



EUTF Monitoring and Learning System SLC

YEARLY 2021 REPORT
COVERING UNTIL 31 DECEMBER 2021

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CONTENTS

CONTENTS	4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	5
1. INTRODUCTION	7
1.1. Background	7
1.2. The EUTF SLC window in 2021	7
2. METHODOLOGY	8
2.1. MLS methodology	8
2.2. Challenges and limitations in the 2021 Report.....	10
3. PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW	11
3.1. Budget and number of contracts by status.....	11
3.2. Budget distribution by country, implementing partner and Strategic Objective	15
3.3. Budget allocated to the COVID-19 response	17
4. SITUATION AND RESULTS OVERVIEW	18
4.1. The Sahel and Lake Chad region in 2021.....	18
4.2. The EUTF response – overview of results	19
5. ANALYSIS BY COUNTRY	49
5.1. Burkina Faso	49
5.2. Cameroon	57
5.3. Chad	62
5.4. Côte d'Ivoire	70
5.5. Ghana	74
5.6. Guinea	79
5.7. Mali	86
5.8. Mauritania	93
5.9. Niger	100
5.10. Nigeria.....	107
5.11. Senegal.....	113
5.12. The Gambia	122
CONCLUSIONS	128
6. INDEX	130
6.1. Tables	130
6.2. Figures	130
6.3. Outcome analyses.....	132


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the ninth report prepared by the Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) for the Sahel and Lake Chad window, covering all outputs achieved through funding from the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced people in Africa (EUTF) in the Sahel and Lake Chad (SLC) region, from the start of activities until the end of December 2021, with a specific focus on outputs generated in 2021 and in the second semester (S2) of 2021.

This report includes outputs from programmes implemented in Burkina Faso, Benin, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, The Gambia and Togo.¹

As of December 2021, the EUTF for Africa has committed (i.e. funds allocated following decisions by the Operational Committees) €4.93B (billion), including €2.21B to 114 decisions in the SLC window. A total of 213 operational projects have been contracted in the SLC region, including 76 completed projects, 123 projects in implementation and 14 projects in inception. 118 of the projects currently in implementation have data or other qualitative information to report and five are either too early in their implementation phase to be able to report outputs or their activities have not yet generated outputs that are relevant to the EUTF indicators. The current report includes data on 194 projects (equivalent in funding to €1.94B), comprising 76 completed projects, as well as 118 projects in their implementation phase with data to report.

Figure 1: Contracted budget breakdown by country and Strategic Objective, December 2021²



Strategic Objective 1: Greater economic and employment opportunities

Positive GDP growth rates drove employment to pick up in almost all sectors of the economy in 2021 but have not been sufficient to absorb new entrants to the job market and make up for the losses of 2020.³ In 2021, EUTF-funded activities created or supported 31,738 jobs (indicator 1.1), a 43% increase compared to cumulative data as of December 2020. In 2021, EUTF-funded programmes facilitated employment for 9,679 women (40% of the beneficiaries)⁴, by a) by creating economic opportunities in rural areas (mostly in Senegal); b) targeting female entrepreneurship (in Mauritania); and c) including women in efforts to boost green and environment-friendly employment (in Ghana and Niger). Insufficient skills adequacy and lack of technical skills hinder access to employment and economic development in the SLC region. To try and address this, EUTF-funded programmes delivered professional trainings including TVET and skills development to 71,893 people in 2021 (indicator 1.4).

¹ Outputs in Benin, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Togo are collected through regional programmes.

² Share of budget for projects contracted and relevant to the MLS. The total displayed in the visual does not reflect budget allocated to cross-cutting activities, which represent €5.0M.

³ Gross domestic product.

⁴ This ratio is calculated on the basis of data for which the gender was specified and leaves out unspecified data. In total, for 2021, figures reported indicate 9,679 jobs for women, 15,073 for men, and 6,985 with no gender specified.

Strategic Objective 2: Strengthening resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable including refugees and other displaced people

In 2021, as the SLC region experienced a shorter rainy season than usual and prolonged dry spells, 613,534 people benefitted from food security-related assistance (indicator 2.4), 86% of which was distributed ahead of or during the lean season (June to August). In addition, EUTF-funded programmes addressed the social protection needs of 307,395 vulnerable people through unconditional cash transfers in 2021, mostly in Nigeria. Finally, EUTF-funded programmes facilitated the construction and rehabilitation of 3,286 social infrastructures (indicator 2.1 bis) in 2021 to improve access to basic social services. Over the year, 444,549 people benefitted from improved access to services thanks to new or rehabilitated social infrastructure (indicator 2.9).

Strategic Objective 3: Improved migration management in countries of origin, transit, and destination

The SLC region continues to be an important transit area for migrants who intend to reach Europe through the Mediterranean or Atlantic Routes. In 2021, EUTF-funded programmes protected and/or assisted 86,876 migrants in transit (indicator 3.2), a ninefold increase from people assisted in 2020. EUTF-funded programmes reached migrants in transit in conflict-affected areas with constrained access. In 2021, Protection West Africa protected and/or assisted 79,842 migrants in transit, mainly in Burkina Faso (29%), Mali (25%) and Niger (25%). EUTF-funded programmes also supported migrants in transit along the Atlantic Route. In 2021, 22,316 people arrived irregularly in the Canary Islands. During the year, EUTF-funded programmes assisted and protected 3,133 migrants in transit in Mauritania and 2,956 in Senegal.

Strategic Objective 4: Improved governance, security and conflict prevention

In 2021, EUTF-funded programmes trained 9,046 community representatives on governance, conflict prevention and human rights (indicator 4.2). Community representatives play a key role in strengthening social cohesion and building peace through dispute resolution, mediation and conflict prevention. In 2021, EUTF-funded programmes focused on the prevention of locally driven conflict through the training of 3,503 community representatives to bolster their role as agents of peace and social cohesion. Community leaders and structures also play an instrumental role in strengthening local governance by ensuring inclusivity and ownership of communities. As a result, EUTF-funded programmes contributed to training 4,910 community representatives on improved governance, a 30% increase compared to 2020. EUTF-funded programmes also trained 9,164 security forces on conflict prevention, improved governance, security and human rights (indicator 4.2) in 2021. Most of them (68% or 6,252 people) were trained on border management to ensure a more proactive and preventive management of transnational threats to support security in the region.

COVID-19 response

COVID-19 assistance by EUTF-funded programmes has decreased compared to 2020 as the need for urgent response subsided. In 2021, COVID-19-related assistance focused increasingly on economic recovery. As surveys in five Sahelian countries showed that around 65% of people reported a loss of income during the pandemic, in 2021, 9,351 micro, small and medium enterprise (MSMEs) received financial support (indicator 1.2).¹

¹ Survey data is from Nigeria (68%), Senegal (65%), Ghana (65%), Burkina Faso (61%) and Guinea (61%). Gallup, 'COVID-19 put more than 1 billion out of work', 3 May 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND

The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced people in Africa (EUTF for Africa or EUTF) was launched in November 2015. It is composed of three geographical 'windows': 'North Africa' (NoA), 'Horn of Africa' (HoA) and 'Sahel and Lake Chad' (SLC), which includes 12 'main' countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and The Gambia. Neighbouring countries are also eligible for regional programmes. This report includes outputs from programmes implemented in 16 countries: the 12 mentioned above as well as Benin, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Togo.¹

This is the ninth report prepared by the Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) for the EUTF SLC window, covering all the outputs achieved with EUTF funding in the SLC region, from the start of activities until the end of December 2021, with a specific focus on outputs generated in 2021 and in the second semester (S2) of 2021. Previous reports can be found [here](#).

In response to the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the European Union (EU) decided to reorient funds in the EUTF SLC portfolio, and some implementing partners (IPs) chose to adjust their activities. Three new COVID-19 specific indicators were added to the EUTF common indicators to better capture the outputs generated through these initiatives in MLS reporting.

1.2. THE EUTF SLC WINDOW IN 2021

As of December 2021, the EUTF had committed (i.e., allocated funds following decisions by the EUTF Operational Committees) €4.93B (billion euros). The SLC window is the first in size in terms of funding, with €2.21B committed across 114 decisions, of which 98%, or €2.16B, have been contracted to 368 projects across the region. Out of these 368 signed contracts, 213 are operational and of interest to the MLS.² Of these, 76 projects worth €513M (million) are completed, 123 projects worth €1.47B, are being implemented, and 14 projects (€43M) are in inception. Out of the 123 projects currently implementing, 118 have data to report.³ This report presents data from 194 projects, including 76 completed projects, covering a total contracted amount of €1.94B. As such, it covers 16 projects and €100M more funding than the S1 2021 report.⁴ Funding and implementation continue to follow the EUTF's four Strategic Objectives⁵ (SOs) and the strategic priorities set by the EUTF Strategic Board and ratified in September 2019 i.e. i) returns and reintegration; ii) refugee management; iii) completing progress on the securitisation of documents and civil registry; iv) anti-trafficking measures; v) essential stabilisation efforts; and vi) migration dialogue.

¹ Outputs in Benin, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Togo are collected through regional programmes and are presented in the overview of results section (4.2) of this report.

² Projects are considered operational when they deliver outputs to beneficiaries. Administrative projects and non-operational projects (such as projects contracted under the Research and Evidence Facility and the Technical and Cooperation Facility, feasibility studies, audits, etc.) are not included in the analysis.

³ Five projects are either too early in their implementation phase to be able to report outputs or their activities did not yet generate outputs that are relevant to the EUTF indicators.

⁴ The €100M increase in budget includes €86M for the 16 newly included projects as well as €14M for top-ups and/or budget amendments for already included projects.

⁵ The four Strategic Objectives (SO) of the EUTF are: SO1 'Greater economic and employment opportunities'; SO2 'Strengthening resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable including refugees and other displaced people', SO3 'Improved migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination' and SO4 'Improved governance and conflict prevention and reduction of forced displacement and irregular migration'.

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1. MLS METHODOLOGY

2.1.1. OUTPUT MONITORING

The Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) team works with each implementing partner (IP) to develop a reporting system that allows the MLS to collect the most detailed and granular level of data common to all IPs. To that end, the MLS has developed a reporting template that it uses with most IPs, although the reporting template is tailored to each project through a drafting and feedback process with respective IPs. Given the complexity and diversity of the EUTF portfolio, and the fact that IPs and M&E systems have different resources, limitations and capacities, the MLS tries to offer as much flexibility as possible with regard to the quantity, disaggregation and format of data collected from IPs.

The MLS then aggregates the collected data using a standardised methodology (and later disaggregates it again along various lines of analysis for reporting). This approach allows the MLS to help IPs map their own activities and outputs against the list of EUTF common output indicators and to have access to a finer level of disaggregation (e.g., by gender, beneficiary type, location, etc.). It also gives the MLS significant flexibility in changing the way data is analysed or presented as needed.

Based on the information received, the MLS team completes output indicator mappings for each project, collects the relevant data from each IP, checks the data for quality and enters it into the MLS database for aggregation, further quality checking and analysis.

During the S1 2020 reporting period, the EUTF revised its common output indicators and their respective methodologies. The resulting revisions have been formalised through a set of methodological notes, which can be found in the annexes to the S1 2020 report. For more information about this process, please see the S1 2020 report.


2.1.2. OUTCOME ANALYSIS

In addition to output monitoring, the EUTF MLS started to include project- and programme-level outcome analysis in S2 2020 in the form of focus boxes for certain completed projects. As explained in previous reports as well as in this [MLS methodological note](#), aggregating outcome data for the EUTF portfolio is not possible in the way that it is for output data, because there are no common and standardised EUTF outcome indicators. This means that no methodologically harmonised outcome data has been collected by EUTF projects, without which comprehensive and meaningful outcome analysis is impossible. Therefore, it was agreed that the MLS would not undertake a comprehensive quantitative aggregation of outcome indicators across projects.

However, as part of the MLS' broader efforts to assess potential large-scale changes effected by the EUTF in its areas of implementation, in March 2022 the team conducted a review of all outcome indicators reported on by projects which had completed before July 2021,¹ in order to assess whether partial aggregation could be feasible in some cases, and if limited conclusions could be drawn about the potential outcomes of the EUTF portfolio beyond specific projects and programmes.

¹ According to EUTF directives, projects are required to deliver their final report no later than six months after the end of their project, hence the choice of this deadline for the inclusion of projects in the study. It should be noted, however, that the lack of a final report after this deadline may be due to a number of factors, including the possibility that reports were not made available to the MLS team.

Figure 2: Process to develop common outcome indicator categories¹



A total of 56 projects that ended before S2 2021 in the SLC window were assessed as part of this exercise.² Out of those, 35 projects had shared a final evaluation report with the MLS team. The remaining 21 projects were either not relevant for a final evaluation, pending a final evaluation because they had recently ended, were part of a programme which was still ongoing, or did not make the documents available to the MLS team.

Collectively, these projects reported on 514 outcome and impact indicators, of which 370 were categorised by the MLS to be 'true' outcomes indicators.³ Among those, 313 indicators were assessed by the team to be SMART.⁴ Combining results from initial SLC and HoA analysis, 33 common outcome indicator categories were identified. Twenty of these were relevant to outcomes mapped under SLC projects. Within SLC projects, the indicator category with the highest aggregation potential was 'increase in minimum dietary diversity score' under Strategic Objective 2, which 23 projects had included in their logframes and/or evaluation reports.

However, while categories allow to group indicators in batches of similar expected outcomes, the way indicators are measured or defined often prevents aggregation. For example, the abovementioned 'increase in minimum dietary diversity score' category includes the indicator 'percentage of households with an acceptable dietary diversity score' that was reported on by a project in Burkina Faso. However, a similar project in Senegal elected to measure the same outcome in terms of 'relative increase in the average individual dietary diversity score of beneficiaries over the course of the project' (with no information regarding the number of *persons* with an acceptable dietary diversity score). It is therefore not possible to aggregate both values.

Even in cases where outcome indicators are exactly equivalent, aggregated values cannot be weighted or calculated without knowing the relevant population or sample size. Furthermore, limitations in the quality and availability of project indicator descriptions and data negatively affect their aggregation potential. For example, of the 313 eligible outcome indicators, only 192 had both baseline and endline data, without which further analysis is impossible. In many cases, indicators measured at baseline were not measured again at endline (or vice versa), or the endline evaluation collected data for a similar but incomparable indicator to the one used at baseline.

As such, it is only possible to aggregate a limited number of indicators across EUTF projects, and even in these cases methodological limitations and caveats must be considered. These aggregable indicators are analysed further in each Strategic Objective section. Project-specific outcome analyses continue to be included as focus boxes in their respective country sections.

¹ 'True' refers here to an outcome indicator representing a short-term or medium-term effect of an activity's output and not the direct product resulting from the development intervention, as per the OECD 'Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Based Management'. Retrieved [here](#).

² See footnote 1.

³ See footnote 2.

⁴ Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, and Time-bound.

2.2. CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS IN THE 2021 REPORT

During the implementation of the methodological changes, some projects were unable to provide the additional disaggregation requested. In these cases, data was included under the 'unspecified' category in the MLS analyses. Others lacked data for the newly created indicators. Significant cases of this include:

- Due to the methodological changes to the common output indicators performed in S1 2020, not all previously gathered GIZ data could be transferred to the changed system. Therefore, the GIZ data included in this report is not complete and numbers may differ from earlier reports.¹
- For completed projects where IPs could no longer be contacted, the MLS team has applied only those methodological changes that were feasible without consultation, taking as reference project documents such as final evaluations.

Data for S2 2021 was received from all projects for which it was expected, except for two:²

- In Niger, the AJUSEN Justice project (NE-06-03) is being substantially modified and no activities took place during the reference period.
- In Senegal, there was a significant team reshuffling following project completion and the PACERSEN project (SN-05-01) is working with the MLS team to extract data for the last two months of implementation (July – August 2021). This data is not available yet.

¹ However, historical data for all projects was retroactively adapted to the methodological changes, whenever possible, and therefore data provided within the same report is comparable, even across reporting periods.


² We estimate missing data for projects that have not been able to report on conducted activities would have contributed to less than 1% of the 7,000 data points collected for S2 2021. Missing data for this semester will as much as possible be gathered for the next report.

3. PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW

3.1. BUDGET AND NUMBER OF CONTRACTS BY STATUS

As of December 2021, the EUTF for Africa had committed €4.93B, including €2.21B across 114 decisions in the Sahel and Lake Chad window, of which a total of €2.02B had been contracted to 213 operational projects.¹ The 213 contracted operational projects include 14 projects in their inception phase, 5 projects in their early implementation phase, with no data to report to the MLS yet, 118 projects in their implementation phase and with data to report and 76 completed projects. The current report includes data on 194 projects (equivalent in funding to €1.94B), comprising 76 completed projects as well as 118 projects in their implementation phase and with data to report.

Figure 3: Projects and budget covered by the current S2 2021 MLS report, December 2021



Since the publication of the previous report, the following projects have been added to the MLS database and to this report:

Table 1: Projects newly added to the MLS for the S2 2021 report, December 2021

Country	Programme Name	EUTF ID	Project Name	Lead IP	EUTF Budget
Burkina Faso	<i>Prévention de l'extrémisme violent autochtone (PEV)</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-BF-08-12	<i>Sur les chemins du dialogue – Prévention de l'extrémisme violent autochtone à travers la promotion du dialogue interreligieux et intercommunautaire, de la base aux institutions publiques (PEV MLAL 2)</i>	PMLAL	€1,000,000
	<i>Appui à la Justice (Justice BF)</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-BF-11-01	<i>Projet d'appui au renforcement de la justice pour lutter contre l'impunité (PARJI)</i>	Enabel	€3,800,000
Chad	<i>Résilience et emploi au Lac Tchad (RESTE)</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-TD-01-12	<i>Contrat mini adductions d'eau potable et de latrines – Lot 2 (RESTE AEP2)</i>	Berthy	€1,073,152 (completed)
Côte d'Ivoire	<i>Programme de soutien et de relance à l'économie dans le contexte de la crise du COVID-19 en Côte d'Ivoire (PSRE)</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-CI-03-01	<i>Programme de soutien et de relance à l'économie dans le contexte de la crise du COVID-19 en Côte d'Ivoire (PSRE)</i>	Côte d'Ivoire	€24,000,000
Guinea	<i>Projet pilote d'amélioration des performances de l'état civil guinéen par le recours à la digitalisation (Etat Civil GN)</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-GN-05-01	<i>Projet pilote d'amélioration des performances de l'état civil guinéen par le recours à la digitalisation (Etat Civil GN)</i>	Enabel	€4,950,000
Mali	<i>Projet d'appui aux investissements de la diaspora malienne dans les régions d'origine (Diaspora Mali)</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-ML-05-02	<i>Investissement de la diaspora dans l'entreprenariat durable des jeunes ruraux au Mali (Diaspora Mali FIDA)</i>	IFAD	€1,000,000

¹ The 213 projects include only 'operational' projects: 155 projects worth approximately €136M and considered 'non-operational' are excluded from the overall analysis. They are mostly evaluations and audits, air services, mappings and plans, reports, communications and events.


Mauritania	<i>L'UE pour le nexus sécurité-résilience-développement en Mauritanie (Nexus SRD)</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-MR-08-04	<i>Appui stratégique dans le domaine de la sécurité et notamment de la sécurité maritime (Nexus SRD Sécurité Maritime)</i>	FIAPP	€2,000,000
Niger	<i>Stabilisation et renforcement socio-économique des populations affectées par la migration irrégulière dans les zones de transit au Niger (Stabilisation Agadez)</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-NE-12-01	<i>Pilotage du projet d'appui à la stabilisation et renforcement socio-économique des populations affectées par la migration irrégulière dans les zones de transit au Niger (PASREP)</i>	HACP	€2,377,570
	<i>Soutien à la création d'un escadron polyvalent de la Garde Nationale du Niger (EP-GNN)</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-NE-16-01	<i>Soutien à la création d'un escadron polyvalent de la Garde Nationale du Niger (EP-GNN)</i>	COGINTA	€4,450,000
Senegal	<i>Programme d'appui au renforcement du système d'information de l'état civil et à la création d'un fichier national d'identité biométrique (Etat Civil SN)</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-SN-07-02	<i>Programme d'appui au renforcement du système d'information de l'état civil et à la création d'un fichier national d'identité biométrique (Etat civil SN CIVIPOL 2)</i>	CIVIPOL	€17,500,000
		T05-EUTF-SAH-SN-07-03	<i>Programme d'appui au renforcement du système d'information de l'état civil et à la création d'un fichier national d'identité biométrique (Etat civil SN ENABEL)</i>	Enabel	€10,500,000
Regional	<i>Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel (PDU)</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-REG-18-03	<i>Infrastructures eau – Tchad (PDU EPEVA)</i>	ACF	€5,550,000
		T05-EUTF-SAH-REG-18-05	<i>Projet de consolidation des systèmes d'adduction d'eau potable et d'assainissement des villes de Dori et Djibo au Sahel (PDU P-CSEPA)</i>	ONEA	€3,000,000
		T05-EUTF-SAH-REG-18-12	<i>Coordination Interconsortia PDU Burkina Faso (PDU Interconsortia BF)</i>	Terre des Hommes	€1,400,000
		T05-EUTF-SAH-REG-18-16	<i>Projet de renforcement de l'accès à l'eau potable et assainissement au profit des personnes déplacées internes dans la région du Sahel (PDU Eau Burkina Faso)</i>	Burkinabè Red Cross	€2,000,000
	<i>Appui aux capacités de dialogue et d'actions concertées des Forces de sécurité intérieures dans les environnements de conflictualité et d'insécurité au Burkina Faso, Mali et Niger (Security G5 Sahel)</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-REG-23-03	<i>Appui aux capacités de dialogue et d'actions concertées des Forces de sécurité intérieures dans les environnements de conflictualité et d'insécurité au Burkina Faso, Mali et Niger (G5 Security FSI)</i>	Pro-mediation	€2,400,000

The graph below represents the evolution in the number of EUTF contracted operational projects as well as the number of projects included in the MLS reports, together with the corresponding funding amounts. Between September¹ and December 2021, eleven operational projects had been contracted, which are equivalent to €28.9M in funding. Over this period, the 16 projects listed above have been newly included in the MLS database. This represents an increase of €101M in funding covered by the MLS SLC reports.²

¹ Portfolio data for the previous report, which covered output data up to 30 June 2021, was valid as of September 2021.

² The €101M increase in budget includes €87M for the 16 newly included projects as well as €14M for top-ups and/or budget amendments for already included projects.


Figure 4: Evolution of projects and budgets covered by the MLS in SLC, December 2021¹



The below graph shows the 213 contracted operational projects by budget, lifespan and status of implementation. The graph uses shortened programme names for the sake of clarity. Budgets refer solely to the EUTF contribution. The length of the bars represents the lifespan of the project and the height/width the EUTF budget per project. The colour of the bars indicates the status of the project. Dates of completion are considered as of December 2021.

¹ In 2020, the MLS shifted from a quarterly to a biannual reporting schedule, initially to accommodate the methodological changes process described in section 2.1, and later to make room for other complementary work streams that aim to support the EUTF and the EU in the medium- to long-term future.


Figure 5: EUTF SLC contracted projects by budget and implementation status, December 2021



3.2. BUDGET DISTRIBUTION BY COUNTRY, IMPLEMENTING PARTNER AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

As of December 2021, regional projects collectively represented the largest amount of contracted EUTF funding. A total of €603.3M (or 30% of the total) were contracted to 56 projects at the regional level. At the country level, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have the largest portfolios, with respective budgets of €292.9M (15%), €249.3M (12%) and €190.8M (9%).

Figure 6: Budget distribution by country and implementing partner, December 2021^{1,2}



The EUTF SLC budget for operational contracted projects remains largely managed by member state agencies (€872.6M, or 43% of the budget), as well as United Nations (UN) agencies, funds and programmes (€414.4M, or 21%). Projects managed by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) represent 19% of the total budget, amounting to €391.7M. Recipient countries' governments directly receive 12% (or €243.3M) of the budget, mostly in the form of budget support actions, followed by international organisations and the private sector to a lesser extent, with 3% and 1% of the budget, respectively.³ An additional 1% of the budget is contracted to other types of implementing partners, including projects implemented by the EU itself.

¹ The map shows the distribution of the combined SLC budget (€2.02B) for the 213 operational projects, per country.

² "New" refers to projects newly added to the MLS for the S2 2021 report.

³ For many contracts, parts of the budgets are subcontracted by IPs (including member state agencies and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes) at least in part to NGOs and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs).

With regards to Strategic Objectives (SO), security and governance activities (SO4) receive the largest share of budget at 32% (€648.2M). SO4 is the main priority in Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Niger, Mali and Mauritania, where it accounts for 69%, 56%, 41%, 41% and 38% of the budget, respectively. Regional projects, followed by country-level projects in Burkina Faso and Niger receive the largest amount of funding for SO4, with respectively €132.1M, €132.4M, and €121.1M dedicated to these activities.


Resilience building (SO2) represents 27% of the EUTF funds in the SLC window (€534.3M) and is particularly significant in Chad and Cameroon as well as among regional projects (where it accounts for 73%, 50% and 36% of the budget, respectively). Regional projects dedicated to SO2 represent €215.1M, followed by Mali (€90M), Chad (€83.6M) and Nigeria (€39.6M).

Economic and employment opportunities (SO1) are supported by 23% (or €473.1M) of the EUTF SLC budget. These types of activities are particularly important in West African coastal countries such as The Gambia (90% of the total funds for this country), Côte d'Ivoire (83%), Guinea (82%), Ghana (80%) and Senegal (56%). In absolute numbers, the countries with the largest amount of funding dedicated to SO1 are Senegal with €92.2M and Niger with €88.9M.

Migration management (SO3) represents another 18% (€361.8M) of total EUTF funding in SLC. SO3 is funded primarily through regional programmes, which represent €210.3M. National country programmes dedicated to SO3 are prevalent in Niger (€53.9M) and Senegal (€27.9M).

The remaining 0.3% (€5.0M) of the EUTF budget contracted in SLC finances cross-cutting activities.

Figure 7: Contracted budget breakdown by Strategic Objectives, December 2021¹




¹ Share of budget for projects contracted and relevant to the MLS. The total displayed in the visual does not reflect budget allocated to cross-cutting activities, which represent €5.0M.

3.3. BUDGET ALLOCATED TO THE COVID-19 RESPONSE

To respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU reoriented funds in the EUTF SLC portfolio, and several IPs made adjustment to their activities. As part of the data collection process since 2020, the MLS team asked IPs to provide information on any reorientation of their activities for the COVID-19 response and the EU to gather information on reallocation of funds. **As of December 2021, €123.8M have been allocated to the COVID-19 response through 61 projects.** This represents 6% of the €1.94B EUTF budget covered by the MLS in the SLC window. In most (70%) cases, projects undertook small activity adjustments while 28% involved agreements between the EU and IPs to reallocate funds. Two projects, the One UN Response Plan in Nigeria (€49.5M, NG-09)¹ and the PSRE in Côte d'Ivoire (€24.0M, CI-03)², are fully devoted to the COVID-19 response. While the One UN Response Plan was signed in the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic (May 2020) to support Nigeria's health response plan, the PSRE, which was signed in June 2021, focuses on the economic recovery post-COVID-19 through budget support to Côte d'Ivoire to support companies affected by the pandemic.

Figure 8: Budget allocated to the COVID-19 response in the SLC, December 2021^{3,4}



¹ EU Support to the United Nations 'One UN Response Plan to COVID-19 in Nigeria'.

² Programme de soutien et de relance à l'économie dans le contexte de la crise du COVID-19 en Côte d'Ivoire.

³ The 61 projects with funds allocated to the COVID-19 response and 58 projects with COVID-19-response outputs are not necessarily the same projects, as some projects have reported COVID-19-response outputs but not reallocated funds and some projects with funds allocated to the COVID-19 response have not generated COVID-19-related outputs that are relevant to the EUTF indicators.

⁴ The contribution of EUTF-funded projects to the response to COVID-19 is calculated only for projects currently implementing and with data to report (194 projects representing €1.94B).

4. SITUATION AND RESULTS OVERVIEW

4.1. THE SAHEL AND LAKE CHAD REGION IN 2021

In 2021, insecurity in the Sahel and Lake Chad (SLC) region remained volatile and continued to expand to coastal countries. In the Liptako-Gourma area and the Lake Chad Basin, the two main centres of conflict in the Sahel, 17,307 people died in 6,290 violent events in 2021.¹ Violence also expanded southward, and in late 2021, alleged terrorist attacks targeted Côte d'Ivoire's and Benin's northern regions, corroborating long-standing predictions of a possible spill over of violent extremism into coastal states.²

The perceived failure of governments and international armies to reduce violence contributed to political unrest and created new dynamics in the fights against terrorism. Persisting insecurity combined with public discontent spurred military coups in Mali in May and in Guinea in September. Burkina Faso experienced anti-government demonstrations in late 2021, ultimately leading to a coup in January 2022.³ In February 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron announced the progressive withdrawal of the French *Operation Barkhane* from the Sahel. As an alternative to French military presence, the Malian government allegedly turned to Russia for military support and Russian mercenaries presumably arrived in Mali in late December.

Given the decade of conflicts in Liptako-Gourma and the Lake Chad Basin, populations remained extremely vulnerable. Forced displacement, mainly resulting from insecurity, was a major cause of vulnerability in the SLC as the region hosted 6.6 million internally displaced people (IDPs) and 1.5 million refugees in December 2021.^{4,5} Food security was still a foremost challenge in 2021, stemming from the combined effects of insecurity, irregular rainfalls and mass displacement. The provision of basic services remained minimal in both regions and humanitarian access continued to face severe constraints, compounding the vulnerability of local populations.^{6,7} In late 2021, 30.6 million people were in urgent need of humanitarian assistance across both regions.⁸

In 2021, the SLC region showed slow recovery from the COVID-19-induced economic crisis and real GDP growth was projected at 3.9% in 2021 after the 2020 recession.⁹ Households, however, still suffered the impact of job losses and the 2020 contraction of the economy. Inflation in commodity and food prices due to higher crude oil prices in early 2021 as well as increasing food insecurity also impacted households' resilience.¹⁰

After a relative lull in irregular border crossings in 2019 and 2020, 14,954 migrants from SLC countries reached Europe in 2021, a twofold increase from 2020.^{11,12} Migrants reached Europe through two main routes: the Atlantic Route (AR) and the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR). Migrants continued attempting to reach Europe using the AR in 2021, after it became increasingly used in 2020.¹³ Meanwhile, the use of the CMR resumed after having decreased in 2020 due to COVID-19 restrictions.¹⁴

¹ ACLED Dashboard, consulted on 7 February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Rida Lyammouri, 'Violence Spill over into the Coastal States', March 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Agence Anadolu, 'Les coups d'Etat se succèdent en Afrique de l'Ouest : l'hiver africain ?', February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Mauritania data is accurate as of 31 October 2021 and Nigeria IDP data as of 31 October 2021.

⁵ Aggregated data from UNHCR Operational Data Portal, consulted on 27 January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ UN OCHA, 'Burkina Faso, Mali & Western Niger – Humanitarian Snapshot', January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ UN OCHA, 'Lake Chad Basin – Humanitarian Snapshot', January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Aggregated UN OCHA data from December 2021, consulted in February 2022. Retrieved [here](#), [here](#), [here](#), [here](#), [here](#) and [here](#).

⁹ ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development, 'Economic Recovery in the midst of Uncertainties', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Aggregated data from FRONTEX, 'Monthly detections of illegal border crossing', consulted in February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹² 7,927 irregular arrivals in 2019 and 7,801 in 2020.

¹³ MMC, 'A Gateway re-opens: the growing popularity of the Atlantic Route', February 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


¹⁴ MMC, 'Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: West Africa', February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

4.2. THE EUTF RESPONSE – OVERVIEW OF RESULTS

This section offers an analysis of the results of the EUTF's response to date against its four SOs: economy and employment; resilience (food security and access to basic services); migration management; and governance and conflict prevention.

4.2.1. OVERVIEW OF EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Figure 9: Main achievements of EUTF-funded programmes in 2021, December 2021



The table below shows the aggregated values reported by SLC projects for the 38 EUTF common output indicators as of 31 December 2021.


Table 2: EUTF common output indicators for all SLC projects, December 2021¹

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	17,333	24,685	31,658	14,939	16,799	105,414	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	4,234	4,570	10,974	5,251	11,419	36,448	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	74,906	98,006	75,738	40,210	71,808	360,668	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET)...	32,254	44,832	30,694	23,398	48,495	179,673	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed,...	18	326	162	79	93	678	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	70	133	65	40	25	333	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	1,583	3,514	2,315	1,490	1,796	10,698	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	403,805	459,855	127,513	20,398	32,551	1,044,123	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	560,237	737,215	341,201	134,295	126,457	1,899,404	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	522,319	697,355	766,141	387,402	226,132	2,599,349	
2.5 Number of insitutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	182	218	17	20	49	486	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	11,413	93,165	21,951	4,492	29,116	160,136	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	666,654	1,259,788	33,912,435	7,687,897	2,040,757	45,567,531	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	15,082	33,237	52,564	27,555	6,837	135,275	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	2,456,491	1,364,114	760,135	519,194	527,198	5,627,132	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	19	36	36	44	74	209	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs...	5,283	5,651	8,764	24,706	62,170	106,575	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	443,182	1,019,906	1,256,594	976,966	808,658	4,505,307	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	28,900	19,228	14,711	4,094	8,869	75,802	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	50,499	21,820	8,728	9,761	13,416	104,224	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	15,887	19,767	30,215	8,966	16,822	91,657	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	64	328	76	33	14	515	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	1,736	3,490	3,319	2,770	2,841	14,157	
3.8 Number of people of concern benefitting from evacuation and resettlement...	2,915	1,395	583	98	367	5,358	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	11	326	305	177	33	852	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	10,340	4,103	1,842	423	144	16,851	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	22	22	23	18	43	128	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	2,315	1,313	7,596	10,668	22,953	44,845	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	13,686	12,178	11,276	8,841	15,458	61,440	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	544,936	429,191	2,651,999	269,165	123,368	4,018,661	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	133	729	363	138	616	1,979	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	213	793	858	590	1,089	3,543	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	188	311	2,376	1,074	1,096	5,045	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	158	200	152	89	102	701	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created...	47	44	24	20	24	159	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	11,465,917	2,101,774	45,527	13,613,218	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	745,648	581,774	538,356	1,865,778	
6.3 Number of entities benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	1,234	981	150	2,365	

¹ Trendlines represent quarterly non-cumulated outputs across time.

4.2.2. GREATER ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

Figure 10: Strategic Objective 1 dashboard, SLC, December 2021¹



In 2021, West African countries slowly began to recover from the COVID-19-induced economic crisis. After a 0.7% economic contraction in 2020, real GDP growth in the ECOWAS region was projected at 3.9% in 2021 and 4.4% in 2022 – surpassing the pre-COVID level of +3.6% in 2019 –, with

¹ Budget figures are related to projects which are contracted, relevant to the MLS, and providing data.

disparities across countries.^{1,2} Recovering commodity prices in 2021 helped resource-intensive and exporting economies in particular. The relaxation of preventive measures to stem COVID-19 infections in West African countries also had positive effects on households' livelihoods and consumption.

In spite of the nascent economic recovery, household livelihoods remained negatively impacted, due to a range of macroeconomic factors.³ The hike in food prices due to the global economic climate negatively affected households in the region, particularly given that most SLC countries are net importers of foodstuffs and thus vulnerable to changes in prices.⁴ The region's economies were also undermined by the insufficient recovery of the touristic sector, high freight charges (reflected in final prices of imported goods), and soaring costs of refined petroleum products that most West African countries need to import.^{5,6} These events caused an uptick in general prices in 2021.⁷ Inflation presented heavy consequences for many of the region's households, and in particular those having suffered from job losses in 2020. During 2020, West Africa lost 7 million full-time equivalent jobs,⁸ a 6.4% decrease compared to the total number of jobs existing in Q4 2019.⁹ Positive GDP growth rates have not been sufficient to absorb new entrants to the job market and make up for the losses.¹⁰

Beyond macroeconomic indicators, the resilience of West African economies remained correlated to local security conditions. Due to insecurity caused by jihadists and other armed groups, households in unstable areas continued to depend on precarious livelihoods and informal, small-scale economic activities, with no signs of improvement likely in the short- to medium-term.¹¹

Supporting jobs and businesses, especially for women

The EUTF is supporting job creation and employment within the SLC window. In 2021, EUTF-funded activities created or supported 31,738 jobs (indicator 1.1), a 43% increase compared to cumulative total achieved as of December 2020. Several programmes contributed to job creation in 2021, with the MIITG (GM-03)¹² and PASPED (SN-09)¹³ programmes accounting for almost a quarter (7,568, or 24%) of all jobs created during the year. Both programmes are implemented in coastal countries, the former in The Gambia and the latter in Senegal. Four programmes contributed for the first time to job creation in 2021: ADEL (ML-12),¹⁴ GrEEn (GH-02),¹⁵ ARCHIPELAGO (REG-15)¹⁶ and PSRE COVID CI (CI-03)¹⁷, creating 2,208, 2,067, 665 and 1,486 jobs, respectively.

The economy of the SLC region is dominated by the informal sector, meaning that a large portion of workers operate without safety nets, which increases their vulnerability. In 2021, of the 31,738 jobs created or supported, EUTF-funded programmes contributed to the creation of 12,044 permanent or long-term regular wage jobs, an 80% increase compared to December 2020. Of all permanent jobs created in 2021, 42% were created in The Gambia through the YEP (GM-01)¹⁸ and MIITG (GM-03)¹⁹ programmes.

¹ African Development Bank, 'West African Economic Outlook 2020 – Coping with the COVID-19 pandemic'. Retrieved [here](#).

² ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development, 'Economic Recovery in the midst of Uncertainties', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ ECOWAS, WFP, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 'Monitoring report on the impacts of COVID-19 in West Africa'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ African Development Bank, 2020. op. cited.

⁵ ECOWAS, WFP, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. op. cited.

⁶ African Development Bank, 'West Africa Economic Outlook 2021 Debt Dynamics: The Path to Post-COVID Recovery'.

⁷ ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development, 2021. op. cited.

⁸ Estimates include formal and informal jobs.

⁹ Although below worldwide and continental shrinkages of -8.8% and -7.7% respectively. ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development, 'Economic Recovery in the midst of Uncertainties', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ IHS Markit, 'Employment developments in sub-Saharan Africa during the first-half of 2021', August 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ Such as the Liptako-Gourma, northern Mali, northern Nigeria, or the Lake Chad region.

¹² Building a future - Make it in The Gambia.

¹³ *Programme de contraste à la migration illégale à travers l'appui au Secteur Privé et à la création d'emplois au Sénégal.*

¹⁴ *Appui au Développement Economique Local et à la prévention des conflits dans les régions de Tombouctou et Gao.*

¹⁵ Boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in Ghana.

¹⁶ ARCHIPELAGO: an African-European TVET initiative.

¹⁷ *Programme de soutien et de relance à l'économie dans le contexte de la crise du COVID-19 en Côte d'Ivoire.*

¹⁸ Youth Employment Project.

¹⁹ Make it in the Gambia.

Women tend to have limited access to decent jobs. In 2021, EUTF-funded programming created or supported 9,679 jobs for women, who represented 40% of this output's beneficiaries.¹ EUTF-funded programmes promoted decent employment for women by a) creating economic opportunities in rural areas, where women contribute most to production; b) targeting female entrepreneurship, which is prevalent in the region but under-exploited; and c) including women in efforts to boost green and environment-friendly employment.

In rural areas, women are more employed in agriculture than men. Yet, women tend to be predominantly involved in subsistence farming and petty food trading.² Despite the vital role that they play, they suffer from poor conditions and living standards and experience barriers such as lack of land ownership, credit and production inputs.³ In Senegal, for instance, while women represent 60% of people working in subsistence farming and produce 50% to 60% of the country's yearly food production,⁴ they continue to experience low living standards and vulnerability due to the informal, low value-added nature of their work. EUTF-funded programmes aim to support rural populations in moving from subsistence-based agriculture to higher value-added, more commercial production. The PARERBA programme (SN-08),⁵ through support to agricultural production, micro-entrepreneurship in rural areas and the building of hydro-agricultural infrastructure, created 1,899 jobs for women in agriculture since the beginning of implementation, including 550 in 2021, accounting for 52% of all the jobs created by the programme during the year.⁶

Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region in the world where the majority of entrepreneurs are women.⁷ Female entrepreneurs contribute 13% of the continent's GDP,⁸ and bear great development weight, as they are twice more likely than their male peers to use their earnings to support and provide education to their families and communities.⁹ They continue, however, to face challenges to the growth of their businesses, and operate within an environment which is less favourable to them: firms owned by women tend to have fewer employees, revenues and benefits and weaker productivity.¹⁰ Against this backdrop, EUTF-funded programmes aim to empower and support female entrepreneurs. In 2021, the One UN Response (NG-09)¹¹ provided capacity building support to 4,373 female-headed micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) across Nigeria. In Mauritania, the SAFIRE programme (MR-07)¹² targets and identifies women to accompany them on their micro-projects. In 2021, the programme accompanied 478 women in the development of their micro-projects.

As more focus is put on green jobs around the world, including in sub-Saharan Africa, women will need to be included in the shift to new types of employment.¹³ In 2021, two EUTF-funded programmes focusing on green employment contributed to employment creation for women. *Emploi Niger* (NE-11),¹⁴ which contributes to the creation of employment and economic opportunities through sustainable management, created 419 jobs for women in total, including 361 in 2021. In Ghana, GrEEN

¹ This ratio is calculated on the basis of data for which the gender was specified and leaves out unspecified data. In total, for 2021, figures reported indicate 9,679 jobs for women, 15,073 for men, and 6,985 with no gender specified.

² World Economic Forum, 'To unlock African women's potential, we must end gendered patterns of labour', April 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ IMF, 'Women's Opportunities and Challenges in Sub-Saharan African Job Markets', 2016. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ WFP, '*Engagement féminin et agriculture vivrière familiale*', consulted in April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ *Projet d'Appui à la Réduction de l'Émigration rurale et à la Réintégration dans le Bassin Arachidier par le développement d'une économie rurale sur base des périmètres irrigués*.

⁶ This ratio is calculated using data where gender was specified and leaves out data where gender was not specified.

⁷ IMF, 2016. op. cited.

⁸ Harvard University, 'Women and the Changing Face of Entrepreneurship in Africa', October 2020. Retrieved [here](#)

⁹ IOL, 'Female entrepreneurs face overwhelming challenges', May 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ Le Point, '*PME d'Afrique : trois priorités pour une croissance plus inclusive*', February 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ EU Support to the United Nations 'One UN Response Plan to COVID-19 in Nigeria'.

¹² *Programme de renforcement de la résilience des communautés urbaines et rurales vulnérables en Mauritanie*

¹³ UN Women, 'Green Jobs for Women in Africa: Opportunities and Policy Interventions', February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁴ *Création d'emplois et d'opportunités économiques à travers une gestion durable de l'environnement dans les zones de transit et départ au Niger*.

(GH-02),¹ aims to boost green employment: in 2021, it contributed to the creation of 887 jobs for women (57% of all the jobs it created this year).²

TVET and skills development to strengthen youth and vulnerable groups' economic insertion

Of all factors underpinning underemployment and economic precariousness in West Africa, insufficient skills adequacy³ and the lack of technical skills stand out, especially for youth and women. As suggested by youth not in education, employment, or training (NEET) rates across SLC countries (see Figure 12),⁴ many young people remain out of training or jobs due to a lack of oppor-

Figure 11: NEET rates, SLC, 2022





Figure 12: Female to male labour force participation rates, SLC, 2022



-tunities or awareness. Women also tend to remain out of the workforce,^{5,6} and their path to professional insertion is hindered not only by cultural factors but also by insufficient qualifications and training. As such, the EUTF has committed to support professional training and skills development delivery to enhance professional insertion and job creation (including self-employment) in contexts where livelihoods are fragile.

In 2021, EUTF-funded programmes delivered TVET and skills development to 71,893 people (indicator 1.4), for a total of 179,673 since the beginning of EUTF-funded activities. During S2 2021 alone, 48,495 people were trained, by far the largest total for any semester since inception.

EUTF-funded programmes delivered TVET and/or skills development in various sectors. Agriculture, fishery and livestock represented 44% of the trainings delivered in 2021. Some programmes offering trainings had a twofold objective of enhancing technical skills and food security. For instance, through the PDU PROGRESS project (REG-18-09),⁷ *Acción contra el hambre* trained beneficiaries in farmer field schools to enhance the resilience of cereal (sorghum, millet, maize, rice) and livestock production systems. In 2021, it trained 9,786 people (including 6,542 in S2 2021). In Guinea, the RESIGUI programme (GN-04)⁸ trained farmers on better agricultural production, storage and transformation techniques. It trained 8,289 beneficiaries in 2021, of which 51% were women.

While 49% of the trainings delivered in 2021 were TVET trainings, dual trainings, internships and apprenticeships represented 8% of the trainings. Through the ARCHIPELAGO programme (REG-15),⁹ 1,895 of the 4,207 people trained in 2021 by the programme received dual trainings (involving

¹ Boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in Ghana.

² This ratio is calculated on the basis of data for which the gender was specified and leaves out unspecified data.

³ That is, the adequacy between available skills on the job market and the needs of economic sectors with potential.

⁴ The World Bank, '% of youth total population, ILO data, retrieved February 2022'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ The World Bank, 'Ratio of female to male labour force participation rates (%) (national estimates), ILO data, retrieved February 2022'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ The ratio of female to male labour force participation is calculated by dividing the female labour force participation rate by the male labour force participation rate and multiplying by 100. For more information, the World Bank, 'Ratio of female to male labour force participation rate (%) (modelled ILO estimate)'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ ACH-PROGRESS (Programme de résilience et de cohésion sociale au Sahel).

⁸ RESIGUI – Améliorer la résilience des populations vulnérables de Guinée.

⁹ ARCHIPELAGO: An African-European TVET initiative.

both TVET and an internship), highlighting the programme's rationale of maximising professional insertion, even before the end of the trainings.

EUTF-funded trainings can be practical or more formal, with a certification at the end. In 2021, 32% of the EUTF's beneficiaries of TVET and/or skills development trainings (1.4) benefitted from a more practical form of training and did not receive a certification, especially in the sector of agriculture and/or to support livelihood activities. In Borno, Nigeria, the RRR programme (NG-07)¹ supported women's agricultural entrepreneurship and developing women's organisational and technical skills. It trained 2,078 women in 2021 (focusing only on women), with the objective of enhancing livelihoods and employment opportunities in agriculture and agricultural value chains. On the other hand, 26% of TVET and/or skills development beneficiaries received a certification from nationally accredited institutions.²

Trainings may also serve a wider capacity-building effort. In Chad, the *Bab-al-Amal* programme (TD-03)³ works with the *Bureaux Formation Emploi*⁴ in the country's largest cities to provide TVET and/or skills development to youth. It trained 859 people in 2021 in close partnership with national authorities, including 128 trainers⁵ and 731 trainees. In Ghana, the GrEEEn programme (GN-02)⁶ delivered TVET and/or skills development training to 12,030 beneficiaries in 2021 (10,854 in S2 2021) or 95% of the total achieved since the programme's inception. Among others, the programme aims to establish or strengthen regional business hubs to incubate and accelerate green and inclusive MSMEs and entrepreneur-led businesses.

Outcome analysis 1: Employment opportunities and IGAs – Aggregated outcome analysis

EUTF-funded interventions have likely⁷ contributed to positive outcomes⁸ on economic and employment opportunities and income-generating activities (IGAs)

To date, 11 completed projects in the Sahel and Lake Chad region have measured SO1 outcomes through a total of 25 project indicators.⁹ Across the EUTF SLC portfolio, most completed projects reported SO1-related results which were mainly classifiable as outputs (29 out of 54), which explains why there are fewer results at the outcome level.

One possible explanation for the low number of outcome indicators is that SO1-related outcomes are hard to measure, especially over time, and that it is less risky to report on outputs rather than outcomes.

The identified outcome indicators measure progress achieved in a range of thematic areas, including economic and employment opportunities, IGAs and livelihoods and the business environment. Completed EUTF-funded programmes appear to have contributed to the strengthening of economic opportunities and IGAs – although the limited number of indicators makes high-level conclusions difficult.

¹ Restoring and promoting sustainable agriculture-based livelihoods for food security, employment, and nutrition improvement in Borno State.

² In addition, in 2021, 1% of the beneficiaries received certifications from non-accredited institutions. As for the remaining 41% of beneficiaries, the type of institution and certification remained unspecified.

³ *Projet de soutien à l'insertion socio-professionnelle des jeunes tchadiens en situation de vulnérabilité.*

⁴ Training and Employment Offices.

⁵ Trained through a Training of Trainers (ToT) approach.

⁶ Boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in Ghana.

⁷ None of the projects mentioned in this focus box included a control group. In the absence of such a control group, it is impossible to assess the direct contribution of the EUTF to these outcomes because the improvements could have happened without the intervention.

⁸ In this section, the word 'outcome' will refer to both impacts and outcomes, as projects may classify the same phenomenon as either impact or outcome depending on their theory of change, among other factors.


⁹ Outcome indicators analysed different from the EUTF output indicators. This analysis focuses on indicators that have both endline and baseline values. However, it also includes indicators that have an endline value and no baseline but have a mid-term value that can be used instead of a baseline for a more limited analysis. Furthermore, some of the indicators that only reported an endline value (but no baseline or mid-term value) were phrased in such a way (e.g. an improvement, increase or reduction compared to the baseline) that the available indicator data could be interpreted without a baseline value. These were also included in the analysis.

- **Economic and employment opportunities:** six outcome indicators by four projects have been identified and placed under the economic and employment opportunities categories. Of these six indicators, four relate to change in income and salary. The four projects that measured a change in income for the beneficiaries reported that **individual or household incomes increased by 57%, 67%, 125% and 328%** by the end of the projects. Two of these four projects surpassed their initial targets, while the two others did not.¹ The absence of baseline studies and the fact that increases in income were self-reported rather than directly measured, and not compared to control groups, constitute limitations to these results.
- **IGA and livelihoods:** three indicators were reported by two projects on successful development of IGA after the projects' end. Data for one of the two projects shows that more than half of beneficiaries maintained the developed/supported IGAs four months after the project's completion, surpassing the initial target. The other project reported that 38% of the supported households managed to diversify their revenues, however lower than the initial target of 50%.

¹ Including one project in Senegal and one regional project in Burkina Faso and Mali.

4.2.3. STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE OF COMMUNITIES

Figure 13: Strategic Objective 2 dashboard, SLC, December 2021¹



Food insecurity remained a foremost challenge to the resilience of populations in the SLC region in 2021, stemming from the compounded effects of protracted violence, climate change and

mass displacement. As of December 2021, 25.9 million people were at crisis or worse levels of food insecurity in the SLC region,² including 4.3 million in the Liptako-Gourma region and 3.3 million in the Lake Chad Basin (highest level for the same period in four years).³ Irregular rainfall during the 2021 rainy season, namely long dry spells in Liptako-Gourma and flooding in the Lake Chad Basin, affected both regions destroying crops and cattle.⁴ This contributed to lower food productivity and higher food prices in the region. While mass displacements partly stemmed from food insecurity, they also worsened it by putting additional pressure on already scarce resources.

The provision of basic services remained highly constrained in the Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad Basin in 2021. In the second half of the year, 5,574 schools were not functional in the Liptako-Gourma region, a 70%-increase compared to the same period in 2020.⁵ In the Lake Chad Basin, 1,026 schools remained closed in late 2021. Prolonged disruptions to education could have long-term consequences for human capital accumulation in the concerned countries. Moreover, instability and the COVID-19 pandemic strained health systems in the region. Amid the region's largest cholera outbreak in Nigeria in late 2021, only 41% of health facilities in the Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe (BAY) states were functioning.⁶ In Burkina Faso, 344 health facilities were either closed or operating at minimal capacity in December, affecting 1.8 million people.⁷

As a result, in December 2021, 30.6 million people were in urgent need of humanitarian assistance across the Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad Basin regions.⁸ As both regions remain extremely volatile, humanitarian assistance continued to face high access constraints, reinforcing the vulnerability of local populations.⁹

Supporting food security in vulnerable regions affected by the deterioration of livelihoods

In 2021, 613,534 people benefitted from food security-related assistance (indicator 2.4), 86% of which was distributed ahead of or during the lean season (June to August). Beneficiaries were mostly in Burkina Faso's Sahel, North and Centre-North regions (39%), Nigeria's Borno region (27%) and Niger (17%). In 2021, these areas experienced a shorter rainy season than usual and prolonged dry spells in September and October, which degraded agricultural land and livestock.¹⁰ For instance, in Niger, flooding during the 2021 rainy season destroyed nearly 7,000 hectares of cultivable land and killed more than 10,000 livestock.¹¹

Most beneficiaries (53%) of food security-related assistance (indicator 2.4) received farming inputs and livestock to reinforce their food production and resilience during the lean season. In 2021, EUTF programmes distributed farming inputs and/or tools to 269,238 people. The RRR (NG-07)¹² programme provided 55% of these beneficiaries with rain-fed inputs in Nigeria's Borno region in anticipation of the lean season. Such improved inputs are meant to help vulnerable households mitigate the effects of either the rainy or dry seasons on crop production and diversity. During the lean season, more than two million people were projected to be at crisis or emergency levels of food insecurity in the Borno region.¹³ Borno experiences high levels of food shortages due to the prevalence of conflicts,

¹ Budget figures are related to projects which are contracted, relevant to the MLS, and providing data.

² Aggregated data from *Cadre Harmonisé*, consulted on 10 February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ UN OCHA, 'Burkina Faso, Mali & Western Niger – Humanitarian Snapshot', January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).; UN OCHA, 'Lake Chad Basin – Humanitarian Snapshot', January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ WFP, 'West Africa: The 2021 Rainy Season in Review', October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ UN OCHA, 'Burkina Faso, Mali & Western Niger – Humanitarian Snapshot', January 2022. Ibid.; UN OCHA, 'Burkina Faso, Mali & Western Niger – Humanitarian Snapshot', November 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ UNICEF, 'Cholera Outbreaks in Central and West Africa: 2021 Regional Update – Week 1-43', December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).; UN OCHA, 'Humanitarian Needs Overview – Nigeria', February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ UN OCHA, '*Burkina Faso – Aperçu de la situation humanitaire*', February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Aggregated UN OCHA data from 02 December 2021, consulted on 3 February 2022. Retrieved [here](#), [here](#), [here](#), [here](#), [here](#) and [here](#).

⁹ ACAPS, 'Humanitarian Access Overview', December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ WFP, 'West Africa: The 2021 Rainy Season in Review', October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


¹¹ UN OCHA, 'West and Central Africa – Flooding situation', September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹² EU Support to Response, Recovery and Resilience in Borno State.

¹³ Aggregated data from the *Cadre Harmonisé*, consulted on 10 February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

irregular rain patterns and limited humanitarian access, which are reinforced during the lean season as food production drops.¹ In 2021, 56,243 additional beneficiaries in the SLC region received livestock to reconstitute the herds they lost, either to extreme weather conditions or violent attacks. Most of this assistance was delivered by the PDU (REG-18)² programme, which provided mainly small ruminants to 31,920 poor households in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. To complement these distributions and ensure the sustainability of herd reconstitution, PDU also provided beneficiaries with technical and veterinary assistance.

Figure 14: Estimated food insecure population during the 2021 lean season (June-August)³



EUTF programmes also aim to strengthen the resilience of local communities against external shocks to foster long-term improvements in food security. In 2021, 247,211 farmers, pastoralists and agro-pastoralists received assistance to reinforce their livelihoods (indicator 2.4). Most recipients (87%) were in the Liptako-Gourma region, which suffers from recurring patterns of droughts and flooding that deteriorate soil, negatively impacting agriculture and farming. This process accelerates food insecurity as these two sectors are the local populations' main sources of livelihood.⁴ EUTF-funded programmes provided 192,644 beneficiaries with improved irrigation and water access and land rehabilitation in 2021 to mitigate the effects of droughts. PDU delivered 54% of this assistance, all in Burkina Faso's North and Sahel regions. The Shimodu (NE-10)⁵ programme reached 23% of the beneficiaries, all in displacement affected communities in Niger's Diffa region. In parallel, 54,567 people were trained on agricultural practices, over half (54%) of them through the CRIALCES (REG-24)⁶ programme in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. CRIALCES delivers technical support to vulnerable farmers to improve their food productivity, the nutritional value of harvested products and the sustainability of techniques used.

¹ Few's Net, 'Nigeria Food Security Outlook – June 2021 to January 2022', 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² *Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel*

³ Figures were projected based on historical trends; Aggregated data from *Cadre Harmonisé*, consulted on 10 February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ WFP, 'Conflits persistants, pertes de terres agricoles et insécurité alimentaire récurrente dans la région du Liptako-Gourma', July 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ *Projet intégré d'appui à la résilience des populations vulnérables réfugiées, déplacées, retournées et hôtes de la région de Diffa, Niger*

⁶ *Réponse à la crise alimentaire au centre Sahel : support nutritionnel et relèvement.*

In total, in 2021, EUTF-funded programmes introduced sustainable management practices to 33,607 hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems (indicator 2.6), 74% of which were situated in Liptako-Gourma. In Mali's Kayes region, the Diaspora Mali (ML-05)¹ programme provided 13,083 hectares of agricultural land with improved irrigation systems. In Niger's Tahoua and Agadez regions, the Pôles Ruraux (NE-03)² programme protected and rehabilitated 5,685 hectares of agricultural lands.

Outcome analysis 2: Resilience of communities, food security – Aggregated outcome analysis

Evolution of food security in implementation areas of EUTF-funded programmes

Twenty completed projects in the SLC window used a total of 352 outcome and impact indicators related to SO2. This analysis assessed the 323 indicators (92% of total) that were 'true' outcome or impact indicators (as opposed to output indicators), and of these, 303 were considered 'SMART' (86% of total). Where relevant, most indicators had a baseline value (all but 16) and endline value (all but 21), though many did not have a midterm value (108). Food security and malnutrition-related outcomes account for 51% of the indicators, followed by health (12%), water and sanitation (9%), livelihoods/economic resilience (7%), and governance for resilience (7%). Most indicators were related to programmes implemented in Burkina Faso (60% of resilience indicators), Cameroon (14%), and Senegal (11%), which relates to timelines for completed projects reporting outcomes rather than which countries have the most resilience-related programming (for comparison, the greatest volume of SO2-related output indicators has been reported by programmes in Niger, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali and Nigeria).

EUTF projects aim to support populations' livelihoods and more specifically to help them cope with food shortages during the lean season. Outcome analysis of 13 food security indicators shows improvements in the Coping Strategy Index (CSI) suggesting a reduction in the use of negative coping strategies in implementation areas for relevant projects.

Table 3: Indicator evolution per project, outcome analysis exercise, March 2022

Programmes	Indicators	CSI	Acceptable FCS ³	Acceptable HDDS ⁴
Résilience TDH	BF-01-01	No baseline		
Résilience Oxfam	BF-01-02	-		-
Résilience ACF	BF-01-03	+		-
Résilience LVIA	BF-01-04 (Sahel)	-		+
Résilience LVIA	BF-01-04 (North)	++		-
Résilience HI	BF-01-05	++		++
RESILIAN	CM-01-01	+		
PRESEC	CM-01-02	+		
KEY ARC	ML-01-01	++	++	
LRRD IRC	NG-01-02	+	++	
RESTE Emploi Résilience OXFAM	TD-01-01		+	+
RSAN Matam ACTED	SN-03-01	-		

++ improved and reached target value + improved but did not reach target value - worsened

Half the indicators (seven out of 13) that reported on CSI showed a reduction in the use of negative coping strategies among surveyed beneficiaries, and three of them reached their target value. The CSI is used as a measure of the impact of food aid programmes and as an early warning indicator of impending food crisis.⁵ When faced with food insecurity, households tend to

¹ *Projet d'appui aux investissements de la diaspora malienne dans les régions d'origine.*

² *Projet d'appui aux filières agricoles dans les régions de Tahoua et Agadez.*

³ Food Consumption Score.

⁴ Household Dietary Diversity Score.

⁵ Ibid.

adopt such coping strategies. Some usually include rationing strategies (i.e. limiting portion sizes, reducing the number of meals a day, restricting consumption of some to facilitate that of others such as children or working members of the household), dietary change (relying on less preferred and less expensive food), or selling household assets to be able to afford food.¹ Ten EUTF-funded projects have indicators reporting on the reduction of coping strategies: five in Burkina Faso (BF-01), two in Cameroon (CM-01), one in Mali (ML-01), one in Nigeria (NG-01) and one in Senegal (SN-03). However, in five cases the CSI increased, and, in another case, no baseline was observed and the programme did not reach its target value.

All three projects that measured the percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Scores (FCS) reported an increase, and two of them exceeded the target value.

The FCS is an index that was developed by the WFP in 1996 and aims to inform on the diversity and frequency of food groups consumed over the previous seven days by household members. It gives an idea on the prevalence of rationing strategies. Based on this score, a household's food consumption can be classified into one of three categories: poor, borderline, or acceptable.²

Half the projects (three out of six) that measured the percentage of households with an acceptable dietary diversity score (HDDS) reported an increase, and one in three reached its target value. The HDDS aims to assess the prevalence of dietary change among surveyed beneficiaries.

As many factors external to the projects impact food security, it can however be difficult to assess to what extent an observed evolution is linked to the actions of involved projects. For instance, in Burkina Faso, the project *Résilience LVIA* (BF-01-04) assessed upon its completion that 10% of sampled households in the Loroum province (North region) were using negative coping strategies, while the target value was set at 20%. In the Soum province (Sahel region), data reported by *Résilience LVIA* at endline showed that 51% of surveyed households adopted negative coping strategies, with the same target value. Both areas had similar mid-term values, with 21,4% in Loroum and 26,5% in Soum. The Loroum and Soum provinces therefore benefitted from similar activities by *Résilience LVIA* and showed similar mid-term situations, yet they recorded opposite endline results. This demonstrates that linking the evolution of food security in a designated area to the sole action of a project is difficult. This demonstrates that many factors contribute to food security and underscores the importance of baseline values to contextualize these changes.

Outcome analysis 3: Resilience of communities, malnutrition – Aggregated outcome analysis

Evolution of malnutrition in implementation areas of EUTF-funded programmes

Relatively mixed results for EUTF projects aiming to reduce prevalence of acute and chronic malnutrition highlight the difficulties of achieving high-level outcomes during a programme life cycle. Furthermore, it is a challenge to parse out a programme's contribution to outcomes given the complex and numerous external factors that influence nutrition. Acute malnutrition (inadequate nutrition, leading to rapid weight loss) and chronic malnutrition (inadequate nutrition over a long period of time, leading to a failure of growth in children) are both key, objective and standardised measures of malnutrition, used by many EUTF programmes. Malnutrition measurements are generally based on anthropometric (body measurements) or clinical indicators.³ The prevalence of malnutrition refers to the proportion of malnourished individuals in a given population.

Changes in nutrition levels for children under five from baseline to endline were most often relatively small, with a median change of -0.8 percentage points. Children under five years are in

¹ Feinstein International Center, Tufts University and TANGO International, 'The Coping Strategies Index – A tool for rapid measurement of household food security and the impact of food aid programs in humanitarian emergencies', January 2008. Retrieved [here](#).

² International Dietary Data Expansion Project, 'Food Consumption Score (FCS)', consulted on 6 April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ WHO, 'Malnutrition: quantifying the health impact at national and local levels', 1 January 2005. Retrieved [here](#).

a key stage of growth where acute malnutrition can cause wasting or thinness, chronic malnutrition can cause stunting or shortness, and both will cause a child to be underweight with long-term consequences for the child's development. The KEY programme (ML-01)¹ in Mali saw prevalence of acute malnutrition for children under five go down in three of their four target regions during the programme, and the prevalence of chronic malnutrition go down in two out of four regions. Notably, a nine-percentage point reduction in chronic malnutrition was recorded in the Tombouctou region. *Résilience HI* (BF-01-05) also saw a reduction in the prevalence of chronic malnutrition for children under five: from 42.9% to 36.7% of the target population during the programme (short of target of reducing to 27.5%).

Table 4: Indicator evolution per project, outcome analysis exercise, March 2022

Programmes		Indicators	Prevalence of		Breastfeeding practices	
			Acute malnutrition	Chronic malnutrition	Early breastfeeding	Exclusive breastfeeding
<i>Résilience Oxfam</i>		BF-01-02				++
<i>Résilience ACF</i>		BF-01-03	+	+	+	++
<i>Résilience LVIA</i>		BF-01-04 (North)	++	+	++	+
<i>Résilience LVIA</i>		BF-01-04 (Sahel)	-	+	++	-
<i>Résilience HI</i>		BF-01-05	+	+	++	
KEY		ML-01 (Gao)	+	+		
KEY		ML-01 (Menaka)	-	-		
KEY		ML-01 (Mopti)	+	-		
KEY		ML-01 (Tombouctou)	+	+		
KEY ARC		ML-01-01				++
<i>Yellitaare</i>		SN-01-01	+			++

++ improved and reached target value + improved but did not reach target value - worsened

Results obtained on adult malnutrition were small, yet positive. *Résilience ACF* (BF-01-03), *Résilience HI*, *Résilience LVIA* (BF-01-04), and *Yellitaare* (SN-01-01) found small reductions in acute malnutrition, and acute malnutrition increased slightly in the Sahel region for *Résilience LVIA*. Notably, *Yellitaare* saw reductions in acute malnutrition of six and eight percentage points in the Matam and Podor regions, bringing the prevalence to 10.8% and 10.2% respectively (very close to target of 10%). *Résilience ACF* and *Résilience LVIA* also saw reductions in the prevalence of chronic malnutrition, with LVIA seeing reductions of five and eight percentage points in the North and Sahel regions, respectively. Finally, RESILANT saw a considerable increase of 17.5 percentage points in the rate of recovery from severe acute malnutrition.

Promotion of good nutrition practices seems to have improved outcomes on attitudes and practices. PRESEC (ML-06-02) found that 56% of their surveyed beneficiaries had improved their attitudes and practices on nutrition, and RSAN Matam ACTED (SN-03-01) found that 82% of beneficiaries could identify three key messages in good nutrition practices.

Outcomes on specific practices like breastfeeding and infant and young child feeding also improved. Optimal breastfeeding, especially in the first six months of the child, is so critical that WHO estimates it could save the lives of over 820,000 children under five each year.² Two of the three main recommendations by WHO and UNICEF include initiation of breastfeeding within the first hour of birth (early breastfeeding) and exclusive breastfeeding for a child's first six months.³ The three projects that measure prevalence of early breastfeeding reported an increase among surveyed women between baseline and endline. In addition, six out of seven projects found an increase in exclusive breastfeeding practices during the programme (KEY ARC, *Résilience LVIA*, *Résilience Oxfam*, *Yellitaare*, *Résilience HI*, and *Résilience ACF*). Notably, KEY ARC had the highest increase

¹ Programme de renforcement de la résilience des communautés, des ménages et des individus vulnérables à l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Mali.

² WHO, 'Infant and young child feeding', consulted on 13 April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Ibid.

in the rate of exclusive breastfeeding, with an increase of 46 percentage points (71% at endline compared to a 25% baseline).

Improved access to basic services

In 2021, 1,046,392 people gained improved access to basic social services (indicator 2.9) thanks to EUTF programmes in the SLC, which represents a 38% increase compared to people reached during 2020.¹

Improving access to basic services in remote areas through cash transfers

EUTF-funded programmes supported the immediate social protection needs of 307,395 vulnerable people² through unconditional cash transfers in 2021, mostly in Nigeria through the One UN Response Plan (NG-09)³ and RRR programmes. For beneficiaries, cash transfers are fungible and provide the benefit of choice, making them a powerful tool to support resilience. In 2021, the One UN Response Plan programme sent unconditional cash transfers of NGN 5,000 (approximately €11) that benefitted 154,557 members of poor households in coping with the socio-economic effects of COVID-19, while 82,859 vulnerable people in the Borno region benefitted from safety net transfers ranging from €85 to €140 sent by RRR to support access to farming and agricultural inputs.

In addition, 248,985 beneficiaries received cash transfers to facilitate their access to food and water supplies. Over half (56%) of these transfers were directed to beneficiaries in the Liptako-Gourma region to support nutrition and food security during the lean season, mainly through the PDU and CRIALCES programmes. Adapting to mobility constraints due to COVID-19 restrictions, CRIALCES sent e-vouchers to pregnant and lactating women and mothers of children between 6 and 23 months to facilitate their access to the necessary nutritious ingredients on the markets during the lean period. Aligning its action to the national social protection frameworks, PDU sent unconditional cash transfers to poor households in Burkina Faso and Mali and made the transfer conditional on participation in communal work in Niger. Distributions were complemented by in-person sensitisations on household saving practices and dietary diversity.

The remaining 44% of beneficiaries were all in Guinea and benefitted from cash transfers from the RESIGUI (GN-04)⁴ programme in the Boke, Kankan, Labe and Nzerekore regions meant to prevent vulnerable households from falling back into food insecurity. In 2021, 242,681 people were projected to be at crisis levels of food insecurity during the lean season in these regions.⁵ Another type of assistance during 2021 was direct distribution of water; PDU provided 1,959 IDPs with drinkable water for seven days in Burkina Faso's Sahel region between April and September 2021.

Improving access to basic services in vulnerable areas through the construction and rehabilitation of social infrastructures

To improve access to basic social services, EUTF-funded programmes also facilitated the construction and rehabilitation of 3,286 social infrastructures (indicator 2.1 bis) in 2021, bringing the total to 10,698 since the inception of EUTF-funded activities. In 2021, 444,549 people benefitted from improved access to services thanks to new or rehabilitated social infrastructure (indicator 2.9).

Of these beneficiaries, 265,882 people had improved access to water and sanitation. Most were in Sahelian countries, with 28% in Mali, 21% in Niger and 13% in Chad. In Niger, 895 infrastructures to

¹ Among them, 556,380 people benefitted from cash transfers, and 444,549 people benefitted from improved social infrastructure, related to water, sanitation and health care. The remaining 45,463 beneficiaries that are not mentioned in more details in the following paragraphs benefitted from other types of support, including improved access to energy and education.

² Beneficiaries of cash transfers included host communities, potential migrants, refugees and IDPs.

³ EU Support to the United Nations 'One UN Response Plan to COVID-19 in Nigeria'.

⁴ *Améliorer la résilience des populations vulnérables de Guinée*

⁵ Aggregated data from *Cadre Harmonisé*.

improve water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) were constructed or rehabilitated in 2021 (indicator 2.1bis), which is notable given that an estimated 1.2 million people were in need of WASH assistance in the country during the same period.¹ An additional 34% of beneficiaries were in Ghana and benefitted from the GrEEEn GH (GH-02)² programme. In Ghana's Western and Ashanti regions, the programme financed the realization of climate-resilient social infrastructure for water access and flood prevention benefitting some 90,156 people in targeted localities.

Access to health care was improved for 131,490 vulnerable people and refugees (indicator 2.9) in Niger's Tahoua, Zinder, Agadez and Tillabéri regions (74%) and in Mali (26%). Basic health services in Niger are lacking, both in terms of quantity and quality, with a health coverage of 48%.³ This means that only 1.9 million people in the country have minimum access to health facilities in their district. The Zinder region has the lowest coverage, with a rate as low as 39%.⁴

EUTF-funded programmes also provided 24,727 people with an improved access to education (indicator 2.9) in 2021, all in Niger (52%), Mali (47%) and Burkina Faso (1%). Protracted violence in the Sahel has significantly impacted the provision of education and in the second half of 2021, 5,574 schools were not functional in Burkina Faso (3,280), Mali (1,664) and Niger (630).⁵ The PROJES (ML-10)⁶ programme built or rehabilitated 190 education-related infrastructures in Mali. In Burkina Faso, the Protection BF (BF-07)⁷ programme equipped 608 Franco-Arab schools and 78 Koranic schools with teaching material (indicator 2.1 bis). By supporting French Arabic schools, the programme aims to strengthen their teaching quality and generalise their accreditation in the national system for primary and secondary levels. The support to Koranic schools aims to facilitate the integration of Talibé children in society and their progressive inclusion in the national education system.

¹ OCHA, 'Aperçu des besoins humanitaires – Niger', February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in Ghana

³ OCHA, 'Aperçu des besoins humanitaires – Niger', February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Ibid.


⁵ OCHA, 'Burkina Faso, Mali and Western Niger – Humanitarian Snapshot', January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Programme Jeunesse et Stabilisation – régions du centre du Mali

⁷ Protection des jeunes dans les zones à risque au Burkina Faso à travers l'éducation et le dialogue.

4.2.4. IMPROVED MIGRATION MANAGEMENT

Figure 15: Strategic Objective 3 dashboard, SLC, December 2021¹



In 2021, the number of people displaced by climate and conflict continued to increase in the SLC region. Over the last three years, the conflict in the Sahel has developed into one of the world's worst humanitarian and displacement crises.² As of December 2021, 6.6 million persons were internally displaced in the Liptako-Gourma³ and Lake Chad Basin regions.⁴ The number of refugees and asylum seekers reached 1.5 million, 41% of which originated from the Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad Basin regions and mainly present in Chad, Cameroon and Niger.⁵ These figures represent a significant increase compared to December 2020, where the number of refugees in the SLC reached 1.3 million, with additional 2.9 million IDPs recorded in the Lake Chad Basin primarily (2.1 million) in the BAY states in Nigeria.⁶

Dangerous migration routes to Europe were increasingly used. In 2021, migrants continued to use the Atlantic Route with approximately 22,316 arrivals in the Canary Islands this year, very similar to the total for 2020 (23,023). Central Mediterranean Route use resumed after decreasing in 2020 because of COVID-19 related restrictions. At the end of 2021, 66,140 migrants had arrived by sea in Italy, a 94% increase over 2020 and a six-fold increase compared to 2019, where 11,471 migrants arrived in Italy.⁷ Two West African countries – Côte d'Ivoire (6%) and Guinea (4%) featured among the top ten nationalities of arrivals.⁸

The EUTF has contracted €359.0M (18% of the EUTF SLC budget) to improve migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination (SO3). The EU-IOM Joint Initiative (EU-IOM JI) represents the bulk of this budget with a total of €195.1M (54%) in SLC, in part facilitating the sustainable and dignified return and reintegration of migrants. The EUTF also provides capacity building and operational support to organisations and institutions to better manage mixed migration flows through programmes such as ProGEM (NE-02, €32.0M)⁹ in Niger and AFIA (MR-02, €3.0M)¹⁰ in Mauritania. Finally, EUTF-funded programmes aim to enhance capacities in the fight against trafficking in persons, notably through programmes such as TEH (REG-12, €17.4M).¹¹ As only 6 out of 30 projects have been completed so far, an overarching outcome analysis for SO3 is not relevant at this stage.

In the second half of 2021, country-specific studies on the state of migration governance were conducted by the MLS in 21 countries, including 12 in the SLC region. These reports, which were commissioned by the EUTF, aim to support the design of future programming by identifying each country's priority needs, existing governance frameworks and their level of implementation, as well as support currently available from the different donors and IPs.

Scaling up protection for migrants

The SLC region continues to be an important transit area for migrants that intend to reach Europe through the Mediterranean and Atlantic. Irregular migration along these routes is increasingly dangerous: at the end of 2021, 4,400 deaths were recorded making it the deadliest year in the region since 2018.¹² Migrants are vulnerable to human trafficking, gender-based violence and other exploitative practices, which require protection interventions and assistance under international law. In 2021, EUTF-funded programmes protected and/or assisted 86,876 migrants in transit (indicator 3.2), a

¹ Budget figures are related to projects which are contracted, relevant to the MLS, and providing data.

² ICMPD, 'Migration Outlook 2022', January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ The centre of the conflict in the Sahel revolves around the area between Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, called the Liptako-Gourma.

⁴ UNHCR Operational Data Portal, consulted in January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ UNHCR, 'Operational portal – Refugee situations', consulted in January 2021. Retrieved [here](#)

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ *Renforcement de la gestion durable des conséquences des flux migratoires.*

¹⁰ *Renforcement des capacités pour une meilleure gestion de la migration afin de protéger l'enfance migrante contre l'exploitation et la traite.*

¹¹ *Appui à la Lutte contre la Traite des Personnes dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée.*

¹² IOM, 'Rising Migrants Deaths Top 4,400 This Year: IOM Records More Than 45,00 Since 2014, December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

tenfold increase compared to 2020. This increase is substantially driven by one programme, Protection West Africa (REG-13), which scaled up its protection and assistance efforts to migrants in transit.

EUTF-funded programmes reached migrants in transit in conflict-affected areas with constrained access. In 2021, Protection West Africa (REG-13) protected and/or assisted 79,842 migrants in transit mainly in Burkina Faso (29%), Mali (25%) and Niger (25%). All three countries have some of the lowest Human Development Index (HDI) scores, with limited fiscal capacities to provide basic services to the population, in addition to widespread insecurity and political unrest.¹ In Niger, activities were implemented in the conflict-hit region of Tahoua where 16,740 migrants in transit were reached. In Mali, programme activities targeted the region of Tombouctou (15,837), which is on one of the main migration routes to Algeria. In Burkina Faso, Protection West Africa was active in the transit areas of Comoe (Cascades region), Houet (Hauts-Bassins region), Kadiogo (Central region) and Seno (Sahel region).

As migrants in transit often find themselves in precarious situations with limited access to basic services, the programme offered different types of assistance: most beneficiaries received non-food items (45%) as well as medical treatment and psycho-social support (34%). Legal assistance (8%), temporary housing and subsistence support (7%) were also provided to a lesser extent. Responding to the needs of vulnerable groups was also a priority: in 2021, Protection West Africa reached 4,305 children through the establishment or reinforcement of 20 one-stop shops offering multiple services. Efforts were also made to enhance child-friendly safe places, deploy mobile teams and support foster families who care for unaccompanied children on the move.²

In 2021, the EU-IOM JI programme continued to provide direct assistance to migrants in vulnerable situations along the Central Mediterranean Route (in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Tchad, Niger and Mali³); as well as along the Atlantic Route (in Mauritania, in Senegal and the Gambia notably).

EUTF-funded programmes further supported migrants in transit along the Atlantic Route. In 2021, 22,316 people arrived irregularly in the Canary Islands.³ The increase in usage of the Atlantic Route has been accompanied by an increase in deaths and disappearances: 82 boat accidents were recorded resulting in the death of 1,176 migrants, some of whom had departed from the coasts of Senegal and Mauritania.⁴ Against this backdrop, the Nexus SRD programme (MR-08) protected and assisted 2,377 migrants in transit in Mauritania in 2021. The majority of beneficiaries (72%) received package support, which englobes the provision of shelter, food, non-food items, as well as psychosocial and medical assistance. Medical assistance was availed to transit migrants in Nouadhibou who were intercepted or rescued at sea. To enhance medical care, emergency medical triage and early referral mechanisms were put in place.

Another way of enhancing protection for migrants is by building the capacities of national stakeholders involved in migration management. In 2021, EUTF-funded programmes trained 5,611 people on migration management and protection (indicator 3.7), representing a 69% increase compared to 2020. Capacity building was mostly achieved through training (91%) and to a smaller extent workshops (8%) that covered two main topics: protection (26%) and human trafficking and migrant smuggling (16%).⁵ A whole-of-society-approach is essential to manage migration and related challenges in a collective and sustainable way.⁶ To this end, EUTF-funded trainings reached diverse actors in 2021 – mainly national and local civilian institutions (47%) – but also national security forces (9%) and community volunteers (6%).⁷

¹ UNDP, Human Development Reports, 2020. Retrieved here

² Description of Action T05-EUTF-SAH-REG-13-02.

³ IOM, A Region on the Move: Mobility Trends in West and Central Africa (January-December 2021), April 2022. Retrieved here.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ 48% of subjects were unspecified and the remaining 10% addressed legal migration.

⁶ Appleby, J. Kevin, Implementation of the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration: A Whole-of-Society Approach, April 2020. Retrieved here.

⁷ 35% of actors who benefited from training were unspecified, 3% were NGOs/CSOs and less than 1% service providers.

Protection West Africa (REG-13) offered training in protection issues, including gender-based violence (GBV) to 1,457 people in 2021. Most participants were trained in Guinea (35%), The Gambia (13%) and Mali (11%). The training component of the programme aims to improve knowledge on protection principles and legal frameworks. In 2021, two overarching themes were at the core of the trainings: 1,117 key child welfare stakeholders were trained to address the protection needs of children on the move and 340 community volunteers participated in trainings related to health protocols, psychosocial support and legal assistance.

In 2021, the TEH programme (REG-12) trained 825 people on risks related to trafficking in persons (TIP). The regional programme aims to combat TIP in the Gulf of Guinea,¹ with most trainings conducted in Ghana (47%), Nigeria (18%) and Côte d'Ivoire (16%). In 2021, the TEH programme continued to reinforce judiciary systems by training 343 actors from local jurisdictions to facilitate the prosecution of traffickers. 61 new members from national civilian institutions participated in ongoing training cycles to reinforce the capacities of inter-ministerial anti-trafficking committees. Other training sessions (39%) addressed the effective use of adopted procedures for the referral of victims of trafficking (VOTs) to assistance services tailored to their specific needs.

Reinforcing reintegration assistance for returnees

Although the SLC region experiences pronounced emigration, an increasing number of migrants are returning to their countries of origin.² In 2021, the EU-IOM JI programme (REG-08) continued to provide post-arrival and reintegration assistance to returnees who primarily arrived from Libya and Niger. In close cooperation with state and non-state actors, returning migrants were supported through an integrated approach addressing their economic, social and psychosocial needs, while including communities as much as possible in the reintegration process.³

104,224 returnees received post-arrival assistance (indicator 3.5) to address their short-term needs as of December 2021. Most returnees were assisted in Mali (22%), Guinea (20%) and Nigeria (18%), which are the most cited nationalities from West and Central Africa that arrived irregularly in Europe between 2017 and 2021.⁴ All returnees received a limited cash instalment to cover their immediate needs, including transportation. Post-arrival assistance under EU-IOM JI also involved cash for work activities in some countries (Burkina Faso, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria) where returnees clean public spaces or participate in similar sanitation- and environment-related work.⁵ These activities are intended to improve the living conditions in local communities while giving a social role to returnees. In Guinea, for example, returnees received €4.5 on average per day worked, and €2.5 were transferred to an individual bank account for savings.⁶

EUTF-funded activities also focused on longer-term reintegration assistance; 91,657 returnees received this type of assistance since inception (indicator 3.5bis). Most received package support (75%) and participated in trainings, job fairs and focus groups discussions. Whenever possible, returnees are referred to services that are tailored to their specific reintegration needs, for which EU-IOM JI relies on partnerships with local and national stakeholders. Professional training and skills development (indicator 1.4) are also used to foster economic reintegration and benefitted 774 returnees in 2021 through the ARCHIPELAGO (REG-15), DIZA (TD-07),⁷ GrEEen (GH-02) and Kallo Tchidaniwo (NE-09) programmes.

¹ Document of Action SAH-REG-12 TEH.

² IOM, 'A Region on the Move: Mobility Trends in West and Central Africa (January-December 2021)', April 2022. Retrieved here.

³ IOM, 'Towards sustainable reintegration: EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration – Five Years On – Key Achievements', March 2022. Retrieved here.

⁴ Of the 694,259 migrants who arrived irregularly in Europe between 2017 and 2021, 28,015 were Guinean, 26,6929 Ivorian and 21,963 Nigerian. IOM, 'Irregular Migration Routes to Europe – West and Central Africa', March 2022. Retrieved here.


⁵ This information is not reported through the MLS and is not reflected in the data collected for 2021.

⁶ Altai Consulting, 'Regional Synthesis Report – TPML Mechanism for Sahel and Lake Chad', June 2021.

⁷ *Programme de développement inclusif dans les zones d'accueil.*

4.2.5. IMPROVING GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

Figure 16: Strategic Objective 4 dashboard, SLC, December 2021¹



The security situation in the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin regions worsened in 2021. While the number of fatalities and violent events remained relatively stable (17,307 people died in 2021, a slight

¹ Budget figures are related to projects which are contracted, relevant to the MLS, and providing data.

increase from 16,373 in 2020),¹ violence spread to new regions and countries as national and international armies struggled to quell insurgencies.

In the Lake Chad Basin, the deaths of leaders of the two main non-state armed groups have had a limited impact on the violence so far. In May 2021, Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram,² died during an attack from the rival Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP).³ Shekau's death led to a record number of defections and renditions of former fighters to the Nigerian authorities: an estimated 20,000 men, women and children had surrendered as of December 2021,⁴ a high number which represents a challenge in terms of demilitarisation, deradicalization and reintegration programmes in the Lake Chad Basin countries.^{5,6} Over the second half of 2021, **ISWAP consolidated its presence in the Lake Chad Basin, pursuing its strategy to replace authorities and governance structures** in territories under its control. ISWAP's leader, Abu Musab al-Barnawi, was allegedly killed in a Nigerian military attack in August 2021.⁷ As of December 2021, his alleged death does not seem to have had a strong impact on the group, which has weathered leadership changes in the past and is less centralised than *Jama'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihad* (JAS).⁸

In the Sahel, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama'at Nusrat Al Islam Wal Muslimin (JNIM) continued to expand their areas of influence beyond the Liptako-Gourma area.⁹ Attacks in Benin and Côte d'Ivoire fuelled fears of an expansion of the conflict from the Sahel to coastal states.¹⁰ In 2021, as governments of the Sahel showed increased interest in negotiating with non-state armed groups, and populations grew more critical of the security response to the conflict by both national and international militaries, **the international community had to revise its strategy.**¹¹ In the midst of a worsening relationship between the military government of Mali and the French government, Emmanuel Macron announced in June the end of the Barkhane operation in Mali by the beginning of 2022.¹² In November, protests surrounding a Barkhane convoy in Burkina Faso and Niger further put into question the future of the European military engagement in the region.¹³

West and Central African countries continued to show signs of democratic erosion in 2021. Over the year, two presidents were toppled by military coups. The military took power in Mali (since 2020 and more directly since May 2021),¹⁴ and in Guinea (September 2021).¹⁵ In Chad, the opposition denounced an 'institutional coup' after Mahamat Idriss Déby took power following his father's death in April 2021.¹⁶ Sanctions imposed by ECOWAS on Mali following the prolonged transition period and, to a lesser extent, on Guinea following the coup, may have a strong negative impact on populations as economies are isolated and trade is jeopardised.¹⁷ A coup in Burkina Faso in the beginning of 2022 and an attempt in Guinea-Bissau have confirmed fears of a 'domino effect' in the region.¹⁸

¹ ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project dashboard', consulted in February 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² Also known as *Jama'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihad* (JAS).

³ The Guardian, 'Boko Haram leader killed on direct orders of Islamic State', June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ ISS, 'No easy answers to Lake Chad Basin's security dilemmas', January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ The New Humanitarian, 'What Nigerians displaced by Boko Haram say about living with ex-fighters', September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ BBC, 'Nigeria says ISWAP leader Abu Musab al-Barnawi is dead', October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Reuters, 'Nigerian general says leader of Islamic State West Africa is dead', October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ The centre of the conflict in the Sahel revolves around the area between Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, called the Liptako-Gourma.

¹⁰ France24, 'Côte d'Ivoire : de nouvelles attaques contre les forces de défense et de sécurité', March 2021. Retrieved [here](#) ;

DW, 'Premières attaques djihadistes contre l'armée au Bénin', December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ ACLED, 'Sahel 2021: communal wars, broken ceasefires and shifting frontlines', June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹² France24, 'Macron announces France's Sahel military force will end in early 2022', June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹³ France24, 'Un convoi militaire français bloqué par des manifestants au Niger', November 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁴ Le Monde, 'Comment le Mali a vécu un deuxième coup d'Etat en moins d'un an', May 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁵ Jeune Afrique, 'Guinée : condamnations internationales après le coup de force contre Alpha Condé', September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁶ TV5Monde, 'Tchad : un coup d'état institutionnel dénoncé par les principaux partis d'opposition', April 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁷ France24, 'Inflation et risque de pénuries... le Mali durement touché par les sanctions de la Cédéao', January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁸ Le Monde, 'L'Afrique de l'Ouest dans la spirale des putschs militaires', January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

Of the €1.94B worth of projects included in the SLC MLS, €607.9M (or 31%) were contracted to support conflict prevention, security and governance activities (SO4) in the region. Most newly contracted projects under SO4 focus on governance, including a project to reinforce the civil registry in Guinea (GN-05-01¹, newly included in this report), and a project in Burkina Faso to support military justice (PARJI, BF-11-01)². Newly contracted projects also aim to support security forces, notably through the second phase of the PARSEC in Mali (PARSEC II, ML-14-13).³

Strengthening conflict prevention and local governance at the community-level

Throughout the year, EUTF-funded programmes trained 9,046 community representatives on governance, conflict prevention and human rights (indicator 4.2), accounting for 37% of all actors trained in the region under this indicator. Of these, 47% were trained in the Sahel's Liptako-Gourma region where transnational and internal violence has increased in the past year.⁴ Another 44% were trained in the Lake Chad Basin (Chad, Far-North region of Cameroon, Borno region of Nigeria) where communities are facing conflict and violence and some 8% were trained in Mauritania's border regions with Mali, which are grappling with growing insecurity.⁵ In 2021, community representatives were mostly trained in improved governance (54% of community representatives), conflict prevention and peacebuilding (39%) and CVE/PVE (7%).

Local communities play a key role in strengthening social cohesion and building peace through dispute resolution, mediation and conflict prevention activities. Local level conflicts can create intercommunal mistrust and result in destabilisation, conflicts and fatalities.⁶ In 2021, EUTF-funded programmes focused on the prevention of locally driven conflict by training community representatives to bolster their role as agents of peace and social cohesion. The number of community members trained on conflict prevention tripled, from 1,017 in 2020 to 3,503 in 2021 (indicator 4.2). The regional PDU programme (REG-18),⁷ implemented in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, trained most of these beneficiaries (86% of all community members trained in 2021) by training community mediators on conflict prevention and resolution as well as early warning systems. In Chad, 100 peace ambassadors were trained through the PRCPT programme⁸ (TD-02) on proactive conflict prevention. In Nigeria, local authorities were involved in EUTF-funded programmes in order to ensure the long-term sustainability of activities. The MCN programme (NG-03)⁹ trained 122 community representatives (3%) on conflict management as part of community peace partnerships (CPPs) and community accountability fora within local councils. These mechanisms serve as coordinating and accountability platforms for regional administrators and officials, security institutions, civil society groups, community leaders and religious leaders. In Burkina Faso, where intercommunal violence has significantly increased in recent years, the PEV programme (BF-08) involved traditional leaders in trainings due to their key role in the community.¹⁰ In 2021, the PEV programme trained 279 community leaders in inter-religious and inter-community dialogue and social cohesion, accounting for 8% of community representatives trained on conflict prevention in the region in 2021.

Community leaders and structures also play an instrumental role in strengthening local governance by ensuring inclusivity and communities' ownership. EUTF-funded programmes contributed to training 4,910 community representatives in improved governance, a 30% increase compared to 2020 (3,774 people). Community structures and local governance tend to weaken during conflict. In 2021, the regional RESILAC programme (REG-05) trained 3,801 people accounting for 77%

¹ *Projet pilote d'amélioration des performances de l'état civil guinéen par le recours à la digitalisation (Etat Civil GN).*

² *Projet d'appui au renforcement de la justice pour lutter contre l'impunité (PARJI).*

³ *Programme d'Appui au Renforcement de la Sécurité (PARSEC Mali Phase 2)*

⁴ 18% in Niger, 18% in Burkina Faso and 11% in Mali.

⁵ SIPRI, 'The high cost of insecurity: The case of Hodh el Gharbi in Mauritania', 2020. Retrieved here.

⁶ ZIF Center for Peace Operations, 'Operationalizing Conflict Prevention: The Role of Civil Affairs Officers in Local Conflict Management', November 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ *Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.*

⁸ *Projet de Renforcement de la Résilience et de la Cohabitation Pacifique au Tchad.*

⁹ Enhancing state and community level conflict management capability in North Eastern Nigeria.

¹⁰ DCAF, 'Critical security issues in Burkina Faso', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

of community representatives trained in democratic governance. Those trained included 1,421 community leaders and 2,380 community-based organisation members in areas affected by extremist violence in the Lake Chad Basin. The remaining 23% of community representatives trained in governance in 2021 (1,109 people) were reached by the DIZA programme (TD-07), which trained 943 people in the Ouaddai region of eastern Chad, where 146,911 refugees and asylum seekers were recorded as of October 2021.¹

Local governance was also strengthened through local strategies, laws, policies and plans developed or directly supported by EUTF-funded programmes (indicator 4.6). In 2021, EUTF-funded programmes supported the development of 127 protocols and/or plans to reinforce conflict prevention and peacebuilding. PDU contributed to 80 of these: 34 national early warning system committees were set up, 19 conflict prevention and management plans were elaborated, 11 early warning systems (EWS) bulletins were published, and 16 peaceful conflict management mechanisms were set up and functional.

Increasing the capacities and coordination of security forces to ensure stability in the region

In 2021, 9,164 security forces (9,064 national and 100 local) benefitted from training on conflict prevention, improved governance, security and human rights (indicator 4.2), accounting for 37% of all actors trained in the region under this indicator. This is almost four times more than in 2020 (2,375 people) and accounts for 52% of the total achieved since the beginning of EUTF-funded activities.

Most security officials (68% or 6,252 people) were trained in border management to ensure a more proactive and preventive management of transnational threats and support overall security in the region. This is eight times more than the cumulative results achieved at the end of December 2020. The Burkina Faso-based ProGEF programme (BF-03),² which has been grappling with growing insecurity in 2021, achieved most of this result (88%) through joint training sessions for local and national police forces as well as operational customs officers. The programme also supported an increase in cross-border security cooperation (indicator 5.4) through the establishment of participatory mechanisms to exchange information on border security and coordinate patrols with counterparts in neighbouring countries (45% of all cooperation initiatives in 2021). In Ghana, the Border Security GH programme (GH-01)³ contributed 11% of the national forces trained in border management in the region through sensitisation sessions on emergency response and contingency planning targeted to local immigration service officers.

National and local security forces were also trained on security (1,415 people or 15% of all security officials trained under indicator 4.2) to support their daily operational activities. Most (49% or 689 people) were GAR-SI officers, trained in Burkina Faso and Mauritania. The GAR-SI units are deployed in remote areas where they support policing activities and can intervene in the case of attacks. As the programme is approaching its end, equipment has been transferred to the units to support their operations (individual kits, vehicles, telecommunication devices, etc.). In 2021, the units received 31,757 items to strengthen governance (indicator 4.1 bis) which is four times more than the results achieved as of December 2020 (7,197 items). Security forces also received technical trainings to support them in fulfilling their civilian protection mandate. In Chad, the PRODECO programme (TD-06)⁴ trained 217 employees (15% of security forces trained on security) of the National Demining Centre on the collection, processing, dissemination and use of collected data by the Information Management System for Mine Action. In Mauritania, where a growing number of people are taking the Atlantic Route,

¹ UNHCR Chad, Statistics on refugees and asylum seeker population', October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² *Programme Gestion Intégrée des Espaces Frontaliers au Burkina Faso*.

³ Strengthening Border Security in Ghana.

⁴ *Appui au déminage, à la protection sociale et au développement des personnes vulnérables*.

the Nexus SRD programme (MR-08)¹ trained 165 swimming trainers (12% of security forces trained on security) in order to strengthen the operational capacity of the country's coastguard.²

Another 634 security forces were trained on conflict prevention and peacebuilding (8%).³ In 2021, the Security G5 Sahel programme (REG-23)⁴ trained 474 security forces in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger and the MCN programme (NG-03)⁵ trained 160 security forces on conflict management, dispute resolution and reconciliation techniques in the north-eastern Nigeria.

Outcome analysis 4: Security and governance – Aggregated outcome analysis

EUTF-funded interventions have likely⁶ contributed to positive outcomes on security and governance

The EUTF likely contributed to strengthening security and governance in the region in the areas of intervention of completed projects. The logical frameworks of 16 completed EUTF-funded projects implemented in the Sahel and Lake Chad region include 73 indicators relevant to governance, conflict prevention and human rights (SO4).⁷ Ten projects can be considered as having contributed to the overall objective of improved security and governance, through two main interventions: population's participation in governance and social cohesion, and coordination of national actors.

- **Enhanced popular representation in governance and social cohesion**

Two projects reported indicators measuring an improved participation of the population in governance and social cohesion. In Chad, the RESTE *Emploi Résilience* OXFAM project (TD-01-01)⁸ which, among other objectives, aimed at strengthening the governance of local development structures and the social cohesion of communities in the Lake Chad region, reported two outcomes related to improved participation in governance. At the end of the four-year long project, 7 public structures were created and responsible for monitoring local development plans (LDPs) and had participatory and inclusive procedures for drawing up, implementing and monitoring communal development plans (CDPs) and LDPs. In total, 65% of women and young people targeted by the project reported LDPs took their specific needs and priorities into account. In Cameroon, the PARSE project (CM-02-01)⁹ reported that 43 new measures requested by youth organisations were implemented by municipalities and regions (compared to 21 originally planned).

Two projects reported increased capacities within communities to address security and violent extremism threats, through community-based early-warning systems (EWS). In the field of CVE/PVE, the PEV DGLPAP project (BF-08-02),¹⁰ which aimed to establish a monitoring system of religious dynamics to maintain social cohesion and prevent radicalisation and violent extremism, reported that one such system was in place and that community members had been

¹ *L'UE pour le nexus sécurité-résilience-développement en Mauritanie.*

² MCC, 'A gateway re-opens: the growing popularity of the Atlantic route, as told by those who risk it', 2021. Retrieved here.

³ The remaining 9% were trained on human rights, civil registration, gender, CVE/PVE, protection, justice and other topics.

⁴ *Appui aux forces de sécurité des pays membres du G5 Sahel pour la lutte contre l'impunité et le renforcement de leurs liens avec les populations.*

⁵ Enhancing state and community level conflict management capability in North Eastern Nigeria

⁶ None of the projects mentioned in this focus box included a control group. In the absence of such a control group, it is impossible to assess the direct contribution of the EUTF to these outcomes because the improvements could have happened without the intervention.

⁷ These indicators measure progress achieved in a range of thematic areas, including security, counter and prevention of violent extremism (CVE/PVE), protection, governance and cross-border issues. The MLS had access to a final or endline report for only 10 of the 16 projects, across five countries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali and Mauritania) and at the regional level. After excluding output-level indicators (reported as 'outcomes' by project teams but recategorized as 'outputs' by the MLS project following a methodological review) and indicators for which no end value was reported, a total of 18 outcome indicators were selected to feed into this outcome analysis (15 indicators were categorised as 'outcomes' indicators and three were categorized as 'impact' indicators).

⁸ *Emploi, résilience et cohésion sociale dans la bande sahélienne et la zone du Lac-Tchad*

⁹ *Projet d'appui à la résilience socio-économique des jeunes vulnérables (Extrême-Nord, Nord et Adamaoua).*

¹⁰ *Monitoring et le suivi de l'évolution à la fois des zones à risque et des zones de promotion des discours radicaux.*

trained to operate it. Similarly, the PEV-KEOOGO project (BF-08-10)¹ aimed to contribute to CVE/PVE by strengthening the monitoring of radicalisation and dialogue promotion in the country. Four community-driven EWS were reported as functional by the end of the project, compared to three originally planned. The activity consisted in the design of an implementation plan as well as the identification and training people responsible to detect potential violent extremism cases within the community.

- **Strengthened coordination between stakeholders**

Two projects reported indicators measuring different degrees of improved coordination in the fields of governance and security. In the field of security, SECUTCHAD (TD-05-01)² and WAPIS (REG-03-01)³ reported three qualitative indicators measuring increased capacities to address security issues and improved relationships within forces. In Chad, SECUTCHAD reported that the complementarity and interoperability between security forces (national gendarmerie, National and Nomadic Guard, national police) was strengthened, in particular through joint training.

Regionally, the WAPIS project reported that national WAPIS systems were better integrated within national law enforcement capacities and that information flows had consequently increased. The project aimed to contribute to national law enforcement capacities in the targeted countries by providing law enforcement actors with appropriate tools to better manage police information and therefore increase their effectiveness in handling transnational crime and terrorism-related cases. The project lasted from 2016 to 2020 and reported that new beneficiary countries engaged in the implementation of the WAPIS System or WAPIS-like systems, both through the commitment of public authorities and concrete steps taken within law enforcement agencies.

- **Overall improved security**

Finally, two projects reported impact indicators related to security and cross-border issues. In Burkina Faso, PEV DGLPAP observed a 'significant decrease in community conflicts in 2020'. In Chad, SECUTCHAD, which aimed to improve day-to-day security for both the population and the state through actions focused on strengthening individual and collective skills of members of the internal security forces, considered that transit corridors with Niger and especially with Nigeria were secured by the end of the project. The project's final report also stated that the household survey conducted on the population's perceptions of security in the localities covered by the project showed that more than 90% of surveyed people were satisfied with the work of security forces, mainly in the fight against terrorism.


¹ *Projet intégré de Monitoring, de Suivi et de Prévention de la radicalisation et de l'Extrémisme violent au Burkina Faso.*

² *Appui à la formation et à la sécurité publique au Tchad.*

³ Support to the strengthening of police information systems in the broader West Africa region.

4.2.6. COVID-19 IN THE SLC AND EUTF RESPONSE

Figure 17: COVID-19, key facts and figures dashboard, SLC, December 2021



As of December 2021, SLC countries had registered 768,611 cumulative cases and 11,789 deaths from COVID-19. Cases rose considerably during July and August, fell from September to November, then rose again rapidly in December, likely due to the presence of the Omicron variant. Only 4% of

people in SLC countries had been fully vaccinated at the end of 2021, compared to nearly 70% in G7 countries.¹ Despite the circulation of variants, West African governments did not resume lockdowns or other major restrictions, and the third and fourth waves of the virus have been shorter and less fatal than previous waves.²

The pandemic worsened poverty, economic inequality, and food insecurity in the region. In 2020, West African countries lost \$48.7 billion (€45B) in GDP and reduced working hours equated to the loss of approximately seven million jobs.³ In 2021, the region saw a 3% increase in extreme poverty.⁴ The effects of COVID-19 were more severe for vulnerable groups who are more likely to rely on contact intensive jobs, including low-skilled workers, the informally employed, women, youth, and the extreme poor.⁵ In addition to this immediate widening of inequality, the pandemic will likely contribute to long-term inequality via school closures, children from poorer families dropping out of school, and lower investment in child health, nutrition and education.⁶ Furthermore, the pandemic has disrupted production and supply chains and spurred inflation, and food prices are more than 10% higher than the five year average for half of West African countries.⁷ The pandemic has thus severely worsened food insecurity in the Sahel through the combination of price increases and the negative impact on household income and purchasing power. Approximately 25 million people in West Africa are unable to meet basic food needs, constituting an increase of 34% compared to 2020.⁸

While in 2020, West African governments focussed on strengthening health systems and offering socioeconomic support to weather the pandemic, they shifted toward austerity in 2021. The combined government budget reduction from 2020 to 2021 for 11 West African countries was estimated at \$4.4 billion.⁹ For example, budget cuts planned in Ghana and The Gambia exceed the equivalent of a full year of government spending on education.¹⁰ In 2020, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) made \$7.2 billion available to the 12 SLC countries in the form of additional loans and debt service relief to alleviate the economic impacts of COVID-19.¹¹ IMF financing imposed austerity measures for all countries, except Mali and Senegal, primarily in the form of reducing public spending and/or wage cuts.¹² Additionally, the West African Economic and Monetary Union requires members states to have budget deficits below 3% of GDP and debt below 70% of GDP, which has also motivated a tightening of budgets (although the requirements are suspended until 2023).¹³

When it comes to ‘building back better’ after the pandemic, Sahelian governments face severe constraints. Limited government budgets in the region constrain the amount of fiscal space for West African countries to continue spending on COVID-19 relief, and government revenues were severely hit by the pandemic. Furthermore, debt is a concern for West African governments, which already spent an average of 61.7% of government revenues on debt services in 2020-2021.¹⁴ At the same time, some organisations, like OXFAM, claim austerity can do more harm, as it prevents governments from enacting social welfare policies that would reverse the impact of the pandemic on poverty and inequality.¹⁵ A recent IMF study showed that major epidemics of the last two decades and the austerity measures that followed were associated with hikes in inequality (up to threefold increase in the

¹ WHO, COVID-19 Dashboard, consulted in April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

Reuters, ‘Extreme vaccine discrimination risks leaving Africa behind – Report’, 6 December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² WHO, ‘Africa on track to control COVID-19 pandemic in 2022’, 10 February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Oxfam, ‘The West Africa Inequality Crisis: fighting austerity and the pandemic’, October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ WFP, ‘Extreme poverty rises in West Africa due to COVID-19 pandemic’, 20 Jan 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ AfDB, ‘African Economic Outlook 2021’, 12 March 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ *Cadre Harmonisé*, ‘Cadre Harmonisé d’identification des zones à risque et des populations en insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle’, April 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ WFP, ‘Extreme poverty rises in West Africa due to COVID-19 pandemic’, 20 Jan 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Estimated from IMF projections of budgets; Oxfam, ‘The West Africa Inequality Crisis: fighting austerity and the pandemic’, October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ IMF, ‘COVID-19 Financial Assistance and Debt Service Relief’, 9 March 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹² Oxfam, ‘The West Africa Inequality Crisis: fighting austerity and the pandemic’, October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Oxfam, ‘The West Africa Inequality Crisis: fighting austerity and the pandemic’, October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁵ Ibid.

countries' Gini coefficient).¹ With these budget constraints, it is likely that SLC countries will have difficulty tackling the pandemic's negative impacts.

EUTF COVID-19 budgets for the SLC now total €123.8M. The €24.0M increase is due to a new COVID-19 programme which started in the second half of 2021: PSRE COVID CI (CI-03)² is designed to provide economic support and recovery from COVID-19 shocks in Côte d'Ivoire. The One UN Response Plan (NG-09)³ is also fully dedicated to COVID-19 in Nigeria, with the largest COVID-19-related budget at €49.5 million, followed by PUS BF (BF-09)⁴ in Burkina Faso with €28.3 million. Other programmes with considerable COVID-19-related outputs reported in the second half of 2021 include MCN in Nigeria (NG-03),⁵ Kallo Tchidaniwo in Niger (NE-09)⁶, the regional PDU programme (REG-18),⁷ YEP in The Gambia (GM-01),⁸ and Promopêche AECID in Mauritania (MR-05).⁹

Incorporating COVID-19 response into community resilience

COVID-19 assistance by EUTF-funded programmes has decreased, both compared to 2020 and during 2021 as the need for urgent response subsided. By the end of 2021, most COVID-19 related programming was winding down. During S2 2021, EUTF-funded programmes distributed 45,527 units of supplies (indicator 6.1) which constitutes a 98% decrease compared to S1 2021. Similarly, the number of entities receiving COVID-19 support (indicator 6.3) fell by 85% between S1 and S2 2021, with 150 entities supported during the second half of 2021. COVID-19 awareness campaigns (indicator 2.7) also reached fewer people in 2021 (74% decrease from 2020 to 2021, and 78% decrease from S1 to S2 2021), likely because general populations are highly aware of the disease and personal protection measures after two years of the pandemic.

The number of individuals reached by the COVID-19 response in 2021 (1,120,130 people, indicator 6.2) was largely driven by COVID-19 testing carried out by the One UN Response Plan in Nigeria, which tested 924,095 people in 2021. Testing continues to be essential, particularly given continued cases with the presence of the Omicron variant, and the fact that Nigeria accounted for 30% of COVID-19 cases recorded in the region in 2021.¹⁰ However, factoring out the One UN Response Plan, COVID support to individuals (indicator 6.2) fell by 96% from S1 to S2 2021.

COVID-19 programming in 2021, particularly by the One UN Response Plan, represents an approach that aims to bring COVID-19 into overall community resilience. The One UN Response Plan reached 1,437,845 people in the second half of 2021 through mass media campaigns that engaged communities on public health risks and essential family practices, including healthy behaviour related to COVID-19 (indicator 2.7). Sensitisation campaigns by MCN and PDU, which reached 14,893 and 2,139 people respectively, also included messaging beyond COVID-19, addressing basic rights and nutrition practices (indicator 2.7). Additionally, the One UN Response Plan trained 1,485 health care workers and community volunteers in case management, infection prevention and control and how to provide SRH/GBV¹¹ services (indicator 2.8). The programme also continued to provide cash transfers that reached 9,789 people during the second half of 2021 (indicator 2.9) to address household economic resilience. This provides a safety net for households who experienced loss of income due to the economic effects of the pandemic.

¹ IMF, 'The Rise in Inequality after Pandemics: Can Fiscal Support Play a Mitigating Role?', 30 April 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² *Programme de soutien et de relance à l'économie dans le contexte de la crise du COVID-19 en Côte d'Ivoire*

³ EU Support to the United Nations 'One UN Response Plan to COVID-19 in Nigeria'.

⁴ *Appui budgétaire pour la mise en œuvre du Programme d'Urgence Sahel du Burkina Faso.*

⁵ Enhancing state and community level conflict management capability in North Eastern Nigeria.

⁶ *Renforcement de la résilience institutionnelle et communautaire dans la région Diffa, Bassin du Lac Tchad, Niger.*

⁷ Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.

⁸ Youth Empowerment Project.

⁹ *Promotion de l'emploi et amélioration des conditions de vie des pêcheurs artisanaux côtiers, jeunes et femmes aux alentours des espaces naturels protégés du secteur nord de Mauritanie.*

¹⁰ WHO, 'WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard', Consulted in March 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ Sexual and reproductive health/Gender-based violence.

Helping MSMEs weather the financial effects of the pandemic

Surveys in five Sahelian countries showed that around 65% of people reported a loss of income during the pandemic.¹ Informal businesses were hit harder by the pandemic due to contact-reliant activities, less access to social protection, and generally greater vulnerability to economic shocks. The strategy of EUTF-funded programmes to support economic recovery by boosting MSMEs is a way to support the economic resilience of the more vulnerable individuals. This MSME support took place in the relatively wealthier coastal countries, likely because their more globalised economies were highly impacted by pandemic shocks, they experienced higher numbers of COVID-19 cases, and because their MSMEs are more developed and better situated for economic support.

In 2021, 9,351 MSMEs received financial support in the context of the pandemic (indicator 1.2). During the second half of 2021, the One UN Response Plan provided financial support to 9,111 MSMEs that received one round each of unconditional cash grants of NGN 38,800 (€90) across seven states in Nigeria. PASPED (SN-09)² also gave financial support to 196 MSMEs across Senegal since the beginning of the pandemic to help them recover from the economic impact. The PSRE budget support in Côte d'Ivoire, which provides funding to Côte d'Ivoire's National Support Funds for SMEs and large enterprises, seeks to support the Ivorian efforts to help the economy recover from the pandemic.³ This semester, through the support funds, the programme supported access to finance for 113 MSMEs, mostly in the services (42%), commerce (28%), and construction (16%) sectors.

EUTF-funded programmes in 2021 also provided technical support and capacity building to 49 MSMEs in the context of the pandemic. Responding to the demand for masks during the pandemic, the One UN Response Plan helped MSMEs in the textile and chemicals manufacturing sectors shift production toward creating quality personal protective equipment (PPE). This capacity strengthening helped MSMEs scale PPE and healthcare manufacturing. 50% of the entities assisted were female owned. During 2021, the EJOM programme (MR-09)⁴ continued the Kabakoo Academies initiative: Challenge to Beat COVID-19, and accompanied innovative entrepreneurs with technical assistance, which led to the creation of four MSMEs.

Support to MSMEs in 2021 helped generate or protect 1,532 jobs (indicator 1.1). This support helped enterprises retain their employees, and thus protected the incomes of people employed by small businesses. During S2 2021, the PSRE supported large companies to safeguard 696 employees and helped small businesses retain 790 jobs.⁵ The jobs supported were formal, long-term, regular-wage employment, and mainly in the construction (33%) and services sectors (33%), as well as commerce (17%) and transportation and logistics (11%). EJOM's support to the creation of MSMEs also led to job creation, with 46 formal jobs created in the services sector in 2021 in Mali.

¹ Survey data is from Nigeria (68%), Senegal (65%), Ghana (65%), Burkina Faso (61%) and Guinea (61%).

Gallup, 'COVID-19 put more than 1 billion out of work', 3 May 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² *Programme de contraste à la migration illégale à travers l'appui au Secteur Privé et à la création d'emplois au Sénégal.*

³ The EUTF has provided €24M to the FSPME and FSGE funds in Côte d'Ivoire. However, the funds also receive funding from other sources. Since the funding available to the FSPME and FSGE evolves with time, we have chosen not to use multipliers or pro-rata to isolate the EUTF's contribution to the results, since these would change over time. Instead, we have chosen to count all the results of the FSPME and FSGE from September (when EUTF funds were transferred) until €24M have been spent.

⁴ Youth Employment Creates Opportunities at Home in Mali.

⁵ Support to large companies is not recorded by EUTF indicators. However, the jobs saved by the support have been included in EUTF indicator 1.1.

5. ANALYSIS BY COUNTRY

5.1. BURKINA FASO

5.1.1. BURKINA FASO IN 2021

Figure 18: Burkina Faso – Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021



In the first five months of 2021, Burkina Faso experienced a relative lull in violence. This can be explained by alleged local non-aggression agreements reached between the Government and members of *Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin'* (JNIM) in late 2020. However, the diversity of violent actors now operating in Burkina Faso and the high autonomy of local units limited the effect of such agreements as was shown by the June attack in the Solhan village of the Sahel region – the deadliest in the country's history – that killed over 160 civilians.¹ In 2021, the number of violent events doubled compared to 2020, with 1,315 violent events registered. Yet the deadliness of attacks was lower on average, leading to a death toll comparable to that of 2020 (2,354 casualties in 2021).²

The June to December period saw an uptick in attacks (72% of the 2021 numbers) in the Sahel, North, East, Centre-North and Boucle du Mouhoun regions, notably against security forces. The violence culminated in mid-November with the suspected jihadist attack against the military base of Inata in the Sahel region that killed 49 gendarmes, the deadliest attack against armed forces in Burkina Faso since 2015. After the Solhan massacre, President Kaboré took full power in defence and security matters in early July and stepped-up the national military response, despite security forces remaining ill-equipped.³

The persistent violence created distrust of the government among the military and civilian population.⁴ Triggered by the attack on Inata camp, hundreds of people in Ouagadougou protested in mid-November, calling for President Kaboré to resign. Ultimately, the military seized power on 24 January 2022.⁵

¹ ACLED, 'Sahel 2021: Communal wars, broken ceasefires, and shifting frontlines', June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² ACLED Dashboard, consulted on 7 February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ ICG, Crisis Watch, consulted on 27 January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).; International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 'Political Upheaval and Counter-Terrorism in Burkina Faso: Between a Rock and a Hard Place', February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


⁴ ICG, Crisis Watch, consulted on 27 January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Reuters, 'Burkina Faso Army deposes president in West Africa's latest coup', January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

In 2021, the surge in attacks in Burkina Faso led to additional mass displacement and growing humanitarian needs in the Sahel, Centre-North, North and East regions. By the end of 2021, half a million people were newly displaced in the country compared to the end of 2020, with the total reaching nearly 1.6 million.¹ A poor rainy season in 2021 reduced crop production, compounding the effects of recurring attacks and mass displacement and putting 1.64 million people at crisis or emergency levels of food insecurity.² In total, 3.5 million people are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance in Burkina Faso,³ up from 2.9 million in late December 2020.⁴

5.1.2. THE EUTF IN BURKINA FASO

Figure 19: EUTF portfolio in Burkina Faso, December 2021^{5,6}




The EUTF has contracted €190.8M in Burkina Faso, focusing mainly on governance and security-related programmes (SO4), which account for 69% of the funding (€132.3M). Low-capacity security forces were supported to strengthen border management (ProGEF, BF-03).⁷ Mass displacements have increased the vulnerability of local communities, as IDPs put additional pressure on already scarce local resources and services. In light of this, 16% of the EUTF’s budget in the country have gone to resilience-building activities (SO2), all through the now completed *Résilience Burkina Faso* project (BF-01)⁸ which aimed to address the root causes of instability, improve the livelihoods of

¹ UNHCR Operational Data Portal, consulted on 27 January 2022. Retrieved [here](#). UN OCHA, ‘Burkina Faso – Situation des personnes déplacés internes (PDI)’, December 2020. Retrieved [here](#).
² WFP, ‘West Africa: The 2021 Rainy Season in Review’, October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).; UN OCHA, ‘Burkina Faso, Mali & Western Niger – Humanitarian Snapshot’, January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).
³ UN OCHA, data from 02 December 2021, consulted on 3 February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).
⁴ UN OCHA, ‘Burkina Faso – Aperçu de la situation humanitaire’, December 2020. Retrieved [here](#).
⁵ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.
⁶ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.
⁷ Programme d’appui à la gestion intégrée des frontières au Burkina Faso.
⁸ Programme « LRRD » de renforcement de la résilience des communautés vulnérables à l’insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle dans les zones frontalières septentrionales au Burkina Faso.

local communities and foster social cohesion. 11% of the EUTF budget was allocated to the creation of employment opportunities (SO1) mostly in conflict-affected areas to strengthen community resilience through an LRRD¹ approach. Finally, 4% was spent on improving migration management (SO3 – EU-IOM JI Burkina Faso, BF-04).²

Figure 20: Selected EUTF outputs in Burkina Faso, December 2021



Supporting vulnerable people with nutrition assistance

In 2021, 179,005 people benefitted from nutrition assistance (indicator 2.3) in Burkina Faso, which represents a seven-fold increase compared to the total results recorded by the end of 2020. All assistance in 2021 came from the PDU programme (REG-18),³ and most beneficiaries were situated in the North region (79%). Between August 2021 and January 2022, three provinces in this region were in a serious situation of acute malnutrition and one was in a critical situation. The factors contributing to phases 3 or 4 of acute malnutrition are inadequate food intake, high prevalence of childhood morbidities (fever and diarrhoea), poor hygiene conditions and low access to drinking water.⁴ In Burkina Faso, PDU screened a total of 86,351 children under five years old and 1,180 children over five for malnutrition in 2021.

PDU also aims to sensitise mothers to the best nutritional practices to foster mid to long-term effects. To this end, PDU trained 54,796 pregnant and lactating women on infant and young child

¹ Linking relief, rehabilitation and development.

² Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Burkina Faso.

³ Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.


⁴ IPC, 'Burkina Faso – IPC Acute Malnutrition Analysis (August 2021-July 2022)', January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

feeding, and an additional 35,867 women on detecting malnutrition using the measurement of mid-upper arm circumference. As better hygiene practices are also key in fighting malnutrition, the project distributed baby wash kits to 801 households with children suffering from acute malnutrition.

Supporting food insecure people ahead of and during the lean season

In 2021, 240,215 people benefitted from food security-related assistance (indicator 2.4), 94% of which was delivered ahead of and during the lean season (April to September). Most beneficiaries were in the North (74%), while the Sahel hosted 21% of them and the Centre-North the remaining 5%. In 2021, all three regions faced food supply shortages and higher food prices.¹ These phenomena stemmed from an abnormally short rainy season and long dry spells in September and October, which negatively impacted crop yield and pasture production.²

Figure 21: EUTF indicator 2.4, in Burkina Faso, December 2021



From April to September 2021, 106,112 people received direct food assistance or direct provision of agricultural and farming inputs to help them meet their immediate needs. PDU supported 56,590 people with ten food preservation storage units or farming inputs in the Sahel and North regions to help them cope with the shortage in food supply. Food preservation attics aim to improve food security and regulate imbalances in food production by fostering the transfer of food products either from one area to another or from a season of abundance to a season of scarcity.³ PDU also distributed food vouchers to 30,668 women during the lean season to mitigate the negative impact

¹ Few's Net, 'Des augmentations atypiques de prix de denrées de base sur plusieurs marchés du pays', December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² WFP, 'West Africa: The 2021 Rainy Season in Review', October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ SOS Faim, 'Les greniers de sécurité alimentaire au Burkina Faso – un impact confirmé', 2016. Retrieved [here](#).

of inflation on household food security. Targeting women is expected to have a direct positive impact on households' nutrition. Finally, the PDU and PEV (BF-08)¹ programmes supplied 18,854 people with products for their livestock, including distributing livestock feed and helping with herd reconstitution.

EUTF programmes also emphasised the long run stabilisation of local populations' livelihoods and reinforcement of their resilience to external shocks. Programmes engaged in water and soil conservation activities to improve water management and increase the productivity of agricultural, forestry and pastoral areas using sustainable techniques. The PDU, PEV and TUUMA (BF-06)² programmes rehabilitated 660.84 hectares of land (indicator 2.6) in Burkina Faso in 2021 to improve food security by securing, increasing and diversifying production. In 2021, PDU provided 78,050 vulnerable farmers with improved irrigation and water access and rehabilitated 25,858 beneficiaries' land. An additional 23,343 people were trained on sustainable production techniques by the PDU and CRIALCES (REG-24)³ programmes.

Outcome analysis 5: Resilience of communities, Burkina Faso – Aggregated outcome analysis

Improvement of reproductive health practices in the implementation areas of the *Résilience BF* programme (BF-01)⁴

The *Résilience BF* programme ended in early 2020. It was composed of five projects, all of which had a “reproductive health” component aiming to improve reproductive health practices, in particular maternal care, in their implementation areas. As part of this component, the programme's activities mainly included the construction and rehabilitation of health centres and building the capacity of community-based health officers. The latter then led awareness-raising activities on reproductive health practices in their communities.

All five projects reported on four indicators that can be divided into two categories: three were related to the prevalence of pregnancy care practices (assisted birth, prenatal and postnatal practices) and one to the use of contraceptives. Improving prenatal practices aims at reducing risks for both the mother and the child during pregnancy and delivery, ensuring their health during the postnatal period and reducing the maternal mortality rate.⁵ Measuring prenatal practices equates here with counting the number of women that benefitted from at least four prenatal consultations to monitor the pregnancy, while measuring postnatal practices relates to the number of women having benefitted from at least one postnatal consultation. Mainstreaming the use of contraceptives was an activity that aimed to grant women of childbearing age control over their fertility and reduce their exposure to sexually transmitted diseases.

Projects show varying tendencies across these indicators. All four indicators improved and reached their target value for the *Résilience LVIA* (BF-01-04) project in Loroum, while all indicators decreased for *Résilience TDH* (BF-01-01). The final report of *Résilience TDH* notes collaboration challenges related to insufficient resources to train enough community-based health workers in reproductive health practices. All indicators related to pregnancy care improved for *Résilience Oxfam* (BF-01-02), even though the project did not reach its target values. For *Résilience ACF* (BF-01-03) indicators on assisted birth and the use of contraceptives decreased, while indicators on prenatal and postnatal practices remained the same. Over the implementation period, the number of fully functioning health centres in the East region dropped due to rising insecurity. *Résilience HI* (BF-01-05) is the only project whose results are less consistent: More pregnant and lactating women

¹ *Rebâtir une cohésion sociale au Nord du Burkina à travers un meilleur suivi de la radicalisation, la promotion du dialogue et la valorisation de l'économie pastoraliste.*

² *Appui à la compétence professionnelle, l'entrepreneuriat et l'emploi des jeunes et des femmes dans les régions rurales du Burkina Faso.*

³ *Réponse à la crise alimentaire au centre Sahel : support nutritionnel et relèvement.*

⁴ *Programme "LRRD" de renforcement de la résilience des communautés vulnérables à l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle dans les zones frontalières septentrionales au Burkina Faso.*

⁵ WHO, 'Maternal health', consulted on 11 April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

reported attending at least four prenatal and one postnatal consultation, whereas the use of contraceptives and resort to assisted birth was less prevalent at endline than at baseline.

Table 5: Indicator evolution per project, Résilience BF (BF-01) programme

Programme and region		Résilience TDH (01)	Résilience Oxfam (02)	Résilience ACF (03)	Résilience LVIA (04) ¹		Résilience HI (05)
		Boucle du Mouhoun	Sahel North	East	North (Loroum)	Sahel (Soum)	North
Pregnancy care	Assisted birth	-	+	-	++	-	-
	Prenatal practices	-	+	0	++	-	+
	Postnatal practices	-	+	0	++	++	+
Use of contraceptives		-	-	-	++	-	-

++ indicator increased and reached target value + indicator increased but did not reach target value
 0 indicator stayed the same - indicator decreased

As projects were implemented in different regions, it is difficult to compare their performance. *Résilience TDH* was implemented in Boucle du Mouhoun and *Résilience ACF* in the East region. *Résilience Oxfam*, *LVIA* and *HI* were all implemented in the North and Sahel regions, but in different provinces and communes. *Résilience LVIA* was unable to compare its results in the Soum and Loroum provinces, as no endline results were collected in Soum due to the security situation and the unavailability of some service providers (as mentioned in the project's final report).

However, projects provide a general overview on how reproductive health practices evolved in implementation areas. Beneficiaries surveyed in the North and Sahel regions showed an overall increase in reproductive health practices, especially in maternal care. In the East and *Boucle du Mouhoun* regions, the prevalence of reproductive health practices decreased among surveyed beneficiaries. When classifying the evolution of a project as either positive or negative, it is primordial to account for external factors that impact recorded results, such as the deterioration of security (as mentioned in *Résilience HI's* final report).

Strengthening national infrastructure and capacities

The security situation in Burkina Faso remained volatile in 2021. Non-state armed groups, including JNIM, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Al Qaeda affiliates continued to attack national security forces, civilians and government officials.² The porous and largely unregulated borders around Burkina Faso have allowed these transnational terrorist groups to expand their activities in the country. EUTF-funded programmes are committed to reinforcing national infrastructure and building capacity among national security forces and communities.

In 2021, EUTF-funded programmes trained 9,430 people on governance and conflict prevention (indicator 4.2), a six-fold increase compared to the total at end of 2020. Most trainings (64%) covered border management and were conducted by the ProGEF programme (BF-03),³ which aims to enhance the network and interoperability of border control and security actors in coordination with neighbouring countries. Lessons learned from the first program cycle (2016-2020) revealed that border management trainings have contributed to a more effective and efficient deployment of security forces.⁴

In addition to training, security forces need equipment to face non-state armed groups. In 2021, 10,944 pieces of equipment were supplied, a nine-fold increase compared to the total at end of

¹ No data was provided at endline for the Soum province for *Résilience LVIA*. The result evolution is based on a comparison between baseline and midterm data.

² ACLED, 'ACLED Regional Overview – Africa (8-14 January 2022)', January 2022. Retrieved here.

³ Integrated Management of Border Areas.

⁴ Internal document of T05-EUTF-SAH-BF-03.


2020 (indicator 4.1 bis). Almost all the technical equipment (98%) was provided by the regional GAR-SI programme (REG-04)¹ to improve the preventive and reactive actions of Burkinabe security forces. The effective control of Burkina Faso's territory and borders will allow for better cross-border cooperation in the combat against transnational crime and terrorism.

1,725 people were trained in conflict prevention and peacebuilding in 2021 (indicator 4.2) to help address the complex underlying tensions in Burkinabe society. The PDU² (REG-18) and PEV³ (BF-08) programmes conducted 88% of these trainings targeting community representatives and local civilian institutions in 2021. PDU trained 781 mediators to strengthen traditional local level conflict management mechanisms, whereas PEV trained 279 women in the Hauts-Bassins region to reinforce their role combatting radicalisation. In parallel, 122,745 people participated in conflict prevention activities (indicator 4.3) mostly through awareness raising (82%) and community dialogues (17%).

Scaling up protection and assistance for migrants and returnees

As Burkina Faso is at the crossroads of several coastal and landlocked countries, it continues to be an important transit country for migrants. Along the journey, migrants may find themselves in hostile environments where they face significant protection issues, including violence, abuse and exploitation at the hands of smugglers and traffickers.

Figure 22: EUTF indicator 3.2, in Burkina Faso, December 2021



EUTF-funded programmes protected and/or assisted 24,326 migrants in transit (indicator 3.2), almost all of whom (95%) were reached in 2021 by Protection West Africa (REG-13). The programme was active in the provinces of Comoé (Cascades Region), Houet (Hauts-Bassins Region), Kadiogo (Central Region) and Séno (Sahel region), which hold important transit points to Niger, Côte d'Ivoire and Mali.⁴ These activities ensured immediate and direct assistance to migrants, including special protection to women and children. In 2021, migrants on the move received different types of

¹ Groupes d'Action Rapides – Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel.

² Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.

³ Prévention de l'extrémisme violent – Rebâtir une cohésion sociale au Burkina Faso et dans les pays de l'initiative d'Accra à travers un meilleur suivi de la radicalisation, la promotion du dialogue et la valorisation de l'économie pastorale.

⁴ IOM, Matrice de suivi des déplacements : Suivi des flux de populations – Burkina Faso, January 2021. Retrieved here.

support, mainly non-food items (43%) and health assistance covering medical treatment and psycho-social support (32%). To a smaller extent, they benefitted from legal assistance focusing on family tracing (12%) as well as temporary housing and subsistence support (11%).

In addition, the EU-IOM JI (REG-08) has supported 3,696 returnees with immediate post-arrival assistance (indicator 3.5) as of December 2021. Post-arrival assistance consisted of a limited cash instalment of FCFA 50,000 (approximately €76) to respond to returnees' immediate needs, including transportation. **Complementary to post-arrival assistance, 2,269 returnees have benefitted from reintegration assistance (indicator 3.5 bis) since inception.** One example of reintegration is the involvement of Burkinabe returnees in entrepreneurial projects that include job counselling sessions, entrepreneurship trainings and business plan development. Local authorities, technical experts and civil society members are involved in the process to guide returnees in their choices and to support them in carrying out their entrepreneurial projects.¹

5.1.3. BURKINA FASO AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 6: EUTF common output indicators for Burkina Faso, December 2021


EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	2,277	2,414	6,151	477	972	12,291	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	55	200	1,855	20	611	2,741	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	4,475	12,644	4,640	1,485	1,961	25,205	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET)...	956	5,747	4,195	4,166	7,710	22,774	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed,...	3	14	22	16	24	79	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	0	33	18	0	0	51	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	522	1,445	386	269	602	3,224	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	98,553	58,101	4,405	1,259	6,642	168,960	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	282,181	100,124	26,270	89,142	89,863	587,580	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	150,574	217,432	173,568	97,142	143,073	781,789	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	23	71	4	17	48	163	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	1,402	1,003	682	516	145	3,747	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	341,434	524,022	170,550	294,514	78,703	1,409,222	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	7,354	11,919	11,040	1,474	2,016	33,803	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	333,002	383,674	73,485	21,076	33,324	844,561	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs...	285	285	286	5,705	17,766	24,326	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	9,018	27,040	13,292	4,675	16,075	70,100	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	1,635	1,260	5,681	72	0	8,647	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	1,595	822	467	362	450	3,696	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	444	612	212	133	868	2,269	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	255	255	286	251	128	1,175	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	2	23	16	6	0	47	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	20	68	1	4	10	103	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	3	0	1	4	24	32	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	924	9	1,210	0	10,944	13,087	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	994	1,667	1,436	2,146	7,284	13,527	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	3,283	83,035	2,070,485	109,558	13,188	2,279,548	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	7	138	123	62	199	529	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	91	430	380	118	302	1,321	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	70	184	615	1,005	239	2,113	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	13	45	4	19	5	86	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created...	10	1	4	10	10	35	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	302,840	0	0	302,840	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	8,509	0	0	8,509	

¹ IOM, 'Reintegration good practices #3 – Support for Entrepreneurship in Burkina Faso', 2020. Retrieved here.

5.2. CAMEROON

5.2.1. CAMEROON IN 2021

Figure 23: Cameroon – Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021



In 2021, Cameroon started to recover from the COVID-19-induced economic crisis, although it continued to face multiple challenges. The country’s economic growth was estimated at 3.5% in 2021,¹ while inflation remained at a moderate 2.3%, below the reference of 3% established by the Central African Economic and Monetary Community.² At the same time, the country’s leeway to make budget adjustments and cope with challenges remained tight. Large parts of public spending were allocated to the preparation of the long-awaited Africa Cup of Nations. A key event with high political and symbolic significance for President Paul Biya, the Africa Cup of Nations which took place from 9 January 2022 after two successive postponements in 2019 and 2021, and despite concerns over the completion of key infrastructure and the spread of the COVID-19 Omicron variant.³

The social climate remained tense and insecurity was widespread, with 924 violent events in the country in 2021 causing 1,347 fatalities,⁴ mostly in the Far North and NOSO regions.⁵ The deaths of two students who were allegedly shot by police forces, in Buea on 14 October and in Bamenda on 11 November, sparked protests against the central government in the English-speaking areas.⁶ During the autumn of 2021, two thirds of schools remained closed in the NOSO regions due to recurrent violence and to a lockdown imposed by a non-state armed group from 15 September to 2 October.⁷

Despite the situation remaining fundamentally unstable, the number of persons of concerns to the UNHCR slightly decreased (by 2%) between December 2020 and December 2021, from 1,960,194 to 1,926,285.⁸ This was mostly due to the decrease in the number of IDPs in the country (down 10% over the year), while the number of refugees (mostly from the Central African Republic – CAR – and Nigeria) increased by 7%, reaching 466,263.⁹ Overall, the underpinning crisis factors remained present: insecurity and terrorist attacks in the Far North and political unrest in the separatist

¹ African Development Bank, ‘Cameroon Economic Outlook 2021’. Retrieved [here](#).

² African Development Bank, ‘Cameroon Economic Outlook 2021’. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Le Point, ‘CAN 2022 : les défis du Cameroun’, 7 January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ The number of fatalities in 2021 was slightly down compared to 2020 (1,723). ACLED, ‘Cameroon – data’.

⁵ The North-West and South-West regions.

⁶ African News, ‘Cameroon: Another child killing by police sends locals to the streets’, 13 November 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ OCHA, ‘Violence in Cameroon, impacting over 700,000 children shut out of school’, 2 December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


⁸ UNHCR, Operational Data Portal, accessed January 2021.

⁹ UNHCR, Operational Data Portal, accessed January 2021.

regions and in CAR. In August and December 2021, repeated clashes between communities in Far North¹ led to multiple fatalities and forced displacements. Between 5 and 8 December, 112 villages surrounding Kousseri, the region's chef-lieu, were burned, over 100 people were wounded and 44 died.² Because of the clashes, 82,637 persons were reported to have arrived in Chad between 5 and 13 December 2021, and 15,215 persons were internally displaced in the Far North region.³

5.2.2. THE EUTF IN CAMEROON

Figure 24: EUTF portfolio in Cameroon, December 2021^{4,5}



The EUTF has contracted €40.3M in Cameroon for national projects,⁶ an amount that has remained unchanged since 2019. Of Cameroon's national projects, all have ended except the €3.3M EU-IOM JI (CM-04)⁷ which benefits from the regional EU-IOM JI Top Up (REG-04-03). The EU-IOM JI aims to strengthen the migration management capabilities of Cameroon's relevant authorities, provide support to returning migrants, and raise awareness on migration and the dangers associated with irregular migration (SO3). Beyond national projects, four regional programmes are active in Cameroon: RESILAC (REG-05),⁸ Erasmus+ West Africa (REG-10),⁹ IPDEV2 (REG-11),¹⁰ and ARCHIPELAGO (REG-15).¹¹

¹ Tensions and violence were mostly due to competition over access to natural resources. For more information, UN News, 'Cameroon: Intercommunal clashes continue to displace thousands', 17 December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² UNHCR, 'Far North Cameroon – Chad Emergency', 16 December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ UNHCR, 'Far North Cameroon – Chad Emergency', 16 December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁵ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁶ The EU-IOM JI in Cameroon (*Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Cameroun*) is part of the regional Joint Initiative, but is contracted as a national project in the country.

⁷ *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Cameroun*.


⁸ *Soutien aux populations du Bassin du Lac Tchad*.

⁹ Erasmus+ in West Africa.

¹⁰ *I&P accélération au Sahel (en appui à l'initiative IPDEV-2)*.

¹¹ ARCHIPELAGO: an African-European TVET initiative.

Figure 25: Selected EUTF outputs in Cameroon, December 2021



Supporting MSMEs from the semi-formal and informal sectors

Cameroon's economy was severely hit by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020; however economic outlooks projected a recovery as early as 2021 with a 3.5% growth rate. The country's per capita GDP at \$3,868 per habitant and per year, in purchasing-power parity terms,¹ conceals important discrepancies between the north and south of the country.

EUTF-funded programmes address the plurality of local economic realities by supporting micro, small and medium enterprise (MSMEs) and small entrepreneurs. They mostly focus on access to funding, trainings and capacity building to meet entrepreneurs' specific needs. In 2021, 135 MSMEs were supported (indicator 1.2), accounting for 8% of the total achieved since the EUTF's inception in the country (1,758 SMEs). All results were obtained by three regional programmes that are active in the country: RESILAC (REG-05),² ARCHIPELAGO (REG-15),³ and IPDEV (REG-11).⁴

While completed national projects (HIMO CM, *Résilience Septentrion*) aimed to support the creation of small enterprises, all of them MSMEs that were supported in 2021 had been previously established. The RESILAC programme focuses on the Far North region – where the economy is mostly livelihood-based and undermined by poor infrastructure and chronic insecurity. It aims to strengthen the resilience of local economic systems. In 2021, it provided trainings for small entrepreneurs running a business (69 MSMEs supported), financial and operational support to transformation units (43 in S2 2021), and access to funding for VSLAs (11 in S2 2021) (indicator 1.2).

¹ World Bank, World Bank data, 2020. Retrieved [here](#).


² Redressement économique et social inclusif du Lac Tchad (RESILAC).

³ Archipelago: an African-European TVET initiative.

⁴ I&P accélération au Sahel (en appui à l'initiative IPDEV-2).

Agriculture was the dominant sector, with 44% of all MSMEs supported by RESILAC in 2021.¹ The ARCHIPELAGO programme, implemented in three regions, supported seven Business Membership Organisations (BMOs) to strengthen economic ecosystems, and indirectly support professional trainings and the creation of small businesses.² The IPDEV programme which focused on urban areas, supported five MSMEs with seed funding and technical assistance.

Figure 26: EUTF indicator 1.2, in Cameroon, December 2021



Providing safe conditions for the return and reintegration of Cameroonian migrants

In 2021, emigration from Cameroon to other African, European or Middle East countries remained significant, through both legal³ and illegal channels. In 2021, 1,965 Cameroonians illegally attempted to cross a European border.⁴ Since 2018, Cameroonians make up the fourth most represented contingent of the SLC window in terms of illegal European border crossings, behind Ivoirians, Guineans and Malians.⁵

Since the inception of the EU-IOM Joint Initiative in Cameroon (CM-04)⁶, 5,255 migrants were supported with immediate, post-arrival assistance (indicator 3.5), including 841 in 2021. The assistance included accommodation and cash for immediate needs such as food and health. Also, since the beginning of the project, 4,185 migrants benefitted from reintegration assistance (indicator 3.5 bis), including 776 in 2021. Housing, food, schooling assistance for children, psychosocial support,

¹ The sectors for the remaining MSMEs supported in 2021 were: financial services (2%), and unspecified (54%).

² ARCHIPELAGO, 'Description of Action'.

³ Due to the free or partially free circulation of people between Cameroon and other Central or West African countries, many Cameroonians work or live abroad. Migration data on Cameroonians emigrating to other African countries may be harder to obtain for this reason, and for the lack of registries abroad.

⁴ Frontex, 'Migratory map', accessed February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


⁵ Frontex, 'Migratory map', accessed February 2022. Op. Cit.

⁶ *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Cameroun.*

and short professional trainings were part of the reintegration support package.¹ The support was delivered according to the needs identified during vulnerability assessments conducted with the migrants.²

Finally, since the JI's inception in the country, 274 government officials have benefitted from trainings on migration management and protection (indicator 3.7), including 91 in 2021. Beneficiaries were mostly trained on managing arrivals and enhancing the socio-economic reintegration of Cameroonian returnees, including issues of professional training, launching a business and post-training follow-up.

Figure 27: EUTF indicator 3.5 bis, in Cameroon, December 2021



5.2.3. CAMEROON AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 7: EUTF common output indicators for Cameroon, December 2021

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	2,600	8,196	1	290	356	11,442	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	858	590	175	6	129	1,758	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	10,485	7,529	15,537	640	598	34,789	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET)...	9,438	8,120	1,714	451	729	20,452	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed,...	5	10	26	0	4	45	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	0	2	0	0	0	2	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	163	538	159	4	6	870	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	107,892	71,691	31,174	355	181	211,293	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	83,120	105,149	21,141	0	0	209,410	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	33,366	42,164	12,139	630	0	88,299	
2.5 Number of insitutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	141	65	4	0	0	210	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	98	3,056	767	41	244	4,205	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	115,042	324,059	251,822	0	0	690,923	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	616	9,145	4,381	40	16	14,198	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	22,800	155,419	81,705	0	0	259,924	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs...	0	28	28	14	14	85	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	6,489	6,423	47,650	0	0	60,562	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	0	85	0	0	0	85	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	2,621	1,218	575	359	482	5,255	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	2,014	965	430	105	671	4,185	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	36	0	0	0	36	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	91	92	45	46	274	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	1	40	34	19	7	101	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	33	125	340	0	0	498	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	0	322	499	426	520	1,767	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	45,359	14,778	1,354	3,886	720	66,097	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	19	126	42	0	5	192	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	11	7	28	4	51	101	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	10	4	56	1	0	71	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	25	25	31	2	1	84	


¹ Altai Consulting, 'Rapport final Cameroun, Mécanisme de Suivi & Apprentissage Tierce Partie du Fonds Fiduciaire d'Urgence pour l'Afrique', 2021.

² Altai Consulting, 'Rapport final Cameroun, Mécanisme de Suivi & Apprentissage Tierce Partie du Fonds Fiduciaire d'Urgence pour l'Afrique', 2021. Op. Cit.

5.3. CHAD

5.3.1. CHAD IN 2021

Figure 28: Chad – Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021



On 20 April 2021, Chad's long-time President Idriss Déby Itno died while battling armed rebel groups,¹ ushering in a new, unpredictable era for the country. After Déby's death, Chad's power was seized by a military junta led by one of his sons, Mahamat Idriss Déby. The country officially engaged in a political transition, with the drafting of a *Charte de transition* on 21 April,² which foresaw the creation of three bodies charged with steering the 18-month transition period.³ Most Chadian political figures expressed support for transitional institutions, including Déby's long-time opponent Saleh Kebzabo.⁴ Albert Pahimi Padacké was appointed Prime Minister on 26 April, and the new government was announced on 2 May.⁵ At the same time, tensions with armed rebel groups lingered. On 29 November, opposing political and military groups obtained the long-awaited amnesty that they had required as a prerequisite for participation in any official debate with the Ndjamena authorities.⁶

The economic and humanitarian situation remained fragile in 2021. In November 2021, over 3.6 million people in Chad were food insecure, including 963,244 severely insecure (Integrated Food Security phases 3 to 5), up 60% from the number of severely food insecure people in 2020.⁷ This increase was mostly caused by irregular rainfalls, and floods that destroyed over 80,000 hectares of crops and killed more than 6,000 heads of livestock.⁸ Overall, 5.6 million people remained in need of

¹ Idriss Déby Itno had been ruling since 1990, when he ousted former President Hissène Habré.

² *Présidence de la République du Tchad, 'Charte de transition de la République du Tchad'*, 21 April 2021. Retrieved [here](#).; RFI, *'Tchad: la charte qui dessine la transition consacre les pleins pouvoirs pour le fils d'Idriss Déby'*, 22 April 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ The first two bodies, the Transitional Military Council providing executive power and consisting of 14 generals, and the Transitional Government, were rapidly constituted in the first days of the transition. At the same time, the Transitional National Council – the organ providing legislative power and consisting of 93 members from all of society – was not put in place before end of September, reflecting the many discrepancies between Chadian political parties, civil society organisations, and other groups. For more information: Tchadinfos, *'Tchad : le Conseil national de transition est formé'*, 24 September 2021. Retrieved [here](#). For more information: RFI, *'Tchad: la charte qui dessine la transition consacre les pleins pouvoirs pour le fils d'Idriss Déby'*, 22 April 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ France 24, *'Au Tchad, la junte nomme un gouvernement de transition'*, 2 May 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Jeune Afrique, *'Tchad : le Conseil militaire de transition nomme un gouvernement'*, 2 May 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Jeune Afrique, *'Tchad : ce que Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno est prêt à concéder aux rebelles'*, 1 December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ OCHA, 'Chad situation report', 16 December 2021, accessed January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


⁸ OCHA, 'Chad situation report', 16 December 2021, accessed January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

humanitarian assistance in December 2021,¹ a decrease from the 6.4 million people in need in December 2020.²

Forced displacements in Chad increased during 2021, due to three main factors: chronic violence especially in the Lake Chad region, extreme climatic events in the Sahelian strip, and insecurity in neighbouring countries (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Sudan). As of 31 December 2021, there were 555,787 refugees in the country (a 16% increase over the year),^{3,4} and 406,573 IDPs (a 21% increase compared to December 2020). In spite of inflows from neighbouring countries and an increase in the number of refugees, the number of asylum-seekers remained relatively stable: from 4,572 in December 2020 to 4,707 in December 2021 (+3%). Finally, the number of Chadian returnees from CAR and at risk of statelessness increased to 77,650 (a 12% increase over the year).⁵

5.3.2. THE EUTF IN CHAD

Figure 29: EUTF portfolio in Chad, December 2021^{6,7}



The EUTF's total contracted budget relevant to the MLS in Chad is €113.9M, of which some 17% have yet to be spent. With the completion of RESTE's (TD-01)⁸ last project in December 2021, three programmes have now ended in Chad, accounting for 38% of the country's total budget. Programmes focusing on resilience (SO2) account for €83.6M, or 73% of the EUTF's funding in the country. These programmes mostly aim to enhance local development and the resilience of fragile communities, but also to expand access to basic services such as clean water, medical care, education or legal assistance. They also work towards improving food security and sensitising fragile groups on nutrition and food security. Another two completed programmes accounting for €20.0M primarily revolved around governance and capacity building of national stakeholders (SO4): SECGEF (TD-08)⁹ and

¹ OCHA, 'Chad situation report', 16 December 2021, accessed January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² OCHA, 'Rapport de situation, Tchad', December 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

³ UNHCR, Operational Data Portal, accessed January 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ UNCHR, 'Personnes relevant de la compétence du HCR au Tchad', December 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Returnees at risk of statelessness are mostly former Chadian families who went to CAR and then came back.; UNHCR, Operational Data Portal, accessed January 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.


⁷ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁸ *Résilience et emploi au Lac Tchad* (RESTE).

⁹ *Sécurité et gestion des frontières*.

SECUTCHAD (TD-05).¹ Finally, with a budget of €10.3M, the *Bab-al-amal* programme (TD-03)² focuses on TVET, youth qualifications and professional insertion in Chad's largest cities (SO1).

Figure 30: Selected EUTF outputs in Chad, December 2021



Supporting people to develop income-generating activities (IGAs)

The COVID-19-induced economic crisis further eroded the livelihoods of Chadian people. Despite some economic recovery and an increased demand for Chadian raw materials in 2021, most of the population did not feel the positive effects of the economic stabilisation.³ Mobility and social restrictions such as the lockdown of Ndjamena in January 2021 and the closing of its markets severely hurt the populations' livelihoods, while government compensations such as food distribution remained largely insufficient.⁴ It is estimated that 38% of Chadian people live below the \$1.9 a day threshold (21% in cities, 53% in rural areas),⁵ and income-generating opportunities are limited.⁶ In rural areas, small-scale agricultural activities remain predominant.⁷

¹ Appui à la formation et à la sécurité publique au Tchad.

² Projet de soutien à l'insertion socio-professionnelle des jeunes tchadiens en situation de vulnérabilité.

³ GDP growth is expected to reach 6.1% in 2021 and 5% in 2022, driven by a spur in industrial activities (cotton ginning, oil production, textile). African Development Bank, 'Chad Economic Outlook', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ The Guardian, 'The lockdown was political: Chad under strain ahead of election'.

⁵ World Bank, World Bank data. Retrieved [here](#); Knoema, 'Tchad - Proportion du nombre de pauvres au seuil de pauvreté nationale'. Retrieved [here](#).


⁶ WFP, 'Chad'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ WFP, 'Chad'. Retrieved [here](#).

EUTF-funded programmes strive to enhance livelihoods through support to IGAs. They focus on agriculture and village savings and loan associations (VSLAs) and adopt a countrywide approach to reach vulnerable people from all regions, including border areas where many displaced persons live.

In 2021, EUTF-funded programmes assisted 20,574 people to develop IGAs (indicator 1.3), a 66% increase compared to the cumulative total as of December 2020. Seven programmes contributed to these results, including DIZA (TD-07,¹ 11,134 people assisted), PRCPT (TD-02, 4,419)² and PDU (REG-18, 2,389).³ IGAs were supported in various ways: through creation and strengthening of VSLAs (45% of the people assisted to develop IGAs in 2021), through training and material assistance for agricultural and livestock activities (17%), and through support to wholesale and retail trade activities (5%).⁴ DIZA assisted host communities, returnees and refugees located outside of camps to set up VSLA groups (2,577 people) and develop IGAs in vegetable farming (630), shea production (ten), other agricultural production (1,255), retail chains (608) and other sectors (6,054). The PRODECO (TD-06)⁵ programme organised trainings to support IGAs in various sectors, such as sewing, cold chain and air conditioning, livestock, agriculture, hairdressing, and stall retail. In 2021, it assisted 959 people, 38% of the total since inception.

Figure 31: EUTF indicator 1.3, in Chad, December 2021



Women made up 51% of the beneficiaries in 2021 and men 41%,⁶ partly due to PDU RECOSOC's (REG-18-08)⁷ focus on the inclusion of women in VSLAs and IGAs. Their work in the peace-

¹ Programme de développement inclusif dans les zones d'accueil (DIZA).

² Projet de renforcement de la résilience et de la cohabitation pacifique au Tchad.

³ Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.

⁴ The sector could not be specified for 33% of the IGAs supported in 2021.

⁵ Appui au déminage, à la protection sociale et au développement des personnes vulnérables.

⁶ The gender disaggregation could not be obtained for the remaining 8% beneficiaries.

⁷ Renforcement de la résilience et de la cohésion sociale dans les zones frontalières du Niger et du Tchad (RECOSOC).

development nexus led PDU RECOSOC to focus on the socio-economic inclusion of women and youth in several activities including support to the establishment of VSLAs, trainings and subsidies to launch or strengthen agricultural, wholesale and retail trade activities. During 2021, the project supported 2,389 people to develop IGAs (including 1,989 through the establishment of VSLAs, 334 in wholesale and retail trade IGAs, and 66 in agricultural IGAs).

Most programmes supporting IGAs were implemented in rural areas. However, the *Bab-al-amal* programme (TD-03)¹ focussed on assisting youth to develop IGAs in urban areas through hands-on professional training and the delivery of equipment and starter kits. In 2021, it supported a total of 484 people (indicator 1.3).

Strengthening local governance and conflict mitigation efforts

Governance remained fragile in Chad at all levels. According to Chad's decentralisation process which started in 1993, there are four layers of subnational governance: more than 800 rural communities, 348 municipalities, 61 departments and 23 regions. However, only a minority of municipalities have local governance as elections have not been held everywhere.² Local administrations expenditures are negligible compared to the national government expenditures,³ and there is no coordination entity or fund for public investment between the different layers of governance. Chiefdoms and traditional governance structures compensate the lack of formal governance, but their operations are often plagued by a lack of participatory management and inadequate resources.

After Idriss Déby's death and the related political events that took place in April 2021, and after programmes building the capacity of national level stakeholders ended, the majority of EUTF-funded programmes now work towards enhancing local governance via a bottom-up, community-centred approach. In order to make governance more representative and sustainable, EUTF-funded programmes work to include various stakeholders such as community leaders, municipal authorities, CSOs, and mediators.

Throughout 2021, EUTF-funded programmes trained 2,772 (1,646 in S2 2021) staff members from local communities and national institutions on governance, conflict prevention and human rights (indicator 4.2), a 56% increase compared to cumulated results as of December 2020. Five programmes contributed to these results, including DIZA (TD-07)⁴ and RESILAC (REG-05).⁵ An overwhelming majority of the staff members trained were community representatives (92%), while national security stakeholders made up the rest (8%).⁶ Community representatives were mostly trained on democratic governance and inclusive participation (92% of the beneficiaries in 2021), while a minority (7%) were trained on conflict prevention and peacebuilding given the fragile security context in Chad.⁷

In the east of the country, the DIZA programme sensitised 1,079 community and municipal leaders on good governance and delivered more technical training to 30 community leaders in the Sila region in planning, budgeting and participatory management. This effort sought to address the lack of representation and participation of certain groups (such as displaced people, women, youth, or ethnic minorities) in traditional governance structures. Inter alia, the DIZA programme supported participatory governance to regulate access to land and natural resources and foster local development plans.⁸

In the Lac region, the RESILAC programme trained 1,096 members from civil society and community-based organisations working in cooperation with the municipalities on local development plans and

¹ *Projet de soutien à l'insertion socio-professionnelle des jeunes tchadiens en situation de vulnérabilité.*

² In 2016, only 42 municipalities were effective. OECD, 'Chad – Unitary Country', 2016. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Indeed, local expenditures amounted to less than 1% of general government expenditures in 2013. This number is not thought to have significantly changed in the past decade.

⁴ *Programme de développement inclusif dans les zones d'accueil (DIZA).*

⁵ *Redressement économique et social inclusif du Lac Tchad (RESILAC).*


⁶ 14 journalists are excluded from this analysis. They represented less than 1% of the results for Indicator 4.2 in Chad in 2021.

⁷ The remaining 1% was trained on legal and judicial assistance to counter gender violence and help victims.

⁸ In 2021, DIZA *Est* supported 15 local development plans, and DIZA *Sud* 17 (indicator 2.1).

access to resources.¹ Also in the Lac region, the PDU (REG-18)² programme trained 203 mediators (51 of whom were women) on conflict resolution related to land sharing between communities. Mediators were trained through networks on issues associated with pastoralism and transhumance, including national and international policies and legislation governing pastoralism. The content was translated into local languages and recorded in audio format for the presentations.³

Figure 32: EUTF indicator 4.2, in Chad, December 2021



In addition, in 2021, EUTF-funded programmes aimed to enhance equal access to land and natural resources. As such, they supported the emergence of frameworks, agreements and cooperation mechanisms to regulate access to resources. In the Lac region, RESILAC facilitated the signing of four agreements to enhance dialogue between groups and encourage the development of locally negotiated rules on space management and access to natural resources (indicator 4.6). PDU created and distributed 100 methodological guides to mediators to clarify the steps to take and the actors to involve at each stage of a mediation (indicator 5.2).

Strengthening the delivery of basic services

Access to basic services remained largely insufficient and uneven throughout Chad. While access to water, electricity education, or civil state registration are higher in urban areas such as Ndjamena, Moundou, Abeche or Sarh, they remain extremely low in the rest of the country. For instance, only 8.4% of the Chadian population had access to electricity in 2019, with a significant discrepancy between urban and rural areas (respectively 36.7% and 2.3%).⁴ The mortality rate

¹ Organisations à base communautaire or OBC in French.

² Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.


³ PDU HD, 'Médiation agro-pastorale au Sahel – demande de subvention.

⁴ World Bank, World Banka data, 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

attributed to unsafe water, unsafe sanitation and lack of hygiene was over two times higher than the average for sub-Saharan Africa,¹ due to the lack of latrines and other clean water infrastructures. Finally, there were no or very few allowances and solidarity mechanisms for the poorest, leaving many in extreme poverty and unable to meet their basic needs.

EUTF-funded programmes in Chad adopted a holistic approach to strengthening the delivery of basic services and helping the poorest. This approach included short-term actions such as the construction of infrastructure, delivery of legal documentation, or distribution of allowances, but also longer-term measures involving national and local stakeholders to create and enhance governance mechanisms associated with the delivery of these basic services.

Figure 33: EUTF indicator 2.2, in Chad, December 2021



In 2021, EUTF-funded programmes delivered basic social services to 14,262 people (indicator 2.2), representing 40% of the total since the start of EUTF-funded activities in the country. Five programmes contributed to these results: DIZA (TD-07, 7,496 basic services delivered), PDU (TD-18, 5,579), PRODECO (TD-06, 684), RESTE (TD-01,² 313) and RESILAC (REG-05, 190). The delivered basic services were mostly access to legal documentation (53% of the basic services delivered in 2021) and access to latrines (39%).³ The DIZA *Appui Transversal* project (TD-07-03)⁴ worked towards addressing the issue of birth registration, in a country where roughly 12% of births are registered – even less for children born in displacement-affected communities.⁵ In 2021, the project provided birth certificates to 7,496 displaced children, of which 5,719 were IDPs and 1,777 refugees and asylum

¹ At 101 vs 47 per 100,000 people. World Bank, World Bank data, 2016. Retrieved [here](#).

² *Résilience et emploi au Lac Tchad* (RESTE).

³ The rest of the basic services delivered included community services for vulnerable and severely wounded people (3% of the services delivered in 2021), education and cash for learning (2%), medical treatment (2%) and psychological support (1%).

⁴ *Programme de développement inclusif dans les zones d'accueil (DIZA) – Appui transversal*.

⁵ World Bank, World Bank data, 2015. Retrieved [here](#).

seekers. The PDU EPEVA (REG-18-03)¹ project ensured access to family latrines for 5,579 households in the Kanem region, after diagnosing gaps in access to sanitation and clean water. The PRODECO programme helped create a social fund in Ndjamena to provide equipment and rehabilitation services for victims of land mines. In 2021, 284 people benefitted from medical support –free physiotherapy and orthopaedic care and equipment from this fund.² PRODECO also delivered temporary social safety nets to households identified as 'very poor' and therefore receiving a monthly allowance that enabled them to meet their primary needs. In 2021, 400 beneficiaries received these monthly allowances (indicator 2.2). The amount of each allowance was intended to start decreasing in 2021, as IGAs and local development plans are to take over.

Beyond the delivery of social services, EUTF-funded programmes also endeavoured to strengthen governance mechanisms, coordination committees, and build the capacities of agents charged with the delivery of basic services. EUTF-funded programmes focused on two actions: creating local committees, and sensitising and training government agents to new laws and the issue of birth registration. In the Kanem region, the PDU EPEVA project established 124 committees (indicator 5.1) to ensure equal access to the 5,579 latrines it had built (indicator 2.2). In three regions of eastern Chad (Ouaddaï, Salamat and Sila), the DIZA *Est* project (TD-07-01)³ set up 28 committees to manage and maintain community infrastructure (indicator 5.1). RESTE created 55 committees tasked with running water places and ensuring the population's equal access to water services (indicator 5.1). In 2021, in parallel to its efforts on registering births of displaced children, the DIZA *Appui Transversal* project trained and sensitised 23 national authorities' staff member on issues related to the asylum law and the socio-economic inclusion of refugees and returnees in Chad (indicator 3.7).

5.3.3. CHAD AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 8: EUTF common output indicators for Chad, December 2021

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	2,081	2,268	2,140	970	243	7,702	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	47	74	70	10	201	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	5,268	16,982	9,109	8,062	12,512	51,933	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET)...	230	2,493	2,481	1,680	1,888	8,782	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed,...	3	24	11	11	5	54	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	26	56	19	20	25	146	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	139	264	298	260	53	1,014	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	660	2,567	17,824	2,280	11,982	35,313	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	18,546	10,477	8,684	3,496	6,587	47,790	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	34,999	18,610	114,634	37,269	16,989	222,501	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	8	40	9	3	0	60	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	70	225	1,496	21	6,977	8,788	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	21,672	30,707	183,797	5,250	6,092	247,518	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	57	1,622	430	142	146	2,396	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	35,160	221,000	14,206	5,830	44,365	320,561	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs...	77	77	77	38	39	309	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	0	605	1,468	289	15,332	17,694	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	0	119	360	70	382	931	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	86	65	14	0	289	454	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	0	1,196	3,011	1,194	834	6,235	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	86	173	187	66	44	556	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	1	1	0	0	0	2	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	0	16	23	4	8	51	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	0	0	16	0	0	16	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	216	709	26	0	951	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	667	1,205	3,118	1,126	1,646	7,762	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	60,527	233,942	69,314	8,306	9,246	381,335	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	1	1	5	0	4	11	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	17	206	131	83	144	582	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	5	12	157	11	132	317	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	10	20	9	3	0	42	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created...	8	0	4	0	1	13	

¹ *Infrastructures EAU Tchad.*


² Fitting of prostheses and orthoses, as well as the reception of orthopaedic equipment such as prostheses, orthoses, canes, tricycles, etc.

³ *Programme de développement inclusif dans les zones d'accueil (DIZA) – Zone Est*

5.4. CÔTE D'IVOIRE

5.4.1. CÔTE D'IVOIRE IN 2021

Figure 34: Côte d'Ivoire – Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021



While the COVID-19 pandemic severely affected Ivorians' revenues, the country's economy began to recover in 2021. In May 2020, studies reported that 63% of companies in Côte d'Ivoire saw a reduction in their activities because of the pandemic. In addition, 131,000 jobs were lost as a result of the economic crisis,¹ and 71% of households saw a contraction in their revenues in 2020.² In 2021, as economic activities restarted, GDP growth picked up and was projected at around 6.2% at the end of the year.³ However, 46% of the population lived under the poverty line at the end of 2021 (compared to 39.5% in 2018) and 6% (almost one million people) were classified in emergency food-crisis phase and in need of urgent intervention.⁴

The political situation in Côte d'Ivoire has remained divisive since the 2010-2011 crisis but showed signs of alleviation in 2021. Former president Laurent Gbagbo was acquitted at the International Criminal Court in March and came back from exile in June.⁵ He met with President Alassane Ouattara in July, in what appeared as an attempt to reconcile the two warring factions of 2010-2011.⁶ In December 2021, the government announced a dialogue between the presidential party and the opposition to reach a consensus for the 2025 presidential elections, after the violence that followed the previous elections in 2020.⁷

The situation in the country was considered stable enough for UNHCR and the government to adopt in September 2021 an updated roadmap for durable solutions for Ivorian refugees who fled the 2010-2011 crisis. UNHCR has vowed to support the voluntary repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the cessation of status for Ivorian refugees by 30 June 2022.⁸ In December 2021, 27,402 Ivorian

¹ INS and UNDP, 'Evaluation de l'impact du COVID-19 sur l'activité des entreprises du secteur formel en Côte d'Ivoire', May 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

² World Bank, 'The state of the Ivorian economy: how Côte d'Ivoire could rebound after the COVID-19 pandemic and boost growth', August 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

³ WFP, 'Côte d'Ivoire – Country Brief', December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ World Bank Data, 'Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population) – Côte d'Ivoire, 2018', consulted in February 2022. Retrieved [here](#); WFP, Op. Cit.

⁵ Le Monde, 'Laurent Gbagbo de retour en Côte d'Ivoire, sa popularité intacte', June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Jeune Afrique, 'Côte d'Ivoire : Ouattara et Gbagbo « préfèrent l'injustice au désordre »', July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Africa News, 'Côte d'Ivoire : reprise du dialogue avec l'opposition', December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


⁸ UNHCR, 'Abidjan joint declaration on the updated roadmap for comprehensive solutions for Ivorian refugees', September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

refugees were still living in neighbouring countries.¹ Since the crisis, 198,840 refugees have returned spontaneously and 99,439 were assisted to return by UNHCR.² In 2021, most refugees were returning from Liberia.³

The security situation in the north of the country deteriorated over the course of the year, with attacks occurring in March, June and October against military postings.⁴ In August, President Ouattara ordered the creation of a new institution to centralise anti-terrorist activities,⁵ and, in November, he announced the recruitment of 3,000 new soldiers for 2022.⁶


5.4.2. THE EUTF IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Figure 35: EUTF portfolio in Côte d'Ivoire, December 2021



The EUTF has contracted €29M to two national projects in Côte d'Ivoire. Both projects started their implementation phase in 2021, while several regional projects have implemented activities in the country since 2018. A €24M budget support project was signed in June to fund the state's effort to provide financial support to businesses impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic (PSRE COVID, CI-03, SO1).⁷ Results from this project are included in the MLS for the first time in this report. Another €5M was contracted to CIVIPOL to support the 2019 national strategy on civil registration in the country (*Etat Civil*, CI-02, SO3).⁸

Figure 36 : Selected EUTF outputs in Côte d'Ivoire, December 2021



¹ UNHCR, 'Operational portal – Côte d'Ivoire', accessed in February 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ UNHCR, 'Côte d'Ivoire : Situation du rapatriement volontaire', December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ France24, 'Côte d'Ivoire : de nouvelles attaques contre les forces de défense et de sécurité', March 2021. Retrieved [here](#); France24, 'Côte d'Ivoire : une nouvelle attaque à la frontière avec le Burkina Faso', June 2021. Retrieved [here](#); Jeune Afrique, 'Côte d'Ivoire : ce que l'on sait de l'attaque terroriste de Téhini', October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Jeune Afrique, 'Côte d'Ivoire : Ouattara muscle la lutte contre le terrorisme', November 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ IvoireSoir, 'Lutte contre le terrorisme : Ouattara annonce le recrutement de 3 000 soldats', November 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Programme de soutien et de relance à l'économie dans le contexte de la crise du COVID-19 en Côte d'Ivoire.

⁸ Appui à la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale de l'état civil et de l'identification en Côte d'Ivoire.


Supporting the economic recovery after the COVID-19 pandemic

MSMEs represent 70% of formal companies in Côte d'Ivoire and employ a large proportion of the population.¹ In the country, MSMEs are estimated to be the most important drivers of job creation, economic growth and poverty alleviation, and contribute 18% of the GDP.²

In 2021, EUTF-funded programmes supported 116 MSMEs in Côte d'Ivoire, or 93% of all MSMEs supported in the country since the beginning of EUTF-funded activities (indicator 1.2). Support mainly occurred in the second half of the year (115 MSMEs). **Most of the of MSMEs supported in 2021 received financial support to cope with the effects of the COVID-19-related economic crisis through the PSRE programme (CI-03).**

In 2020, 97% of MSMEs in Côte d'Ivoire reported having been severely affected by the pandemic-induced crisis.³ As a relief measure, in April 2020, the government of Côte d'Ivoire announced the creation of two funds to support small and large companies to recover from the crisis: the FSPME, for small enterprises, and the FSGE for larger ones.⁴ The EUTF-funded PSRE programme is a budget support action that contributed to both funds. **Between September 2021 (when the EUTF disbursed funds) and December 2021, 113 MSMEs received financial support through the FSPME** (indicator 1.2).⁵ MSMEs were provided on average FCFA 31M (approximately 47,000€), and the financial support is estimated to have saved 790 jobs (indicator 1.1). An additional 696 jobs were saved through support to large companies, under the FSGE fund (indicator 1.1).⁶

Figure 37: EUTF indicator 1.2, in Côte d'Ivoire, December 2021



Most MSMEs supported during 2021 operated in the service industry (48 MSMEs – 42%) and wholesale and retail trade (32 MSMEs – 28%). The companies that were supported in these sectors employed 492 and 249 people, respectively. This accounts for nearly all MSMEs created in those sectors by

¹ Institut national de la Statistique de Côte d'Ivoire, 'Répartition des entreprises selon leur taille', 2012. Retrieved [here](#).

² IJECM, 'Small medium enterprise growth and performance: evidence from Côte d'Ivoire', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Fratmat, 'Impact de la COVID-19 sur les TPE et PME : « 97% des PME déclarent être touchées fortement » révèle une étude de l'Agence Côte d'Ivoire PME', June 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ FSPME, *Fonds pour le soutien des petites et moyennes entreprises*: Fund to support small and medium enterprises, and FSGE, *Fonds pour le soutien des grandes entreprises*: Fund to support large enterprises.; Financial Afrik, 'COVID-19 : la Côte d'Ivoire annonce deux fonds pour les grandes entreprises et les PME', April 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ The EUTF has provided €24M to the FSPME and FSGE funds in Côte d'Ivoire. However, the funds also receive funding from other sources. Since the funding available to the FSPME and FSGE evolves with time, we have chosen not to use multipliers or pro-rata to isolate the EUTF's contribution to the results, since these would change over time. Instead, we have chosen to count all results of the FSPME and FSGE from September (when EUTF funds were transferred) until €24M (or the EUTF's contribution) have been spent.

⁶ Support to large companies is not recorded by EUTF indicators. However, the jobs saved by the support have been included in EUTF indicator 1.1.

EUTF-funded programmes to date. Another 18 companies in the more labour-intensive construction sector were also supported, protecting 491 jobs.

In 2021, an additional two MSMEs were supported through the IPDEV2 programme (REG-11),¹ which provides funding and technical assistance to small businesses (indicator 1.2). IPDEV2's assistance to MSMEs, including incubation services and support to a local private equity fund, led to the creation of 188 jobs in the country in 2021 (indicator 1.1).

5.4.3. CÔTE D'IVOIRE AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 9: EUTF common output indicators for Côte d'Ivoire, December 2021


EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	0	71	155	1,788	2,014	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	0	9	1	115	125	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET)...	0	0	0	432	592	1,024	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	0	0	0	1	2	3	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	0	0	0	38	0	38	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	0	0	0	0	36	36	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs...	0	254	1,981	951	670	3,856	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	12,199	41,175	10,758	1,035	1,980	67,148	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	5	9	307	2	2	325	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	3,631	1,865	859	1,089	1,186	8,630	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	1,241	875	1,239	942	1,556	5,852	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	0	0	1	0	1	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	127	259	287	122	795	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	64	55	35	1	155	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	10	331	121	0	0	461	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	0	0	0	0	15	15	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	0	0	0	17	17	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	0	0	10	686	54	750	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	0	1	3	0	1	5	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	0	0	1	5	6	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	0	0	1	2	1	4	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	0	1	0	2	3	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created...	0	0	0	1	0	1	

¹ I&P accélération au Sahel (en appui à l'initiative IPDEV-2).

5.5. GHANA

5.5.1. GHANA IN 2021

Figure 38: Ghana – Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021



Ghana's economy is beginning to recover from COVID-19 shocks, with the government's recovery strategy emphasising local economic resilience and support to MSMEs.¹ The pandemic and lockdowns led to a 1.4 percentage point increase in the poverty headcount in 2020.² More than 770,000 Ghanaian workers saw wage reductions, and 42,000 workers were laid off during lockdowns in 2020.³ In response, Ghanaian government's CARES programme has prioritised livelihoods and local resilience, supporting enterprises as part of its second phase of 'revitalisation and transformation'.⁴ In 2021, Ghana's new development bank attracted capital, included €170 million from the European Investment Bank, €46.5 million from the German Government, and a USD 40 million grant from the African Development Bank.⁵ The Development Bank of Ghana aims to boost job creation in strategic sectors and improve access to finance for MSMEs, which account for 98% of Ghana's businesses.⁶ The country also received a USD 1 billion Rapid Credit Facility from the IMF.⁷ Ghana's growth is now projected to average 5.1% from 2021-2023, compared to its decelerated 1.7% growth in 2020.

Climate change and weather variability increasingly affected Ghana's population in 2021. In the second half of 2021, heavy flooding killed nine people and caused extensive damage in the north, and a flood in the Upper West region displaced 336 people.⁸ In November, almost 4,000 people in Ghana's Volta region were displaced by a tidal surge that hit more than 500 houses.¹⁰ The agriculture and

¹ National Development Planning Commission of Ghana, 'Five MMDAs Launch COVID 19 Recovery Plan', Consulted in April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² UNU-WIDER, 'Distributional Effects of COVID-19 in Ghana', October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ The Borgen Project, 'The impact of COVID-19 on poverty in Ghana', July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ The Ghana COVID-19 Alleviation and Revitalisation of Enterprises Support (CARES) programme is a GHS 100 billion, three and a half year, comprehensive programme to mitigate the impact of COVID-19. Ghana Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 'Ghana CARES "Obaatan pa" Programme', Consulted in April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ KfW Development Bank, 'A new engine for Ghana's economic transformation', 15 December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

European Investment Bank, 'President Nana Akufo-Addo unveils EUR 82.5 million Team Europe backing for Ghana's COVID-19 national response plan during visit to EIB', 13 December 2021. Retrieved [here](#). AfDB, 'Ghana: African Development Fund extends \$40 million grant to establish The Development Bank Ghana', 13 November 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ World Bank, 'The Key to Creating More Jobs in Ghana', 24 November 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ AfDB, 'Ghana Economic Outlook', Consulted in April 2022. Retrieved [here](#). World Bank, 'Ghana Country Overview', consulted in April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Floodlist, 'Ghana – Fatalities Reported After Floods in North', 31 August 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ BBC, 'Ghana floods', 3 September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


¹⁰ France 24, 'Almost 4,000 people displaced by tidal surge in Ghana, 10 November 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

livestock sectors employ 55% of Ghana’s economically active population, and are the sectors most impacted by weather hazards.¹ Current mitigation and adaptation measures are not sufficient, and flood exposure is projected to cost the country USD 160 million in damages annually.² At COP26, leaders of lower and middle income countries, including Ghanaian President Akufo-Addo, criticised the failure of wealthy countries to deliver their commitment of USD 100 billion to support poorer countries to fight climate change.³

Beyond pandemic-related shocks and extreme weather events, Ghana is also beginning to see the effects of the security situation in the Sahel, with potential trends in southbound movements of people from Burkina Faso. The Mixed Migration Centre found that IDPs from Burkina Faso and Mali have increasingly made secondary cross-border movements into Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire that are likely to become more frequent and permanent amidst the ongoing instability.⁴

5.5.2. THE EUTF IN GHANA

Figure 39: EUTF portfolio in Ghana, December 2021^{5,6}



The EUTF has contracted €24.6M in projects in Ghana. Employment-related projects (SO1) account for 80% of this funding, and the remaining 20% deals with migration management (SO3). All national projects were contracted at the end of 2019 as part of two programmes: the GrEEEn programme (GH-02) focuses on supporting the creation of green employment and enterprise opportunities, and the Border Security programme (GH-01) aims to strengthen local and national capacity for migration and border management.⁷ The second half of 2021 marks the third semester that these projects are reporting outputs, as their inception phases were interrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic in S1 2020. As of December 2021, programmes in Ghana were approximately halfway through their contracted implementation period.

¹ World Bank, ‘Climate risk country profile – Ghana’, Consulted in April 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ CDD Ghana, ‘Are Least Resourced Countries Judging the Health Implications of Climate Change Accurately?’, 8 November 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


⁴ Mixed Migration Center, ‘The impact of the Sahel conflict on cross-border movements’, 5 October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁶ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁷ Boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in Ghana; Strengthening Border Security in Ghana.

Figure 40: Selected EUTF outputs in Ghana, December 2021



Investing in a green and inclusive future through professional training

Ghana has experienced massive economic growth during the past three decades, and poverty rates more than halved from 1998 to 2016.¹ The Ghanaian government now aims to manage an inclusive economic transition that invests in strategic sectors to improve firm productivity and therefore growth and household incomes.² A key component of this strategy involves investing in the technical and digital skills of the labour force through education and technical and vocational training.

In 2021, 12,301 people in Ghana received professional training from EUTF-funded programmes (indicator 1.4), which is 18 times the number of people trained the previous year. Most of this support came from the GrEEen programme,³ in particular from an initiative by UNCDF to build the financial capacity of the diaspora, youth, women, and returnees, particularly those working in green sectors or on climate compatible infrastructure. This training covered financial skills and how to pitch a business, reaching 9,283 people in 2021, including 17 returnees (indicator 1.4). Meanwhile, ARCHIPELAGO's TVET initiative (REG-15)⁴ in Ghana targeted host communities, training 81 women and 188 men in agribusiness. The course covered training in horticulture and entrepreneurship skills and included job placements, aiming to address the needs of the horticulture sector and link young people to the job market.


¹ World Bank, 'Ghana Rising: Accelerating Economic Transformation and Creating Jobs. World Bank', 10 November 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ Boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in Ghana.

⁴ ARCHIPELAGO: an African-European TVET initiative

Figure 41. EUTF indicator 1.4, in Ghana, December 2021



In 2021, the GrEEn programme also continued its opportunities for youth employment (OYE) initiative, which provided training, coaching and mentoring support to 2,593 people (69% of whom were women), mostly in the Ashanti and Western regions (indicator 1.4). Implemented by SNV, OYE is a three-month certification programme, with an employability track focussing on vocational and soft skills for finding employment, and an entrepreneurship track geared toward starting businesses. The entrepreneurship track was most popular (some 9 participants out of 10), potentially because trainees tended to have secondary or primary level education, affording them few opportunities in the job market. Despite its appeal, GrEEn’s midterm evaluation found that less than half of trainees in the entrepreneurship track graduated, compared to 87% of those enrolled in the employability track. The evaluation also found that 28% of participants were able to secure a job after completing OYE, likely due to a low demand for workers and interns as companies are still dealing with the effects of COVID-19. Most participants in the entrepreneurship track reported that they have not yet been able to start a business due to financial challenges. The OYE programme also featured internship placements, with 138 youth placed in 2021 (58% of whom were women).

Promoting the green circular economy

The Ghanaian government's National Green Jobs Strategy for 2021-2025 explicitly prioritises a transition toward a green and circular economy.¹ The green circular economy involves minimising waste so that material inputs are kept within the system, thus reducing pollution and natural resource depletion. With Ghana's young and dynamic labour force, and the progress made in poverty reduction in recent decades, there is significant potential for technical investment in green sectors.²

The GrEEn programme seeks to support businesses and job creation in the green circular economy. In addition to professional training, the programme provided incubation and acceleration services to 33 MSMEs in 2021 (indicator 1.2). The project's needs assessment for MSMEs this year (indicator 5.3) pointed to a lack of a) knowledge of and access to green technology, b) access to finance, c) access to specific technical and vocational skills, and d) market demand for green products and services. GrEEn SNV's midterm evaluation recommended that the programme's training (indicator 1.4) and support to MSME's (indicator 1.2) align more closely with the technical and vocational skill gaps in the green sector. Indeed, the programme's activities involve elements of 'green' focus, for example, emphasis on sustainable agriculture, organic farming, renewable energy, and WASH. The content of MSME support, however, tends to focus on soft skills such as CV writing, professional behaviour, interview techniques, budgeting, designing a business plan, and pitching to investors.

In 2021, GrEEn also raised awareness about the green circular economy among public and private stakeholders: for example, GrEEn organised three international green investment fora that disseminated knowledge about the green investing landscape and allowed green MSMEs to network with banks, green investors, members of the diaspora and other private sector actors (indicator 5.1). The programme also developed a web platform that provides updates and news related to the green circular economy, and links entrepreneurs with potential investors, employers or mentors (indicator 5.2).

5.5.3. GHANA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 10: EUTF common output indicators for Ghana, December 2021

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	0	2	1,040	1,092	2,134	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	0	5	351	345	701	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	0	0	79	2,368	4,011	6,458	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET)...	0	5	679	1,418	10,883	12,985	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	0	0	0	10	0	10	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	0	0	0	0	10	10	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	0	0	0	90,156	90,156	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	0	0	0	0	3	3	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs...	0	7	7	4	4	22	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	3,110	24,855	826,738	2,031	342	857,076	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	0	0	5	0	26	31	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	875	266	518	309	488	2,456	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	212	449	303	186	275	1,426	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	47	247	43	393	729	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	5	88	64	54	10	221	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	29	57	204	6	0	296	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	0	31	0	0	31	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	140	40	49	374	431	1,034	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	0	19	6	196	221	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	0	0	3	2	33	38	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	0	13	2	2	17	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created...	1	0	0	1	2	4	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	32,000	0	0	32,000	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	7,000	182,763	0	189,763	
6.3 Number of entities benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	10	10	0	20	


¹ Ghana Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations, 'National Green Jobs Strategy 2021-2025', 22 March 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² Baba Ali, Ernest, Anufriev, Valery Pavlovich, Amfo, Bismark, 'Green economy implementation in Ghana as a road map for a sustainable development drive: A review', July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

5.6. GUINEA

5.6.1. GUINEA IN 2021

Figure 42: Guinea – Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021



On 5 September 2021, months of significant socio-political tensions and protests against President Alpha Condé’s controversial third term crystallised into a coup. President Condé was overthrown by special forces and replaced by interim President Mamady Doumbouya. The Transition Charter was published on 27 September, and a civilian Prime Minister was named in early October – former UN official and agricultural finance specialist Mohamed Beavogui.¹ Yet, the transition’s institutions, like the Transitional National Council,² charged with elaborating the future Constitution, had not yet been formed by the end of the year.³ As of December 2021, many uncertainties remained regarding the transition’s exact timeline and the organisation of elections.⁴

Despite the coup and ECOWAS’s resulting sanctions against the regime,⁵ the Guinean economy continued to prove stronger than its West African counterparts. Guinea’s economy grew at a projected 5.6% in 2021, above regional and continental averages (3.4% for the African continent),^{6,7} stimulated by additional energy supply from the newly built 450-megawatt Souapiti Dam, as well as mining and infrastructure projects.⁸ Mild sanctions from ECOWAS compared to Mali’s, interest from foreign investors, uninterrupted trade with Mali and some non-African partners partly enabled the economic growth.⁹ Yet, this robust economic performance did not translate into reduced inequalities or increased livelihoods for the population in 2021.

During the second half of 2021, Guinea was affected by several climatic events and natural catastrophes. By the end of August 2021, heavy rains fell over most of the country, causing floods in

¹ Al Jazeera, ‘Guinea military government names Mohamed Beavogui as PM’, 7 October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² *Conseil National de Transition* in French.

³ Jeune Afrique, ‘Guinée : pourquoi le Conseil national de transition n’est toujours pas formé’, 8 December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Le Monde, ‘Guinée : des organisations de la société civile proposent une transition de vingt-quatre mois’, 30 December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Al Jazeera, ‘ECOWAS resorts to sanctions over Guinea and Mali coups’, 16 September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ AfDB, ‘Guinea Economic Outlook’, 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ AfDB, ‘Africa Economic Outlook’, 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ AfDB, ‘Guinea Economic Outlook’, 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


⁹ While most ECOWAS countries sanctioned Mali’s coup authorities by closing borders and suspending trade of certain goods and services, Guinea refused to close its border with Mali as an act of solidarity.

the prefectures of Conakry, Guéckédou, and Siguiri. Floods affected 69,671 people, injured 21 and killed five.¹

Guinea remained mostly a country of departure and transit of migrants, while hosting very few persons of concerns to the UNHCR. By December 2021, only 5,483 refugees (mostly from Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone) and 3,551 asylum seekers were present in the country, a stable number compared to December 2020.² A surge in the number of Guinean migrants detected while attempting to illegally cross a European border was observed in 2021, with 3,012 illegal border crossings, more than 2019 and 2020 cumulated – although significantly down compared to the peak of 15,985 in 2016.³

5.6.2. THE EUTF IN GUINEA

Figure 43: EUTF portfolio in Guinea, December 2021^{4,5}



The EUTF has committed €73M in Guinea, a stable number compared to June 2021. The INTEGRA programme (GN-01)⁶ makes for most of the funding in the country with €60M. The programme aims to create jobs, provide TVET especially to youth, and support entrepreneurship and small businesses (SO1). Through the €8M RESIGUI programme (GN-04),⁷ the EUTF strives to build the population's resilience in the face of food insecurity (SO2). Finally, the €5M *Etat Civil* programme (GN-05)⁸ seeks to strengthen and digitise civil registry processes, while building national actors' capacities (SO4).

¹ IFRC, 'Guinea: Floods in Siguiri - Emergency Plan of Action (EPoA), DREF Operation update n° 1', 25 January 2022. Retrieved here.

² UNHCR, 'UNHCR data portal – Guinea'. Accessed January 2022.

³ FRONTEX, 'Detection of illegal border crossings statistics', accessed February 2022. Retrieved here.

⁴ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.


⁵ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁶ *Programme d'appui à l'intégration socio-économique des jeunes en République de Guinée.*

⁷ *RESIGUI – Améliorer la résilience des populations vulnérables de Guinée.*

⁸ *Projet pilote d'amélioration des performances de l'état civil guinéen par le recours à la digitalisation.*

Figure 44: Selected EUTF outputs in Guinea, December 2021



Increasing food security through land rehabilitation and the construction of community productive assets

Food security remains a concern for large shares of the Guinean population. During the period between October and December 2021, 564,458 people were food insecure,¹ a 4% decrease from the same period in 2020 (589,567).² COVID-19-induced mobility restrictions disrupted many informal seed and agricultural markets in 2020 and 2021, and created a rise in prices.³ Also, in 2021, the presence of pests in some areas damaged off-season crops.⁴ Finally, structural factors and reduced resources for agricultural and pastoral activities in some prefectures, poor infrastructure, limited transformation techniques, and fragile access to markets hindered the consolidation of integrated agricultural value chains.⁵

The RESIGUI programme (GN-04),⁶ which is implemented by the WFP, carried out several activities through a humanitarian-development nexus approach to increase resilience against food insecurity. Running from July 2020 to March 2022, the programme articulates three phases: 1) an emergency phase including the delivery of food items and unconditional cash transfers, 2) a recovery phase (including conditional cash transfers, the creation of community productive assets, and the training of farmers), and 3) a final resilience-building phase promoting environment-friendly and

¹ RCPA, 'Situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle / Guinée'. Retrieved here.

² WFP, 'Food security highlights West and Central Africa', December 2020. Retrieved here.

³ African Development Bank, 'Guinea Economic Outlook'. Retrieved here.

⁴ CILS, WAEMU, ECOWAS, 'Rapport régional sur la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle', 2021. Retrieved here.

⁵ Dinguiraye, Boké, Siguiri, Coyah, Dubréka, Labé, Mali, Gueckédou and Nzérékoré; CILS, WAEMU, ECOWAS, 'Rapport régional sur la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle', 2021. Op. Cit.


⁶ Améliorer la résilience des populations vulnérables de Guinée.

sustainable agricultural practices as well as access to markets. The project entered its third and final phase during the second semester of 2021.¹

In 2021, RESIGUI built 126 productive infrastructures related to agriculture, and the storage and transportation of food items (indicator 2.1 bis).² Of this total, 52 infrastructures were rural tracks, 45 were wells, 24 were storage warehouses, and five were drying areas used for the transformation of certain agricultural products. This infrastructure was intended to strengthen all levels of agricultural value chains, including not only production factors, but also transformation, access to markets and sales of foodstuffs. All infrastructure was built after consultation processes with the communities which allowed the programme to identify and plan the construction of prioritised productive assets. Inclusive participation from the communities, including women and marginalised groups, is supposed to contribute to the sustainable use of productive infrastructures.

RESIGUI further contributed to introducing agricultural practices that are more adapted to local soil conditions and climate change. In 2021, the programme rehabilitated 827 hectares (indicator 2.6), all of the land rehabilitated by EUTF-funded programmes in Guinea so far.

Figure 45: EUTF indicator 2.6, in Guinea, December 2021




¹ WFP, RESIGUI, 'Description of Action'.

² This number excludes two productive and social infrastructures (indicator 2.1) built by IOM in 2021.

Reinforcing protection and assistance for migrants and returnees

Guinea sees mixed migration flows, both as a point of origin and transit with growing return rates from Niger.^{1,2} The complex nature of mixed migration raises the question of how to best provide protection and assistance to migrants, returnees and people on the move. Children especially face heightened risks of violence, abuse, trafficking and various forms of exploitation along the journey and when separated from their families.

Figure 46: EUTF indicator 3.2, in Guinea, December 2021



In 2021, 2,305 migrants in transit were protected and/or assisted (indicator 3.2). Of this total, 98% were children supported by Protection West Africa (REG-13). Children on the move are particularly vulnerable to become victims of trafficking (VOTs), and in West Africa, they represent 75% of all trafficking victims.³ To account for their special needs, Save the Children established or reinforced 20 “one-stop shops” that offer multiple services. The programme also sought to enhance child-friendly safe spaces, deploy mobile teams and support foster families.⁴

As of December 2021, the EU-IOM JI (REG-08) had supported 20,511 returnees with immediate post-arrival assistance (indicator 3.5). Most returnees were male (97%) and received a cash instalment of 500,000 GNF (approximately €51) for their immediate needs, including transportation.

The EU-IOM JI (REG-08) also offers longer-term reintegration assistance from which 13,122 returnees had benefitted as of December 2021 (indicator 3.5bis). Reintegration activities typically begin with a counselling session, during which returnees are given a phone with a SIM card and are interviewed to determine their social, psychosocial and economic reintegration needs.⁵ After successful referral, returning migrants may participate in vocational trainings offered by international development agencies (mainly GIZ and ENABEL) and private companies covering different sectors like agriculture and mechanics.⁶

¹ IOM, Research Brief – The debt of migrants assisted with voluntary return and its impact on the sustainability of reintegration, January 2021. Retrieved here.

² IOM, Assistance to Voluntary and Humanitarian Return 2017 – June 2021, July 2021. Retrieved here

³ Altai Consulting, Anti-trafficking initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea, June 2021. Retrieved here.

⁴ Save the Children, 'Document of Action T05-SAH-REG-13-02'.

⁵ IOM, 'Rapport Narratif Intérimaire à l'Union Européenne', 2020.


⁶ EU-IOM Knowledge Management Hub, 'Qualitative Study on Outwards Referrals', December 2021. Retrieved here.

Delivering professional and skills development trainings to youth

Despite Guinea's solid GDP growth in 2020 and 2021, prospects for socio-economic integration remained bleak for most vulnerable categories of the population. Youth especially continued to be affected by unemployment and precarious situations in the informal sector.¹

EUTF-funded programmes focussed on professional trainings and skills development in order to address Guinean youths' lack of economic perspectives by enhancing skills, self-employment, and entrepreneurship. In 2021, two programmes provided professional trainings to 16,479 people (indicator 1.4), bringing the total to 23,056 since the EUTF's inception in the country.

Figure 47: EUTF indicator 2.6, in Guinea, December 2021



¹ Although these situations do not necessarily show in youth's unemployment or NEET figures: Guinea's NEET rate was 10.8% in 2019 (7.2% men, 13.5% women), the lowest of the SLC window The World Bank, '% of youth total population, ILO data, retrieved February 2022'. Retrieved here.

The INTEGRA programme (GN-01)¹ focused on young, unemployed or underemployed people from all regions in Guinea. The programme trained 8,190 people in 2021, of whom at least 57% were youth under 35.² INTEGRA worked with several government stakeholders including the Action Civic Service for Development Agency:³ 70% of the trainings were delivered through a nationally accredited institution. Trainings in 2021 were delivered in many sectors such as agroindustry, food quality and hygiene, information and communication technologies, urban logistics, security, or tiling. The programme also connected TVET graduates with private companies to maximise professional insertion. For instance, INTEGRA referred beneficiaries to companies such as Afridej (meal delivery business), IP Sécurité (security and escorts), or FAPEL (water pumps).⁴ Insertion efforts led to the creation of 510 jobs in 2021 (indicator 1.1).⁵

RESIGUI provided innovative agricultural production and transformation practices to smallholder farmers. In 2021, it trained 8,289 farmers on several topics, including governance of farmer organisations, accounting, materials management, stock management, marketing techniques, improved rice parboiling, and good agricultural practices through field schools. RESIGUI strove to maintain a gender balance and enhance women's productive employment in agriculture: 49% of the beneficiaries from the 2021 trainings were women.

5.6.3. GUINEA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 11: EUTF common output indicators for Guinea, December 2021

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	55	1,363	426	654	2,498	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	444	1,058	333	110	1,945	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	0	1,246	1,278	0	10	2,534	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET)...	0	2,026	4,551	7,168	9,311	23,056	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed,...	0	3	2	1	0	6	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	1	0	0	85	43	129	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	0	0	0	0	1,323	1,323	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	0	0	17,996	0	17,996	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	0	0	0	479	348	827	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	0	8,787	14,643	221	23,651	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	0	74	0	382	1,397	1,853	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	0	6,975	65,920	42,615	115,510	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs...	0	12	12	117	2,188	2,329	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	21,155	21,161	6,432	1,180	7,805	57,733	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	0	76	11	6	0	93	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	8,280	3,637	2,270	3,311	3,014	20,511	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	1,832	2,206	1,836	2,455	4,794	13,122	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	174	0	1	0	175	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	299	450	523	312	1,583	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	672	107	92	31	18	920	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	0	0	0	2	0	2	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	8	1	2	1	12	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	0	8	1	4	2	15	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	15	1	0	12	28	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created...	0	36	0	1	0	37	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	23,015	2,106	0	25,121	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	4,035	1,053	0	5,088	

¹ Programme d'appui à l'intégration socio-économique des jeunes en République de Guinée – INTEGRA.

² The remaining 43% beneficiaries in 2021 were adults aged over 18, and potentially includes more youth aged under 35.

³ The Agence du Service Civique d'Action pour le Développement (ASCAD) is a public administrative institution created in 2011 to implement the Action Civic Service for Development (SCAD in French). Its core mission is to promote civic and citizenship education for young Guineans and to help them acquire or strengthen a professional qualification in order to facilitate their socio-economic integration. For more information, retrieved here.

⁴ Through INTEGRA, FAPEL also received technical assistance and funding up to \$100,000 to acquire equipment.

⁵ The total number of jobs created in 2021 by INTEGRA was 1,080 (indicator 1.1), also including short-term cash-for-work jobs, full-time jobs in MSMEs supported, or other full-time jobs created for/by people who did not attend INTEGRA's trainings.

5.7. MALI

5.7.1. MALI IN 2021

Figure 48: Mali – Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021



In May 2021, Assimi Goïta took power through a military coup. In December 2021, he presented his timeline for a return to civilian rule, which is longer than expected by regional organisations. On 7 November, in response to the delay in the return to a democratic process,¹ ECOWAS adopted sanctions against the transition leaders and their families including a travel ban and the freezing of their financial assets.² Malian authorities however pressed forward by extending the current transition of the military junta from "six months to five years" in December 2021.³ As a result, ECOWAS announced that additional sanctions could be imposed on the country in early January.⁴ Indeed, on 9 January 2022, ECOWAS and WAEMU⁵ closed Mali's borders with ECOWAS states (except Guinea) and suspended trade and financial exchanges (except for basic necessities).⁶

Tensions between the new authorities in power in Mali and European member states, particularly France, impacted the deployment of international armed forces in Mali. In July, France officially began the withdrawal of Barkhane troops from the north of the country as announced in June.⁷ In September, rumours of a deployment of Wagner mercenaries emerged and prompted France to warn Mali against such a partnership.⁸ Despite this, Mali's Prime Minister officially stated his intent to explore ways to better provide security autonomously with new partners.⁹ At the end of the year, 15 nations issued a joint statement condemning the Malian junta's alleged contacts with the Russian paramilitary company Wagner.¹⁰

¹ France 24, 'West African regional bloc ECOWAS imposes new sanctions on Mali and Guinea', 8 November 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² AlJazeera, 'West Africa bloc ECOWAS imposes sanctions on Mali leaders', 7 November 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ TV5 Monde, 'Au Mali, les Assises nationales demandent de reporter les élections "de six mois à cinq ans"', 30 December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ RFI, 'West African bloc ECOWAS warns of sanctions if Mali misses election deadline', 13 December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ West African Economic and Monetary Union

⁶ Le point, 'Après un mois de sanctions, où en est le Mali ?', 10 February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Euronews, 'Mali: French military cedes control of Timbuktu camp to Malian army', 15 December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ France 24, 'Reports of Russian mercenary deal in Mali trigger French alarm', 14 September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


⁹ VOA, 'Mali Seeking 'Better Ways' to Contain Terrorism', 28 September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, 'Communiqué conjoint sur le déploiement du groupe Wagner au Mali', 23 December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

At the end of 2021, the security and humanitarian situations in Mali remained critical. In S2 2021, 521 attacks were recorded (937 reported fatalities).¹ While central Mali (Mopti) remains the region most affected by the violence (40% of reported attacks in 2021, and 47% of fatalities), southern Mali continue to see an increase in incidents of violent extremism.² Security incidents hamper people's access to services and livelihoods.³ In December 2021, it was estimated that 7.5 million people (compared to 5.9 million in 2020) needed humanitarian assistance in Mali.⁴ Additionally, 1.2 million people are estimated to be acutely food insecure, a three-fold increase since December 2020.⁵ The number of internally displaced persons reached 401,736 at the end of December 2021, a 24% increase from December 2020.⁶

5.7.2. THE EUTF IN MALI

Figure 49: EUTF portfolio in Mali, December 2021^{7,8}



The EUTF has contracted €249.3M in Mali, primarily to programmes working on security, governance and conflict prevention (SO4, 41%) or resilience (SO2, 36%). PARSEC (ML-06)⁹ constitutes over a third of the SO4 budget (42%), and PROJES (ML-10)¹⁰ is the main contributor to the SO2 budget, at €43.5M. These two programmes are expected to be renewed for a second phase within the Support Program for the Transition in the Republic of Mali (PST, ML-14), whose objective is to support initiatives in favour of a return of the state in fragile areas (centre and north of Mali). As of December 2021, projects contracted under the PST represented €21.0M, or 21% of the SO4 budget. In Mali, many programmes are reaching the end of their implementation period.

¹ ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event data project dashboard', accessed in January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event data project dashboard', accessed in January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ OCHA, 'Aperçu des besoins humanitaires (version synthèse) - Mali', January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ CILSS, 'Cadre Harmonisé d'identification des zones à risque et des populations en insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle', December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ UNHCR, 'Mali: Country report', accessed in January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


⁷ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁸ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁹ Programme d'Appui au Renforcement de la Sécurité dans les régions de Mopti et de Gao et à la gestion des zones frontalières.

¹⁰ Programme Jeunesse et Stabilisation – régions du centre du Mali.

Figure 50 : Situation in Mali and EUTF outputs – as of December 2021



Supporting the economic recovery of vulnerable populations

EUTF-funded programmes aim to improve the socio-economic resilience of communities through job creation and support to IGAs. Malians continue to face profound and systemic challenges in terms of employment due to a mismatch between skills and market needs and a low ratio of job creation to population growth.

As of December 2021, 125,816 people had been supported to develop IGAs (indicator 1.3), including 55,977 in 2021 alone (44% of the total achieved). Such support is expected to enhance immediate revenues for populations, making households more resilient and able to withstand future insecurity and climatic shocks. This can in turn can allow communities to promote the creation of more jobs, thus improving economic stability. In this regard, EUTF programmes have adopted complementary approaches where support to IGAs is often combined with prior support to infrastructure, value chains, or training. In 2021, the national programmes PAFAM (ML-02)¹, ADEL (ML-12)², and Diaspora Mali (ML-05)³ contributed the most to this indicator (85%), adopting distinct and complementary approaches.

PAFAM supports the cashew nut value chain by creating and assisting IGAs in the sector and grouping them together into cooperatives. The Agricultural Development Policy of Mali considers cashew to be one of the commercial value chains most capable of adding value for the country, including through job creation.⁴ In 2021, the programme trained 18,212 members of these cooperatives to better participate in processing and production, and 143 to work on management and marketing within the cooperative. This represents 72% of PAFAM's support to IGAs since the programme's inception. Two fifths (40%)

¹ Création d'emplois par l'amélioration de la filière de l'anacarde, afin d'atténuer les causes de l'émigration, dans les régions de Sikasso, Kayes et Koulikoro.

² Appui au développement économique local et à la prévention des conflits dans les régions de Tombouctou et Gao.


³ Projet d'appui aux investissements de la diaspora malienne dans les régions d'origine.

⁴ VCA4D, Cashew value chain analysis in Mali, September 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

of all the programme's beneficiaries have been female, despite cashew nut processing being historically handled by men.¹

In 2021, Diaspora Mali invested in the construction of a multifunctional centre to support IGAs, which reached 12,425 people. Meanwhile, the ADEL programme takes a more traditional approach to IGA support by providing technical and entrepreneurial training and start-up kits. In 2021, it supported 16,864 people to develop their IGA. Finally, IOM also helps establish IGAs as part of its support to the reintegration of returning migrants. The EU-IOM Joint Initiative in Mali (ML-07-02)² supported a total of 14,717 returnees with reintegration assistance (indicator 3.5bis) since its inception, which most often includes support to set up an IGA.

Figure 51: EUTF indicator 1.3, in Mali, December 2021



In addition to supporting local and vulnerable populations to develop IGAs and economic opportunities, EUTF-funded programmes in Mali also helped support and create direct employment. As of December 2021, 6,009 direct jobs (indicator 1.1) had been created or supported through EUTF-funded projects, including 3,064 in 2021 alone (51% of the total output). The ADEL programme implemented a component aiming to strengthen professional integration and training mechanisms in the Tombouctou region and to thus integrate young people professionally, particularly through formal employment. The programme adopts a holistic approach to employment promotion: the career counselling and employment development units strengthened by the programme identify young beneficiaries and develop personalised training and employment pathways based on existing structures and human resources. As of December 2021, ADEL had helped 2,208 youth find employment after finishing their TVET training at the beginning of 2021.

¹ Ibid.


² *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Mali.*

Relief through building essential infrastructure

Strengthening the resilience of Malian communities continues to involve supporting access to basic services, especially through the construction of infrastructures. Almost ten years after the 2012 crisis, the weak presence of the Malian state in parts of the central and northern regions has resulted in limited the population's access to basic social services, increasingly so in 2021 because of recurrent security and physical constraints.¹ In December 2021, an estimated 3.7 million people were in need of water and sanitation services, while 4.4 million people lacked health services, in part due to the degradation or absence of infrastructures.²

As of December 2021, 2,459,461 people had benefitted from improved access to basic social services, including 168,704 in 2021 alone (indicator 2.9). In 2021, 44% of these services were related to water and sanitation, 22% to nutrition and food security, and 22% to health care. In 2021, it was estimated that only 31% of the Malian rural population had access to a functioning source of drinking water, while 30% of the water infrastructure serving rural areas and small towns were not operational.³ Moreover, as a result of insecurity and COVID-19, health service provision decreased by 22% in 2021, with a 31% decrease in curative consultations alone and a 24% decrease in immunisation coverage. It is estimated that in 2021, eight attacks were carried out on health centres, including four in Gao.⁴

Figure 52: EUTF indicator 2.9, in Mali, December 2021



The vast majority of EUTF activities leading to improved access to basic services in 2021 involved the creation or rehabilitation of social infrastructure. During 2021, 84% of beneficiaries of basic services were reached through the construction of infrastructure, and the rest was supported through cash transfers, and to a lesser extent, training of service providers. EUTF-funded projects have

¹ OCHA, 'Aperçu des besoins humanitaires (version synthèse) - Mali', Janvier 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ USAID, 'Water for the World Country Plan', July 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Health cluster Mali, 'Bulletin n°4 du cluster santé', December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

built or rehabilitated a total of 1,438 social infrastructures. This includes 735 in 2021, which is twice the amount achieved by the end of 2020 (indicator 2.1 bis). This year, 506 infrastructures (69% of the 2021 total) were built or rehabilitated by the PROJES programme (ML-10),¹ which adopts a sequenced implementation, allowing for the rapid implementation of initial priority actions for vulnerable beneficiaries, progressively involving and empowering public actors to pursue conflict resolution and sustainable local development. During its inception phase, buildings such as schools and markets were rehabilitated, and access to drinking water was improved.

Supporting the construction of infrastructures also allows projects to bring short-term relief to vulnerable populations through cash for work (CfW) activities. In 2021, Diaspora Mali employed 1,862 people on construction sites through CfW, generating the equivalent of 509 full-time jobs (indicator 1.1) and bringing short-term relief to vulnerable people in Kayes, Sikasso and Mopti.

Support to civil registration

EUTF-funded programmes also aimed to strengthen the presence of the state in conflict-affected areas, including through the provision of civil registration documents. A study from the KEY programme established that only 65% of its adult beneficiaries had national identification documentation and only 25% of children. One of the main causes of this lack of registration in Mali is that populations are not sensitised to its importance. In 2021, 172,380 people have been reached by sensitisation campaigns on legal documentation by the PAECSIS programme (ML-08² – indicator 2.7). Another cause for this lack of registration is the absence of coverage of state services in remote or rural areas. Therefore, PAECSIS established “*campagnes de rattrapage*” so that people can have new or updated papers. In 2021, a total of 11,210 civil documents were issued as a result of the programme’s activities, adding up to the 6,959 civil documents previously issued through the KEY programme and bringing the total to 18,169 (indicator 2.2).

¹ Programme Jeunesse et Stabilisation dans les régions centre du Mali.i

² Programme d'appui au fonctionnement de l'état civil au Mali: appui à la mise en place d'un système d'information sécurisé.

5.7.3. MALI AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 12: EUTF common output indicators for Mali, December 2021

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	1,778	1,167	817	2,248	6,009	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	950	1,664	718	424	287	4,043	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	18,499	30,766	20,574	17,437	38,540	125,816	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET)...	3,689	5,511	5,998	2,272	7,092	24,562	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed,...	7	58	19	36	10	130	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	258	323	122	174	561	1,438	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	3,813	2,344	1,290	6,600	4,610	18,657	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	108,815	190,481	62,961	8,386	9,080	379,723	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	38,880	69,426	56,314	7,240	14,896	186,756	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	10	2	0	0	0	12	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	5,133	4,736	4,152	1,155	16,370	31,547	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	31,343	176,408	314,206	320,596	227,161	1,069,714	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	586	5,069	364	116	577	6,712	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	1,749,378	308,089	233,291	76,416	92,287	2,459,461	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	0	0	21	0	0	21	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs...	2,361	2,293	2,673	3,666	19,036	30,029	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	0	91,476	42,729	19,043	199,938	353,186	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	1,882	977	349	176	219	3,603	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	9,863	6,131	1,581	2,219	3,076	22,870	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	1,532	5,688	2,577	733	4,187	14,717	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	3	19	18	23	0	63	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	82	57	111	442	823	1,514	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	2	14	6	3	6	31	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	0	0	31	17	16	64	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	3	2	3	0	2	11	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	837	6	1,318	410	4,367	6,938	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	610	2,168	1,074	1,066	2,527	7,445	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	265	1,753	1,987	3,256	2,220	9,481	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	37	381	134	5	287	844	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	12	26	53	122	188	401	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	17	16	808	19	404	1,264	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	34	26	15	13	8	96	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created...	8	0	8	2	1	19	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	102,641	0	0	102,641	

5.8. MAURITANIA

5.8.1. MAURITANIA IN 2021

Figure 53: Mauritania – Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021



In 2021, 1.4 million people in Mauritania faced food insecurity.¹ Food security deteriorated following a significant deficit in rainfall and increased prices of agricultural inputs due to pandemic-related shocks.² As a result, agricultural yields fell by 14% compared to the average of the last five years, and food prices subsequently rose.³ Data from the November *Cadre Harmonisé* show that households were under nutritional stress in 37 districts, and 5 districts showed crisis levels in terms of gaps in food consumption and use of negative coping strategies.⁴ Approximately 348,000 people needed humanitarian assistance between October and December 2021 to meet basic needs following agricultural shortfalls and reduced incomes from economic shocks.⁵ It is forecast that 660,000 people will face severe food insecurity during Mauritania's June – August 2022 lean season, and the Ministry of Health estimates that 136,254 acutely malnourished children will require urgent care in 2022.⁶

At the same time, households continued to suffer from loss of livelihoods due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which pushed approximately 48,000 people into extreme poverty,⁷ bringing the share of those in extreme poverty to 6.4% in 2021.⁸ The modelled unemployment rate was already high before the pandemic at 10.7%, and 21% for youth,⁹ and reduced job opportunities and inflation further undermined household purchasing power.¹⁰ Social assistance spending in Mauritania is relatively high (at 7.5% of GDP), and the national Tekavoul Social Transfer programme reaches 47% of the poorest quintile, with one of the highest coverages in the region.¹¹ This year, with support from UNHCR and WFP, Mauritania included refugees in the Tekavoul social registry, which will extend food security

¹ UNICEF, 'Humanitarian Action for Children – Mauritania', Accessed April 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

² Famine Early Warning Systems Alert, 'A drop in income for the most vulnerable households during the early stages of the upcoming lean season', Accessed April 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

³ Ibid.

⁴ FAO, 'Crop prospects and food situation: Quarterly Global Report, December 2021, Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ FAO, 'Crop prospects and food situation: Quarterly Global Report, December 2021, Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ World Bank, 'Poverty and equity brief – Mauritania, April 2021, Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ World Bank Blogs, 'Roadmap for a more inclusive and fiscally sustainable post-COVID economy in Mauritania', 22 October 2021, Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ ILO STAT Database, 'Unemployment Youth Total, Accessed April 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ Famine Early Warning Systems Alert, 'A drop in income for the most vulnerable households during the early stages of the upcoming lean season', Accessed April 2022, Retrieved [here](#).


¹¹ World Bank, 'Mauritania Country Overview', Accessed April 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

assistance and approximately 12.5€ in cash to 7,409 of the most vulnerable Malian refugee households.¹ For migrants, on the other hand, assistance has been more difficult to come by. In an IOM study, nearly all migrants in Nouadhibou and Nouakchott reported not having accessed humanitarian assistance, and though most surveyed migrants had an economic activity of some kind, approximately two-thirds reported that COVID-19 had decreased their revenues.²

This year, migrants departing on the Atlantic Route from Mauritania continued to face dangerous journeys and insufficient services along the way. In 2021, 22,316 individuals reached the Canary Islands irregularly by boat (a slight decrease of 707 compared to 2020), and an estimated 1,173 people died on this journey.³ Nouadhibou is a major departure point, and over 1,200 people were rescued off Mauritania’s coast between October 2020 to August 2021.⁴ Notably, the Mauritanian Coast Guard intercepted seven survivors in August (47 missing).⁵

5.8.2. THE EUTF IN MAURITANIA

Figure 54: EUTF portfolio in Mauritania, December 2021^{6,7}



The EUTF has contracted €77M to projects in Mauritania. The largest proportion of this funding (38%) goes to security and governance, supporting the government’s de-radicalisation efforts through the CORIM programme (MR-06),⁸ which concluded in S2 2021, and supporting Mauritanian institutions on governance for the security-resilience-development nexus through the Nexus SRD programme (MR-08).⁹ Another 35% of the budget is contracted to programmes focussing on economic and employment opportunities (SO1). These programmes, notably SAFIRE, Promopêche GIZ/ILO, and Promopêche AECID (MR-07, MR-04, MR-05),¹⁰ aim to support access to and creation of jobs as well as technical

¹ UNHCR, WFP, World Bank, Govt. Of Mauritania, ‘Inclusions des réfugiés dans le registre social national’, December 2021, Retrieved [here](#).

² IOM DTM, ‘Enquête sur la migration à Nouadhibou’, 29 December 2021, Retrieved [here](#).

³ IOM DTM, ‘Enquête sur la migration à Nouakchott’, 22 December 2021, Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ IOM, ‘Irregular migration towards Europe: Western Africa – Atlantic Route’, January 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

The number of deceased migrants is difficult to estimate due to a lack of systematic monitoring of departures.

⁵ UNHCR, ‘Another boat tragedy off North Africa’s Atlantic coast stark reminder of perilous sea journeys’, 18 August 2021, Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁸ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.


⁹ Résilience pour la cohésion sociale et culturelle en République Islamique de Mauritanie.

¹⁰ L’UE pour le nexus sécurité-résilience-développement en Mauritanie.

¹⁰ Programme de renforcement de la résilience des communautés urbaines et rurales vulnérables en Mauritanie ; Promotion de l’emploi et amélioration des conditions de vie des pêcheurs artisanaux côtiers, jeunes et femmes aux alentours des espaces

training focusing on high-potential sectors such as fishing and construction. Finally, programmes dealing with migration management (SO3) and strengthening the resilience of communities (SO2) comprise 14% and 13% of EUTF funding, respectively. Most programmes in Mauritania are nearing the end of implementation in 2022 or 2023.

Figure 55: Selected EUTF outputs in Mauritania, December 2021



Supporting household resilience through IGA support


In Mauritania, 5,890 people were assisted to develop IGAs in 2021, an increase of 40% compared to 2020, bringing the total number of people supported since inception to 22,933. Nearly three quarters (73%) of IGA support in Mauritania consisted of training in entrepreneurship and developing IGAs. Most these training beneficiaries were reached by the SAFIRE programme (MR-07) which supports household livelihoods and resilience through the creation of economic opportunities and socio-professional insertion.

Notably, the programme trained 3,451 farmers, 95% of whom were women, creating a peer advisory system for agro-pastoralists to experiment with improved techniques that can improve agricultural production (indicator 1.3). This activity highlights the programme's emphasis on the link between supporting income generating activities as a means to improve overall economic resilience and food security. This is important given the decline in income for poor and extremely poor households in

naturels protégés du secteur nord de Mauritanie ; Création d'emplois décents et consolidation de l'emploi existant pour les jeunes et potentiels migrants dans le secteur de la pêche artisanale.

Mauritania, and exacerbating factors such as increasing prices of staple foods, reduced agricultural production, and macroeconomic factors like inflation.¹

Figure 56. EUTF indicator 1.3, in Mauritania, December 2021



Overall, beneficiaries of IGA support in Mauritania were mostly women, at 84%. Mauritania has both a high proportion of female-headed households and an extremely low ratio of female to male labour force participation at 46% (the second lowest in the SLC region).² Furthermore, the economic challenges presented by COVID-19 and containment measures have more severely impacted women who are more likely to work in informal sectors of the economy, and therefore are afforded less protection over wages, property rights, employment, and financial services. In surveys, 41% of female heads of household reported a significant decrease in revenues due to COVID-19, compared to 38% of male lead households, and 38% of female led households experienced a decrease in quality of foodstuffs consumed compared to 30% of male-led households.³

During 2021, 72% of young people receiving financing for IGAs provided by SAFIRE and Refugees' Resilience (MR-06)⁴ were women, and about a third of these young women were refugees. Additionally, Promopêche AECID (MR-05)⁵ provided infrastructure and equipment for 334 female workers (93% of beneficiaries for this activity) who earn income in the fishing sector, which was particularly hit by COVID-19. SAFIRE, which particularly targets unemployed women, single women, and female heads of household, provided IGA training and package support to help youth and women entrepreneurs finalise

¹ Famine Early Warning Systems Alert, 'A drop in income for the most vulnerable households during the early stages of the upcoming lean season', Accessed April 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

² World Bank, 'Female headed households', Consulted in April 2022, Retrieved [here](#); ILO, 'Labour force participation rate', Consulted in April 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

³ World Bank, 'Rapport sur la situation économique en Mauritanie', May 2021, Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Renforcement de la résilience et de la capacité d'autonomisation des réfugiés, des rapatriés et des personnes déplacées internes liés au conflit du Nord Mali.

⁵ Promotion de l'emploi et amélioration des conditions de vie des pêcheurs artisanaux côtiers, jeunes et femmes aux alentours des espaces naturels protégés du secteur nord de Mauritanie.

their economic activity. Over two-thirds of the jobs benefitting from SAFIRE IGA support in 2021 were held by women, totalling 606 jobs (indicator 1.1).

Providing urgent assistance to migrants

During 2021, EUTF programmes supported 3,133 migrants in transit (indicator 3.2), including 2,097 during Q4 2021, the highest yearly output since the beginning of activities. The Nexus SRD Programme (MR-08),¹ which is implemented by IOM and aims to improve governance of the security-resilience-development nexus and prevent conflict and forced displacement, provided 76% of this assistance. For programmes in Mauritania, urgent relief and humanitarian assistance were a priority during S2, particularly given the urgent needs of migrants transiting through Nouakchott and Dakhlet Nouadhibou.

Most beneficiaries (2,482) received generalised support to meet the various needs of people on the move. During 2021, the EU-IOM JI Mauritania (MR-03)² provided mixed protection and assistance to 756 migrants in transit (indicator 3.2). Support ranged from food assistance to medical and psychosocial support and accommodation assistance for vulnerable cases. Nexus SRD reached 1,726 people through local CSO partners with 'package support', including psychosocial support and psychological first aid for migrants who had attempted departure, especially those with vulnerable profiles such as children or victims of sexual violence (78% of those receiving package support were women).

The government of Mauritania has placed emphasis on expulsions in response to movements of migrants through the country and has recently announced that it would rehabilitate two migrant transit centres managed by the police in Nouakchott and Nouadhibou. In 2021, Human Rights Watch documented cases of abusive arrest or detention of migrants by the police and gendarmes, as well as arbitrary collective expulsions to the Malian border by authorities.³ The Global Detention Project also noted that arbitrary detention, detention of refugees, forced expulsion, and the human rights of the detained, especially women, were concerns.⁴ These events affected migrants who were intercepted at sea or arrested on Mauritanian territory.⁵ In August, IOM and UNHCR published a joint press release calling for increased search and rescue capacity, assistance, and legal pathways for migrants, who often end up in administrative detention in Mauritania.⁶

Nexus SRD worked with civil society and the Ministry of Interior and Decentralisation throughout 2021 to support the 1) the creation and institutionalisation of SOPs on managing migrant departures and care of migrants and refugees in Nouadhibou, 2) creation of a code of conduct for operations related to migrant departures, and 3) update of the National Strategy for Migration Management and its plan of action (indicator 4.6). Activities related to developing SOPs focussed on the promotion of alternatives to detention of migrants, care of migrants and refugees, urgent response and case referencing. Specifically, IOM proposed to introduce into the SOPs a system that depends on the profile of surviving migrants, where response can be adapted to a case profile in order to minimise the number of detentions, particularly among vulnerable groups such as women, children, sick people, or victims of trafficking.

¹ L'UE pour le nexus sécurité-résilience-développement en Mauritanie.

² Contribuer au renforcement de la gouvernance et de la gestion des migrations et des frontières, et faciliter la protection, le retour et la réintégration durable de migrants en Mauritanie


³ Human Rights Watch, 'Submission to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on Mauritania' 24 August 2021, Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Global Detention Project, 'Submission to the Universal Periodic Review, 37th session of the UPR working group', February 2021, Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Human Rights Watch, 'Submission to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on Mauritania' 24 August 2021, Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ UNHCR, 'Another boat tragedy off North Africa's Atlantic coast stark reminder of perilous sea journeys', 18 August 2021, Retrieved [here](#).

Figure 57. EUTF indicator 3.2, in Mauritania, December 2021¹



Nexus SRD also provided urgent medical assistance to 651 people in 2021, particularly for people intercepted at sea, through a medical triage system. The unpredictability of movements along the Atlantic Route remains a major challenge for the management of activities related to the triage mechanism, although patterns observed from 2020 and 2021 show that shipwrecks tend to take place more often in September and December. The programme and its partners, French Red Cross and Mauritanian Red Cross, have had to maintain flexibility to respond to fluctuating numbers of people in need of assistance. Also on the governance side, Nexus SRD aims to improve the operational capacity of Mauritanian officials to effectuate rescues at sea, and, in the second half of the year, 25 trainers taught 140 members of the Mauritanian coast guard and gendarmerie to swim (indicator 4.2).

Finally, Nexus SRD completed two studies in 2021 on the presence and profile of migrants in Nouakchott and Dakhlet Nouadhibou to improve visibility on migrant movements in Mauritania, (indicator 5.3). The studies' findings nuance the perception of Mauritania as merely a transit country to reach Europe. They found that most migrants in both cities are under 35 (71% in Nouadhibou, 67% in Nouakchott) and men (68% in Nouadhibou and 73% in Nouakchott).² Mainly Senegalese and Malian nationals, migrants overwhelmingly reported that Mauritania was their final intended destination at their moment of departure (93% in Nouadhibou, and 89% in Nouakchott).³ Among those who intended to move to another country, most aimed to reach Spain (36-37%), France (21-25%), Morocco (11-14%) or others.⁴ Additionally, 77% in Nouadhibou and 65% in Nouakchott reported their intent to stay in the country during the six months following the study, and the majority of those who did not intend to stay hoped to return to their country of origin.

¹ The map does not show data provided by the EU-IOM Joint Initiative for EUTF indicator 3.2 because it is only available at the national level. Non-disaggregated data accounts for 3,026 beneficiaries (40%) of assistance to migrants in transit in Mauritania.

² IOM DTM, 'Enquête sur la migration à Nouadhibou', 29 December 2021, Retrieved [here](#).

³ IOM DTM, 'Enquête sur la migration à Nouakchott', 22 December 2021, Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

5.8.3. MAURITANIA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 13: EUTF common output indicators for Mauritania, December 2021

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	46	325	1,888	629	449	3,336	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	18	465	532	52	1,068	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	5,160	7,678	4,205	2,337	3,553	22,933	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET)...	533	1,747	3,562	2,268	1,922	10,032	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed,...	0	0	2	0	0	2	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	4	11	47	9	4	75	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	404	204	334	92	88	1,122	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	3,098	40,332	587	0	44,017	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	0	5,422	13,367	5,116	272	24,177	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	8	12	14	0	0	34	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	87,260	298,839	4,207	2,293	392,599	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	0	170	14	122	81	387	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	0	2,100	0	0	2,100	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs...	757	1,363	2,361	683	2,450	7,614	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	6,550	14,120	1,550	0	0	22,220	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	910	2,525	374	198	408	4,415	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	11	12	8	21	1,087	1,139	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	10	7	0	19	2	38	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	15	76	44	0	12	147	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	262	970	248	98	131	1,710	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	3	0	3	0	6	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	13	30	7	3	0	53	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	2	2	0	0	0	4	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	31	0	1,877	52	7,124	9,084	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	223	339	976	647	601	2,786	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	15,250	511	64,761	9,781	2,579	92,882	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	39	10	17	15	23	104	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	26	122	8	19	175	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	13	6	269	4	117	409	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	5	32	32	3	5	77	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created...	9	0	1	1	0	11	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	35,207	4,889	5,152	45,248	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	6,662	2,921	1,786	11,369	
6.3 Number of entities benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	95	10	0	105	

5.9. NIGER

5.9.1. NIGER IN 2021

Figure 58: Niger – Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021



Mohamed Bazoum was elected president of Niger in February 2021. The opposition contested the results, but he was inaugurated in April,¹ two days after a thwarted military coup attempt.² While President Bazoum stressed the importance of addressing insecurity in Niger, he faced increasing popular discontent throughout the year as the Sahel conflict entered its tenth year. Protests erupted in November against the French military presence as a Barkhane convoy was crossing Niger to reach Mali. At least two people died and 18 were injured.³

The security situation in Niger continued to deteriorate throughout 2021; 1,393 people died in 313 security incidents in Niger (a 24% increase from 1,119 fatalities in 2020).⁴ While regions in the Liptako-Gourma (Tahoua and Tillabéri) continued to account for most fatalities (83%), violence increasingly expanded into the southwest (Maradi).⁵ The number of fatalities more than doubled in Maradi from 2020 to 2021 (29 people in 2021 compared to 11 in 2020) as bandit groups originally from north-western Nigeria conducted cross-border attacks.⁶ The region hosted 15,910 IDPs and 57,122 Nigerian refugees as of November 2021.⁷

Insecurity in Niger and neighbouring countries continued to cause displacements and Niger hosted 581,114 persons of concern as of December 2021, including 264,257 IDPs and 249,945 refugees (mainly from Nigeria and Mali). The number of IDPs notably diminished from December 2020 (298,458 people) as return operations took place during the second half of the year. In June, President Bazoum announced that the government would support the return of all 100,000 displaced people in Diffa (on the border with Nigeria). More than 40,000 people returned to their home villages in August 2021.⁸ However, populations reportedly dreaded the lack of security in return areas as well as the lack

¹ Jeune Afrique, 'Présidentielle au Niger : Mahamane Ousmane conteste les résultats et revendique la victoire', February 2021. Retrieved [here](#)

² BBC, 'Niger 'coup' thwarted days before inauguration', March 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Le Monde, 'Au Niger, deux morts dans des heurts lors du passage d'un convoi militaire français', November 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project dashboard', consulted in February 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project dashboard', consulted in February 2021. Retrieved [here](#);

ANP, 'Insécurité dans la région de Maradi : Réunion du conseil régional de sécurité', September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


⁷ UNHCR, 'Niger - Population of concern', November 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ UNHCR, 'Niger : Situation des mouvements de populations Diffa, Tillabéri, Tahoua et Maradi', September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

of infrastructure in their home villages, which were destroyed by Boko Haram attacks and have been abandoned for years.¹ New displacements due to persistent violence were reported in Diffa in November and December.²

5.9.2. THE EUTF IN NIGER

Figure 59: EUTF portfolio in Niger, December 2021^{3,4}



The EUTF in Niger has contracted **€292.9M** mainly to security, governance and conflict-prevention related programmes (41%). In 2021, five projects were contracted in Niger, including two SO4-related projects aiming to support the fight against terrorism in Niger. One supports the creation of a joint investigation team for counter-terrorism operations (ECI CT, NE-15),⁵ built on the model of the joint investigation team for anti-smuggling and anti-trafficking operations (ECI, NE-05).⁶ Another will build the capacity of the CENTIF, the national unit for control of financial information, in its role preventing the financing of terrorist operations (AJUSEN CENTIF, NE-06-04).⁷ The EUTF has also contracted €88.9M to programmes that support employment and economic opportunities (SO1 – 30%). Two new programmes were signed in 2021 to boost employment in areas of transit and origin of migration flows (PROSTARAZ, NE-12-02)⁸ and in the conflict-torn region of Tillabéri (ProEMPLOI, NE-13).⁹ Finally, an SO2-related project was contracted in 2021 to support the safeguarding of the W National Park (ASP APN/WAC, NE-14-02).¹⁰ As of December 2021, 76% of the EUTF budget planned for Niger had been disbursed.

¹ RFI, 'Niger: six ans après, des milliers de déplacés regagnent le village de Baroua', June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² UNHCR, 'Niger : Situation des mouvements de populations récents dans la région de Diffa', December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁴ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁵ *Création d'une équipe conjointe d'investigation pour la lutte contre les réseaux criminels liés au terrorisme.*

⁶ *Création d'une équipe conjointe d'investigation pour la lutte contre les réseaux criminels liés à l'immigration irrégulière, la traite des êtres humains et le trafic des migrants.*


⁷ *Appui au renforcement des capacités de la CENTIF.*

⁸ *Projet de stabilisation et du renforcement socio-économique dans les régions d'Agadez et de Zinder.*

⁹ *Promotion de l'emploi pour le renforcement de la résilience économique des communautés de la région de Tillabéri.*

¹⁰ *Sécurisation et résilience du Parc W Niger et périphérie.*

Figure 60: Selected EUTF outputs in Niger, December 2021



A whole-of-society approach to reinforcing social cohesion and preventing conflicts

In 2021, Niger continued to grapple with violent extremism, both external (cross-border security threats) and internal (increasing vigilante violence), recording 313 violent events and 1,393 fatalities.¹ This represents a 35% decrease in violent incidents and a 19% increase in fatalities compared to 2020. In the Tillabéri and Tahoua regions of western Niger, more than 600 civilians were killed in 2021, over five times more than in 2020.² In order to support peaceful coexistence and better governance and prevent conflicts, EUTF-funded programmes trained 2,509 people on issues ranging from improved governance and security to conflict prevention and human rights in 2021 (indicator 4.2), a 221% increase compared to outputs achieved in 2020.

In 2021, most EUTF-funded trainings targeted community representatives on conflict prevention and improved governance (1,606 people or 64% of all actors trained on these topics). Most of these community representatives (85%) were trained in the region of Diffa where the RESILAC programme (REG-05)³ trained 1,324 community leaders and members of community-based organisations on democratic governance.⁴ Another 188 community mediators were trained by the regional PDU programme (REG-18)⁵ in the Tillabéri region, which was the most affected by violence in 2021. A recent study on the role and perception of ‘customary characters’ in the Tillabéri region highlights that community representatives (traditional authorities, elders and religious authorities) are considered by local populations as the main actors available to support conflict resolution and justice inside their village.⁶

¹ The New Humanitarian, ‘What’s behind the rising violence in Western Niger?’, September 2021. Retrieved [here](#); ACLED, ‘Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project dashboard’, consulted in March 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), March 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ RESILAC – Redressement économique et social inclusif du Lac Tchad.

⁴ The remaining 94 community representatives were trained by the PDU programme in Diffa and Agadez.

⁵ Programme d’urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.

⁶ Clingendael Institute, ‘Customary Characters in Uncustomary Circumstances: The case of Niger’s Tillabéri region’, December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

At the community-level, the media and journalism can play a positive role in appeasing tensions and rebuilding peaceful dialogue.¹ In 2021, EUTF-funded programmes trained 60 journalists on conflict prevention and peacebuilding (indicator 4.2). The Shimodu programme (NE-10)² trained 40 community radio hosts from the Diffa region on the design of community awareness campaigns related to social cohesion, peaceful conflict prevention and management. The training sought to improve the resilience of displacement-affected communities in the region. Radio spots on peacebuilding and conflict prevention reached 181,000 people (indicator 4.3). Additionally, PDU trained 20 journalists on conflict sensitivity in the regions of Diffa and Agadez.

In efforts to help reduce conflict, EUTF-funded programmes also focused on training security forces. In 2021, an increasing number of violent events (80) involving states forces were reported, resulting in 476 fatalities among state forces during the year.³ The same year, 548 national state forces received training on security, conflict prevention and human rights from EUTF-funded programmes (indicator 4.2). Due to the rise in targeted attacks against forces as well as reports of human abuses from security forces,⁴ EUTF-funded programmes focused on training forces in human rights principles to ensure the fulfilment of their protection mandate. As such, the Security G5 Sahel programme (REG-23)⁵ trained 296 internal security forces in conflict prevention and human rights (54% of forces trained). Furthermore, security forces were trained to support their daily operations. AJUSEN (NE-06)⁶ contributed to training 234 people (43% of security forces trained): 90 National Guard members on search and rescue operations, 74 members from diverse forces on intelligence gathering and analysis and 70 from the Directorate for the Surveillance of the Territory on border management.

EUTF-funded programmes have also supported the creation of new units like the ECI CT (counterterrorism),⁷ the EP-GNN (polyvalent squadron of the National Guard of Niger)⁸ and the GAR-SI units (security).⁹ In 2021, 18 members of the ECI CT were trained in counter terrorism and 6 vehicles were provided to them by the ECI programme. GAR-SI units received 10,005 items of equipment (including 23 vehicles) while the EP-GNN received 353 items, including 105 pieces of equipment to detect improvised explosive device (indicator 4.1 bis) by their respective supporting programmes. In total in 2021, EUTF-funded programmes provided 10,403 items to strengthen governance, all to security forces.

¹ N. Kuusik, 'The role of the media in peacebuilding, conflict management, and prevention', E-International Relations, 2010. Retrieved [here](#).

² *Projet intégré d'appui à la résilience des populations vulnérables réfugiées, déplacées, retournées et hôtes de la région de Diffa*.

³ ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project dashboard', consulted in March 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ CNDH, 'Rapport de mission d'enquête, d'investigation, de vérification et d'établissement des faits relatifs aux allégations portant sur la disparition de 102 personnes dans le département d'Ayorou, région de Tillabéri', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ *Appui aux forces de sécurité des pays membres du G5 Sahel pour la lutte contre l'impunité et le renforcement de leurs liens avec les populations*.


⁶ *Contrat relatif à la Reconstruction de l'Etat au Niger en complément du SBC II en préparation / Appui à la Justice, Sécurité et à la Gestion des Frontières au Niger*.

⁷ *Création d'une équipe conjointe d'investigation pour la lutte contre les réseaux criminels liés au terrorisme*

⁸ *Soutien à la création d'un escadron polyvalent de la Garde Nationale du Niger*

⁹ *GAR-SI SAHEL (Groupes d'Action Rapides – Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel)*

Figure 61: EUTF indicator 4.2, in Niger, December 2021



Increasing vulnerable people's resilience through the development of IGAs

After a significant decline in Niger's growth rate in 2020 (3.6% compared to 5.9% in 2019) that stemmed from the combination of climate, health and security crises, the country's economic outlook was favourable in 2021, with a projected 5.1% rebound in growth.¹ Nonetheless, the socio-economic situation in Niger remained very fragile. More than 10 million people (approximately 42.9% of the population) were living in extreme poverty (with less than \$1.90 per day) and around 60% were unemployed as of December 2020.²

In 2021, 12,937 people (50% women)³ were assisted to develop IGAs, a 50% increase compared to outputs achieved in 2020 (indicator 1.3). Most (45% or 5,877 people) received IGA training through the PDU, Emploi Niger (NE-11)⁴ and RESILAC programmes. In 2021, all the beneficiaries were trained in agriculture, fishery and livestock production or processing. Niger's economy is poorly diversified and dominated by a subsistence-oriented agricultural sector (accounting for 40% of GDP in 2020), which is highly dependent on climate.⁵ In Tahoua and Tillabéri, the regional PDU programme trained 3,913

¹ World Bank, Niger Overview, 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² World Bank, Niger Overview, 2021. Retrieved [here](#); World Bank, World Bank data, 2020. Retrieved [here](#).


³ For 15% of beneficiaries, the gender disaggregation was not accessible and marked as 'unspecified'.

⁴ *Création d'emplois et d'opportunités économiques à travers une gestion durable de l'environnement dans les zones de transit et départ au Niger*

⁵ World Bank, Niger Overview, Op.cit.

people to strengthen their agro-pastoral livelihoods and their resilience to food and nutritional insecurity. In Agadez and Zinder, 649 beneficiaries were trained by Emploi Niger in climate-resilient agricultural production techniques to better cope with the consequences of climate change. Another 888 people were trained by RESILAC, which focuses on strengthening the resilience of vulnerable people affected by conflicts in the Diffa region.

Figure 62 : EUTF indicator 1.3, in Niger, December 2021



EUTF-funded programmes also supported beneficiaries through entrepreneurship training to ensure that entrepreneurs manage their businesses, operations and income better. Of the 2,125 people trained in 2021, an overwhelming majority (97%) was targeted by Emploi Niger, which trained 2,058 youth on this topic (52% women, 48% men). The remaining 3% received training on establishing a business in the construction sector, through the Kallo Tchidaniwo (NE-09)¹ programme.

¹ Renforcement de la résilience institutionnelle et communautaire dans la région Diffa.

Access to finance was also fostered by EUTF-funded programmes to encourage and enable beneficiaries to start small-scale IGAs. In total, 3,116 people (all women) were supported through the establishment of VSLAs which were started in S2 2021 with PDU support in Agadez and Diffa. VLSAs are small, member-run microfinancing groups of 20 to 25 members, and enable vulnerable people (often women and youths) to build savings and take out loans at low interest rates, which is proven to be an efficient social protection tool. The programme's VSLAs run on yearly cycles, at the end of which cumulative savings and benefits are distributed to members proportionally to the amount saved.

Finally, some beneficiaries (996 people) received material support. In 2021, RESILAC supported 557 producers from farmer field schools through the provision of farm inputs and small equipment. The Stabilisation Agadez programme (NE-12) provided 439 people with material and initial equipment, mostly for agricultural, fishery and livestock production or processing activities (90%).

5.9.3. NIGER AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 14: EUTF common output indicators for Niger, December 2021

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	4,831	4,550	8,260	2,495	2,909	23,045	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	91	127	668	425	518	1,829	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	5,940	5,337	8,624	4,820	8,117	32,838	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET)...	6,110	7,875	3,767	2,283	3,655	23,689	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed,...	0	212	72	11	21	316	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	26	30	21	10	0	87	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	62	852	749	454	472	2,589	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	1,020	6,339	5,254	4,049	4,720	21,382	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	184	3,455	14,687	20,926	39,253	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	70,386	123,818	125,031	61,068	41,480	421,783	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	0	0	0	0	1	1	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	4,680	82,855	13,471	1,897	4,642	107,545	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	3,669	197,158	49,496	169,844	420,167	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	651	1,426	1,382	3,439	1,042	7,940	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	144,191	266,542	211,714	97,375	202,409	922,231	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs...	1,695	1,218	712	4,477	15,733	23,835	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	263,488	199,745	8,806	24,775	35,097	531,911	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	24,468	14,166	7,497	3,531	7,730	57,392	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	5,219	1,643	864	79	411	8,216	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	285	487	529	432	511	2,244	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	45	14	10	5	0	74	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	660	693	312	214	34	1,913	
3.8 Number of people of concern benefitting from evacuation and resettlement...	2,915	1,395	583	98	367	5,358	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	6	4	4	2	16	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	9,233	2,996	22	0	0	12,251	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	10	0	0	14	0	24	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	489	1,082	1,433	10,025	378	13,407	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	1,607	1,768	781	1,231	1,278	6,665	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	395,666	78,233	49,526	115,646	71,669	710,740	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	7	40	16	13	13	89	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	46	40	88	50	91	315	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	48	58	451	17	158	732	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	29	18	14	3	12	76	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created...	8	7	5	3	4	27	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	3,713	1,632	64	5,409	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	867	625	3,288	4,780	
6.3 Number of entities benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	20	0	0	20	

5.10. NIGERIA

5.10.1. NIGERIA IN 2021

Figure 63: Nigeria – Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021



The Nigerian political and security situation continued to deteriorate across the country. In the Northwest, bandit groups have expanded their area of operation, prompting increased military presence. In September 2021, following the kidnapping of 73 school children, Nigerian troops backed by gunships and fighter jets carried out a major offensive against gangs.¹ In the north-east of the country, since the death of Abubakar Shekau in May 2021, several hundred of JAS (or Boko Haram) members surrendered to the Nigerian military.² The unprecedented scale of these renditions highlighted the need for a harmonised strategy to deal with fighters who claim to have repented and are now – controversially – looking to be reintegrated into a society scarred by 12 years of war.³ The renditions have also benefited ISWAP, which seemed less impacted by the alleged death of its leader Abu Musab Al-Barnawi.⁴ In total, 1,261 attacks resulting in 2,290 deaths were recorded in S2 2021 in Nigeria.⁵

As a result, the number of IDPs and refugees from Nigeria increased in 2021. As of December 2021, there were almost 3.2 million IDPs in Nigeria (up 10% from December 2020), 69% of whom were in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (BAY) States.⁶ The number of Nigerian refugees in the three neighbouring countries of Niger, Chad and Cameroon reached 327,313 (compared to 304,252 at the end of 2020).⁷ In October 2021, the Borno State government announced that all displacement camps in Maiduguri would be shut down by 31 December, and some resettlements were carried out soon after.⁸ Human Rights Watch warned that so far, resettlements and camp closures have taken place without adequate notice or information.⁹

The ongoing insecurity coupled with adverse economic effects further exacerbated the humanitarian needs of vulnerable populations. As of December 2021, an estimated 8.7 million

¹ France 24, 'Nigeria troops raid bandit camps in northwest', 6 September 2021. Retrieved here.

² The New Humanitarian, 'What Nigerians displaced by Boko Haram say about living with ex-fighters', 1 September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Ibid.

⁴ BBC, 'Nigeria says Iswap leader Abu Musab al-Barnawi is dead', 14 October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event data project dashboard', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ UNHCR, 'Nigeria: All population Snapshot', Accessed January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Ibid.


⁸ Le Monde, 'Le Nigeria vide les camps de déplacés de Maiduguri', 30 December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Human Rights Watch, 'Nigeria: Halt Closure of Displaced People's Camps', 21 December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

people (out of 12.4 million inhabitants) were in need of humanitarian assistance in the BAY states.¹ Of these, 2.2 million were internally displaced; 1.5 million were returnees who lacked essential services and livelihoods; and 3.9 million were members of host communities affected by the presence of IDPs.² This figure includes the majority (an estimated 733,000) of the 1 million people in areas currently inaccessible to international humanitarian actors.³

5.10.2. THE EUTF IN NIGERIA

Figure 64: EUTF portfolio in Nigeria, December 2021^{4,5}



The EUTF has contracted €125.6M in Nigeria, mostly to security, governance and conflict-prevention (SO4, 56%) and resilience (SO2, 32%) programmes. Notably, €49.5M (39% of the total budget) was allocated in 2020 to SO4 to support UNDP's implementation of the One UN Response Plan (NG-09).⁶ The MCN (NG-03)⁷ programme, also contributing to SO4, brings the EUTF budget in this area to €70.5M. Strengthening the resilience of communities and the most vulnerable (SO2) accounts for €39.6M of EUTF budget in Nigeria. All the programmes that contributed to address the crisis in the BAY states (SO2), namely RRR (NG-07),⁸ LRRD NG (NG-01),⁹ ISING (NG-02)¹⁰ and PSS (NG-06)¹¹ are now completed. Additionally, 12% of the Nigerian contracted EUTF budget is allocated to the EU-IOM Joint Initiative (NG-04),¹² which contributes to migration management (SO3). Most ongoing projects are approaching the final stages of implementation, and it is estimated that 11% of EUTF budget in Nigeria are yet to be spent.

¹ OCHA, 'Nigeria Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022', 9 February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁵ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁶ EU Support to the United Nations 'One UN Response Plan to COVID-19 in Nigeria'.

⁷ Enhancing state and community level conflict management capability in North Eastern Nigeria.

⁸ EU Support to Response, Recovery and Resilience in Borno State.


⁹ Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development and promoting the stability and safety of communities in displacement in North East Nigeria.

¹⁰ Investing in the Safety and Integrity of Nigerian Girls.

¹¹ Strengthening Psychosocial Support, Mental Health, Reintegration and Protection Services for children in Borno, including children associated with Boko Haram.

¹² Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants in Nigeria.

Figure 65 : Situation in Nigeria and EUTF outputs – as of December 2021



Continued support to strengthen Nigeria's national healthcare system


In 2021, the COVID-19 pandemic continued to negatively impact Nigeria and the livelihoods of Nigerians. As of December 2021, Nigeria recorded a total of 241,513 cases including 3,030 deaths. While the numbers of COVID-19 cases in Nigeria are declining, the negative economic and sociological effects of the pandemic are still being felt. The pandemic led to loss of livelihoods, and health systems have been strained to the point of near collapse. These challenges called for a rapid scale-up of public health preparedness and response, as well as measures to protect vulnerable populations.

In 2021, EUTF-funded programmes continued to strengthen the Nigerian health system for current and future health responses. In 2021, a total of 372 entities benefitted from COVID-19 emergency response activities, all from the One UN Response Plan (indicator 6.3), bringing the total number of entities supported to 987 (a 60% increase from results as of December 2020 – indicator 6.3). Health centres and hospitals benefitted the most from this support this year (71%). As of December 2021, the programme had contributed to setting up a total of 346 fully functional health care facilities across the 36 states with capacity for both triage and treatment of confirmed COVID-19 cases. In addition, 150 public tertiary and specialist health care facilities in the country were supported via training to improve detection of COVID-19 during a potential new wave of the pandemic. The remaining beneficiary entities were laboratories that benefitted from extended testing capacity, and governmental institutions supported to develop contingency, response, and recovery plans (including those responding to secondary effects of COVID-19). These achievements contrast with the state of Nigeria's healthcare systems at the start of the pandemic when the country had only seven labs with the capacity to test for the virus, and five hospital beds available for every 10,000 people.

Beyond supporting institutions, the One UN Response Plan programme also provided training for social and healthcare workers. In 2021, a total of 23,005 service providers benefitted from capacity building to strengthen service delivery in the context of the COVID-19 response (indicator 2.8). Notably, during the year, the One UN Response Plan conducted COVID-19 case management cascade trainings for 22,148 health care workers, which included doctors, nurses, pharmacists, laboratory

technicians and community volunteers in all states except Delta and Akwa-Ibom (where other interventions were prioritised). Moreover, public health workers and social workers were trained on COVID-19 risk mitigation and provision of essential SRH/GBV¹ services. These health workers cascaded the information to other health care providers across health facilities.

Figure 66 : EUTF indicator 6.3, in Nigeria, December 2021



Finally, the programme began activities to strengthen local MSMEs to produce high-quality personal protective equipment (PPE) and health care-related products. Notably, a partnership with a private sector producer of PPE was created to give women producers guidelines on quality PPE production. Nigerian MSMEs tend to lack the capacity to produce high-quality PPE and other health care-related products using established national and international standards, and further, to produce these products at scale. So far, 45 women benefitted from capacity training to expand the scope of their business operations and position themselves as healthy economic actors in the production and distribution of PPE in Nigeria (indicator 1.2).


Beyond short-term resilience: supporting the Nigerian economy through MSME support

In 2021, given the disrupted economic and food security context, EUTF-funded programmes continued to distribute cash for short-term household relief against the effects of the pandemic. In 2021, 237,416 people received cash transfers (indicator 2.9). This included 154,557 people receiving unconditional cash grants of NGN 5,000 (USD \$13) from the One UN Response Plan.

The One UN Response Plan also increasingly supports MSMEs, particularly those run by women, as part of a more long-term approach to economic recovery. In 2021, 9,332 MSMEs were supported or created through EUTF-funded programmes (97% of the MSMEs supported since the beginning of EUTF activities in Nigeria). A total of 9,111 MSMEs and informal businesses received cash transfers of NGN 38,800 (\$100) from the One UN Response Plan in 2021, the seven targeted states.

Figure 67 : EUTF indicator 1.2, in Nigeria, December 2021


¹ Sexual and reproductive health/Gender-based violence



Promoting peace through community dialogue and sensitisation

The security situation in the north-eastern BAY states remained volatile in 2021 as incidents and attacks continued. Insecurity weakened community-based governance institutions like local government councils, local courts and religious institution. Governance was further jeopardised as other actors such as vigilante groups and agencies emerged to provide security, although they often lack capacity or accountability.

Figure 68 : EUTF indicator 4.3, in Nigeria, December 2021



In this context, addressing divisions through dialogue and mediation activities was key to stabilising the communities divided by the insurgency. As of December 2021, 142,475 people had participated in conflict prevention and human rights activities organised by EUTF-funded programmes, including 42,376 in 2021 (indicator 4.3). This represents a 42% increase compared to outputs achieved by December 2020. Activities were mostly implemented in Borno (53%) and Yobe (30%) which are at the epicentre of the Nigerian conflict. The main contributor to this indicator remained the MCN programme (NG-03), with 30,769 participants in 2021. The programme aims to strengthen the capacity

of community-based conflict management institutions, therefore helping to build up the resilience of communities and prevent their relapse into violence. In 2021, the bulk of MCN beneficiaries were involved in community dialogues (28,768, 94%) while the remaining participants engaged in civil mediation activities (2,001, 6%). The RESILAC programme (REG-05) contributed the remaining 2021 achieved output via awareness raising events (11,607).

5.10.3. NIGERIA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 15: EUTF common output indicators for Nigeria, December 2021

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	4,575	75	0	0	0	4,650	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	257	27	37	1,325	8,007	9,653	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	17,101	5,511	5,386	252	933	29,183	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET)...	774	1,322	286	24	2,144	4,550	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed,....	0	0	0	0	3	3	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	12	0	0	0	0	12	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	431	24	535	200	3	1,193	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	186,085	315,828	66,926	5,441	1,286	575,566	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	0	10,000	0	0	10,000	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	170,961	200,430	255,380	158,373	5,057	790,201	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	0	600	740	0	230	1,570	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	114,224	9,388	32,036,292	6,988,029	1,454,954	40,602,887	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	5,624	1,774	34,598	21,741	1,485	65,221	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	169,560	17,965	118,327	227,628	9,789	543,268	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs...	7	7	7	3	3	27	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	1,196	10,415	55,316	3,193	1,800	71,919	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	0	0	5	3	0	8	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	11,451	4,450	920	817	903	18,541	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	5,203	4,773	1,267	486	2,745	14,473	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	0	3	0	1	4	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	324	324	370	207	268	1,493	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	41	71	12	0	124	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	10	65	129	149	0	353	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	4	17	3	0	0	24	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	0	60	0	0	60	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	9,093	4,601	3,160	597	808	18,260	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	24,587	16,939	58,573	18,677	23,698	142,475	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	9	2	9	11	6	37	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	33	1	23	0	1	58	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	16	12	4	2	1	35	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	28	9	6	1	1	45	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	10,769,181	2,013,032	20,311	12,802,524	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	425,784	392,864	532,040	1,350,688	
6.3 Number of entities benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	615	222	150	987	

5.11. SENEGAL

5.11.1. SENEGAL IN 2021

Figure 69: Senegal - Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021



In a context of economic hardships, Macky Sall’s government faced unprecedented protests in the country in early 2021. The COVID-19 pandemic had a significant impact on the economy, affecting the revenues of 85% of households.¹ Exports dropped by 10% and further eroded public debt, which is estimated to have reached 70.9% of GDP in 2021 compared to 63.8% in 2019.² The arrest of Ousmane Sonko in March 2021 caused protests to spread across the country, and the scale of participation suggested underlying socio-economic motives.³ Subsequently, the President launched an emergency programme for socio-economic integration and youth employment in April 2021,⁴ Xëyu Ndaw Ni,⁵ with a budget of 450 billion XOF (690 million EUR) for the period 2021-2023. In this context, in June 2021, the IMF unlocked a 650 million USD loan to support young people’s employment.⁶ In December 2021, the IMF and the Senegalese government discussed the implementation of sectoral policies to promote industrialisation and job creation through the production of basic foodstuffs and pharmaceutical products.⁷

In an attempt to promote the country’s economic recovery, the national assembly adopted a law to restore the post of Prime Minister in December 2021.⁸ The post had been abolished in 2019 by President Macky Sall, who had argued that this decision would increase political efficiency.⁹ According to the Minister of Justice, Malick Sall, reinstating the function of Prime Minister is necessary to support the country’s economic recovery and for ‘better coordination and implementation of public policy’.¹⁰

¹ Jeune Afrique, ‘Sénégal : Macky Sall face au challenge de l’emploi’, December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ Ousmane Sonko, main political opposition figure, allegedly accused of raping a woman in a massage parlour and threatening her. He was arrested along with members of his party in March 2021 on his way to the tribunal for ‘public order offence’ and ‘unauthorised protest’.

⁴ Programme d’urgence pour l’insertion socio-économique et l’emploi des jeunes.

⁵ In Wolof, ‘together for tomorrow’.

⁶ Jeune Afrique, 2021. Op. Cit.

⁷ IMF, ‘Les services du FMI achèvent une mission au Sénégal pour les consultations de 2021 au titre de l’article IV, ainsi que les revues au titre de l’Instrument de coordination de la politique économique, de la Facilité de crédit de confirmation et de l’Accord de confirmation’, December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Le Monde, ‘Le Sénégal rétablit la fonction de premier ministre’, December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ RFI, ‘Sénégal : vers la restauration du poste de Premier ministre’, November 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


¹⁰ Le Monde, 2021. Op. Cit..

The stake of local elections, planned for January 2022, is high, as the opposition is hoping that a victory against Macky Sall's party will deter him from running for a third mandate in 2024.¹

Amidst a deteriorating economic landscape, departures on the Atlantic Route continued throughout 2021. Strengthened police management in Niger and the closure of land borders due to the COVID-19 pandemic led to an increase in the use of the maritime route. In May, a ship carrying 86 people capsized off the coast of Saint Louis, in the north of the country. The ship was identified by a Spanish patrol plane based in Dakar and passengers rescued by the Senegalese navy.² In August, another boat carrying people aiming to reach the Canary Islands sank near Saint Louis. The Senegalese navy and the Spanish Civil Guard rescued 11 people, including eight Senegalese and three Gambians, but many people remained missing.³

5.11.2. THE EUTF IN SENEGAL

Figure 70: EUTF portfolio in Senegal, December 2021^{4,5}



The EUTF has contracted €165.4M in Senegal, 56% of which goes to employment-related projects (SO1), followed by security, governance and conflict-prevention (SO4 – 22%) and migration-related projects (SO3 – 17%). The EUTF aims to create economic opportunities and jobs with the DES (SN-04)⁶ and PASPED (SN-09)⁷ programmes. Support to population's resilience is also provided through the PARERBA (SN-08)⁸ and PACERSEN (SN-05)⁹ programmes, mainly through food diversification initiatives and access to basic services. The EUTF also aims to assist returning migrants and support

¹ RFI, 'Au Sénégal, Khalifa Sall, ancien maire de Dakar : 'Je serai candidat à la présidentielle de 2024', December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² Info migrants, 'Sénégal : 82 personnes secourues in extremis par la Marine nationale', May 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Info migrants, 'Une soixantaine de migrants font naufrage au large du Sénégal', August 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁵ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁶ Développer l'emploi au Sénégal : renforcement de la compétitivité des entreprises et de l'employabilité dans les zones de départ.


⁷ Programme de contraste à la migration illégale à travers l'appui au Secteur Privé et à la création d'emplois au Sénégal.

⁸ Projet d'Appui à la Réduction de l'Emigration rurale et à la Réintégration dans le Bassin Arachidier par le développement d'une économie rurale sur base des périmètres irrigués.

⁹ Projet d'Appui à la réduction de la migration à travers la Création d'Emplois Ruraux au Sénégal.

their sustainable reintegration with the *Migration Senegal* programme (SN-06).¹ In Senegal, preventing irregular migration, smuggling of migrants and human trafficking are also priorities supported by the *Etat Civil SN* and POC programmes (SN-07² and SN-10,³ respectively), which pertain to SO4. It is estimated that most of the EUTF contracted budget in Senegal (80%) has been spent as of December 2021 and that 20% are yet to be spent by 2024.

Figure 71: Figure 72: Selected EUTF outputs in Senegal, December 2021



Strengthening MSMEs, creating employment and training the youth

Job creation is a pressing issue for the Senegalese population and the government. According to a survey conducted by Afrobarometer and the *Consortium pour la Recherche Économique et Sociale*⁴ in 2021, unemployment is one of the most important issues that the government needs to address.⁵ The Senegalese government set up a national program for promotion of decent employment, which aims to create 100,000 – 150,000 ‘productive and remunerative jobs’ per year.⁶ The state relies

¹ *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations, retour et réintégration durable au Sénégal et accompagnement des investissements de la diaspora sénégalaise.*

² *Programme d'appui au renforcement du système d'information de l'état civil et à la consolidation d'un fichier d'état national d'identité biométrique au Sénégal.*

³ *Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint (POC) de lutte contre l'émigration irrégulière, la traite et le trafic de migrants au Sénégal.*

⁴ *Consortium pour la recherche économique et sociale*


⁵ Africaportal, ‘Malgré une baisse du chômage, les Sénégalais réclament plus d'efforts du gouvernement en matière de création d'emplois’, December 2021. Retrieved [here](#). In 2021, 49% of respondents cited unemployment as the most important problem in the country, compared with 38% in 2013. Health and education came in second and third positions, with respectively 48% and 29% of respondents ranking them as key issues.

⁶ BIT, ‘Programme pays de promotion du travail décent au Sénégal’, December 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

on two main initiatives for youth employment: the support project for the promotion of youth and women's employment,¹ with a budget of 17B F CFA (approx. 26M EUR), and the community agricultural domains programme.² More recently, and in response to the socio-economic tensions following the COVID-19 pandemic, the Government launched the emergency programme Xeyu Ndaw Ni in April 2021, with the objective to create jobs and/or improve the conditions for job creation, in the short- and medium-term.³

In Senegal, EUTF support to job creation rests on two pillars. The first involves supporting MSMEs or livelihood groups to create and preserve employment, whilst the second aims to provide skills to (mostly) young people to facilitate their insertion in the labour market or to help them become self-employed.

Figure 72: EUTF indicator 1.1, in Senegal, December 2021



In 2021, EUTF-funded programmes contributed to the creation of 7,913 jobs (indicator 1.1), including 2,248 during the second semester. Of total jobs created in 2021, 85% resulted from support to MSMEs. The PASPED programme (SN-09)⁴ is also a driver for employment in Senegal and accounted for a total of 4,012 jobs in the country since the beginning. PASPED also provided financial

¹ *Projet d'Appui à la Promotion d'Emploi des Jeunes et des Femmes (PAPEJF)*, implemented by the African Development Bank.
² *Programme des Domaines Agricoles Communautaires (PRODAC)*, implemented by the National Agency for Agricultural Integration and Development.
³ The programme rests upon five pillars: (i) special recruitment; (ii) public project of community interest; (iii) projets of public investment at high labour intensity; (iv) support to private initiative; and (v) reforms.
⁴ *Programme de contraste à la migration illégale à travers l'appui au Secteur Privé et à la création d'emplois au Sénégal.*

and technical support to a total of 754 MSMEs (indicator 1.2). The PARERBA programme (SN-08)¹ also contributed to the creation of 1,078 jobs in 2021 through support to MSMEs and livelihood groups.

In Senegal, poor linkages between skills and training and the labour market contribute to unemployment and under-employment. In 2021, 1,357 people benefitted from professional training and/or skills development (indicator 1.4), including 745 in the second semester. Respectively 49% and 23% of all trainings conducted in 2021 were technical (TVET) or dual (TVET and internship). Other types of trainings conducted in 2021 were practical internships or apprenticeships through PASPED. Since its start, PASPED has facilitated 1,361 internships, including 162 in 2021. So far, 330 beneficiaries found a job in 2021 as a result of the internship (indicator 1.1).

Strengthening the governance of migration and support to migrants

In recent years, migration governance gained importance in Senegal. The need to better channel and leverage the positive contribution of migration and the diaspora for the country's development, on one hand, and to limit irregular migration flows, on the other hand, drove international and national actors to focus more on the governance infrastructure in Senegal.

In Senegal, EUTF-funded programmes work with partners to strengthen the architecture of migration governance. In 2021, , the *Migration Senegal* programme (SN-06)² handed over 154 items of equipment to strengthen governance (indicator 4.1 bis), or 55% of total equipment provided throughout the year. Equipment from *Migration Senegal* supports the establishment of BAOS, which are migration desk offices spread across the territory.³ *Migration Senegal* also supported the establishment of four regional action plans (indicator 4.6) implemented by the BAOS in Tambacounda, Sedhiou, Kolda and Kaolack in 2021, and trained 88 BAOS staff (indicator 3.7). Lastly, the EUTF commissioned a study on migration governance in Senegal, which identifies the country's priority needs, existing governance frameworks and their level of implementation, as well as support currently available to migration actors.⁴

Senegal is a country of origin for irregular migration. In 2021, 361 Senegalese arrived in Europe through irregular border crossings. This number dropped significantly compared to recent years,⁵ likely due to the strengthening of control mechanisms from the government and its international partners (such as the EU and Spain). Nevertheless, this figure may underestimate the extent of the phenomenon, as it is not always possible to know the identity of people arriving.⁶

Against this backdrop, EUTF implementation partners promote existing economic opportunities in the country. In 2021, 1,133,758 (potential) migrants were reached by information campaigns on migration and on existing opportunities (indicator 3.3), such as those provided by the DES programme

¹ *Projet d'Appui à la Réduction de l'Emigration rurale et à la Réintégration dans le Bassin Arachidier par le développement d'une économie rurale sur base des périmètres irrigués.*

² *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Sénégal et accompagnement des investissements de la diaspora sénégalaise.*

³ The *Bureaux d'Accueil, d'Orientation et de Suivi* aim to guide Senegalese before they leave the country and upon their return, voluntary or not. The establishment of a BAOS in every region of Senegal is a priority for the *Direction générale d'Appui aux Sénégalais de l'Extérieur* (DGASE). The DGASE aims to have BAOS deal with cross-cutting issues related to migration, including professional training, psycho-social support, protection, etc.

⁴ The study is not limited to the EUTF, but aims to identify the specific aspects of migration governance that future programming could consider supporting in Senegal, through an assessment of: the migration-related priorities in the country; existing migration governance frameworks and actors; and the support already provided. The study suggests that renewed support for the migration governance architecture regarding diaspora, return and reintegration, and the fight against migrant smuggling would be key to capitalizing on the progress made in recent years. On issues where Senegal is less advanced (migration due to climate, pastoralism, human trafficking), donors could support concrete progress, depending on the priorities and capacities of government actors.

⁵ FRONTEx, 'Detections of illegal border-crossings statistics', consulted in April 2022. Retrieved [here](#). As comparison, in 2016, 10,391 illegal border crossings from Senegalese were registered, the highest figure.

⁶ Interview with informants in Dakar. Many arrivals do not have identity documents, and may not be included to the final number stated here.

(SN-04)¹ on professional training. The largest contributor to awareness raising in the country is the *Tekki Fii* campaign of DES, which accounted for 95% of the total audience reached in 2021.

Prevention of irregular migration also relies upon an effective fight against criminal networks linked to migrant smuggling and trafficking. In Senegal, the EUTF finances the implementation of the POC programme (SN-09),² which strengthens the capacity of government and security actors to contribute to the fight against criminal networks linked to the smuggling of migrants. To ensure sustainability, POC works directly with national institutions and national security forces, training them on security and border management. In 2021, the programme trained 662 staff on governance, conflict prevention and human rights (indicator 4.2) – a 66% increase since December 2020 –, including 207 in S2.

EUTF support to migration in Senegal also provides assistance and protection to the different profiles of migrants, including those in transit, those requiring assistance to voluntary return to their country of origin, and returnees.

Senegal is a coastal country and shares borders with five neighbouring countries, making it a transit point for irregular migration. Migrants in transit often find themselves in a precarious situation, sometimes stranded in foreign countries and with their conditions and legal categories changing along their migration journey. Thus, they require specific humanitarian assistance and protection to reduce human rights violations.³

In 2021, EUTF-funded activities supported 2,956 migrants in transit (indicator 3.2) in Senegal including 1,633 in the second half of the year. Since beginning of EUTF-funded activities, services to migrants in transit in Senegal were provided by two programmes. *Migration Senegal* (SN-06) has provided protection services to 407 migrants in transit since 2018 through the EU-IOM Joint Initiative. Considering the numerous needs of migrants in transit, Protection West Africa (REG-13) implemented a wide array of activities, including provision of non-food items (32% of all support provided in 2021), help for family tracing (28%), and psycho-social assistance (16%). The programme helped 2,854 migrants in transit in 2021 (including 1,582 in S2 2021), compared to 442 at the end of December 2020. Because migrant children in transit – accompanied and unaccompanied – require a wide range of physical, mental health and social needs,⁴ beneficiaries included children in transit, 458 of whom were supported in 2021, including 320 during the second half of the year. Migrant women in transit – who represent a group at risk as they may face gendered forms of discrimination – were also figured among the beneficiaries.⁵ In 2021, 1,220 migrant women in transit benefitted from support through EUTF-funded activities. Finally, since 2018, the *Migration Senegal* programme supported 208 voluntary returns (indicator 3.4) from Senegal to various countries of origin through the EU-IOM JI.⁶

¹ *Développer l'emploi au Sénégal : renforcement de la compétitivité des entreprises et de l'employabilité dans les zones de départ.*

² Partenariat opérationnel conjoint de lutte contre l'immigration irrégulière et le trafic de migrants et de la traite des êtres humains au Sénégal.


³ OHCHR, 'Situations of migrants in transit', consulted in April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Conflict and health, 'Migrant children in transit: health profile and social needs of unaccompanied and accompanied children visiting the MSF clinic in Belgrade, Serbia', April 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ In the below graph, the action chart shows cumulative percentages since beginning of implementation, and may thus varies from figures detailed for 2021.

Figure 73: EUTF indicator 3.2, in Senegal, December 2021



Senegalese migrants that left and chose to come back may be supported by EUTF-funded activities upon their return. Returnees face social, economic and psychological challenges upon their return and, sometimes, discrimination and stigmatisation.¹ They require different types of support to ensure a safe and dignified return and sustainable reintegration. This is done in two stages. The first stage consists of providing immediate post-arrival assistance. Since its inception, the *Migration Senegal* programme (SN-06), through the EU-IOM JI has provided post-arrival assistance (indicator 3.5) to 5,512 returnees in the form of cash for immediate needs. The second stage consists of providing returnees means to reintegrate successfully, taking into account the multidimensional nature of the reintegration process.² Overall, the EU-IOM JI has provided reintegration assistance to 21,512 returning migrants (indicator 3.5 bis). Support provided to beneficiaries included economic support (IGA, training, support to find a job / create a business, etc.) or package support (which may include economic support) Other types of support were provided by the DES (SN-04) and PACERSEN (SN-05)³ programmes. DES has helped a total of 330 returnees through a professional training or socio-professional reinsertion, while PACERSEN has provided labour work to 179 returnees in their farms to support them in their reintegration.

Outcome analysis 6: Resilience in rural areas, Senegal – Aggregated outcome analysis

Improving resilience in rural areas

¹ IOM, 'Coming home can be harder than leaving: the psychosocial challenges of being a returnee', July 2019. Retrieved [here](#).
² IOM, 'Return and reintegration', consulted in April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).
³ *Projet d'Appui à la réduction de la migration à travers la Création d'Emplois Ruraux au Sénégal, par la mise en place de fermes agricoles villageoises et individuelles.*

As of December 2021, three programmes have ended in Senegal¹. Yellitaare (SN-01)² and RSAN Matam (SN-03)³ aimed to improve resilience of local population in targeted areas, while PACERSEN (SN-05)⁴ intervened in rural areas to improve livelihoods through employment and wealth creation.

Resilience programmes were most active in the north of Senegal, where food insecurity and malnutrition rates are amongst the highest. On average, 30% of the population in the north suffers from food insecurity.

Yellitaare, which ended in January 2021, intervened in the region of Matam and department of Podor to improve populations' resilience.⁵ Food insecurity rates in these two zones are high, at respectively 27% and 39%.⁶ The end of project implementation coincided with lower rates of food insecurity in the zones of intervention, at 12% and 8.2% in Matam and Podor respectively, compared with a baseline of 27.2% and 36.2% and exceeding the targets of 21.8% and 29.3%. Activities implemented to improve food security rested on two main axes. The first was improvement in agricultural land. While the north of the country has vast, irrigable agricultural land which should constitute a comparative advantage in terms of food availability, it remains under-exploited.⁷ The programme contributed to the improvement of over 100 hectares of land for the development of rice production and vegetable crops. The second axis of intervention was the provision of cattle for households.⁸ Combined, these two factors allowed beneficiaries to improve their nutrition thanks to a larger / more diversified food production. At the end of implementation, 100% of beneficiaries had mastered good practices for diversification and improvement of their activities, compared to a baseline of 40%, and 100% of beneficiaries continued to implement an activity in agriculture and farming, compared to a baseline of 65%.

Food security is subject to external factors, especially climate. In Matam, the evaluation of the RSAN Matam programme pointed to an increase in households' coping strategy index (CSI), meaning that they had to use harmful coping strategies due to an inability to access food. During the lifetime of the programme, the region was subject to poor harvesting seasons (in 2017) and long dry spells (in 2018), meaning that most households had to adopt strategies to ensure a minimal level of food consumption.⁹

Food insecurity is also a major cause of malnutrition.¹⁰ During the lifetime of the Yellitaare programme, acute malnutrition rates in the zones of intervention dropped from 16.5% to 10.8% in Matam and 18.2% to 10.2% in Podor (almost reaching the target value of 10% for both zones). Most notably, the programme strengthened nutrition-related interventions, implementing activities relative to growth monitoring and promotion (tracking child growth to support optimal nutrition),¹¹ screening and management of acute malnutrition, and fortifying foods at home with vitamin and mineral

¹ Closed programmes are: Yellitaare (ended in January 2021), PACERSEN (ended in 2021), and RSAN Matam (ended in 2019). Projects from other programmes, such as *Développer l'Emploi au Sénégal* or *Migration Senegal* also ended but were not considered due to (i) sensitive information; or (ii) data not yet available from the evaluation reports.

² *Amélioration de la réponse des communautés les plus vulnérables face aux crises nutritionnelles et alimentaires dans les départements de Podor, Ranérou, Matam et Kanel.*

³ *Projet de renforcement de la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle dans la région de Matam (RSAN Matam).*

⁴ *Projet d'appui à la réduction de la migration à travers la création d'emploi ruraux au Sénégal, par la mise en place de fermes agricoles villageoises et individuelles (fermes Natanguées).*

⁵ The programme was also active in the region of Ranerou and Kenel.

⁶ FAO, 'Analyse rapide de la sécurité alimentaire au nord du Sénégal', February 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Akvo, 'Résilience des populations les plus vulnérables face aux crises nutritionnelles et alimentaires dans les zones de départ de Podor, Ranérou, Matam et Kenel', consulted in April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ 372 households received poultry and 475 households received small ruminants.

⁹ The end of the programme was also correlated with positive outcomes in Matam. The project provided subsidised food acquisitions to 3,300 poor households, with a usage rate of 100%. Of these recipient households, 40% increased food production after the first agricultural campaign, and over 50% of beneficiaries reported improved agricultural production.

¹⁰ Unite for Sight, 'Module 2: food insecurity', consulted in April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).; Karger, 'Food Insecurity and Malnutrition', consulted in April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ USAID, 'Strengthening Growth Monitoring and Promotion', consulted in April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

powders.¹ At the end of the programme, 73% of children under five were covered by nutrition services in the zones of intervention, below the target of 90% but exceeding the baseline value of 49.9%. The use of maternal milk also significantly increased during the lifetime of the project, reaching 52% compared to a baseline value of 36.4% and a target value of 45.5%.

EUTF-funded programmes improved livelihoods for rural populations in targeted areas. The AECID component of the PACERSEN programme established three types of farms: family farms, village farms, and Waar Wi farms. 15 hectare-*Naatangué* farms equipped with a pressurised irrigation network. The project served to improve the revenues of farms and farmers. At the end of implementation, farmers had increased their revenue by 44%, below the target of 75%. The establishment of farms also contributed to employment creation in targeted areas. In total, 753 jobs were created through these new farms, although this figure is below the initial target of 1,241, due to delays in implementation.

5.11.3. SENEGAL AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 16: EUTF common output indicators for Senegal, December 2021


EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	553	3,344	9,102	5,665	2,248	20,912	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	1,688	1,146	4,278	804	200	8,116	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	6,207	7,356	3,194	743	0	17,501	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET)...	9,757	7,109	2,505	612	745	20,729	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	6	11	7	0	0	25	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	3	56	13	27	10	109	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	5,378	2,781	304	0	0	8,463	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	67,575	327,702	168,358	0	0	563,635	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	23,153	20,052	15,709	20,520	4,365	83,799	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	0	40	0	0	0	40	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	23	658	588	330	150	1,750	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	42,939	104,275	209,046	0	0	356,260	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	194	1,997	99	0	20	2,310	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	2,400	10,737	15,933	24,189	11,392	64,651	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	19	36	15	44	71	185	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs...	102	102	544	1,322	1,633	3,703	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	103,918	506,419	142,382	695,242	438,517	1,886,478	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	0	7	119	30	52	208	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	3,104	789	371	619	629	5,512	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	1,035	945	17,928	1,960	0	21,868	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	8	0	1	1	10	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	67	67	227	104	206	671	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	36	50	41	7	134	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	221	73	549	123	7	973	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	0	0	0	0	2	2	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	34	0	702	155	123	1,014	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	150	50	141	455	207	1,003	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	9	28	10	8	45	100	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	44	9	6	21	80	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	8	9	3	2	3	25	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	14	5	16	2	31	68	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	84,525	0	0	84,525	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	252,047	0	0	252,047	
6.3 Number of entities benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	93	0	0	93	

¹ Cochrane Library, 'Home fortification of foods with multiple micronutrient powders for health and nutrition in children under two years of age', February 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

5.12. THE GAMBIA

5.12.1. THE GAMBIA IN 2021

Figure 74: The Gambia - Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021



In December 2021, incumbent President Adama Barrow was re-elected in the first presidential election since the fall of former President Yahya Jammeh. Jammeh, who stayed in power for over twenty years until 2017, is said to have tried to influence the elections from his exile in Equatorial Guinea by sending messages and broadcasts at rallies in support for the opposition. President Barrow's peaceful election is a positive sign for democracy building, with a turnout close to 90 percent, and signals the diminishing importance of his predecessor.

In a report published in December, the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC) recommended prosecution against Yahya Jammeh in front of an international court. The publication of this report was long awaited by victims and their families and represents a key step in the transition to democracy. According to the report, former President Jammeh and his associates perpetrated 'serious crimes' in The Gambia during their tenure. The Commission noted the involvement of Yahya Jammeh in the murders of 50 West African migrants and recommended that he be prosecuted for 'murders, arbitrary arrests, disappearances' in a West African country other than The Gambia – such as Senegal –, under the supervision of the ECOWAS or the African Union.

President Barrow's second term begins in a difficult economic landscape. During the pandemic, the country lost 200,000 jobs – for a population of 2.5M inhabitants – and tourist arrivals fell from 235,000 in 2019 to 90,000 in 2020. As a result of the pandemic-induced crisis, an additional 20,000 people (one percent of the Gambian population) fell into extreme poverty. The surge of new COVID-19 variants across the globe in 2021 and travel restrictions continued to cast a shadow on economic recovery.

Despite the global economic crisis, remittances from the diaspora proved resilient in 2021. Remittances play a historical role in The Gambian economy, representing 15% of GDP in 2019 and 22% in 2020. Between January and October 2021, Gambians sent over USD 650M in remittances. It is estimated that the Gambian diaspora population consists around 200,000 people, including undocumented migrants in irregular situation and the multidimensional diaspora.¹ In The Gambia and


¹ ECRE, 'Civil society input to EU-Africa cooperation on migration: the case of The Gambia', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

other low- and middle-income countries, remittances remained strong during the pandemic and provided a ‘critical lifeline for the poor and the vulnerable’.¹

Boat departures on the Atlantic Route continued throughout 2021, despite the dangers of the journey. In November 2021, a boat carrying dozens of people was reported missing since leaving Gambian shores and had still not been found as of December 2021. Another boat left The Gambia on 30 November, reaching Europe with 106 people – including 40 minors – while 17 others died on the journey.

5.12.2. THE EUTF IN THE GAMBIA

Figure 75: EUTF portfolio in The Gambia, December 2021^{2,3}



The EUTF has contracted €37.4M to projects in The Gambia, of which employment-related projects (SO1) account for 90%, while one project focus on migration management (SO3 – 10%). Through the YEP (GM-01)⁴ and MIITG (GM-03)⁵ programmes, the EUTF aims to create economic opportunities and jobs, particularly for the youth and people in rural areas. The EU-IOM Joint Initiative in The Gambia (GM-02) provides post-arrival support and reintegration assistance to returning migrants and raises awareness on the risks of irregular migration.⁶ Projects in The Gambia are nearing the later phases of implementation, and it is estimated that 12% of EUTF contracted budget in the country is yet to be spent.

¹ World Bank, ‘Defying Predictions, Remittance Flows Remain Strong During COVID-19 Crisis’, May 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.


³ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁴ Youth Employment Project.

⁵ Building a future – Make it in The Gambia.

⁶ European Commission. ‘EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, The Gambia’. Retrieved [here](#).

Figure 76: Selected EUTF outputs in The Gambia, December 2021



Building resilience through agriculture in The Gambia

In The Gambia, agriculture is a major driver of growth. The sector accounts for one quarter of the country's total GDP and employs 75% of the labour force.¹ In spite of the sector's vital importance, agricultural outputs do not meet the country's needs and The Gambia relies heavily on imports, meaning that food prices are subject to fluctuation in the international market and the exchange rate of the Dalasi.² The sector remains mainly subsistence-oriented, with (mostly) women gardeners producing for local consumption market and petty trading.³

EUTF-funded programmes aim to improve agricultural practices in the country and contribute to land rehabilitation. As of December 2021, the MIITG programme (GM-03)⁴ had rehabilitated 124 hectares of agricultural land using sustainable management practices (indicator 2.6), including 61 hectares in 2021. Two EUTF-financed actors participate in land rehabilitation in The Gambia: Enabel and IMVF. IMVF fosters agribusiness at the farm level in rural Gambia for the development of sustainable market-oriented value chains. Enabel upgrades rural infrastructure to support sustainable production and increase productivity in selected value chains. Enabel's infrastructure is built using cash for work (CfW) labour from young people and returnees, building, for instance, cement walls and fences around agricultural land. In 2021, 763 people participated in CfW labour (including 270 women) with Enabel, compared to 291 in 2020. The CfW labour corresponded to the creation of 234 full-time equivalent jobs in 2021 (indicator 1.1).⁵ After working for several months and accumulating savings, CfW labourers can then be referred by Enabel to other EUTF implementation partners for additional skills training or employment.

¹ United States Department of State, 'The Gambia – Country commercial guide', September 2020. Retrieved [here](#).


² WFP, 'FAO in Gambia', consulted in April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Enabel, 'Rapport année 1 : rural infrastructure and employment creation project – RIEC', consulted in April 2022.

⁴ Make it in The Gambia.

⁵ The number of jobs created or supported through cash for work activities is calculated in full-time equivalent, based on the number of days worked by beneficiaries divided by 230 (workdays per year).

Figure 77: EUTF indicator 2.6, in The Gambia, December 2021



In The Gambia, poor people experience poverty in its multi-dimensional nature, such as limited ability to access basic services, especially in rural areas.¹ In 2021, thanks to improvements to agriculture infrastructure and water systems carried out by Enabel through the MIITG programme (GM-03), EUTF-funded activities extended access to basic services to 1,621 people (indicator 2.9).

Supporting migration in its multi-dimensional nature

The EUTF migration strategy in The Gambia rests on three pillars. The first is raising awareness on the risks of irregular migration and professional opportunities at home. The second seeks to provide assistance to migrants in transit, while the third consists of supporting Gambian returnees' return and reintegration as well as providing assistance to migrants in the Gambia who wish to return to their countries of origin.

While The Gambia is mainland Africa's smallest country, it has one of the highest numbers of irregular departures in the SLC region. In 2021, the proportion of irregular border crossings was the highest across the whole SLC region.² Limited opportunities at home can be a push factor for people to migrate. Against this backdrop, EUTF-funded activities in The Gambia developed campaigns to promote and raise awareness of economic opportunities in the country. As of December 2021, 481,317 potential migrants were reached by information campaigns (indicator 3.3), including 301,634 in 2021 (63% of the total since beginning). The main contributor to awareness-raising campaigns is the YEP programme (GM-01),³ which accounted for 86% of all beneficiaries, with 416,043 people reached since the beginning of EUTF activities. YEP's *Tekki Fii*⁴ campaign conducts roadshows across the country to raise awareness on migration, host intergenerational talks, and on how to make a good living in The Gambia in general.

In addition to being a country of departure, The Gambia is also a gateway for irregular transit migration. Nationals from other countries in the sub-region (such as Senegal, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali) work in The Gambia until they find a way to northern Africa and then Europe.⁵

In 2021, EUTF-funded activities provided support to 2,969 migrants in transit (indicator 3.2), including 2,558 in S2 2021, compared with 76 as of December 2020. Close to 100% of migrants in transit assisted since the beginning of EUTF activities received support from Protection West Africa. The programme is managed by the Spanish Red Cross and Save the Children and targets migrants in transit as well as transit communities. The two implementing partners aim to provide complementary responses to selected protection needs in The Gambia, with Save the Children more active in the North Bank and the Lower River regions and the Spanish Red Cross implementing its activities in the West Coast and Upper River regions. The Spanish Red Cross works through humanitarian service points

¹ OPHI, 'Policy – A Multidimensional Approach'. Retrieved [here](#).

² Frontex, 'Detections of illegal border-crossings statistics', consulted in April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

The proportion is calculated by dividing the total number of irregular border crossings reported over the country's total population. In The Gambia, the rate was 0.17% in 2021, the highest in the region. As comparison, Mauritania, the country in the region with the second smallest population after The Gambia, has a rate of 0.03%. The average ratio across SLC countries is 0.02%, meaning that the Gambia's rate is nine times higher than the average.

³ Youth Employment Project.


⁴ *Tekki Fii* means 'Make it here' in Wolof.

⁵ Maastricht University, 'Gambia migration profile', October 2017. Retrieved [here](#).; Migration Policy Institute, 'The Gambia: Migration in Africa's "Smiling Coast"', August 2013. Retrieved [here](#).

and networks of volunteers that provide protection services to migrants, including temporary housing and subsistence support, legal services (counselling & family tracing), and medical help.

Because migrant children in transit – accompanied and unaccompanied – require a wide range of physical, mental health and social needs,¹ the programme also targeted children in transit, 225 of whom were supported in 2021 by Save the Children, including 132 in S2. Save the Children uses mobile teams to identify and refer children on the move and trains relevant stakeholders on child protection. Since the beginning of implementation, Save the Children trained 261 key actors on child protection (indicator 3.7), including 177 in 2021. Lastly, in 2021, 566 migrant women in transit benefitted from support through EUTF-funded activities.²

Figure 78: EUTF indicator 3.2, in The Gambia, December 2021



For those migrants that left and come back, return can be associated with great distress. Returnees may face problems ranging from joblessness to social maladjustment to boredom and frustration.³ They sometimes face discrimination and stigmatisation.⁴

In The Gambia, EUTF-funded activities provide return and reintegration support to returning migrants. As of December 2021, 6,180 Gambian returnees have benefitted from post-arrival assistance (indicator 3.5) through the EU-IOM JI. Returnees received cash to cover their immediate needs. The EU-IOM JI has also provided reintegration assistance in the form of ‘package’ support⁵ to 4,568 Gambian returnees (indicator 3.5 bis) as of December 2021. IOM put in place a referral platform to aggregate information on returnees supported by the Joint Initiative to be shared with other implementing partners. As a result, the YEP programme was able provide entrepreneurship support and skills training programs to 192 returnees, and Enabel (through the MIITG programme) absorbed returnees for cash for work activities.

¹ Conflict and health, ‘Migrant children in transit: health profile and social needs of unaccompanied and accompanied children visiting the MSF clinic in Belgrade, Serbia’, April 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² A reason for the fact that women represent a lower proportion of beneficiaries could be that programmes are not always able to help women, who avoid the main migration routes given their vulnerability.

³ Oladele O. Arowolo, ‘EUTF-funded activities also support Gambian returning migrants’, consulted in April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ IOM, ‘Coming home can be harder than leaving: the psychosocial challenges of being a returnee’, July 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Package support is when multiple types of assistance are provided, including two or more of health, legal, housing, cash, in-kind categories.

Lastly, the EU-IOM JI in The Gambia provides support to migrants wishing to return to their countries of origin. Since the beginning of its operations, the programme has supported 58 such voluntary returns from The Gambia (indicator 3.4), providing migrants with pre-departure services.

5.12.3. THE GAMBIA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 17: EUTF common output indicators for The Gambia, December 2021

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	370	1,681	1,514	1,976	3,827	9,369	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	335	306	1,633	959	1,034	4,267	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	1,770	2,956	3,114	2,065	1,540	11,445	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET)...	767	2,877	955	625	1,812	7,036	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed,...	0	5	8	4	26	43	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	0	0	7	4	5	16	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	0	21	42	52	9	124	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	0	241,939	5,450	80,100	327,489	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	0	42	257	51	22	371	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	688	2,400	760	861	4,709	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs...	0	4	73	411	2,558	3,045	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns...	8,775	73,378	97,530	210,756	90,878	481,317	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	0	3	2	3	50	58	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	3,440	729	217	405	1,389	6,180	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	2,028	1,324	835	257	123	4,568	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	196	317	250	130	894	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	10	5	0	0	15	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	65	208	292	82	85	732	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	4	1	1	0	1	7	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	4	4	3	0	0	11	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	0	0	1	0	0	1	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	1	7	2	3	13	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	112,796	80,114	20,000	212,910	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	40,744	1,548	1,242	43,534	
6.3 Number of entities benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	402	738	0	1,140	

CONCLUSIONS

The situation in the SLC region continued to deteriorate in 2021 as the insecurity that has been affecting the Liptako-Gourma area and the Lake Chad Basin for a decade intensified and expanded to other regions. Displacement figures further increased, and the two areas hosted almost 1.5 million refugees/asylum seekers and 6.6 million IDPs at the end of the year. Mass displacement, combined with the effects of climate change, endemic poverty and the consequences of the COVID-19-related preventive measures resulted in a rising number of people in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, reaching 30.6 million by December 2021.

THE EUTF PORTFOLIO IN S2 2021

The EUTF contracted portfolio in the SLC window grew by 10% in 2021 in number of projects and 6% in funding, from 193 operational contracts worth €1.90B at the end of 2020 to 213 contracts worth €2.02B in December 2021. The Trust Fund reached its peak in spending during the first half of 2020, but a significant amount of budget remains to be implemented.

Twenty additional projects were contracted in 2021, covering all Strategic Objectives.² Fourteen projects were contracted to support


governance, peace and security (seven in Mali, three in Burkina Faso, two in Niger, one in Guinea and one at the regional level); and another three contracts were signed contributing to SO1: two projects were signed to support the economic opportunities for populations in Niger and one to support the recovery of MSMEs in Côte d'Ivoire in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Two contracts were signed to support the resilience of populations (one at the regional level and one in Niger). Finally, one project was contracted to support the efforts of the security forces to combat irregular migration in Mali (contributing to SO3).

The EUTF also reacted to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on SLC countries by reorienting some of its funding towards the COVID-19 response. In total, 61 projects redirected funds, accounting for €123.8M towards a COVID-19 response; 58 projects had implemented COVID-related activities at the end of December 2021 (increased from 56 at the end of 2020).³

THE MLS

This report is the outcome of the ninth round of data collection conducted by the MLS team for the EUTF's SLC window. In 2020, the MLS shifted from a quarterly to a biannual reporting schedule, initially to accommodate the methodological changes process conducted in 2020, and later to make room for other complementary work streams that aim to support the EUTF and the EU in the medium- to long-term future. The format of this report largely follows the S1 2020 report, which adopts a more narrative approach compared to earlier quarterly reports by linking project outputs to contextual data.

Figure 79: Spending of EUTF SLC funds¹



¹ Estimates based on known contracts' budget, start and end dates. Only contracted and operational projects are included.

² Portfolio data for the S2 2020 report was valid as of April 2021.

³ The 61 projects with funds allocated to the COVID-19 response and 58 projects with COVID-19-response outputs are not necessarily the same projects, as some projects have reported COVID-19-response outputs but not reallocated funds and some projects with funds allocated to the COVID-19 response have not yet generated COVID-19-related outputs that are relevant to the EUTF indicators.

Data collection for the S2 2021 report lasted from the end of January to the beginning of March 2022. In addition to the standard data collection requests, IPs were asked to update their COVID-19 budget and response data when relevant. A number of IPs also provided the MLS team with more qualitative information on programme implementation, which provided further qualitative details and explanations to the data collected.

This report includes data for 194 projects, a number that has been gradually increasing from 71 projects in the first report for 2018, to 129 at the end of 2019 and 166 at the end of 2020.

2021 KEY ACHIEVEMENTS

Substantial outputs were reported against all Strategic Objectives in S2 2021.

- **Economy and employment:** The EUTF supported the creation of 31,738 jobs in the SLC region in 2021, for a total of 105,414 jobs created or supported since the beginning of activities (indicator 1.1). In addition, 112,017 people benefitted from assistance to income generating activities in 2021 (indicator 1.3), and 71,893 people benefitted from TVET and/or skills development (indicator 1.4). Additionally, 16,670 MSMEs were created or supported in 2021 (indicator 1.2). Finally, 172 business and productive infrastructures were built or rehabilitated over the course of the year (indicator 1.5).
- **Resilience:** EUTF-funded programmes supplied 613,534 people with food security-related assistance (indicator 2.4) and 260,751 with nutrition assistance (indicator 2.3) in 2021. EUTF-funded programmes also supported the delivery of 52,950 basic social services (indicator 2.2), and improved access to basic services for 1,046,392 people (indicator 2.9). Furthermore, 3,286 social infrastructures were built or rehabilitated (indicator 2.1 bis) in 2021.
- **Migration:** EUTF-funded activities assisted 12,963 voluntary returns and humanitarian repatriations (indicator 3.4), and supported 23,176 returnees with post-arrival assistance (indicator 3.5) and 25,788 with reintegration assistance (indicator 3.5 bis) in S1 2021. EUTF-funded programmes also provided assistance or protection to 86,876 migrants in transit, refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs in 2021 (indicator 3.2). To improve migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination, programmes also provided capacity building or operational support to 47 institutions and non-state actors (indicator 3.6) and 5,611 staff (indicator 3.7) in 2021. Campaigns on the risks of irregular migration reached 1,785,624 migrants and potential migrants over the course of the year.
- **Governance, security and conflict prevention:** EUTF-funded programmes supported the drafting of 754 laws, plans and policy documents aimed at improving governance and policymaking efforts in 2021 (indicator 4.6). Furthermore, 392,533 individuals participated in peacebuilding activities centred around social cohesion and conflict resolution in 2021 (indicator 4.3). EUTF-funded programmes also delivered conflict prevention and security-related training to 24,299 staff and members of key actors involved in social cohesion and peace dynamics over the course of the year (indicator 4.2). Finally, 61 infrastructures were built (indicator 4.1) and 33,621 units of equipment (indicator 4.1 bis) were provided to support governance and security in 2021.
- **COVID-19 response:** To mitigate the impact of the pandemic in the SLC region, 2,147,301 COVID-19 supplies were provided with EUTF funding in 2021 reaching a total of 13,613,218 since the beginning of the pandemic (indicator 6.1). Additionally, 1,120,130 individual beneficiaries and 1,130 entities benefitted from specific COVID-19 response activities in 2021, for a total of 1,865,778 and 2,365 respectively (indicators 6.2 and 6.3).

6. INDEX

6.1. TABLES

Table 1: Projects newly added to the MLS for the S2 2021 report, December 2021	11
Table 2: EUTF common output indicators for all SLC projects, December 2021	20
Table 3: Indicator evolution per project, outcome analysis exercise, March 2022	30
Table 4: Indicator evolution per project, outcome analysis exercise, March 2022	32
Table 5: Indicator evolution per project, Résilience BF (BF-01) programme.....	54
Table 6: EUTF common output indicators for Burkina Faso, December 2021	56
Table 7: EUTF common output indicators for Cameroon, December 2021	61
Table 8: EUTF common output indicators for Chad, December 2021	69
Table 9: EUTF common output indicators for Côte d'Ivoire, December 2021	73
Table 10: EUTF common output indicators for Ghana, December 2021	78
Table 11: EUTF common output indicators for Guinea, December 2021	85
Table 12: EUTF common output indicators for Mali, December 2021	92
Table 13: EUTF common output indicators for Mauritania, December 2021	99
Table 14: EUTF common output indicators for Niger, December 2021	106
Table 15: EUTF common output indicators for Nigeria, December 2021	112
Table 16: EUTF common output indicators for Senegal, December 2021	121
Table 17: EUTF common output indicators for The Gambia, December 2021	127

6.2. FIGURES

Figure 1: Contracted budget breakdown by country and Strategic Objective, December 2021.....	5
Figure 2: Process to develop common outcome indicator categories	9
Figure 3: Projects and budget covered by the current S2 2021 MLS report, December 2021	11
Figure 4: Evolution of projects and budgets covered by the MLS in SLC, December 2021	13
Figure 5: EUTF SLC contracted projects by budget and implementation status, December 2021	14
Figure 6: Budget distribution by country and implementing partner, December 2021	15
Figure 7: Contracted budget breakdown by Strategic Objectives, December 2021	16
Figure 8: Budget allocated to the COVID-19 response in the SLC, December 2021	17
Figure 9: Main achievements of EUTF-funded programmes in 2021, December 2021	19
Figure 10: Strategic Objective 1 dashboard, SLC, December 2021	21
Figure 11: NEET rates, SLC, 2022	24
Figure 12: Female to male labour force participation rates, SLC, 2022	24
Figure 13: Strategic Objective 2 dashboard, SLC, December 2021	27
Figure 14: Estimated food insecure population during the 2021 lean season (June-August)	29
Figure 15: Strategic Objective 3 dashboard, SLC, December 2021	35
Figure 16: Strategic Objective 4 dashboard, SLC, December 2021	39
Figure 17: COVID-19, key facts and figures dashboard, SLC, December 2021	45
Figure 18: Burkina Faso – Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021	49
Figure 19: EUTF portfolio in Burkina Faso, December 2021	50
Figure 20: Selected EUTF outputs in Burkina Faso, December 2021	51

Figure 21: EUTF indicator 2.4, in Burkina Faso, December 2021	52
Figure 22: EUTF indicator 3.2, in Burkina Faso, December 2021	55
Figure 23: Cameroon – Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021	57
Figure 24: EUTF portfolio in Cameroon, December 2021	58
Figure 25: Selected EUTF outputs in Cameroon, December 2021	59
Figure 26: EUTF indicator 1.2, in Cameroon, December 2021	60
Figure 27: EUTF indicator 3.5 bis, in Cameroon, December 2021	61
Figure 28: Chad – Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021	62
Figure 29: EUTF portfolio in Chad, December 2021	63
Figure 30: Selected EUTF outputs in Chad, December 2021	64
Figure 31: EUTF indicator 1.3, in Chad, December 2021	65
Figure 32: EUTF indicator 4.2, in Chad, December 2021	67
Figure 33: EUTF indicator 2.2, in Chad, December 2021	68
Figure 34: Côte d'Ivoire – Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021	70
Figure 35: EUTF portfolio in Côte d'Ivoire, December 2021	71
Figure 36 : Selected EUTF outputs in Côte d'Ivoire, December 2021	71
Figure 37: EUTF indicator 1.2, in Côte d'Ivoire, December 2021	72
Figure 38: Ghana – Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021	74
Figure 39: EUTF portfolio in Ghana, December 2021	75
Figure 40: Selected EUTF outputs in Ghana, December 2021	76
Figure 41. EUTF indicator 1.4, in Ghana, December 2021	77
Figure 42: Guinea – Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021	79
Figure 43: EUTF portfolio in Guinea, December 2021	80
Figure 44: Selected EUTF outputs in Guinea, December 2021	81
Figure 45: EUTF indicator 2.6, in Guinea, December 2021	82
Figure 46: EUTF indicator 3.2, in Guinea, December 2021	83
Figure 47: EUTF indicator 2.6, in Guinea, December 2021	84
Figure 48: Mali – Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021	86
Figure 49: EUTF portfolio in Mali, December 2021	87
Figure 50 : Situation in Mali and EUTF outputs – as of December 2021	88
Figure 51: EUTF indicator 1.3, in Mali, December 2021	89
Figure 52: EUTF indicator 2.9, in Mali, December 2021	90
Figure 53: Mauritania – Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021	93
Figure 54: EUTF portfolio in Mauritania, December 2021	94
Figure 55: Selected EUTF outputs in Mauritania, December 2021	95
Figure 56. EUTF indicator 1.3, in Mauritania, December 2021	96
Figure 57. EUTF indicator 3.2, in Mauritania, December 2021	98
Figure 58: Niger – Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021	100
Figure 59: EUTF portfolio in Niger, December 2021	101
Figure 60: Selected EUTF outputs in Niger, December 2021	102
Figure 61: EUTF indicator 4.2, in Niger, December 2021	104
Figure 62 : EUTF indicator 1.3, in Niger, December 2021	105
Figure 63: Nigeria – Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021	107
Figure 64: EUTF portfolio in Nigeria, December 2021	108
Figure 65 : Situation in Nigeria and EUTF outputs – as of December 2021	109

Figure 66 : EUTF indicator 6.3, in Nigeria, December 2021	110
Figure 67 : EUTF indicator 1.2, in Nigeria, December 2021	110
Figure 68 : EUTF indicator 4.3, in Nigeria, December 2021	111
Figure 69: Senegal - Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021	113
Figure 70: EUTF portfolio in Senegal, December 2021	114
Figure 71: Figure 72: Selected EUTF outputs in Senegal, December 2021	115
Figure 72: EUTF indicator 1.1, in Senegal, December 2021	116
Figure 73: EUTF indicator 3.2, in Senegal, December 2021	119
Figure 74: The Gambia - Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2021	122
Figure 75: EUTF portfolio in The Gambia, December 2021	123
Figure 76: Selected EUTF outputs in The Gambia, December 2021	124
Figure 77: EUTF indicator 2.6, in The Gambia, December 2021	125
Figure 78: EUTF indicator 3.2, in The Gambia, December 2021	126
Figure 79: Spending of EUTF SLC funds	128

6.3. OUTCOME ANALYSES

Outcome analysis 1: Employment opportunities and IGAs – Aggregated outcome analysis	25
Outcome analysis 2: Resilience of communities, food security – Aggregated outcome analysis	30
Outcome analysis 3: Resilience of communities, malnutrition – Aggregated outcome analysis	31
Outcome analysis 4: Security and governance – Aggregated outcome analysis	43
Outcome analysis 5: Resilience of communities, Burkina Faso – Aggregated outcome analysis	53
Outcome analysis 6: Resilience in rural areas, Senegal – Aggregated outcome analysis	119