THE EUROPEAN UNION EMERGENCY TRUST FUND FOR STABILITY AND ADDRESSING THE ROOT CAUSES OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN AFRICA

T05-EUTF-HOA-SO-46

1. IDENTIFICATION

Title	Enhancing security and the rule of law in Somalia
Total cost	Total estimated cost: EUR 45 million Total amount drawn from the Trust Fund: EUR 45 million
Aid method / Method of implementation	Project Modality Direct Management (grants, procurement of services) Indirect management with international organisations (UN MPTF and/or specific UN agencies).
DAC-code	15210 Security system management and reform 15130 Legal and judicial development

2. RATIONALE AND CONTEXT

2.1. Summary of the action and its objectives

The programme is based on the **fourth objective of the EU Trust Fund**, namely improve governance and conflict prevention. It is also aligned with the **Valletta Action Plan priority domain (1)** on the development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement; and SDG 16: promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels

Ensuring Somalia's continued development and stabilisation requires as prerequisites that security and rule of law are present across the country This is the EU's principal concern for the years to come as it ensures greater protection of both Somali and EU priorities in the country and region; i) short-term stabilisation, longer term economic development, maritime security, international trade, counter terrorism and ii) a gradual and time-bound drawdown of the AMISOM mission and iii) increased capacity by the Somali authorities to counter irregular migration. In the case of the last point, Somalia is, along with Eritrea, the country of origin where most of the migrants arriving in Europe come from within the Horn of Africa.

The **overall objective** of the action is to increase the presence and efficacy of security forces throughout the Federal Member States whilst at the same time connecting this increased law enforcement to a more accessible, reliable and competent justice provision, in order to contribute to fostering a more conducive environment in which Somalia can develop.

The primary beneficiaries will be those individuals who are or who will become police or security officers and/or judiciary personnel as well as those who will benefit from the increased law enforcement and access to justice; men, women, boys and girls. A particular emphasis throughout the implementation of the programme will be on ensuring increased adherence to human rights by all security and justice actors targeted throughout. Ensuring adequate HR standards are present within the corrections sector will be an important component thus ensuring the entire justice chain is being supported.

An increased law enforcement capacity, coupled to access to justice will allow local communities to further develop economically. It will also provide a buffer against Al Shabaab (AS) operations and thus contribute to overall stabilisation of the country. A More efficient and present security forces throughout the country will allow for a gradual drawdown of AMISOM and increased ownership for security provision and law enforcement of and by the Somali security services.

Underpinning these interventions, the programme will also focus on increasing overall security sector governance (SSG) thus increasing the accountability of the security and justice providers, enhancing the line Ministries' and governing bodies' ability to manage their respective entities and allow parliament to play its necessary oversight function.

This programme, while ensuring to reinforce the Federal and State interoperability and political relationship, will have an enhanced geographical focus in order to increase and deepen the EU's impact to security and development in those areas where the needs and/or threats are highest.

This programme is a component of the EU's Development Cooperation Strategy 2017-2020 for Somalia *(Pillar 1: Build effective and sustainable responses to security challenges)* through which an additional €200 million was mobilised from the EDF's reserve as top-up to the EU's National Indicative Programme 2014-2020 and transferred to the EU Trust Fund Horn of Africa.

2.2. Context

2.2.1. Country context

In a context that remains challenging on many fronts, substantial progress has been achieved in the creation of the federal structure: five Federal States have been created Jubaland, South West, Galmudug and Hirshabelle with political discussions continuing regarding the status of Banadir and Mogadishu. Critical parameters of Somalia as a Federal State, including the formula for resource sharing and the articulation of competencies between the respective entities, are still to be defined and enshrined in the Constitution and progress is highly dependent on the establishment of relations of trust between the centre and the periphery. While the consolidation of the FMS will require long term investments, their establishment has already resulted in a multiplication of counterparts outside Mogadishu and in a demand for expansion of the EU's geographical scope.

The goal of holding universal elections in 2016 was not achieved. The abbreviated electoral model was a result of a political agreement between the Federal and regional governments. For the first time in Somali history the electoral process resulted in the formation of an Upper House. Timid parallel work has started for the conduct of universal suffrage in 2020 with the establishment of a National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) as referred to in the draft Constitution, which should gain political acceptance and more autonomy and should develop the future electoral legal framework.

Although some gains have been made in the fight against AS, major set-backs have occurred, and AS has proven to be resilient. AMISOM and Somalia's allies play an important role in providing security; however, increasingly the Somali security sector is being called-on to live-up to its responsibilities. The Somali National Army and Somali Police Forces at Federal and Regional level remain weak and unable to fulfil their role independently and there have been very slow advances in establishing integrated professional Somali security forces. There is broad agreement that the (re)building of security forces is urgent to prepare a take-over from AMISOM, defend the integrity of the country as well as provide much-needed law enforcement.

Progress across all fronts and in all sectors remains fragile and spoilers continue to be effective in reducing and delaying development. Key issues that remain unsolved include i) the presence

and activity of the terrorist organisation Al Shabaab, ii) the clan-dominated nature of Somali politics, iii) the existence of warlords and plethora of militias and armed groups, iv) structural and institutional weaknesses of federal and regional administrations, including issues with their accountability and v) lack of proper fiscal means and overreliance on irregular development aid flows from donors.

Security and the rule of law are two key components needed for sustaining and carrying further the state and peacebuilding process. The existing security is largely ensured by AMISOM presence (due to gradually withdraw from Somalia as from 2018) and its offensive activities in the past years. The Somali National Army and Police - at Federal and Federal Member State level - remain weak and unable to fulfil their role to the expected standards although their capacities and presence is gradually growing. The formal justice system has barely recovered from two decades of neglect, leading Somalis to overwhelmingly rely on the more trusted alternative/traditional forms of justice dispensation systems.

Consequently, the entire country depends on inadequate or very basic security and judicial service providers. The EU's proposed intervention will be based on an analysis of the opportunities which more specific geographic focus provides by assessing whether and where it makes sense to invest more in a joined-up, sequenced and mutually reinforcing manner without undermining the overall Federal project.

2.2.2. Sector context: policies and challenges

Security

The Somali National Army is at present unable to efficiently reduce the threat of Al Shabaab without substantial assistance from AMISOM and other local militias, whilst due to the current absence of large numbers of police forces (except in Mogadishu), local militias and armed groups remain key players in providing law enforcement. Compounding this situation, a high level of violence continues to also occur between clans as a result of inter-clan dynamics and localised political power struggles.

The imbalanced focus over the last decade on a military solution to the AS threat has undermined the strengthening of and key role the police has in a post-conflict state: organised crime (including acts of piracy), remains present and ordinary criminal activity is not being pursued. The police are still not in a position to hold and secure areas recovered from AS and bring peace dividends to the population let alone play its critical role in the criminal justice chain.

The civil war that erupted in the early 1990's led to the virtual collapse of the formal justice system in the Southern parts of Somalia and, to a lesser extent, in Puntland. Its infrastructure was either destroyed or rendered useless, and many legal professionals were killed or left the country. There is a massive absence of human capital throughout the country, with the partial exception of Somaliland.

Policy and operational developments

As per the National Security Policy, Somalia's Security Forces have, amongst others, the following strategic functions: i) safeguard the peace and stability under the civilian oversight of a duly elected leadership, ii) restore and maintain internal security, law and order and counter internal threats and the constitutional order, iii) provide access to justice, dignity and the rule of law, and uphold the human rights of its citizens; and iv) promote confidence and security-building measures.

The 16 April 2017 Political Agreement on the Somali National Security Architecture and subsequent Security Pact (11 May 2017) provide the framework in which the International

Community ought to provide its support to the Somali security sector. Both documents set-out a vision for the various Somali security entities.

Since the adoption of both these strategic documents, the Comprehensive Approach to Security has started to be operationalised through the creation of Work-Strands focusing on: i) AMISOM and its drawdown, ii a) defence, ii b) internal security, iii) stabilisation and iv) P/CVE. The EU is actively engaged across all these Strands (and sub-strands) and assumed the co-Chair of the Internal Security Strand in late August 2017. Two critical pieces of work that will guide the future IC's inputs and support are the National Defence Strategy and the Internal Security Strategy (an interlinked Counter Insurgency Plan is also being developed).

It is against this policy background that support to the police is aimed at implementing the New Police Model (NPM) that was adopted in June 2016 by the National Leadership Forum and was reaffirmed in the above-mentioned Security Pact. The NPM calls for the creation of a two-tier police structure consisting of a Federal Police and Federal Member State Police. It is imperative that structurally and sustainably sound policing functions start being delivered across the FMS in order to meet the plethora of law and order, security challenges and threats. Whilst the Federal Police (SPF) operates within a modicum of inherited procedures and legislation and has a basic functional structure in place it remains very weak in projecting itself as an efficient law enforcement entity and will require significant change management and reform. The FMS police forces, on the other hand, practically do not exist and need to be created from scratch. Throughout the NPM implementation it will remain important to stress the interoperability, coordination and collaboration between the Federal and State Police forces.

Justice & Corrections

Justice in Somalia is provided through a variety of institutions, systems and mechanisms, including formal, customary (Xeer) and religious (Sharia). Evidence suggests that the vast majority of cases are dealt with outside of the formal system through various informal courts, mediators, traditional mechanisms and private arrangements - systems that are regarded as being more legitimate, accessible and trusted than the formal justice system.

The formal justice system has made some progress over the last few years, however, it remains very weak in terms of capacity and geographic reach. Women are particularly marginalised and need a specific focus and attention. The Federal government and Federal Member States are working to put in place a New Justice and Corrections Model based on unified key substantive and procedural laws - the structure and competencies of the Courts, status of prosecutors, the Attorney General's Office and other core judiciary functions are all still under debate. The definition of the Justice Model is also inherently linked to the ongoing Constitutional Review process.

The situation in Somaliland is more mature with a judiciary that is more competent (better staffed, trained and remunerated), a Justice Ministry that has a clear vision and the overall rule of law being respected to a greater degree. The duality between formal and traditional is also present in Somaliland.

An EU-funded action (700k€) aimed at strengthening the interaction between Traditional Justice and Formal Justice only just started (08/2017) and attempts to ensure increased Human Rights adherence and connectivity between both systems. The corrections system, similarly to the justice system, suffered during the two+ decades of civil war. Most correctional facilities are in a very bad state, the custodial corps needs overhauling and treatment and detention situation of inmates/detainees needs to be seriously improved.

Underpinning these sectors, there is a need to promote security sector governance (SSG). Increasing the accountability of the security and justice providers, enhancing the line Ministries' and governing bodies' ability to manage their respective entities is paramount.

2.3. Lessons learnt

<u>General</u>

It is crucial to extend RoL services to recovered areas; the majority of implemented projects have channelled the bulk of their support in key areas such as Mogadishu, Garowe and Hargeisa. Improvements in security conditions and recovery of areas previously controlled by Al Shabaab will provide an opportunity to support the expansion of state institutions.

Strengthen sectoral data and building on a results-based: importance of gathering data, establishing baseline assessments and accurately measuring progress.

<u>Police and security forces</u>

Since 2013 salary top-up payments (stipends) to the Somali Police Force have been a major engagement from the EU, in order to ensure that police officers are adequately compensated for providing security, law and order. However, as regular payments are critical to ensure loyalty, commitment, morale, performance and retention of skilled police officers, the efforts by the Somali government in ensuring that salaries to the security forces are fair and paid on time are crucial and essential. This has not been the case in a consistent manner.

Against this background, a ROM-mission of past police-support (stipend) programmes identified that an increased focus needs to be put on the qualitative/operational aspects of the police receiving financial remuneration. Therefore, in this new programme the EU proposes to specifically work on putting in place the structures required to have sustainable and efficient police forces operating throughout the country, ensuring they receive the adequate training required to carry out basic policing functions as well as increasing the overall security sector governance (cfr accountability and civilian oversight) linked to an active monitoring emphasis - all of which are aimed at enhancing the operational effectiveness of the police.

There exists the need to integrate the cooperation efforts by specifically working on the security sector governance aspects (i.e. accountability, political and civilian oversight). The police need to operate within a more structured and politically effective institutional framework - with the appropriate legislation and procedures being in place. This approach is meant to bring more effectiveness and added value to the significant financial assistance the EU provides to the police.

Tensions exist between the Somali Police Forces (SPF) and Ministry of Internal Security (MoIS) hierarchies on their level of commitment to the NPM provisions, with the SPF showing significant reluctance and the MoIS and FMS being fully in line with the political agreement and NPM provisions. The EU is advocating shifting its emphasis from only supporting the Federal Police to increasing support to FMS police in complementarity to supporting the Federal police. Enhanced policy and political dialogue with Somali police stakeholders will be required throughout the programme implementation to minimise the tensions between Federal and State authorities in this regard.

The ongoing UK (DfID) support to the Jubaland (Kismayoo focus) and Southwest (Baidoa focus) police forces has identified the following issues: i) importance of selecting recruits from locations where they will go back to when fully-fledged police officers (local knowledge and community access), ii) importance of identifying leadership cadre and provide appropriate junior officer training, iii) difficulty of States to mobilise their own revenues makes these

investments medium term in duration until States' revenues are increased sufficiently to assume full financial responsibility.

It is crucial to ensure police presence in areas of displacement as well as areas of return: with more than a million IDPs being subject to international humanitarian law and human rights violations, it is crucial that the State pays special attention to issues of displacement and security, when assuming its responsibility to protect all its citizens.

Regarding maritime policing and coast guard functions, the EU (through EUCAP Somalia) is supporting the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), Puntland and Somaliland to develop a suitable legislative and institutional framework. In this respect, longer term sustainability and impact of the EU's overall strategic level advising, mentoring and training requires parallel efforts on more operational aspects, particularly on infrastructure, equipment and running costs of Maritime Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, where basic institutional frameworks are in place.

Concerning the defence sector, the support provided by different international partners (mainly US, UK, Turkey, EU) to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Somali National Army (SNA) has proven to be crucial to structure and build institutions, to strengthen the chain of command and control, to increase the operational capacity of the troops on the ground and to facilitate the communication between the Ministry and the SNA General Staff. However, due to the fragility of the country and the security challenges that Somalia is facing, building state institutions in a sustainable manner is a long-term process that requires flexibility and adaptability to answer to emerging priorities. The pursuit of the reform of the SNA is critical not least in light of the anticipated AMISOM withdrawal as part of the Transition Plan, yet the Federal Government is limited in its ability to speedily move ahead with further reform initiatives due to the significant financial constraints it encounters.

Justice

Somalis tend to use the customary system first and then turn to the formal justice system only when they cannot reach a resolution under customary law (or to codify an agreement reached prior) - it is still often seen as the "system of last resort." A recent study carried-out in Somaliland, however, identified one group that strongly preferred the formal justice system to the customary system - women - and this because the courts treated them more equally than the customary system.

It is generally recognised that the formal justice sector's main challenges are a combination of lack of trust by the Somali people and considerable political interference which contributes to a lack of independence and considerable presence of corruption. The EU's programme thus needs to ensure that outreach campaigns regarding the service provision by the judiciary are to be present throughout its implementation. Legal aid service is essential for improving access to justice: the provision of legal aid services to disadvantaged groups can be an effective way to achieving concrete results for individuals as well as having a systemic impact on the responses of justice institutions to the needs and demands of disadvantaged groups. Legal aid approaches can also help fulfill broader development goals with acquisition of one right increasing the enjoyment of other rights, including economic and political rights.

Legal aid, for instance, is currently being provided mainly by informal actors (e.g. CSO's). The judiciary is keen to see a rebalancing in the usage of the NGO's/CSO's to the more formal structures (e.g. Bar Association). This programme will thus endeavour to use more, where possible, the formal entities for the implementation of justice provision.

Whilst the JRoL evaluation is not finalised yet, elements to be taken into consideration for the justice sector interventions in Somaliland include: i) the need to focus actions on urban areas

other than Hargeisa, ii) need to include the interaction between formal and informal justice and iii) possibility to focus on areas other than criminal justice (e.g. civil law, contract law, trade law,...).

Implementation issues within the UN's MPTF framework that need to be remedied in the next iteration of the UN's Rule of Law (RoL) programme include: i) achieving an effective balance and allocation of financial resources for service delivery on the one hand and institution building on the other, ii) remaining realistic in expectations management specifically in light of the relative paucity of available funds from the International Community in support of justice & corrections specifically and iii) streamlining and simplifying governance and decision making of the programme.

2.4.   Complementary actions

This intervention builds on the acquired EU experience of working on and in the Somali security and justice sectors for the past several years. A very high EU investment (both financial and technical) has been provided and this programme will build on the achievements made throughout past actions.

The Joint EEAS/COM options paper to expand EU support in the security sector of Somalia provides an overview of EU thinking with regards to a more integrated approach to the various EU inputs into Somalia's security sector. More specifically, the recommended options were to i) expand the EU's direct support to the Police (at federal level and state level), ii) re-focus defence support at the command and control and political strategic level, iii) enhance maritime security efforts around the four main Somali ports as well as Somali Coast Guard and iv) enhance linkages between traditional justice and formal justice chains. This proposed EU programme contributes to all four overall options with a specific weighting in favour of items i) and iv) and will benefit from an enhanced and reinforced collaboration with the EUTM-S and EUCAP-S CSDP missions.

The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) provides some additional support specifically in the area of human rights. The EU has refocused to address the HR-security or HR-justice relationship. The latest Call for Proposal (2.1M€) specifically targets human rights issues for detainees and people in pre-trial detention as well as overall capacity building to the corrections services.

The IcSP will continue to concentrate on key crisis response, conflict prevention and peacebuilding actions, allowing for the EU's approach to an ever-changing security environment to be adapted when relevant. In this respect, the ongoing work to amend the IcSP regulation, paving the way for more active follow-up to Capacity Building for Security and Development (CBSD) projects is worth noting as being a complementary tool, specifically, but not only, linked to the defence sector component of the SSG objective.

The European Development Fund (EDF) Regional Indicative Programme has funding specifically aimed at supporting maritime security in the Horn of Africa and in Somalia specifically on facilitating Somali-Somaliland-International Community discussions on maritime security coordination through the MSCC. Potential new EU initiatives in the maritime domain will need to continue to be framed by the overarching 2013 Somali Maritime Resources and Security Strategy (SMRSS).

The EU's CSDP missions/operations - EUTM-S and EUCAP Somalia - offer useful avenues for enhancing the overall EU's support to the Somali security sector. This requires the proposed EU's programme to be flexible in its approach in order to maximise the EU's integrated approach. This is all the more relevant in light of the Strategic Review exercise that is

reviewing the mandates of the missions and which will be finalised and adopted by EU Member States in early 2018.

DfID (UK) is designing a new security and justice programme: close collaboration and coordination continues to take place in order to maximise both programme objectives and intended activities. The Italian Carabinieri has a considerable Darwish (paramilitary police) training programme based in Djibouti whilst the USA has a relatively large programme in support of the SPF's Criminal Investigation Department. The German government has also recently started to provide new funds in support of the implementation of the new policing model. The UK/USA provides additional support specifically on Counter Terrorism issues to the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) as well as the Attorney General's and Chief Justice Offices. Finally, the long-term IscP's Law Enforcement in the Horn of Africa programme has a specific pillar focused on capacitating the Somali Police Force's Counter Terrorism effectiveness (through its Criminal Investigation Department). DK and NL are contributing significant funds to the building of a brand new Mogadishu Courts and Prison Complex (MCPC) whilst the NL-DK-UK contributed to building a brand new prison in Garowe. Through the JRoL some minor infrastructure works and training for custodial corps personnel has taken place. It has to be recognised there is a considerable imbalance in available funding between support to police and the justice & corrections sectors, the former receiving much more attention than the latter. It is for this reason that justice & corrections pillar of the successor to the Joint Rule of Law Programme (currently in the design stage) will need to be very focused, specific and less ambitious. Donors, at present, likely to provide funds specifically for justice & corrections actions, within or outside the new Rule of Law Programme consist of the UK, USAID, SE, DK, NL.

2.5. Donor co-ordination

The Rule of Law working group is chaired by the Ministry of Justice and co-chaired by the NL and EU and brings together the police, justice and corrections actors in an effort to enhance coherence across the entire justice chain. This working group feeds into the overall strategic discussions that take place within the Somali Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) and the CAS Executive Group; these fora ensure implementation of the National Development Plan and Comprehensive Approach to Security, respectively.

The CAS Executive Group is the operational body which brings together Somali Security and Rule of Law (RoL) Institutions with relevant international partners and the resources they are providing. The aim is to deliver effective and coherent practical support to the institutions and forces that will constitute the agreed National Security Architecture, within the context of the Security Pact. The CAS has several strands, the ones relevant for this progamme being:

Strand 1 - enabling AMISOM

AMISOM FHQ, TCCs, MoD, SNAF, US, EU, UK, TU, UAE, UNSOM.

Strand 2a - defence sector/SNAF

MoD, SNAF, US, EU, UK, IT, TU, UAE, UNSOM, AMISOM FHQ, TCCs and other partners (e.g. DE,)

Strand 2b - Internal Security

MoIS, SPF, NISA, CG, FMS, Federal Parliament, NSA, EU, DE, UK, IT, SE, USA, TU, UAE, UNSOM.

The EU and MoIS co-Chair the Internal Security Strand (2b), EUCAP Somalia co-chairs the Maritime Security sub-strand, Germany co-chairs the Police sub strand and the UK the

intelligence sub-strand. As such, the EU has a very good picture of international support to the various sub-sectors of internal security and is able to ensure its support is fully in line with and does not duplicate other initiatives.

The SDRF has the overall responsibility to coordinate and strategize the support towards the implementation of the NDP and has a direct responsibility to validate and approve the projects funded under the UN Multi Partner Trust Fund Window, which include the UN Joint Rule of Law Programme.

3. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

3.1. Objectives

The **overall objective** of the programme and the **specific objectives** are as follows:

This programme will contribute towards the rebuilding of the justice chain and will specifically focus on its security and justice pillars. Moreover, a reinforced emphasis will be put on creating, where absent, State Police and security Forces as well as fostering greater linkages and exchanges between the formal and informal justice systems. Throughout the programme specific emphasis will be placed on ensuring that the Federal-FMS relationship is reinforced so-as to ensure interoperability and increased collaboration.

Security Sector Governance objective.

The **overall objective** of the SSG pillar is to ensure the responsible security and justice ministries assume greater political control and strategic oversight of their respective security and judiciary agencies and entities.

More **specifically,** this pillar will aim to structurally strengthen the ministries (at their mutual collaboration at Federal and between Federal and State level) through the adoption and application of appropriate procedures and regulations governing human resources, financial management, operational/policy planning etc.

Security forces objective:

The _overall objective_ of the EU's security forces support pillar will be on enhancing the efficiency and capacity of the Somali police and other security forces and ensuring more ~~police~~ presence of Somali security forces within the urban and peri-urban areas of main cities within Somalia.

More specifically, at the federal level the challenge is around structural reform of the existing forces whilst at the state level the State security forces need either to be created and built starting from nothing, or integrated.

Justice & Corrections objective:

The overall objective is to continue building-up a professional, trusted and accessible formal justice and corrections system whilst recognising the role that informal justice mechanisms play in local conflict prevention and resolution.

More specifically the programme will focus on three main pillars: i) learning & development, ii) access to justice and iii) safeguarding the overall rights of detainees. An _additional specific objective_ will be to ensure that the responsible justice ministries/organs assume greater responsibility and oversight thus creating more accountable and efficient systems governing the judiciary and correctional services.

3.2. Expected results and main activities

The expected results are:

SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE

The following results will be targeted:

i) EU's ability to understand and engage with senior Somali governmental officials is strengthened through in-depth and continuous monitoring and strategic analysis;

ii) improving political and civilian oversight and accountability so that the relevant security-related line ministries - Internal Security, Defence, Justice (at FGS and FMS level) - are capacitated to carry-out their full spectrum of responsibilities leading to a more accountable and efficient service provision by the security and justice providers;

iii) enabling legislative and other relevant bodies to exercise an increased control over the security forces.

The main activities of this pillar will be:

i) procurement of early warning capability and strategic analysis including continuous threat and risk assessment regarding the Somali security force's composition and conduct, payment of salaries/stipends, perception of forces and leadership engagement,

ii) training, mentoring and advising as well as providing general capacity building and support to reform processes to the ministries' of Internal Security, Defence and Justice civil servants at Federal and State level where relevant.

iii) build police and judicial structures that are sustainable over time by creating new or reinforcing existing policies, legislative acts, procedures and structures (including human resources, payroll reform, career development, retirement,…).

It will be critical to create a virtuous information loop from the early warning/strategic analysis activity, through the EU to the relevant oversight Ministries and back to their respective security forces as this will strengthen the Ministries' understanding of their security forces, provide a vehicle to address, if relevant, human rights issues as well as inform the EU's geographic focus approach through the provision of continuous threat and risks assessments.

SECURITY FORCES

The following results will be targeted:

i) increase the number and improve the professional level of active Somali police personnel able to operate and carry-out basic, Somali-specific, policing functions,

ii) law enforcement/security presence increased for Somali people living in some of the major urban centres,

iii) improve accountability and oversight of the police by governmental and independent entities,

iv) build efficient and sustainable police structures,

v) increase existing or new maritime police units' capacities operating out of Berbera, Bosasso, Mogadishu and/or Kismayoo,

vi) sustain peace and reconciliation processes at the FMS level,

vii) strengthen the management of the Somali security forces' human resources.

The main *activities* of the EU's intervention in the police/security sector will be:

i) procurement of non-lethal support equipment, including sea-going capability, and infrastructure work (e.g. stations, outposts, uniforms, communication devices, vehicles, handcuffs, Personal Protective Equipment, boats, etc.)

ii) provision of financial remuneration (stipends),

iii) provision of trainings (including leadership), development and mentoring opportunities for security forces.

iv) provision of support for the effective reintegration of security forces.

The EU will also support the further roll-out of maritime police units focusing on the main ports of Somalia where law enforcement infrastructure needs to be upgraded, equipment and sea-going capability provided, maintenance ensured and training for maritime law enforcement agencies delivered. This specific action will draw lessons from the IcSP-funded Mogadishu Maritime Police Unit project.

JUSTICE & CORRECTIONS

The following results will be targeted:

i) ensure and increase the available human capital and knowledge necessary to build a professional and efficient judiciary,

ii) provide avenues for Somalis to access justice services that are framed and governed by an appropriate civil service/Ministry,

iii) increased adherence to national and international standards for detainees.

Interventions supporting justice reform and delivery will be aligned to the level of absorption by relevant institutions across the country, in line with the geographical focus. In any case, the main activities will focus on the following:

a) Legal Learning & Development through the provision of law scholarships and a graduate trainee initiative, encouraging academic distance learning for the Law Faculties, furthering the law training diploma for police, and creation of a law review journal.

b) Access to Justice through the usage of mobile courts, legal aid/legal clinics and judiciary facilities' reconstruction. The interconnectivity between formal justice and alternative dispute resolution will also be fostered.

c) Institution building for the judiciary by fostering the creation and operationalisation of a Bar Association and providing support to legislative/procedural updates.

d) Initiatives aimed specifically aimed at prisoners/detainees as well as individuals in pre-trial detention and focusing on issues such as the right to a fair trial, effective, efficient and professional prosecution services and capability, ensuring separation of women and men (and children) within correctional facilities thereby improving the living conditions of prisoners, (technical/vocational) education for prisoners, anti-torture and illegal detention. Small-scale refurbishment of correctional facilities will also be an activity within this component.

These activities contribute to the implementation of the Somaliland National Development Programme and the strategy of the Somali judiciary.

3.3. Risks and assumptions

Supporting security sector reform and rule of law in Somalia entails significant levels of risk. Mitigating these will require the EU to have a strong M&E system in place which is able to respond rapidly. Adhering to the do no harm principle (utilizing adequate analyses) will be paramount.

The following is a non-exhaustive list of main risks:

Lack of Somali ownership, political will and financial resources: Somali authorities not fully committed to structural reforms and/or adherence to political commitments made. Revenue streams do not increase significantly thus leading to the security and justice sector not being sustainable

Security situation worsens: combined effort to address security situation does not have desired impact and AMISOM draws down too quickly leaving underprepared Somali security forces to deal with a resurgent AS.

Corruption: financial (misuse of programme funds) and political (elite capture).

Human rights abuses: committed by beneficiaries of the EU programme.

State fragmentation 'balkanisation': the EU's programme detrimentally affects the cohesion of the country by creating de facto "mini states" that are disconnected and see no reason to participate in the continued state building and federalisation process.

The assumptions for the success of the project and its implementation include:

This programme is not a "one-off" and the EU continues building-on past achievements with all available instruments at its disposal (political, development, CSDP).

Sustainability: This EU programme (and other international partners) will not solve all the problems and challenges identified. The EU needs to accept that longterm and heavy financial and technical investment into the security and justice sectors will be required.

AMISOM continues to provide operational security until Somali security forces are able to assume responsibility themselves for security conditions on the ground. The EU will continue investing in AMISOM post-2018, however, effective decision-making, implementation, coordination and burden sharing in managing the mission's transition towards a Somali owned security system needs to be put in place.

The **Justice & Corrections Model is transposed, agreed and adopted** within the Constitutional Review process whilst the New Policing Model remains the agreed framework for developing police at Federal and State level.

Closer collaboration and cooperation with other international partners takes place, thus allowing for a better policy dialogue and increased coherence and focus on priorities within the security and justice sector (in the first instance with EUCAP-S and EUTM-S).

A maximum of **flexibility with regards to the implementation modalities** is

approved thus allowing the EU Delegation scope and room for manoeuver when identifying the most appropriate delivery mechanism.

The country does not collapse back into a state of civil war.

Mitigating measures have been considered, including:

The support to the police will allow Federal and Federal Member States to interact and decide on their common key priorities. It can thus be considered as contributing to **trust-building between the two police levels** - allowing for the NPM to be implemented with less risk of the Federal Police derailing the process. Without this measure, the risk of the Federal Police delaying or not receiving support is medium.

The broader support to Somali security forces, especially as regards the integration of regional forces, shall contribute to reconciliation and the stabilisation of the country.

Dialogue, coordination and collaboration on interoperability and issues of mutual concern are discussed within the relevant **working group settings**; Rule of Law working group and the Strand 2b internal security sub-strands.

By facilitating **the deployment of active police officers** on the ground an enhanced operational law enforcement capacity and footprint is provided, thus mitigating to some degree a deterioration of the security situation. This is not solely a policing issue and will also be dependent on other Somali actors such as the SNA and NISA.

The EU, through a different intervention, has a dedicated Third Party Monitoring facility responsible for assessing the entire EU development portfolio. This facility will thus allow the EU to appreciate operational dynamics (including **early warnings on issues pertaining to corruption on financial mismanagement**) and make adjustments where necessary. Without this measure, the risk of the EU not being able to have an overview and understanding of the operational implementation of the programme is low.

EU Delegation personnel (operational and political), through constant interaction with implementing partners and beneficiaries will remain up to date with activity and policy processes. The risk associated to not being able to deploy EU personnel is high.

This programme will **need to build into all components measures aimed at mitigating HR risks (advocacy, monitoring)** as well as components facilitating increased adherence to HR. The EU's co-lead of the Internal Security Strand is a good vehicle through which to reinforce HR-specific issues.

By remaining **politically engaged and supportive of the Federal project**, the balkanisation of the country can be mitigated against.

3.4. Cross-cutting issues

<u>Human Rights</u>

The risk of occurrence of the most serious crimes, inhuman and degrading treatment, torture, death penalty and slavery are considered to be high in Somalia. This is further aggravated by a culture of impunity, whereby perpetrators of gross human rights violations are rarely brought to justice. There is evidence of torture, death penalty, forceful recruitment of child soldiers by Al Shabaab in the parts of the country under its control. The Somali authorities and security forces have been implicated in human rights violations as well, including arbitrary arrest and prolonged pre-trial detention as well as extrajudicial killings. The Federal Government as well as FMS is still applying the death penalty. The situation is aggravated by the use of military courts to trial cases that should fall under the jurisdiction of civilian courts and by little time for appeal between the sentencing and the execution.

Human Rights watchdogs and media reports cite the above-mentioned - the overall trend over the last years has not improved.

<u>Public Financial Management</u>

Somalia is highly vulnerable to external shocks with no capacity nor available fiscal space to absorb these. Despite a gradual increase in domestic revenue collection over the last years, the fiscal space has in fact declined due to increases in recurrent obligations and arrears. Since the vast majority of expenditures are recurrent costs the impact of a shock affects salaries of civil servants and the security forces. The Somali Armed Forces and Police have, over the last years, gone months without salary payments. With the New Policing Model and National Security Architecture calling for 32,000 police concerted efforts need to be made to ensure the EU and other partners' financial support is made sustainable in the medium term. The EU's PFM engagement at Federal and State level need to thus remain intact whilst activities aimed at private sector development and the so-called 'blue economy' need to be stepped-up in order to increase the potential tax base for the Somali authorities.

3.5. Stakeholders

Somali stakeholders (and primary beneficiaries)

- Federal and State Ministries: internal security, justice, defence. Whilst Federal Ministries on the whole are weak in terms of human resources (personnel), planning capacity, procedures and oversight/control of the entities they are responsible for, State Ministries are embryonic at best. Both levels are, however, critical in ensuring sustainable and Somali-owned reform takes place.

- Federal entities: Parliament, Attorney General's Office, Chief Justice. The Federal Parliament has a crucial role in providing oversight and accountability functions towards the Executive and security/justice agencies and entities. It is also critical in passing appropriate updates to existing Laws/Bills and/or passing new ones - its history to date, however, shows that legislating is not a top-priority.

- Security entities: Federal and State ~~Police~~ security forces and Custodial Corps. The Federal Police is the best organised and most recognisable police entity in the country, whilst State police (excepting in Kismayoo and Baidoa) is non-existent. The Federal Police will be instrumental in the coming years in ensuring a modicum of policing takes place within Banadir as well as providing training and specialised support to the State Police. They will have to overcome their reluctance to engage in the NPM implementation. The State Police needs to concentrate on one thing: its creation and the provision of basic policing services. Regional security forces have proven to be a key actor for security and they remain critical for the stability of local areas as underlined in the National Security Architecture and the National Security Policy.

- Somaliland Ministry of justice, Chief Justice (CJ), Attorney General's Office (AGO), and Parliament. The Ministry, CJ and AGO all three are functional and have a very good overview and idea of what the needs are for Somaliland's continued consolidation of the judiciary. The separation of competencies is understood. The Somaliland Parliament has a crucial role in providing oversight and accountability functions towards the Executive and security/justice agencies and entities. It is also critical in passing appropriate updates to existing Laws/Bills and/or passing new ones - its history to date, however, shows that legislating is not a top-priority.

- Somali/Somaliland people with a specific emphasis on IDP's and returnees. As indicated earlier, both the police and judiciary do not benefit from having a high trust factor amongst Somalis. Earning the Somali peoples' trust will only be achieved by providing honest, efficient and professional services. Outreach campaigns could be considered part of overcoming this social contract issue.

International stakeholders (partners)

- EUTM, EUCAP, EUNAVFOR

- EU Member States: UK (FCO, DfID), DE, DK, NL, SE, IT

- Third countries: USA, TU, UAE

- Third parties: UNSOM, AMISOM

4. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

4.1. Financing agreement

No Financing agreement foreseen.

4.2. Indicative operational implementation period

The implementation period will be 96 months.

4.3. Implementation components and modules

Security Sector Governance

The majority of the components of the Security Sector Governance will be through procurement of services.

Usage of the Capacity Injection Mechanism (UNDP) will be reserved for targeted civil servants support within the MoD and MoIS (Federal & State level). This mechanism is the accepted channel through which civil servants reform and support takes place.

Security forces and Justice

Both the justice and police components will be framed by the new UN Joint Rule of Law Programme (JROL2) and a large component of this programme will be channelled through the UN MPTF.

Usage of the UN Multi Partner Trust Fund is proposed as it is identified in the "New Partnership Framework for Mutual Accountability and Accelerated Progress" as being one of the priority channels for funding the Somali National Development Plan and is the privileged channel for funding Joint Programmes. This modality is also proposed because the MPTF has proved to be, so far, an appropriate mechanism to fund the current UN Joint Rule of Law Programme. The choice of working through the UN JROL Programme is determined by their capacity to ensure a coherent approach across the country, their increased reach beyond Mogadishu, Hargeisa and Garowe, and their capacity to mobilise relevant expertise and support the delivery of services.

If, after careful EUDEL analysis, the UN MPTF implementation mechanism proves not to be satisfactory in terms of cost/benefit, reporting and timely achievement of results (through past & existing Joint Programme evaluations), a part of the above mentioned activities may be implemented through direct management/grants.

A significant proportion of the intended police activities will be implemented by UNOPS (either through the MPTF or directly to UNOPS) with reporting lines, coordination and collaboration being assured to the JROL2. This option is proposed based on discussions between the EU, the UN, the FGS/FMS, the UK and other interested donors geared to set up a Police support project. The project activities, which reflect what is proposed in this document, would be implemented by UNOPS.

Other activities related to supporting security forces that cannot be supported through existing UN MPTF programmes will be implemented through UNOPS given the organisation's

longstanding experience in the security sector and its well-established procedures to answer to emerging needs in a flexible and reactive way.

Monitoring, audit and evaluation will be through procurement of services.

4.4. Indicative budget

Component	Amount in EUR
1. Security Sector Governance	7,000,000
2. Security forces support	25,000,000
3. Justice and corrections support	12,000,000
4. Monitoring, audit and evaluation	1,000,000
Total	**45.000.000**

4.5. Evaluation and audit

Monitoring will be a continuous task carried-out by the EU Delegation to Somalia, as well as by the various implementing partners.

A mid-term and final evaluation will be carried out for this action via independent consultants contracted by the European Commission and in association with Somali counterparts, notably the Ministry of Planning and International Development and relevant line ministries.

The mid-term evaluation will be carried out for learning purposes, in particular with respect to ensuring that the various implementing partners adapt their strategies and improve the implementation of the remaining actions until the end of the project.

The final evaluation will be carried out for accountability and learning purposes at various levels (including for policy revision), taking into account in particular the fact that for some beneficiaries support from this action might be their first received, the geographic location of the actions will be different from previous times (with an increased security risk) and some actions are innovative.

The Commission shall inform the implementing partner(s) at least one month in advance of the dates foreseen for the evaluation missions. The implementing partner(s) shall collaborate efficiently and effectively with the evaluation experts, and inter alia provide them with all necessary information and documentation, as well as access to the project premises and activities.

The evaluation reports shall be shared with the Somali authorities and other key stakeholders. The implementing partner and the Commission shall analyse the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluations and, where appropriate, in agreement with the partner country, jointly decide on the follow-up actions to be taken and any adjustments necessary, including, if indicated, the reorientation of the project.

If necessary, ad hoc audits or expenditure verification assignments could be contracted by the European Commission for one or several contracts or agreements. Evaluation and audit assignments will be implemented through service contracts, making use of one of the

Commission's dedicated framework contracts or alternatively through the competitive negotiated procedure or the single tender procedure.

Without prejudice to the obligations applicable to contracts concluded for the implementation of this action, the Commission may, on the basis of a risk assessment, contract independent audits or expenditure verification assignments for one or several contracts or agreements.

All projects implementing this action will have to integrate the EUTF Monitoring and Learning System - MLS (T05-EUTF-HOA-REG-28) for the reporting of selected output and outcome indicators, as well as to take part in case study exercises and the learning strategy developed by the MLS. The project implementing partners will be requested to provide regular (at least quarterly) data to the MLS in a specific format, which will be introduced during the contract negotiation stage.

The projects implementing this action will at least have to report against a selected number of the EUTF output indicators existing at the present date (see list in annex). The monitoring of these indicators will therefore have to be included in the projects' M&E systems (in addition to all other indicators existing in the project's logical framework). As more output and outcome indicators are being developed by the MLS, the projects might be requested to include additional indicators in the course of implementation of the action.

4.6. Communication and visibility

Communication and visibility of the EU is a legal obligation for all external actions funded by the EU. This action shall contain communication and visibility measures, which shall be based on a specific Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action (CVPA), to be elaborated at the beginning of the action.

In terms of legal obligations on communication and visibility, the measures shall be implemented by implementing partners for their specific components in line with the CVPA. Appropriate contractual obligations shall be entered into the Agreements concluded by the Commission with the entrusted entity. The Communication and Visibility Manual for European External Action shall be used to establish the Communication and Visibility Plan of the Action and the appropriate contractual obligations.

The external/public-facing Akvo on-line reporting platform will be used to communicate and report on this action as well as on all projects implementing this action. It will link directly to the EUTF website. The logical frameworks of the projects will be encoded in their respective Akvo page and regular reporting of project's activities and outputs will take place on this platform.

Communication and visibility will be built into the various programme components and will be agreed between the EU and implementing partner. The EU Delegation is putting in place a dedicated communications facility with a third party which will also be used as vehicle to communicate on this programme.

Social media platform (e.g. Twitter) as well as press communiqués will also be used throughout.

Annex I: Mapping against EUTF strategic priorities, Valletta Action Plan and UN SDGs

EU Trust Fund Strategy	Valletta Action Plan	United Nations Sustainable Development Goals
Four main areas of intervention	**Five priority domains, and 16 initiatives**	**17 goals**

1) Greater economic and employment opportunities
 	
2) Strengthening resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable, as well as refugees and displaced people
 	
3) Improved migration management in countries of origin and transit
 	
4) Improved governance and conflict prevention, and reduction of forced displacement and irregular migration
	1) Development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement
	   1. enhance employment opportunities and revenue generating activities
	   2. link relief, rehabilitation and development in peripheral and most vulnerable areas
	   3. operationalise the African Institute on Remittances
	   4. facilitate responsible private investment and boost trade
	
	2) Legal migration and mobility
	   5. double the number of Erasmus scholarships
	   6. pool offers for legal migration
	   7. organise workshops on visa facilitation
	
	3) Protection and asylum
	   8. Regional Development and Protection Programmes
	   9. improve the quality of the asylum process
	   10. improve resilience, safety and self-reliance of refugees in camps and host communities
	
	4) Prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking of human beings
	   11. national and regional anti-smuggling and anti-trafficking legislation policies and action plans
	   12. strengthen institutional capacity to fight smuggling and trafficking
	   13. pilot project in Niger
	   14. information campaigns
	
	5) Return, readmission and reintegration
	   15. strengthen capacity of countries of origin to respond to readmission applications
	   16. support reintegration of returnees into their communities
		1) End poverty in all its forms everywhere
		2) End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture
		3) Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages
		4) Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all
		5) Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
		6) Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all
		7) Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all
		8) Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all
		9) Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation
		10) Reduce inequality within and among countries
		11) Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable
		12) Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns
		13) Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts
		14) Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development
		15) Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss
		16) Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels
		17) Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development

	Results chain:	Indicators	Baselines (incl. reference year)	Targets (incl. reference year)	Sources and means of verification	Assumptions
Overall objective: Impact	Somalia is more secure, peaceful and stable.	• Fragile States Index (FSI)** • Mo Ibrahim Index (MII) on African Governance** • Corruption Perception Index (TII)** • Global Peace Index (GPI)** • Average Rule of Law score as measured by the Worldwide Governance Index (EU Results FW, level 1 #4) • Number of violent deaths per 100,000 (EU Results FW, level 1 #7)	FSI Rank 2/178 (2017) MII Rank 54/54 (2016) CPI Rank 176/176 (2016) GPI Rank 158/163 (2016)	Overall improvement on all indices by end of 2022	FSI: www.fundforpeace.org MII: www.moibrahimfoundation.org/iiag TII: http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview GPI: http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/indexes/global-peace-index	

| Specific Objective(s): Outcome(s) | Outcome 1: Security is enhanced through provision of increased efficient and professional security forces. | • Number of active police personnel in FMS police forces (gender disaggregated) (EU Results FW, level 2 #3)
• Number of active police personnel in SPF (gender disaggregated) (EU Results FW, level 2 #3)
• Number of reports on human rights violations by the Somali security forces followed up with proper procedures
• Number of police officers having followed legal and/or HR training (EU Results FW, level 2 #3)
• Number of police infrastructure improvements
• Number of police officers who received basic policing (non-lethal) equipment
• Number of regional forces integrated
• Number of armed groups demobilized & integrated into the SSF
• Number of regional forces having followed trainings | Operational Readiness Assessment 7,000

tbd

tbd

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a | 500 per FMS by 2022 (tbc)

Decrease to 6,000 for SPF by 2022

tbd

All new recruits (tbd)

Per FMS: 2

All new recruits (tbd)

5.000 regional forces integrated by 2022 | AMISOM reports

FMS MoIS reports

Implementing partner reports

M&E reports

Updated RoL Perception surveys

CSO Monitoring data

Press statements/media reports

Official reports submitted to Parliament(s) by State institutions

Annual financial reports from Govt to Parl

FGS and NIC reports, third party monitoring

FGS biometric database, possibly confirmed by UNOPS registration | International partners coordinate and collaborate very closely

FMS/FGS authorities and police remain committed to NPM implementation

Effective political dialogue between FGS and FMS; progress on reconciliation processes |

	Outcome 2: Citizens are increasingly able to access a more professional, impartial and capable formal and informal justice system	• Nr of people who bring their cases before court (formal and TDR) disaggregated by sex • Nr of cases adjudicated (and percentage to the total) • Nr of mobile courts deployed, including number of cases heard and sentence passed (gender disaggregated) • Nr of persons who received legal aid – gender disaggregated (EU Results FW, level 2 #3) • Nr of RoL infrastructure upgrades / built • Nr of Somalis going into the legal scholarship programme (gender disaggregated) • Nr of procedural and operational documents (e.g. manuals, rules of procedures) developed in Parliaments • Law graduates going into the justice sector • Nr of referrals from non-state to state justice actors for crimes such as rape, SGBV and murder • Nr of publications of Law Journal	Current Joint Rule of Law programme ends in 1st quarter of 2018: all baselines to be established at that time	Quantitative Improvement on all baselines – tbd per specific component prior to next implementation period start	JROL reports Implementing partner status reports. Official reports submitted to Parliament(s) by State institutions CSO Monitoring data M&E reports Somaliland Law Journal launched and actively issued	Cooperation continues and improves between justice chain stakeholders resulting in strengthened and more professional justice sector. TDR and Legal Aid policy are accepted and rolled-out by the Federal and FMS Ministries of Justice. Places of higher education remain able to carry-out their functions. Key pieces of legislation and justice & corrections model adopted. Political will to continue the Constitutional review process remains. Political will and focus on further constitutional development and rule of law.

	Outcome 3: Federal and regional line Ministries are strengthened in areas such civilian oversight, command & control, and organisational development	- Number of trainings (HR management, leadership, policy & planning, budgeting,…) provided to ministries of Defence and Internal Security - Number of civil servants trained - Number of Parliamentary committee (justice, security) hearings - Number of inter-parliamentary workshops/interacti ons (federal- regional) - Increased legislative and oversight role of Parliament			Official parliamentary reports submitted by relevant Committees. New and/or updated pieces of legislation (Police Act, Coast Guard Act, Justice Model, Penal and Civil Code,…)	Good collaboration and cooperation between FGS and FMS

Annex III: EUTF HOA Indicators as part of the Monitoring and Learning System

Annex - List of Output Indicators for the EUTF HoA

EUTF HoA proxy indicators	Disaggregations: type of action								Target groups		
									Gender	Type of beneficiaries	Age group
									Male / Female	Refugees / IDP / Host community / Returnee / Migrant in transit	

1. Greater economic and employment opportunities

1.1	Number of jobs created	Permanent position	Short-term job	Cash for work	Incentives to civil servants	Self-employed	Unspecified				
1.2	Number of job placements facilitated										
1.3	Number of MSMEs supported	Access to finance	Business development	Training	Provision of equipment	Market access	Unspecified			Not relevant	
1.4	Number of people assisted to develop economic income-generating activities	Funding	Business development service	Entrepreneurship programme	Financial education programme	Unspecified					
1.5	Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) and/or skills development	Professional training	Skill development scheme	Internship/Apprenticeship	Unspecified						
1.6	Number of industrial zone and business infrastructure created, expanded or improved									Not relevant	

2. Strengthening resilience

2.1	Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	Health	Education	Water	Sanitation	Housing	Domestic energy	Legal	Unspecified	Not relevant	
2.2	Number of people receiving one basic social service	Health	Education	Water	Sanitation	Housing	Domestic energy	Legal	Nutrition	Unspecified	
2.3	Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	Social protection schemes	Technical training in agricultural practices	Support to agricultural production	Agricultural inputs	Land development	Unspecified				
2.4	Number of people receiving food security related assistance										
2.5	Number of local governments that adopt and implement local disaster risk reduction strategies									Not relevant	
2.6	Hectares of land benefiting from improved agricultural management	Irrigation	Rehabilitation	Improved Management	Unspecified					Not relevant	

3. Improving Migration Management

3.1	Number of projects by diaspora members									Not relevant	
3.2	Number of migrants in transit protected or assisted	Protection measures	Medical and psycho-social assistance	Shelter	Food	Legal assistance	Unspecified				
3.3	Number of migrants, or potential migrants, reached out by information campaign on migration and risks linked to irregular migration										
3.4	Number of voluntary returns or humanitarian repatriation supported	Transportation	Pre-departures counselling	Assistance to obtain travel documents	Return ticket	Travel escorts	Assistance upon arrival			Not relevant / Not relevant	
3.5	Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration packages	Used for income-generating activities	Used for medical assistance	Used for education	Used for housing support	Unspecified					
3.6	Number of refugees and forcibly displaced persons benefiting from a legal integration process									Not relevant	
3.7	Number of institutions (national and local) and Non-State actors directly supported through capacity building on migration management	Capacity building	Operational support	Unspecified						Not relevant	
3.7 bis	Number of individuals trained on migration management	State actors	Non State actors							Not relevant	
3.8	Number of early warning systems created									Not relevant	

4. Improved governance

4.1	Number of staff from governmental institutions and internal security forces trained	Ministry workers	Judges	Justice actors	Policemen	National guards	Unspecified				
4.1 bis	Number of institutions and no n-State actors benefiting from capacity building on security, conflict prevention and human rights	Capacity building	Operational support	Unspecified						Not relevant	
4.2	Number of people participating in conflict prevention and peace building activities	Community dialogue	Civilian mediation	Peacebuilding actions	Awareness raising activities	Unspecified					
4.3	Number of victims of trafficking, assisted or referred to assistance services	Medical assistance	Psycho-social assistance	Counselling	Accommodation	Legal counselling	Family tracing	Support to travel documents	Assistance to voluntary return / Unspecified		
4.4	Number of cross-border cooperation initiatives created / launched or supported									Not relevant	
4.5	Number of strategies, policies and plans developed and/or directly supported	Geographical scope			Nature of the output			Type of support		Not relevant	
4.6	Number of refugees benefiting from an Out-of-Camp									Not relevant	

CROSS-CUTTING

5.1	Number of multi-stakeholders groups and learning	Type of actors			Goal of the group/platform					Not relevant	
5.2	Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up, implemented and / or strengthened	Studies	Needs assessments	Market/skills assessments	Reporting and statistics systems	Unspecified				Not relevant	