Middle East

Estimates of African migrant workers in GCC countries and Lebanon vary between 2 million and 4.5 million.⁵ Most of them come from Egypt (some put the number of Egyptian workers in Saudi Arabia at 2.9 million,⁶ of which most are men) but also increasingly from eastern Africa, and particularly from Ethiopia (500,000 Ethiopian migrants were present in Saudi Arabia before deportations started in 2017, with around 340,000 returns since then).⁷ As Asian countries are putting protection measures in place to provide their migrant workers with better wages and health protections, it seems that GCC countries are increasingly turning to African workers,⁸ though as of now the latter still represent a small minority compared to Asian workers.⁹

Low-skilled migrant workers are vulnerable to exploitation, with issues of mass expulsions and trafficking reported. 9% of irregular migrants heading from East Africa to Saudi Arabia in the first half of 2020 were unaccompanied children.¹⁰ Vulnerability is often related to the 'Kafala' system, which ties a migrant's legal presence to its employer, and may disproportionately affect female labour migrants.¹¹ However, as of November 2020 the Kafala system had reportedly been relaxed by Saudi Arabia and

¹ 'World Bank boosts support for pastoralists in Horn of Africa', 2014. Retrieved [here](#).

² EUTF REF, 'Cross-border analysis and mapping', 2016. Retrieved [here](#).

³ IOM, 'Regional policies and response to manage pastoral movements', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ IOM, 'Regional policies and response to manage pastoral movements', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population country notes for Saudi Arabia (2017 data), Lebanon (2012), Dubai (2011), Kuwait (2012), Qatar (2013) and Bahrain (2014)

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, '2019 Mobility overview in the east and Horn of Africa and the Arab peninsula', 2020.

⁸ Interview with key informant from UN agency.

⁹ Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population country notes for Saudi Arabia, 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, 'A region on the move: mid-year mobility overview January to June 2020', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ Domestic workers victim of sexual abuse for example may be unable to leave their employer, lest they lose their legal status.

Qatar.^{1,2} One should also keep in mind the significant numbers of qualified migrant workers, especially from NoA countries, who work in GCC countries, notably as part of Technical Cooperation Agreements, and are less vulnerable.

Labour migration to the Middle East is regulated by bilateral labour agreements (BLAs). However, existing bilateral agreements mostly focus on domestic workers who are traditionally women, and there is reportedly still a lack of legal opportunities for male migrants.³ This is said to lead men to opt for irregular migration through dangerous routes – the vast majority of east African irregular migrants to Saudi Arabia through Yemen are men, for example.⁴ In addition, in contrast to southeast Asian countries, which have negotiated regional labour agreements, BLAs give individual African countries less weight and leave them in a ‘take it or leave it’ position in negotiations with GCC countries.⁵ For instance, the minimum wage for Ugandan nationals in Saudi Arabia is USD 200, while that for nationals of the Philippines is USD 400.⁶ Here there is a significant opportunity for RECs to get involved, and IGAD has recently committed to discussing labour migration with the GCC.⁷

The regulation of private employment agencies should be a priority. A 2015 survey conducted among over 400 Ethiopian workers in Saudi Arabia found that they paid almost USD 500 in recruitment costs, or almost four times as much as their average monthly earnings on arrival.⁸ In the COVID-19 context, many migrants were reportedly sent home without wages and with large recruitment fees to reimburse. In some countries, such as Uganda and Kenya, recruitment agencies were also involved in trafficking cases, with some traffickers posing as recruitment agencies.⁹

Labour migration to the EU

In the EU, 61,000 first-time residence permits were issued to African citizens in 2019 for work reasons, though this represented only 12% of all permits issued (most were for family reasons).¹⁰ 37% of permits for work reasons were delivered to women. From 2015 to 2019, 236,000 first-time work-related permits were issued, and as of 31 December 2019, 614,000 African citizens had valid residence permits for work reasons.

A significant proportion of irregular flows to Europe can also be qualified as labour migration. According to a 2019 survey of irregular African migrants arriving in Europe, 38% cited work or sending money home as the most important reason for coming to Europe.¹¹

¹ BBC, ‘Saudi Arabia eases ‘kafala’ system restrictions on migrant workers’, 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

² Human Rights Watch, ‘Qatar: Significant labor and kafala reforms’, 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Interview with key informant from UN agency.

⁴ IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, ‘A region on the move: mid-year mobility overview January to June 2020’, 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Interviews with key informants from UN agency, EU.

⁶ Laiboni, N. ‘A Job at Any Cost’: experiences of African women migrant domestic workers in the Middle East’, 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Interview with key informant from the EU

⁸ World Bank, KNOMAD-ILO migration costs surveys 2015, accessed [here](#).

⁹ See for example United Department of State, ‘Trafficking in persons report’, 2020. Retrieved [here](#). The EUTF-funded BMM programme supported CSOs to raise awareness on risks and developed a hotline for migrants subject to these risks.

¹⁰ Eurostat Asylum and Managed Migration database accessed [here](#).

¹¹ UNDP, ‘Scaling fences – voices of irregular migrants to Europe’, 2019. Accessed [here](#). Women were eight percentage points less likely to select this as their main reason for coming to Europe.

Focus box 12: Regular pathways and irregular migration: a controversial relationship

The relationship between providing regular pathways and reducing irregular migration is subject to debate. Legal labour pathways tend to be more accessible to high-skilled migrants than low-skilled workers,¹ and while many irregular migrants have relatively high levels of education (a recent study found that half of irregular African migrants interviewed in Europe had completed secondary education or higher, though only 8% had tertiary education),² the significant proportion of low-skilled migrants suggests that the expansion of legal pathways must account for different skill levels, including lower-skilled workers, in order to maximise the impact on reducing irregular migration.

In addition, many experts believe that legal pathways alone are not enough to replace irregular migration entirely with regular migration, and some have argued for combining the expansion of legal channels with stricter enforcement of border controls.³


2.1.3. Student mobility from Africa

‘Only’ 130,000 African students (tertiary level) were studying in other African countries in 2017, while over 400,000 were studying in non-African countries, including 245,000 in Europe (of which France accounts for nearly half).⁴ As illustrated on the right, Nigeria (80,000) and Morocco (50,000) account for the largest numbers of African students studying abroad. The main African countries of *destination* for African students were South Africa (36,000), Morocco (17,000), Senegal and Ghana (13,000 each). In Europe, 42% of African recipients of first-time residence permits for education reasons were women.⁵ In France, the percentage of women and girls among students from Africa is about 45% (about 10 points lower than the average for all origin countries).⁶

Lack of universal recognition of university degrees constrains the mobility of students across Africa.⁷

The Addis Ababa Convention on the recognition of higher education degrees, adopted in 2014, only came into force in 2019 and has only been ratified by 19 African states.⁸ ECOWAS adopted a similar convention in 2003, but member states are struggling with its implementation.⁹

Figure 30: Number of students studying abroad, by country of origin



2.2. Migration for development

Though brain drain has been identified as a key challenge associated with labour migration out of Africa, there is significant potential for diasporas to benefit development in their country of origin.

¹ Newland, K., and Riestler, A. 'Welcome to work? Legal migration pathways for low-skilled workers', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

² 51% of irregular migrants interviewed had completed secondary education or higher according to UNDP, 'Scaling Fences', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Clemens, M., & Gough, K., 'Can regular migration channels reduce irregular migration? Lessons for Europe from the United States', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2017. Data accessed [here](#). Other EU destinations for students included Germany (23,000), Italy (12,000) and Portugal (7,000).

⁵ Eurostat Asylum and Managed Migration database accessed [here](#).

⁶ Campus France, 'Gender and students' mobility', 2016. Retrieved [here](#).


⁷ AU, 'First progress report of the chairperson of the commission on academic mobility scheme in Africa. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ UNESCO portal accessed [here](#).

⁹ Ibourk, A., 'Exploring the potential for skills partnerships on migration in West Africa and Sahel', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

Remittances represent a significant proportion of GDP, and in some countries, they represent more than ten times the amount of development aid (see figure on the right). According to the World Bank, remittances to Africa represented USD 81B in 2018, though other studies put the total (formal, informal and in-kind) at USD 200B.¹ Using World Bank estimates, lowering remittances costs from the current 9%² to 5% would represent the equivalent of over USD 3B annually. This is particularly relevant for women, who tend to have less access to lower-cost transfers (such as mobile money).³ Anti-money laundering and antiterrorist regulations in developed countries play a key role in keeping these costs high, and the EU recently made these regulations stricter rather than looser.⁴

Figure 31: Remittances in 2018 (World Bank)



It is unclear to what extent remittances contribute to economic growth⁵, as two thirds of remittances are used for households' daily needs.⁶ However, for communities affected by slow-onset climate change or natural disasters, remittances can support their resilience and help to reduce their economic vulnerability.⁷ In addition, diaspora bonds, for example, allow diasporas to lend money to the government of their origin country at a below market rate, thus potentially contributing to funding schools, roads, and overall development. Countries such as Morocco, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya and Somalia are estimated to have over USD 1B in annual diaspora savings. Nigeria has reportedly had success with such bonds, while others, including Ethiopia, have not.⁸ In some cases a major barrier is the lack of confidence that diasporas may have in the governments of their origin countries.⁹

Little data exists on returns of diaspora members. Beyond assisted and forced returns, which are discussed in the thematic review on *Returns and reintegration*, very little information exists on spontaneous returns,¹⁰ which are likely to constitute the bulk of returns to Africa, and to significantly contribute to transfers of knowledge, experience and networks back to their origin country.

Though only a minority of African states have national labour and/or diaspora policies, over two thirds of those that do adopted them in the past four years. According to a survey of 39 African states,¹¹ 31% have national labour migration policies, and 41% have diaspora policies, of which 81% were adopted within the past four years.

¹ IOM, 'Africa migration report', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ UN Women and Remittances, 'Migrant women & remittances: exploring the data from selected countries', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Interview with key informant from UN agency

⁵ World Bank, 'Migration and development: a role for the World Bank Group', 2016. Retrieved [here](#). As underlined in the report '*In general, the inconclusive results on the impact of remittances and growth may be largely due to the difficulty of separating the cause from the effect: if remittances react counter-cyclically to growth, then the negative relationship between the two is a result of reverse causality running from growth to remittances, not vice versa.*'

⁶ Ibid and iD4D, 'A quel point les diasporas contribuent-elles au développement', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ ILO, 'Climate change, displacement and labour migration'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ World Bank, 'Leveraging economic migration for development: a briefing for the World Bank Group', 2019. Retrieved [here](#). The failure of the Ethiopia initiative '*was largely due to a lack of faith in the project operator to deliver a return on investment, and a lack of confidence in the government to act as a guarantor*' (Smart, C. and Hargrave, K., 'Migration as opportunity: Innovation, policies and practice', 2019. Retrieved [here](#)).

⁹ Interviews with key informants from research organisation and from EUTF implementing partners.


¹⁰ OECD, 'Interrelations between public policies, migration and development', 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ 39 African countries surveyed, self-report. 'Report of the assessment of the capacity building needs of African Union member states and Regional Economic Communities to manage migration', 2018.

3. Key non-EUTF interventions

This thematic review identified projects worth around €110M currently funded by non-EUTF actors in the fields of labour migration and migration for development, including about €70M by other EU instruments, as illustrated in the figure below.

Figure 32: Selected non-EUTF interventions in the fields of labour migration and migration for development¹



¹ Abbreviations detailed in the annex.

Apart from the EU, key donors are the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) and GIZ, as illustrated in the figure above. For SDC, two of the three pillars of their post-2021 migration strategy cover support to migrant workers, and increasing the contributions of migration for development (including remittances).

As shown in Figure 32, funding is targeted at the following areas:

- **Mobility schemes**, although many of these schemes benefit a very limited number of beneficiaries. In addition, existing schemes do not systematically prioritise development outcomes for the country, which increases the risk of brain drain. Counter-examples include the Mobility Partnerships Facility (MPF) funded by DG HOME, which has financed a number of pilot projects including the innovative PALIM project. This project is based on the Global Skills Partnership model, which aims to address the risk of brain drain (see focus box below). Another important initiative is the Intra-Africa Academic Mobility Scheme, funded under the EU Pan-African Programme, which has supported 1,400 student and staff mobilities between African countries so far. Though the initiative is focused on higher education, the Pan-African Programme is also funding pilot projects for TVET students and staff (at present solely between African countries and the EU). These mobility initiatives are complemented by a number of institutional efforts to facilitate skills portability.¹
- **Efforts to protect migrant workers**, with programming implemented mostly by ILO and tending to focus on labour migration towards the Middle East.
- **Increasing contributions of migrant workers to their countries of origin**, with a focus on NoA and West Africa.

Not included in the amounts presented above are major programmes by the World Bank on ID systems (the ID for Development initiative) **and in support of pastoralists**, notably through a USD 248M programme to support pastoralists in six west African countries (*Projet Régional d'Appui au Pastoralisme au Sahel* – PRAPS), though it is unclear to what extent the scheme targets cross-border pastoralists, as opposed to agro-pastoralists remaining in one country.

Focus box 13: Examples of successful/promising mobility schemes

In the Pacific, the 'Recognised Seasonal Employer Scheme' was created in 2007 to meet the labour needs of New Zealand's horticulture and viticulture industries. The programme is considered very successful as earnings of migrants from participating countries increased by 28%.² Some best practices from this scheme include the involvement of private firms in programme administration alongside the New Zealand government, as well as allowing migrants to participate in the scheme multiple times based on employers' recommendations, thereby reducing the risk of migrants overstaying. It also addressed one of the major drawbacks of circular mobility schemes, which is that employers will be dissatisfied if they are not allowed to re-hire good workers. Moreover, in the Pacific scheme, sending countries developed schemes to maximise diaspora involvement in community development to ensure a wider distribution of benefits and remittances.³

The German pilot project 'Triple Win nurses' focuses on the recruitment of skilled health professionals from Bosnia, Serbia, the Philippines and Tunisia. Since 2012, more than 3,000 nurses have been placed with German employers⁴, which is a high number of beneficiaries compared to many other mobility schemes. GIZ has developed technical and language training which all take place in countries of origin but are financed by German employers. This is a key good practice for project sustainability. The project has also received praise for the quality of its training facilities set up in countries of origin.⁵

¹ They include the Haqaa 2 and 'Tuning Africa' initiatives funded under the Pan-African programme, as well as the UNESCO qualifications passport for refugees and vulnerable migrants.

² ODI, 'Migration as opportunity: evidence of labour migration initiatives', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

³ ODI, 'Migration as opportunity: innovation, policies and practice', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ GIZ website, 'Sustainable recruitment of nurses (Triple Win)'. Accessed [here](#).

⁵ Clemens, M., 'Global Skill Partnerships: a proposal for technical training in a mobile world', 2015. Retrieved [here](#).


An as yet not fully tested but very promising approach currently piloted by Belgium as part of the PALIM project is a model called 'Global Skills Partnerships'.¹ In this type of scheme, training is provided in a single facility to both professionals willing to migrate and workers who will remain in their country, so as to 'compensate for' brain drain, which is arguably one of the greatest risks of mobility schemes facilitating migration to the EU.

Another innovative idea is the payment of a 'deposit' by migrants wishing to receive a temporary residence permit allowing them to work, which they would get back, provided that they leave the country again by the date specified in the permit.²

4. EUTF portfolio

EUTF funding for labour migration and migration for development is limited compared to other thematic areas, accounting for about €75M (with an additional €10M if one includes support to IGAD's Free Movement Protocol, counted in the thematic review on *Migration governance*), of which almost half is allocated to the NoA window. This represents about 2% of total EUTF funding. As illustrated in the figure below, two countries (Senegal and Morocco) received particularly significant funding. The portfolio analysis used project budgets disaggregated by activity (and other relevant project documents) whenever they were available to estimate amounts dedicated to each thematic area. Thus, in this case, the budgets referred to correspond to the amounts estimated to be dedicated to migration governance in each project, and not total budgets.


Figure 33: EUTF funding for labour migration and migration for development



¹ Clemens, M., 'Global Skill Partnerships: a proposal for technical training in a mobile world', 2015. Retrieved [here](#).

² The Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration, 'A Joint Endeavour: Shaping Migration from Africa to Europe – eight key messages', 2020. Accessed [here](#).

Figure 34: EUTF-funded projects related to labour migration and migration for development¹



¹ As of October 2020; only contracted projects with more than EUR 150,000 dedicated to labour migration and/or migration for development are included; abbreviations detailed in the annex; amounts for GIZ projects intentionally not indicated. LY-06-02 refers to the project 'Integrated approach to protection and emergency assistance to vulnerable and stranded migrants in Libya', implemented by IOM.

The largest amounts are dedicated to promoting diaspora investments (about €35M). In Senegal, for example, the project PAISD III (€10M to support diaspora projects and returns) has been described as a successful attempt to 'regionalise' the appeal of diaspora-funded projects.¹

Large amounts are also dedicated to mobility schemes for students and university staff (Erasmus+, €16M, about 600 mobilities supported) and for workers (THAMM, €15M, see Focus box 14 below). However, EUTF support for *intra-Africa* mobility schemes has remained almost non-existent. Erasmus+ mostly funds mobilities between West Africa and Europe, not intra-Africa. One exception is the project *Coopération Sud-Sud*, as part of which a limited number of students and volunteers are supported with their intra-Africa mobility.

Focus box 14: THAMM

THAMM is a €20M EUTF-funded programme that aims to generate labour mobility from NoA to the EU and to improve the governance of labour migration in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. Under its umbrella, IOM and ILO jointly carry out capacity building activities for national stakeholders, while GIZ implements a mobility scheme for migrant workers from the three North African countries to Germany. OFII and Enabel will start implementing other mobility schemes shortly. These pilot mobility schemes rely on different approaches: GIZ builds on its 'triple win'² concept, linking countries of destination suffering from a specific labour market shortage with countries of origin that have a surplus of qualified experts in the same field. Enabel will further develop the 'Global Skills Partnership' (GSP) approach mentioned in Focus box 13 (where potential migrants and non-migrants are trained together); and OFII will implement a circular mobility scheme with a strong focus on reintegration. An MLS case study on THAMM highlighted the following key aspects to be considered in mobility schemes:

- **Involving the private sector and automatising matching mechanisms is key for costs to be sustainable.** GIZ seeks to build more financial sustainability in its scheme through the financial contribution of the private sector and cost-sharing agreements with employers, and Enabel will also involve the private sector (IT) in the design of its scheme. In addition, a large part of the costs of such schemes involve 'matching mechanisms' that, in the absence of strong labour market information systems, have to be 're-invented' for each new scheme. Related to this, ILO will implement capacity building activities for national authorities on the collection and analysis of labour migration data in North Africa.
- **Mobility schemes set up as part of development programming must prioritise the development of origin countries and address the issue of brain drain.** GIZ's 'triple win' scheme only identifies and intervenes in sectors that have a surplus of workers in North African states, in order to avoid depleting human capital there, while Enabel's 'Global Skills Partnership' involves the simultaneous training of non-migrants, therefore even leading to 'brain gain'.

Funding for identity systems is also strong, with €57M in total, spent mostly in Mali and Senegal (with projects implemented by Civipol and Enabel).³

Few EUTF projects support transhumance corridors, and most of those that do operate within specific areas of countries and are not cross-border. Exceptions include the HD-led component of the *Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel* (€5M) – though its focus is on conflict prevention, not on favouring herders' mobility per se – and the livestock epidemiology-surveillance project in the Horn of Africa, which includes the surveillance of livestock movements across borders.

¹ Interview with a key informant from EUTF implementing partner.

² See GIZ website, Sustainable recruitment of nurses (Triple Win). Accessed [here](#).

³ Not illustrated in Figure 34 above given the only partial overlap between ID systems and labour migration / migration for development.

5. Perspectives and areas of opportunities

Make free movement protocols a reality and prepare infrastructures to support mobility

The EU could start drafting a roadmap for implementation, which could include a long-term capacity building plan for civil servants at all levels, facilitating implementation by local organisations, and awareness raising among the public. Part of the focus should be on corruption, while remaining cognisant of the local political economy.¹ This should be connected to the broader efforts on supporting migration governance frameworks and capacities across Africa (see thematic review on *Migration governance*). In parallel, it is suggested that the EU pay special attention to the potential unintended effects of its own border management programmes (especially for programmes focused on intra-REC borders) on labour migration between African countries, and in particular on seasonal migration, which can be an important resilience factor for populations.

It will also require the development of a realistic roadmap and investment plans to put robust ID systems in place. This must be done in coordination with other actors given the significant costs (especially the World Bank with the ID4D initiative), while prioritising countries with the greatest needs rather than those with large irregular outgoing flows, and keeping in mind the highly political dimension of ID systems (with large implications for elections).

Protocols on transhumance and their implementation should also be supported, especially considering the challenges related to herder-farmer conflicts in the SLC area. Key lessons learned can be drawn from the FMM research on the implementation of the ECOWAS transhumance protocol, including the need to conduct awareness raising and advocacy with governments and RECs to highlight the positive side of transhumance, and notably the fact that it can be more environmentally sustainable than intensive livestock farming. In addition, the IOM DTM could be supported in its efforts to collect data on transhumance, provided this data is effectively used by government stakeholders, in particular for early warning systems. More generally, more awareness and data collection on border areas could be necessary (cf. thematic review on *Border management*).

In parallel, donors should continue to focus on supporting the development of intra-Africa transport, connectivity infrastructure and hubs of economic development, as free movement from one unfavourable economic environment to another will probably not deliver many benefits. Cities will be the most likely places of employment creation in the future, but only if their absorption capacity (basic services, infrastructure) increases in line with their growth rate (one billion new urban residents expected in Africa by 2050). This will also be essential to avoid the real risk of conflicts created by unsustainable pressure on weak urban services.

Support intra-country mobility, especially for populations affected by climate change

Intra-country mobility could be looked at with great attention, especially in the context of climate change, with rural workers increasingly likely to move to cities (as opposed to other countries) due to decreasing agricultural returns. Future EU funding could, for example, consider funding improvements to the legal environment, so that people feel that they have the option to move should they want to (e.g. strengthening of land rights in areas of origin), and to services in cities of destination, especially for women (e.g. job services, health and education services for children, etc.). Dialogue between environment, labour, social affairs and migration ministries should also be facilitated in order to ensure coherence of labour migration policies with environmental and social protection policies.

Support existing labour migrant populations in Africa and the Middle East

In Africa, migrant workers' specific needs will need to be streamlined into employment policies and planning, particularly with regard to access to social services and protection, with additional

¹ In some areas corruption remains the only possible source of livelihoods.

support for pre-departure training as well as support services when in the country (such as hotlines) and upon return to the origin country.

The EU could help African states, most likely through RECs, to develop regional positions and measures to negotiate with third states who receive labour migrants. Depending on the demand from African countries, it can also provide much needed technical support related to the regulation of private employment agencies and the set-up of pre-departure training and post-return reintegration support. This can be done in coordination with ILO, which has strong experience with the Africa-to-Middle East labour migration corridor.

Identify and develop new labour migration corridors in Africa

In the short term, concrete gaps and complementarities should be identified between labour markets in Africa. As the development of comprehensive and updated labour market information systems does not seem to be realistic in the short term, efforts should focus on the most obvious and promising sectors where numbers are likely to be significant and existing barriers relatively limited (e.g. building on the initial work of the BMM programme on seasonal migration between Sudan and Ethiopia), and where private companies are ready to commit to funding a part of the effort in order to access to the required profiles.

Realistically identify future needs and opportunities for mobility schemes to Europe

Pilot initiatives for mobility schemes should be scaled up, building on the experience of existing schemes. Mobility schemes to Europe funded through development programming may not directly impact irregular migration, and involve numbers that are dwarfed by the legal mobility already occurring outside of development programming (and overshadowed further by the number of young Africans entering the job market every year). However, they remain necessary for political reasons and because pilot initiatives are key to identifying opportunities and obstacles, and building connections and trust between businesses, business associations and employment agencies on both sides of the Mediterranean. They can therefore be a first step towards a more sustainable, employer-led (and ideally employer-funded) labour mobility system. In addition, legal mobility options existing beyond development programming may not be accessible to low-skilled workers. Future pilot mobility schemes will be able to build on the experience acquired through the Mobility Partnership Facility, THAMM and other similar programmes to identify the most realistic and creative options that avoid brain drain and absconding (Global Skills Partnerships piloted by Belgium, seasonal/circular migration schemes with payment of a deposit, etc.).

Further develop student mobility, especially intra-Africa

Based on its own experience (Bologna Process), the EU could strengthen its support to the AU and RECs to facilitate recognition (and portability) of qualifications (including for TVET) across Africa, in partnership with key stakeholders such as UNESCO. It could also step up its support to intra-Africa student mobility while paying particular attention to supporting access to full degrees and to building the capacities of institutions that request it. Lessons could also be drawn from the EU-funded *Intra-Africa Academic Mobility Scheme* and pilot projects promoting mobility between TVET institutions.

Support an increased and more profitable diaspora involvement in Africa's mid/long-term development

Reducing remittances transfer costs, promoting diaspora investments and diaspora (temporary) returns are only partly in the hands of EU development programming, but the EU has a key role to play in adopting 'systemic approaches' to supporting remittances in particular – for example, by relaxing regulations on small transfers, not mandating similar checks down the value chain, capping transfer fees, and facilitating new licenses to promote competition. The EU can also encourage diaspora entrepreneurship, ideally by supporting, when they already exist, national incubation/support platforms

available to all. It can also strengthen diaspora organisations within EU member states, building on the (mostly upcoming) work of the EU Global Diaspora Facility.

In parallel, the EU could assist countries to develop positive relations of trust with their diasporas, which should ultimately allow for more development-oriented diaspora investments. This effort could build on the work done at the local level by EUTF-funded projects in Tunisia and Senegal, and on the success of Morocco, which over the past few years has reportedly managed to rebuild the trust of its diaspora through deepened engagement.



Carpentry training in the Rhino Settlement

Photo credits: BTC

Migration governance

Labour migration & migration for development

Response to forced displacement

Protection

Return & reintegration

Response to trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants

Border management


Triple nexus

1. Introduction

‘Forced displacement’ is not a legal term but rather a commonly accepted way of describing the movement of populations protected by international conventions and frameworks. Forced displacement (or displacement) is defined as ‘the movement of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters.’¹

The use of the term is debated because it is largely recognised that a continuum of agency exists, rather than a voluntary/forced dichotomy.² However, the distinction between forced and voluntary movement is instrumental to the refugee protection system. Labelling people as ‘forcibly displaced’ or a movement as ‘forced displacement’ allows for the duty of states and non-state international actors to protect and assist these groups to be triggered.

Figure 35: Legal frameworks and tools for the protection and assistance of forcibly displaced populations (IDPs, refugees and asylum seekers)



However, existing frameworks and tools overlook some groups that can be (and sometimes are) considered forcibly displaced, such as **people who have been expelled** from host countries (**forced returns**), and **people displaced as a result of disasters and climate change** (which are not included in the 1951 Convention).³ In addition, there is no agreed definition of what constitutes an ‘affected community’, nor is data systematically collected on host communities.⁴ For the purpose of this report, the term ‘displacement-affected communities’ (DACs) includes: ‘forcibly displaced persons, including refugees and internally displaced persons, and the local communities affected by their presence in areas of displacement and as well in areas of return and (re)integration’.⁵ Throughout this thematic review, support to DACs refers to activities aimed directly at forcibly displaced people, host

¹ IOM, ‘Adapted from ‘Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’, annexed to United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, 1998.

² IOM, ‘Glossary on Migration’, 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Some actors (including the World Bank) consider that people migrating as a result of slow onset climate changes engage in a process that is not different to that of ‘economic migration’.

⁴ World Bank. ‘Forcibly displaced: toward a development approach supporting refugees, the internally displaced, and their hosts’, 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ UNHCR, ‘Policy on UNHCR’s engagement in situations of internal displacement’, 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

communities and communities living along transit routes, as well as activities aimed directly at a population (without differentiating by status) that has been affected by forced displacement.

Focus box 15: Challenges in formulating policies for climate-induced displaced people^{1,2,3}

Frequent natural disasters combined with slow onset environmental changes resulting in large population movements have highlighted the lack of frameworks and recognised definitions for individuals displaced by these phenomena. The 1951 Refugee Convention, for example, does not recognise such people as refugees, though the 1969 OAU Convention and 1984 Cartagena Declaration covers 'circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order'. The 2018 Global Compact on Refugees is the first international framework to specifically mention climate, environmental degradation and natural disasters, as they 'increasingly interact with the drivers of refugee movements'.

Although the last decade has observed a strong push to protect 'climate refugees' under the 1951 Convention or under a new agreement, the debate over the definition has highlighted numerous challenges. Supporters of this terminology argue that using any other definition would downplay the emergency of the situation. However, isolating climate-related reasons for displacement or migration decisions is often challenging, as they are part of a continuum of factors. Moreover, climate events occur at very different paces (from slow desertification to flash floods), which can blur the line between voluntary and forced migration. Opponents of the 'climate refugee' terminology believe that individuals fleeing slow onset events are making an informed choice to adapt to their situation and should therefore be considered 'migrants' rather than 'refugees'. Conversely, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre argues that 'the critical nature of slow onset events tends to become apparent when a crisis point is reached', pointing out the urge to protect them. Finally, some fear that extending the definition of refugees to individuals displaced by climate change would weaken the legal architecture for refugees and dilute governments' will to implement it.

In the meantime, people who move for climate-related reasons find themselves in a legal void, which further exacerbates their vulnerability.


¹ UN, Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, 1984.

² UN, Global Compact on Refugees, 2018.

³ IDMC, No matter of choice: displacement in a changing climate, 2018.

2. Situation across Africa

Figure 36: Map of forcibly displaced populations in the three EUTF windows, as of June 2020



The Horn of Africa (HoA) is characterised by large numbers of forcibly displaced people (accounting for 61% of all displaced people in EUTF countries), most of whom are hosted in camps. Conflict and natural disasters have increased the already sizable caseloads of IDPs and refugees since the beginning of the EUTF, adding to the number of individuals displaced due to prolonged conflicts. In the Sahel and Lake Chad (SLC), which accounts for 33% of all displaced people in EUTF countries, a significant increase in violence in the last few years has provoked additional displacement around the Liptako-Gourma and the Lake Chad Basin, where more localised conflicts have been ongoing since 2012 and 2009. Insecurity could spill over to coastal countries and cause more displacement in the coming years. While North of Africa (NoA) is mostly characterised by mixed migration flows, the escalation of hostilities in Libya and the Syrian crisis have led to an increase in the number of IDPs, refugees and asylum seekers. The region hosts 6% of all displaced people in EUTF countries.

2.1.1. Specific profiles and needs

Women

On average, across EUTF countries, women represent around half of all refugees and asylum seekers and around half of all IDPs. This number varies slightly across regions: while in NoA, only 39% of refugees are women, in SLC, they represent 52% of refugees and 51% of IDPs. Overall, the proportion of women in internally displaced populations tends to be higher than that of men, and higher than in the

national population. In Burkina Faso, for instance, following the escalation of violence in 2019, 65% of all adult IDPs were women as of March 2020. This is likely because women are most likely to flee with the children while men are forcibly recruited to fight by armed groups.¹ In the HoA, women account for 50% of refugees and asylum seekers on average, and for more than half of IDPs. Somalia, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Sudan are four of the nine countries in the world that host more than 1 million forcibly displaced women and girls.

Displacement reinforces discrimination against women and girls, and they tend to face greater challenges than their male counterparts in accessing work, education, health care and protection. Women are more vulnerable to gender-based violence and trafficking (see thematic review on Protection). They also suffer disproportionately from loss of livelihoods.² Specific needs, such as those related to sexual and reproductive health for women, are also more difficult to meet in displacement contexts due to stigma, lack of available services and lack of information.

Children

While the different profiles of children in mobility tend to be gathered under the category of 'children on the move', forced displacement appears to be particularly prominent: at the end of 2019, people under 18 years old accounted for 43% and 40% respectively of refugee and IDP populations worldwide, while only representing 10% of the international migrant population.³ These proportions are even higher in specific regions and countries: they account for 57% and 56% of refugees and asylum seekers in the HoA and SLC respectively, and for 62% in both Ethiopia and South Sudan.⁴

Of the 17 million children living in internal displacement because of conflict or violence globally, 48% are in sub-Saharan Africa, which therefore accounts for the largest share of IDPs under the age of 18, followed distantly by the Middle East and North Africa (26%).⁵ In Somalia and Burkina Faso, children represented more than 60% of IDPs at the end of 2019, and in Chad and Niger, this proportion ranged between 53 and 57%.⁶

Displacement exacerbates the pre-existing vulnerabilities of children and creates specific needs. While on the move, children face challenges to access basic services as well as specific threats and protection needs⁷ (for more information on these aspects, please refer to the thematic review on Protection). More specifically, refugee children face challenges to access education, notably due to language barriers, and are five times more likely to be out of school than other children. IDP children also tend to face higher rates of acute malnutrition, and crowded displacement environments may increase the transmission of communicable diseases that are especially dangerous for children.⁸

While demographic data is recognised as essential to understanding the impact of displacement on different population groups, sex- and age-disaggregated information is not always available for all forcibly displaced populations. UNHCR notably provides disaggregated data for refugees and asylum seekers, but this information is still lacking for some countries, and disaggregated data on IDPs remains limited. In the MLS data for SLC, for example, for indicators that request gender or age disaggregation from implementing partners, gender is unspecified in 40% of cases for displaced populations (compared to 15% for all beneficiaries), and age is unspecified in 90% of cases (compared to 85% for all beneficiaries). These averages vary depending on activities and status – for instance, the gender of returnees benefitting from voluntary returns, post-arrival and reintegration assistance is unspecified in

¹ UNHCR, 'Insecurity hinders access to displaced in north-eastern Burkina Faso'. November 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

² IDMC, IMPACT and PLAN International. 'Hidden in plain sight: Women and girls in internal displacement', March 2020, Retrieved [here](#).

³ UNHCR, 'Global Trends – Forced Displacement in 2019', Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ UNHCR Refugee Data Finder – Consulted in December 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Please note these numbers are reportedly largely underestimated, only account for 53 countries for which data was available and only consider displacement associated with conflict and violence. For more information: IDMC, 'Twice Invisible – Accounting for internally displaced children', November 2019, Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ UNHCR Global Trends, Op. Cit.

⁷ Save the Children, MMC, 'Young and one the move in West Africa', February 2018, Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ IDMC, 'Twice Invisible – Accounting for internally displaced children', November 2019, Retrieved [here](#).

90% of cases, while gender *is* specified for refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs receiving such assistance in 88% of cases. The age of beneficiaries is unspecified in 95% of cases for refugees and asylum seekers, 90% for returnees, and 81% for IDPs.

2.1.2. Climate change and impact on needs

The importance of climate change and environmental threats for migration, including displacement, is receiving increased recognition, in part thanks to growing literature on the topic.

On one hand, climate change seems to be a key driver of these phenomena, either through natural disasters abruptly forcing individuals to leave their homes or through slower onset processes. Migration and displacement are forms of adaptive response by populations to the loss of their livelihoods due to the destruction of their environment, although many in this situation still choose to stay. As expressed in the Global Compact for Refugees, climate change and environmental pressure also interact with other displacement drivers, such as conflict. Furthermore, numerous refugee and IDP camps and other hosting areas are affected by climate change (including natural catastrophes), which can exacerbate pressure on natural resources and the environment.

Quantifying climate-induced displacement is challenging, in part due to the lack of recognised definitions for 'climate refugees' or 'environmentally displaced persons' (see Focus box 15). Several organisations, however, provide numbers on populations displaced by disasters, with IDMC notably reporting 1.8 million new internal displacements in 2019 in the HoA, about 370,000 in SLC and 5,000 in NoA.¹ It should be noted that a significant proportion of these displacements, including those caused by floods and storms, are highly seasonal in character and tend to repeat every year and/or rainy season.²

In addition to its role as a displacement factor, climate change adds to the pressure already exerted by refugees on the environment and natural resources in hosting areas. In areas with numerous camps, the presence of refugees or IDPs may further exacerbate the exhaustion of resources.³ Limited resources in turn pose challenges to the creation of economic opportunities for both the host communities and the displaced. Such dynamics sometimes lead to conflicts between the host and displaced communities, as in Gambella (Ethiopia), where the forest is quickly diminishing as refugees cut down trees to produce wood fuel for cooking.

2.2. Legislative and institutional frameworks

In SLC and the HoA, governments have progressively adopted laws to protect forcibly displaced people and to implement international and regional conventions at the national level. Conversely, most NoA countries have not yet adopted domestic measures to ensure the implementation of frameworks on refugees and IDPs.

In the **HoA**, Uganda is often considered a model country, as its policies grant refugees relative freedom of movement and rights, including to seek employment and access national services. Four countries in the HoA have also adopted the CRRF (out of five signatories). ECOWAS has allowed for freedom of movement and residence across most countries in SLC since 1979. However, Niger is the only country to have passed a law protecting IDPs (in 2018) by making the government responsible for assisting them. In **NoA**, Morocco stands out with the introduction in 2014 of the National Immigration and Asylum Policy, even though humanitarian organisations report that asylum seekers and refugees continue to experience gaps in access to documentation, employment and basic services, as well as racial discrimination.

¹ IDMC, Internal displacement data. Retrieved [here](#).

² IDMC, Internal displacement 2020: Mid-year update, 2020.

³ WB, Forcibly Displaced – Towards a Development approach supporting refugees, the Internally Displaced and Their Hosts, 2017.

Focus box 16: CRRF and RDPP case study¹

The CRRF is a framework, contained within the 2016 New York Declaration for refugee response, that can be endorsed by refugee-hosting countries. CRRF programming and solutions have focused on promoting self-reliance and local integration of refugees rather than resettlement or return. The approach builds on several themes, including a **whole-of-government** approach, **integrating refugees into national systems**, a **whole-of-society response** and **global responsibility and burden sharing**. Ethiopia, Uganda, Chad, Djibouti and Kenya have all endorsed the CRRF approach.

Findings on CRRF implementation

There are many barriers to private sector investment in refugee-hosting areas, but this type of investment is key to large-scale job creation in these places. The **transition toward using national systems for delivering both services and humanitarian assistance to refugees** needs to be supported. However, refugees are currently not often represented in budget allocations for social infrastructures in refugee-hosting areas. The Itang water supply scheme in Gambella is a notable exception in this regard, and therefore a best practice to look to.

Findings on EUTF programmes

The CRRF generation of programming in the HoA has **increasingly focused on governance issues and livelihoods** (especially in Kenya and Ethiopia). The **transition from RDPP programmes to CRRF does not** seem to be highly coordinated (except in Kenya). This is especially notable for certain lots in Ethiopia (e.g. Afar) that are suffering from underfunding. **Conflict sensitivity and political economy analyses need to be reinforced** as several projects were unable to account for intra-refugee and intra-host community differences and grievances, with important distinctions between the two categories often overlooked in project design.

2.1. Major trends and challenges in the operational response

2.1.1. Toward self-reliance and alternative solutions to camps

The international community and national governments are increasingly recognising that forced displacement should be treated as a development issue and should not be left only to humanitarian organisations. For refugees, the Global Compact for Refugees (GCR) and the CRRF follow the same objectives, described above.² For IDPs, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (**IASC framework on durable solutions for IDPs**) defines three main outcomes as durable solutions: return, resettlement elsewhere in the country and local integration.³

2.1.2. Return

In 2019, 5.6 million forcibly displaced people worldwide returned to their areas or countries of origin (5.3 million IDPs and 317,200 refugees).⁴ However, returns do not always meet the criteria set by the IASC for durable solutions.⁵ In some cases, returnees go back to countries of asylum, where they try to register as refugees again (as occurs in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya, for example). In addition, many people return to areas that are destroyed by conflict or natural disasters and with limited basic services and social infrastructures available, such as in South Sudan.

International assistance tends to focus on people when they are displaced and to overlook their needs when they return. In Libya, where returnees (493,716) now outnumber IDPs (392,241),⁶ several

¹ Findings come from the MLS case study that is focusing on four countries in the Horn of Africa (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda).

² UNHCR, 'The Global Compact on refugees', accessed in 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

³ IASC, 'IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons', April 2010. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ UNHCR, 'Global Trends – Forced Displacement in 2019', Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ IASC, 'IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons', April 2010. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ IOM, 'Libya IDP and Returnee Report', Round 32 – July-August 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

programmes target returnees but no specific monitoring is provided to ensure that all the necessary conditions for their return are in place. Significant return movements, voluntary or not, were also witnessed in other countries. In Nigeria and Ethiopia, governments have encouraged and sometimes organised large-scale returns of displaced IDPs, often before conditions could legitimately support these returns. About 1.7 million Ethiopian individuals thus returned home between April 2019 and June 2019 according to the government.¹ Interviews highlighted that there is a lack of programmes and funds focusing on assisting IDPs returning to and in their areas of origin.

Interestingly, in the case of climate-induced displacement, a return seems to be the preferred durable solution for individuals displaced by floods, storms and other sudden climate events. Conversely, returns appear barely feasible for populations fleeing desertification, sea level rise and other slow onset events.²

Women's needs require specific attention upon return as discriminatory practices that exclude women from inheritance and marital property can be significant barriers for women to rebuild their lives in their area of return.^{3,4}

2.1.3. Resettlement

Resettlement is a critical tool for the protection of the most vulnerable refugees, especially in countries that cannot or do not provide them with appropriate assistance. It is often viewed as the preferred option for refugees in Libya, as the harsh conditions they experience do not allow for other durable solutions. However, the proportion of refugees being resettled is decreasing, and the gap between places offered by states and resettlement needs has never been wider (81,000 places offered in 2019 for 1.4 million refugees in need of resettlement).⁵ The criteria for resettlement used by host countries to select beneficiaries tend to consider the age and gender of the persons being resettled, but they vary widely between countries. Many countries don't rely on UNHCR's assessment and criteria but want to add additional ones. Some countries are notably preferring to host women and children and others are reluctant to welcome unaccompanied children. The Emergency Evacuation Transit Mechanism (ETM) in Niger, implemented by UNHCR, is a key instrument for the evacuation of refugees from Libya, but it suffers from the lack of resettlement places in third states, leading to overcrowding and tensions with the government of Niger. It also leads to bottlenecks in the evacuation process and a very low number of available spots for evacuation from Libya (see the thematic review on *Protection*).⁶ In an effort to find further solutions, UNHCR entered into discussions with Rwanda and an MoU was signed on 10 September 2019 between Rwanda, the African Union and UNHCR for the establishment of an ETM in Kigali.⁷

2.1.4. Local integration

Resettlement and return benefit a limited number of forcibly displaced people, leading governments and development actors to turn to self-reliance approaches for DACs and alternative solutions to camps. However, development actors report a lack of funding for the implementation of a durable solutions agenda. In the HoA, interviewees felt that the formation of durable solutions-centred policies and working groups, sometimes pushed by donors, could not yield substantial results because of a lack of concrete action on the part of national governments and insufficient development funding. In the same region, several interviewees noted that governments

¹ IOM, Ethiopia National Displacement Report 5, September 2020.

² IDMC, No matter of choice: displacement in a changing climate, 2018.

³ NRW, 'The Kampala Convention: make it work for women'. 2014. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ For more information on returns, please refer to the Thematic Review Return & Reintegration.

⁵ UNHCR, 'Global Trends – Forced Displacement in 2019'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ The New Humanitarian, 'A protest dispersed; a camp burned: Asylum seekers in Agadez face an uncertain future', 10/02/2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ For more information on the ETM, please see the thematic review on Protection.

have not prioritised support to refugees and IDPs enough to implement the commitments they made as part of the New York Declaration and other initiatives. Also, generally low levels of funding mean that donors often face a difficult choice: whether to enable beneficiaries to meet their immediate needs, or build long-term solutions with a slower delivery of outputs.

When it comes to local integration, long-term development solutions should complement the necessary humanitarian assistance for DACs in need. Efforts to strengthen the humanitarian-development nexus are recognised in the Agenda 2030 pledge to ‘leave no one behind’ and have been supported through the GCR and the CRRF.

Complementarity and coordination between humanitarian and development interventions are key as situations do not always evolve in a predictable manner. Although the DFID/UK FCDO-funded NENTAD in Nigeria was designed on the assumption that security forces would support increasing stability in the region, the programme had to increase its budget and adapt activities to the rise of humanitarian needs after the surge of violence in 2019. In northeast Nigeria, the EUD’s coordination with ECHO and the EDF allows for a concerted repartition of areas of implementation, depending on the evolving needs of the population and is instrumental for project implementation in the area.

Focus box 17: Livelihood support for refugees in Mauritania

In Mauritania, UNHCR and ILO are adopting a humanitarian and development approach to providing refugees in the M’bera camp with humanitarian cash and food assistance, as well as education and livelihood opportunities. The project, funded by the EUTF, also **targets host communities** living around the camp, and is part of a comprehensive response in which **multiple donors** are participating (World Bank, ILO and the private sector). Both approaches are aligned with the CRRF (to which Mauritania is not a signatory). However, building resilience for forcibly displaced populations requires time, long-term strategy and funding. In addition, the M’bera camp is in a remote area with poor electricity and internet connection, which hinders activity implementation. Finally, UNHCR, despite becoming increasingly involved in the humanitarian-development nexus (see part 3.2 of this review), is not able or willing to commit large amounts of funding to scale up or replicate livelihood projects like this one without stronger engagement from development actors.

Even if efforts to improve coordination are increasing, notably within the framework of the double or triple nexus, development and humanitarian responses appear to suffer from coordination gaps across the three windows. Actors tend to work separately without a clear, common agenda and approach to forced displacement. While some networks exist, donors report a lack of collaborative projects and coordination on the ground. Coordination between donors also seems to vary across situations and countries and to rely on individual actions rather than systematic information-sharing and cooperation groups. For example, in Nigeria, a group of donors for the north-eastern states exists and is fully functioning, while, across the border in the Diffa region of Niger, efforts to increase coordination mostly rely on individual initiatives. In Ethiopia, the government-led national coordination office (NCO) that supports CRRF processes has reportedly not held a meeting for nearly two years, despite being partially funded by the EUTF.

Finally, humanitarian and development actors tend to have different organisational structures, making cooperation difficult. For example, while development funding is largely based on specific projects, humanitarian actors are often funded based on their global appeals and have limited capacities to report on specific activities attached to a specific funding flow. In addition, development cycles are often multiannual while humanitarian funding is planned on a yearly basis.

Focus box 18: Provision of support to the urban displaced^{1,2,3,4,5}

Urban and self-settled refugees are often underserved when it comes to both humanitarian and development programming. Although precise numbers on urban refugees and IDPs do not exist, it is estimated that 58% of refugees and at least two thirds of all IDPs now live in urban areas.

Humanitarian actors seldom provide aid to the urban displaced as the provision of aid is often tied to residence in a recognised camp/settlement or urban area. This creates challenges as the self-settled displaced suffer from protection and service delivery gaps. Their exclusion from national censuses and municipal level data also makes it difficult for cities to adequately plan for all their residents, often resulting in increased pressure on public services. **UNHCR created a policy on urban refugees in 2009**, but the 2014 policy on alternatives to camps reverts to a dichotomy between camp and out-of-camp refugees. This dichotomy, while presenting alternatives to camps as a general, somewhat homogenous group, takes the focus away from specific urban refugee situations. The policy also does not distinguish between rural and urban settings for refugees and solely uses the term 'out of camp'. However, in Libya, UNHCR modified its operational strategy from 2019 onwards and increased its support to refugees in urban areas. Around the same period, IOM also started to focus on providing further support to migrants in urban settings, notably through its community stabilisation projects implemented in four cities in Libya – Sabha, Qatroun, Kufra and Benghazi.⁶

Solutions to urban displacement include practising inclusive urban city planning, incorporating a migration lens in decentralisation/urban projects operating in areas affected by forced displacement, and ensuring that humanitarian interventions support urban development outcomes. In addition, city to city learning can be an effective means of exchanging best practices for cities.

Programming for the urban displaced is notably funded by the Swiss Development Cooperation for Cities Alliance, with pilot projects in Arua (Uganda) and Jijiga (Ethiopia) as part of the Global Programme on Cities and Migration, and by the EU via the EUTF regional CRRF projects in Koboko (Uganda) and Assosa (Ethiopia), as well as the *Solutions Pérennes* programme in Djibouti.

2.1.5. Inclusion of host communities in programming

In order to improve long-term opportunities for forcibly displaced populations, international actors are turning toward the inclusion of host communities in their programming. This facilitates the integration of forcibly displaced populations and mitigates the likelihood of tensions with host communities. It also increases resilience in areas where the inflow of displaced populations exacerbates stress on services and infrastructures. The EUTF mid-term evaluation has notably shown that coupling the humanitarian assistance for displaced populations with development programming for both the host and displaced communities was instrumental in the reduction of tensions and resilience building.⁷ Finally, it ensures more buy-in from host governments. Including host communities in programming is part of the RDDP approach and of the approach taken by CRRF projects, which use a beneficiary target ratio of 50:50 or 30:70 (host to refugee), depending on the context. To support Libyan and non-Libyan youth to access education, UNICEF has developed the concept of 'Bayti', an integrated approach to child protection and education targeting displaced Libyan children, migrant and refugee children, and vulnerable children from the host community, and providing them with access to non-formal education of different types such as catch up and remedial classes, and life skills education.

¹ IIED, 'Cities for all? Rethinking urban displacement', 2019.

² IRC, 'Urban refuge: how cities are building inclusive communities', 2018.

³ Source for urban refugee data: UNHCR, 'Global Trends: Forced displacement in 2017', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Source for urban IDPs data: UNHCR, 'Global Trends: Forced displacement in 2019', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ The UNHCR categorizes geographic location for refugees in two types of areas: urban and rural. Refugees living in urban areas predominantly live in a camp location (79%) while 95% of refugees in urban locations live in individual accommodation.

⁶ Through a community stabilisation component, IOM aims to contribute towards easing tensions between Libyan tribes and between Libyan host communities and migrants by providing communities and municipal governments in four cities with opportunities to implement small projects that will restore essential services, rehabilitate key infrastructure, and promote economic development, while bringing different groups together peacefully and in a spirit of cooperation.

⁷ GDSI, 'Mid-term Evaluation of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa 2015-2019', October 2020.

Although the inclusion of forcibly displaced communities in programming is recognised as key for durable solutions, the security measures implemented in certain camps present a significant challenge to said inclusion. In several countries where the security situation is worsening, the securitisation of camps has increased in recent years, due to government-declared state of emergency measures as well as operations by armed forces.¹ While Burkina Faso has supported the gradual integration of refugees into national development programmes (refugees have, for instance, been included in national employment agency trainings), security around camps in the country has become tighter and refugees must now ask for authorisation to leave the camps. In addition, in certain situations, camp residents are suspected of harbouring members of armed groups, leading to greater surveillance and restriction of movements. Securitisation around camps is also the result of efforts by governmental organisations to ensure control over large numbers of refugees. In Ethiopia, for example, the agency in charge of refugees and returnees (ARRA) has sought to keep control of camps, refugees, and the projects that support them alike. Refugees notably have to seek authorisation from ARRA in order to set up a business, and in some areas, to access basic services, which can prove to be a very bureaucratic process.²

Focus box 19: Recovery, Stability and Socio-economic Development in Libya (RSSD1)

Budget: €50M

IPs: AICS, UNDP and UNICEF

Timeframe: from 09/2018 to 09/2021

Objective: Improve the **living conditions and resilience of vulnerable populations** and **support local governance**, in the **municipalities most affected by migratory flows**, by enhancing access to basic and social services.

Key preliminary findings: While there is **little consensus on the precise definition of ‘community stabilisation’**, which may negatively affect the programme’s capacity to assess its impact on this matter, **RSSD1’s approach appears to be suited to the Libyan context**. Central government institutions have been weakened by conflict, which has led local stakeholders, including municipalities, to take on increased responsibilities such as for the provision of basic services, and RSSD1 notably aims to strengthen municipalities’ capacities in providing these services. **The programme’s focus on improving access and quality to basic services also appears to be relevant** as efficient service delivery is perceived as key to developing social cohesion and strengthening the legitimacy of local actors.

The main best practice identified relates to the programme’s governance structure, which is characterised by strong involvement from the Libyan authorities, as well as solid coordination between the IPs involved in the programme. However, **several challenges were highlighted:** the volatility of the context, which means that that programme regularly needs to adapt to changing circumstances; lack of capacities and resources among Libyan institutions, which often slows down operations; and although the programme has identified the needs of the main beneficiaries (i.e. host communities) and may also benefit displaced communities in terms of the activities implemented, this last group does not seem to have been consulted in the design phase of the programme.

2.1.6. Strengthening governments’ capacities to support DACs

In the HoA in particular, donors interviewed for this study indicated that an important share of their support to DACs consists of advocacy for the development of national frameworks protecting their rights and promoting durable solutions. For example, the EU, UK FCDO, US Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration and the World Bank were all involved in the formulation of the new refugee law passed in Ethiopia in 2019. The EUTF-funded RE-INTEG IDLO project played an important role in the adoption of the first IDP and refugee-returnee law in Somalia. The approach taken by IDLO to drive the development of the law forward, by consulting and ensuring buy-in from all

¹ As an illustration : ONU info, ‘Burkina Faso : des réfugiés maliens retrouvent le camp de Goudoubo grâce à une sécurité renforcée,’ 21/12/2020. Retrieved [here](#).

² WB, Impact of Refugees on Hosting Communities in Ethiopia, A Social Analysis, 2020.

political stakeholders (at both Federal and State levels) throughout the process, has proved to be an effective strategy for fostering policy development. Such frameworks are critical for engagement between development actors and governments and to serve as entry points to support the inclusion of DACs in national systems.

Political willingness to assist refugees is sometimes lacking, but new instruments and cooperation have allowed for government buy-in to be secured. In Cameroon, the World Bank provided the government with the Refugee Sub Window grant, which was contingent on the inclusion of refugees in a cash transfer programme (Social Safety Net). In the case of the Jobs Compact in Ethiopia, funding from the World Bank, the EU and DFID was conditional on progress on economic rights for refugees, which were embodied in the new refugee proclamation that was successfully passed in January 2019. The EUTF mid-term evaluation states that the Trust Fund's focus on migration drew governments' attention to topics they would not be interested in otherwise.¹

Despite some positive policy developments, the operationalisation of laws for DACs remains a major issue, which poses significant challenges for development actors. The inclusion of DACs in national systems requires the sectorial ministries to adjust their budgets to support DACs, build capacity in affected areas, take over from national entities in charge of DACs, and support coordination. Such adjustments were missing in Ethiopia, where the health and education bodies in DACs-hosting areas were not receiving additional funds from the central administration to extend their support.

These national systems also suffer from a pre-existing lack of capacity, which is exacerbated by the number of forcibly displaced individuals to support. While Djibouti's decision to include refugees in the national health system was welcomed by all observers, several interviewees claimed that this move caused a temporary decrease in the quality of health services provided to refugees. In addition, forcibly displaced populations are often hosted in some of the most deprived zones of the countries in which they now live, where infrastructures are lacking and economic opportunities are scarce for both forcibly displaced and host populations. This is notably the case in the Tindouf camps in Algeria, which host Sahrawi refugees in a highly remote desert area.²

2.1.7. Leveraging the skills and experience of the DACs

Building on the existing skills of DACs generally ensures greater success for livelihoods programming. In the case of UNHCR programming in Dollo Ado, the development of livelihoods related to parts of the livestock value chain were considered to be more successful and self-sustaining for the future, notably because 'livestock management is more familiar to both hosts and refugees' (thereby requiring less training).³ Using existing skills found within DACs can also be a strategy for the capacity building of basic service providers at the national level. In Chad, former teachers in refugee camps were trained on the Chadian national education system, which allowed all primary and secondary schools in camps to transition smoothly from the Sudanese to the Chadian education system.⁴ Schools in refugee camps are now integrated into the national system, teachers are accredited, and both benefit from national education funding. The curriculum transition (Sudanese refugees were, prior to 2014, studying the Sudanese curriculum in camps), initiated by the UNHCR and the Government of Chad, has been reinforced by a teacher training programme organised by the JRS (Jesuit Refugee Service).⁵

Refugees face several challenges with regard to accessing work, including the lack of legal recognition of their rights at the national level, but also language, the absence of social networks and sometimes even the lack of knowledge about their own labour rights. Employers also tend to be insufficiently sensitised on the rights of refugees on this matter, and they often consider it easier to

¹ GDSI, 'Mid-Term Evaluation of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa 2015-2019', October 2020.

² ACAPS, 'Algeria - Sahrawi refugees', 23/06/2020. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Oxford Refugee Studies Centre, 'Building Refugee Economies: An evaluation of the IKEA Foundation's programmes in Dollo Ado', p. 72.

⁴ UNHCR. Chad: Curriculum Transition Overview. July 2015. Retrieved [here](#)

⁵ JRS. Chad: Darfuri students excel after curriculum transition. September 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

employ them informally. In 2020, UNHCR launched a new portal aimed at informing refugees about the higher education opportunities that are open to them in their host countries.

Many refugee camps are located in isolated and underdeveloped areas, which means that there are fewer livelihood opportunities available to their inhabitants, as well as to their hosts. Several interviewees claimed that a large share of the livelihoods support provided to refugees and host communities in refugee-hosting areas was inefficient, due to the lack of economic infrastructure and the relative absence of the private sector, which remains hesitant to invest in hosting areas, because of the high-risk profile of such financing. Poor connections with important markets also undermine trade opportunities for refugees and hosts. In Uganda, the World Bank-funded 'Roads and Bridges in the Refugee Hosting Districts/Koboko-Yumbe-Moyo Road Corridor' project intends to fill such connectivity gaps. In Kenya, the EUTF-funded 'Enhancing self-reliance for refugees and host communities in Kenya' programme provides infrastructure support, including for Kalobeyei's urban development and roads, and incentivises private sector investments.

Refugee and IDP participation in the design and implementation of projects seldom occurs but is increasingly encouraged by policy frameworks and approaches. In the humanitarian field, for instance, this was one of the commitments of the Grand Bargain, an agreement between large donors and humanitarian organisations launched during the World Humanitarian Summit of 2016.¹ The DFID/UK FCDO-funded Danwadaag project created a reintegration score with the beneficiary IDPs and hosts, including indicators to measure how the beneficiaries themselves defined reintegration. Yearly evaluation of these co-created indicators allows for the programme design to be adapted as needed.

In addition, the inclusion of women in the design and implementation of projects is paramount. Women are often considered a 'minority group' in the sense that they face specific discrimination and have specific needs. However, women are also a valuable resource, especially in situations of conflict-induced displacement, where they can be involved in peace and reconstruction activities. Demographic changes resulting from conflict also mean that women in displacement are more likely to be heads of households.

Given the significant proportion of children among IDPs and refugees, any attempt at preventing or responding to both internal and cross-border displacement should include a focus on this particularly vulnerable group.² Ensuring their meaningful participation in the decisions that affect them is key as 'they know their needs better than anyone' and can contribute to the development of programmes and policies that have a greater impact on their lives.³

3. Key non-EUTF interventions

3.1. Humanitarian funding for forced displacement

Humanitarian funding for forcibly displaced people is highly dependent on a small share of donors and actors. In all three regions, according to the data available (shown in graph below), UNHCR is the main recipient of donor funding, and the US government is the main donor. The European Union is the second largest donor of humanitarian funding for displacement and the second largest donor to the UNHCR. Recipient organisations are overwhelmingly UN agencies, mostly UNHCR and the WFP, which together receive more than 60% of the funds in all three regions.

Most situations that are considered to be protracted (including most of the HoA, Chad and Nigeria) are lacking more than 50% of required UNHCR funding as of October 2020, possibly indicating donor fatigue. Libya, Algeria and Tunisia (NoA), Djibouti (HoA), Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Ghana (SLC)


¹ IASC, 'The Grand Bargain'. Accessed in 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

² IDMC 'Twice Invisible' report, Op. Cit.

³ UNICEF, 'Lost at Home – The risks and challenges of internally displaced children and the urgent actions needs to protect them', May 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

are the only eight operations out of 23 (22 countries and the Senegal multi-country operation) that have received more than half of the funds required as of October 2020. For overall humanitarian funding, it is worth mentioning that since displaced populations in the HoA are primarily hosted in camps, more interventions will be targeted specifically at displaced populations (and therefore appear in this graph) than in SLC, where interventions reaching displacement-affected populations are less systematically targeted by status. The graphs below only show humanitarian funding for forced displacement (therefore, donors or funds with significant development funding such as the European Commission, the World Bank and the EUTF are not as strongly represented as they would be otherwise).

Figure 37: Main donors and recipients of **humanitarian** funding for forced displacement, and UNHCR funding, as of October 2020^{1,2,3}



¹ In the map and in calculations, Senegal MCO refers to Senegal Multi Country Office, which covers Senegal, The Gambia, Guinea and Liberia. Source: UNHCR. Retrieved [here](#).

² In the humanitarian funding for forced displacement, every flow of funding reported that specifically referred to forcibly displaced populations in its description is included. Source: OCHA Financial Tracking System. Retrieved [here](#).

³ For UNHCR funding, 'amount required' refers to the UNHCR's requirements for country operations over the year. Retrieved [here](#).

3.2. Development funding for forced displacement

Targeted development assistance for forced displacement has existed since the 1980s, but has grown rapidly since 2016 thanks in part to increased involvement from multilateral development banks.¹ In 2009, the World Bank created the Global Programme on Forced displacement (GPDF), which worked on a 'paradigm shift and change of mindset inside the Bank and with client governments and partners' toward the idea that displacement is a development issue.² While in 2005 the World Bank was funding one forced displacement project, in 2018, it had approved 59, with a net commitment of \$3.7 billion.³ The IDA18 refugee sub-window, finalised in 2016, provided \$2 billion to 'top up' countries' regular IDA allocation for projects targeting refugees and host communities. More broadly, in 2017 multilateral development banks⁴ published a joint paper advocating for reinforced cooperation between humanitarian and development actors, and for a development approach to forced displacement that reflects long-term perspectives and seeks sustainability.⁵

UNHCR has been supporting this shift by acting as a catalyst for development engagement with regard to support to displacement-affected communities through logistical support, data and analysis, advocacy support to governments and coordination support.⁶ Since the New York Declaration, UNHCR has also intensified its collaboration with development actors through the creation of Senior Development Officers in country offices. While UNHCR does not have a global strategy to expand their support to self-reliance with development funds, some projects have been implemented with development funds from the EUTF and the IKEA Foundation.

State agencies play a prominent role in the funding of forced displacement interventions; however, approaches and the scope of engagement vary. The US Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) and USAID have maintained a strong humanitarian focus, through large funds from the PRM to UNHCR across the three regions and Food for Peace programmes implemented by USAID. However, interviewees from the PRM and USAID also highlighted the political advocacy work done by the US to better protect and integrate refugees. The UK FCDO's support to DACs is mainly conducted through larger development programmes such as the Building Resilience Initiative (BRI) in Ethiopia. However, the British agency still funds a few exclusively DACs-focused programmes, like the Safety, Support and Solutions Phase II (SSSII) programme, which aims to provide assistance to migrants and refugees along the Central Mediterranean Route, or the Dalwadaag programme, which supports IDPs in Somalia. AFD received the mandate to work on migration and forced displacement in 2016, and as a result, the agency is currently implementing two cross-border pilot projects in Nigeria, Cameroon and Central African Republic.

Multi-donor initiatives have also emerged, such as the joint UK Aid, UNHCR and World Bank evidence-building programme on protracted forced displacement. Finally, the private sector has increasingly engaged in development funding for displacement, with notable examples including the IKEA Foundation, which supports the development of livelihood activities in the Dollo Ado refugee camp, in collaboration with UNHCR (€85M).

The main development programmes on forced displacement outside of the EUTF, according to the data available (shown in the graph below), can mainly be found in the HoA and SLC regions. The main donors are the World Bank, even though it is considered a new player in DACs support, notably with a €372M programme in the HoA (DRDIP) and two important programmes in SLC (Refugees and host

¹ Group of MDBs. Forced displacement: a joint paper by multilateral development banks. 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

² World Bank. The evolution of the WBG's role in forced displacement. Retrieved [here](#).

³ IEG, World Bank Group. An evaluation of World Bank Group support in conflict induced situations of forced displacement. 2017. Retrieved [here](#).


⁴ Including the African Development Bank (AfDB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Investment Bank (EIB), and the World Bank Group (WBG).

⁵ Group of MDBs. Forced displacement: a joint paper by multilateral development banks. 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ GPPI. UNHCR's engagement in Humanitarian-Development cooperation. 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

communities support [€183M] and Education Reform Support Project [€110M]). The UK FCDO is also a key contributor with the programmes BRAER (€181M) and PAMOJA (€62M) in the HoA, as well as CSSF in Egypt (€16M) to a lesser extent. AFD is mainly present in Sahel through two programmes (I Yéké Oko [€12M] and ISOLT [€7M]).

Figure 38: Selected non-EU-funded development programmes on forced displacement in activity^{1,2,3,4}



¹ The budget for the BMZ regional programme also includes Rwanda and Mexico.

² The Prospects Partnership programme (2019-2023) financed by the Netherlands and implemented by the IFC, ILO, UNHCR, UNICEF and World Bank covers eight countries: Uganda, Sudan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. The total budget of the initiative is €550M. Therefore, the budget appearing on the graph is equal to 5/8 of the total programme budget, as this report covers only five of the eight concerned countries.

³ The figure represents the largest development programmes with a focus on DACs identified by the consulting team. It is based on extensive secondary research and desk review and interviews with an important number of actors in the field of support to DACs. However, the consulting team is aware that the lack of transparency of development funds does not consistently allow for an exhaustive identification of the funds and programmes in the field.

⁴ Abbreviations: Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF); Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project (DRIP); Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF); Building Resilience and an Effective Emergency Response (BRAER); Kenya Integrated Refugee and Host Community Support Programme (PAMOJA); *Projet d'Appui à l'Inclusion Sociale et à la gouvernance locale* (ISOLT).

3.3. Targeting

There are different methods for targeting displacement-related programme beneficiaries, including status-based, needs- or vulnerability-based, and area-based approaches. The choice of targeting method may be influenced by programme objectives: protection objectives are most likely to be identified through vulnerability analyses, while livelihood interventions may need to target the beneficiaries most likely to be employed (skills-based). The choice of method also depends on country context. Area-based approaches are particularly adapted to programming for DACs (especially in urban settings) as they ensure context-specificity, mapping of services and actors as well as integrated programming for host and forcibly displaced populations alike.¹ The vulnerability-based approach usually considers criteria such as age, gender and/or disability, and may be relevant to adapt interventions to the specific needs of these vulnerable groups.

4. EUTF portfolio


The EUTF has funded a large and diverse range of projects to support DACs, with various strategies employed across the three windows. The portfolio analysis used project budgets disaggregated by activity (and other relevant project documents) whenever they were available to estimate amounts dedicated to each thematic area. Thus, in this case, the budgets referred to correspond to the amounts estimated to be dedicated to forced displacement in each project, and not total budgets.

Programmes in the HoA have largely aligned with international frameworks for DACs, such as the CRRF projects in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, or RE-INTEG in Somalia, which uses the IASC framework indicators. Moreover, external stakeholders considered the Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) to be a precursor to the CRRF approach. In NoA, support to DACs mainly focuses on Libya and is provided as part of larger development programmes that aim to strengthen the stability and resilience of both host and displaced populations. In SLC, programmes have supported the resilience of populations following the LRRD (Linking relief, rehabilitation and development) approach. Such programmes are often not specifically aimed at DACs but are implemented in hosting areas.

It should also be noted that the EUTF made the decision in December 2018 and May 2019 to fund two programmes focusing on displacement in the Great Lakes Region (Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and Democratic Republic of the Congo). Thus, the EUTF contributes to a UNHCR-led initiative focusing on South Sudanese refugees and alternatives to camps in the Democratic Republic of Congo and a programme supporting the CRRF in the entire region, with €3M and €9M respectively. The EUTF chose to mobilise these funds from the EUTF HoA window because of the effects of displacement from the Great Lakes on the HoA as well the Trust Fund's objective to support the CRRF process.

¹ Area-based approaches are well adapted to urban areas as urban crises often require 'a greater understanding of urban systems, collaboration with local government, and interventions across multiple sectors and scales.' From USWG, Area-based approaches in urban settings: compendium of case studies (May 2019).

Figure 39: EUTF funding for forced displacement^{1,2,3}



¹ As of October 2020; only contracted projects are included. Abbreviations detailed in the annex. In the 'Main EUTF programmes on forced displacement' box: Programmes' budget amounts indicate the amount of funding for SO1, SO2 and SO4 for DACs, as indicated in the portfolio analysis section, out of the programmes' total budget.

² The figure includes the main EUTF programmes in each of the three regions identified by the consulting team, based on the budget and focus on DACs.

³ Save = Save the Children; MdM = Médecins du Monde France; SLCRR: Strengthening Local Capacities for Resilience and Recovery. Numbers rounded to the nearest 0.5M.

Most stakeholders claim that the EUTF has created space, learning and funding for a significant number of innovative ‘pilot’ projects to support DACs. Such risk-tolerant funding seems to have encouraged other development partners to pursue similar approaches. For instance, the EUTF-funded RE-INTEG programme, which supports durable solutions for IDP hosting areas in Somalia, was followed by the UK-funded Danwadaag and the Danida-funded Durable Solutions Programme. These actions have notably benefitted from the lessons learned on area-based approaches that were generated by RE-INTEG, as well as from the programme’s engagement with government partners. Equally, the RDPP Kenya project acted as a catalyst to attract additional donors to Kalobeyei (such as the IFC’s Kakuma Kalobeyei Challenge Fund). In Niger, GIZ has replicated *Kallo Tchidaniwo*, an EUTF-funded social housing project in refugee camps in Mali. The project uses a pilot approach to increase resilience and protection of displaced populations through an urbanisation programme which also aims to strengthen social cohesion in the region and build the capacity of the local authorities. In northeast Nigeria, the approach of the MCN programme on safe centres for teen girls has been replicated through other EU funding in different areas (Sokoto, North West), and the government is supporting the scaling up of the approach at the federal level.

The EUTF has been able to fund projects that integrate both development and humanitarian approaches, notably in zones where humanitarian activities alone were previously implemented. The RDPP programme, for example, was cited as an innovative programme bridging the gap between humanitarian and development programming. In Libya, several programmes have also integrated this double nexus approach by providing direct assistance to DACs while simultaneously strengthening local capacities for resilience and recovery. In the SLC window, multi-year projects allowed for increased funding visibility and for an extended focus on resilience building to intervene in displacement situations.

In cases where the EUTF invested in the political dimension of support to DACs, this was reported to be one of the most impactful aspects of the intervention by all interviewees. First, in some projects the EUTF placed an emphasis on engagement between IPs and local governments. This strategy encouraged buy-in from local authorities and was perceived as a key step for the development of durable solutions. In Libya, where migration and asylum are both ‘taboo’ topics, the involvement of local authorities in community stabilisation programmes such as RSSD1 has been paramount. Second, other programmes include a component and/or project dedicated to policy development or political support, such as RE-INTEG. This fostered progress on legislative frameworks in favour of DACs protection and integration. However, several other programmes had limited political objectives and/or components. Several stakeholders pointed out that, in these cases, the contracted INGOs’ capacity to promote durable solutions in their areas of concern was limited by the lack of a political partner in charge of policy development at the national and subnational levels. This was particularly the case for the RDPP programme in its various countries of implementation. Finally, in countries where EUTF projects were signed very quickly, the government’s buy-in was often overlooked.

Numerous interviewees expressed concerns about the lack of adaptive programming possibilities, which prevented IPs from operationalising the lessons learned from project implementation and from responding to arising shocks and crises. Even though programmes in Libya suffered from the volatile context and subsequent flows of IDPs, which were not accounted for in the initial programme design, the EU has reportedly been cooperative in dealing with IPs’ requests for changes during implementation. The RDPP ET IRC project in Tigray Region had to deal with a significant influx of refugees from Eritrea as a result of the peace agreement and border opening, placing additional pressure on activities involving basic services. Despite this development, no additional funding or addendum was directly added to this project. While the EUTF proved flexible when it came to revising contract details or operational modalities, interviewees suggested that this adaptiveness should be extended to allow for amendments to programme design and strategy.

When looking at the situation in NoA, it is important to consider the impact of EU programmes implemented in other regions. Border management programmes in SLC have made it increasingly difficult for migrants and refugees to travel northwards. DTM IOM numbers indicate a decrease in mixed

migration flows along the Central Mediterranean Route over the last few years; however, this appears to be because people on the move now tend to use more dangerous routes, mainly to avoid checkpoints and official border points. As a result, they reportedly arrive in NoA with greater vulnerabilities and needs.¹ Increased focus on border management was also identified as a factor contributing to a shift in attitude towards refugees and migrants among several governments in the region. This is notably the case in Morocco and Algeria, where violent behaviour from police officers, forced displacements toward the south of the both countries, and collective expulsions to the Nigerien border have reportedly been on the rise for the last four years.

5. Perspectives and areas of opportunities

5.1. General principles

Donor coordination: Donor coordination is even more critical in forced displacement programming than in other thematic areas. The creation of joint funds (such as *Alliance Sahel*, which is often cited as an effective multi-sector and multi-donor partnership) should be considered to ensure a common strategy and approach to forced displacement in each country or area of intervention.

Evidence-based approach / real-time monitoring tools: Multi-donor mapping and vulnerability assessments should be commissioned, as well as political economy analyses. The Research and Evidence Facility (REF) could be useful in that regard. Real-time monitoring of activities should be used to adjust interventions to rapidly evolving contexts and to facilitate the integration of lessons learned and best practices.

Political dialogue and cooperation with local government and sectoral systems:

- The EU's political clout offers an opportunity to **bridge the gap between development and political actors**. The consulted stakeholders described the EU as a key actor that is able to link agencies and authorities, thanks to its capacity to get involved in political processes and invest in new political approaches. The RSSD1 programme in Libya is characterised by the strong involvement of Libyan authorities at the local and central levels, notably based on multiple consultations during the inception phase.
- **Engagement with the governments** of each country is fundamental, as the buy-in of local and national stakeholders was identified as a key factor in the successful implementation of the response. For instance, the secondment of knowledge management staff to local administration offices by the ReDSS in Somalia proved effective for building the target authorities' capacity to coordinate, exchange information and convene stakeholders for better DACs support. Such engagement might include facilitating dialogue about policy development in countries with legislative gaps, and using capacity building and advocacy to support governments to operationalise durable solutions and include DACs within national systems (both at the central and local level). Engagement with governments on policy development has notably been conducted as part of the EUTF portfolio in NoA, such as in Morocco, with a focus on migration policies² that could potentially be extended to DACs.
- The use of country systems should be ensured by **funding sectoral plans** (e.g. in Uganda) as well as ensuring a proper division of roles and responsibilities between line ministries, traditional refugee actors (e.g. Office of the Prime Minister in Uganda) and regional or district level entities, including by helping to **ensure that budgets are assigned** at the local level.

Private Sector Partnerships: Further engagement with the private sector should be considered where possible, notably through public-private partnerships. In Somalia, the DANIDA Durable Solutions

¹ Clingendael, 'Multilateral Damage – The impact of EU migration policies on central Saharan routes', September 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

² For more information on this, see the thematic review on Migration Governance.

programme's agreements with private water companies has allowed for a 50% decrease in the price of water for IDPs.

5.2. Programme design

Agility and flexibility: Future responses to forced displacement should be designed in a flexible manner to better respond to the volatility of displacement situations and concomitant humanitarian and development needs, through real-time monitoring systems, larger contingency funds and the creation of crisis modifiers funds.

Continuity should be promoted: Longer multi-year programming cycles should be promoted to increase programme impact at the local level, as well as to ensure the sustainability of durable solutions. The EUTF mid-term evaluation highlighted that, despite the emergency character of the EUTF, it should provide 'larger and more systemic support to ensure sustainability and longer-term societal impact.'¹

Nexus approach should be adopted: As both humanitarian and development assistance are key to supporting DACs, the development of actions that integrate both components should be promoted. This could be done by: i) **designing graduation approaches** to assist DACs with specific needs, to support new arrivals with any trauma, and to invest in the capabilities of settled DACs to enhance their local integration; ii) **conducting joint assessments with ECHO** in areas where both the EUTF and ECHO are present, to understand the gaps between interventions and build on potential synergies; iii) **ensuring that humanitarian activities like psychosocial or food support are incorporated into development programmes** to reach DACs who are facing trauma or food insecurity. For example, the EUTF and ECHO have increased their collaboration in Uganda, sequencing their activities in similar areas and sectors and exchanging knowledge on specific topics such as disaster preparedness.

Improving returns: Actors involved in population returns should make sure these **returns are conducted in satisfactory conditions**, and that the assistance does not stop until a durable solution is reached. As such, increased monitoring could be conducted before and following returns to ensure that the criteria defined by durable solutions frameworks² are met. There should also be an increase in funding in areas of returns. Actors should also work with governments to ensure that the conditions are met to prepare for safe and orderly returns.

Participatory and area-based approach: Integrate DACs into programme design through participatory approaches, and in particular: i) design integration indicators based on DACs' expectations and ensure their measurement on a yearly basis, ii) consult, support and operate through DACs' informal community structures and governance actors, iii) **employ area-based approaches** as an entry point to target areas under significant displacement pressure. Meaningful participation of women should be ensured in programme design and implementation, as they represent a significant added value as heads of households, decision makers and potential peace actors. The participation of children should also be ensured, or at least their opinions and voices must be heard, so that policy and programming can better respond to their needs and protect them.³

Livelihoods: Particularly when it comes to livelihoods interventions, special attention should be placed on taking into consideration not only the possibilities (e.g. refugee legislation as well as its practical implementation, natural resources) but also the beneficiaries' desires (e.g. youth wanting to move to urban settings or resettle may not be willing to participate in 'typical' rural livelihoods programmes) and strong value chain analyses as opposed to the traditionally supply-driven existing interventions.

Involvement of displaced communities in stabilisation programming: ensure the involvement of displaced communities in any programme implemented in areas where i) they are in significant numbers

¹ GDSI, 'Mid-term Evaluation of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa 2015-2019', October 2020.

² Such as UNHCR Global Compact on Refugees (accessible [here](#)) and IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs (accessible [here](#)).

³ UNICEF, 'Lost at Home – The risks and challenges for internally displaced children and the urgent actions needed to protect them', May 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

and ii) their presence could lead to tensions with host communities. Stabilisation programmes and their success rely significantly on their design and implementation processes as well as the level of contribution from target communities.¹

Targeting: The individual targeting method may depend on the type of programme: development actors recommended vulnerability- and needs-based targeting methodologies, but additional vulnerabilities arising from status alone must be considered when designing programmes. Gender and age should notably be taken into consideration in targeting to ensure that the activities implemented benefit these vulnerable groups too.

Urban adjustments: Support to cities hosting a large number of forcibly displaced people should be extended by: i) building the capacities of local city authorities to deliver integrated public services to hosts and DACs alike, ii) incorporating DAC numbers for city planning purposes, most notably by conducting census-type activities, iii) conducting additional research to better understand the needs and aspirations of DACs residing in cities, and iv) advocating to ensure that national authorities recognise self-settled urban refugees. Further research on cities as a place of integration would also be recommended.

Climate impact: Environmental risk assessments should be consistently carried out in order to define responsible strategies and activities. Influx of IDPs and refugees exacerbate pressure on local resources, often in arid zones. To mitigate such threats, it is crucial to encourage environmentally sustainable initiatives.

Exit strategies: Ensure that all implementing partners include and effectively implement an exit strategy in the development of their programme to ensure the sustainability of their approach.

5.3. Evidence-based and data-driven approach

Collaboration with learning partners should continue to foster the identification of best practices and lessons learned for future interventions (e.g. ReDSS for RE-INTEG, URD for KEY in Mali), with special attention given to the dissemination of these findings to governments, donors and other development actors.

Investments should be made in research and learning on support to DACs in insecure and hard-to-reach areas, as methods of implementation and M&E often need to be adapted.

Harmonise and centralise / share data collected on forced displacement, beneficiary profiles and needs, to better inform policy and programming. With a variety of actors becoming involved in data collection around forced displacement (UNHCR, IOM DTM, DRC 4Mi, REACH), data on movements, beneficiary profiles and needs tends to be collected from diverse sources, using different definitions and methodologies, which negatively affect their comparability and quality. Information should systematically be collected i) about beneficiaries, including their geographic origin, education, skills and job aspirations, based on standard questions, and ii) about the local setting, including infrastructures, access to market and economic opportunities in (and out of) the area, and promising value chains, in order to design realistic livelihoods support activities in line with the skills and opportunities available locally. IPs must ensure that they collect gender- and age-disaggregated data to monitor the extent to which their activities also benefit vulnerable groups such as women and youth. In the case of qualitative surveys, specific and culturally sensitive approaches should also be implemented for these groups to ensure that their opinions are accurately collected.

Monitor the impact of projects as they unfold through ROM or real-time monitoring tools (e.g. Third Party Monitoring, internal monitoring by the IP) to identify best practices as well as shortcomings

¹ IOM, 'Community Stabilization – An approach for facilitating progress towards durable solutions and operationalizing the Humanitarian–Development–Peace Nexus: Lessons from Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Somalia', Migration Research Series, 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

and be able to scale up promising activities, as well as to ensure the durable solutions promoted meet the criteria identified in the durable solutions frameworks.

Include all persons of concern: The inclusion of additional groups in the definition of forced displacement should be considered in policy and programming to take into consideration groups that are left in the 'grey area'. These could include: **people who have been expelled** from host countries (**forced returns**), **people displaced as a result of disasters and climate change** (which is not included in the 1951 Convention), as well as **stranded migrants** (who have been forced to stop at some point along their journey).



Somali migrants in a temporary shelter in Tripoli

Photo credits: Altai Consulting

Migration governance

Labour migration & migration for development

Response to forced displacement

Protection

Return & reintegration

Response to trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants

Border management

Triple nexus

1. Introduction


There is no universally agreed definition of protection, but for the purpose of this study, we will use the one established by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), according to which protection refers to ‘*all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law (human rights law, humanitarian law and refugee law)*’.

This definition is generally accepted among stakeholders, and also applies to people on the move.¹ It defines protection as a sector of intervention that is clearly delimited by a number of laws and conventions, but which remains broad on the ground.

- The **core meaning of protection** is a humanitarian action that targets the most vulnerable people and seeks to preserve their physical integrity in the context of an emergency. It includes activities such as health services, food provision, shelter or legal support.
- The **broad meaning of protection** includes a more development-oriented perspective. It targets the most vulnerable people but also aims to improve their individual resilience and protection environment in order to ensure long-term protection.²
- All aid actors should also incorporate protection principles in their interventions. This process of **protection mainstreaming** relies on different principles: avoid causing harm, ensure impartial access to protection services, provide accountability to beneficiaries and support the development of self-protection capacities.

These different types of protection activities are subject to change according to the nature and timing of the protection incident, and the migration status of the individual, as people on the move fall under different legal protection frameworks. These responses can be interrelated and sometimes overlap in order to cover all aspects of protection. This study will focus on the aspects related to migration and mobility shown in the visual below.

Figure 40: Protection activities related to migration and mobility




¹ IOM and UNHCR use the IASC definition.

² Interview with key informant from INGO.

2. Situation across Africa

Conflict-related violence, combined with poor protection governance and the COVID-19 pandemic, are contributing to higher protection needs across the region, especially in NoA and SLC.

Figure 41: Main protection needs across the three EUTF windows



2.1. Rising violence

Since 2018, increases in intercommunal clashes, violence by armed groups, and military operations have prompted massive, and largely internal, displacement across the three EUTF regions. The situation is particularly critical in Burkina Faso, which is now facing the fastest growing internal displacement crisis in the world, with more than one million IDPs, 75% of whom remain without adequate shelter.¹ Similarly, more than 425,000 people remain displaced in Libya following Khalifa Haftar's attack on Tripoli in April 2019, and need accommodation, food and health services.²

In these volatile contexts, people on the move have increasingly become targets of terrorist and military attacks, or victims of abuses and rights violations by state actors. This is especially the case in SLC. In March 2020, following the terrorist attacks in Goudoubou refugee camp in Burkina Faso, 57% of the camp's inhabitants decided to return to Mali. In Mentao, the second most important camp in the country, 32 Malian refugees suspected of complicity with jihadists were injured by security forces.³ Continuous violence in Libya also compromises protection for people on the move, as seen in July 2019, when an airstrike hit Tajoura Detention Centre outside Tripoli, killing 53 refugees and migrants.⁴ People on the move can thus be forcibly displaced multiple times, adding complexity to already increasingly mixed migration flows.

¹ OCHA, 'Central Sahel, Reviewed needs and requirements', October 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

² DTM IOM Libya, August 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Crisis watch Database. Accessed [here](#).

⁴ MMC, 'A new normal: Evacuations from Libya to Niger and Rwanda', September 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

2.2. Weak protection governance

Despite increased needs for people on the move, weak national capacities limit the implementation of existing protection frameworks.¹ Despite a relatively advanced refugee protection framework, few states across the SLC region conduct Refugee Status Determination (RSD), which is instead mostly carried out by UNHCR. In NoA, despite Morocco's initial efforts to set up an asylum system in 2014, no formal asylum law has been adopted, and the 2013 and 2016 waves of regularisation of irregular migrants have had mixed results.² Though they allowed 50,000 migrants to gain access to residency permits, the procedures were lengthy and not always properly conducted, with some applications rejected for no explicit reason.³

Some states have also decided to strengthen restrictive migration management, often with the support of international actors. The situation is especially critical in Libya, which does not legally recognise the status of asylum seekers nor its obligation to provide them with protection. Most of its migration-related laws are prosecutorial in nature.⁴ Law no. 6 of 1987 criminalised the 'illegal' entry, stay or exit of foreign nationals, and persons who have assisted or facilitated their entry. In 2010, Law no. 19 penalised irregular entry with detention or a prison sentence of up to three years followed by deportation.⁵ Out of the 600,000 migrants present in the country, around 3,000 are supposedly detained in official DCIM centres, where they live in subpar conditions and can be tortured, physically and sexually abused, and sold to traffickers. The situation is even worse in clandestine prisons or non-official centres, which are controlled by armed groups and smugglers and remain extremely difficult to access.⁶ The number of informal detainees is unknown, but a recent estimate from the Danish Refugee Council suggests that 80,000 people might have been confined in these facilities at some point in recent years.⁷ Border controls have also been strengthened across the region, in Sudan, Niger, Libya and Algeria. Algeria, for example, expelled 3,400 migrants to Niger in September 2020 alone.⁸

Restrictive migration management increases smuggling prices as well as the vulnerability of migrants to trafficking. Stronger border controls have benefitted the smuggling business, and encouraged migrants to take more dangerous, expensive and remote routes to avoid security patrols. Increased smuggling prices also force people on the move to travel with higher sums of money at the beginning of their journey, thus becoming a more attractive target for traffickers along the route.⁹ As a result, migration routes have changed since the beginning of the EUTF. Since 2018, the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR) has been surpassed by both the Eastern and Western routes, with decreased transit movement through Sudan and Niger, and decreasing departures from Libya, due to counter-smuggling and border initiatives in these countries.¹⁰

In this migration governance context, people on the move are frequently stigmatised. Host communities sometimes refuse to use the same health or education facilities as migrants, or fear retributions from authorities. In Tripoli, one migrant was reportedly expelled by his landowner who feared arrest after UNHCR came to assist his tenant.¹¹ Migrants thus remain hidden, distrust protection actors and sometimes resort to traffickers and smugglers to access job opportunities, shelter and health services.¹²

¹ In the HoA, five countries have signed the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). In SLC, ECOWAS allows free movement and residency across the region since 1979.

² Interview with key informant from UN agency.

³ Le Monde, 'Maroc : premier bilan après une régularisation massive de sans-papier'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Clingendael, 'From abuses to cohabitation: A way forward for positive migration in Libya', October 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Amnesty International, 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ MSF, 'Trading in suffering: detention, exploitation and abuse in Libya'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ TNH, 'What happens to migrants forcibly returned to Libya', August 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Aljazeera, 'Algeria expelling thousands of migrants across Niger', October 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Interview with key informant from research institution.

¹⁰ Interview with key informant from research institution.

¹¹ MSF, 'La machine à broyer', December 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

¹² Interview with key informant from research institution.

2.3. COVID-19 pandemic

Due to increased border controls and travel restrictions, migrants and refugees are often stranded in transit hubs, which can lead to depleted financial resources and limited working opportunities. This not only affects their physical and mental health (due to, for example, hunger, malaria, stress and anxiety), but can also leave migrants vulnerable to negative coping mechanisms for earning money, such as forced labour and prostitution.

The pandemic has also affected the provision of both short- and long-term protection services. In SLC, asylum seekers and refugees have observed delays in administrative processes for obtaining refugee status and other legal documents. Across Africa, UNHCR and IOM's resettlement and voluntary return activities have also been delayed or suspended during the pandemic.¹

2.4. Specific profiles

2.4.1. Women

In 2019, women comprised slightly less than half (47%) of all migrants in sub-Saharan Africa.² There is rarely a single factor driving women's decision to migrate. Some women may have a comfortable financial situation in their country of origin, but wish to follow their husband to maintain family unity and protect their marriage.³ Others migrate alone or with their children, in order to increase their access to productive assets, such as land, finance or education, or to escape patriarchal social structures to improve their autonomy and social status.⁴

Gender also shapes the migration experience, and female migrants usually face more protection risks along the route. They often have less information, less education and fewer options for regular migration. They are thus more vulnerable to violence, abuses and trafficking, especially if they are not accompanied by a male relative.⁵ According to IOM, in 2019, 57% of victims of trafficking in Africa were women,⁶ and in 2017, the organisation reported a 600% increase in the number of potential sex-trafficking victims arriving in Italy by sea, most of whom (around 8,000) were Nigerian.⁷ According to some reports, women on the move are more often victims of sexual exploitation, but also kidnapping and organ trafficking, compared to men.⁸ Sexual violence against women and girls on the move is notably reported in Sudan, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco, and is sometimes also reported in reception and detention facilities in Europe.⁹

2.4.2. Children

Overall, 25% of people on the move across Africa are children (under 18) ¹⁰ – 6.5 million in total.¹¹ Africa has the largest share of children among its migrant population, especially in countries like Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Kenya, where children account for more than 40% of the immigrant population.¹²

Drivers of child migration are often numerous, complex and layered. Some are escaping a post-conflict or post-natural disaster humanitarian crisis. Others, travelling alone or with their family, are seeking better education or economic opportunities in order to provide for their relatives. In many parts

¹ Seefar, 'Exploring the impact of COVID-19 on the Vulnerabilities of Migrants on the Central Mediterranean Route', August 2020.

² United Nations, 'Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 'International Migration 2019'. Retrieved [here](#).

³ IOM, 'Le parcours des migrantes de retour', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ IOM, 'West and Central Africa: More Women Search for Equality through Migration', March 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Ibid

⁶ The Counter Trafficking Data Collaborative, 'Victims from Africa'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ A. Malakooti, 'The Intersection of Irregular Migration and Trafficking in West Africa and the Sahel', February 2020.

⁸ A. Malakooti, 'The Intersection of Irregular Migration and Trafficking in West Africa and the Sahel', February 2020.

⁹ Council of Europe, 'Protecting the rights of migrant, refugee and asylum-seeking women and girls'. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ Migration data portal, 'Child and young migrants'. Accessed [here](#).

¹¹ This figure includes migrant and forcibly displaced children.

¹² UNICEF, 'Data snapshot of migrant and displaced children in Africa'. Retrieved [here](#).

of Africa, migration is also a rite of passage for young people transitioning into adulthood. It can be supported by families and communities through long-established and relatively safe migration paths along which children travel regularly with family, friends or relatives. Some can be sent to Quranic schools to improve their religious education, or to family friends and relatives to work as a maid or an apprentice.¹

Children are among the **most vulnerable groups of people on the move**. They endure harsh conditions while travelling along the route, and are often denied basic service provision, such as health, food and water. They lack information and proper registration documents to access such services, which can also be too expensive and not necessarily adapted to their needs and profiles. Some children suffer trauma along the route, or miss years of schooling during their migration journey.² They are also more likely to experience violence, exploitation or abuse, as often reported in some Quranic schools, or can suffer from severe psychological distress, as they sometimes travel alone and unprotected.³

All these risks tend to vary according to the **age and gender** of the individual. Boys and girls may be forced into child labour and child marriage, while adolescents, especially young girls, are more prone to sex trafficking.⁴

The context and nature of migration movements also affect these risks. In transit, children on the move face increased risks of sexual and gender-based violence (GBV), forced labour, extortion and exploitation, among other abuses. As refugees and IDPs, children may be forced into child labour or early child marriage to cope with economic deprivation.⁵

2.5. Climate change

Climate change is widely recognised as a contributing and exacerbating factor in migration. While it is difficult to clearly assess the link between global warming and mobility, climate-related events such as flooding, forest fires, droughts and intensified storms force some populations to move. Other slow-onset effects such as desertification, sea level rise, increasing temperatures or land and forest degradation are also increasingly influencing decisions to migrate.⁶

These climate-related issues will also heighten protection needs for people on the move, above all by limiting access to basic resources. Some forms of agricultural or pastoral lifestyles will become unsustainable in certain areas, thus restricting livelihood opportunities and disrupting food systems. Water quality and availability along the routes could also decrease, as sea-level rise can result in salinisation of fresh water sources. Tensions in accessing scarce natural resources will intensify, especially between migrants, refugees and host communities.⁷ Climate change could also limit access to health services along migration routes. Malnutrition in addition to drought-induced food insecurity, mass human displacement and the exacerbation of environmentally sensitive chronic diseases will strain healthcare systems, which are already struggling to meet the needs of a growing population in Africa.⁸ There will also be an increasing number of forcibly displaced populations, due to extreme weather events such as severe droughts, floods or other natural hazards,

Though climate change will exacerbate protection risks along the route, these risks will always be shaped by individual vulnerabilities or linked to socio-economic, political and security contexts.⁹ It will then become challenging to implement an adapted protection response, with the first

¹ ODI, 'What works to protect children on the move', July 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

² UNICEF, 'Global programme framework on children on the move', November 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

³ IFRC, 'Protection and Assistance for Children on the Move'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ ODI, 'What works to protect children on the move', July 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ ODI, 'What works to protect children on the move', July 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Brooking, 'The climate crisis, migration and refugees' July 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ UNICEF, 'In search of opportunities', July 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Wiley Online Library, 'The effects of climate change on human health in Africa, a dermatologic perspective', January 2020. Retrieved [here](#).


⁹ OHCHR, 'The slow onset effects of Climate Change and Human Rights Protection for cross-border migrants', March 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

question being how to categorise those displaced by climate change. Defining them as ‘climate refugees’ or as ‘climate migrants’ will have very real implications with regard to their access to protection services under international law (see Focus box 16 in ‘Forced displacement’ section’).¹

3. EU and non-EU interventions and actors

3.1. Types of protection actors

Figure 42: Types of protection actors



3.2. EUTF programmes

According to our portfolio analysis, the EUTF dedicates an estimated €304.5M to protection across the three windows through a total of 76 projects. The portfolio analysis used project budgets disaggregated by activity (and other relevant project documents) whenever they were available to estimate amounts dedicated to each thematic area. Thus, in this case, the budgets referred to correspond to the amounts estimated to be dedicated to protection in each project, and not total

¹ IOM, ‘Migration and climate change’, April 2008. Retrieved [here](#).


budgets. Protection activities included in this portfolio mapping include all protection and assistance mechanisms for people on the move such as emergency assistance to meet basic physical and psychological needs, evacuation support, awareness raising activities, search and rescue operations, resettlement and protection of victims of trafficking. They exclude activities related to protection governance and voluntary returns, which respectively fall under Migration governance and Return and reintegration. Long-term protection activities focusing solely on refugees were included in Forced displacement.

The NoA window has the largest amount (€170M) and proportion (24%) of EUTF funding allocated to protection activities, as the protection of vulnerable migrants is one of the four priority areas for the region according to the EUTF's Strategic Board.¹ In Libya, the EUTF contributes to voluntary return and evacuations, and also provides emergency assistance to those in detention centres, at disembarkation points and in urban areas. In Morocco, the *Appui aux autorités* programme, implements awareness raising (AR) activities which aim to strengthen the capacity of Moroccan institutions to combat migrant smuggling and human trafficking, as well as to implement integrated border management. In addition, this action implements AR campaigns on the risks associated with irregular migration for youth and unaccompanied minors.²

¹ EUTF website. Accessed [here](#).

² EUTF website. Accessed [here](#).

Figure 43: EUTF programmes including protection (PT) activities¹




¹ As of October 2020; only contracted projects with amounts above €150,000 for protection (PT) are included. Numbers rounded to the nearest 0.5M. Abbreviations of projects are detailed in the annex. PT amounts for GIZ projects purposefully not indicated. In cases of multi-project programmes where not all IPs work on PT, only the IP(s) working on PT are listed. For the following programmes, other IPs are: NoA: 'Strengthening protection and resilience' – IMC; 'Managing Mixed Migration flows in Libya' – UNDP, GIZ; 'RDPP II' – Médecins du Monde; 'THAMM' – Enabel. SLC: 'Développer l'emploi au Sénégal' - AF Consulting Senegal, GRET, PPI, LuxDev, AFD. HoA: 'Solutions pérennes' – WFP; 'RDPP Ethiopia' – Plan International; 'CRRF Ethiopia' – Mercy Corps; 'Enhancing self-reliance for refugees and host communities in Kenya' – DRC; 'BMM I' – UNODC, British Council, CIVIPOL, Expertise France, Italian Department of Public Security, IOM; 'BMM II' – UNODC, IOM, CIVIPOL; 'RDPP Sudan' – AICS, UNIDO, GIZ, Landel Mills; 'RE-INTEG' – UNHCR, NRC, IDLO, AVF.

Although the portfolio analysis indicates smaller proportions of EUTF funds allocated to protection in SLC (4%) and the HoA (3%), this is partly due to differences in the types of situations and responses that are relevant in these regions. In SLC, two of the EUTF's main priorities are return and reintegration and refugee response management, which also include protection activities, but these are respectively included in the RR and forced displacement portfolios.¹ Most protection activities are implemented through the EU-IOM Joint Initiative, which operates in twelve countries in the region, and the ETM led by UNHCR in Niger. In 2019, a new regional programme (PROMISA) was launched, operating in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali, in order to address the protection crisis for people on the move in the central Sahel. In the HoA, the presence of fewer migrants on the move and the greater incidence of protracted situations means that protection needs are less urgent and more likely to be addressed through longer-term support to displacement-affected communities (see thematic review on *Response to forced displacement*).

¹ These activities were mapped under 'return and reintegration' and 'forced displacement'.

3.3. Humanitarian protection funding overview

Figure 44: Humanitarian protection donors, receiving countries and organisations in EUTF regions (2016-2020)¹



The United States (US) is currently the largest contributor of humanitarian funding to protection activities in the EUTF regions. It is especially active in the HoA, where it has provided nearly USD 194M

¹ Data was retrieved using the OCHA financial tracking system with the following filters for sectors (GBV, mine action, protection, child protection, NFIs and shelter), usage years (2016-2020), flows (committed and paid), and countries (EUTF countries). It does not differentiate the flows between protection for people on the move and protection for all types of beneficiaries.

in protection funding, of which 47% has been allocated to the United Nations

The EU is currently the third biggest protection donor of humanitarian funding to protection activities in the EUTF regions¹ after the UN. Much like the US, it has allocated half of its protection funds in the past four years to the HoA. While 70% of this amount was given to UN agencies, EU implementing partners for protection are more diversified in SLC, with 20% of funds going to the International Rescue Committee (IRC), 16% to the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and 12% to the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC).

Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBPF) in Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia allocated USD 188M to protection activities between 2016 and 2020. They allow donors to pool their contributions into shared, unearmarked funds to support local humanitarian efforts. This enables humanitarian partners in crisis-affected countries to deliver timely, coordinated and principled assistance.

Switzerland is the fifth biggest donor with USD 142M allocated to protection between 2016 and 2020. In both the SLC and HoA regions, nearly 70% of their funds have been allocated to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Its mandate was established through the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its objective is to help and protect people affected by armed conflict or other forms of violence.

4. Protection responses and main challenges

To respond to increased protection needs across the region, actors combine different types of responses to alleviate or prevent the immediate impact of a given protection incident, create a safe environment, and restore the individual's resilience through durable protection solutions.

4.1. Responsive protection assistance

4.1.1. Flexible interventions to quickly respond to protection needs

Protection actors operate in unstable environments and use flexible interventions to quickly stop, limit or alleviate the impact of violence against people on the move. In Libya, MSF (which is not an EUTF implementing partner) adapted its mode of intervention using mobile teams and a protection strategy that was tailored to the country's political and security context. They quickly managed to liaise with the most relevant local actors in the country to get access to detention centres (DC).

Focus box 20: Non-EUTF MSF interventions and access to detention centres

MSF uses mobile clinics to provide medical assistance in urban areas and DCs located in Tripoli, Mistrata, Khoms, Zliten, and Dhar El-Jebel. In these areas, where permanent facilities and staff are limited due to the security situation, MSF uses mobile clinics, under the administration of the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM). The teams move around and provide primary health care and life-saving referral services.

MSF added a protection component to their work when they started intervening in the DCs. Based on their local knowledge and analysis, MSF liaised directly with the DCIM and established certain conditions for their intervention in the centres: 1) access to all detainees, 2) access granted to all MSF staff, including internationals, 3) Humanitarian Affairs Officers (HAO) have the right to observe living conditions in the DCs and report them to the UNHCR, IOM, national authorities or any other relevant actor, and 4) inclusion of advocacy activities to improve conditions in the DCs and contribute to long-term protection.

¹ As of November 2020, the EU is the first contributor in Libya with USD 30M. OCHA website, Libya. Retrieved [here](#).

However, they faced numerous challenges implementing these activities on the ground. Working in DCs, they reported issues such as independence of action, access, acceptance and limitations placed on their capacity to implement a medical response. In a fragmented Libya, some DCs are more firmly under the control of the DCIM than others. MSF must constantly renegotiate access to detainees and treat them in front of armed guards. With no proper record keeping in DCs, close monitoring and follow up of patients is extremely difficult, which has a highly negative impact on medical care – especially in the case of communicable diseases.¹

Protection interventions must also provide services along migration routes and adapt to dynamic and fast-changing circumstances. The DFID-funded Safety, Support and Solutions Phase II (SSSII) programme (2018-2021) adopted a route-based approach to providing protection services along the CMR.² It targets areas of pre-departure, transit, destination and return, thus covering the full cycle of migratory movement, and allow partners to respond flexibly to changing needs on the ground.

Focus box 21: DFID SSSII, good practices and challenges of the route-based approach

SSSII aims to make migration safer and more orderly, and to provide critical humanitarian support to migrants and refugees along the CMR.

- It provides direct assistance to vulnerable migrants in transit (including protection), search and rescue operations in Niger, capacity building, information and sensitisation, assisted voluntary return and reintegration, and data production.
- The programme is implemented through strong cooperation and information sharing between multiple partners: IOM, UNICEF, British Red Cross, and a consortium led by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC).
- Some partners, like DRC, have reinforced their provision of protection services along the route. DRC Mali deploys a mobile upstream protection response from Bamako to Gao, with protection monitors accompanying migrants on the buses along the migration route. They provide individual protection assistance (non-food items, referrals) and 'protection by presence' along the route and through 17 checkpoints. They also report on protection incidents they witness, and advocate for central authorities in Bamako to intervene and address extortion practices at checkpoints (which can cost migrants up to 30,000 CFA, or approximately €46).³

However, some partners faced challenges on the ground in their efforts to implement an effective route-based approach:⁴

- Some IPs mentioned a very top-down approach, with burdensome reporting procedures and complex M&E systems imposed by the donor.
- Beneficiary targeting was based on migration status rather than vulnerability criteria and was therefore not always adapted to circumstances on the ground, especially in the central Sahel where SSSII targeted migrants while an IDP crisis was emerging in Burkina Faso in 2018. In Libya, the programme was better adapted to the mixed migration context and supported health structures for the host communities and migrant populations.⁵
- Finally, some donors can perceive protection assistance along the route as a pull factor for irregular migration, which can limit the implementation of certain protection activities. During the implementation of SSSII, the Red Cross had to vigorously advocate for the relevance of cash transfers along the route, as there was a perceived risk of migrants using that money for travelling irregularly.⁶

Children on the move are also victims of protection incidents during their journey and require tailored protection assistance. Along the East Africa migration route, for example, Save the Children is implementing a ten-year regional project funded by the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) in

¹ MSF, 'Difficult choices: providing healthcare in detention centres in Libya', 2017, Retrieved [here](#), and interview with key informant from INGO.

² Countries: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cote D'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Tunisia.

³ Interview with key informant from INGO.

⁴ Similar issues are observed with regard to migration to the Gulf via Yemen.

⁵ Interview with key informant from INGO.

⁶ Interview with key informant from INGO.

Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt, which supports access to shelter, protection and health services for children on the move, and strengthens policies and local capacities to provide them with durable solutions.¹

Women often face specific protection risks along the route, such as gender-based violence. To address this, in Nigeria, the EUTF-funded MCN programme supported the establishment and functioning of safe spaces in Borno, Yobe and Adawama. Three centres were equipped to offer both psychosocial and medical support to victims of sexual and gender-based violence. Additional smaller units across the states help to expand their reach. The Nigerian government was satisfied with the approach and willing to scale it up to the country level.²

The targeting of beneficiaries within mixed migration flows is reported by protection actors to be a significant challenge in emergency contexts. Refugees, IDPs and migrants all have different needs and protection frameworks, and sometimes coexist with host communities experiencing similar protection incidents. Targeting only people on the move may threaten the protection principle of neutrality, humanitarian access to certain areas and beneficiaries, as well as the physical safety of protection actors. Beneficiaries may also be further stigmatised for receiving aid support to which host communities do not have access.³ Most protection actors thus advocate for an inclusive approach, with adapted services for different types of people on the move when needed. Examples of this approach in the HoA include the EUTF-funded Regional Development Protection Programme (RDPP), which is implemented in Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda. It supports the capacity building of local and national authorities for an integrated approach to mixed migration and host communities, and provides both displaced populations and host communities with protection and livelihood support.

As they are often implemented in unstable environments, protection interventions can also be disrupted by external political, security or environmental issues, as illustrated by the decrease in search and rescue (SAR) operations in the Mediterranean Sea. In 2017, Libya established its own search and rescue zone in which no foreign vessels would be allowed without prior authorisation from the Libyan authorities.⁴ This also applied to NGOs, whose SAR operations were disrupted by the Libyan Coast Guard (LCG) on two occasions in May 2017. On both occasions the LCG exhibited threatening behaviour such as firing shots in the air and then at the water after panicked migrants had leapt into the sea.⁵ They also intercepted 9,000 migrants and refugees in the Mediterranean Sea between January and November 2019⁶ and returned them to Libya, where they often end up in urban areas, DCs or non-official facilities. In addition, the lack of commitment from EU member states to accept migrants disembarking on their soil also contributed to a decrease in the number of SAR operations.⁷

The COVID-19 pandemic has also hampered the implementation of some protection activities. In SLC, some asylum seekers and refugees observed delays in accessing refugee status, and apart from Ghana, which decided to hold Virtual RSD interviews amidst COVID-19 restrictions, few countries have adapted their administrative processes to remote working. This has delayed the RSD process and increased backlogs of applications in RSD systems.⁸ Border restrictions and lockdowns also severely hindered protection activities, as seen within the ETM programme in Libya, Niger and Rwanda. Due to border restrictions, the UNHCR had to suspend its evacuation and resettlement flights for seven months, and had limited access to its beneficiaries during lockdown – especially in Niger, where they live in the Hamdallaye transit facility, 30 km from the UNHCR offices in Niamey.⁹

¹ Save the Children, 'East Africa: Our support for children along migration routes'. Retrieved [here](#).

² Interview with key informants from EU.

³ Interview with key informants from INGO.

⁴ Amnesty International, 'Libya's Dark Web of collusion', 2017.

⁵ Human Rights Watch, EU: Shifting Rescue to Libya Risks Lives, June 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ MSF, 'La machine à broyer', December 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Council of Europe 'Lives saved. Rights protected. Bridging the protection gap for refugees and migrants in the Mediterranean', June 2019.

⁸ Interview with key informant from EUTF implementing partner.

⁹ Interview with key informant from EUTF implementing partner.

4.1.2. Local-led awareness raising (AR) campaigns to prevent protection risks

AR campaigns are another type of intervention that protection actors may implement for people on the move. However, these campaigns mostly focus on the risks of irregular migration, rather than providing information on alternatives to irregular migration. Extensive research shows that such information, when provided along the route, does not deter migrants from travelling. AR campaigns appear to be more effective when messages are disseminated through trusted local actors such as community or religious leaders, and when they include information about alternatives to illegal migration and local opportunities.

Focus box 22: Awareness raising campaigns – trends and challenges¹

Although the portfolio analysis indicates 15% (€45M) of EUTF funds allocated to protection were used for AR activities, this is partly due to the overwhelming contribution of the *Appui aux autorités* programme (NoA), which has an estimated €33M budget dedicated to AR.² In SLC, €9M were allocated to AR activities, 64% of which through the EU-IOM JI, which informs migrants of the risks of irregular migration and local alternatives in the countries of origin. The second main contributor in SLC is PROMISA, a regional protection programme accounting for 25% of AR funds in SLC, which sensitises beneficiaries on the protection risks for children and migrants along the route. In the HoA, €1.3M were allocated to AR, with the biggest contribution attributable to *Autonomisation des réfugiés* (46%) in Djibouti, which aims to sensitise refugees and host communities on refugees' new rights and the benefits of the CRRF approach.

AR campaigns tend to focus their message on protection risks, though extensive research shows that this does not deter migrants from embarking on irregular migration routes. Most of them already know about the risks, or express their wish to continue even after experiencing traumatic events that they were not prepared for.³ They communicate with friends or relatives living abroad who have succeeded in their journey, and thus might think that AR campaigns are only used to stop them from reaching Europe.⁴

Awareness-raising messages

- To maximise effectiveness, some protection actors provide information on local alternatives to irregular migration such as trainings and vocational courses that can be offered to migrants in transit. For example, the EUTF initiatives INTEGRA (in Guinea) and Tekki-fii (in The Gambia) advertise their own employment programmes as an alternative to irregular migration.⁵ AR campaigns can also encourage migrants to invest the money they would have paid to a smuggler in a course or a local project.⁶
- Research also shows that more practical information should be provided for those who wish to continue their journey and avoid protection risks. AR campaigns could provide information on the location and services of the main protection actors, basic rights migrants are entitled to, and which roads and means of travelling to use to avoid being vulnerable to trafficking or extortion. For example, they could advise migrants not to take large sums of money at the beginning of their journey in order to be less vulnerable to trafficking, or provide warnings about the lack of effective hotlines in Libya.⁷

Awareness raising: means of dissemination

- Protection actors often try to involve local and national partners in the dissemination of protection messages. These include journalists, local associations, religious and traditional authorities, and friends and family at the community level. Such actors allow for extended beneficiary outreach, but should also be involved in designing the AR campaign.
- Protection actors would benefit from increased cooperation with partners from the diaspora, who are highly influential in the migration decision-making process at the individual level, and 'service

¹ Altai, 'Third Party Monitoring & learning, Cycle 2 – cross country analysis', June 2020.

² Altai was not provided a disaggregated budget and this estimation is based on a brief description of programme activities.

³ OECD, 'Identifying the factors driving West African migration', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Interview with a key information from a research institution.

⁵ Altai, 'Third Party Monitoring & learning, Cycle 2 – cross country analysis', June 2020.

⁶ Interview with a key information from a research institution.

⁷ Ibid.

providers' related to migration such as transport companies and border officials, who could also help to disseminate the message.¹

- Protection actors often use multiple communication channels, such as mass media combined with in-person AR, to extend their reach and maximise the impact of the AR campaign.

EU-IOM Joint Initiative (JI) good practices in SLC and Libya

- IOM Nigeria designed community dialogues in close collaboration with relevant stakeholders (including the National Agency for Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and National Orientation Agency) to strengthen effectiveness and local ownership. This is a longer-term, community-based approach facilitated by trained community representatives and repeated over a period of 12 months. The community facilitator manual incorporates key topics adapted to the Nigerian context.
- IOM in the Gambia and Guinea mobilised the Gambian Returnees from the Backway and *l'Organisation Guinéenne pour la Lutte contre la migration irrégulière* to promote peer-to-peer sensitisation. A recent evaluation of the Migrants as Messengers project (IOM, 2019), which used a similar approach, indicates that returnees are a trusted source of information, with the personal and emotional dimension of their message strengthening its relevance and credibility to the audience and having an important impact on potential migrants' perception of risk and on their intention to migrate.
- IOM Libya is conducting awareness raising among affected populations and groups vulnerable to trafficking. The sensitive nature of counter-trafficking in Libya makes a nationwide or general AR campaign difficult. IOM thus implements AR campaigns at the community level, taking into account the needs of the identified persons or groups, as well as their location and the related trafficking risks they may face. To this end, IOM adapts its AR tools using material support such as leaflets, books, or virtual content. They gather migrants' testimonies from Libya, and transform them into digital products to be shared on social media², via FM radio stations in migrants' communities of origin, or along the routes.³

4.2. Protection environment and capacity building of local and national actors

Most protection actors agree on the importance of involving local and national actors to build a safe protection environment. Community actors can ensure that migrants in volatile places are reached by interventions, thanks to their knowledge and legitimacy at the local level. They also reinforce traditional protection and support structures, making communities safer in the long term.⁴ The EUTF-funded programme *Resilience building for vulnerable children* in Libya, led by UNICEF, developed a strong outreach strategy that enhances collaboration with different tribes in the south and with leaders of different communities in Tripoli, including migrants, to reach their beneficiaries.⁵ National actors can ensure the long-term impact of programmes and support more complex protection activities such as resettlement processes, evacuations, or protection support in detention centres.

However, cooperating with national and local actors can be challenging if their understanding of protection incidents is limited, and if they lack the capacity to address the protection needs of people on the move. The EUTF-funded *AFIA* programme in Mauritania encountered several barriers in their efforts to build the capacity of civil society organisations (CSOs) to protect children on the move from exploitation and trafficking. Local and national authorities were not familiarised with protection incidents related to children on the move, and did not perceive *talibé* children in Quranic schools, domestic maids, and young economic migrants as children of concern, but as examples of

¹ Ibid.

² One example of IOM's digital campaign on anti-trafficking in Libya is available [here](#).

³ Protecting vulnerable migrants and stabilising communities in Libya, Action Fiche.

⁴ Interview with key informants from research institution.

⁵ Interview with a key informant from a UN agency.

child mobility in conformance with West African culture.¹ National and local actors can also lack the capacity to respond to the specific protection needs of people on the move, such as psychological trauma. Interviewees reported a significant lack of strong capacity in the fields of psychosocial and psychiatric support across all three EUTF windows.²

International protection actors therefore support capacity building and coordination efforts to strengthen the protection response at the local and international levels. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the EUTF-funded programme PROMISA created a cross-border taskforce that brings together national authorities from The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea and Senegal, as well as key partners. The taskforce has facilitated information sharing on the situation of non-Senegalese street children, victims of police abuses in Dakar during curfew, and effective coordination for their return home.³ To support governments along key migration routes to better respond to the challenges of mixed migration, IOM and its partners also established a network of Migration Response and Resources Centres (MRRCs) in 2009, which provide direct protection assistance thanks to cooperation agreements with various governments, UN and NGO partners. They support migrants' access to basic services and temporary accommodation, medical and psychosocial care, assisted voluntary return and reintegration services and specialised assistance for migrants in vulnerable situations.

Focus box 23: Obock MRRC (Djibouti) – good practices and challenges⁴

Established in 2011, and mostly funded through EU programmes, the Migrant Response and Resource Centre in Obock (Djibouti) is an important transit point for Ethiopian migrants seeking better opportunities in the Gulf countries. 603 migrants were hosted in the MRRC as of October 2020.

Together, DRC and IOM design and conduct capacity building sessions. They train MRRC staff on data registration and screening mechanisms, but had difficulties in recruiting a qualified PSS advisor due to the lack of psychosocial capacities in Djibouti, with only one psychiatrist in the country according to IOM. They also sensitise government officials on protection incidents and migrants' basic rights, which allows for stronger cooperation between DRC, IOM and the Djiboutian authorities.

To extend their outreach, the MRRC in Obock established protection monitoring patrols and mobile clinics. Protection monitoring patrols allow DRC and IOM to conduct large numbers of referrals for migrants to access the services they need. This contributed to the establishment of the MRRC as the centre of a multi-partner approach that provides migrants with health, psychosocial and protection services. IOM also launched a mobile clinic in December 2017, composed of one MRRC nurse, and one nurse and one doctor from the local health centre, which patrols twice a week.

Across all three EUTF windows, the IOM-EU JI has established or rehabilitated 45 MRRCs along the main migration routes since the beginning of programme intervention.⁵

All of these initiatives also aim to foster ownership of protection activities by local and national actors, as seen in Djibouti, where national authorities are becoming more involved in the country's refugee response.

Focus box 24: National response to the protection of refugees and migrants in Djibouti

In 2017, Djibouti's National Law on Refugees was adopted. Although some have reported that the quality of services has declined since the inclusion of refugees in the health care system,⁶ others emphasise the positive change of perspective within the government.⁷ The EUTF-funded IOM project *Solutions pérennes*

¹ Interview with key informant from INGO.

² Interview with key information from UN agency.

³ VOA, 'Senegal street children among those at risk during COVID-19', April 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Altai, 'AMMI-Micro Evaluation component', 2018.

⁵ IOM-EU Joint Initiative website. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Interview with key informant from research institution.

⁷ Interview with key informant from the EU.

supported this transformation,¹ as well as the National Office for Assistance to Refugees and Disaster Victims (ONARS) which is extending its mandate to the protection of vulnerable migrants. Over the years, IOM has established a trusted relationship with national partners and engages with all sectorial ministries, encouraging each to take responsibility in their field of expertise. Other relevant actors include the National Union of Djiboutian Women and the National Police's Minors' Brigade. To support the coordination of Djibouti's migration policy and strategy, IOM is also assisting the Bureau for the National Coordination of Migration, which was established in November 2019. The Bureau will liaise with the Ministry of Women and the Family, the Committee for the Best Interest of the Child and the ONARS on matters relating to the protection of vulnerable migrants.² The EU supported the project through its interactions and dialogue with the Djiboutian government.

In order to build a safe protection environment, actors require longer-term protection interventions and closer coordination with development actors. The EUTF supports this nexus approach to protection through consortia programmes, longer-term interventions, and, according to some interviewees, by serving as the missing link between ECHO and DEVCO.³ In the HoA, GIZ and IOM's cooperation during the first phase of the BMM programme allowed them to establish networks and relationships with national authorities in order to build strong referral mechanisms and systems.⁴

4.3. Durable solutions and complementary pathways

According to UNHCR, there are three main approaches that can provide **durable protection solutions** for refugees: voluntary returns, local integration⁵ and resettlement (RST). When these approaches are not feasible, **complementary pathways** also offer safe and regulated avenues by which refugees can be admitted to a third country to meet their international protection needs.⁶ Some apply to refugees only, such as humanitarian visas, humanitarian corridors and community sponsorships. Others, like family reunification, education or employment opportunities are available to all types of people on the move, and based on a different set of criteria (educational level, professional skills, family situation etc.)⁷

¹ 'Solutions pérennes pour les populations hôtes, les réfugiés et les migrants les plus vulnérables sur le territoire djiboutien' (Solutions pérennes) project.

² Interview with key informant from UN agencies.

³ Interview with key informants from INGOs.


⁴ Interview with key informant from the EU.

⁵ See thematic reviews on *Return and reintegration* and *Response to forced displacement* for more information.

⁶ UNHCR, 'Complementary pathways for admission of refugees to third countries', April 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Ibid.

Figure 45: Durable solutions and complementary pathways for refugees¹



RST is a long, complex and selective process that needs to be complemented by complementary pathways to provide alternative durable protection solutions to third countries, such as sponsorship schemes or humanitarian corridors.

Though resettlement is an effective and durable protection solution, it targets a very limited number of refugees, and is an expensive and complex mechanism. Out of the 20.4 million refugees of concern to UNHCR around the world at the end of 2019, only 64,000 were resettled at the end of the year.² In 2020, numbers were even smaller, with only 20,364 RST departures, which can be largely explained by the COVID-19 outbreak.³ The pandemic has not only temporarily halted RST flights globally but also made it more challenging for host countries to accept RST cases in the face of a looming recession and limited opportunities to conduct field missions.⁴

To increase annual RST quotas and alleviate the financial pressure on states, some countries, such as Canada, strengthened their efforts in the community sponsorship of refugees. They started in 1979 with their Private Sponsorship of Refugees Programme (PSRP), which allowed Canadian citizens and permanent residents to support resettlement by providing financial, emotional and social support for newly arrived refugees. Since then, the programme has resettled nearly 300,000 refugees⁵ and similar schemes have been replicated in the US, Australia and some EU countries.⁶ To help manage the intake of refugees, the Canadian government has placed caps on the number of persons that sponsorship agreement holders can apply to sponsor annually. The cap was 8,500 in 2018 and 10,500 in 2019.⁷

Other countries, like Italy, support humanitarian corridors, which involves the admission of refugees through a humanitarian visa coupled with post-arrival support through a community sponsorship model.⁸ Italy began this initiative in 2015 with a two-year pilot programme to evacuate 1,000 Syrian refugees from Lebanon. The rhythm of implementation, unlike other community sponsorship schemes, has been swift from the beginning, with almost 90 per cent of the quota already filled by August 2017.⁹ Since 2017, Italy has also been the main country supporting humanitarian evacuations directly from Libya, with 710 evacuees as of late 2019, including families, single mothers, unaccompanied children and disabled people. This was partially funded by the EU, and

¹ Definitions are taken from UNHCR website, 'Complementary pathways for admission to third countries'. Retrieved [here](#).

² UNHCR website. Accessed [here](#).

³ UNHCR, Resettlement data. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ MPI, 'The next generation of refugee resettlement in Europe' November 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ International Bar Association, 'A model instrument for an emergency evacuation visa', June 2020.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Canada Council for Refugees website. Accessed [here](#).

⁸ UNHCR, 'Complementary pathways for admission of refugees to third countries', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ International Bar Association, 'A model instrument for an emergency evacuation visa', June 2020.

was the result of a tripartite agreement between the Italian authorities, the UN-recognised Libyan government and UNHCR.

Focus box 25: Emergency Transit Mechanism

The ETM is funded by the EUTF and UNHCR, and was set up in late 2017 to evacuate the most vulnerable refugees from Libya to Niger and Rwanda, where support to RST and complementary pathways will be provided. The UNHCR first signed a memorandum of understanding with the Government of Niger in December 2017, and with the Government of Rwanda, along with the African Union, in September 2019, for the establishment of transit centres in both countries.

As of December 2020, 3,833 persons have been evacuated from Libya through the ETM. 3,318 persons were sent to Niger, and 515 persons to Rwanda. However, some interviewees expressed mixed views regarding the feasibility and durability of the programme in a challenging operating environment like Libya.

The number of refugees evacuated is limited by political and security constraints in Libya.

- Access to DCs is limited and requires close cooperation with relevant authorities.
- The selection of persons of concern is the main challenge in the evacuation process:
 - 1) UNHCR only selects beneficiaries pertaining to nine nationalities, and cannot always independently choose who they assist once they access the DCs. Some detainees are concealed, while others give bribes to DC guards to be presented to UNHCR.
 - 2) Lack of time (sometimes less than 10 minutes per person) and the limited availability of interpreters and private rooms in the centres impede UNHCR staff from conducting proper screening interviews.¹
- For all the above-mentioned reasons, RSD processes are rarely completed in the country and are thus finalised in transit centres.²
- Evacuations, especially in a volatile context like Libya, require robust financial and logistical means, and close cooperation with the authorities, to support evacuation flights and issue exit permits.³

Due to limited resettlement (RST) spots and lengthy procedures, refugees are stranded in transit centres, especially in Niger.

- The selection of RST cases is the main challenge in the resettlement process.
 - Though UNHCR received 6,351 RST pledges as of November 2020, there is a mismatch between evacuees' profiles and host countries' RST criteria. Some, like Denmark, tend to favour women rather than single men while others, like Canada, do not accept unaccompanied minors.⁴
 - Host country officials might refuse to travel to Rwanda or Niamey to conduct the required face-to-face interview to validate the RST case, due to external factors such as insecurity or COVID-19.
- Numerous migrants were thus stranded in Niger, which contributed to a deterioration of the living conditions in the ETM centre, and fuelled tensions between the evacuees, host communities and the national government, as well as among the evacuees themselves. While the ETM initially planned to host 600 people, the centre hosted up to 1,200 people in 2019 – a number that has since decreased to 677 in January 2021.⁵ Migrants also lack access to some basic services, as expressed during their demonstrations against UNHCR staff in October 2020,⁶ and have complained about the quality of the food. Tensions among the evacuees, notably between Somalis and Eritreans in August 2019, led to the hospitalisation of a dozen people.⁷
- Tensions between host communities and refugees extending their stay in Niamey
 - Niger: Tensions arose among the host communities over the future of evacuees, as their stay was not of a temporary nature as initially planned.
 - Rwanda: To ensure peaceful coexistence between refugees and host communities, UNHCR Rwanda implements joint social cohesion activities, and built a skill centre and an office structure where both communities can discuss issues of common interest.

¹ Interview with key informant from UN agency.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid

⁴ Interview with key informants from national stakeholders in Canada and Denmark.

⁵ UNHCR, 'Factsheet, Emergency Transit Mechanism', December 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Twitter. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Interview with key informant from UN agency.

Launched in August 2020, the Biometrics Identity Management System (BIMS) could help improve the RSD process in Libya, and limit transit time

- BIMS allows the use of fingerprints and iris scans to build a biometric record, upload it in a centralised UNHCR database, and finalise the refugee's registration or check if the registration has not been processed by any other UNHCR operation.¹
- BIMS will also allow those already registered as refugees to finalise and obtain refugee status in Libya. For those who do not 'match' any already existing profiles, UNHCR will have to conduct the whole RSD process in another country, where authorities are willing to grant asylum or refugee status.²

The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) that later encompassed it has also contributed to improved long-term protection solutions for refugees. Through these declarations, member states agreed to continue improving their response to the refugee crisis against four objectives: ease pressure on host countries, enhance refugee self-reliance, expand access to third-country solutions and support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.³ Significant progress has been made regarding refugee self-reliance and their access to education and health systems.⁴ In Rwanda, refugees have national identity cards and access to national health systems, and the government has adopted a policy to progressively integrate refugees into the national health system and primary and secondary education cycles.⁵

5. Perspectives and areas of opportunities

5.1. Responsive protection assistance

Support an inclusive approach to protection while keeping adapted protection services for different migration profiles

- In order to adapt to increasing mixed migration flows and avoid tensions with host communities, encourage an inclusive approach based on criteria of vulnerability and needs on the ground, rather than on migration status.
- In parallel, support efforts to provide tailored protection assistance for different migration profiles, as refugees fleeing conflicts and young economic migrants do not suffer from the same trauma, and fall under different protection frameworks.

Strengthen cooperation with national and local actors to ensure continuity in the protection response, especially in volatile areas

- Community stakeholders are trusted and knowledgeable actors, and as such are effective for beneficiary outreach and can contribute to the design of tailored protection approaches.
- National actors ensure the long-term impact of protection activities and the building of a safe protection environment, and are needed for more complex protection activities such as resettlement processes, evacuations and protection support in detention centres.

Continue mobile interventions and search and rescue operations along fast-changing migration routes

¹ UNHCR Website, 'Registration tools'. Accessed [here](#).

² Interview with key informant from UN agency

³ UNHCR website, 'The Global Compact on Refugees'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ UNHCR, 'Two Year Progress Assessment of the CRRF Approach', December 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ ODI, 'The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework Responsibility-sharing and self-reliance in East Africa', September 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

- Mobile interventions extend beneficiary reach, but require effective referral systems to more adapted and equipped protection actors, as well as stronger capacities to provide protection services on the spot.
- SAR operations ensure life-saving assistance in the most unstable areas along migration routes, but require effective referral services and follow up at disembarkation points (when rescued at sea) and at migrant centres (when rescued in the desert).

Strengthen the network of MRCs

- Promote the use of mobile clinics and protection monitoring patrols to extend MRCs' reach along migration routes.
- Strengthen staff capacity in the provision of protection services, especially in psychosocial support, and ensure a gender balance is respected to allow effective provision of GBV-related protection services.

Continue funding information sharing, data collection and research on protection needs, especially for women and children

- **Strengthen efforts in the research and analysis of local contexts:**
 - to better understand protection issues and the relevant actors to liaise with in order to ensure adapted and sustainable implementation of protection activities, especially in Libya. The lack of international actors on the ground requires aid agencies to heavily rely on local partners to access volatile areas and hard-to-reach beneficiaries.
 - to keep track of changing migration routes and the locations of urgent protection needs. This will facilitate communication and cooperation between key actors on the implementation of protection activities. While most donors tend to focus on Libya in NoA, an increasing number of people on the move are also departing from Algeria and Tunisia, where access to durable protection solutions could also be reinforced.¹
- **Improve and expand information sharing, data collection and analysis on protection needs, especially regarding women and children on the move.** They often travel through very informal networks and are reluctant to report protection incidents.² Disaggregated information covering their needs, trends and profiles, and stronger coordination and data sharing among the different protection actors, would allow for more adapted protection programming, including prompt referrals to appropriate actors.

AR campaigns with adapted messages and means of dissemination

AR campaigns should not solely focus on the protection risks along the route, as they often do not deter migrants from travelling:

- They should also provide information about alternatives to irregular migration and about local opportunities.
- For those that still wish to continue, they should provide practical information on how to best prepare for these risks: knowledge of main protection actors, basic rights they are entitled to, roads and means of travelling to avoid being vulnerable to trafficking or extortion. For example, they could inform migrants not to take large sums of money at the beginning of their journey in order to be less vulnerable to trafficking.³
- AR campaigns should also focus on means of dissemination. It is paramount to include a wide range of other actors, such as local communities or officials working on migration and smuggling.⁴

¹ UNHCR, 'Sea movement Trends from Africa to Europe, departures from Libya, Tunisia and Algeria', 2020.

² Interview with key informant from EUTF implementing partner.

³ Interview with key informant from research institution.

⁴ Interview with key informant from research institution.

5.2. Protection environment

Reinforce national protection laws and frameworks for people on the move, especially for IDPs and their access to shelter, basic services, land and property. In Somalia, IDPs are forcibly removed at night by the police when landowners claim the seemingly unoccupied land on which they settle.¹

Reinforce capacity building in the psychosocial sector (PSS), especially in the context of protection of people on the move who have often suffered from traumatic events along their journey.

- Strengthen capacities at the national level, where people on the move often lack appropriate assistance due to the lack of psychiatric institutions.
- Continue capacity building at the local level, as seen in Nigeria with PSS programme, which offers two days of psychosocial support to all returnees. The support is delivered by 17 CSOs who are recruited by IOM and trained and deployed in the main areas of return. CSOs are also in charge of case management and remain in regular contact with returnees.

Continue to reinforce cooperation between state actors:

- especially with regard to case management for children on the move, in order to facilitate their return to their country of origin and to mitigate protection risks they may face along the journey, as seen with PROMISA programme during the COVID-19 pandemic.
- especially between state actors and CSOs, in order to ensure effective sharing of information and referral systems.

Continue to sensitise national and local authorities on protection issues, especially those related to gender and children on the move that are either unfamiliar or underestimated because they are associated with local and cultural practices.

Ensure long-term funding to implement these types of activities, and shift from a humanitarian to a more nexus-oriented approach to protection. Support closer coordination with development actors and longer-term projects of at least 24 months, in order to reinforce the individual's resilience and protection environment.

5.3. Resettlement and complementary pathways

In order to avoid bottlenecks in transit centres, continue advocacy efforts for more resettlement spots and swifter resettlement processes, and stronger refugee status determination capacities along the route

- The EU and UNHCR should advocate for more flexible criteria from RST countries and share good practices on adaptable RST procedures. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Norway began conducting remote RST interviews, a practice that seems to work effectively and will be used until autumn 2021 in order to avoid delaying RST processes during the pandemic.
- Vigorously reinforce RSD capacities in countries along the route, with dedicated funds allocated to these activities, so that refugees have already completed this process once they reach Libya and can be evacuated more quickly.

Improve communication efforts on the ETM

- Due to the limited number of spots available, the selection process is one of the most challenging aspects of the ETM. It requires extensive communication efforts from UNHCR to manage beneficiaries' expectations and avoid any pull factors to DCs or transit facilities, while not appearing as an obstacle to beneficiaries' access to protection pathways to third countries.

¹ Interview with key informant from EUTF implementing partner.

If ETM activities are scaled up to other countries

- Ensure transparency and realism when making the initial agreement with the government partner, especially regarding the capacity of the transit centre and the maximum amount of time that refugees and asylum seekers can stay in the country.
- Additional transit centres in Africa should not alleviate pressure on western countries to speed up resettlement processes.¹

Continue to provide durable solutions to migrants and refugees along the routes, including admission to third countries, before they reach Libya with the intention of heading towards Europe

- Support resettlement and complementary pathways as they contribute to the decreased likelihood of people on the move heading towards Libya and the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe through dangerous migration routes.²
- Donors should increase their funding in strategic countries along the CMR, like Sudan, Ethiopia, Chad, Niger and Mauritania, where the security and political context would allow RSD and RST processes to be implemented more easily than in Libya.³

Continue to strengthen protection solutions for people on the move in Libya

- Depending on the evolution of the political situation in Libya, several stakeholders mention that reconstruction could require between 2 and 3 million migrant workers. UNHCR could support Libyan authorities in their efforts to plan for this reconstruction phase and, jointly with other international actors, start mapping refugees and migrants' professional skills or strengthen their efforts in supporting migration governance in Libya, especially regarding work permits and protection of migrant workers' rights.⁴
- Continue RST efforts directly from Libya, with programmes such as the EU-funded Regional Development and Protection Programme for North Africa (RDPP NA), and share good practices of countries like Sweden and Canada which select resettlement beneficiaries located in Libya through remote selection interviews.⁵
- Strengthen UNHCR-EU cooperation with countries like Canada, which has pioneered the concept of community sponsorship of refugees, and Italy, which operates humanitarian evacuations directly from Libya, and humanitarian corridors from Niger. The EU and UNHCR could support coordination efforts among third countries regarding the implementation of complementary pathways, as already done by one UNHCR partner (FRC-COSI) within the ETM programme. FRC-COSI initiated a working group with different actors from various countries and organisations supporting access to complementary pathways in order to facilitate the sharing of good practices and challenges.⁶

Reinforce long-term protection solutions for children on the move

- Strengthen the formalisation of the host family system, especially in West Africa, where families and communities already organise themselves to accommodate children but need to be supported and monitored by the state to ensure respect of their basic protection rights.
- Reinforce long-term protection solutions for children on the move through stronger capacity building of national protection actors in family tracing and family reunification processes.

¹ MMC, 'A new normal: Evacuations from Libya to Niger and Rwanda', September 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

² ETM Niger, Description of Action document.

³ Interviews with key informants from UN agency and INGO.

⁴ Interviews with key informants from UN agency and INGO.

⁵ Interview with key informant from UN agency.

⁶ Interview with key informant from INGO.



Group of local youths and returnees, supported by an EUTF-funded resilience programme in Ethiopia

Photo credits: Altai Consulting

Migration governance

Labour migration & migration for development

Response to forced displacement

Protection

Return & reintegration

Response to trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants

Border management

Triple nexus

1. Introduction

The following section provides an analysis of the landscape of return and reintegration to Africa, building on a thorough review of the EUTF-funded return and reintegration activities (from Africa to Africa), as well as on insights on non-EUTF interventions (including returns from Europe to Africa) to gain a comprehensive overview of the actors and approaches at stake, and of best practices in this field. Resettlement is covered in the thematic review on *Protection*.

Key concepts and terms related to RR are defined as follows:

- **Return** involves the return of a person to a country of transit or origin.
- **Forced return** denotes a return against an individual's will that is generally implemented in cooperation with the individual's country of origin.¹ **Readmission** is a policy tool for forced returns involving cooperation with a country of origin.²
- **Assisted Return** and **Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) terminologies** depend on the responsible entity's approach. While AVR is mainly used by IOM, some European actors use 'assisted return' due to the controversy linked to the 'voluntary' aspect of return, or the fact that assistance is offered both to forced and voluntary returnees. In either case, services typically include administrative and logistical support to return by a host country or returning agency.³ **Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR)** refers to programmes with social, education and economic assistance, in addition to support to return.⁴
- **Voluntary Humanitarian Returns (VHR)** applies to returns of persons fleeing violence or persons in humanitarian settings.⁵
- **Reintegration assistance** involves a number of activities aiming to re-establish economic, social and psychosocial relationships, such as business start-up, coaching, labour market counselling, vocational training, housing, health care and education. These activities can also be offered through referrals to other national and development programmes.⁶
- **Sustainable reintegration** has different definitions depending on the country, actors, circumstances in the country of origin, migrants' situation and the programme under which they are returned. Sustainable reintegration commonly captures levels of economic self-sufficiency, social stability and psychosocial well-being, and is influenced by individual characteristics and expectations of reduced likelihood of remigration. Thus, sustainable reintegration is a sought outcome of reintegration assistance.⁷

As represented below in Figure 1, traditionally RR efforts consist of the following key elements: logistical **return** arrangements, **support on arrival** and the addressing of immediate basic needs, and **reintegration** (economic, social and psychosocial). Recently, some RR programmes have started to add a layer of **longer-term accompaniment and follow-up** of returnees in order to better ascertain reintegration sustainability. In parallel to these steps, RR interventions can strengthen **national ownership** of the process through policy development and institutional strengthening, as well as involvement and capacity building of local counterparts, with a handover to national authorities envisioned in the medium to long term.

¹ Kuschminder, K. 'Return and Reintegration Policy between Europe and Africa' 2019.

² Kuschminder, K. 'Return and Reintegration Policy between Europe and Africa' 2019.

³ European Migration Network (EMN), 'Migration and Asylum Glossary', 2014.


⁴ IOM, 'Reintegration Handbook', 2019; AU, 'Migration Policy Framework', 2018. Retrieved [here](#); European Migration Network (EMN), 'Migration and Asylum Glossary', 2014.

⁵ IOM, 'Assistance to voluntary and humanitarian return 2017/2018', July 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ IOM, 'Reintegration Handbook', 2019; AU, 'Migration Policy Framework', 2018. Retrieved [here](#); European Migration Network (EMN), 'Migration and Asylum Glossary', 2014.

⁷ IOM, 'Reintegration Handbook', 2019.

Figure 46: Key layers of return and reintegration interventions




2. Situation across Africa

This section outlines the main return flows to Africa, including forced and assisted returns from the EU, intra-Africa voluntary assisted returns, and returns from the Middle East (which are mainly forced).

- Returns from the EU:** From 2014 to 2019, a total of 11,940 migrants benefitted from assisted return (mainly voluntary) from the EU (28 countries) to Africa, with 58% returning to Algeria, Nigeria, Morocco and Tunisia. During the same timeframe, 221,560 were forcibly returned following an order to leave.
- Returns from Africa:** In 2019, IOM observed a continued increase of AVRs particularly from West and Central Africa, with Niger overtaking Germany as the main host country. From May 2017 to November 2020, IOM assisted 88,949 people with their voluntary return from Africa and 101,027 migrants with reintegration assistance. 2019 also observed a sharp increase in the number of third-country nationals being forcibly returned from Algeria to neighbouring countries such as Mali and Niger.¹
- Returns from the Middle East:** Over four years (2013-2014 and 2017-2020), the approximate number of returns from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) (total 437,509) is almost twice the total number of forced returns from the EU recorded in five years (221,560).

¹ IOM, '2019 - Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration - Key Highlights', 2020. Retrieved [here](#); Mixed Migration Centre (MMC), 'EAST Africa and Yemen – Quarter 2 2020', 4 August 2020; IOM, 'Impact of COVID-19 movement restrictions on migrants along the Eastern corridor. Report 2 – as of 30 April 2020', 2020.

Figure 47: Main return flows to Africa¹



*These values are provided by the EU-IOM Joint Initiative and are further detailed in section 3.2.

In 2019, women and children² constituted 18% and 17% respectively of all IOM AVR returns to the East and Horn of Africa, 26% and 13% of returns to the Middle East and North Africa, and 12% and 8% of returns to West and Central Africa. Significantly, more than 80% of the 760 migrants in vulnerable situations, defined by IOM as victims of trafficking, unaccompanied and separated children and/or migrants with health-related needs, returned to the East and Horn of Africa were unaccompanied and separated children.³

With the **onset of COVID-19 and the suspension of AVR services, returns were mostly spontaneous from March 2020 through the following six months**, meaning without external assistance, protection or health control.⁴ The pandemic has affected both migrants enrolled in voluntary return programmes and those currently benefitting from reintegration assistance. As of July 2020, more than 21,000 migrants enrolled in AVR under the EU-IOM Joint Initiative (JI) were left stranded in Niger, Mali, Chad and Burkina Faso following border closures in March.⁵ Until February 2020, a total of 78,297 stranded and vulnerable migrants had been assisted with their voluntary return through the JI.⁶

Migrants often face numerous socioeconomic challenges in the context of reintegration.⁷ Migrants moving within Africa often undertake dangerous journeys and are at risk of a range of human rights violations and abuses, such as those reported in detention centres in Libya.⁸ Minimally integrated and low-skilled migrants returning to Africa from Europe face loss of social status, shame and self-

¹ Labels are provided on the 4 countries with the highest numbers of forced and assisted returns from the EU. Arrows with dotted lines indicate that the data provided is not exhaustive and only reflects part of the actual caseload. Source: EUROSTAT (subject to reporting from member states), IOM « Return of Ethiopian Migrants from The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (5 May 2017 - 13 April 2020) », EU-IOM Joint Initiative website, IOM Somalia 'Situation Report: IOM Somalia Returns', 28 May – 18 June 2014, MMC 'Return migration – a regional perspective', 9 May 2018.

² Defined as those aged between 0-17 years under IOM's AVRR programme

³ IOM, '2019 Return and reintegration key highlights', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ IOM, 'Impact of COVID-19 movement restrictions on migrants along the Eastern corridor', as of 30 September 2020.

⁵ IOM, 'EU IOM JI for migrant protection and reintegration – COVID-19', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).


⁶ IOM, 'EU-IOM Joint Initiative – Flash report n°25', February 2020.

⁷ CRIS: European University Institute; King, R. 'Generalizations from the history of return migration', 2020.

⁸ ONHCR, 'Situation of migrants in transit', 2016. Koser, K., and Kuschminder, K. 'Comparative research, 2015.

stigmatisation in their communities of return, and may have to reimburse family members for financial support provided on the initial migration journey.¹ The following diagram describes some of the different realities and needs according to returnee type.

Figure 48: Reintegration needs and types of intervention according to returnee profiles



Besides economic, social and cultural influences, external factors such as environmental degradation and climate change can increasingly affect reintegration processes. The reintegration process may be challenging for migrants returning to environmentally degraded or hazardous areas, due to the difficulties these areas pose in allowing to develop livelihoods in settings that are often dependent on natural resources. For migrants whose country of origin is severely impacted by environmental degradation and resource reduction, return may not be conceivable. In response to these dynamics, RR projects such as 'Mainstreaming environmental dimensions into reintegration support to reduce the effects of climate change on migration in West Africa'², which is implemented by IOM and funded by the French Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs, seek to create opportunities for returnees and their communities in green sectors that can contribute to resilience and adaptation to climate change.³

Focus box 26: Women and children in return and reintegration

Women, children and people with disabilities may require gender-, child- and/or disability-sensitive considerations during RR processes, particularly with regard to additional psychosocial needs. Women are often vulnerable to gender-based violence and trafficking, resulting in trauma that must be addressed through specific psychosocial assistance.^{4,5} In economic reintegration efforts, women and men's participation in different economic sectors may impact opportunities available to both genders.

The EU Return Directive indicates that the interests of children (i.e. educational and social links in the host country), **should be considered in return decisions.** The Return Directive's Article 10 specifically does not permit the return of unaccompanied children, unless they are to be received by a guardian or other reception

¹ IOM, 'Labour market inclusion of less skilled migrants in the European Union', 2011. Retrieved [here](#).

² IOM, 'Mainstreaming environmental dimensions into reintegration support to reduce the effects of climate change on migration in West Africa', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

³ IOM, 'Reintegration handbook: Annex 11 – Guidance for mainstreaming environmental and climate considerations into reintegration programming', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ UNODC, 'Return and reintegration – Tool 7.3: Understanding the challenges for returnee victims of trafficking', n.d. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ RSO, 'Bali process policy guide on returns and reintegration', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

facilities.¹ Assistance in RR programmes is guided by the Convention on the Rights of the Child² and involves assistance by social workers to deal with shock and trauma, as well as to conduct family assessments to evaluate the socio-familial context of a child and the possibility of reunification.³

UNICEF has developed several considerations and good practices on return and reintegration of children. These were developed based on a 2019 comparative study of RR processes (primarily return procedures) in Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, and they defend the interests of migrant and refugee children as well as an individualised approach to RR decisions and processes. Notable good practices cater to both the return and the reintegration process. In returns, guardianships and alternatives to detention centres are emphasised for unaccompanied children, while reintegration operations should include child-specific needs when determining levels of reintegration support. In the Netherlands, Nidos, a specialised guardianship institution, has entered an agreement with IOM on post-return monitoring of unaccompanied children.⁴

3. EUTF portfolio

This section provides an overview of all EUTF-funded programmes contributing to RR. It goes on to examine specific aspects of the reintegration process and the challenges and good practices experienced and implemented by the EU-IOM Joint Initiative and other EUTF-funded programmes.

3.1. EUTF portfolio mapping

Under the EUTF portfolio, €306.5M are dedicated to RR across the three windows through a total of 33 projects. The portfolio analysis used project budgets disaggregated by activity (and other relevant project documents) whenever they were available to estimate amounts dedicated to each thematic area. Thus, the budgets referred to correspond to the amounts estimated to be dedicated to RR in each project, and not total budgets.

The SLC window receives most of the RR funding (55%), largely due to the EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration (EU-IOM JI or JI) and to the main return route from northern Africa to SLC, followed by NoA (27%) and the HoA (18%). In the HoA and SLC, reintegration accounts for the largest portion of RR funds (80% and 79% respectively) compared to only 39% in NoA, where the proportion of funds dedicated to returns is higher. This is due to the large number of migrants being returned from NoA to SLC and the HoA, where they benefit from reintegration assistance.


¹ European Council and Save the Children, 'Comparative study on practices in the field of return of minors', 2011. Retrieved [here](#).

² IOM, 'A framework for assisted voluntary return and reintegration', 2016. Retrieved [here](#).

³ IOM, 'IOM partners with Save the Children to assist 600 children in Ethiopia', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ UNICEF, 'Child-sensitive return', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

Figure 49: EUTF-funded projects related to return and reintegration^{1,2,3}



¹ As of October 2020; only contracted projects with amounts above €150,000 for RR are included. Numbers rounded to the nearest 0.5M. Abbreviations of projects are detailed in the annex. RR amounts for GIZ projects purposefully not indicated. Projects not entirely dedicated to reintegration of returnees, but which had livelihoods activities specifically dedicated to returnees were included.


² In cases of multi-project programmes where not all IPs work on RR, only the IP(s) working on RR are listed. For the following programmes, other IPs are: 'Managing mixed migration flows in Libya' - UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR and GIZ; 'Développer l'emploi au Sénégal' - AFD, 20STM and PPI; 'ProGres' - AFD/Mercy Corps, GIZ and ICMPD; 'BMM I' - UNODC, British Council, CIVIPOL, Expertise France, Italian Department of Public Security, IOM; 'BMM II' - UNODC, IOM, CIVIPOL; 'RE-INTEG' - UNHCR, CARE NL, World Vision, UN-Habitat, Concern, NRC, IDLO and AVR and for 'DIZA' - UNHCR.

³ *EU-IOM Joint Initiative / RRF: Formerly 'Facility on sustainable and dignified return and reintegration'.

3.2. The EU-IOM JI and other EUTF-funded RR projects

Since its inception in 2017, the regional Joint Initiative (JI) has assisted 88,849 migrants with their return, and 101,027 with reintegration support,¹ for an average overall per capita cost of less than €3,000 for RR, including an average budget per capita of €1,400 granted to beneficiaries for their reintegration process. That more beneficiaries have received reintegration support than return assistance is explained by ad hoc and exceptional assistance provided to forcibly returned migrants who joined the reintegration process following their return. The JI is **the only large-scale programme dealing with south-south RR flows and is unique in its magnitude.**

Figure 50: Geographic breakdown of EUTF RR funds and key EU-IOM JI outputs²



3.2.1. Amount and modality of assistance provided to returnees

The amount of assistance provided to individual returnees varies depending on vulnerabilities and needs. In most countries, IOM provides a one-off *in-kind* grant upon approval of a reintegration or business plan or completion of vocational training, in the form of equipment to start a business or project. In its initial phase, the JI experienced a caseload that was much larger than initially planned, which generated **delays in the provision of economic reintegration assistance**, creating a degree of dissatisfaction among returnees and some attrition as a result. The outbreak of COVID-19 further complicated the provision of in-kind assistance; in some countries, such as Côte d'Ivoire and Sudan, the closure of markets due to COVID-19 led IOM to change the modality to **immediate financial support in the form of cash or mobile money**, which beneficiaries tend to favour across JI areas of

¹ IOM, 'EU-IOM Joint Initiative – Flash report n°34', November 2020.

² EUTF RR funds include EU-IOM JI funds and other programmes contributing to RR. EU-IOM JI figures refer to outputs achieved since the start of the programme (May 2017) until November 2020 (source: IOM, 'EU-IOM Joint Initiative – Flash report n°34', November 2020).

operation.¹ Implementing cash assistance required extensive dialogue with IOM headquarters, the EU and country offices, as well as the development of questionnaires to monitor the delivery and use of cash. Two types of cash assistance were thus conceived: an unrestricted kind to be used by returnees as they wish and mainly to cover their immediate needs, and business assistance provided in cash rather than in kind. Depending on the beneficiary target, countries can use one or both modalities.²

Focus box 27: Good practice – Cash and in-kind assistance in Mali³

In Mali, returnees are granted €500 on arrival to cover their first needs. Simultaneously, they engage in a first discussion on reintegration with IOM, and are supported to access essential services such as accommodation or medical treatment. After developing a reintegration plan with the returnee, IOM pays out a further €900 in kind (equipment and/or training). Beneficiaries have so far been satisfied with this option, as it offers a flexible alternative to the scheme where they are obligated to use the money to pay for the equipment necessary for the realisation of their reintegration plan. Indeed, many decided to use the cash as start-up capital (in addition to addressing their immediate needs) and the second in-kind transfer motivated them to keep in touch with IOM to consolidate their businesses.

3.2.2. Psychosocial assistance

The need for psychosocial assistance (PSS) is widespread among returnees, especially in relation to trauma and loss of social status. Through the JI, IOM offers a variety of services including psychosocial counselling, focus group discussions, family mediation, community mediation and special security measures. Social support may include social protection schemes, housing, education, medical support, childcare, legal services, etc. Most beneficiaries have reported that PSS has helped them feel at least 'somewhat' better. However, their needs are only partially met, with persisting challenges lying in **identifying needs** and ensuring **accessibility, quality and continuity of care**, especially for returnees outside country capitals.⁴

To address the JI's **weakness in the provision of PSS**, IOM is mobilising partners such as the Red Cross and other medical NGOs, where possible. Still, this work is in progress and **only a few referral mechanisms have been put in place so far between IOM and other IPs**. IOM has started to mobilise more effort and expertise to **step up its psychosocial support** capacities and activities.

Focus box 28: Good practice – Decentralisation of PSS⁵

To become less reliant on mental health professionals in areas where they are scarce, IOM has introduced initiatives to deliver PSS at the local level.

- In Nigeria, **PSS is offered to all returnees for two days (integrated into a business skills training) and delivered by personnel from 17 CSOs recruited by IOM, who are trained and deployed in the main areas of return**. CSOs are also in charge of case management and of remaining in regular contact with returnees. WhatsApp groups between returnees are encouraged.
- In The Gambia, IOM organised **for local health workers to play the role of PSS focal points** and to provide at least basic support in their communities.
- In Guinea, PSS through both **organised and informal peer-to-peer discussions** is provided thanks

¹ In Sudan, for instance, returnees were not able to negotiate directly with the suppliers anymore, and the mobile money system (MTN) used to transfer the in-kind grant stopped operating. Despite being the only alternative solution, the recourse to cash assistance is problematic; given the hyperinflation in the country, the package is now worth 25% of what it was worth 2 years ago. (Interview with informant from UN agency).

² Interview with key informant from UN agency.

³ Interview with key informant from UN agency.

⁴ Altai Consulting, 'Third-party monitoring & learning for EUTF in the SLC region – Cycle 2 cross-country analysis', September 2020.

⁵ Altai Consulting, 'Third-party monitoring & learning for EUTF in the SLC region – Preliminary findings from Cycle 1, 2, and 3', presented on 17 December 2020.

to a returnees' association set up with IOM's help.

PSS is of particular importance for child returnees. In Ethiopia, where minors represent 14% of the total JI caseload¹, IOM partnered with local organisations as well as Save the Children to harness their available structures and to strengthen direct service provision, capacity building and a multi-sectoral approach in dealing with the RR of children. **The JI has also supported street children from Ethiopia residing in Djibouti by establishing a night shelter**, both as a protection measure as well as to facilitate the return process by preventing children from being detained on the day of their return and therefore being unable to travel.²

The 2020 Impact Evaluation of the EU-IOM JI in the HoA indicates that children are prone to remigration as a result of persistent vulnerabilities, social stigma and ostracism from the communities of return. The study recommends that measurements of reintegration be strengthened through the development of indicators considering child-specific needs such as the right to education and access to emotional support. The evaluation similarly recommends that individual realities be further studied, as a majority of minors returned to the HoA are between 15 and 17 years old and could have reached social maturity in local contexts, though they are considered minors by international standards, and therefore could have different, individual needs in terms of education, training and employment.

3.2.3. Job creation, job placements and referrals³

In several countries, IOM has started to offer a **broader range of economic reintegration options**, which seem to align with the majority of returnees' skills and aspirations.⁴

By **assisting many of its returnees to set up their own businesses**, the JI is building on its traditional methods and offers a customised approach to returnees. Thus, experiences from the JI in the HoA indicates that greater consideration should be given to inquiring about and understanding migrants' education levels and existing skills, including those gained while abroad, to inform business development and vocational training.⁵ Unfortunately, the **limitations of the reintegration budget per beneficiary** prevent IOM from investing in proper market assessment and business planning prior to business start-ups, and from ensuring a mid-term mentoring and follow-up of individual projects. While no data is currently available on the sustainability of the small businesses created, this dimension is to be further assessed as projects gain in maturity, and future programming should build on lessons learned at a broad scale, and consider more generous reintegration packages to increase the chances of sustainability of the projects.

An alternative to creating small businesses is the orientation of returnees towards concrete jobs. To date, however, **job placement has not been very developed** through the JI. This approach requires a robust knowledge of the job market, a network of private sector actors and local employers, and specific expertise that IOM is still to build in the EUTF countries.⁶ In some countries, other IPs and national agencies whose core business consists in job orientation and employment could take over this aspect of economic reintegration, but there is sometimes a **lack of suitable projects and limited institutional capacity of national actors** to which IOM can refer returnees. Added to this, the **weakness of the formal sector and inability of potential employers to comply with IOM's**

¹ Methodological report: IMPACT – Impact evaluation of the EU-IOM Joint Initiative for migrant protection and reintegration in the Horn of Africa region, 22 October 2020.

² Mid-term review of EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration in the Horn of Africa, May 2019.

³ Referrals here is defined as directing a returnee to another project or institution that is not an IOM direct implementing partner or contractor, and that has its own funding and autonomy of action.

⁴ Altai Consulting, 'Third-party monitoring & learning for EUTF in the SLC region – Preliminary findings from Cycle 1, 2, and 3', presented on 17 December 2020.

⁵ Methodological report: IMPACT – Impact evaluation of the EU-IOM Joint Initiative for migrant protection and reintegration in the Horn of Africa region, 22 October 2020.

⁶ It is to be noted that IOM already developed an ambitious job placement programme, the MAGNET initiative, funded by the EU to support voluntary returns to Iraq in 2012-2013. This led to the successful placement of several hundreds of Iraqi returnees in local companies.

requirement of health insurance to cover occupational needs hinders job placement opportunities.¹ A promising job placement initiative by IOM Senegal started in 2020, mainly in industrialised urban areas, and is expected to show results in 2021.

Focus box 29: Good practice – IOM-CMA29 partnership for job training and placement in Senegal

In Senegal, an MoU has been signed between the French *Chambre de Métiers et de l'Artisanat du Finistère* (CMA29) and IOM in the framework of the EUTF-funded Archipelago programme to develop measures around job training and placement. CMA29 aims to improve youth, women and returnees' employability in businesses in the construction and textile sectors, as well as the maintenance and production of small agricultural material, by enhancing their professional skills. It also supports business creation and artisans through training in entrepreneurship. With limited targeting and budget, the project has so far delivered promising results, such as developing a block release training programme with businesses for 300 youth, including 100 returnees.

Referrals are still low in numbers but are increasing under the JI. A lesson learned from Guinea, where few actual referrals take place as returning migrants choose to stay with IOM due to perceived better conditions, is that referral possibilities need to be planned and approaches must be harmonised at the design stage of interventions. In Cameroon, the early adoption of SOPs (September 2017) allowed for the mobilisation of relevant partners through a well-functioning steering committee and the establishment of four working groups (arrival, reintegration, awareness raising and, data collection).

Focus box 30: Good practice – Externalisation of activities in Cameroon

In Cameroon, IOM's activities were very limited before the JI. To overcome the lack of human resources in the country, IOM decided to externalise most of its activities to existing state and non-state actors as follows:

- **Joint validation with the Government** of reintegration plans, business plans and cash-based interventions;
- **Joint validation by the EUD-IOM-Ministry of External Relations** of activities and awareness-raising tools;
- **Provision of 15 counsellors from the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Civic Education** for counselling and orientation on the elaboration of business plans, as well as civic education, and **four counsellors from the Ministry of Social Affairs** for psychosocial support;
- **Service delivery partnerships with NGO technical partners** (*PAARDIC* for reintegration monitoring and *CIBLE* for professional trainings) and **specialised partners** (NGO *TRAUMA CENTRE* for psychosocial support);
- **Technical consultations with specialized ministries** (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Animal Industries, etc.);
- **Referrals to public hospitals and private clinics** (not formally contracted due to administrative difficulties);
- Professional trainings via acquisition of services by the Multifunctional Centres of Youth Promotion.

In parallel, IOM continues to directly implement some activities such as deploying their own reintegration counsellors and a psychiatrist in charge of psychosocial support for the most serious cases.

A few challenges remain to improve sustainability. Concrete commitment by national partners is sometimes lacking, often due to limited capacities, resources and prioritisation of the newly introduced topic of return migration compared to other issues.

Referring to other EUTF projects has only been done to a limited extent in many JI countries due to a variety of obstacles. In Senegal, these have included IOM's inability to share returnee data due to personal data sensitivity, delays in the start-up of projects envisaged for referral, and their financial configuration. Indeed, returnees are likely to be less favourable to projects whose revenue is

¹ Interview with key informant from EUTF implementing partner.

not generated in a sufficiently timely manner to cover their needs, even if they are economically sustainable. In response, IOM has recently consolidated a module with 'quick revenue' projects combined with long-term ones to increase the attractiveness of certain sectors and facilitate orientation toward sustainable projects.

In Guinea, despite a favourable context, with the presence of a large EUTF consortium (INTEGRA), as of September 2020, only four referrals had taken place for the Enabel and UNDP components, and a further few with ITC. In Burkina Faso, only nine returnees were referred to the ITC-Mode Ethique project, most of whom then left due to a misalignment with returnees' expectations and profiles as well as practical difficulties (remote location of the project compared to major return areas) and other factors. In Mali, however, the collaboration between IOM and SNV (as part of the EJOM consortium) has recently allowed the number of referrals of IOM beneficiaries to EJOM to rise to more than 200 people. In addition, in The Gambia, IOM is piloting a user-friendly 'online outward referral mechanism' for EUTF partners, as described in the below Focus box. Some partners such as Enabel have used it to recruit returnees for cash for work activities when they needed very specific workforce. However, the platform is limited in that it only contains data for new returnees.

Focus box 31: Good practice – Online outward referral mechanism in The Gambia¹

In August 2019, IOM in The Gambia signed a data sharing agreement with ITC, GIZ, IMVF and Enabel, allowing for the development of the '**online outward referral mechanism**'. The platform is connected to IOM's case management system (MiMOSA) and provides partners with basic data about returnees, which can be used to contact the referred returnees and evaluate their participation in support activities. Mapping sessions with IOM and its partners were organised to assess potential matching in terms of geographic locations and assistance opportunities. Since 2019, additional partners have approached IOM to be included in the system, including *Cooperazione Internazionale* (COOPI), YMCA The Gambia and Catholic Relief Services.

3.2.4. Community-based projects

The JI Framework SOP for RR emphasises group support in the form of **collective and community assistance**. **In practice, the evolution toward more community support did not happen to the extent originally intended by IOM**, and the approach faced considerable operational challenges and delays. The level of engagement in, experience with and opinions about collective and community assistance vary significantly across countries and implementing partners, with no community-based projects in Mali or Mauritania and 163 in Côte d'Ivoire, for instance. In the HoA, 19% of the businesses supported are collective businesses.²

There seems to be a **contrast between implementing partners and governments' enthusiasm on the one hand, and the lack of returnee interest on the other**.³ Some returnees in Cameroon reported being distrustful of other migrants, and therefore preferring individual assistance options; similar feedback has emerged from other countries. In Senegal, orientation toward community projects was tempered by the somewhat 'artificial' set-up of the project start-up process, bringing together beneficiaries who sometimes do not know each other and thus hindering cohesion and trust between associates. In response, IOM organises group sessions to present the different options available to returnees and gathers participants who have left or gone back to the same village. Therefore, most projects are only composed of two to three beneficiaries. While acquaintance among beneficiaries working on the same business seems essential, projects involving eight or more beneficiaries, such as those observed in agricultural and farming communities, are deemed to have more potential.

¹ IOM, 'EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration – Biannual Reintegration Report #3', July 2020.

² Interview with key informant from EUTF implementing partner.

³ Altai Consulting, 'Third-party monitoring & learning for EUTF in the SLC region – Preliminary findings from Cycle 1, 2, and 3', presented on 17 December 2020.

Focus box 32: Good practice – A promising start for the community approach in The Gambia

In The Gambia, positive feedback has been reported on the **'participatory community needs assessment'**. The process takes place in collaboration with the Department of community development, returnees and community representatives, regional representatives and NGO/CSO representatives with technical knowledge. Participants are selected at community level, and IOM strives to favour the most vulnerable members of the community and encourage social diversity. To mitigate the risks inherent in bringing together people with different backgrounds, trainings on conflict management and group dynamics, as well as entrepreneurship, are offered. To coordinate and monitor migration-related activities in the region, 'regional migration sub-committees' involving the governor, the Department of community development and community leaders. At the local level, monitoring is conducted by village development committees, with the involvement of an IOM reintegration assistant thanks to the establishment of a new IOM sub-office in Basse. While community projects are fairly recent, so far, the approach seems promising and holistic. The projects are starting to generate revenue, 30% of which is transferred to the village development committees, and the first results are already visible, for instance with the construction of new wells in villages.

There is still limited evidence of the profitability and sustainability of community-based approaches. At the time of writing this report, more research is being done across the Sahel region on the lessons that can be learned from the community-based approach, the necessary requirements to put it in place, and how the risk of drop-offs can be mitigated in the future.¹

Focus box 33: Participatory Programme Monitoring Meetings (PPMM)²

To strengthen communication channels between IOM, beneficiaries and other programme stakeholders, and reinforce the accountability of IOM vis-à-vis assisted returnees, IOM is introducing **PPMMs: structured, interactive and open dialogues allowing all types of stakeholders to critically examine programme implementation, identify gaps and come up with solutions jointly.**

These meetings differ from the pre-existing communication and coordination platforms established by the JI in that practical issues are discussed, as opposed to strategic ones, and returnees are involved on an equal footing with other participants, as opposed to meetings that mainly involve governments and field partners. Furthermore, rather than aiming to make decisions on beneficiaries' reintegration, the PPMMs focus on the reintegration programme itself and on the beneficiary perspective. Feedback is gathered by communities, migrants, government officials, IPs, UN agencies, CSOs and the private sector. So far, 12 PPMMs have been held in countries in the HoA, bringing together 386 participants, including 154 migrant and returnee beneficiaries. Meetings are structured around core guiding questions, such as how to effectively adapt cash-based interventions to COVID-19. Recommendations for mitigation measures are then harnessed, documented and monitored.

3.2.5. Building national ownership and sustainability

National ownership and sustainability of the RR process requires policy development and institutional strengthening as well as the involvement and capacity building of national actors. EUTF funding has been essential to open a dialogue with national authorities on migration issues such as RR.³ The JI has so far made considerable progress on enhancing these governance dimensions to increase empowerment, ownership and leadership, and on increasing the visibility of RR. IOM has a strong level of engagement in JI countries, especially in Nigeria. Coordination bodies have been established in all JI countries, SOPs have been validated in 11 countries, and a few have drafted or revised their migration policies. Greater participation by ministries, public agencies and CSOs has been achieved in project steering committees and the review of reintegration/business plans. IOM has

¹ Third-party monitoring of the JI Cycle 3 in progress in 12 countries of the SLC region.

² 29Sep20 - IOM Webinar - Introducing PPMM (RR).

³ GDSI, 'Mid-term evaluation of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa, 2015-2019, Volume II: Annexes', October 2020.

invested commendable efforts in formal and informal capacity building of governments and field partners, with high beneficiary satisfaction.¹

Focus box 34: Good practice – Capacity building for psychosocial assistance in Nigeria²

In coordination with the Federal Ministry of Health, IOM is rolling out the WHO Mental Health Gap Action Plan (MHGAP) training of trainers for health professionals in Edo and Delta States in Nigeria, which are both areas with high return numbers and which lack sufficient mental health professionals to provide clinical intervention. Participants are trained on identifying and treating mild to moderate mental health conditions, with a focus on the specificities of the mental health and psychosocial distress faced by returning migrants. The training is followed by on-the-job supervision for a duration of three months.

However, significant challenges persist. The political adoption of policies and SOPs and the inclusion of RR in policies are still relatively limited; so is the information sharing between the EUTF, other EU entities, EU member states and other RR stakeholders. Questions related to the end of the project and funding remain open, such as how to institutionalise technical committees and coordination bodies, especially in the COVID-19 context.³ Further, **the involvement of national institutions remains limited**. Often, they are subcontracted for a limited period of time, rather than acting independently from IOM. IOM's moderate engagement with national partners can partly be explained by its experience controlling the entire RR process as well as the heavy investment made in the development of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in each country. National agencies, for their part, often have relatively weak implementing and uptake capacity. In some contexts, specific entities control the extent to which IOM can engage with ministries. For example, in Sudan, IOM is unable to partner directly with ministries; its main focal point is the SSWA, whose mandate is to support the diaspora working overseas and does not cover the relevant thematic expertise.⁴ However, in other countries like Burkina Faso, the local government is demanding to play a more central role in the coordination of future voluntary returns from Africa, such as the one it already plays in coordinating the reintegration of forced returnees from a variety of countries and not benefitting from specific EUTF support.

Finally, the JI's much higher than expected caseload made it difficult to reconcile the objective of reintegrating all returnees in a satisfactory manner with that of putting national parties at the core of the process to ensure its sustainability but could become a priority in the next phase.

Focus on nationally owned mechanisms supported through the EUTF

While the JI plans to continue strengthening capacity building with different partners, **other EUTF-funded programmes are pushing for national appropriation of the RR process through capacity building of national authorities that are entirely in charge of managing RR**. Projects supporting national ownership of the RR process include the 'Sustainable reintegration support to Ethiopian returnees from Europe' and '*ProGreS Migration Tunisie*'.

Focus box 35: ARRA's national reintegration operational management system in Ethiopia

Established in 1992, the Agency for Refugees and Returnees (ARRA) is a government agency under the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) and the Ethiopian government counterpart to UNHCR in Ethiopia. Since 2012, ARRA has been involved in AVR, first through a Return agreement with Norway and currently with **all EU member states as well as Switzerland and Norway**.

¹ Altai Consulting, 'Third-party monitoring & learning for EUTF in the SLC region – Preliminary findings from Cycle 1, 2, and 3', presented on 17 December 2020.

² IOM, 'EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration – Biannual Reintegration Report #3', July 2020.

³ Altai Consulting, 'Third-party monitoring & learning for EUTF in the SLC region – Preliminary findings from Cycle 1, 2, and 3', presented on 17 December 2020.

⁴ Interview with key informant from UN agency.

Starting in 2018, the €15M EUTF-funded 'Sustainable reintegration support to Ethiopian returnees from Europe' project supports ARRA through capacity building and contributing to the development of a **national reintegration operational management system** for Ethiopia. The agency partners with IOM, local NGOs such as Agar for reception services, and government offices at regional and woreda¹ levels. The project targets 400 asylum seekers rejected by EU member states as well as Norway and Switzerland, and ARRA has recently agreed to expand its scope to 400 returnees from Africa and the Middle East on a case-by-case basis per the approval of the EUD in Ethiopia.²

Although ARRA is willing to own the RR process, its capacity is limited and its mandate also covers all refugee matters. Capacity building efforts have proven difficult due to the agency's structure, according to some stakeholders. Challenges include ensuring sustainability at the end of the EUTF's support and limited information exchange with some EU member states on returnees' pre-arrival to Ethiopia, hindering the provision of immediate reintegration support upon arrival.

'ProGreS Migration Tunisie'³ is a €2.5M reintegration project in Tunisia implemented by Expertise France with OFII, **whose objective is to support a Tunisian-led common reintegration mechanism ('Tounesna') for a selected number of Tunisian returnees from four European countries (France, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland)**. So far, this is the only identified **platform exclusively dedicated to reintegration** in EUTF countries.

Focus box 36: Good practice – Tounesna for RR in Tunisia

The reintegration 'platform' is hosted by the *Office des Tunisiens à l'Etranger* (OTE), but most of the reintegration activities are implemented by private partners similar or identical to those that implemented reintegration before the creation of 'Tounesna'. Though some stakeholders reported the limited involvement of local authorities in the process to have been a weakness of the intervention, **a strong sense of ownership from the government at the national level is indisputable**. The national authorities were closely involved in the design of the platform and refused to have some salaries paid for by the project. The set-up of this unique common scheme is an important step towards more coherent and sustainable reintegration programming by the EU, with identical assistance provided to the 200 beneficiaries regardless of which of the four EU countries they come from.

Hosting such a mechanism within the Tunisian government can help to (re)build a connection between the returnees and public services. Other advantages include positive externalities for returnees from countries not offering reintegration assistance (e.g. Libya), but to whom the OTE is also offering a range of basic services that are not funded by the EUTF but by the Tunisian government.

At this stage, Tounesna's absorption capacity is limited, but a second phase of the project should facilitate further improvement. However, several obstacles prevent some EU member states from funnelling the money they currently spend on their reintegration programmes through Tounesna. First, some countries appear to be 'locked into' existing contracts.⁴ Second, and more importantly, the common reintegration package included in Tounesna (€4,000 to €5,000 per individual in economic assistance or €2,500 per household in social assistance) is significantly higher than the existing schemes of several EU member states, who may not be willing to pay more. At some point, a compromise may be required to increase the number of EU member states participating.

Tunisia was initially planned to be covered by the JI, but the JI SOPs are inconsistent with Tounesna's modus operandi. Indeed, the Tunisian government requires that reintegration assistance amount to €5,000, a per capita budget that is 3-4 times higher than that of the JI's. **Tounesna could nevertheless leverage some of IOM's strengths**, for example in building the government's capacity to set up monitoring systems, or to provide psychosocial support (which Tounesna is currently not offering).

¹ Woredas constitute third-level administrative divisions in Ethiopia.

² ARRA, 'Description of Action – EUTF05-HoA-ETH-52-01'.

³ Long name: '*Favoriser la mise en œuvre de la stratégie migratoire nationale de la Tunisie*'.

⁴ For example, Belgium would have to publish a 'royal decree' to change its main providers of reintegration assistance from IOM and Caritas to Tounesna.

Altai's MLS team is currently conducting a case study on the *ProGreS Migration Tunisie* project that will provide more in-depth analysis and details about Tounesna.

Essential to the development of such platforms is the willingness and interest of the government to own the process. In this regard, Tounesna was able to benefit on the achievements of the LEMMA project (DCI-funded, 2016-2019), which laid the groundwork for Tounesna by making reintegration a key point of attention for the government, and whose deliverables included a roadmap that planned for a reintegration mechanism coordinated by the government.

Finally, efforts are ongoing to strengthen cooperation on RR between authorities **across EUTF windows**. The cross-window programme '*Action de Coopération Sud-Sud en matière de migration*', implemented by Expertise France and GIZ,¹ develops reintegration and integration tools for returnees and migrants respectively, and **facilitates cooperation between responsible authorities in Morocco, Senegal, Mali and Côte d'Ivoire regarding protection of migrant rights in aspects related to RR**.

3.2.6. Emergency returns and Voluntary Humanitarian Returns (VHR) – Africa-Africa

VHRs offer tailored approaches to migrants impacted by conflict or natural disaster-related displacement.² IOM processed VHRs during the mass outflows of some 706,000 migrants due to the civil unrest in Libya in 2011. Services included an assistance hotline, rural and border area registrations and a network of community mobilisers.³ IOM's VHR programme resumed its first operations since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in August 2020 by assisting 118 Ghanaian migrants enrolled in VHR stranded in Libya.⁴ IOM is one of the few actors with tangible results on VHR, as VHR returns also occur under the JI. Enhancing humane and sustainable solutions for stranded and vulnerable migrants through VHR and reintegration from Libya is also one of the specific objectives of the EUTF-funded 'Managing mixed migration flows in Libya' project (€54.8M). The project has benefitted persons in detention centres and urban areas, has achieved good buy-in from the government and has established a joint counselling system between IOM and UNHCR to ensure that individuals are able to make an informed decision regarding returning to their country of origin.⁵

Some countries have developed their own emergency return apparatus. Morocco implemented an emergency procedure for voluntary repatriation to address the demands of 6,100 Moroccan nationals staying in Libya to be repatriated in the three months following the outbreak of conflict in Libya in 2014. Supported by the EU-funded (but not EUTF) *Sharaka* project, the government developed an inter-ministerial unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Residing Abroad and of Migration Affairs as operational partners⁶. Later, this framework led to a first sharing of experiences and practices on returns in emergency situations between Morocco, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Mali under the EUTF-funded '*Action de Coopération Sud-Sud en matière de migration*' programme.⁷

4. Return and reintegration from Europe (non-EUTF)

While the EUTF, mainly through the JI, constitutes a major donor in the area of RR, other EU instruments and member states are contributing sometimes significantly to the field. It is thus interesting

¹ Interview with key informant from public agency.

² IOM, 'A region on the move – mid-year report', 2020.

³ IOM Libya, '2019. Annual Report', 2019.

⁴ IOM, '*Libya voluntary returns*', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ GDSI, 'Mid-term evaluation of the EUTF, 2015-2019, Volume II: Annexes', 2020.

⁶ Expertise France (Sharaka project), *Le retour d'urgence des marocains résidant à l'étranger en situation de crise*, 2016.


⁷ Interview with key informant from public agency.

to position the EUTF within the wider perspective of other European-funded initiatives, from which good practices and lessons learned can also be drawn to inform the future of RR programming. While the EUTF's, and more broadly DG INTPA's, focus mainly lies with south-south RR, initiatives funded by EU member states and DG HOME deal with RR from Europe. To better understand the environment in which such actions unfold, this section describes the key return flows from the EU to Africa in the last ten years and the evolution of key RR-related policies, actors and funding since the 1970s. It further draws attention to partnerships between and approaches by EU member states, which offer additional perspectives and potential good practices.

4.1. EU return numbers worldwide¹

With only 13% of cumulative assisted returns from the EU, Africa has a relatively low number compared to 44% for Asia and 39% for Europe. Similarly, forced returns from the EU to Africa make up 20% of the total cumulative forced returns from EU member states in the last ten years, with much higher rates for returns to European countries (40%).

Figure 51: Returns from the EU




¹ Eurostat, 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

4.2. Evolution of EU return and reintegration funding and actors

The following overview presents an evolution of key RR-related policies, actors and funding since the 1970s, with a particular focus on the most recent changes in the landscape.

Figure 52: Evolution of the RR landscape for returns from the EU



The **Return Directive** (2008) is the main piece of EU legislation governing the procedures and criteria to be applied by member states when returning irregularly staying third-country nationals.¹

AVR is perceived as a more humane and cost-effective alternative to deportations. IOM is the main agency for AVRR, benefitting from strong financial backing from EU funds and member states through bilateral agreements. In parallel, **Frontex** was created in 2004, but its mandate only expanded to cover return management in 2016 and reintegration in 2019.

The **European Return Fund** (2007-2013) was followed by the **Asylum and Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF)** (2014-2020). With the creation of the Return Expert Group under the European Migration Network, the AMIF supported the European Integrated Return Management Initiative (EURINT) and the European Return Liaison Office (EURLO), as well as the **European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN)** in 2018.

4.3. Partnerships and EU member states approaches in return and reintegration

This section explores the most comprehensive partnership in the realm of RR from Europe (ERRIN), the rapidly increasing role of Frontex, and highlights specific approaches adopted by certain EU member states, in an effort to extract good practices and highlight different actors in the field outside of the EUTF.

4.3.1. The European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN)

A continuation of the **European Reintegration Network (ERIN)** initiated under the European Return Fund, ERRIN is a **joint initiative for the benefit of member states**, with a budget of €28.6M continuing until June 2022.² ERRIN creates economies of scale by subcontracting a **range of local service providers**³ and reintegration services in clusters.⁴ The eligibility of the returnee and the cost of the reintegration package are decided by member states according to national considerations, for which specific guidelines and national annexes are developed.⁵ To mitigate the risk of beneficiaries preferring to depart from EU member states offering larger packages, several countries, such as Germany, refrain from communicating the maximum amount/any fixed amount of reintegration assistance to the returnee during counselling sessions in the host country.⁶ The table below showcases a few examples for selected EU member states of variations between 1) in-kind reintegration assistance through ERRIN, and 2) cash return assistance.

¹ In September 2018, the Commission proposed a targeted recast of the directive. Amongst others, this aimed to 'reduce the length of return procedures, secure a better link between asylum and return procedures and ensure a more effective use of measures to prevent absconding'. In June 2019, the Council agreed on several amendments to the Commission's proposal. See [here](#) for more details.

² ICMPD, Our work – European and Global Initiatives – ERRIN' n.d. Retrieved [here](#).; ERRIN, 'ERRIN Flyer' n.d. Retrieved [here](#). ERRIN, 'ERRIN Flyer' n.d. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Currently, ERRIN works with the following service providers: Caritas International Belgium, Women Empowerment Literacy and Development Organisation (WELDO), European Technology and Technical Center (ETTC) Iraq, IRARA (and through collaborations with BRAC in Pakistan and ZAMZAM in Somalia), European Reintegration Support Organisations (ERSO) and OFII (*Office Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration*, with which a new partnership allows other ERRIN MS to use OFII's network in additional countries). Further discussions are ongoing with GIZ for a possible partnership (Interview with key informant from EU Network).

⁴ See ERRIN webpage.

⁵ Interview with key informant from EU Network.

⁶ OECD, 'Sustainable reintegration of returning migrants: A better homecoming', 2020.

Table 2: Examples of EU member states' levels of in-kind reintegration assistance in origin country through ERRIN and cash assistance, 2020¹

In-kind reintegration assistance		Cash assistance	
Denmark	Up to DKK 20,000, approximately €2,700, per adult and child, through ERRIN and ERSO	Belgium	€250
Sweden	In-kind support offered through ERRIN (€2,500 for voluntary returnees and €2,000 for forced returnees)	Germany	€1,000 per adult: up to €3,500 per family, possibility of additional assistance for medical needs, through REAG/GARP depending on nationality
France	In-kind services worth around €3,000 through ERRIN	Norway	NOK 8,000, approximately €780, in cash through the IOM Vulnerable Groups Programme

Since its inception, ERRIN's total caseload has reached nearly 25,000 beneficiaries in 34 countries of origin. Though not involved with ERRIN, IOM continues to process major caseloads from the EU to countries of origin through bilateral agreements with multiple member states. In 2019, IOM assisted 28,256 migrants to return from the European Economic Area, including 5,141 to North Africa and the Middle East, 819 to West and Central Africa, and 354 to the East and Horn of Africa.²

In parallel to its core joint reintegration programmes, ERRIN develops **joint projects and innovative activities**. In a similar fashion to the EUTF-funded '*ProGreS Migration Tunisie*' project mentioned above, ERRIN strives to strengthen national authorities' capacities to better assist returnees in the country of origin, such as in the case of the Ghana Immigration Service as described in the below Focus box.

Focus box 37: Good practice – Migration Information Centre for Returnees in Ghana

The Ghana Gov2Gov project, implemented by ICMPD³ and financed by the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), has created a Migration Information Centre for Returnees (MICR) at the Kotoka International Airport in Accra, managed by the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS). The centre aims to improve reintegration services offered to returning migrants and will serve as a point of referral for reintegration partners, including IOM.^{4,5}

4.3.2. Frontex European Centre for Returns (ECRet)

Frontex' European Centre for Returns was established in 2015 to assist member states in pre-return and return operations. **In 2019, the new Frontex Regulation expanded the Agency's mandate to cover post-arrival and post-return operations.** To this end, Frontex has absorbed EURLO and EURINT, and is to take over ERRIN's activities by July 2022⁶ with a transfer plan already in place. **Member states will continue to have the final say on the content of reintegration assistance and who it should benefit,** meaning that differences between packages are likely to remain. This will be a considerable challenge for Frontex, which will not only support the 15 ERRIN member states, but all EU member states.

Due to divergences between the financial regulations of Frontex and AMIF, some activities such as the pilot testing of ideas and concepts will not be transferrable, and the criteria for service provider selection

¹ OECD, 'Policy questionnaire return and reintegration', 2020.

² IOM, '2019 - Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration - Key Highlights', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

³ OFII, '*Rapport d'activité 2018*', 2019.

⁴ ERRIN, Factsheet 'Ghana immigration service - Migration Information Centre for Returnees (MICR)', n.d. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Gov2Gov projects are currently being implemented in Ghana and Armenia.

⁶ ETIAS, 'Frontex Regulation to Strengthen Operations', 2020. Retrieved [here](#); UNHCR, 'UNHCR comments Frontex mandate', n.d. Retrieved [here](#); Council of the European Union. 'Frontex Programming Document 2020-2022', 20 November 2019; Frontex, 'Return', n.d. Retrieved [here](#).

will change. While this means that new service providers will be able to get involved, it is likely that Frontex will continue to cooperate with some of ERRIN's existing partners and will not effect considerable changes in the short term. In this regard, partnering with IOM could be of added value, provided that IOM accepts working with 'assisted returns' within its areas of competence. Indeed, as ERRIN and Frontex have an obligation to process returns, whether voluntary or forced, the absorption of RR by Frontex will likely normalise the use of 'assisted' return at the expense of IOM's 'voluntary' return. Some European countries, like Norway, Austria and the UK, are already endorsing the use of the term 'assisted returns', while others continue to employ '(assisted) voluntary return'.¹

4.3.3. EU member states' approaches

While EU member states cooperate with IOM and/or ERRIN on RR, each has its own way of operating. For example, France was the only country found to implement its RR policies entirely through its own authorities, through the **Office Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration (OFII)**.

Focus box 38: Good practice – RR by OFII

France implements return and reintegration policies exclusively through its own authority, the OFII, which has implemented voluntary RR in countries of origin since 1977. OFII's voluntary return assistance includes: 1) *material support*: travel fees; and 2) *financial support*: €650 per capita for third countries with visa requirements and €300 per capita for third countries without visa requirements.

OFII also offers reintegration support, including to students and young professionals reaching the end of their regular stay. Reintegration assistance includes: 1) *social reintegration* (level 1): average cost: €400 per adult and €300 per minor; 2) *employment* (level 2): financial coverage of up to 50% of job salary for up to one year (average cost: €3,150) or funding for professional training (average cost: €800); and 3) *business creation* (level 3): average cost: €4,900.

Follow-up of the reintegration plan is ensured for one year, but OFII agents can pay visits to previous beneficiaries during up to two to three years after the end of their plan to verify its sustainability if they are located in the same area as a returnee they are currently supporting. In Senegal for instance, visits to the field are organised each week, allowing OFII to cover 70% of previous projects.² Such long-term follow up stands out compared to other RR programmes, where follow up of individual projects rarely exceeds one year.

In parallel, OFII processes RR via ERRIN to the specific countries of origin covered by the network. Within this framework, OFII has entered into partnerships with other ERRIN members such as Denmark, Germany, Finland and Luxemburg to allow them to test OFII's methods for returns from their territories to countries of origin covered by the OFII facility.³

In other countries, RR is implemented through implementing partners or service providers, such as CSOs, international organisations, local partner organisations and private sector organisations. Models include Germany, which has a complex network of partners available to implement return counselling and reintegration support activities. Under the country's federal system, RR processes involve both the state, German local authorities, civil society and other actors. As an example, return counsellors will be available at all these levels in Germany to counsel migrants. Germany's partner structures in Germany and countries of origin are country-specific and include political partners, government agencies (GIZ), CSOs, IOM and private sector organisations.

Similarly, the **Swiss Secretariat for Migration** coordinates return counselling services at the federal level and undertakes capacity building of implementing partners in countries with new RR projects.

² Interview with key informant from EU member state.

³ Ibid.

Financial compensation is offered to partners conducting return counselling, while each canton can choose their own implementing partners, such as Caritas or the Red Cross. In Switzerland's Federal Asylum Centres, IOM typically carries out return counselling, and has been mandated to undertake all reintegration operations.

Another interesting practice is applied in the Netherlands, where NGOs are considered key partners of the government in RR. The implementing agency of the Dutch Government's return policy, the Repatriation and Departure Service (*DT&V*) of the Ministry of Justice and Security, finances AVRR projects implemented by IOM and a **range of Netherlands-based NGOs** such as the Dutch Refugee Council (*VluchtelingenWerk Nederland*), Bridge to Better Foundation and *WereldWijd* Foundation.¹

Focus box 39: Good practice - *WereldWijd* Foundation (WorldTools)²

Managed by the *WereldWijd* Foundation in partnership with IOM, the WorldTools project offers material support to migrants wishing to return from the Netherlands to their country of origin. Based on a business plan defined by the beneficiary before departure, the returnee can choose from a range of donated material stocked in a large warehouse, the cost of which is deducted from the reintegration grant. The equipment is then packed and shipped, free of cost, to the returnee's country of origin after departure. Each box also includes a small toolbox which can benefit the returnee's family or community. The project thus allows beneficiaries to return with better-quality material, start their business quickly, or support already existing family businesses. However, the benefits of free material and shipment are sometimes outweighed by the cost of customs procedures.

Finally, the **Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI)** managed to increase the uptake in assisted returns thanks to its ongoing communication to potential returnees and 'motivational interviewing' at reception centres in Norway. At reception centres, UDI staff inform migrants that they are expected to leave and use motivational interviewing to encourage migrants to choose assisted returns, rather than being subjected to forced returns at a later stage. During the return application process, staff highlight the benefits of assisted returns through support on arrival in the country of origin and clearly communicate individual options available to the potential returnee.³

5. Perspectives and areas of opportunities

Assess and anticipate the magnitude of Africa return flows to calibrate future RR programmes

Although the available data is incomplete, several major flows of return to Africa from Africa, Europe and the Middle East were identified over the last five years. Future trends should be assessed based on a combination of datasets that include data collected by IOM through its broad network of offices, through IOM DTM tools, and by DRC through the MMC, as well as data available from Frontex and EU member states' interior ministries on irregular migrants in the EU. Returns from the Gulf countries are more difficult to assess, but coordination with embassies, combined with monitoring of economic and sanitary conditions, should give indications of future waves of return.

These sources of information should be compiled and updated regularly, and the monitoring of trends should allow the EU and other international donors and agencies involved (e.g. DFID and ILO in Ethiopia) to properly calibrate the systems to be maintained or put in place to support future returns.

¹ Repatriation and Departure Service, 'Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration of migrants returning from the Netherlands'.

² IOM, 'Practice #6 - Pre-departure reintegration assistance in the Netherlands: material and shipment support'.

³ Holm, K. 'Counselling on return in reception centres in Norway: Presentation at: EMN German Conference', Berlin, 4 May 2017.

Continue supporting returns from Africa to Africa, which are likely to remain high during the next 10 years

Supporting returns from Africa to Africa is likely to remain a key focus area for the EU under the NDICI. While flow monitoring data indicates a decrease in movement due to COVID-19, irregular flows are still taking place.¹ For example, estimates by EUDs and IOM to support future programming in Nigeria indicate that there are about 40,000 Nigerian migrants in Libya, 2,000 in Niger, and 1,000 spread across West and North Africa. Some of these migrants are stranded, while others are well established. Depending on the rapidly evolving situation in transit countries, the number of vulnerable and low-skilled returnees to support through return and reintegration assistance could remain significant, with social reintegration likely to be a challenge.² Thus, a robust system of assistance to RR from Africa to Africa should be maintained.

Integrate lessons from the EU-IOM JI and other projects in the next phase of assistance to RR from Africa to Africa

The current systems, working groups, committees and teams put in place by IOM to assist over 100,000 migrants after their return through the JI and mobilise governments and other actors should be maintained to avoid losing the benefit of capacities built and knowledge gained. IOM should also continue to provide the core services of pre-departure information and mentoring, return and support on arrival (including psychosocial support through partnerships with medical NGOs).

However, **sufficient and reliable evidence of the effectiveness and sustainability of reintegration is still lacking** – a finding that was also highlighted in the EUTF mid-term evaluation. There is a need to transparently share data, enhance M&E tools, and implement longitudinal monitoring of beneficiaries' situations and perceptions. The need to prioritise migration data analysis and mainstream evaluation across all IOM interventions was also underlined in the JI's recent lessons learned study.³

Reintegration funding per capita should be increased to allow for a proper follow-up of the returnees over 18 to 24 months. The examples of different reintegration assistance amounts per returnee (presented in the above sections) give a rough indication of how individual in-kind grants offered by EU member states and through ERRIN can be two to five times higher than what is offered by the JI⁴. This is mainly due to a combination of larger individual grants, the subcontracting of specialised operators, and long-term follow up.

Increased visibility over a longer programming time span could allow IPs to better plan and ensure intervention sustainability. Time was a significant constraining factor for the JI, whose end date has changed several times, thereby hindering the development of longer-term projects.

Partnerships and referrals to local, durable and experienced entrepreneurship, value chain, job creation and TVET programmes would allow IOM to optimise the delivery of return services, protection and psychosocial assistance. These systems should be more systematically developed with effective labour market and needs assessments mechanisms, and their impact be regularly assessed. The EU could engage in a strategic discussion with IOM, beneficiary governments and other development agencies to map stakeholders and initiatives and assess respective comparative advantages in each country.

¹ For instance, 38,000 movements to Europe were captured by the DTM in SLC in the first three months of 2020 only, and 90,000 movements to Saudi Arabia from Ethiopia in the first six months of 2020. IOM Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa, 'A Region on the Move: Mid-year Mobility Overview January to June 2020', 2020, accessed here. IOM DTM, 'Quarterly migration report: West and Central Africa, January – March 2020'. Accessed [here](#).

² Interview with key informant from EUTF implementing partner.

³ IOM, 'EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration – Lessons learnt and recommendations for future programming', 2020.

⁴ It is, however, to be stressed that the amount per returnee granted via ERRIN depends on the member state from which the person returns, and thus varies from one country to another.

Job placement opportunities should be more systematically considered and intervention modalities further assessed, based on existing job placement programmes with public or private agencies.

Other lessons from ongoing activities that could be integrated into the next phase include the following:

- Community-based projects responding to the joint needs of communities and returnees could continue to be developed but should not be seen as an instant solution
- The time lag between return and the start of economic support should continue decreasing to avoid returnees dropping out before or during the reintegration process
- Psychosocial support needs should be better assessed on arrival, and psychosocial support services could be strengthened through partnerships with medical NGOs
- Migrants should be better informed about, and prepared for, their reintegration options and the situation in their country of origin
- In certain cases and based on analyses of local social constructs, economic reintegration activities should be embedded into broader job creation programmes for the general population that are independent from the RR process. Indeed, in some instances it was noted that being associated with an RR project resulted in returning migrants isolating themselves and not integrating properly into the local community.

In parallel, continue building the capacity of local reintegration platforms, taking advantage of best practices developed by other agencies under ERRIN and EUTF funding

While the EU-IOM JI mostly focused on the national adaptation of SOPs for RR, the next step of building local capacity and a platform for reintegration was not delivered through JI.

The next cycle of EU funding could support the long-term establishment of national platforms for RR that are integrated into local frameworks.

Interviewed partner countries show interest in having greater control on return and reintegration, including because, in certain cases, they have to deal with “forced returns” or evictions from other African countries of Gulf states (given the modality of return, they do not fit under IOM’s guidelines for instance). In some cases, partner governments have started developing their own centres and facilities. Given the non-negligible numbers these forced returns can amount to (in the tens of thousands from Gulf countries for example) and the likely traumatic return conditions, the EU may consider supporting these returns both through the set-up of national platforms and through specific funding aimed at these individuals.

The ERRIN Gov2Gov in Ghana (ICMPD) or Tounesna with OTE in Tunisia (OFII) offer a glimpse of what could be achieved, and interventions should build on the experiences of partners who piloted similar models. In the case of national mechanisms for returns from Europe, such as ARRA, a good relationship with EU member states can be encouraged through the appointment of RR officers in local embassies. A single platform would ensure national ownership and the sustainability of RR. Furthermore, synergies between such platforms and IOM’s AVRRE programme could allow to perfect the quality of RR assistance. For instance, Tounesna could leverage on some of IOM’s strengths, such as building the government’s capacity to set up monitoring systems, or providing psychosocial support (which Tounesna does not systematically provide at the moment).

A national platform would be able to redistribute some of the financial support between returnees, thus compensating for the varying EU member state reintegration packages and providing minimum guaranteed services to those returning without a programme. Capacity building during the development of such platforms should include emergency response so that the national partner is able to take ownership of extreme situations, such as in the case of VHR.

Naturally, establishing such platforms depends first and foremost on the government's interest in owning the RR process, and on its capacity to do so. Therefore, this handover must be planned for realistically and not rushed, as **these platforms will require initial advocacy efforts, followed by a long phase of technical support, and continuous funding in the medium to long term.**

In parallel, DG INTPA should advocate for these platforms to be supported by member states (and by Frontex in its future RR coordination role) and integrated as a local vehicle to support return and reintegration locally in the medium term.

RR programmes from Europe should be progressively harmonised, taking advantage of the experience gained through ERRIN, the JI and OFII and use the national platforms in countries of origin as they emerge, while remaining cognisant of the member state's preference to remain the owner of their RR process

The EU would benefit from a more coherent return strategy, based on a thorough analysis of flows (including expected and real) and RR actors, their purpose, comparative advantages and areas of focus. This would provide a basis for partners to choose counterparts and move away from project-based organisation toward **robust, long-term relationships between partners with strong coordination procedures.**

The EU would also benefit from investing in a **transparent system of data centralisation** that tracks funded caseloads, RR countries, and types of reintegration support received. With the transfer of ERRIN to Frontex in 2022, there should be an opportunity for this data platform, coordination and harmonisation of efforts to be **integrated into ECRet, the new RR unit under Frontex.**

Harmonising the standards of RR among EU countries should be considered, but such efforts should not lead to a decrease in reintegration subsidies. Furthermore, a 'one size fits all' approach is not recommended, as offering the same reintegration assistance to all returnees, irrespective of their profile (e.g. voluntary or forced), can lead to discontent, failures and, in some cases, higher risks of remigration.¹ Moving toward more balance between EU member states' assistance while seeking increased adaptability in the content of assistance provided to different returnee profiles would provide a solution to the current situation where it is more beneficial to return from some countries compared to others.

Finally, the complexity of creating job opportunities in most African countries, for returning migrants as for the local population, should not be overlooked in future programming

Small business creation grants rarely generate sustainable businesses, unless proper market research, business planning, financial instruments including micro-credit, and mid-term mentoring is ensured (see OFII approach).

The economic fragility in most countries of origin necessitates a well-established platform with a long-term view of the labour market needs (at least in key sectors of the local economy), well-structured job creation programmes, and the adoption of more organic approaches to job creation, such as community-based consultation and support to community projects. This will be one of the strategic objectives of the NDICI and should indirectly benefit reintegration programming, if the right partnerships and bridges are put in place.

When designing job creation interventions, particular attention needs to be paid to the barriers to employment faced by women as the sectors in which they work tend to be less represented.

¹ Interview with key informant from donor government, OFII: example of forced returnees being involved in drug dealings, earning in a week the equivalent of the yearly financial support given by the programme.

Continue assessing RR programmes, building on best practices and identifying areas for further research

Lessons learned from ILO's support¹ to the major wave of returns from the Gulf States to Africa should be examined in order to identify best practices and challenges and support future returns from the same region.

Further studies would be useful to better understand the differences between returnee profiles (forced, voluntary, high and low-skilled, children and gender) and those of the local population in the places they are returning to, in order to identify the differences in needs, circumstances and beliefs, and how to adapt reintegration assistance accordingly.

With regard to RR of **children**, the EU-IOM Knowledge Management Hub's Research Fund has initiated a study to develop monitoring tools and identify good practices to promote the sustainable reintegration of child returnees.² Similarly, UNICEF's guideline for child-sensitive returns³ and Save the Children's document on durable solutions for returnee children are key recommendation documents for the specific RR needs for children.⁴

¹ EDF-funded 'Support the Reintegration of Returnees in Ethiopia' (2015-2018) and DFID-funded 'Improved Labour Migration Governance to Protect Migrant Workers and Combat Irregular Migration in Ethiopia' (2017-2020). More information [here](#).

² IOM, 'Return and reintegration platform – The EU-IOM Knowledge Management Hub's Research Fund issues request for proposals', 16 April 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

³ UNICEF, 'Child-sensitive return', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Save the Children/Samuel Hall, 'Achieving durable solutions for returnee children: what do we know?', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).



Group of migrants heading to Libya from northern Chad

Photo credits: Jérôme Veyret for Altai Consulting

Migration governance

Labour migration & migration for development

Response to forced displacement

Protection

Return & reintegration

Response to trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants

Border management

Triple nexus

1. Introduction

1.1. Smuggling of migrants

The smuggling of migrants (SOM) is defined in one of the Palermo protocols as ‘procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.’ In 2016, human smuggling to Europe was considered by Europol to be one of the fastest growing criminal markets. However, national responses to this type of crime remain fragmented, and their effectiveness is often questionable. Sub-Saharan African countries also tend to adopt a more permissive attitude toward SOM, which they see as a lesser problem compared to trafficking of children or trafficking for sexual exploitation, for instance.

1.2. Trafficking in persons

Trafficking in persons (TIP) is one of the three key crimes for which specific protocols were developed at the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (Palermo Convention) in 2000. According to the definition, ‘trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.’¹

TIP is a broad term that can be split into several types and categories: labour exploitation, sexual trafficking, forced begging, forced recruitment into armed groups, organ trafficking, and others; domestic trafficking vs international trafficking; trafficking of children vs trafficking of adults, etc. Women and girls are also more vulnerable to human trafficking, accounting for 60% to 65% of victims worldwide.² TIP fundamentally differs from SOM for one main reason: people being trafficked are always victims, whereas migrants being smuggled are not considered victims, as they voluntarily pay a fee to the smuggler in exchange for a service.

¹ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons especially women and children’, Article 3a, 2000. Retrieved [here](#).


² IOM, Polaris, Liberty Shared, ‘Counter trafficking data collaborative’, 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

Focus box 40: TIP vs SOM

TIP and SOM are fundamentally distinct crimes under international law and require different policy responses (while some smuggling may end in trafficking, most of the time, it does not).¹ For different reasons, both TIP and SOM can have connections to other types of criminal activities, though the association is more systematic in the case of cross-border TIP networks, which traffic victims to Europe while engaging in drug trafficking, money laundering, financial fraud or other crimes.² Some cases of SOM also involving drug trafficking or false documentation have been found, though evidence on the subject remains scarce.^{3,4}

However, despite being different crimes both practically and under international law, stakeholders interviewed for this study highlighted that the concepts of migrant smuggling and trafficking are often conflated. This observation is supported by a study that demonstrates that the term ‘smuggling’ was mentioned alongside ‘trafficking’ over 50% of the time in EU, African and EU-African policy documents.⁵

However, interviewees suggested that placing TIP and SOM on equal footing puts excessive emphasis on the criminal exploitation aspect, which is stronger in trafficking, while neglecting the agency of migrants seeking smuggling services. This tends to lead to a response focused on a law enforcement approach, with disproportionate attention paid to border controls and to the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators, as well as the criminalisation of victims and a lack of attention to their protection needs. A better balance between border controls, investigations of criminal networks and stronger judicial systems on one hand, and prevention and sensitisation of perpetrators and victims on the other hand, depending on the context, should be sought.



2. Situation across Africa

2.1. Situation across the three windows

In Africa, the extent and persistence of TIP and SOM are rooted in state fragility (including total state collapse in Libya), mass conflict-driven forced displacement, limited legal migration options and poverty. While more than 80% of victims are trafficked domestically or to neighbouring countries, African victims of trafficking (VOTs) are sometimes trafficked internationally. For instance, according to UNODC, among victims identified in western and southern Europe, 20% were from sub-

¹ Ibid.

² UNODC, 'Global report on trafficking in persons, 2020'. Retrieved here.


³ UNODC, 'The role of organised crime in the smuggling of migrants from West Africa to the European Union', 2011. Retrieved here.

⁴ Interview with a key informant from an international IP.

⁵ ENACT, 'Human Smuggling in Africa – The creation of a new criminalized economy?', 2020.

Saharan Africa in 2016, and VOTs from sub-Saharan Africa represented around 10% of victims identified in MENA countries.¹

Figure 53: Country classification (2020 US TIP Report) and main migration and smuggling routes



Furthermore, as climate change increases the likelihood of natural disasters and constitutes a major factor in forced migration and displacement, the most vulnerable migrants (such as women and girls) find themselves at an increased risk of being trafficked and exploited. Faced with the loss of their livelihoods, they may resort to high-risk behaviours, such as turning to recruitment agencies associated with human trafficking and migrant smuggling. Several studies have shown that natural disasters, which will intensify in the next decades due to climate change, were linked to a rise in trafficking in persons due to increased displacement; for instance, some studies indicate that TIP may increase by 20 to 30% during disasters.²

Smuggling of migrants is by nature an evolving, enduring, cross-regional and cross-continental phenomenon. In the Sahel, smuggling and trafficking itineraries mainly go through countries like Mali or Niger, as well as secondary hubs (Mauritania), before reaching the Maghreb and Europe.³ In East Africa, routes follow the three main migration paths: the northern one towards North Africa and Europe, the eastern one towards the Arabian Peninsula, and the southern one towards South Africa.

Many migrant smuggling and human trafficking criminal networks operate in countries in the North Africa region due to their strategic location between sub-Saharan Africa and Europe, their status as origin, transit and destination countries for migration, and the civil war in Libya. In Libya, highly organised trafficking networks operate in the country and are connected to other networks from the Sahel and East Africa,⁴ and migrants are especially vulnerable to various forms of trafficking such as recruitment of child soldiers, sexual exploitation, and forced recruitment into militias.⁵ Additionally,

¹ UNODC, 'Global report on trafficking in persons', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

² Michael Gerrard, 'Climate change and human trafficking after the Paris agreement', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

³ GAR-SI Description of Action.

⁴ US Department of State, 'TIP report, 20th edition', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ IOM, 'Migrant vulnerability to trafficking and exploitation', 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

research shows that migrant detention facilities in Libya have increasingly become a site for recruitment into smuggling or slavery.¹

Figure 54: Types of trafficking by region




Across the continent, the two main forms of trafficking are labour or sexual exploitation,² although the available data suggests that the proportions differ across the three windows.³ It is also worth mentioning that Africa is the region where most of the male child victims of trafficking have been detected, and sub-Saharan Africa is the only region where the number of girls trafficked is larger than that of women.⁴

Reports suggest that the capacity of African governments to detect victims of trafficking and to convict perpetrators is comparatively weak.⁵ Numbers reported by African countries are considered to largely underestimate the real volume of people trafficked and smuggled. On TIP, between 2002 and 2019, the IOM Global Dataset found 1,285 'official cases' of African VOTs⁶ identified in Africa, of which the majority (985) were identified in West Africa. African VOTs detected in Africa represent only 2.6% of all VOTs officially identified during the period, suggesting that African countries might still have insufficient capacity to adequately quantify these issues. For instance, in the Horn of Africa, countries tend to only consider crimes or offences that take place entirely in their territory, and therefore omit cross-border trafficking from their statistics. At the same time, many countries are reluctant to recognise the domestic nature of organisations behind SOM and TIP crimes, instead seeing it as a 'foreign' issue. As major literature sources on TIP and SOM depend on the contributions of member states, these same limitations with regard to numbers can be encountered in such reports.⁷

2.2. International frameworks

Figure 55: Legislative frameworks



¹ Micallef, M., The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime, 'The human conveyor belt: Trends in human trafficking and smuggling in post-revolution Libya', 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

² Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 'Myths about human trafficking in Africa', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

³ UNODC, 'Global report on trafficking in persons', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ UNODC, 'Global report on trafficking in persons', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ IOM, 'Counter trafficking data collaborative', 2018. Retrieved [here](#). As per country of citizenship of the victims.

⁷ Interview with a key informant from a UN agency.

The **UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and the Protocols Thereto**, also known as the Palermo convention and protocols, provide the international legal framework for defining and addressing TIP and SOM. The **Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children**, which entered into force in December 2003, is the first global legally binding instrument to establish an agreed definition of TIP.¹ Furthermore, the **Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air** entered into force in January 2004.²

2.3. Continental frameworks and actors

While many frameworks on anti-trafficking can be observed at the continental, regional, and national level, few exist on smuggling. This is a reflection of the uneven attention SOM and TIP receive from the international community and of the greater momentum on trafficking, which has gained traction on the political agenda of many African countries in recent years.³ The most important continental framework on anti-trafficking is the **Ouagadougou Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, especially Women and Children (2006)**, adopted in Tripoli in November 2006 by the AU-EU Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development. The plan aims to develop cooperation, best practices and mechanisms to prevent and combat TIP in Africa, as well as between Europe and Africa.

2.4. Regional frameworks and actors

The five North African countries are part of the **Comprehensive Arab Strategy for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings**, which was adopted in 2012 by members of the Arab League. The strategy aims to strengthen prevention, reinforce national capacities and regional cooperation, protect victims and criminalise all forms of TIP.

The **ECOWAS Initial Plan of Action against Trafficking in Persons (2002-2003)** was the first detailed plan of action in West Africa. It is heavily focused on criminal justice responses. It was followed by other plans of action, of which the latest was adopted in 2019.⁴ The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework is another example of a framework that focuses on human security and TIP.⁵

The **West African Network of Central Authorities and Prosecutors (WACAP)**, established in 2013 by UNODC, is a network of focal points of the 15 ECOWAS countries and Mauritania.⁶ It deals with cross-border organised crime in general, and aims to strengthen capacities and cooperation between relevant authorities for criminal matters and support prosecutors and magistrates.

In West Africa, the **Niamey Declaration group** is a major discussion forum on TIP, SOM, migration, and related topics.⁷ Its main objective is to formulate practical and operational recommendations to improve coordination between participating states in the fight against SOM and TIP.

The **African Union-Horn of Africa initiative on human trafficking and migrant smuggling** represents the main forum for dialogue, exchange of information, experience sharing and deliberating on measures relating to TIP and SOM among countries in the region. The initiative also aims to support

¹ See UN Treaty Collection website, Status of Treaties, *Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons*. Accessed [here](#). Protocol ratified by all African countries except South Sudan, Somalia and the Republic of the Congo.

² See UN Treaty Collection website, Status of Treaties, *Protocol against the smuggling of migrants*. Accessed [here](#). Protocol ratified by 43 African countries but not by Chad, Eritrea, Morocco, Somalia and South Sudan in the 3 EUTF windows.

³ Interview with key informant from a think tank.

⁴ ECOWAS, 'ECOWAS reviews strategy to curb trafficking in persons in the region', June 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ ECOWAS, 'Conflict prevention framework', 2008. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ UNODC, 'WACAP'. Accessed [here](#).

⁷ UNODC, 'International meeting in Niger against smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

the implementation of the Migration Policy framework for Africa 2018-2030 and of the Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings.¹

The East African Community (EAC) has also produced the **EAC Anti-trafficking in Persons Bill** in 2016. The bill provides a legal framework to respond to TIP through prevention, prosecution of perpetrators and protection mechanisms for victims of trafficking. However, as of 2020 it has not yet been enacted by Heads of State of the EAC.²

2.5. National frameworks and actors

In 2019, 49 countries in Africa had anti-trafficking legislation in their judiciary arsenal.³ However, across the continent, national anti-trafficking frameworks and capacities differ greatly from one country to the other. Funding is often insufficient, and capacities are weak, even though significant progress has been made in recent years. Other limitations include common corruption practices among law enforcement and judiciary bodies, the reluctance of governments to acknowledge involvement of national staff in any criminal activity, and the tendency of law enforcement to focus on foreign perpetrators rather than national ones.

Most countries across the three windows have adopted national anti-trafficking legislation as well as strategies or action plans and set up anti-trafficking coordination bodies. However, important gaps still exist in North Africa – notably the lack of victim identification and referral mechanisms, which increases the risk of punishing or penalising victims such as undocumented migrants; the lack of appropriate protection services, including shelters, for victims of trafficking; and insufficient efforts to prosecute traffickers. Libya faces the most challenges due to the ongoing conflict, and the situation is made even worse by the known complicity of Libyan government officials in TIP and SOM operations.⁴

Furthermore, implementation of legal frameworks, especially in East and West Africa, is often hampered by blurry definitions, disproportionate sanctions for different types of crimes, or conflation of TIP and SOM concepts. Many countries also lack a preventive and sensitisation approach to perpetrators of trafficking – for instance, in West Africa in the cases of Quranic schools encouraging trafficking of children.

¹ AU-HOA Initiative on Human Trafficking and Smuggling of Migrants, 'Terms of reference'. Retrieved [here](#).

² Oxford Human Rights Hub, '20 years after Palermo protocol: Towards a stronger East African regional anti-trafficking framework', 12 May 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

³ AU, 'Draft report of the evaluation of the implementation status of the African Union's Ouagadougou action plan to combat trafficking in human beings, especially women and children (2006) in Africa', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ US Department of State, 'TIP report, 20th edition', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

Figure 56: Country overview of SOM/TIP response


	North of Africa					Horn of Africa								
	Algeria	Egypt	Libya	Morocco	Tunisia	Djibouti	Eritrea	Ethiopia	Kenya	Somalia	South Sudan	Sudan	Tanzania	Uganda
Anti-trafficking legislation		✓	⚡ ?	✓	✓	✓	⚡ ?	✓	✓	⚡ ?	⚡ ?	✓	✓	✓
Anti-trafficking strategy	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	⚡ ?	✗	✗	⚡ ?	⚡ ?	⚡ ?	✓	✓	⚡ ?
Anti-trafficking coordination body	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Formal victim referral mechanism		⚡ ?	✗		✓	⚡ ?	✗	⚡ ?	✓	✗	✗	⚡ ?	⚡ ?	⚡ ?
Special court/prosecutor/investigative judge for trafficking cases	⚡ ?	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Special police unit for TIP/SoM	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	⚡ ?	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	⚡ ?

⚡ ? Mechanism/law exists but is only partially implemented Mechanism/law is being developed

	Sahel and Lake Chad					Gulf of Guinea					
	Burkina Faso	Chad	Mali	Mauritania	Niger	Cameroon	Côte d'Ivoire	Ghana	Guinea	Nigeria	Senegal
Anti-trafficking legislation	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Anti-trafficking strategy	⚡ ?	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✓	⚡ ?	✓
Anti-trafficking coordination body	✗		✓	✗	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Formal victim referral mechanism	⚡ ?	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	⚡ ?	⚡ ?	✓	⚡ ?	⚡ ?
Special court/prosecutor/investigative judge for trafficking cases	✗	✗	✗	⚡ ?	✗	⚡ ?	✗	⚡ ?	✗	✗	✗
Special police unit for TIP/SoM	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	⚡ ?	✓	✓	✗	✗

3. Key non-EUTF interventions

Figure 57: Main non-EUTF interventions¹



¹ Abbreviations detailed in the annex. For the Global Fund to End Modern Slavery, not all donors are mentioned.

This thematic review identified more than €69M of non-EUTF funding dedicated to ongoing projects in the area of anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling, including more than €46M by other EU instruments, as illustrated in the figure below. Some budgets were not available.

Anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling programming seems to be a relatively concentrated field, with few donors and relatively small amounts dedicated to these actions; additionally, TIP receives much more attention than SOM in terms of funding. Apart from the EU, two of the main donors are the UK and the US, with the latter funding projects across North, West and East Africa for a total of €8.9M through the Trafficking in Persons Office of the US Department of State (J/TIP). The UK is notably financing two projects executed by UNODC, while projects financed by J/TIP are mainly implemented by IOM, UNODC and UNICEF. Moreover, the UK and US provide €42.7M to the Global Fund to End Modern Slavery. The fund is supported by other private and public donors and it currently operates programmes in Uganda and Kenya (as well as in other continents) to help these countries make forced labour economically unprofitable.

The EU is currently funding three projects in West Africa, through the EDF: A-TIPSOM, OCWAR-T, and the FMM with co-funding from ECOWAS. The programme 'West African Response to Trafficking' (OCWAR-T) adopts a very large, comprehensive framework that goes beyond TIP and builds on criminal investigation task forces, small arms control, anti-TIP, and research and improved governance frameworks for combatting organised crime.¹ The rationale behind OCWAR-T is to bring together projects that were funded separately under the tenth EDF, and to establish synergies on anti-criminal action and TIP specifically. The A-TIPSOM programme revolves around five main pillars: improving migration-related governance in Nigeria with a specific focus on TIP and SOM, enhancing prevention of TIP and SOM in key areas of origin and transit, improving protection, return and reintegration of VOTs and migrants smuggled from Europe, enhancing identification, investigation and prosecution of traffickers and smugglers, and enhancing cooperation to combat TIP and SOM at the national, regional and international level.²

Lastly, some EU member states are taking bilateral action against TIP and SOM. For instance, the Netherlands and Italy fund the UNODC PROMIS project, which fosters judicial cooperation between Nigeria and Europe through exchanges of Nigerian liaison magistrates in Italy and Spain.

The types of interventions identified show how donors are increasingly opting for integrated approaches. While law enforcement and protection were traditionally addressed in silos, current programmes often incorporate elements of both, and pay increased attention to the victim's side in investigation and prosecution processes. Examples of this are visible in many of the US J/TIP programmes, which generally include a victim-centred approach. Information sharing and international cooperation, which are traditionally weaknesses in the fields of trafficking and smuggling, are also receiving more funding. Examples of this include projects that encourage EU-Africa exchanges, such as the Netherlands- and Italy-funded PROMIS, as well as EU- and EUTF-funded interventions such as ROCK and WAPIS.³

As can be seen in the previous diagram, UNODC is a major actor in the implementation of anti-trafficking programming across Africa, with several past and current projects in North Africa executed under the 'Regional Programme for the Arab States to Prevent and Combat Crime, Terrorism and Health Threats and Strengthen Criminal Justice Systems in Line with International Human Rights Standards' (2016-2021), including the NACSAT project in NoA. In West Africa, UNODC elaborated the Regional Strategy for Combating Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants,⁴ in support of

¹ US Department of State, 'TIP report, 20th edition', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

² ATIPSOM, 'About us'. Retrieved [here](#).

³ The West African regional programme WAPIS aims to facilitate exchange of police information and cross-border collaboration on criminal matters in general, going beyond TIP or SOM

⁴ UNODC, 'Regional strategy for combating trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants (2015-2020)'. Retrieved [here](#).

ECOWAS. Moreover, UNODC is currently administering the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Victims of Trafficking in Persons.

Focus box 41: UN Trust Fund for Victims of Trafficking

The United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Victims of Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (UNVTF), was established by the UN General Assembly in 2010 and is administered by UNODC.¹ Based on a victim-centred approach, the UNVTF has awarded €4.9M in grants to 89 NGOs assisting victims of trafficking through four grant cycles. The new emergency aid window of the UNVTF is currently being implemented with projects in West, East and North Africa (notably Tunisia, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda) in order to counter the impact of COVID-19 on victims of TIP.


The projects implemented provide shelter and direct medical and psychosocial assistance to migrant victims of trafficking. While the Fund focuses more specifically on women and children, it has recently adopted a gender-sensitive perspective and seeks to ensure that no gender is overlooked, as boys and men are very much affected by trafficking as well. For that purpose, calls for proposals now include elements that look at gender-specific needs and technical evaluations incorporate gender-sensitive criteria to assess proposals.

INTERPOL is another key actor in the field of anti-trafficking in Africa, mainly operating through capacity building and training of border guards, policemen and gendarmes, and other relevant authorities. Other implementing agencies involved in anti-trafficking programming in Africa include EU member state agencies, such as GIZ, Expertise France and Civipol, as well as IOM and UNICEF.

¹ See UNODC website, The United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund. Accessed [here](#).

4. EUTF portfolio

Figure 58: Mapping of EUTF interventions¹



¹ As of October 2020, only contracted projects with over €150,000 dedicated to TIP and SOM are included. Numbers rounded to the nearest €0.5M. Abbreviations detailed in the annex. Amounts for GIZ projects purposefully not indicated. In cases of multi-project programmes where not all IPs work on TIP/SOM, only the IP(s) working on TIP/SOM are listed.

EUTF funding for anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling activities represents 5% of the EUTF's migration, mobility and forced displacement-related budget. According to our portfolio analysis, a total of €95M of the EUTF's contracted budget is allocated to activities tackling TIP and SOM (€49M in SLC, or 51% of the total contracted on this thematic area; €25M in NoA, i.e. 27% of the total; and €21M in HoA, i.e. 22% of the total).

The portfolio analysis used project budgets disaggregated by activity (and other relevant project documents) whenever they were available to estimate amounts dedicated to each thematic area. Thus, in this case, the budgets referred to correspond to the amounts estimated to be dedicated to TIP/SOM in each project, and not total budgets. Activities included in the TIP/SOM portfolio analysis consist of those that aim to strengthen institutional and security forces' capabilities to tackle trafficking and smuggling of humans at the operational level. The TIP/SOM portfolio analysis *excludes* activities such as protection of victims of trafficking (including awareness raising on the risks of TIP) and search and rescue operations, which all fall under the theme of *Protection*. The budget support programme in Morocco was excluded from this total, as it was mapped in the thematic review on *Border management*.

28 projects deal with anti-trafficking across the three windows, including 20 in SLC, five in the HoA and three in NoA. Projects in NoA are mainly dedicated to law enforcement and security activities. In SLC, anti-trafficking efforts aim to protect victims and better regulate human trafficking in transit countries, such as Niger and Mali. In the HoA, the EUTF supports the strengthening of national capacities as well as cooperation between countries on sharing information and dismantling criminal organisations operating in the region.

Some programmes have adopted a holistic approach to anti-trafficking, with a combination of institutional capacity building, regional cooperation, legal support, and protection activities. These notably include BMM and the TEH project (*'Appui à la lutte contre la traite des êtres humains dans le Golfe de Guinée'*).¹ The latter tackles TIP in Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Togo. Having started activities at the beginning of 2020, the TEH has so far mainly developed relationships with national anti-trafficking coordinating units, identified relevant actors and persons to be trained, and started its advocacy and training activities.

BMM I and its follow up BMM II have been mentioned as positive examples of an integrated approach, both in terms of engagement and coordination among implementing partners and for the way the projects combine support to policy development, institutional capacity building and protection of vulnerable migrants and VOTs. Building on the achievements of and lessons learned from the first intervention, BMM II aims to encourage more transnational cooperation, while BMM I had a more country-level focus. A possible point of improvement identified for BMM I is the fact that laws and policies supported were not tailored enough to national contexts.

The regional project 'Dismantling the criminal networks operating in North Africa' has been praised as an ambitious, holistic programme with an interesting combination of country-specific and regional approaches, which allows for better buy-in and engagement from target countries. Key informants also highlighted that the programme seeks to bridge the gap between law enforcement and more protection-focused activities. Future assessments will be useful to assess the project's concrete impact and identify best practices.

A number of programmes focus on information sharing, notably WAPIS in SLC and the ROCK in the HoA. While WAPIS focuses on the digitisation of police files and the sharing of police information, it does not specifically seek to build capacities in the area of judiciary response to irregular migration, like the ROCK does. So far, the ROCK has set up a facility where Liaison Officers from law enforcement agencies in seven beneficiary countries work together, with the support of the ROCK technical team, to share information on TIP and SOM and produce intelligence reports that are shared with INTERPOL.

¹ In English, Support for the fight against trafficking in persons in the Gulf of Guinea.

The Liaison Officers (LO) are central to the ROCK model: they act as key entry points to the information from their home countries and are instrumental in facilitating access to and sharing of information between countries on trafficking and smuggling, and in overcoming countries' reluctance to do so. The LO approach is therefore a key lesson learned from the implementation of the ROCK, and one that could be replicated in other interventions. While the ROCK's approach is innovative and has significant potential, is it too early to determine the outcome-level change brought about by the programme. This should be assessed through further studies later in the life of the project. The ROCK was originally intended to end in December 2020, but was granted a no cost extension until September 2021 to allow the programme to consolidate its achievements. At the end of October 2019, the African Union (AU) and Sudan signed a host agreement on a continental centre, the COCK (African Centre for Combatting Irregular Migration), giving this entity the legal status of a Specialised Technical Office of the AU Commission. This move indicates that the AU may be interested in taking over the ROCK in the future. It is assumed by stakeholders that this agreement covers the ROCK, though it is not mentioned in the agreement (and neither is the EU).

Finally, several projects aim to improve investigation and prosecution techniques and mechanisms for African countries. In Niger, the ECI programme has created joint investigation teams with police officers from Niger, Spain and France. It provides operational and judicial capacity building for Niger national police services involved in the fight against criminal networks. At the same time, it increases the number of investigations and the rate of completed investigations related to the fight against illegal immigration and trafficking of human beings. Lastly, it establishes synergies between anti-TIP and other types of anti-trafficking. The ECI has been praised for its effectiveness by a variety of national and international stakeholders and several other countries, and EU DGs have shown interest in replicating or at least adapting the concept to their needs.

5. Perspectives and areas of opportunities

5.1. Strategic focus

Clarify the difference between TIP and SOM and ensure programming does too

The **understanding of and response to TIP and SOM is undermined by a common tendency to conflate the two concepts.** Research suggests that little has been done by donors to support the differentiation between TIP and SOM and that many national legal frameworks across Africa do not adequately distinguish between the two phenomena. This blurs the line between traffickers and smugglers, identifying the migrants as mere objects of criminal exploitation.

To further strengthen the **differentiation between TIP and SOM, developing awareness raising, information and training activities** for relevant stakeholders (such as police, judges, civil society organisations, etc.) on the differences between trafficking and smuggling would be an important step in promoting a better understanding of the two phenomena. While acknowledging that the same investigation may lead to a smuggling and/or trafficking network and though in many countries the same law enforcement units are in charge of both crimes, several interlocutors affirmed that there is still a lack of understanding of the difference between SOM and TIP, and that this has repercussions not only for the way that smuggling and trafficking is treated but also for VOTs, who are often discouraged from coming forward because of this lack of awareness.

Support the improvement and implementation of existing frameworks that are adapted to each country's specific context

At the legislative and policy level, African countries and organisations generally have action plans, laws and frameworks in place to deal with TIP. However, **the extent to which they are comprehensive, enforced and up to date varies considerably.** According to informants, some policies, especially at

the regional level, lack the necessary follow-up support and implementation, or are in many cases unattainable and distant from the reality on the ground.¹ Research also suggests that greater attention is paid to TIP than SOM by international and national response frameworks, as well as by donors.

It would therefore be beneficial for the EU and other donors to **rely as much as possible on existing frameworks and plans and support their implementation**, rather than try to introduce new ones.

- For instance, at the continental level, the African Union conducted an evaluation of the **Ouagadougou Plan of Action** and developed various recommendations for updating and improving it.²

Focus box 42: The Ouagadougou Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings

In 2019, the African Union, with the help of GIZ, conducted an evaluation of the Ouagadougou Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, Especially Women and Children (2006). It concluded that the Plan needed to be revised. In particular, it called for an updated framework for law enforcement and implementation of anti-trafficking measures.³ Other weaknesses highlighted by the evaluation were that the Plan fell short in articulating measurable results with indicators and timelines, that it had no structure for oversight, and that awareness of the Plan was low among national authorities.⁴ The evaluation also stressed that increasingly restrictive migration regimes abroad are pushing vulnerable migrants into the arms of criminal networks that facilitate TIP and SOM. Therefore, TIP and SOM agendas should be more aligned with the migration-development agenda by, for example, streamlining TIP and SOM-related dialogues through existing fora such as the African Union Horn of Africa Initiatives, the Khartoum Process and the Rabat Process.⁵

- The **EAC Anti-Trafficking in Persons Bill** is another example of poor enforcement of legal frameworks. Since its development was announced by the EAC in 2016, offering a framework for the prevention of TIP in the region, little to no progress has been observed in the implementation of its standard at the national level.

When supporting laws and policies, donors should ensure that they are tailored to national needs and dynamics, and therefore are developed on a case-by-case basis: a bad law can be worse than none. Laws not being adequately tailored to national contexts was also highlighted as a weakness of BMM I by respondents.⁶ A good practice when developing a TIP or SOM law is to follow a **three-step approach: 1. map existing TIP/SOM dynamics, 2. consult with relevant stakeholders, and 3. develop the law or policy**. The first step is neglected in most cases.

Furthermore, research suggests that, rather than driving the legislative process, the role of bodies such as the AU, IGAD, ECOWAS and EAC should be one of **limiting harmful responses at the country level**, and promoting key messages and approaches such as encouraging differentiation between trafficking and smuggling, without demonising the latter.⁷ The EU and other donors could support these institutions in this role. However, it is important to take into consideration the fact that both TIP and SOM can have (different) political implications for governments. In this regard, all regional organisations may not be able to take on a leading policy role in tackling SOM – or may have to do so carefully – as it remains a complicated political matter for some of their member states. For instance, ECOWAS has drafted a strategy against trafficking, but has not done so for migrant smuggling.

Lastly, differences in the conceptual understanding of TIP or in the judicial response to TIP among countries can hinder regional cooperation, such as in cases of cross-border prosecution matters, or when a VOT identified in one country cannot be referred to the protection services of another country

¹ Interview with key informant from a think tank.

² AU, 'Draft report of the evaluation of the implementation status of the African Union's Ouagadougou action plan to combat trafficking in human beings, especially women and children (2006) in Africa', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Interview with key informant from a think tank.

⁷ Interview with key informant from a think tank.

(of origin or transit) due to a different legal interpretation of TIP in the latter. For example, an adult VOT from Togo cannot be referred for protection since the national legislation only criminalises child trafficking, limiting support to child VOTs.¹ Regional cooperation may also be hindered by the fact that bodies in charge of TIP crimes do not have the same level of formalisation and specialisation in different countries. In the near future, donors should seek to help African countries harmonise the definitions, legislations and responsible bodies regarding TIP, preferably at the regional (ECOWAS, IGAD) or sub-regional level.

Continue to fund information sharing, data collection and research on trafficking and smuggling, and use it in real time to adjust programming in a fast-changing environment

As a direct consequence of the very fluid nature of the phenomenon, the **lack of sound, reliable and updated data on trafficking and smuggling** is another major barrier to effectively combatting TIP and SOM.

In general, figures reported by African countries are likely to be a significant underestimation of the real extent of the issues. The absence of adequate data collection and tracking systems is a key explanation, as well as the fact that governments tend to focus on certain types of crimes only (for example those involving foreign organisations).

Improving and expanding information sharing, data collection and analysis in order to understand the bigger picture, both on the African continent and globally, could be promoted through a two-track, complementary approach as currently implemented by GLO.ACT and Enact. Such an approach involves, on one hand, regular studies with a specific geographic and thematic focus that provide a snapshot of the situation at a given moment, while on the other hand, collecting routine data to help identify longer-term trafficking and smuggling trends in a region.²

Following this logic, with regard to TIP, for example, different types of efforts should be supported in parallel:

- **Information sharing between national law enforcement systems (and within the various points of national legal chains) to coordinate investigations** on the ground. Lessons learned in terms of improved information and data sharing can be drawn from the implementation of the ROCK, as one of the key successes of the project has been its **ability to engage liaison officers from different countries**. Such an approach could be replicated as an effective way of encouraging cooperation and exchange of information on TIP between countries gathered around a common challenge. In interviews, several staff working on TIP in partner countries indicated the need for centralised databases to make sure all relevant stakeholders had access to the necessary information. They also mentioned studies and information on routes (see below).
- **Complementary data collection, mapping of key routes and TIP issues identified from the point of view of victims of trafficking** could be data based on victims' testimony collected by local CSOs, NGOs and international organisations working on the subject, as well as through observations on the ground. These sources of data should be shared among TIP stakeholders and updated on at least a quarterly basis to inform programming in real time.
- **More qualitative research, such as that already funded by the EUTF through partner organisations like UNODC, GI and others**, should be pursued to analyse the evolution of the routes, profiles and TIP strategies at play, and to complement the quantitative data. However, they also take more time to be implemented and published (at best on a yearly basis), and therefore they should complement data with deeper analysis and recommendations.

¹ Rabat Process, 'Assessment of anti-trafficking gaps, needs and transferable practices in the ECOWAS member States and in Mauritania', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

² Interview with key informant from UN agency.

- **Real-time monitoring of the programmes** should be put in place by each organisation, with proper assessments of change generated by their activities, and best practices and challenges more systematically shared across practitioners as projects continue to unfold – without waiting for final evaluations, which tend to come too late in the game.

A similar but separate approach on data gathering and analysis should be conducted with regard to smuggling, with occasional synergies (in studies and research) when and where they are relevant.

Map out and improve transit centres along the routes

Various experts interviewed stressed that the main gap in anti-trafficking actions remains the sheltering, protection and reintegration of VOTs. Government transit centres in Africa are scarce, often have limited capacities, and are not up to international standards. NGOs and CSOs also sometimes manage transit centres without the state being able to support them. **Increased funding to extend and renovate these centres** is therefore key and should be provided as much as possible in exchange for budgetary engagements from governmental authorities to maintain the centres. This should be done in coordination with the different organisations involved in the development of Migrant Reception Centres (MRCs) - see also the thematic review on *Protection*.

Increase long-term support and protection for victims of trafficking

Donors should **invest more in protection, including psychosocial support**, which are a prerequisite for further reintegration activities and economic empowerment of VOTs. The COVID-19 crisis has shed even more light on the issue of traumatised VOTs in need of psychosocial support. Although there is global awareness of the topic, capacities remain largely insufficient in some countries, where a few mental health practitioners are left to cope with thousands of traumatised VOTs. Moreover, emphasis should be placed on providing shelter to all VOTs and in particular to men. Indeed, many boys and young men are exposed to forced begging and exploitative work; however, in several African countries, the majority of shelters for victims of trafficking are reserved for women and children, making it impossible for male victims to find emergency accommodation.¹ Witness protection is a priority in some countries in order to ensure prosecution of trafficking cases; victims should be placed in safe spaces and supported when testifying in court. In the longer term, there is a need to support the reintegration of VOTs in their community and to support their economic empowerment (thereby decreasing their vulnerability to trafficking), such as through professional or basic skills trainings, or help with finding a job.

Research and address domestic TIP

The relevant literature and KIIs point to **more limited anti-trafficking efforts to understand and address domestic TIP specifically** – in part because of societal factors and taboos, and sometimes the blind eye turned by national authorities.² For instance, there is a strong need to strengthen and extend national research and data collection mechanisms on modern slavery and trafficking, in order to guide national policy responses.³ On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that action on domestic TIP is relatively new, and that positive momentum and achievements in combating domestic TIP can be observed in many countries. While domestic trafficking is still often addressed through synergies created by programmes tackling international trafficking – that is, prosecution and reinforcement of penal chains, or prevention of TIP – programming on domestic TIP would benefit from a more targeted approach from donors in the future. Country-specific efforts from donors should include research, data collection, awareness raising, promotion of human rights, and protection, as well as building the capacities of national security forces and judicial actors.

¹ Interviews with key informants from NGO and government.

² Interviews with key informants from a syndicate and government.

³ Alliance 8.7, ILO, Walk Free Foundation, IOM, 'Forced labour and forced marriage', 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

Coordinate with anti-money laundering activities

The EUTF's AML-THB project in the HoA is reportedly one of the first projects funded in Africa that aims to address anti-money laundering and TIP jointly. The trainings provided as part of the project were praised by some interviewed beneficiaries, especially for the way they brought different agencies together, helped them identify each agency's strengths and generate synergies. While this is in itself a significant achievement for the EU, it would be advisable to **strengthen cooperation in this field with actors such as UNODC**, as observed in BMM, to maximise synergies and leverage partners' visibility. It would also be advisable to link these efforts with anti-corruption activities (as is already being done by the AML project in the HoA), given their important role in trafficking and other illicit activities.

Intensify anti-trafficking efforts in areas affected by climate change and natural disasters

Because of the increased risks of trafficking in persons in the wake of natural disasters, donors could support projects seeking to address TIP in disaster-stricken zones and among communities that are particularly affected by climate change, for instance through the **development of mobile prevention or detection units in these areas**. Since women and children are particularly at risk of being trafficked, these units need to be gender- and child-sensitive.

5.2. Modalities of intervention

Promote continuity of activities and larger grants to local CSOs

The question of the financial stability and sustainability of projects implemented by NGOs and CSOs is a key issue for civil society. Many projects seeking to address TIP only receive short-term, limited funding to act on specific issues, making NGOs dependent on donors and forcing them to sacrifice some of their needed activities and focus. This can undermine the effectiveness and impact of anti-trafficking projects. Therefore, **encouraging more holistic approaches through larger grants** could be beneficial for civil society actors.

The involvement of local NGOs and CSOs is particularly relevant in the case of smuggling, given that its roots are often to be found in communities. They should be involved not only to better understand the phenomenon but also to help address it, including legislatively.

Explore opportunities of partnerships with influential local voices

Building partnerships with influential local voices and religious authorities to convey prevention messages on anti-trafficking can bring additional results, especially for the sensitisation of perpetrators of human trafficking or potential VOTs. For instance, in Mauritania, Save The Children, in partnership with the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Original Education, developed a sensitisation guide on the protection of children in situations of mobility. The guide uses prescriptions from the Quran, the Hadiths, and the Sharia, which allowed the messages to be more effectively conveyed, including during prayers.¹ Reaching people through religious leaders and traditional *chefferies* also allows the impact of an intervention to extend into the most remote areas.

Increase gender and child sensitivity of anti-TIP/SOM programming

The research and interviews conducted for this study highlighted the need for **increased sensitivity to gender and children in projects that seek to combat TIP and SOM**.² The EU could seek to further encourage the adoption of a gender- and child-sensitive approach by IPs, for instance by ensuring that specific assessments are conducted and that gender and child concerns are taken into account in

¹ Altai Consulting, 'TPML Mauritania phase 1'.

² IOM, 'Migrant vulnerability to trafficking and exploitation', 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

training content and in identification and protection activities, and that more gender- and child-friendly policies are promoted. Furthermore, the gender dimension could also be taken into stronger consideration when supporting enrolment and training of women in security forces and other agencies involved in the response to TIP and SOM.

Enhance ownership at the different levels of the chain

Existing platforms of discussion like the Rabat Process in West Africa and the Khartoum Process in the Horn of Africa **should be used more** in the future, so that African priorities on TIP and SOM, and the type of anti-trafficking or anti-smuggling measures they expect, can be more effectively taken into consideration. Preliminary dialogue would also ensure enhanced ownership of the project by the national authorities afterwards.

The two major TIP- and SOM-related interventions in the HoA provide useful examples of how **buy-in and inclusion of all partners starting from the design phase can drive the success of a programme**. In the case of BMM, the EU engaged partners from the early stages of the programme and was able to maximise the contribution of all actors involved. On the other hand, the ROCK project encountered challenges early on in its implementation due to an unclear mandate and poor support from some partners who did not agree on the project's design.

Ensuring ownership of projects by high-level authorities is also key. To this end, appointing focal points who are responsible for certain outputs and projects at the country level enhances accountability and efficiency of the funds allocated, as does holding regular discussions among key stakeholders. **Developing co-decided projects, for instance through a demand-driven facility** such as with FMM in West Africa, also increases ownership of the projects.

Areas for better coordination

According to respondents, donors (including DEVCO) have a tendency to look at developing countries through the prism of what is missing, and therefore to prioritise capacity building activities rather than **enabling the effectiveness of structures that already exist**. Advocacy activities, political dialogue, and strengthening coordination on the ground among donors and with beneficiary countries could help to redress this perspective.



BORESHA project in the cross-border 'Mandera triangle' (Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya)

Photo credits: Maslah Mohamed for the EU

Migration governance

Labour migration & migration for development

Response to forced displacement

Protection

Return & reintegration

Response to trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants

Border management

Triple nexus


The following review examines key actors, lessons learned, best practices and gaps in programming on border management, as well as the multitude of migration, security, regional and economic integration, trade and cross-border trends that influence priorities in the field of border management.

1. Introduction

There are several definitions of and approaches to border management, but most are related to border controls – that is, monitoring, regulating and/or facilitating the flows of people, goods, services, money, animals, etc. Border management is therefore relevant to security concerns such as counterterrorism and trafficking, and extends into areas such as integration, customs, trade and transport. Border management priorities may vary depending on the relevant regional organisation and country.

The concept of **Integrated Border Management (IBM)** was coined by various actors, including the EU and IOM, and stresses the need for inter-agency and inter-country cooperation and for adopting a holistic view of addressing border challenges.¹

Figure 59: Integrated Border Management (IBM) approach



2. Situation across Africa

Despite the arbitrariness of borders in Africa, which were shaped by European rivalries during colonisation rather than by African realities,² the AU (formerly the OAU), chose to maintain borders achieved upon the independence of most African states in the 1960s,³ stating that borders were and shall remain intangible.⁴ In 1986, the AU adopted Resolution CM/Res.1069 (XLIV) on Peace and Security in Africa⁵ through a negotiated settlement of boundary disputes.⁶ This is all the more important because, despite some progress, formal border delimitation in Africa remains unachieved: **in 2011, only about a third of African borders were properly delimited.**⁷

¹ IOM, 'IOM and Integrated Border Management', 2015. Retrieved [here](#).

² Okumu, W., 'Border management and security in Africa' 2011. Retrieved [here](#).

³ African Union, 'Constitutive Act of the Organisation of the African Union', article 4. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ African Union, resolution A.H.G./16-1, 'Border Disputes among African States'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ African Union, 'Resolution CM/Res.1069(XLIV) on Peace and Security in Africa', 1986. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ African Union, 'African Union border governance strategy', November 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ AU, AUBP, 'Delimitation and demarcation of boundaries in Africa', 2013. Retrieved [here](#).

Focus box 43: Cross-border areas, communities, and border management

Growing recognition of the importance of border areas and ties between communities by development and political partners has shaped cross-border cooperation since the 2000s. In West Africa, ECOWAS' cross-border cooperation policies aim to formalise West African cross-border initiatives and to enhance cooperation on cross-border areas.¹ Similarly, in the Horn of Africa, cross-border initiatives have mainly been driven by regional institutions and bilateral agreements, such as through IGAD's identification of cross-border clusters and the implementation of IGAD projects to support border areas and cross-border development. However, limited progress can be observed from initiatives to support the development of borderlands.

The role of cross-border initiatives in border management interventions lies in recognising the importance of cross-border ties, comprehensive border management approaches, and information exchange and cooperation. Cross-border areas could be supported comprehensively through IBM by acknowledging the role cross-border exchanges has for communities and the role of social, cultural and economic ties across borders, instead of limiting its role to security and politics in border areas.

Only allowing legal mobility to occur at a small number of border posts can also impact cross-border mobility and trade, including of goods and livestock. In general, laws and frameworks throughout East Africa are not adapted to fostering cross-border exchanges (for example for pastoralist communities to move and trade easily across borders), despite efforts by IGAD.

Border authorities also lack robust platforms for information exchange and cooperation due to limited means, capacity and channels for effective coordination.

Cross-border exchanges and ties offer the potential for trade, development and stabilisation, but more work is needed. Further research could help an investigation on the impact of the development of border areas and cross-border dynamics on national and regional integration and stability, on mobility in border areas and its management, and on labour migration across borders.

Borders are places where many interests related to economic integration, mobility and security play out. Most African borders are fluid and integrated to some extent, in part due to the presence of the same communities and tribes across borders.² Borders are often disregarded by local communities, who see them as arbitrary and artificial as they often split tribes and clans across borders. Women and children are among those voluntarily or involuntarily traversing borders along key migratory routes. Women and children are susceptible to discrimination, abuse (including economic or sexual exploitation), corruption and neglect at borders. Yet, women constitute a large proportion of informal traders and utilise borders as trading routes.³ Important informal trading routes and common infrastructure (such as schools or health facilities) used by communities across borders all contribute to making border areas places of high informal integration.⁴ As an example, informal exports monitored at border points in Uganda, or informal cross-border trade (ICBT),⁵ constituted 15% of the country's total exports in 2018.⁶ In Benin, ICBT is estimated to generate 20% of GDP, in part thanks to informal trade with its giant neighbour Nigeria.⁷

Border situations vary across Africa. **In North Africa, conflicts in Libya and Mali and the rise in terror attacks have led North African governments to increasingly see their borders as a security challenge that requires a securitised approach,** as illustrated by the militarisation and fortification of

¹ ECOWAS, 'Cross border initiatives', 2016. Retrieved [here](#).

² Economic Commission for Africa, 'African Migration – Migration Governance (draft report)', October 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

³ IOM, 'Gender and border management', n.d. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ IGAD, 'Regional pastoral livelihoods resilience project (RPLRP): Review report', September 2016. Retrieved [here](#); UNCTAD, 'What future for women small-scale and informal cross-border traders when borders close?', May 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Informal cross-border trade could be defined as all trade 'that happens outside of the formal channels, which would be those of customs authorities'. J. Stuart, 'Informal cross-border trade in Africa in a time of pandemic', April 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ UBOS, 'The informal cross border trade survey report 2018', July 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ The importance of ICBT between Benin and Nigeria contrasts with official figures: Nigeria accounted for only about 6% of Benin's exports and 2% of Benin's imports in 2015–2017. Economic Development Institution, Benin Institutional Diagnostic, Chapter 8, 'Benin's informal trade with Nigeria', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

the Tunisian-Libyan and Moroccan-Algerian borders.¹ However, some note that the securitisation of borders has increased risks of instability along the frontiers, as communities depend on the informal economy of smuggling goods such as fuel.²

In West Africa and in ECOWAS countries, despite security challenges (Liptako-Gourma, Lake Chad), there is a continued focus on regional integration and facilitating flows of people, goods, animals and services. ECOWAS is the most advanced regional bloc in terms of establishing free mobility through its free movement protocol (also see thematic review on *Labour migration*). Borders are characterised by complex, formal and informal flows such as seasonal migration, labour-related migration, nomadic pastoralism and transhumance, as well as criminal flows such as trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants, and the trafficking of drugs (for instance tramadol) or weapons. These criminal flows are encouraged by the limited control exerted by central governments over border areas.

In the Horn of Africa, many cross-border communities benefit from mobility across borders with large migration flows that facilitate trade and income. Several policies by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) promote regional integration efforts on free movement and cross-border collaboration. However, regional integration efforts are less advanced here than in West Africa, as longstanding conflicts and limited trust between states all hinder the implementation of the East African Community's (EAC) vision of free movement.³

Across sub-Saharan Africa, human mobility and migration in border areas are used as means of adaptation to changing climatic and environmental conditions. Cross-border movement has been heavily impacted by climate change, and particularly by drought and desertification.⁴ Pastoralists are forced to change their migration and transhumance routes as water sources dry up and grazing land becomes unsuitable, which sometimes creates discrepancies between new routes and existing border points, illustrating the need for more flexibility in controls of cross-border livestock movement. These new routes often push herders to new areas or grazing land, which can sometimes lead to conflict with local communities. Increased mediation efforts are required to address such issues between communities. In the Sahel, these temporary and seasonal forms of cross-border migration may progressively shift to more permanent southward migration as the consequences of climate change increasingly affect local populations and their environment and resources.


¹ Gallien, M. and Herbert, M., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 'The risks of hardened borders in North Africa', August 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ IGAD, 'Gap analysis of cross-border trade policies, bilateral agreements and implementation challenges of IGAD minimum integration plan', September 2016. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ OHCHR, 'The slow onset effects of climate change and human rights protection for cross-border migrants', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

Figure 60: Overview of borders in Africa



2.1. Key frameworks and regional actors

Frameworks and policies on border management involve different actors at the international, continental, regional and national level, often with different or conflicting interests and priorities in terms of securitisation, facilitating migration and regional and economic integration. The **AU has committed to a progressive border agenda, emphasising border cooperation and joint governance** through its AU Border Governance strategy. It acknowledges border governance as a positive contribution to peace and security, integration, resource sharing and trade facilitation, inclusive growth and sustainable development building in the 2014 Niamey Convention on cross-border cooperation, the 2063 AU Agenda and the 2007 AU Border Programme (AUBP). Notably, the Free Movement of Persons in Africa, which includes provisions for an African passport, is a flagship programme of the AU's Agenda 2063 with cooperation from the RECs,¹ and the initiative had registered 32 signatures but only four ratifications as of 2020.² Key frameworks, as shown, could be viewed as initial steps towards making African borders resources and anchors for policies and integration.^{3,4,5}

¹ AU, 'Progress report on the free movement of persons in Africa', 4-8 November 2019. Retrieved [here](#).


² IOM, 'IOM to support popularization of free movement of people in Africa', January 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

³ African Union, 'African Union border governance strategy', 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ GIZ, 'Border governance: Support to the African Union border programme', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ AU, 'The revised migration policy framework for Africa and plan of action (2018-2027) draft', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

Figure 61: African Union key frameworks on borders



Regional cooperation and the implementation of key frameworks remain challenging, with differing priorities and limited human and financial resources, data sharing, and member state ratifications of key documents. This includes the Niamey Convention, which has so far only been ratified by 15 member states, hindering the initiative to increase transnational cooperation on borders. However, there are active border governance coordination fora through which the AU and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) seek to strengthen inter-sectorial coherence.¹ Difficulties include the harmonisation of bilateral and multilateral commitments.²

In North Africa, the **Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)** has sought to deepen cooperation among Maghreb countries and enable the free movement of people, but activities have stalled due to recent crises, such as the conflict in Libya and political tensions between Algeria and Morocco.³

In the East and Horn of Africa, **IGAD** plays a central role with its migration expertise and emphasis on trade, infrastructure development and cross-border cooperation. For example, through the 2018 ‘Policy framework on the nexus between informal cross-border trade and cross-border security governance’, it promotes the institutionalisation of IBM to facilitate vital cross-border movements and trade in the region.⁴ The EAC has also made limited advances on free movement, with **the Common Market Protocol** envisioning the removal of restrictions on labour movements and the harmonisation of labour policies across the EAC.⁵

In West Africa, **ECOWAS** remains a crucial actor for border management. The 1979 Protocol on Free Movement of Persons stipulated the right of ECOWAS citizens to enter, reside and establish economic activities in other member states, even though the second and third phases have not been fully implemented.^{6,7} On security, efforts on cross-border cooperation were deepened with the 2008 ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework,⁸ which emphasises cross-border initiatives as a means of reducing tensions, fighting cross-border crime and enhancing community welfare, among other concerns. Outside ECOWAS, the **G5 Sahel** is a platform for regional cooperation on development, security and military matters in the Sahel.⁹ It aims to promote the double nexus approach and strengthen the links between economic development and security.¹⁰ Other fora for discussions on

¹ Ibid.

² IGAD, ‘Nexus between informal cross-border trade and cross-border security governance’. 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Economic Commission for Africa, ‘Report on Africa’s regional integration agenda’, 2013. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ IGAD, ‘Nexus between informal cross-border trade and cross-border security governance’. 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ See EAC, Common Market Protocol, (Art. 5(2)).

⁶ ECOWAS, ‘Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment’, 1979. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Interview with key informant from a regional organisation.

⁸ ECOWAS, ‘ECOWAS conflict prevention framework’, 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Across its five member states: Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad.

¹⁰ France Diplomacy, ‘G5 Sahel Joint Force and the Sahel Alliance’, 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

border management in West Africa include the Liptako-Gourma Authority and the Lake Chad Basin Commission.

Focus box 44: The Lake Chad Basin Commission

The regional platform known as the **Lake Chad Basin Commission** (LCBC, or CBLT in French) was launched in 1964, originally with the mandate of ensuring the replenishment of Lake Chad through the Chari and Logone rivers, as well as regulating the preservation and use of natural resources. It brings together countries that are otherwise split between different regional organisations (mostly ECOWAS and ECCAS): Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, the Central African Republic and Libya. The LCBC therefore covers a historically far more integrated area from a bottom-up perspective.¹

With the emergence of Boko Haram and greater insecurity in the region, the LCBC has also become a forum for discussions about border management, security, and military cooperation. It provides the legal framework for cooperation and channelling funds to the **Multinational Joint Task Force** (MNJTF) between Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad and Benin, which was authorised by the AU Assembly in 2015.² However, political and military cooperation within the MNJTF remains fragile, creating tensions and frustrations between countries. Countries also have diverging views: Nigeria sees the fight against Boko Haram as a national issue and approaches it in a unilateral manner, while Niger requests bilateral assistance from Chad, and Chad advocates for greater cross-border military cooperation.³

3. Key non-EUTF interventions

This review identified several ongoing border management projects funded by non-EUTF actors in the EUTF regions, including at least €108M of funding from other EU instruments, as illustrated in the figure below. However, some budgets were not available due to a lack of information and transparency regarding donors and amounts dedicated to border management projects.

3.1. External donors operating in the three windows

Border management programming seems to be a relatively concentrated field. Apart from the EU, key donors identified include EU member states, notably France and Germany, who along with the UK⁴ and USAID⁵ promote border management efficiency by facilitating regional integration, trade, strengthening border security and anti-trafficking. Other donors include Japan, with support to equipment, infrastructure, technology and information systems in Uganda, such as the USD 1.8M 'Strengthening Border Security in Uganda' project in 2016 and a 2020 commitment of USD 4.1M to support communities, border security and a COVID-19 response.^{6,7}

¹ European Centre for Development Policy Management, 'Understanding the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC): Water and security at inter-regional crossroads', March 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ West Africa Report, 'Assessing the multinational joint task force against Boko Haram', 2016. Retrieved [here](#).


⁴ Polnar, M., World Customs Journal, 'Coordinated border management from theory to practice', 2011. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ USAID, 'East Africa – East African Community (EAC)', 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ UNDP, 'Japan contributes USD 4.1 million', October 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ IOM, 'Japan donates USD 1.8 million to strengthen Uganda border security', March 2016. Retrieved [here](#).

Figure 62: Mapping of main non-EUTF interventions¹



*These projects do not only deal with border management, but this review was not able to obtain disaggregated budgets.

¹ FMM and EUNAVFOR MED IRINI do not only deal with border management but this review was not able to obtain disaggregated budgets. Total budget for the 'Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project' is €103.5M but, in the absence of a disaggregated budget, it was not possible to evaluate the cost of cross-border livestock trade.

Germany (BMZ/GIZ) has supported border delimitation, RECs and cross-border interventions under the 2007 AU Border Programme (AUBP). By 2019, more than 6,000 kilometres of borders were delimited, thanks to the expertise and digital solutions provided by the AUBP programme and GIZ's support.¹

Focus box 45: GIZ support to the African Union Border Programme (AUBP): Cross-border collaboration and the RECs

Since 2008, **GIZ has been supporting the AUBP, which is currently in its fourth and potentially last phase** covering the period 2020-2022. Besides border delimitation and capacity building of RECs, the programme fosters cross-border cooperation by working with border communities, civil society and state actors, and by strengthening local authorities through capacity building. This has led to numerous local agreements on cross-border collaboration on, for example, facilitating trade and access to schools and health facilities in border communities, mainly in West Africa.² GIZ also works with NGOs and community organisations on livestock and pastoral conflicts to find local, cross-border solutions.

Community inclusion in the management of borders can further be a way for donors, partners and governments to complement a cooperative and capacity-building approach and move beyond a securitised border agenda to help decriminalise border communities and facilitate cross-border movements and trade.³ Due to the mismatch between the demand on the RECs capacity and limited resources and funding capacities available, GIZ seeks to strengthen their capacity by having security advisors and other experts work closely with the RECs.

Given its traditional linkages to authorities, governments, and border officials, border management is not often perceived as a field that is relevant for CSOs. However, there is an opportunity for CSOs working with cross-border communities to play a larger role in border management efforts.⁴

Other examples of cross-border cooperation within Africa include UNCTAD's 'Borderline' project, which targeted the complexity of trade barriers to ICBT and cross-border trade in Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia. The project sought to benefit female informal traders, who are a vital source of employment and livelihood in border districts, and resulted in a set of gender-sensitive policy recommendations. **Key best practices include introducing awareness-raising initiatives through women's associations and cross-border associations** to tackle the limited awareness among women of trader rights and obligations and of the availability of existing trade regulations to simplify business operations and procedures. The intervention further envisioned that one-stop border posts could be tailored to meet the needs of cross-border traders, such as by constructing shared facilities and fast-track clearance systems for small-scale traders.⁵

3.2. International organisations and border management

With a global portfolio of around 200 IBM projects and around USD 125M⁶ in funding allocated to IBM worldwide in 2018, IOM is a key implementing agency for migration and border management, and for the nexus between border management, trade and migration. IOM works on capacity building and governance in the Horn of Africa, and partners with **UNODC** on security-related border matters on smuggling and trafficking in persons.⁷ IOM also implements a humanitarian border management approach to the region's refugee situation, supporting governments and border

¹ GIZ, 'Border governance: Support to the African Union border programme', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ Interview with key informant from research institution.

⁴ Interview with key informant from UN agency and research institution.

⁵ UNCTAD, 'Gender-sensitive policy recommendations to support women cross-border traders in Malawi, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ IOM, 'Immigration and border management', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Ibid.

institutions to manage displacement and helping them to manage sudden migration flows at border points.¹

ICMPD has increasingly adopted IBM and participates in national, bilateral and EU-level initiatives on border management in North Africa and more recently in West Africa.² ICMPD notably promotes good governance and regional cooperation in Tunisia through the elaboration of an IBM strategy and the creation of training centres with a regional focus.

As implementing partners, Frontex and Interpol drive a strong security agenda, through which Frontex supports cooperation on border management with Europe's neighbouring countries (including North Africa) and in sub-Saharan Africa. However, the agency often suffers from a negative image as it is seen as an extension of EU border policy in Africa.³ Interpol takes a security-oriented approach to border management, and strengthens various relevant border agencies (police, gendarmerie, customs) through capacity building, training of members, material support, transfer of technology and connection to centralised regional or Interpol databases.⁴ Interpol also fosters information exchange and cooperation between countries, including through the WAPIS⁵ in ECOWAS countries.⁶

3.3. IGAD on cross-borders in the Horn of Africa

In the Horn of Africa, IGAD seeks to facilitate regional cooperation and cross-border initiatives by integrating border management to facilitate trade, transport and integration through borders.

Several of its projects move beyond the securitised border management approach by recognising the role of communities, agriculture and livestock, and regional integration in IBM. Projects streamlining cross-border collaboration on health and agriculture include numerous interventions aimed at strengthening cross-border platforms.⁷ The World Bank/IGAD project, 'Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project' (RPLRP) has amounted to USD 122M and focuses on cross-border trade policies and cross-border movements of livestock in Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda. To improve the ability of agro-pastoralists and pastoralists to access intra-regional and international markets, the project streamlines and harmonises policies and bilateral agreements, and works on cross-border trade hindrances to foster value chains and formal trade in border areas.⁸

¹ IOM, 'Humanitarian border management'. Retrieved [here](#).

² ICMDP, 'Border management and security', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Interview with key informant from EU agency.

⁴ Interpol, 'INTERPOL operation advances border security in West Africa', August 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ West-African Police Information System.


⁶ EUTF, WAPIS, Action Fiche. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ IGAD, 'Health program', August 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ IGAD, 'Gap analysis of cross-border trade policies, bilateral agreements and implementation challenges of IGAD minimum integration plan', September 2016. Retrieved [here](#).

4. EUTF portfolio

Figure 63: EUTF interventions related to border management¹



¹ As of October 2020, only contracted projects with over €150,000 dedicated to border management are included. Numbers rounded to the nearest €0.5M. Amounts for GIZ projects purposefully not indicated. Abbreviations detailed in the annex. In cases of multi-project programmes where not all IPs work on BM, only the IP(s) working on BM are listed. In this case, for AJUSEN, the other IP is AFD.

EUTF funding for border management activities represents the second-largest portfolio among the thematic areas (after support to displacement-affected communities, and on an equal basis with protection and return & reintegration) **and accounts for 16% of the EUTF's migration-related budget, or 8% of the total EUTF budget.** According to our portfolio analysis, a total of €320M has been contracted to border management interventions across the three windows through 32 EUTF projects: 23 in SLC, four in NoA and five in the HoA. The portfolio analysis used project budgets disaggregated by activity (and other relevant project documents) whenever they were available to estimate amounts dedicated to each thematic area. Thus, in this case, the budgets referred to correspond to the amounts estimated to be dedicated to border management in each project, and not total budgets.

This analysis focuses more on the security aspects of border management as cross-border activities such as basic services, resilience and economic opportunities were allocated to other thematic areas. Therefore, the portfolio analysis focuses on direct border management activities. It excludes security-oriented projects not dealing strictly with border management (when portions of these projects are included, they pertain to border management) and resilience-oriented projects in border areas.

Border management has received the most attention in NoA, with €160M, or 50% of the total spending on border management. **SLC** accounts for the second largest portion of funding, with €145M spent on border management, or 45% of the total. This relatively high share can be explained by the importance of cooperation on security concerns in West Africa, including counterterrorism, trafficking in persons, drugs and weapons, and smuggling of migrants. In the **HoA**, border management (€15M, 5%) is only a secondary topic that places far behind economic and resilience efforts for displacement-affected communities.

Often, border management efforts by the EUTF go beyond simple border control and security. Some projects focus on border control, but most at least partially cover IBM. In the HoA, border management projects are part of a larger holistic migration governance programme. Projects in SLC are more security-oriented, but some also address the needs of border communities (including EU-IOM JI in Mauritania, as described below). In NoA, border management interventions focus more on the procurement of equipment and training of border personnel and are either led by EU member state agencies or ICMPD, or are budget support projects.

Focus box 46: The EU-IOM Joint Initiative in Mauritania

In Mauritania, the **EU-IOM Joint Initiative** (JI), an €8M project that ended at the end of 2020, integrated border management components that IOM had been implementing in the country since 2006.¹ The EU-IOM JI in Mauritania was distinct from the other EU-IOM JI country projects in the region in that it built on two main pillars: **1) strengthening border management, and 2) improving migration governance, including protection and AVRR of migrants.**

Leveraging the good relations that IOM has built with the Mauritanian authorities through previous border management projects, this approach to border management was more ambitious than material supplies and trainings for security-oriented objectives. It included strengthening traditional border management actors (police, gendarmerie, customs, etc.) but also involved local actors such as municipalities, mayors, and pastoralist committees. Lastly, IOM aimed to stabilise border communities and further involve them in border management processes in the long run.

By October 2020, the EU-IOM JI project in Mauritania had built or rehabilitated 6 border posts. It had also created or strengthened 20 village committees in the wilayas² of Guidimakha and Gorgol, located on the borders with Senegal and Mali. Lastly, it had helped to enhance trust and establish better relationships between border management agencies, local governance actors, and border communities.

¹ IOM, 'IOM, EU Donate Border Management Equipment to Mauritania', 2016. Retrieved [here](#).

² 'Wilaya' is an Arabic term meaning 'Administrative division'. It is often translated by 'region', 'province', 'state', or 'governorate'.

The PARSEC programme in Mali also approaches border management from an IBM perspective by combining border management, security and border governance.

Focus box 47: PARSEC in Mali

In Mali, **PARSEC** is a €29M programme funded by the EUTF and implemented by Expertise France. It targets the regions of Mopti and Gao, including areas along the border shared with Burkina Faso and Niger. PARSEC's main focus is on security, justified by a tense context in the Litapko-Gourma. To address these security concerns, the programme adopts a holistic approach that includes reinforcing the rule of law, training relevant security forces and border management actors and improving equipment and infrastructure. More specifically, and in accordance with the IBM vision, PARSEC strengthens and ensures interoperability between various security and defence actors, such as the national police, the *Garde Nationale*, the gendarmerie, the army and customs officials, through diagnostics, operational support, equipment, trainings, and building and rehabilitating infrastructure, including border posts.

In the Horn of Africa, the **Better Migration Management (BMM) phase I and II programmes implemented by GIZ has a border management component** within the framework of regional integration and better migration management. Activities during the first phase involved bilateral cooperation, capacity building on border management, protection and IBM. A key lesson as the programme moves into the second phase is to build on the regional integration gains developed during the first phase, such as the cross-border coordination platforms and regional learning institutions that were established. However, as regional harmonisation was not fully conceptualised and implemented during the first phase, BMM uses a regional approach to strengthen cooperation with the AU and IGAD and alignment with the Khartoum Process by involving these entities in planning exercises and national implementation. National ownership has also been promoted by involving national and regional institutions in the planning stages for the second phase, with annual workshops planned to support a number of feedback mechanisms that were proposed.¹

5. Perspectives and areas of opportunities

Promoting a more developmental and climate-sensitive model of border management

Border management tends to be treated by many stakeholders – including sometimes the EU and often the partner countries – solely from the security point of view, with a combination of procurement and training of border guards. Many indeed question the benefit of placing border posts here and there on a continent with thousands of kilometres of desert and forests and improperly delineated borders.

At the same time, borderlands typically remain under-developed areas, where people seldom see or benefit from the presence of the government, and while they remain places of passage that are crucial for both formal and informal trade, they are underserved and underappreciated.

There would be tremendous advantage in taking a positive view of borders and borderlands, as is already being advocated by several organisations, including the AU, IOM and other implementing partners. For example, a limited number of well-organised, sustainable crossing points could be created to support real free movement, legal trade and security, without hindering traditional informal movements such as those of pastoralists or border area inhabitants. This would involve working not only with law enforcement and local governments but also with communities and civil society. This sort of approach could help these areas to develop through a virtuous cycle of positive cross-border dynamics, community interaction, growing trade and exchanges, which in turn could make borderlands and thus borders more attractive to migrants for ordered, safe, intra-African mobility.

¹ T05-EUTF-HOA-REG-78-01, 'Better migration management II DOA'.

Moreover, cross-border regions and cities, as areas particularly affected by deteriorating climatic conditions and the climate change-migration nexus, can be places of opportunity and responsibility for which countries pool together resources to address climate change and risks. The issue of climate change would also be an interesting starting point to encourage nexus interventions, notably between development and peacebuilding or security. There are increasing opportunities for cooperation between local authorities and for the shared management of border areas in order to promote local development and security, support local populations, and mitigate climate risks. The EU could capitalise on growing interest from African countries and communities in climate change adaptation by supporting the development of legal frameworks and governance structures for effective climate-sensitive cross-border management, and by supporting resilience strategies for border areas and resources.

Gaps to be addressed/weaknesses to keep in mind

- In a context where many communities depend on traditional social and economic systems for their livelihoods, **excessively strict border management can increase these communities' vulnerabilities and foster mistrust** of border management actors.
- **Conducting assessments on linkages between officials, implementing partners, and border communities**, and the potential of **involving local communities in border management**, is key.
- Design and ongoing assessments of border management programmes should take their externalities and potential side effects into account – especially those that affect border communities. When the pros – for instance enhanced security or formal crossing points – do not clearly outweigh the cons, the **do no harm** principle shall prevail to avoid disrupting informal cross-border ecosystems and livelihoods of border communities.
- In East and North Africa, and to a lesser extent in West Africa, there is a **strong need for regional cooperation and harmonisation of practices between countries**, as border management systems differ substantially in terms of capabilities, organisation, and effectiveness across countries.¹
- Finally, some experts underlined the **need for more flexibility regarding the reallocation of funds** and shifts in strategy and implementation for border management projects. Due to the highly political nature of border management, and particularly in volatile security or migration environments, priorities may change quickly – for instance in the event of a terror attack, or of a shift in relations with neighbouring countries.²

Thematic areas of focus

Combining 'hard' (equipment, construction of border posts, security) **and 'soft'** (protection of migrants, human rights at the border) **aspects of border management is key for project sustainability and impact**. On one hand, leaving out 'softer' aspects comes with the risk of not correctly assessing and addressing migrants' potential vulnerabilities at the border (unaccompanied minors, victims of trafficking, etc.).³ On the other hand, focusing solely on 'soft' aspects could make national authorities less interested in the project, and therefore undermine project ownership and the sustainability of the action. **Adopting a more integrated approach** that includes, among other things, rights-based referral mechanisms for migrants and trainings on detection of victims of trafficking at the border, along with equipment, capacity building, and rehabilitation of border posts, could help to generate more interest from border officials and thereby maximise the efficiency and sustainability of all project components.

Moreover, in line with this integrated approach, **a human-centred perspective could be employed to better account for the needs of border communities and border agencies in future funding**.⁴ Such an

¹ Henlon, Q. and Herbert, M., 'Border security challenges in the Grand Maghreb', 2015. Retrieved [here](#).

² Interview with key informant from a UN agency.

³ Interview with key informant from a UN agency.

⁴ Henlon, Q., and Herbert, M., 'Border security challenges in the Grand Maghreb', 2015. Retrieved [here](#).

approach should emphasise minimal disruption of, or support to, the livelihoods of local populations, and increased security in border areas. To do so, building trust between populations and border personnel, as well as anti-corruption trainings for border personnel, are crucial. For instance, in Mauritania, the EU-IOM JI created 20 village committees in *wilayas* on the border with Senegal and Mali, that aim to clarify access to natural resources, trade and livestock flows for the local populations.¹

The significance of cross-border trade and informal flows of people and goods means that it is important to tap into the huge benefits of supporting borders for trade, livelihoods, and economic development, and to **de-securitise the border management agenda**. While the bulk of EUTF funding on border management goes to security or migration-oriented programmes, it would be beneficial to approach border management from a holistic perspective that includes, for example, the facilitation of trade, or building infrastructure – such as roads, schools, markets, or business infrastructure in general – to be used by communities on both sides of the border.

More funding could be allocated to supporting cross-border trade and long-term solutions for pastoralist, nomadic and semi-nomadic lifestyles. As pointed out by high-level interviewees, disconnected political and administrative structures are inadequate for addressing transboundary issues such as common livelihoods, trade and resilience patterns. Cross-border programmes can contribute to reducing this mismatch by providing a framework to manage trade, resources and mobility of both livestock and persons. In the Horn of Africa, for instance, efforts by the EUTF-funded Cross-Border programme have received positive feedback from local interviewees citing multi-country conflict actors, common livelihoods and resilience patterns structured around mobility as crucial for strengthened collaboration in areas with divided political and administrative structures.²

Current EUTF projects do not seem to be implementing specific activities dedicated to **mitigating corruption at border posts** (both for authorities and border communities), although corruption has been identified as an important issue impeding effective border management. This could be addressed through **awareness-raising activities on corruption, specialised training on prosecuting corruption cases, and monitoring tools** for border authorities.^{3,4} Moreover, as the frequent rotation of personnel in border areas is often pointed to as favouring corruption, border management programmes should see if rotations of personnel can be reduced, or if specialised, well-trained border management units can be appointed, as opposed to non-specialised policemen and gendarmes. Lastly, programmes tackling corruption should focus on formal crossing points located between two border cities or in populated, informally integrated areas, where economic activity and trade are more important and where the potential for regional integration is higher.

Encouraging the harmonisation of travel documents and procedures are one way of promoting legal migration, and tackling various types of trafficking can be another relevant intervention at the REC level, if RECs request it. In ECOWAS countries, the FMM programme supported travel document harmonisation and the promotion of the ECOWAS biometric ID cards for internal mobility. Document harmonisation should capitalise on existing procedures and have realistically implementable roadmaps, so as not to discourage member states.⁵

To prevent the risk of interrupted continuity undermining long-term impact, programmes and implementing partners should take appropriate actions from the beginning, such as: **integrating trainings of officials into the national authorities' curricula, obtaining budgetary guarantees for structures and institutions created or reinforced, making authorities accountable for every result**, and favouring support to authorities over direct action. Lastly, border management programmes

¹ For more information, IOM, 'EU-IOM Joint Initiative – Mauritania'. Retrieved [here](#).

² MLS Case study on the EUTF Cross-Border Programme: Collaboration in cross-border areas of the Horn of Africa, January 2021

³ UNDP, 'Combating cross border corruption – UNDP partners with national and local authorities to stop the vice', October 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Interview with key informant from a regional organisation.

⁵ Interview with key informant from a regional organisation.

may use follow-up tools or focal points to continue to measure the impact of the programme, even after the project has ended.

EUTF interventions could better target women and children by integrating a gender- and child-sensitive perspective into border functions, such as through policies and capacity building exercises for border authorities. As women play an important role in informal trade, initiatives such as UNCTAD's Borderline project aim to bring together women's associations and cross-border associations through awareness-raising initiatives to foster informal trade. The project led to the development of gender-sensitive policy recommendations¹, including the involvement of women's associations in decision-making processes in Joint Border Committees in the EAC to help mainstream gender issues. Save the Children has developed several good practices on cross-border cooperation that target children, based on experiences from borders between South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. These include recommendations on harmonised SOPs, consular services in destination areas for interviewing and documenting children on the move, and needs-based groups such as border post reference groups involving immigration, police, local CSOs and frontline social workers that aim to protect unaccompanied and separated children.²

Actors to be supported

Choosing the appropriate receiving institutions and beneficiaries according to the objective, and ensuring ownership of these objectives by the institutions or beneficiaries, are key. For instance, regional organisations may be the best-placed institutions for high-level discussion, framework building, and policy drafting, although they can be bureaucratic in some cases. At the country level, good existing relationships with an implementing partner can be leveraged with direct implementation, as long as the same implementing partner is kept along the way, to maintain trust with authorities and the partner's already-existing knowledge of the country. Lastly, budget support can be implemented with national authorities, but should only be considered with several prerequisites, such as thorough discussions with the country, political stability, objective indicators to track the money injected and monitor results, and measures to prevent corruption or embezzlement. Budget support should also be implemented over a timeframe longer than two years, so as to promote lasting change and ownership by the beneficiaries.

Best practices to be considered/strengths to be leveraged

Some key informants suggested that the reorientation of funds from one border point to the other could be facilitated when needed (e.g. from management of land borders to building capacities in airports or ports, or vice versa). To facilitate this, projects could **use mechanisms such as a Demand-Driven Facility (DDF)**, which is already the case for the SBS Ghana programme led by ICMPSD or for FMM West Africa. The FMM programme used the DDF to process requests from ECOWAS member states, dealing with high-level border management issues such as migration and border management strategies. The programme also processed requests for operational support, and, in the most relevant cases, accepted and implemented them. In total, it approved 11 requests out of the 49 that were submitted.

The establishment of **one-stop border posts (OSBPs)** facilitates the movement of goods and persons across borders by creating a single stop for border control between two countries.³ OSBPs reduce waiting times, increase cost efficiencies, and enhance cooperation between the relevant border agencies.⁴ However, OSBPs should be established only when the potential for border cooperation between two countries meets minimum standards. For instance, in the case of Mauritania and Mali, the lack of formal border demarcation, as well as insecurity and weak border management on the Malian

¹ UNCTAD, 'Gender-sensitive policy recommendations to support women cross-border traders in Malawi, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia', December 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

² Save the Children, 'Cross-border protection of children on the move in East and Southern Africa: A quick reference guide for bilateral coordination', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

³ IOM Rwanda, 'Immigration and border management'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Ibid.

side, have prompted Mauritanian authorities, in partnership with IOM, to build or renovate their own border posts on Mauritanian soil, which are operated by the Mauritanian police or gendarmerie.

Areas for better coordination

A multilateral approach, instead of a bilateral one, could be encouraged in future EU funding, in order to address border management needs regionally. For example, the strengths of the BMM programme have been linked to its regional design, where the EUTF has a structural advantage in targeting structural problems in cooperation with both national governments and the RECs. The design of a Common Operating Picture (COP)¹ – a tool that supports joint decision-making by allowing countries to build a common overview of an event through sharing of information – could also facilitate interactions and information sharing, build trust between partners and improve the effectiveness of capacity building efforts. Because of the sensitive and sovereign nature of border management, activities could first focus on more consensual areas of cooperation, such as cross-border investigations on terrorism or drug trafficking, or regional integration.

Though different European instruments fund border management projects (the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace or IcSP, EUTF, AMIF, etc.), there should be a **clearer separation between them, and each should have a distinct mandate**. This separation, along with better coordination, would help to avoid potential overlaps in programming, as well as reduce confusion for the beneficiaries of border management programmes funded by the European Union. For instance, security-focused border management programmes should be funded by the IcSP, while more comprehensive border management programmes dealing with migration or regional integration should be financed by the EUTF and EUTF-like instruments.

¹ Henlon, Q., and Herbert, M., 'Border security challenges in the Grand Maghreb', 2015. Retrieved [here](#).



A refugee and host community member pose in front of a sorghum farm in Kalobeyei, Kenya

Photo credits: FAO

Migration governance

Labour migration & migration for development

Response to forced displacement

Protection

Return & reintegration

Response to trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants


Border management

Triple nexus

1. Introduction


1.1. Definitions

Figure 64: Linkages between development assistance, humanitarian aid and peacebuilding¹



The objective of the triple nexus is to maximise the effectiveness, efficiency and impact of coordination between humanitarian, development and peace actions. In practical terms, for the purposes of this study and in accordance with the OECD DAC ‘Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus’, this means implementing joint analysis, shared strategic planning and programming, and collective outcomes among humanitarian, development and peace actors, all of which should be supported by predictable, flexible, multi-year financing and a comprehensive, adaptable and coherent donor strategy. At the programming level, approaches to the triple nexus vary widely depending on how ‘peace’ actions are defined and integrated, as illustrated in the figure below.

Figure 65: Programming approaches to the triple nexus²



One of the most contentious aspects of the triple nexus is the definition of ‘peace’, and what some consider to be a misleading blurring of concepts between peacebuilding, security and stabilisation. Some stakeholders believe that there can be no genuine triple nexus without the full integration of ‘hard’ peace actors, such as those who implement security, counterterrorism and

¹ This visual is based on a diagram from ECDPM, ‘Think local. Governance, humanitarian aid, development and peacebuilding in Somalia’, March 2019.

² This visual is based on the article by Centre for Humanitarian Action, ‘Triple nexus to go’. Retrieved [here](#).

stabilisation, on the basis that humanitarian and military actors have always worked together to exchange information, coordinate access to volatile areas, and avoid impinging on one another's work. Others would prefer to refer to this type of collaboration as the 'humanitarian-development-security' nexus, and to limit the definition of 'peace' to 'soft' interventions such as social cohesion or community-level reconciliation.¹ This is a reflection of the fact that although the triple nexus is widely agreed to be a highly relevant concept in complex crisis situations, a common understanding of what it means or should mean in practice is largely lacking.

1.2. The triple nexus in context

The term 'silos' is commonly used to describe the historical relationship between the humanitarian and development sectors. Agencies, departments, teams, project cycles and other processes are often inflexibly categorised as either pertaining to one field or the other, with funding streams and donor mechanisms allocated accordingly. These overly rigid categorisations tend to breed unnecessary competition, discourage crossover, and create communication and collaboration gaps on the ground, despite frequent overlaps in goals and objectives.

In 2016, the first World Humanitarian Summit promoted the idea of the 'humanitarian-development nexus' as the future of strategic planning, funding and programming. UN Secretary General António Guterres' oath-taking remarks to the UN General Assembly later that year, in which he framed the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding sectors as 'three sides of the same triangle'², established what is now referred to as the 'triple nexus', whereby peacebuilding is added to the humanitarian-development nexus when appropriate. From these developments the UN's 'New Way of Working' (NWoW), which is virtually identical to the triple nexus, was born. (Indeed, while the NWoW approach remains highly relevant, it appears that even within the UN the term 'nexus' is increasingly preferred to avoid confusion over terminology.)

Other key actors in the global triple nexus discourse include the World Bank, with its Humanitarian-Development-Peace Initiative, the EU, with its nexus pilot countries and Joint Development Humanitarian Framework, and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), which is not a major global donor but is among the most advanced in the triple nexus discourse, with staff explicitly dedicated to its implementation.

¹ CHA, 'Triple nexus to go', February 2020, Retrieved [here](#).

² Secretary-General António Guterres' remarks to the General Assembly on taking the oath of office, 12 December 2016.

1.3. History of the triple nexus

Figure 66: History of the triple nexus

The Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development approach (1980s)

Food security crises in Africa in the 1980s lead to the emergence of the LRRD concept amid recognition that a more effective approach to transitioning from **humanitarian response to longer-term development** support is needed.

Building resilience in protracted crisis (2010s)

Calls grow for humanitarian and development actors to work together, especially in protracted crises and situations of chronic vulnerability. **Conflict prevention, disaster risk reduction, and disaster preparedness** come to the fore.

European Union

In 2012, droughts in East Africa and the Sahel lead the EU to strengthen its resilience agenda.

- **SLC** Global Alliance for Resilience Initiative (2012)
- **HOA** Supporting the Horn of Africa's Resilience programme (2012)

United Nations

From 2012-2014, global displacement rates soar with wars in Syria and South Sudan, climate-related conflict, and Islamist insurgencies.

- **Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework** (2016) calls for greater support for refugees and host countries in order to avoid tensions

The triple nexus, from international frameworks to EU implementation (2015-)



Sustainable Development goals - SDGs (2015)

17 goals adopted by all UN member states, and nexus-like approaches such as Disaster Risk Reduction and Resilience are integrated into the SDGs.



The World Humanitarian Summit - WHS (2016)

Milestone for the commitment to linking humanitarian and development action, with the endorsement of the World Bank and the International Organization for Migration.



The New Way of Working – NWoW (2016)

Originates from the WHS and promotes joint analysis and planning, collective outcomes, and localisation. Flexible and multiyear financing and increased investment in prevention is supported through the **Grand Bargain**, also endorsed during the WHS.



Council conclusions on Operationalising the Humanitarian-Development Nexus (2017)

- Six pilot countries: Chad, Iraq, Myanmar, Nigeria, Sudan, and Uganda
- At an informal meeting in 2018, EU member states unofficially support the triple nexus.



Humanitarian-Development-Peace Initiative - HDPI (2017)

UN and WB aim to identify collective outcomes and deliver integrated responses through data sharing, joint analysis and assessment needs.



OECD DAC Recommendations on the operationalization of the nexus (2019)


Principles and approaches for strengthening and accelerating collaboration and coherence between humanitarian, development and peace actions. **First ever OECD instrument with UN adherence.**

2. Triple nexus approaches in the Sahel and Lake Chad, Horn of Africa and North of Africa regions

Multiple protracted and complex crises in the Sahel and Lake Chad, Horn of Africa and North of Africa regions demand a layered approach that addresses short-term emergency needs (humanitarian) while at the same time breaking the cycle of dependence on humanitarian assistance (development). By extension, this includes addressing the root causes of conflict (peacebuilding) and thus requires collaboration between the humanitarian, development and peace sectors.

2.1. Sahel and Lake Chad

Figure 67: Non-exhaustive selection of nexus initiatives, frameworks and funding mechanisms in SLC



The combination of the first Libyan civil war in 2011, the political crisis in Mali in 2012 and the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency led to a significant destabilisation of the Sahel and Lake Chad region in the early 2010s. As terrorist activities spilled over from Mali to neighbouring Niger and Burkina Faso, unprecedented waves of forced displacement and humanitarian needs emerged in 2019. Protracted conflicts, coupled with recurrent droughts and food crises that were particularly severe in 2011-12, increased the need for stronger cooperation between humanitarian, development and peace actors, leading to a push for nexus approaches among the three sectors.

For example, **in Mali, the international community has tried to support an integrated approach with initiatives such as the Sahel Alliance**, which is often cited as an effective¹ multi-sector and multi-donor partnership² that targets a number of priority areas such as education, youth employment, food security, and internal security. At the national level, the country launched the Integrated Security Plan for the Central Regions (PSIRC in French), which aims to strengthen security and prevent conflict

¹ Interview with independent triple nexus expert.

² The partnership includes France, Germany, the European Union, the African Development Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, the World Bank, the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Finland.

between communities as well as supporting livelihoods and provision of basic services.¹ Government counterparts, such as the Dedicated Ministry of Social Cohesion, Peace and National Reconciliation can help support coordination between humanitarian, development and peace actors for a robust triple nexus approach.

Burkina Faso is struggling to shift from decades of development programming to the type of assistance required in the current emergency context. Instead of following the traditional continuum from humanitarian towards development activities, development actors need to implement an extremely flexible resilience approach in close coordination with humanitarian actors. Some programmes also add a social cohesion component, with activities such as community dialogue and civil-military mediation. They aim to strengthen the social fabric of communities, and limit the risk of local recruitment and spread of jihadism in rural and remote areas of the country.²

In Niger, stronger political governance and commitment from state actors are favourable to a nexus approach. For example, the High Authority for the Consolidation of Peace engages in crisis and conflict prevention, and supports projects across the humanitarian, development and peace sectors, such as food security, military-civilian dialogue, and local economic development.³ In 2018, the Tripartite Technical Committee was created to provide a roadmap for the implementation of the nexus.⁴

In Nigeria, the triple nexus approach is mostly relevant in the north-eastern regions, where cooperation between humanitarian, development and peace actors allows for greater access to beneficiaries. Major donors also seem to have embraced the nexus approach in Nigeria, with the EU choosing it as one of the six pilot countries to operationalise the humanitarian and development nexus, as well as implementing the EU Borno Support Package (2017). This initiative blends funds from ECHO, the EUTF and the European Development Fund (EDF) in order to improve the resilience of conflict-affected populations in Borno.⁵ Humanitarian, development and peacebuilding specialists from the delegation in Abuja co-designed the package and promoted an area-based approach through political negotiation with state and local authorities.⁶ Within the EUTF, the LRRD programme in Nigeria supports a triple nexus approach in the north-eastern regions. It is comprised of three projects promoting softer peace components such as social cohesion, trust building between communities and the police force, and community dispute resolution mechanisms, while simultaneously supporting access to livelihoods and basic services.

In Chad, another EU nexus pilot country, including a social component in the humanitarian and development nexus is crucial to ensuring long-term stability in a context affected by multiple types of identity-based tensions. Most nexus initiatives in the country focus on humanitarian-development cooperation, but flexible funds such as the Alliance Sahel could help to support a triple nexus approach.

2.2. Horn of Africa

The 2010-2012 East Africa drought was a humanitarian disaster that contributed to the deaths of over 250,000 people in Somalia alone. **Failure to mitigate the crisis was partially attributed to the international community's focus on short-term humanitarian responses** to previous climate-related crises instead of building long-term resilience,⁷ triggering a serious reconsideration of the way the international community operates in the region. A concerted, effective push for a resilience agenda followed in the early to mid-2010s, which has naturally evolved into a triple nexus agenda in the second half of the decade.

¹ PSIRC Description of Action document.

² Interview with key informant from EU.

³ HACP website, Project archives. Retrieved [here](#).


⁴ Niger Humanitarian Response Plan 2020.

⁵ IOM, 'Operationalizing the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus', 2019.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ The Guardian, 'East Africa's drought: The avoidable disaster', 18 January 2012.

Figure 68: Non-exhaustive selection of nexus initiatives, frameworks and funding mechanisms in the HoA



For example, over the past few years, increasing stability in Somalia has given rise to a shift away from an entrenched cycle of short-term humanitarian action towards a longer-term, state- and resilience-building approach. In 2020, a joint effort from the UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, the Federal Government of Somalia and the donor community has led to the establishment of a task force and Steering Committee for the triple nexus, the ToRs of which are currently under preparation.¹

By contrast, the absence of a functional national government counterpart in South Sudan leaves little room for a balanced nexus approach, as the majority of actors and interventions focus on humanitarian assistance and support to the peace process.² As such, the recently launched Partnership for Recovery and Resilience, a multi-donor initiative that works with regional governors to implement a coordinated area-based programming approach, may be the only example of a strong nexus initiative in South Sudan.

In Sudan, the UN launched significant efforts to advance the New Way of Working starting in 2017, as the shifting context at the time seemed ripe for repositioning the country towards a combined humanitarian and development approach.³ Sudan is also one of the six EU nexus pilot countries, with an action plan that focuses on undernutrition and forced displacement. The fall of President Omar al-Bashir and the need to recommence efforts with the new transitional government has led to an

¹ Interview with key informant from EU.

² Interviews with multiple key informants, including donor organisations and other country experts.

³ UN and OECD, 'From funding to financing: Financing Strategy Mission Report – Sudan', May 2017.

inevitable stalling of progress,¹ but the political transition has also unlocked exciting possibilities for mainstreaming the full spectrum of the nexus in collaboration with the transitional government counterpart.²

Finally, the nexus policy agenda in Uganda is perhaps most clearly represented by the rollout of the CRRF and by the EU nexus action plan for the country. The CRRF in Uganda supports an advanced whole-of-government approach to refugee integration and serves as a galvanising framework to bring a wide diversity of actors across the nexus under a common platform for coordination.³ Like Sudan, Uganda is an EU nexus pilot country, and the main aim of the EU's nexus action plan for the country is to contribute to the rollout of the CRRF. Operational progress is most apparent in the EU's DRR programming, which was chosen as the first priority sector for implementing a nexus approach. For example, as ECHO has particularly strong DRR expertise in Uganda, it was actively involved in the preparation and planning of the DRR aspects of the EUTF-funded RISE programme.

2.3. North of Africa

Overall, the international agenda in the North of Africa region tends to be more focused on migration management and development than humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding. As such, **Libya is the only country in the region with serious multi-sectoral needs and where concrete attempts to implement the triple nexus are in place.** In 2018, the UN, in coordination with other key stakeholders, began to conceptualise a triple nexus strategy focused on the southern region of Libya. This work has led to the inclusion of nexus themes in the 2019/2020 Humanitarian Response Plan as well as in the Strategic Framework (UNSF) for the country, the creation of a dedicated working group, and a nexus pilot project launched in the southern municipality of Sabha by WFP, UNFPA and UN WOMEN.

The EU has also strengthened its triple nexus approach in Libya through some of its EUTF-funded community stabilisation programmes, which seek to address drivers of instability and vulnerability by contributing to the restoration of normal social and economic life for Libyan communities and migrants. 'Managing mixed migration flows in Libya' is one such project, and it aims to provide basic protection services to migrants, foster socioeconomic development at the municipal level, and strengthen local governance. It also supports social cohesion between migrants and host communities through anti-discriminatory and inclusive approaches to local economic development.⁴

¹ Interview with independent triple nexus expert.


² Interview with key informant from EU.

³ Interview with key informant from research institution.

⁴ 'Managing mixed migration flows in Libya through expanding protection space and supporting local socio-economic development' Description of Action document.

3. Triple nexus interventions in the EUTF portfolio

Figure 69: EUTF nexus programming



*Humanitarian-development **Peace-development

4. Lessons learned and perspectives on operationalising the triple nexus

4.1. The challenge of integrating the peace component of the triple nexus

Peace is a prerequisite for development programming and for protecting the impact of humanitarian and development programming gains. Nevertheless, in most countries where the triple nexus is relevant, the humanitarian-development nexus tends to be reasonably well established while the peace component remains poorly integrated. One factor may be that **the peace dimension can have significant operational implications for humanitarian and development actors**, and its inclusion, depending on how it is defined, may compromise enthusiasm among certain actors to engage with the nexus approach. Peacebuilding interventions can range from ‘soft’ (conflict-sensitive and do-no-harm approaches, as well as social cohesion interventions) to ‘hard’ peace actions (such as interventions related to security and defence). Some advocate for a wholly separate ‘humanitarian-development-security’ nexus to capture the inclusion of security actors due to concerns with regard to the inclusion of these ‘harder’ elements of peace in the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, of which most are related to the notion of the politicisation of aid and to the humanitarian principle of neutrality.

A predominant concern is that the politicisation of aid may become even more explicit under an approach that seeks to integrate peace (and therefore sometimes, by extension, security) into humanitarian and development action, which in turn may threaten the humanitarian principle of neutrality, humanitarian access to certain areas and beneficiaries, as well as the physical safety of humanitarian personnel. In Mali, where actors such as the UN and the EU support security interventions like MINUSMA, EUCAP Sahel and EUTM Mali, as well as humanitarian and development activities, this can lead to confusion between security and humanitarian actors on the ground,¹ because local populations see the same logo and name associated with all three types of activity. In the same vein, a perceived association of humanitarian actors with UNSMIL in Libya has repeatedly limited humanitarian access in some areas.

Furthermore, concerns raised by humanitarian actors are also often relevant for ‘softer’ peace interventions. In Somalia, for example, as FPI and ECHO often use the same implementing partner (such as IOM), there are concerns that the potential lack of any perceived distinction between the EU’s stabilisation and humanitarian work may threaten ECHO’s humanitarian principles.² In Niger and Mali, some EUTF implementing partners reportedly struggled to gain the trust of beneficiaries, as the EUTF was often perceived as a mechanism to contain migration in exchange for humanitarian and development funds, rather than a tool for the benefit of local populations.³

4.2. Effective HDP coordination requires joint analysis, planning and collective outcomes

Maximising coordination between actors across the humanitarian, development and peace sectors is the core tenet of the triple nexus. At the programming level, interventions designed with an explicit triple nexus approach should naturally facilitate collaboration between humanitarian, development and peace actors. **Joint analysis and planning should be the foundation of such**

¹ Interviews with independent expert and key informant from EUTF implementing partner.

² Interview with key informant from EU.

³ Interview with key informant from EUTF implementing partner.

interventions, in order to establish a common understanding for setting shared objectives. Indeed, increased sharing of analysis between humanitarian, development, and political peace colleagues is where some consider the six EU nexus pilots to have shown the most progress. However, data sharing remains a challenge in many contexts – even internally, such as across UN agencies – for reasons ranging from organisational culture to legitimate privacy and security concerns.

Collective outcomes are essential for robust joint planning and analysis as well as for nexus-oriented programme design and financing. Collective outcomes are therefore central to the UN New Way of Working, and as a result the UN has made significant progress toward developing collective outcomes in various countries. By contrast, the EU has been more programmatically focused in its nexus approach, leading to concrete nexus-oriented interventions but possibly less strategic cohesion, as reflected by a comparative absence of work on collective outcomes for its programming.

Focus box 48: Effective HDP coordination in northeast Nigeria

National and international actors intervening in northeast Nigeria demonstrate a strong commitment to the implementation of the triple nexus approach. For example, ECHO, EUTF and EDF regularly discuss and coordinate on areas of interventions through the 'northeast' cluster. Similarly, a coordination/advocacy group (comprised of key donors and ambassadors from the US, UK, EU, etc.) has been formed at the ambassadorial level to promote respect of International Humanitarian Law and access for humanitarian actors, as well as to strengthen an integrated approach for the next programming phase.¹

The UN Strategic Framework for northeast Nigeria also aims to support a triple nexus approach to the COVID-19 pandemic. It therefore focuses not only on humanitarian assistance (cash transfers, food distributions) but also on development activities by supporting national health systems to implement their own COVID-19 response, by providing immediate livelihood support to cover financial losses during the outbreak, and by supporting early recovery peace activities to mitigate the impact of the outbreak on the security situation.²

4.3. Financing the nexus

4.3.1. Barriers to effective donor coordination

Donors are well-placed to provide high-level, overarching guidance to ensure a cohesive nexus strategy at the country, regional or global level. Strategic donor coordination is therefore key to maximising collaboration and efficiencies across the humanitarian, development and peace sectors.

Although there is a general lack of sufficient coordination between donors at the global level, donor coordination at the country level tends to vary significantly. For example, in Uganda, the CRRF has served as a robust framework for donor coordination, and is also an example of where the EU has 'come together' better with other donors such as the UN, as most EU and EUTF programming aims to directly support the CRRF.

At the EU level, the first point of action in any country is to optimise coordination between the development (DEVCO), humanitarian (ECHO) and political (FPI) work streams. In several Horn of Africa countries included in this study, stakeholders reported an improvement in EU coordination in the last year or two, or since the advent of a formal nexus discourse within the EU. However, this is often attributed more to individual personalities and working relationships than to institutionalised collaboration.

Furthermore, the so-called 'security-development nexus' must be supported through considered collaboration and coordination, though some stakeholders believe that careful differentiation and an explicit prioritisation of human security (as opposed to national or military security) are also required to avoid displacement of development funds. Such an approach would mean that

¹ Interview with key informant from EU.

² Joint Support Framework for Multi-Sectoral response in Northeast Nigeria, June 2020.

'security-relevant' development activities (that is, development implemented in conflict-affected areas that require security arrangements and a conflict-sensitive approach) can be funded with development resources, while 'security target' activities that seek to directly influence security dynamics should be financed with security resources to avoid the politicisation of aid.¹ The EU's African Peace Facility (now folded into the European Peace Facility), which provides support to African-led peace operations, and the Instrument for contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), for example, are considered by some to exemplify both the tensions contained within the security-development nexus as well as the potential risk of 'securitising' development policy when the distinction between security and development is not clearly demarcated.²

One of the main barriers to EU coordination, particularly in countries where all EU development funding is channelled through the EUTF, is also the misalignment of planning and funding cycles. ECHO responses are planned on an annual basis, whereas EUTF decisions are made throughout the year with little predictability as to the amount of funding that will be allocated to any given country, inhibiting higher-level coordination and joint planning. Another practical barrier is simply the location of EU offices, with staff based together tending to collaborate more, and more effectively, than those who are not. For example, in the cases of Somalia and South Sudan, some staff members are based in Nairobi while others are located in Mogadishu or Juba respectively, and EU staff in both countries stressed the negative impact this has had on effective collaboration. In the Sahel and Lake Chad region, collaboration between DEVCO and ECHO can be even more challenging due to the security context and the increased risk of politicisation of aid. For example, ECHO reportedly asked one implementing partner that had received funds from both entities to explain why they had accepted EUTF funds in a region where the EU is not perceived as a neutral actor.³

4.3.2. Nexus-supportive financing processes

One of the core OECD DAC recommendations for the triple nexus is to shift away from siloed annual funding cycles and instead promote predictable, flexible, multi-year financing that brings humanitarian, development and peace stakeholders together. Many donors (as well as multilateral development banks such as the World Bank) have already made steps towards this type of funding through pooled funds and other new funding instruments that aim to provide implementing partners with more flexibility and adaptability than was previously possible, though significant work remains to be done to reflect a genuine shift in approach.

This is perhaps the area above all others where the EUTF positively stands out, as it is a flexible funding mechanism capable of both responding to emergency situations and financing longer-term development action (including within the same project). ECHO is highly flexible but has a limited budget and operates on an annual funding cycle, while there is no built-in flexibility in traditional DEVCO funding to facilitate a transition to humanitarian action when needed. As such, the EUTF has served as a valuable 'bridge' between EU humanitarian and development funding in many countries, allowing for a flexible response, a longer-term perspective in traditionally humanitarian contexts, and the integration of lessons learned into programming strategy. For example, in northern Uganda, where few actors are able to look beyond six to twelve months due to the almost exclusively humanitarian focus, the ability to take a longer-term, more development-oriented perspective has proven to be extremely positive in terms of facilitating a more nexus-oriented approach than is generally possible in the region, as reflected in an external evaluation of the RDPP programme.⁴ Similarly, in the Sahel and Lake Chad region, the EUTF's flexibility has allowed for the implementation of a nexus approach to protection (which is traditionally funded by ECHO according to strict humanitarian criteria), by

¹ European Peace Facility 'An EU off-budget fund to build peace and strengthen international security', June 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

² European Foreign Affairs Review, 'An uneasy nexus: Development, security and the EU's African Peace Facility', January 2013, and Devex, 'EU to invest in military capacity for development work', 19 December 2017.

³ Interview with key informant from EUTF implementing partner.

⁴ Interview with key informant from research institution.

supporting the implementation of longer term projects and the inclusion of livelihood support activities in protection interventions.¹

4.4. Importance of integrating bottom-up approaches and empowering local and national actors

Some stakeholders consider the triple nexus to be a top-down concept that has been largely imposed by donors without effective communication or adequate resources, when it should instead actively encourage and facilitate bottom-up planning and the integration of lessons learned from implementing partners in the field. However, one implementing partner in northern Uganda noted that the EUTF's flexibility and longer-term perspective has allowed them to develop and integrate lessons learned as well as to link their programming strategy to the country's national development plan, which is all the more valuable in a context where few actors are able to look beyond six to twelve months due to the almost exclusively humanitarian focus from donors. Measures could be implemented to ensure that these types of linkages and opportunities to integrate best practices and lessons learned are replicable across all programming.

A successful triple nexus approach also requires strong engagement with national and local capacities, both to prevent and respond to crises as well as to maximise the long-term impact of a response. However, flexibility and patience are required on the part of donors to ensure that implementing partners have the time and resources needed to build local and national capacities and to foster project ownership by local actors and communities. Supporting strong female participation in these local processes (including through partnerships with local women-led organisations) should be prioritised to promote gender justice and gender equity as well as to ensure gender-sensitive approaches and outcomes.

4.5. Importance of gender considerations for the triple nexus

Women and girls are among the most vulnerable and marginalised in conflict-affected contexts, not least because of the intersection between conflict and gender-based violence. Furthermore, gender-based inequalities, norms and discrimination are often intensified and reinforced during conflicts and other emergencies. Responding to these complexities in crisis settings requires cross-cutting efforts that span the triple nexus. However, interventions targeting gender equality, women and girls' empowerment and gender-based violence are largely underfunded,² and investment in the role of women in peacebuilding processes and crisis response remains insufficient.

By promoting structural change, facilitating interlinkages, and engaging a wide range of stakeholders, an effective operationalisation of the triple nexus creates opportunities for more integrated and transformative approaches to gender considerations. Furthermore, the triple nexus's emphasis on local actors and leadership (as outlined above) can be used to facilitate frameworks and structural incentives for empowering female participation and leadership at the local level, such as through partnerships with local women-led organisations.³ However, achieving such outcomes requires that gender justice be treated not as an 'extra' to be 'integrated' but as a fundamental priority supported through dedicated strategic, coordination and financing mechanisms.

¹ Interview with key informant from protection sector.

² Oxfam, 'The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus', June 2019.

³ Ibid.

4.6. Climate change and the triple nexus

Africa is particularly vulnerable to global warming due to its low adaptive capacity, geographical position, and socioeconomic conditions.¹ This presents a threat to peace and stability across the region, as climate-related shocks trigger both mass displacement and increased competition for resources.

As it promotes joint analysis, local empowerment and ownership, and increased cooperation between humanitarian, development and peace actors, the triple nexus is particularly relevant in areas that are significantly affected by climate change and climate-related shocks – not least because climate-related shocks and conflict often intersect and exacerbate one another.

A successful triple nexus approach also implies strong engagement with local and national actors, who can be extremely useful in supporting the implementation of effective ‘adaptation’ strategies to climate change. Communities often possess unique localised knowledge of their environment and can ensure that tailored and cost-effective climate adaptation strategies are adopted.²

Joint analysis and planning are the foundations of triple nexus interventions, in order to establish a common understanding for setting shared objectives: including climate change in risk analyses will allow for adapted and sustainable programming, whereas overlooking environment considerations in post-disaster contexts (such as the risk of groundwater contamination through the construction of emergency latrines or inadequate location of temporary shelters) can undermine the sustainability of the programme as well as the long-term resilience of communities.³

5. Perspectives and areas of opportunities

Address the ‘P’ in HDP

Peace should be systematically integrated from the beginning of any nexus discussion or joint planning process in conflict-affected contexts. For example, the *Programme d’urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel* is implemented in all G5 countries, and was designed as a pilot project for the implementation of the triple nexus. During a long twelve-month inception phase, IPs established a common logical framework, jointly agreed on beneficiary targets and included social cohesion actors from the beginning. The EU organised a workshop in Brussels with five pre-selected consortia, one for each country, to discuss targeting, age groups, and key concepts such as resilience and social cohesion. The Burkina Faso consortium was present, and was composed of IPs who had previously worked on *Résilience* and *Prévention contre l’extrémisme violent* programmes, and thus had prior experience with the EUTF, humanitarian-development coordination, and implementing social cohesion activities.

Humanitarian and development actors should be thoroughly familiarised with the different approaches to peace (from ‘hard’ security interventions to softer peacebuilding actions such as social cohesion), and similarly, there should be a strong understanding among peace actors of the impact of their activities on the humanitarian and development sectors. Donors could support this by encouraging and facilitating discussions and brainstorming sessions, particularly if they contract humanitarian, development and peacebuilding projects in the same area.

There is, however, no universally applicable triple nexus approach, and the inclusion of the peace component must be carefully adapted to each context. For example, in some contexts, it is particularly important for clear distinctions to be made between humanitarian, development and peace actors, in order to safeguard humanitarian access, maintain the effective provision of services and protect the

¹ FAO, ‘Climate change predictions in Sub-Saharan Africa’, October 2016. Retrieved [here](#)

² Regional Climate Change Programme, ‘Climate change adaptation: an integrated approach’, 2014. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Humanitarian Law and Policy, ‘Climate, conflict and crises: first and foremost, do no harm’, February 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

personal safety of humanitarian staff. Programmes should also ensure the active participation of local stakeholders in the analysis and implementation of peace activities, particularly when funded or implemented by actors that also intervene in the security sector, in order to ensure credibility and legitimacy and to mitigate the politicisation of aid. Though these concerns are mostly related to what some prefer to call the 'humanitarian-development-security' nexus, which includes 'hard' peace actors and interventions, they are also relevant for 'softer' peace activities such as social cohesion and community-level reconciliation.

Support coordination across the nexus through joint analysis and planning and collective outcomes

Several EUTF programmes strengthened cooperation between the humanitarian, development and peace sectors through a consortium approach, which brings together actors from across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus through a joint response to the call for proposals, joint design and planning of the project, and a common logical framework. It is worth noting that this approach, though effective, requires the allocation of additional budget and time for coordination that must be realistically planned for.

Ensure that financing processes facilitate coordination instead of hindering it

Where possible, funding cycles should be aligned to facilitate joint planning and coordination across the humanitarian and development sectors. When this is not possible, flexibility should be built into funding processes to allow for coordination.

Flexibility, adaptability and risk tolerance are key to effective nexus-supportive financing. This is one area where the EUTF stands out, by being flexible enough to finance projects that span the nexus, including in areas that have traditionally had a strong humanitarian or development focus, and by incorporating adaptive components such as crisis response modifiers into programming.

Predictable funding to facilitate coordination and collaboration should be promoted.

Improve donor coordination

Despite reports of recent advances since the launch of the EU nexus strategy, there remains room for improvement with regard to collaboration between ECHO and DEVCO, as the level of cooperation in each country depends largely on motivated individuals and the strength of personal relationships. Efforts to institutionalise mechanisms for encouraging and facilitating collaboration, including joint assessments, trainings and missions, could be considered. Another practical suggestion is simply to consider office space and location, as multiple stakeholders noted that it is significantly easier to promote collaboration between staff who work together physically.

Emphasise local and national capacity building

More patience and flexibility may be required from donors to ensure that capacity building interventions are provided with the time and resources required to produce results. For example, the EUTF-funded programme RESILAC, which operates in the Lake Chad Basin countries, has adopted the CARE approach to the triple nexus, which stresses the need for an intervention grounded in local realities and that integrates local responses. RESILAC conducts needs assessments with the most relevant CSOs and CBOs across the humanitarian, development and peace sectors, and also reinforces their local project management skills.¹

¹ Interview with key informant from EUTF implementing partner.

Increase research efforts on the implementation of the triple nexus in EU ‘pilot’ countries

Studies have been conducted on the triple nexus and its implementation across Africa, but more specific research on the EU nexus pilots appears to be lacking. Each of these countries – Chad, Iraq, Myanmar, Nigeria, Sudan and Uganda – were chosen because they face on-going, acute and protracted crises. Analyses of in-country EU operations, as well as joint assessments of risks, vulnerabilities, the types of partnerships established between actors across the nexus, and challenges faced with regard to financing the triple nexus, could support the development of valuable and operationalisable lessons learned on how best to implement the nexus going forward.¹

Integrate gender and climate change as fundamental priorities when implementing the triple nexus approach

As it promotes joint analysis, local empowerment, and engages a wide range of stakeholders, an effective operationalisation of the triple nexus creates opportunities for more integrated approaches to climate change and gender considerations. Involving local actors can help to support women’s empowerment and leadership at the community level, as well as tailored and cost-effective strategies for climate adaptation. However, achieving such outcomes requires that climate change and gender be fully integrated in the joint analysis and planning phase of triple nexus approaches, and treated as fundamental priorities supported by dedicated financing mechanisms.

¹ Red Cross EU Office and ICRC, ‘The European Union Humanitarian-Development Nexus’, December 2018.

EUTF strengths and weaknesses

This section presents a combination of the main comments from key stakeholders from the fields of migration, mobility and displacement on the EUTF approach. It includes views received from consultations with EUDs from the three EUTF windows, several EU member states and partner states, as well as a broad range of implementing partners of the EUTF, and a summary of the main strengths and weaknesses that appeared through the above thematic reviews. It is largely based on stakeholders' perceptions and is not meant as a formal evaluation of the Trust Fund.

As several interlocutors noted, the EUTF has been a 'game changer' for the EU and for migration and mobility-related funding in many ways, mainly in terms of magnitude, visibility and innovation. It has allowed to place migration and mobility issues on several partner countries' agendas in an unprecedented way. The large scope was, however, not always fully understood and often gave a sense that its ambitions were too broad. What is certain is that the EUTF had to invent, within the EU and with its partners, new tools and methods. This has not been easy, and the efficiency of the Trust Fund compared to other EU instruments is still debated. IP selection seems pragmatic but could be further improved, and the EUTF has favoured a nexus approach. The EUTF is also praised for its focus on evidence and transparency, but could benefit from a more proactive effort on communication. As we look towards the next cycle of financing for the EU, all interviewed stakeholders agree that continuity is of the essence and migration and displacement-related issues need to remain priorities, albeit with slightly different angles and priorities.

1. Scope and ambitions

Magnitude, visibility and innovation

With €4.8B in approved programming, the EUTF budget represents about 30% of the total EU ODA effort in the EUTF area of operations (about €3.4B disbursed in 2018).¹ Approved decisions represent an amount equivalent to 31% of the EU's ODA budget in NoA, 34% in HoA and 25% in SLC. The EUTF therefore represents a very significant component of the EU Commission's assistance to Africa. As such and by nature of its topic and the high visibility of its launch, it is exceptional in visibility and magnitude.

This visibility and magnitude helped some specific stakeholders: for instance, IOM was able to move from having to rely on short term, unreliable funding to a longer term, larger, more predictable source which allowed it to finally start realising a vision they were developing but did not have the resources to implement on a broad scale². Several IOM interlocutors indeed mentioned the fact that this funding had allowed them not only to better staff their projects but also to develop more cross-cutting knowledge and tools such as evidence and M&E tools and to think in a more coherent, strategic way rather than having to rely on member states' varying visions and priorities. Similarly, GIZ explained that the significant additional funding has allowed them to develop beyond their traditional areas of focus. In this regard, it should be noted that the EUTF has been instrumental in developing and / or reinforcing partnerships with states as well as organisations, including for instance the discussions at the Operational Committees or with the Practitioners Networks in Brussels. It should be noted, however, that both IOM and GIZ featured among the main recipients of funds from the Trust Fund – the experience could hardly have been replicated with other implementing partners to this level.

¹ DEVCO 2019 annual report; the percentage was calculated by estimating an 'annual' average for EUTF funding, calculated as the total funding approved divided by five (average project duration).

² The *Integrated Approach to Reintegration* that was implemented on a broad scale through the Joint Initiative. See also [link](#).

EUDs mentioned several other IPs which they thought had learned (and improved) significantly by working with EUTF funding. Some EUD colleagues noted that they themselves had learned a lot through their increased collaboration with member state agencies, and that working with different agencies based on their thematic strengths or level of political dialogue with the partner governments had enhanced collaboration and joint programming – ‘international cooperation as it will be in the future.’

With the magnitude came a high degree of visibility which, in many cases, helped publicise projects and attract other funders. This was clearly stated by UNHCR in Kenya: while the EUTF is not UNHCR’s main donor in Kenya, it has been instrumental in attracting and maintaining the interest of other donors and in giving an innovative – and risky – concept a chance to develop in its support to the Kalobeyei Integrated Socio-Economic Development Plan, for example. The EUTF’s staff flexibility and willingness to accept risk taking was highlighted in several instances.

However, in specific geographic and thematic areas such as protection in Libya for example, the magnitude of the Trust Fund reportedly led to increased competition between potential implementing partners, preventing much needed coordination and synergies. It also led to ‘too many large’ contracts that may not have been the best fit for purpose.

Placing migration and forced displacement on the agenda of partner countries

EUDs as well as the interviewed EU member states and partner countries were overall quite positive regarding the EUTF’s success. Both EUD and member states noted that it had served to place migration on the agenda of most partner countries as it had never been before, and show that the EU was united and truly committed on migration and mobility. EUDs mentioned the fact that the EUTF had allowed them to lead a more ‘mature dialogue’ and to start cooperating in an area that was previously difficult to engage in. Ethiopia for example was mentioned as a country where the Trust Fund had supported a high-level dialogue. Additionality was mentioned several times as well as the extra focus brought to forced displacement. Some, however, did mention that the message implied in the EU’s increased attention to migration was not necessarily always positive or helpful to development work and had led to some ‘difficult conversations’.

Interviewed officials from partner countries were overall quite positive about the EUTF and the programmes implemented with its funds, although they did regret the initial lack of implication of national authorities (in both project decision-making and in specific programmes’ implementation) saying that ‘speed of delivery was no excuse’. At the same time, they acknowledged that this had improved over time and that partner countries themselves made things complicated through ‘lack of coordination and instability within their ministries.’ Several mentioned that they wanted issues related to migration and displacement to remain priorities for EU future support (e.g. Burkina Faso mentioned forced returns, IDPs and labour migration, Uganda, protection and livelihoods for refugees).

A political instrument... which sometimes lacked political support

For member states in particular, the EUTF is a political instrument. Several of them mentioned that it showed ‘unified action in the face of a crisis’ and all valued the new approach not only on the European front but with regards to partner countries as well: indeed, most of them mentioned the importance of all sitting around the same table even if some regretted the fact that, with time, the partner countries seemed to have lost interest in the process. The Trust Fund was seen as particularly useful to support political dialogue with the partner countries and the member states hoped that there would remain some type of forum to continue exchanging with them.

EUDs also acknowledged the political nature of the Trust Fund but some felt that they and some of their projects could have benefitted from more active involvement and political support from Headquarters and their political leadership. While the Fund had helped in supporting high-level political dialogues with the government, they still felt that the commitment to coordination and open dialogue with relevant institutions and authorities had to be enhanced, in part to improve ownership, in particular for complex

regional projects dealing with trans-boundary issues, which would have benefitted from more central government support and buy-in. In addition, while the relationship with IGAD and migration and forced displacement has and continues to be fruitful, some interlocutors mentioned that the work with IGAD in general would benefit from having clearer guiding lines and strategy. In some specific sensitive migration contexts, different aspects of the portfolio could find themselves almost in contradiction, making a unified political support particularly difficult.

Evidence and transparency

The EUTF is considered innovative – especially compared to the EU traditional development approach – in placing an accent on evidence and transparency more than had previously been done by the EU (or even other donors). While the REF was sometimes said to be too far from the operational topics or too academic in its initial phase, and some confusion came from the fact that each window had its REF, the idea behind it and the approach were very much seen as a step forward.

Similarly, the attempt to show results in a transparent fashion through the Monitoring and Learning Systems and on the Trust Fund's website is appreciated, even though there is clear impatience for 'more than numbers' and 'real results,' which will hopefully be addressed by the work on outcomes that will start gaining momentum once enough projects complete and are thus able to deliver outcome results. Relatedly, the fact that there is a platform (AKVO) with relevant logframe data and that feeds directly into IATI is positive, as is the intent to conduct impact evaluations on a range of projects. It should be noted that criticism regarding transparency was generally related to the awarding of contracts rather than the results. More recent consultations with member states indicate that they are still very interested – and curious – as to what are the 'exact results of the EUTF' although they recognise these will be hard to identify and will take time.

Despite the increased transparency, misconceptions and criticisms

With magnitude and visibility came its lot of misunderstandings and misconceptions, several of which were regularly brought up in in the press and some civil society thought pieces. Depending on their points of view, some interlocutors criticised: 'everyone knows the EUTF does only border management', 'the Libyan coast guard' or on the other side, 'it's all root causes – development as usual' or even 'why is the EUTF focusing on humanitarian action?' Also, some member states mentioned specific instances (criticism of Sudan-based programmes) where they would have hoped for more proactive responses from the EU to some unfounded but widespread criticism.

Clearly, some of the misunderstandings may have been wilful and at least partly a by-product of the Fund's high visibility. They could, however, have been addressed more proactively, earlier, and with existing evidence, thus reducing their negative impact on the Fund's image and future, with a more strategic external communication and use of data.

At the same time, it should be noted that several EUDs still grapple with the trade-off between transparency and visibility on one hand and the fear of raising expectations on the other hand.

It should also be noted that each member state – and within each state, each agency or ministry – clearly has their own priorities and understandings of situations, not all of them fully based in evidence: increased sharing of information on collected evidence may help to alleviate gaps in migration-related knowledge.

... which could have partly been dispelled by a more proactive communication strategy

An active communication strategy could have helped address some of the strongest and often erroneous criticism, but the EUTF's communication is often considered inexistent outside the official website, too timorous and lacking resources. Often, the communication was described as defensive or focused on the logo rather than a message. It is clear that the EUTF was in a difficult position, needing to mean different things to different audiences (including member states with wide ranging opinions), in

three different windows with distinct approaches, which made having a proactive communication strategy complicated. However, it may be worth studying whether the constructive ambiguity it maintained was worth not being able to project a vision and pre-empt or even address unfair attacks.

An impression that some countries benefitted more than others

Both some EUDs and some member states noted that some beneficiary countries benefitted more than others from the EUTF: some said that certain countries had understood the leverage they had and known how to use it; others that some countries had been better at aligning their policies with EU interests and some regretted that the EUTF had not reacted in time to certain rapidly worsening situations in some other countries.

One important point to note, made by some interlocutors about the EUTF but also about donors in general, was the concern that, by supporting some countries much more than others (and in some cases not supporting some countries at all), notably in migration governance and border management, the EU and the donor community were creating or worsening regional / continental imbalances that could have a significant impact (for instance creating appealing situations for new smuggling or trafficking routes).

In this regard, some partner countries mentioned other countries' legislations as key issues for themselves, for example when it came to investigating or prosecuting cases of trafficking or even protecting victims. They called for joint investigations and increased coordination (nationally and regionally) but said they were hindered by varying national legislations and capacities.

Root causes and 'too' broad ambitions

The broad scope of the Trust Fund, which was not always fully understood, gave the impression that it intended to address too many issues. Various stakeholders criticised the EUTF's attempt to address too much, leading to a 'collection of projects' without a clear strategy or end goal (and without clear assessments done beforehand).

The focus on 'root causes' was often condemned, especially by stakeholders who would like to see projects focused on specific aspects of migration management such as border management (or even migration governance) and given the 'emergency' nature of the instrument, not deemed appropriate for the long-term efforts required by root causes. For others, the focus on root causes is dangerous in that it leads to a loss of political leverage by reading development efforts through the migration prism, where the EU no longer supports partner governments in their efforts of social and economic development, but 'only' does so because it lives in fear of migration of non-socioeconomically-integrated youth.

Similarly and combined with the perceived lack of real strategy or prioritisation, the magnitude was sometimes criticised in the average size of contracts, when some said that the EUTF gives the impression – among others to partner states – that the EU was committing large sums in a limited timeframe with doubts about some projects' 'return on investment'. This was in part mentioned in relation to the limited absorption capacity of some governments in countries where the EUTF (as well as other donors) was seen as trying to do too much without enough regard for the authorities' capacity to absorb and, even more importantly, sustain reforms and improvements after the projects' completion.

A seeming lack of local ownership which has improved with time

Local ownership is another area in which the EUTF finds itself suffering from its advantages: on one hand, it was able to address issues that were generally not seen as priorities by partner states (as migration-related issues and forced displacement often are) and to do so speedily but on the other hand, most projects, especially when they attempt to change mind sets or structures and systems, require local ownership, if only to ensure sustainability. Striking the right balance is difficult. Lack of local ownership was mentioned by several interlocutors (EUD and member states) when noting that some of the first projects had been 'rushed through' without proper consultation with partner countries.

At the same time, as mentioned above both member states and partner states overall considered that the Trust Fund had made progress since the beginning. Also, it is clear that in some specific contexts, on such a sensitive topic and given other government priorities, it is extremely hard to get said ownership.

Interestingly, when asked about future priorities, interviewed partner states did not necessarily request more funds or more capacity building but rather to be more in the driver's seat, for donors to get together to 'jumpstart' necessary investments (for instance VOT shelters) and in the case of government staff, to make sure that their leadership was fully engaged in programs so that they could use them to develop strategies (rather than as one-off efforts) for their department. Some also mentioned the importance of donors helping to lobby for the national allocation of necessary budgets and for 'markers of success' to be included with support, citing as examples 'improved intra-agency cooperation, increased number and efficiency of prosecutions etc.).

Looking forward, partner states recommended: more implication of national (and local) authorities, the need for more needs assessments and situation analyses (at national and regional levels) before making decisions on programming, basing actions on national and local plans which they consider to be their workplans and often a means, *inter alia*, of donor coordination without which there tends to be 'repetition' (or strategies or policies, when they exist), working more with local NGOs and CSOs to ensure sustainability and increased transparency in data sharing. The need for more centralised data was also mentioned several times.

Too much focus on 'negative' aspects of migration

Most of the interviewed EUDs, some of the member states and many of the other interviewed stakeholders regretted that too much focus had been placed on the 'negative' aspects of migration, on the likes of irregular migration and return & reintegration or even 'hard' aspects of border management as opposed to providing better and more opportunities for legal migration.

The argument was made many times that 'if people want to migrate, they will' and that more accent should be put on making migration safer and better managed. Some EUDs noted that they and their partner governments were not talking about the same thing when they discussed migration. Important topics to be addressed included labour migration, migration governance, free movement, improved intra-African migration, protection of labour migrants and migration for development, the latter in large part through improved engagement with the diasporas.

Interviewed partner states indeed mentioned preoccupations with protection (of their nationals working or 'stuck' in other countries, of victims of trafficking in their country or abroad, or even of refugees in their country), labour migration (and making it easier and safer for their nationals to work abroad) and how to better involve and attract back their diaspora.

... and some missed opportunities

Accordingly, some EUDs (and other interlocutors) lamented the lack of projects on legal migration, including labour migration and aspects of migration for development. Some also mentioned that, in the hurry to develop projects, they had not taken into consideration 'cultural issues' that affected migration and mobility in their country enough or that some projects or programmes had not been developed as they should have: reintegration was mentioned several times in this regard. While the EU-IOM JI was seen as largely successful on the return side, there were some doubts about the reintegration aspect and about whether IOM was the right partner for this. Some pointed at 'rural' reintegration as unappealing to young migrants and returnees, some mentioned the lack of longer-term support or of a track record on this aspect.

Finally, with regards to missed opportunities, a few EUDs lamented the fact that they had not been able to address a quick deterioration of the situation (especially with regards to forced displacement) in time. In some cases, they mentioned a 'lack of guidelines' on how to deal with some sudden changes or

specific organisations. Some even regretted the lack of a clear EU position with regard to their partner country on the topic of migration and mobility.

On this topic, some of the member states would have liked more attention on protection, less 'root causes', more local ownership which they noted would have been helped by more implementation by local organisations, including civil society and in one case they mentioned a partner country's government's frustration with important delayed programmes. The partner countries tended to mention similar issues although also acknowledging their 'share of the blame' for delays in some cases and satisfaction with programmes which had been able to become more inclusive of the government while in progress.

2. The EUTF in practice

New kinds of projects and a new – and different – way of working

The EUTF is recognised by several interlocutors as having changed 'how work is done', partly in that it brings the partner states to the table at the Operational Committees (at the same time, other stakeholders criticise a supposed lack of partner state involvement on the ground); it opened the discussion with both member states and partner states; it allowed to work with countries that had not been typical development partners, on topics that they were not necessarily comfortable with and that often were not their priorities and; it pushed implementing partners to work more and better together, in consortia or otherwise, be it through nexus work or other types of efforts.

EUDs notably mentioned the ability to develop regional and cross-border projects (for example, the ROCK, BMM or the Cross-Border programme in the HoA) and particularly valued the idea of trying to foster further collaboration between, across and among countries in the region and, in this case, with IGAD. EUDs also felt they had been encouraged to work together more and were looking forward to continuing collaborating with the new programming cycle. They mentioned that several of these types of programmes had functioned as pilots and helped them and their IPs to learn and they had raised awareness about relevant topics. They hoped to include the learned lessons in future programming. It should be noted however, that some regretted the fact that some regional projects were regional only in name. Some of these projects were also mentioned positively by the partner states: for example, the BMM or AML projects in Kenya, ProGEM's migration observatories and the ECI in Niger or Enabel's SPRS-NU skilling youth in Uganda.

As a Trust Fund, the EUTF also had – at least in theory – the capacity to attract resources, knowledge and experience from different sources. This was particularly the case in the fact that it attracted new staff (see section on Organisation and Structure below), developed Research and Evidence Facilities (REFs) and acted as a catalyst for attention on development and migration from think tanks and academics. On the financial side, while less resources than expected consisted in voluntary funds and therefore, in that sense, it could have been more successful in attracting resources, a non-negligible number of projects saw co-funding or other types of support (political, advocacy, posts, synergies with national projects) from member states.

But the time frame was too short

Many interlocutors, notably from the EUDs, pointed out that changes in the fields of migration, mobility and displacement take time. The EUTF's time frame was too short to show concrete achievements and even more so for desired systemic change. With regards to forced displacement for example, some warned that '*we cannot change our focus every four-five years [...] We need to continue in order to see the results.*' Related to this, there was a concern with the lack of exit strategies and/or continuity for some EUTF projects and for their sustainability.

Decision making and coordination

Decision making within the EUTF was an area for concern to many stakeholders: several called it opaque and noted that all the decisions were already taken by the time they get the information and certainly before the Operational Committees. This can be particularly concerning for member states who would have contributed to the Trust Fund (although few contributed more than the initial amount) and to partner states, and was also raised by the EU Parliament. However, it should be noted that this perception also evolved positively with time as, among other things, the organisation of the Operational Committees improved and the rush to sign contracts decreased.

Several stakeholders – both internal and external to the EU – also mentioned a highly Brussels-led decision making process, with little chance or time to provide input or collaborate (in the case of other EU financial instruments) before the decision was taken, and with possible negative repercussions on the design of the project of the lack of ‘on the ground context and information’. Mention was made of ‘experts coming in and deciding without consulting’. Again, this was particularly mentioned about earlier programmes, including by a partner state recommending that the ‘real needs of populations be identified on the ground’ before approving projects.

Having said this, opinions varied quite a bit with regards to consultation, depending on countries, partners and instruments, thus giving the impression that issues of consultation and coordination varied almost on a personal basis. They also seem to have improved with time (including between the first phase of this study and the current one): a year on, the member states seem rather positive about the Operational Committees and hope to have a similar mechanism in the future. The Brussels-led perception, however, persists.

The confusion – and lack of coordination – also very likely came from the system in which the EUTF was born: interviews with stakeholders in different EU departments and agencies (and EUDs) showed a lack of clarity about the various EU instruments dealing with migration and mobility-related topics. While monthly migration meetings are a positive step in trying to centralise and share information, they do not reach the EUDs and do not suffice to clarify who does what. And the confusion only broadens once outside the EU: for instance, some stakeholders enthusiastically described an EUTF project that should be maintained at all cost – it was an IcSP project. Similarly, some partner state interviewees working with specific projects knew that they were funded by the EU but certainly not by which instrument.

EUDs themselves agreed that, although they would want to work together on regional projects, they are ‘not structured to do so.’ Some of them also struggled dealing with the implementation of decisions which they considered to have been taken by Brussels unilaterally and without knowledge of the context or the implementing partners’ presence on the ground.

Many stakeholders regretted the lack of coordination between windows and what they considered the relatively arbitrary division of windows, especially in circumstances where important migration flows were divided across two or three windows (e.g. Chad, Sudan and Libya / Egypt). Several stakeholders mentioned as an example the fact that there were no cross-window programmes between SLC and HoA and few between SLC and NoA while this would have been much needed, when politically possible. Several IPs mentioned widely differing contracts and relationships with the different windows. Coordination between the windows was also complicated by the fact that the NoA window was managed by DG NEAR while the two other windows belonged to DG DEVCO (now INTPA). At the same time, some of the most needed cross-window or even cross-border actions would be extremely hard to implement given the current context (e.g. Niger-Libya).

Despite all these issues, it should be noted that most member states were interested in having some kind of mechanism that would allow them to be involved in the selection and implementation of the programmes with the new instrument to come.

A difficult start which left an imprint

Many of the above (and other) criticisms made of the EUTF are related to its genesis (and interviewees are very much aware of this): set up in the midst of a crisis, with a sense of emergency, with little time or – at the beginning – human resources and in a very politically sensitive setting. Thus, a number of interviewees recognise that this is behind the fact that some of the earlier programmes were approved quite fast, thus possibly without the necessary consultation, that they were not all tailored to mobility and migration issues as the priority at the time was to show speedy action. The dichotomy between the ‘emergency’ trust fund and the fact that it aims to deal with long-term, structural issues, although seen as a key problem, is accepted, as are the diverging political pressures it endures from the member states as well as from within the EU Commission itself.

It is in this context that EUDs confirm that sometimes, at the beginning, they had to formulate programmes ‘in a rush’ and that they did not have enough time to consult with the partner country or to do the appropriate research beforehand. They however note that they generally ‘paid for it’ during implementation when aspects of the programme took longer than planned or had to be corrected. This rush also had an impact on coordination which naturally suffered.

Organisation and structure

Even in its organisation and structure, it is clearly understood that there was little the EUTF could do about the fact that it is split across DEVCO (now INTPA) and DG Near. At the same time, lack of coordination, information-sharing and even standardisation was mentioned repeatedly: from the Fiches Action that widely differ across (and even within) windows, to different relationships and contracts with the same partners, to the fact that monitoring is done differently across the windows, something which the Practitioners’ Network¹ particularly regretted. It must be noted, however, that, for instance, relations with the latter have evolved positively, indicating that the complaints were also related to the usual pains coming with changing ways of working.

On a positive note, the EUTF is predominantly praised for the calibre of the personnel it has recruited, although sometimes they are considered to be a bit too development-oriented, which is said to be one of the causes for the excessive ‘root causes’ / ‘development as usual’ projects. Also, some EUDs still seemed regularly under-staffed. In addition, with the ‘end’ of the EUTF approaching, turnover is high and in some cases institutional memory – and to a certain degree the relationship with some IPs – is being lost when several key members of a team leave at the same time or when positions are left empty for several months at a time.

While decision-making went faster, implementation did not

It is generally accepted that programming / decision-making and contracting was faster and more flexible than for EU standard projects², the rest of the process did not seem to be significantly faster, in part because the Trust Fund works with the ‘usual’ implementing partners and in often more difficult settings than other instruments. The EUTF’s mid-term evaluation in fact noted that ‘The use of ‘preferred IPs’ and direct contracting in most cases turned out to be efficient, but in a number of cases raised issues’ and ‘While *contracting* could be made efficient, *implementation* start-up had by and large to follow standard procurement and staff contracting procedures³.’

Contracting even appeared to be slower in some cases, for a variety of reasons, including because implementing partners knew in advance they had been selected and it gave them leverage to make negotiations last longer or because certain aspects such as the ‘MLS clause’ were not initially included

¹ The Practitioners’ Network for European Development Cooperation is a platform for exchange, coordination and harmonisation between European development cooperation organisations. It consists mainly of 17 European member states’ agencies.

² Court of Auditors Special Report 32/2018 (December 2018).

³ GDSI, ‘Mid-term Evaluation of the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa 2015-2019’, October 2020.

in pre-existing high level agreements with implementing partners like the UN agencies. In addition, innovative set ups with consortia-like settings like BMM proved to take particularly long to fall in place because of how highly unusual they were and because of the strict rules and regulation of some of the partners.

Countries with special measures, like Somalia, particularly did not see a speeding up of procedures thanks to the EUTF. In fact, some EUD colleagues mentioned that the Trust Fund had been problematic in that it created parallel systems (e.g. the 'wiki' or AKVO) that were not necessary with other instruments and which therefore required more time. Some colleagues even mentioned that the only difference was that it had taken more time to prepare projects because of all the justifications needed to link them to migration.

In addition, several instances were mentioned in which the contract and project actually suffered from the fast decision-making: when a partner was not fit for purpose but was chosen to gain time; when there was no time to conduct relevant studies or assessments before designing the project, when inception phases were forfeited and therefore important systems were not put in place and planning did not happen and, finally various cases when inception phases took much longer than planned in order to include what could not be done in advance, thus catching up the time 'saved' at the beginning. According to some interlocutors, pressure on IPs for visible 'quick fixes' also contributed to sub-optimal coordination mechanisms and in some cases to insufficient attention paid to possible adverse effects or unintended consequences of certain actions.

This leads to a point about EUDs: compared to other instruments with lesser means, having a presence on the ground is clearly considered beneficial and helped build real ground-based know-how into the projects. The opinions of and relations with the EUTF varied by EUD however, depending on a number of factors, including the significance of migration related projects in the portfolio and how much additional funding the Fund actually brought to the EUD.

With regards to speed of implementation, several EUDs did mention that the pressure to disburse had led to 'too many big contracts' to IPs who, in any case, reverted to sub-contractors, thus increasing money spent on overheads and delays. Large contracts were also criticised by EUDs and external stakeholders who said that large IPs were sometimes chosen not because they were the best but 'to have less to manage'.

3. Implementation

Selection of implementing partners

The EUTF has been criticised, even by its own member states, for what some call the 'washing machine syndrome' in which member states agencies are supposedly getting most of the Fund's budget. This notion, however, could have been cleared up or at least tempered by a portfolio analysis which shows that things are not as extreme as they are said to be (see section on *EUTF portfolio analysis*).

The important role of the member states' agencies is related to criticisms that say that the EUTF is too broad, too development-oriented, partly because the member states agencies are said to propose actions they are familiar with. In this regard, the Fund has been decried for giving the implementing partners too much power in the development of projects, in some cases even asking them to write the Fiches Action for their own projects. In addition, as mentioned above, an IP's knowledge that they have been informally chosen for a project gives them a high leveraging power when it comes to contract negotiation.

At the same time, some rightfully point out that the member states (and sometimes their agencies) are sometimes the best placed, with the best experience to take on certain contracts, partly because of historical and diplomatic relations (e.g. Italy with Libya or Spain with Morocco, France in francophone Africa because of language capacities among other things).

Several EUDs pointed out the risks of diluting the EU strategy or EU image when choosing certain partners: some indicated member state agencies were more likely to follow their state's line (especially when there was co-funding) and others considered international agencies had their own agenda. In any case, they called for a better balance of implementing partners, with increased inclusion of NGOs – both international and local – and CSOs (which some member states and most partner states also recommended)

In summary though, what transpires through all these points is that many contracts were not allocated to IPs based on a solid analysis taking into consideration their core competences, field presence, ability to deliver in complex and remote situations, existing relations with the government and proven track record. The choice of IPs sometimes did not either seem to consider the impact on the EU's strategy and visibility or notions of portfolio diversification and local ownership.

Encouraging the nexus approach

As part of its innovative approach, the EUTF is recognised for having encouraged work in the development-humanitarian nexus, funding this type of work and encouraging implementing partners to work together on related topics, for instance in the sphere of forced displacement. This has led to broader projects, with both short and long term aspects and apparently encouraged humanitarian partners to more sustainable practices. It has, however, increased the risk (raised by several interlocutors) that increasing numbers of partners will try (and have started) to move away from short term, humanitarian work to 'follow the money.' For development partners, limited staff resources and lack of experience in running protection and humanitarian assistance programmes in complex crises also reportedly prevented opportunities for further integrating humanitarian work within development programming.

More broadly, the degree of effectiveness of implementation of the nexus varied across regions, with some DG ECHO interlocutors regretting insufficient coordination and lack of joint programming resulting in overlapping of activities in North Africa for instance, as well as the fact that humanitarian principles may not have been sufficiently taken into account. Consultations with EUDs confirmed the perceived importance of the nexus and the wide range of situations with regards to its actual implementation.

In the security-development nexus, though, there is still progress to be made, in part because the cultural divide is broader. Actors working in this nexus regretted a 'project' mentality which, they said, was not adapted to what are, in essence, long term, highly sensitive reforms that need more time and a more structural, even political approach than that which the EUTF gave them, coming according to them, too much from a development angle. In this regard, some stakeholders regretted the lack of high-level political involvement and representation from the Commission, which, they say could have helped push forward some particularly sensitive projects. Interviewed member states confirmed the importance for them of implementing the nexus but said there was still a long way to go.

Recommendations for future programming

1. Strategy, objectives and mobilisation around the next phase of programming

Redefine the purpose of the EU's migration, displacement and mobility programming in Africa at the crossroads of the different priorities at stake

The **overall purpose** could be aligned with the objectives expressed through the Global Compact for Migration (GCM), ensuring that migration in and out of Africa is safer, better informed, more orderly and better managed.

The **more specific objectives should aim at a balanced approach of migration, displacement and mobility** that takes into account:

- the **needs of the most vulnerable**: a comprehensive and sustainable response to major flows of forced displacement and the protection of migrants along the routes of Africa;
- the **priorities of partner countries** that tend to be more focused on legal mobility and channels, protection of their citizens, diaspora engagement and the support to host communities, combined with security priorities;
- **European priorities** on irregular migration, return and reintegration, anti-trafficking and smuggling and border management, combined with developmental goals and future EU labour market needs.

Specific priorities and objectives should be reassessed in each region, and then by country, to define a balanced portfolio of migration and mobility programmes to address these, while maintaining cross-country coherence through regional initiatives and making sure not to create or exacerbate regional – or continental – imbalances.

Funding should take into consideration the correspondence between the **magnitude of the problem** and the response.

Carefully define the boundaries of the migration, mobility and displacement portfolio

Root causes should not be addressed through the migration 10% funding line, but rather through the main part of the NDICI portfolio (the other 90%) with a range of activities addressing job creation, infrastructure, improvement of public services, support to governance and peacebuilding that will generally contribute to the country's development and stabilisation but **should not be earmarked migration** – even if some would argue that better governance, job opportunities and stability are likely to decrease irregular migration and forced displacement. The “10%” should not be used either for non-migration/displacement-related (or very indirectly related) activities under the pretext that beneficiary countries would not want these to go under bilateral funding.

It is also important to carefully **research and define what ‘root causes’ actually are**: the literature already shows that they vary based on a large number of factors (including nationality, economic well-being, level of education, religion and perceptions – including concerns and grievances – of their country and institutions) and are different for economic migration as opposed to forced displacement. What works in one country and for one type of migrant might not in another situation. Thus, a job creation project may not be useful if people migrate because they are unhappy with their government. This is why it is important to clearly understand exactly what the real root causes are in each context before formulating a possible response.

In parallel, migration should be mainstreamed in development portfolios as a general principle, but should only be accounted in the 10% **when they directly benefit migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers, IDPs, returnees or victims of trafficking**, in which case some development projects can be partly earmarked *migration*. This should, for example, be the case of job creation projects with a quota dedicated to returnees and referral systems linking them to return and reintegration activities, or TVET programmes taking on board well-identified groups of refugees, etc.

In general, the balance between mainstreaming migration in the NDICI *development* portfolio on the one hand, and dedicating funding to core migration projects to develop specific systems, capacities and protection solutions on the other, should be carefully calibrated in order to avoid spreading the 10% too thin.

Stabilisation and security activities should be the object of a specific funding line, although activities related to the stabilisation of host communities will have to be designed in coherence with specific support to refugees, IDPs and migrants in areas of high displacement, ideally using a triple nexus approach.

Move away from the emergency mode and establish a mid-term strategy

None – or few, other than some sudden crises leading to displacement and emergency needs – of the key issues identified under migration, displacement and mobility thematic reviews can be addressed in the short term, and many of the activities initiated under the EUTF are expected to bear fruits in the medium to long term.

In each thematic area, a **multi-stage approach should be defined, with realistic hypotheses of completion and impact, while continuity, handover / exit strategies and sustainability** options should be envisioned and properly timed; this multi-stage approach might have to be spread across several funding cycles.

Integrate current and future mobility trends, and the risks of shocks in the design of flexible systems and tools

The natural demographic growth observed across the continent, the attractiveness of coastal areas and a number of regions abroad, the increasing effects of climate change and increasing levels of connectivity are expected to continue generating a **desire to migrate in specific countries and sub-groups that has to be anticipated and accompanied, and sometimes oriented** (for example towards areas of growing economic activity).

Large population movements triggered by political crises, climate change or natural disasters are expected to occur on the African continent over the next decades. Some of these can be anticipated; others will remain unpredictable.

Resources should be dedicated to the tracking of population movements (IDPs, refugees and migrants) and the monitoring of the origin, destination and profile of people on the move to better inform programming, with a high level of reactivity (early warning systems) and a depth allowing for the identification of protection needs and their evolution. This should naturally involve the key partners involved in these fields who have already developed data collection tools and systems (UNHCR, IOM, and DRC in particular) and could involve the support of a combination of mobility tracking tools like the 4Mi (DRC), and DTM (including flow monitoring points and transhumance tracking tool) already put in place by IOM in a large number of countries, whose design should be readjusted to the needs of the community of migration stakeholders, and whose data should be made available on a regular basis to relevant practitioners.¹

¹ The way forward could include a more flexible and light approach, with a more limited number of points, focused not necessarily on capturing exact flows but rather on the detection of protection issues and potential mass/unexpected movements. This could

Tools and systems that are being put in place will have to remain flexible to absorb these trends and shocks, and should be built to integrate updated information on crises and stress in real time (regular updates on migration and displacement, early warning systems, rapid reaction procedures).

Return beneficiary states to the driver's seat with regards to migration policy wherever possible

Interviewed partner states have shown their interest in managing migration and mobility-related policy, at least when it comes to their own nationals. While they appreciated the EUTF's efforts, and some advocated for a specific migration funding line or facility to be maintained, to ensure a continuity in the efforts undertaken under the EUTF, they asked for more involvement, more and better information sharing and more coordination organised around their existing plans (when these plans exist).

A first step could be to make an **assessment of each country's migration, mobility and forced displacement-related landscape in the transition phase to the new funding cycle**, including existing legislation and structures, programs and gaps, to then develop programs that would be as well aligned as possible to the partner countries' needs and priorities – in line with a recommendation made in the Migration Governance section. Despite the inherent complexity and time required for these types of assessments and for work with complex national systems, this would allow for more buy-in and in fine sustainability and would help avoid duplication with other donors.

In some specific circumstances in which these topics may not be a priority or where it may be hard to find the right national-level interlocutors, the assessments would remain useful and different types of national interlocutors should continue to be brought on board, like local level governments and CSOs.

Establish road maps for donor cooperation involving partner countries, key institutions (AU, RECs) and expert agencies in each sub-thematic area to ensure a coherent programming in each region / country

Momentum has been built and at the same time tensions around migration and mobility have decreased enough that there is a **window of opportunity to gather the multiple stakeholders** of migration, displacement and mobility and build on the lessons learned in the last five years from the EUTF and other programmes to **plan for the future in a coordinated fashion**.

Such road maps could be developed using the technical meetings linked to the key continental and regional political dialogues (Khartoum, Rabat), through the Global Refugee Forum for displacement-related issues or through any other relevant forum assembling the three main actors (donors, partner countries and specialists).

Several key stakeholders have been identified in each thematic area whose contribution to regional thematic roadmaps could be valuable. Many of them expressed an interest in participating.

This, however, would **require preparation and coordination** in order to have the right actors in the room (partner countries, donors, specialists) and **base the discussion on data** (reports such as this one could be used as a starting point to develop common ground) in order to **move forward constructively** and build a plan.

A series of thematic **roadmap consultations** could be organised in early 2021, along with the next programming phase, to develop an agreed-upon matrix of priority interventions and short-, mid- and long-term objectives in each sub-theme, and establish coordination mechanisms if necessary. These

be complemented by longitudinal 'stock' assessments in specific points of tension based on needs. In addition, the mobility tracking component focused on IDPs should be further developed, potentially building collaborations with National Institutes of Statistics to foster sustainability. Finally, special attention should be placed upon the Transhumance Tracking Tool developed by the DTM – especially in light of the mounting farmer-herder tensions in SLC – and in particular on its early warning system, which if deemed successful, could be replicated in other areas.

already exist in some specific thematic areas, such as forced displacement with the CRRF at country level.

Establish meaningful partnerships with other donors and agencies, leverage the leadership of some stakeholders in specific thematic areas, and develop complementarities of programming – enhancing the Team Europe approach

Some donors and agencies have positioned themselves on certain thematic areas and geographies (in part thanks to the EUTF's funding). This should not be ignored, and on the contrary **complementarities should be highlighted and built upon** (see thematic reviews for more detail).

Team Europe principles should be adopted and strengthened in each country (as is already being done) to develop coherent migration portfolios, avoid overlaps with EU member states' portfolios, and build on the specific interests and strategies of partner states.

Some international organisations – UN or other – have mandates and/or established track records in certain thematic areas and/or regions/countries. This could be built upon to **develop real, mutually beneficial partnerships**. The EU-IOM Joint Initiative was a good start: further partnerships could ensure more strategic decision-making through common, clearer messaging, improved service and adaptation and more adapted information-sharing, while possibly reducing contracting and programming costs/efforts and ensuring continuity.

Similarly, work with RECs would benefit from being reassessed: an analysis could be done of the multiplicity of donors working with them, their areas of focus, the organisations' key strengths (and weaknesses) and the specific areas their member states are more willing to let them take the lead on. Based on this, more organised and targeted support could be developed that could better play to the organisations' strengths.

Bear in mind that not all partnerships need to be structured and formal (which could be complicated given existing bureaucracies) as long as they allow high-level strategic agreement and direction setting.

At the same time, it will be essential to carefully **review both overall partners and implementers on a case by case basis**, based on their comparative advantages, established track records in the specific places and modalities of implementation, thematic expertise and key strengths and weaknesses. Consider the **implications of choosing a partner on the EU's strategy, communication and visibility**, as, inevitably, these partners will have their own (or their main donor's) strategy, and ensure alignment where possible – or choose another partner.

It would be advisable to **diversify the pool of available implementers** to avoid depending too much on one partner, encourage innovation and ensure the right fit with specific projects and contexts. One of the main criticisms of the EUTF was that its speedy decision-making was cancelled out by slow implementation because it was 'playing with the usual development actors' and that in several cases they did not, at the beginning, have the relevant migration and displacement-related expertise (which they did develop over time), thus leading to sub-contracting, increased timelines and higher overhead costs.

Continue to develop a culture that encourages innovation and learning

One of the EUTF's strengths has been to innovate and develop new types of projects (some of the most criticised projects at the beginning might yet turn out to be some of its key successes).

Development tends to be a field where the same 'tried and true' approaches continue to be replicated for years, even when they do not necessarily provide the desired impact and without testing key assumptions. The EUTF showed that new approaches are possible. **Such new, evidence-based approaches should be further encouraged**, including with new partners. But, more importantly, a **system that allows for lessons to be learned from these approaches**, even when they have been replaced by others, should be built. It would also gain from being centralised (collecting information

from the three windows, which are still quite separate, including in their information management) and maintained regularly, encouraging cross-fertilisation across projects and geographies / windows. This is especially important at a moment when all eyes are turning from the EUTF and its projects towards the new MFF with the risk of the EUTF becoming 'old news'. One could also consider learning from the other relevant Trust Funds (e.g. Bêkou and Madad).

Build a strong communication strategy – overall, by country and by project

While the EUTF brought migration and mobility issues into the limelight, it was also criticised for its lack of control over its messaging and its lack of responsiveness to criticism. When developing innovative approaches, it will be important to **support them with strong communication**: if the fundamentals of a programme/project are good (a solid theory of change based on strong evidence), **bold communication should be possible and is desirable**, especially in the face of baseless criticism.

There should be investments in a strategic communication team that can drive a message forward and support implementation. This should be accompanied by **political support** when needed.

Post-EUTF transition: Ensure continuity on the most successful initiatives while defining a new ambition and vision; both should not be contradictory

While EUTF transition recommendations will be more detailed in the next section, as the EUTF is about to be replaced by the NDICI, it is important to highlight that a great many projects will continue implementing during the next three to four years and will **need to continue to benefit from EU support**, with regard to human resources and systems but also to visibility and political support. A **bridging system should be set up** so that their achievements (and failures) continue to be documented and feed into the parallel NDICI programming and vice versa. The recent one-year extension of the EUTF gives the EU an opportunity to organise this transition properly.

Geography: Extend migration, displacement and mobility strategies to other African countries affected by migration and displacement flows

This is particularly relevant in the case of forced displacement, where movements and solutions should be looked at from a wide, regional angle, as well as in cases of cross-border issues such as trafficking and international crime and of international migration routes in general. This is also important in order to **avoid creating further imbalances** within the continent by focusing on certain areas more than others.

Pay greater attention to migration and displacement caused by climate change and environmental disasters

Research suggests that, as the dramatic impacts of climate change will be felt more and more severely throughout the African continent in the next decades, both in terms of slow-onset and rapid degradations and natural disasters, this risks causing mass migration to neighbouring countries and Europe, as well as mass internal displacement. **This trend should be carefully monitored in future funding instruments and built into programming and long-term planning**, in order to promote communities' resilience and facilitate safe and regular migration as a positive adaptive measure.

2. Programming and implementation modalities

Transition phase: Allocate time and resources to design the next programming cycle in a coordinated manner to give migration and mobility programming its full place

As highlighted by many EUDs, there is a tremendous pressure to start delivering the main lines of the next programming cycle. At the same time, retroactively, the EUTF's hurried start and accelerated approach at the beginning is seen by many as one of its main weaknesses.

Therefore, in a context where a new and more balanced programming strategy needs to be developed on migration and mobility – as well as all other areas – in many countries, **time and resources should be allocated to solid strategies, based on well thought-through theories of change, building on evidence** and lessons learned from the EUTF. As much as possible, room should be left to conduct the necessary assessments and develop each region and country's strategy progressively, in regular consultation with the partner countries' governments.

Time and space should also be given to the EUDs to develop their strategies by following, where relevant, a **nexus approach, where the different units and DGs work together** (e.g. DEVCO and ECHO but also security and resilience), based on the same information, assumptions and objectives in order to ensure that migration and mobility issues are either addressed directly if necessary or **fully and measurably mainstreamed** in other relevant programmes.

Take into account the partner countries' limitations in terms of absorption capacity – project ambitions need to be adjusted appropriately, and technical support should be increased in a number of countries

While the ambitions of many EUTF and non-EUTF migration projects were legitimate, many of them faced the lack of capacity – and absorption capacity – of the partner countries' governments, regional organisations and sometimes local partners.

Project phasing and milestones should take this limitation into account in a realistic manner, and while systems should be put in place relatively quickly to generate change, they must be accompanied by a long capacity-building, mentoring and handover phase.

It could be interesting to identify best practices of successful institutional capacity building in Africa and try to replicate the best approaches in the field of migration governance.

Build sustainability into programming from the beginning

As EUTF contracting comes to an end, the sustainability of existing programmes and initiatives is a recurring question. Many of the EUTF's programmes have spent considerable effort building the capacities of local partners, training and mentoring them. It could be advisable to conduct a longitudinal assessment of these efforts to ascertain where the intended goal is reached in the longer term.

Indeed, this may help highlight the most efficient and effective ways to build capacity (training of trainers, involvement of leadership in staff's capacity building) while respecting absorption capacity. In this regard, some interviewed beneficiaries showed more interest in help working with other countries or developing centralised databases than in 'more training.'

Implementing partners (MS agencies, UN agencies, NGOs, consortia and coordination mechanisms): efficiency, continuity, access and diversification will have to be balanced

As mentioned above, a **balance needs to be established between global or continental partnerships and the need for efficiency, continuity, innovation and the diversification** of partners based on their strengths.

At both the global / HQ level and the country level, it could be worthwhile to make and regularly maintain a list of potential IPs and an overall and country/level assessment of their presence, strengths and weaknesses, comparative advantages (specific expertise, languages, skill sets, systems already in place, access to local authorities, flexibility and transparency, and ability to collaborate and build local capacities, M&E systems and including their likelihood to sub-contract other partners and the additional costs involved) in order to be able to pick from them faster when the need arises. At the country level, this could be particularly useful in identifying NGOs and CSOs that could be called upon.

Given the work and projects that are currently being implemented, it would also be good to **build on the capacities and systems created** by a number of organisations: this would allow institutional

knowledge to be built on instead of starting from scratch, while integrating adjustments and improvements based on the return on experience.

In fragile environments, NGOS – both international and national – and local CSOs can be particularly useful in their ability to deploy speedily to remote areas and to continue implementing in difficult circumstances even when international organisations and member state agencies cannot. In addition, local CSOs can be particularly useful in situations with little government (central or local) buy-in and to ensure sustainability. At the same time, working with these types of partners, given their often limited size, can be quite labour intensive for EUDs: it is therefore important to **carefully consider the need for consortia and which partners to include**. While they are useful, for instance to bring on board smaller, more localised actors such as civil society, they need to be well **built, supported and budgeted for** in order to really deliver synergies. Coordination units need to be budgeted for, joint (or at least coordinated) objectives, timelines and strategies must be agreed upon, and Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL) and communication tools have to be put in place.¹ On this topic, INTPA could try to benefit from ECHO's experience working with NGOs and CSOs.

Think out of the EUTF box and diversify the migration portfolio in exploring all thematic areas in light of changing contexts in each country

Some thematic areas were neglected in the design phase of the EUTF because of lack of time, relevant know-how, possible lack of interest from local authorities, or because the context was different at the time – which is the case in many countries in the SLC region, where security has since deteriorated and where major population movements have occurred.

In the early stage of the new programming phase, the entire matrix of migration and mobility thematic areas should be considered in light of the country's situation and the partner government's priorities, even when they are not aligned with the EU's, considering, among other things, that certain areas can serve as bridges for more difficult subjects.

Work across EUDs to coordinate regional programming and share lessons and good practices

As already initiated for the pre-programming phase in some EUTF countries (but insufficiently done in the past), **cross-EUD consultations** will be necessary to align objectives and lines of programming across countries in each thematic area. This coordination should be given time and space in the next few months. Similarly, cross-window and cross-geographical team consultations should be encouraged, with the support of the Migration thematic unit and the newly created Regional and Multi-Country Programmes for Africa unit in order to ensure the appropriate regional or cross-window responses are developed.

HR and institutional knowledge: Build on knowledge gained through the EUTF management teams and position at least one dedicated migration and mobility portfolio coordinator in most EU delegations, as relevant

Continuity needs to be ensured as much as possible in the teams in both HQ and on the ground to support the transition phase and avoid reinventing the wheel in countries of high turnover. In the future, it would be important to continue to **recruit specialists** on migration and/or displacement and related topics (e.g. protection) and embed them in EUD teams.

¹ For more information on consortia and implementation in remote areas see following Altai MLS case studies: “*Les mécanismes d'inter-consortiums comme modalité de gestion de programmes de résilience au Sahel - Étude de cas*”, June 2020; “*Collaboration in cross-border areas of the Horn of Africa region - Case study on the EUTF cross-border programme*”, January 2021; and “*Conflict prevention, peace, and economic opportunities for the youth - Lessons learned from a consortium approach to stability and conflict prevention in Kenya*”, January 2019.

More systematic knowledge transmission and management tools or checklists on migration, displacement and mobility should be developed at both the country and the central (cross-window) level, including to **centralise knowledge** that is currently divided across windows and, in some cases even EUD and to **manage it proactively and disseminate it** so that it is effectively fed into future programming. This can also include ensuring that programmes in similar geographies (and/or on similar thematic areas) are aware of each other and **encouraging synergies between programmes** (e.g. BMM, AML and ROCK in HoA).

Further **cooperation with external stakeholders** (international organisations, think tanks, academics) can also be envisaged in order to continue widening and deepening the significant knowledge accumulated so far and keep it up to date.

Regional programmes vs customised national approach: integrate best practices

Developing programmes at a regional level has proven to be **the right scale** for a number of (though not all) thematic interventions: they can allow for economies of scale, exchanges and learning between countries, the creation and support of linkages between countries around a common problem and improved information sharing. However, to gain the full benefit from some interventions, it is important to keep the relevant EUDs fully involved and to establish and maintain **close management** that allows for **quick reactions and high-level political support** to be applied at the right moments in the project.

In any case, it should be ensured that a **regional analysis is conducted** before and during country-level projects on migration and mobility, as these can have an **impact on other countries** and even other regions (cf. impact of some Niger projects on migration routes and protection issues in the two windows).

3. Monitoring, evaluation and learning and data systems

Continue enhancing an evidence-based and real-time learning approach grounded in several layers of monitoring and data tracking

Ensure real-time monitoring and learning: Continue harvesting lessons learned across countries and monitoring projects in real time¹ (to be able to react and make appropriate changes or provide political support in time) and share learning in a flexible manner with relevant stakeholders – depending on the stakeholders, different amounts and types of information can be tailored and disseminated via newsletters, case studies, short webinars, or a dedicated learning platform by thematic area with a maintenance resource.

What to disseminate to whom and how should be part of a dedicated MEL strategy, the most important aspect of which should be **ensuring that the information gathered is in fact used to adapt** existing and/or build better new programmes.

Continue aggregating project outputs and developing visualisation tools to create a strong basis of information that will allow for a better coordination and analysis of effects generated by ongoing EUTF projects and future migration, displacement and mobility projects.

Combine a series of tools to measure effects and impact

EUTF outcomes will only start coming to the surface in the next few years. One should be realistic about what can be collected in the short term (best practices, details of activities and outputs, feedback from

¹ This can include a combination of internal monitoring at project level, the aggregation of monitoring data at the portfolio level, and third-party monitoring (TPM) with complementary data collected at the field level by an external body and a rapid feedback loop into project teams to adapt activities accordingly. When combined with a learning component (TPML), lessons can also be shared across countries and with other donors.

project teams and local partners, and immediate outcomes) vs long term changes and trends that will have to be measured. For example:

- Project-level outcome monitoring should be collected through solid baseline and endline studies planned in project M&E plans (but these are not always available) or ex-post evaluations. Based on the gaps identified in M&E systems and lack of consistency in measurement methods, the development of a set of common outcomes relevant to each thematic area is highly recommended to support future programming (and prior to contract signature).¹ While a great part of the responsibility for the collection of this data lies with the IPs, the EUTF management and staff in EUDs have an important role ensuring that M&E is taken seriously and that this information is in fact collected and analysed appropriately.
- In each thematic area, a more qualitative assessment could be done to identify the changes generated over the last ten years by the sum of the different international interventions and review the most impactful approaches (outcome harvesting approach). This would also support the development of relevant indicators to support future outcome tracking for the thematic area.
- National and regional level monitoring of key trends and the correlations that can be identified with EU interventions could also be tracked. This can be done through a set of high level indicators based on external sources, and might also involve partnerships with several organisations, the development of a cross-country barometer of perceptions of migration, and in parallel the capacity building of national institutes of statistics for the long term sustainability of the systems.²

Develop and use solid M&E tools to ensure that, when migration and mobility-related programming is mainstreamed, it is done accurately and in such a way as to have real impact

Mainstreaming what are considered cross-cutting issues often turn into ‘tick the box’ situations. Even with a marker system, if **mainstreaming is to be done in an effective way**, programme managers must be given the **right tools and training** to do so. Relevant specific objectives and targets must be designed and measured accurately, the right populations and/or areas must be targeted based on established evidence, data must be at a minimum disaggregated by gender and age something that is still far from systematic in current projects (e.g. an employment programme with a returnee target must have locations in areas where returnees are likely to return, it should offer potential jobs that are likely to attract them, and its targets should be expressed in numbers of returnees).

Establish new baselines / updated assessments in 2021, overall and in each thematic area

Updated assessments of the effective implementation of frameworks and capacities in place are needed, particularly in areas such as migration governance, free movement / legal migration, countering trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants and protection along the migration routes. These types of assessments should ideally be conducted over a nine- to twelve-month timeframe and could be sequenced to i) confirm priorities, ii) define the depth of needs in each country, iii) adjust technical support according to local capacities, while the next range of projects is being identified, to anchor their design in a more accurate situation analysis (including possible risks) and prior to contracting, and iv) provide future programmes with a baseline situation analysis.

¹ See more details on the work of the MLS on outcome indicators [here](#)

² See the work of the MLS on ‘high-level indicators’, capturing the high-level trends that the EUTF contributed to (irregular migration, forced displacement, etc.) [here](#).

Hold implementing partners to the highest standards not only for implementing activities but also for collecting and sharing information

The EU's (and the EUTF's) M&E systems and ability to learn from its actions and improve programming along with time will always be limited by what it is able to gather from its implementing partners, who are closest to the ground. They are also responsible for an important part of the relationship with beneficiaries, including partner country governments. In light of this, it will be important to continue to hold them to the highest standards with regards to their M&E systems, how they are built, what they collect, what they share and with whom; and to make sure that key programmatic data is made available to both the EU and the partner country to allow them to properly monitor activities, adjust and coordinate the different streams of programming in the most agile manner.

Ensure the funding mechanism allows for rapid contracting and flexibility in contracts

This specific aspect of the EUTF was praised by most stakeholders, and was very well adapted to the migration and displacement issues at stake. Some flexibility should be maintained in the NDICI migration programming, including through the use of crisis modifiers when necessary.

Beyond these general recommendations, specific areas of opportunities and priorities for future programming were identified in each thematic area of this report.

Conclusion

The second phase of the *Learning Lessons from the EUTF* exercise provides a snapshot of migration, displacement and mobility programming in the 25 EUTF partner countries in Africa, through a combined review of over 500 projects gathered in seven key thematic (and one cross-cutting) areas, the identification of gaps and opportunities for future programming, complemented by an analysis of lessons that can be learned from the EUTF experience.

While the exercise was limited by time constraints and travel limitations, it already reflects a very dense landscape of projects and stakeholders, but also the major role played by the EUTF in contributing to shaping this landscape in the past five years. The Trust Fund has been described by many as a game changer in positioning migration much higher on the agenda of partner countries and RECs and creating new dynamics in the sector.

Initially designed to bring an emergency response to the 2015 migration crisis and support the Joint Valetta Action Plan, the EUTF gave birth to a much more ambitious and long term-oriented matrix of interventions, and the beginning of a coordinated response to many of the critical issues and challenges that have been identified along the mixed migration routes in East, West and North Africa, including major vulnerabilities and protection needs which had been identified but not addressed until then with this level of magnitude. The EUTF was a success in marking this first step and offering protection to many migrants, IDPs and refugees, while initiating the development of systems to better manage migration across the African continent. It will now have to demonstrate its ability to set in motion longer term changes, strengthen the migration dialogue with partner countries and create a continuum of programming and knowledge with the incoming NDICI.

The end of the official contracting period of the Trust Fund offers a moment to take a step back and place the EUTF interventions in the broader context of migration and development. Consulted stakeholders largely acknowledged the value created by the Trust Fund, the role the EU has had and should continue to have in migration, displacement and mobility-related programming and expressed interest in contributing to the next phase of programming, if given the opportunity to do so.

This next phase of programming should not be developed in isolation, and more space and time should be given to the design phase than what was allocated during the early days of the Trust Fund. With 10% of the NDICI dedicated to migration, displacement and mobility programming, this transition phase opens a great window of opportunity to continue building on the dynamics initiated and avoid losing the gains achieved and the momentum built so far.

This report hopefully provides a useful layer of knowledge and some ideas and directions to consider in future discussions and formulations of strategies. Further assessments will be needed to lay the foundations for future programming, in consultation with other donors and partner countries.

While migration, displacement and mobility dynamics in Africa remain a very complex subject, the options available to address the topic are now a bit better known and understood, and can be taken to the next level if rigorously informed, organised and tracked over the next 10 to 15 years.

Annexes

Abbreviations

A-TIPSOM	Action Against Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants in Nigeria
ACAV	<i>Associazione Centro Aiuti Volontari</i>
ACF	Action Against Hunger
AECID	<i>Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo</i>
AFD	<i>Agence Française de Développement</i>
AICS	<i>Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo</i>
AJUSEN	<i>Appui à la Justice, Sécurité et à la Gestion des Frontières au Niger</i>
AMEM	<i>Appui à la Migration Equitable pour le Maghreb</i>
AMIF	Asylum and Migration and Integration Fund
AML/TBH	Disrupting Criminal Trafficking and Smuggling Networks Through Increased Anti-Money Laundering and Financial Investigation Capacity in the Greater Horn of Africa
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
AR	Awareness Raising
ARRA	Agency for Refugees and Returnees
AU	African Union
AUBP	African Union Border Programme
AUC	African Union Commission
AVR	Assisted Voluntary Return
AVRR	Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration
B	Billion
BAMF	German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees
BIMS	Biometrics Identity Management System
BLA	Bilateral Labour Agreement
BMM	Better Migration Management
BMP	Border Management Programme
BMZ	<i>Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung</i>
BRAER	Building Resilience and an Effective Emergency Refugee Response
BRI	Building Resilience Initiative
CAMM	Common Agendas for Migration and Mobility
CATS NN	Collaboration Against Trafficking and Smuggling in Nigeria & Niger
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CBPF	Country-Based Pooled Funds
CD4D	Connecting Diaspora for Development
CEFA	<i>Comité Européen pour la Formation et l'Agriculture</i>
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CFA	<i>Communauté Financière Africaine</i>
CMA29	<i>Chambre de Métiers et de l'Artisanat du Finistère</i>
CMR	Central Mediterranean Route
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COOPI	<i>Cooperazione Internazionale</i>
COP	Common Operating Picture

CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSSF	Conflict, Stability and Security Fund
CTB	<i>Agence Belge de Développement</i>
CTRS	<i>Communauté Tunisienne Résidente en Suisse</i>
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DAC	Displacement Affected Communities or Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DC	Detention Centre
DCI	<i>Défense Conseil International</i>
DCIM	Department for Combating Illegal Migration
DDF	Demand-driven Facility
DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development
DFID	Department for International Development
DIZA	<i>Programme de Développement Inclusif des Zones d'Accueil au Tchad</i>
DoA	Description of Action
DRC	Danish Refugee Council or Democratic Republic of the Congo
DRDIP	Development Response to Displacement Impacts Project
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
DT&V	Repatriation and Departure Service
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
EAC	East African Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECHO	Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
ECI	<i>Equipe Conjointe d'Investigation</i>
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECRet	European Centre for Returns
EDF	European Development Fund
EEA	European Economic Area
EF	Expertise France
ERRIN	European Return and Reintegration Network
ETM	Emergency Transit Mechanism
EU	European Union
EU NAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
EUCAP	European Union Capacity Building Mission in Niger
EUD	European Union Delegation
EURINT	European Integrated Return Management Initiative
EURLO	European Return Liaison Office
EUTF	European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa
EUTM Mali	European Union Training Mission in Mali
FAIR	Integrated Programme on Fair Recruitment
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
FIIAPP	<i>Fundación Internacional y para Iberoamérica de Administración y Políticas Públicas</i>
FMM	Free Movement of Persons and Migration

FMP	Free Movement Protocol
FPI	Service for Foreign Policy Instruments
GAR-SI	<i>Groupes d'Action Rapides – Surveillance et Intervention</i>
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GCM	Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
GCR	Global Compact for Refugees
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIS	Ghana Immigration Service
GIZ	<i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</i>
GLOA.ACT	Global Action against Trafficking in Persons and the Smuggling of Migrants
GPFD	Global Programme on Forced displacement
GRET	<i>Groupe de Recherches et d'Echanges Technologiques</i>
GSP	Global Skills Partnership
HACP	<i>Haute Autorité à la Consolidation de la Paix</i>
HAO	Humanitarian Affairs Officers
HD	<i>Centre pour le Dialogue Humanitaire</i>
HDP	Humanitarian-Development-Peace
HDPI	Humanitarian-Development-Peace-Initiative
HoA	Horn of Africa
HOME	Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs
HOMERe	High Opportunity for Mediterranean Executive Recruitment
HTI	Human Trafficking Institute
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IBM	Integrated Border Management
ICBT	Informal Cross-Border Trade
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
ID	Identity Document
ID4D	Identification for Development
IDA	International Development Association
IDC	Directorate General for Development Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy
IDLO	International Development Law Organisation
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMVF	<i>Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr</i>
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
INTPA	Directorate-General for International Partnerships
IO	International Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IP	Implementing Partner
IRC	International Rescue Committee

ISOLT	<i>Projet d'appui à l'Inclusion Sociale et à la gouvernance locale</i>
IT	Information Technology
ITC	International Trade Centre
JHDF	Joint Humanitarian-Development Framework
JI	Joint Initiative
JLMP	Joint Labour Migration Programme
JNRP-RS	Joint Nutrition. Resilience Programme in Red Sea State
KEY	<i>Programme de renforcement de la résilience des communautés, des ménages et des individus vulnérables à l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Mali</i>
KII	Key Informant Interviews
KSA	Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
LCBC	Lake Chad Basin Commission
LCR	Libyan Coast Guard
LESP SLSP	Livestock Epidemio-Surveillance Project to Support Livelihoods of vulnerable rural smallholders and pastoralists
LIBMM	Support to Integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya
LMIS	Labour Market Information System
LO	Liaison Officer
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
LuxDev	Lux-Development S.A.
LWOB	Lawyers Without Borders
M	Million
M4D	Mobiles for Development
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MC	Mercy Corps
MC2CM	Mediterranean City-to-City Migration
MCN	Managing Conflict in Nigeria
MdM	<i>Médecins du Monde France</i>
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MGI	Migration Governance Indicators
MICR	Migration Information Centre for Returnees
MIDA	Migration for Development in Africa
MIDWA	Migration Dialogue for West Africa
MIEUX	Migration EU eXpertise
MIITG	Make it in The Gambia
MINUSMA	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MLS	Monitoring and Learning System
MMC	Mixed Migration Centre
MMD	Migration and Mobility Dialogue
MNJTF	Multinational Joint Task Force
MOI	Ministry of Interior
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPF	Migration Partnership Framework
MRC	Migrant Resource Centre
MRRC	Migration Response and Resources Centre
MRRM	Migrant Resource and Response Mechanism
MS	Member State
MSF	<i>Médecins Sans Frontières</i>

MSME	Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises
NACSAT	North Africa Cooperation on Migrant Smuggling and Trafficking in Persons
NCO	National Coordination Office
NDICI	Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument
NEAR	Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
NENTAD	North-East Transition to Development Programme
NFI	Non-Food Items
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NISS	National Intelligence and Security Services
NoA	North of Africa
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NSM	National Strategy on Migration
NWoW	New Way of Working
OUA	Organisation of African Unity
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OCWAR-T	Organised Crime: West African Response to trafficking
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFII	<i>Office Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration</i>
ONARS	<i>Office National d'Assistance aux Réfugiés et Sinistrés</i>
OSBP	One-Stop Border Post
OTE	<i>Office des Tunisiens à l'Étranger</i>
PAAIP	<i>Programme d'Appui à l'Autonomisation et l'Inclusion des Populations</i>
PAGS	<i>Appui à la Coopération Régionale des Pays du G5 Sahel et au Collège Sahélien de Sécurité</i>
PAIERA	<i>Plan d'Actions à Impact Économique Rapide à Agadez</i>
PAISD	<i>Programme d'Appui aux Initiatives de Solidarité pour le Développement</i>
PALIM	Pilot Project Addressing Labour Shortages Through Innovative Labour Migration Models
PAMOJA	Kenya Integrated Refugee and Host Community Support Programme
PanAf	Pan-African Programme
PARSEC	Support Programme to Strengthen Security in the Mopti Region and Improve the Management of Border Areas
PASPED	<i>Programme de Contraste à la Migration Illégale à Travers l'Appui au Secteur Privé et à la Création d'Emplois au Sénégal</i>
PDU	<i>Programme d'Urgence pour la Stabilisation des Espaces Frontaliers du G5 Sahel</i>
PEV	<i>Lutte Contre l'Extremisme Violent</i>
PfRR	Partnership for Recovery and Resilience
PLASEPRI	<i>Plateforme d'Appui au Secteur Privé et à la Valorisation de la Diaspora Sénégalaise en Italie</i>
POC	<i>Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint</i>
PoC	Person of Concern
PPMM	Participatory Programme Monitoring Meetings
PRAPS	<i>Projet Régional d'Appui au Pastoralisme au Sahel</i>
PRESEC	<i>Projet de Renforcement de la Résilience des Populations des Régions Septentrionales du Cameroun</i>
PRIME Africa	Platform for Remittances, Investments and Migrants' Entrepreneurship in Africa
PRM	US Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration
ProGEF	Programme Gestion Intégrée des Espaces Frontaliers
PROMIG-FES	Promoting Migration Governance (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung)

PROMISA	<i>Projet d'Appui à la Protection des Migrants les plus Vulnérables sur les Routes Migratoires du Sahel</i>
PSIRC	Integrated Security Plan for the Central Regions
PSRP	Private Sponsorship of Refugees Programme
PSS	Psychosocial Sector
RDPP	Regional Development and Protection Programme
REC	Regional Economic Community
RECOSA	<i>Renforcement des Collectivités Territoriales Marocaines dans l'Amélioration des Structures d'Accueil des Migrants</i>
ReDSS	Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat
RE-INTEG	Enhancing Somalia's Responsiveness to the Management and Reintegration of Mixed Migration Flows
RESET	Resilience Building and Creation of Economic Opportunities in Ethiopia
RESILAC	<i>Redressement économique et Social Inclusif du Lac Tchad</i>
RESTE	<i>Résilience et Emploi au lac Tchad</i>
RESTORE	Building Resilience in Northern Somalia
ROCK	Regional Operational Centre in Support of the Khartoum Process and AU-Horn of Africa Initiative
ROM	Results-Oriented Monitoring
RR	Return and Reintegration
RPLRP	Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project
RRF	Return and Reintegration Facility
RSD	Refugee Status Determination
RSSD	Recovery, Stability and Socio-Economic Development in Libya
RST	Resettlement
RSW	Refugee Sub Window
S3M	Simple, Spatial, Survey Method
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAR	Search and Rescue
SDC	Swiss Development Cooperation
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SIDA	Swedish International Development cooperation Agency
SIMPI	Strengthening IGAD's Migration Policy Implementation
SLC	Sahel and Lake Chad
SLCRR	Strengthening Local Capacities and Resilience in Libya
SNIA	National Strategy on Immigration and Asylum
SNV	<i>Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers</i>
SO	Strategic Objective
SO 1	Greater Economic and Employment Opportunities
SO 2	Strengthening Resilience of Communities and in Particular the Most Vulnerable Including Refugees and Other Displaced People
SO 3	Improving Migration Management
SO 4	Improved Governance and Conflict Prevention and Reduction of Forced Displacement Land Irregular Migration
SOM	Smuggling of Migrants
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SORUDEV	South Sudan Rural Development: Strengthening Smallholders' Resilience
SSR	
SRD	<i>Sécurité-Résilience-Développement</i>
SPRS-NU	Support Programme to the Refugee Settlements and Host Communities in Northern Uganda

SSII	Safety, Support and Solutions Phase II
TCF	Technical Cooperation Facility
TEH	<i>Appui à la Lutte Contre la Traite des Personnes dans le Golfe de Guinée</i>
THAMM	Towards a Holistic Approach to Labour Migration Governance and Labour Mobility in North Africa
TIP	Trafficking In Persons
TN	Triple Nexus
ToR	Terms of reference
TSO	<i>Terre Solidali</i>
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UDI	Norwegian Directorate of Immigration
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNSF	United Nations Strategic Framework
UNSMIL	United Nations Support Mission in Libya
UNVTF	United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Victims of Trafficking in Persons
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollars
VHR	Voluntary Humanitarian Return
VOT	Victim of Trafficking
WACAP	West African Network of Central Authorities and Prosecutors
WAPIS	West Africa Police Information System
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WHS	World Humanitarian Summit
YEP	Youth Empowerment Project

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