



EUTF Monitoring and Learning System SLC

S1 2023 REPORT

COVERING UNTIL 30 JUNE 2023

Altai Consulting for the European Union – December 2023



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the European Union



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This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union through the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). Its contents are the sole responsibility of Altai Consulting and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report was prepared by Eric Davin, Justine Rubira, Philibert de Mercey, Laetitia Sanchez Incera, Manuel Schädler, Manon Buttarro and Amir Hamdane.

We gratefully thank project staff from the implementing partners who took the time to sit with us and comply with our reporting requirements. We are indebted to:

- COGINTA, Enabel, PMLAL, and Promediation in Burkina Faso;
- IOM in Cameroon;
- AFD, *Caritas Suisse*, Concern Worldwide and GIZ in Chad;
- CIVIPOL in Côte d'Ivoire;
- ICMPD, SNV and UNCDF in Ghana;
- Enabel, GIZ, IOM and ITC in Guinea;
- AFD, European Centre for Electoral Support, GIZ, IFAD, IOM, UNDP and WFP in Mali;
- AECID, *Croix-Rouge Française*, FIIAPP, GRET, ILO, IOM, and OXFAM in Mauritania;
- AFD, African Parks Network, CIVIPOL, CNDH, Enabel, Garkua, Karkara and Wild Africa Conservation (WAC) in Niger;
- British Council, IOM and UNDP in Nigeria;
- AECID, AFD, AICS, CIVIPOL, Enabel, IOM in Senegal;
- Enabel, IOM and ITC in The Gambia;
- ACF, ACH, Camoes, *Caritas Suisse*, *Centre pour le Dialogue Humanitaire*, CIVIPOL, Danish Institute for Human Rights, *Expertise France*, FIIAPP, *Humanité & Inclusion*, Interpol, *Investisseurs & Partenaires*, IOM, IRC, *Office National de l'Eau et l'Assainissement*, *Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie*, OXFAM, PMLAL, Promediation, Red Cross Burkina Faso, Red Cross Spain, Save the Children, Sequa, at the regional level.

We would also like to thank the European Union (EU) Delegations to Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and The Gambia as well as the EUTF team in Brussels.

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
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the twelfth report prepared by the Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) for the Sahel and Lake Chad window, covering all outputs achieved through funding from the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced people in Africa (EUTF) in the Sahel and Lake Chad (SLC) region, from the start of activities until 30 June 2023, with a specific focus on outputs generated in the first semester of 2023 (S1 2023).

This report includes outputs from programmes implemented in Burkina Faso, Benin, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, The Gambia and Togo.¹

As of 30 June 2023, the EUTF for Africa had committed² €5.0B (billion), including €2.2B to 114 decisions in the SLC window. A total of 213 operational projects have been contracted in the SLC region, including 142 completed projects, 68 projects in implementation and 3 projects in inception. 65 of the projects currently in implementation have data or other qualitative information to report and 3 are either too early in their implementation phase to be able to report outputs or their activities have not yet generated outputs that are relevant to the EUTF indicators. The current report includes data on 207 projects (equivalent in funding to €2.0B), comprising 142 completed projects, as well as 65 projects in their implementation phase with data to report.

Figure 1: Contracted budget breakdown by country and Strategic Objective, June 2023³



Strategic Objective 1: Greater economic and employment opportunities

In 2023, inflation in West Africa was expected to stabilise at 17.5%.⁴ In response to heightened prices, many countries in the region increased their policy rates, decelerating economic growth. As a result of these economic challenges, the risk of debt distress in West Africa rose⁵, while international discussions about the sovereign debt restructuring architecture continued.⁶

In the first half of 2023, EUTF-funded programmes created or supported 11,087 jobs, most of them in Niger, Guinea and Senegal. Investing in human capital was a major strategy to support job creation. TVET and skills development are key to improve labour productivity. In the first half of 2023, 23,266 people benefitted from TVET and skills development, ranging from formal technical apprenticeships to ad hoc digital financial literacy trainings.

¹ Outputs in Benin, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Togo are collected through regional programmes.
² This refers to funds allocated following decisions by the Operational Committees.
³ Share of budget for projects contracted and relevant to the MLS.
⁴ AfDB, 'West Africa Economic Outlook 2023: Mobilizing Private Sector Financing for Climate and Green Growth', 31 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).
⁵ EBID, 'West African Development Outlook - A mixed bag outlook: debt distress, flagging growth and declining inflation', June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).
⁶ Council on Foreign Relations, 'The Common Framework and Its Discontents', 26 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

Strategic Objective 2: Strengthening the resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable, including refugees and other displaced people

As violence continued to escalate, humanitarian assistance was urgently needed across the Sahel and Lake Chad region during the beginning of 2023. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in 2023, more than 37.7 million people across Burkina Faso, the Extreme North of Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Niger, and northeast Nigeria would require humanitarian life-saving assistance.¹ In addition, the SLC region was grappling with an unprecedented food crisis in the first half of 2023, and it is expected to be persistent throughout the year. From June to August 2023, over 45.2 million people could experience crisis or worse levels of food insecurity and malnutrition, reflecting an 11% increase from the 40.7 million projected for June to August 2022.²

The number of EUTF projects contributing towards SO2 is diminishing, as 69% of projects within this objective were completed by end of S1 2023. Nonetheless, EUTF delivered significant outputs related to resilience, providing improved access to basic social services to 279,725 people (indicator 2.9), food security assistance to 117,942 (indicator 2.4), and nutrition assistance to 151,211 (indicator 2.3), the latter mainly to children under five years old (77%). These results were achieved in 11 countries, but most of the assistance was delivered in Burkina Faso, Mali, Ghana, Niger and Senegal.

Strategic Objective 3: Improved migration management in countries of origin, transit, and destination

During the first half of 2023, West and Central Africa witnessed a surge in internal and cross-border displacements. The UNHCR documented 8.3 million internally displaced people and 1.9 million refugees and asylum-seekers in the region as of 30 June 2023.³ Burkina Faso and Nigeria saw significant rises in internally displaced populations between December 2022 and June 2023, with increases of 180,163 and 411,415 respectively, while Chad's refugee numbers grew by 169,960.⁴ Beyond displacement, the region also continued to be a major departure point for migrants traveling to Europe, with 30,805 individuals from the region illegally crossing Europe's border using routes mainly used by illegal immigrants. The most prevalent were the Central Mediterranean (25,447) and the Atlantic (3,938) routes.⁵

In the first semester of 2023, EUTF funded activities focusing on raising awareness on the risks associated to irregular migration, reaching 2,943,412 people (indicator 3.3). The EUTF supported 420 voluntary returns (indicator 3.4) and the reintegration of 509 returning migrants (indicator 3.5 bis). Since EUTF's launch, 73,215 returning migrants have benefitted from voluntary return assistance (indicator 3.4) and 91,642 from reintegration assistance (indicator 3.5 bis).

Strategic Objective 4: Improved governance, security and conflict prevention

The security crisis in the Sahel and Lake Chad region has been intensifying, with Burkina Faso and Nigeria's Borno State being the most affected by violence in the first half of 2023. The conflicts have also begun to expand to the northern areas of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo. In S1 2023, Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Guinea were governed by military juntas. In addition, the Nigerian

¹ WHO, 'Outbreak and Crisis Response Appeal – The Sahel', January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² *Cadre Harmonisé, 'Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2022 et projetée en juin-août 2022'*, March 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ UNHCR, 'Regional bureau for West and Central Africa: Forcibly displaced and stateless population and trends from 2018-2023'. June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Own calculations comparing UNHCR data from December 2022 and June 2023.

UNHCR, 'Regional Bureau for West and Central Africa: Forcibly displaced and stateless population and trends from 2018-2023'. June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

UNHCR, 'Regional Bureau for West and Central Africa', 31 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Frontex, 'Monitoring and Risk Analysis'. November 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

presidential elections in January 2023 were mired in controversy, leading to widespread public discontent.

In this tense situation, EUTF-funded programmes trained 11,520 people on governance, conflict prevention, and human rights across the Sahel and Lake Chad region (indicator 4.2). A notable achievement this semester was the training of 8,823 people in Mali to support the referendum process (indicator 4.2) which led to the adoption of a new Constitution in June. In addition, 1,397,417 people participated in conflict prevention and human rights activities (indicator 4.3). Lastly, EUTF-funded programmes provided 10,034 pieces of equipment to civilian institutions and security forces, to strengthen governance and security (indicator 4.1 bis).

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND

The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced people in Africa (EUTF for Africa or EUTF) was launched in November 2015. It is composed of three geographical 'windows': 'North Africa' (NoA), 'Horn of Africa' (HoA) and 'Sahel and Lake Chad' (SLC), which includes 12 'main' countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and The Gambia. Neighbouring countries are also eligible for regional programmes. This report includes outputs from programmes implemented in 16 countries: the 12 mentioned above as well as Benin, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Togo.¹

This is the twelfth report prepared by the Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) for the EUTF SLC window, covering all the outputs achieved with EUTF funding in the SLC region, from the start of activities until the end of June 2023, with a specific focus on outputs generated in the first semester of 2023. Previous reports can be found [here](#).

1.2. THE EUTF SLC WINDOW IN 2023

As of end of June 2023, the EUTF had committed (i.e., allocated funds following decisions by the EUTF Operational Committees) €5.0B (billion euros). The SLC window is the first in size in terms of funding, with €2.2B committed across 114 decisions.² There are 213 operational contracts and of interest to the MLS.³ Of these, 142 projects worth €1.3B are completed; 68 projects worth €733M (million) are being implemented; and 3 projects (€32M) are in inception. Out of the 68 projects currently implementing, 65 have data to report.⁴ This report presents data from 207 projects, including 142 completed projects, covering a total contracted amount of €2.0B. As such, it covers two projects and €21M more funding than the previous MLS report, for the second semester of 2022.

Funding and implementation continue to follow the EUTF's four Strategic Objectives⁵ (SOs) and the strategic priorities set by the EUTF Strategic Board and ratified in September 2019 i.e., i) returns and reintegration; ii) refugee management; iii) completing progress on the securitisation of documents and civil registry; iv) anti-trafficking measures; v) essential stabilisation efforts; and vi) migration dialogue.

¹ Outputs in Benin, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Togo are collected through regional programmes and are presented in the overview of results section (4.2) of this report.

² EUTF website. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Projects are considered operational when they deliver outputs to beneficiaries. Administrative projects and non-operational projects (such as projects contracted under the Research and Evidence Facility and the Technical and Cooperation Facility, feasibility studies, audits, etc.) are not included in the analysis.

⁴ Three projects are either too early in their implementation phase to be able to report outputs or their activities did not yet generate outputs that are relevant to the EUTF indicators.

⁵ The four Strategic Objectives (SO) of the EUTF are: SO1 'Greater economic and employment opportunities'; SO2 'Strengthening resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable including refugees and other displaced people', SO3 'Improved migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination' and SO4 'Improved governance and conflict prevention and reduction of forced displacement and irregular migration'.

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1. MLS METHODOLOGY

2.1.1. OUTPUT MONITORING

The Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) team works with each implementing partner (IP) to develop a reporting system that allows the MLS to collect the most detailed and granular level of data common to all IPs. To that end, the MLS has developed a reporting template that it uses with most IPs, although the reporting template is tailored to each project through a drafting and feedback process with respective IPs. Given the complexity and diversity of the EUTF portfolio, and the fact that IPs and M&E systems have different resources, limitations and capacities, the MLS tries to offer as much flexibility as possible with regard to the quantity, disaggregation and format of data collected from IPs.

The MLS then aggregates the collected data using a standardised methodology (and later disaggregates it again along various lines of analysis for reporting). This approach allows the MLS to help IPs map their own activities and outputs against the list of EUTF common output indicators and to have access to a finer level of disaggregation (e.g., by gender, beneficiary type, location, etc.). It also gives the MLS significant flexibility in changing the way data is analysed or presented as needed.

Based on the information received, the MLS team completes output indicator mappings for each project, collects the relevant data from each IP, checks the data for quality and enters it into the MLS database for aggregation, further quality checking and analysis.

During the S1 2020 reporting period, the EUTF revised its common output indicators and their respective methodologies. The resulting revisions have been formalised through a set of methodological notes, which can be found in the annexes to the S1 2020 report. For more information about this process, please see the S1 2020 report.

2.1.2. OUTCOME ANALYSIS

In addition to output monitoring, the EUTF MLS started to include project- and programme-level outcome analysis in S2 2020 in the form of focus boxes for certain completed projects. As explained in previous reports as well as in this [MLS methodological note](#), aggregating outcome data for the EUTF portfolio is not possible in the way that it is for output data, because there are no common and standardised EUTF outcome indicators. This means that no methodologically harmonised outcome data has been collected by EUTF projects, without which comprehensive and meaningful outcome analysis is impossible. Therefore, it was agreed that the MLS would not undertake a comprehensive quantitative aggregation of outcome indicators across projects.

However, as part of the MLS's broader efforts to assess potential large-scale changes effected by the EUTF in its areas of implementation, in March 2022, the team conducted a review of all outcome indicators reported on by projects which had completed before July 2021¹, to assess whether partial aggregation could be feasible in some cases, and if limited conclusions could be drawn about the potential outcomes of the EUTF portfolio beyond specific projects and programmes.

A total of 56 projects that ended before S2 2021 in the SLC window were assessed as part of this exercise.² Out of these 56, 35 projects had shared a final evaluation report with the MLS team. The

¹ According to EUTF directives, projects are required to deliver their final report no later than six months after the end of their project, hence the choice of this deadline for the inclusion of projects in the study. It should be noted, however, that the lack of a final report after this deadline may be due to a number of factors, including the possibility that reports were not made available to the MLS team.

² See footnote 1.

remaining 21 projects were either not relevant for a final evaluation, pending a final evaluation because they had recently ended, were part of a programme which was still ongoing, or did not make the documents available to the MLS team. Collectively, these projects reported on 514 outcome and impact indicators, of which 370 were categorised by the MLS to be 'true' outcomes indicators.¹ Among those, 313 indicators were assessed by the team to be SMART.² Combining results in initial SLC and HoA analysis, 33 common outcome indicator categories were identified. Twenty of these were relevant to outcomes mapped under SLC projects.

However, while categories allow to group indicators in batches of similar expected outcomes, the way indicators are measured or defined often prevents aggregation. Even in cases where outcome indicators are exactly equivalent, aggregated values cannot be weighted or calculated without knowing the relevant population or sample size. Furthermore, limitations in the quality and availability of project indicator descriptions and data negatively affect their aggregation potential. In many cases, indicators measured at baseline were not measured again at endline (or vice versa), or the endline evaluation collected data for a similar but incomparable indicator to the one used at baseline.

As such, it is only possible to aggregate a limited number of indicators across EUTF projects, and even in these cases methodological limitations and caveats must be considered. These aggregable indicators were then analysed in the SO sections of the 2021 annual report, and these analyses will be continually revised in future annual reports (as a critical mass of additional completed projects are required before the aggregated data can be significantly updated). Project-specific outcome analyses continue to be included as focus boxes in their respective country sections.

2.2. CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS IN THE S1 2023 REPORT

During the implementation of the methodological changes, some projects were unable to provide the additional disaggregation requested. In these cases, data was included under the 'unspecified' category in the MLS analyses. Others lacked data for the newly created indicators. Significant cases of this include:

- Due to the methodological changes to the common output indicators performed in S1 2020, not all previously gathered GIZ data could be transferred to the changed system. Therefore, the GIZ data included in this report is not complete and numbers may differ from earlier reports.³
- For completed projects where IPs could no longer be contacted, the MLS team has applied only those methodological changes that were feasible without consultation, taking as reference project documents such as final evaluations.

Data for S1 2023 was received from all projects for which it was expected, except for the following:⁴

- *Etat Civil GN* (GN-05-01), G5 Law Compliance (REG-23-02), POC Mali (ML-13-01), PARSEC EF (ML-06-02), DESERT (NE-11-03), PASREP (NE-12-01), *Stabilisation ESO Niger* (NE-06-07), AJUSEN CENTIF (NE-06-04), TUUMA (BF-06-01) did not send data this semester.

Finally, it is important to note that as projects are closing, they compile their total outputs and oftentimes do a complete revision of their data. They sometimes ask the MLS to correct past data over the whole lifetime of the project. The full list of corrections impacting data reported in past MLS reports is provided in Annex 6. This semester, large corrections were introduced by the EU-IOM Joint Initiative, for all its programmes, and *TEH Golfe de Guinée*.

¹ See footnote 2.

² Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, and Time-bound.

³ However, historical data for all projects was retroactively adapted to the methodological changes, whenever possible, and therefore data provided within the same report is comparable, even across reporting periods.


⁴ We estimate missing data for projects that have not been able to report on conducted activities would have contributed to less than 8% of the 6,000 data points collected for S2 2021. Missing data for this semester will as much as possible be gathered for the next report.

3. PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW

3.1. BUDGET AND NUMBER OF CONTRACTS BY STATUS

As of June 2023, the EUTF for Africa had committed €5.0B, including €2.2B across 114 decisions in the Sahel and Lake Chad window, of which a total of €2.1B had been contracted to 213 operational projects.¹ The 213 contracted operational projects include 3 projects in their inception phase, 3 projects in their early implementation phase, with no data to report to the MLS yet, 65 projects in their implementation phase and with data to report and 142 completed projects. The current report includes data on 207 projects (equivalent in funding to €2.1B), comprising 142 completed projects as well as 65 projects in their implementation phase and with data to report.

Figure 2: Projects and budget covered by the yearly 2022 MLS report, June 2023



Since the publication of the previous report, the following projects have been added to the MLS database and to this report:


Table 1: Projects newly added to the MLS for the S1 2023 report, June 2023

Country	Programme Name	EUTF ID	Project Name	Lead IP	EUTF Budget
Mali	<i>Programme de soutien à la transition en République du Mali</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-ML-14-01	<i>Projet d'appui aux réformes et aux élections au Mali (2021-2023)</i>	UNDP	€ 15,000,000
Mali	<i>Programme de soutien à la transition en République du Mali</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-ML-14-12	<i>Résilience et développement durable sur la bande agropastorale au Mali</i>	WFP	€ 12,500,000

The graph below represents the evolution in the number of EUTF contracted operational projects as well as the number of projects included in the MLS reports, together with the corresponding funding amounts. Between January and June 2023, the two projects listed above were newly included in the MLS database. This represents an increase of €21M in funding covered by the MLS SLC reports.

¹ The 217 projects include only 'operational' projects: 129 projects worth approximately €65M and considered 'non-operational' are excluded from the overall analysis. They are mostly evaluations and audits, air services, mappings and plans, reports, communications and events.


Figure 3: Evolution of projects and budgets covered by the MLS in SLC, June 2023¹



The below graph shows the 214 contracted operational projects by budget, lifespan, and status of implementation. The graph uses shortened programme names for the sake of clarity. Budgets refer solely to the EUTF contribution. The length of the bars represents the lifespan of the project and the height/width the EUTF budget per project. The colour of the bars indicates the status of the project. Dates of completion are considered as of October 2023.

¹ In 2020, the MLS shifted from a quarterly to a biannual reporting schedule, initially to accommodate methodological changes process, and later to make room for other complementary work streams that aim to support the EUTF and the EU in the medium- to long-term future.


Figure 4: EUTF SLC contracted projects by budget and implementation status, October 2023



3.2. BUDGET DISTRIBUTION BY COUNTRY, IMPLEMENTING PARTNER AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

As of June 2023, regional projects collectively represented the largest amount of contracted EUTF funding. A total of €602.0M (or 29% of the total) were contracted to 55 projects at the regional level. At the country level, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso have the largest portfolios, with respective budgets of €293.7M (14%), €288.4M (14%), and €190.8M (9%).

Figure 5: Budget distribution by country and implementing partner, June 2023^{1,2}



The EUTF SLC budget for operational contracted projects remains largely managed by member state agencies (€893.7M, or 43% of the budget), as well as United Nations (UN) agencies, funds, and programmes (€442.1M, or 22%). Projects managed by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) represent 19% of the total budget, amounting to €395.7M. Recipient countries' governments directly receive 12% (or €239.8M) of the budget, mostly in the form of budget support actions, followed by international organisations and the private sector to a lesser extent, with 3% and 1% of the budget, respectively €69.2M and €24.6M.³

With regards to Strategic Objectives (SO), security and governance activities (SO4) receive the largest share of budget at 33% (€692.1M). SO4 is the main priority in Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Mali, Niger, and

¹ The map shows the distribution of the combined SLC budget (€2.06B) for the 218 operational projects, per country.

² 'New' refers to projects newly added to the MLS for the S1 2023 report.

³ For many contracts, parts of the budgets are subcontracted by IPs (including member state agencies and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes) at least in part to NGOs and CSOs.


Mauritania, where it accounts for 69%, 56%, 49%, 42%, and 36% of the budget, respectively. Projects in Mali, followed by regional projects and projects in Burkina Faso receive the largest amount of funding for SO4, with respectively €141.3M, €135.6M, and €132.4M dedicated to these activities.

Resilience building (SO2) represents 26% of the EUTF funds in the SLC window (€534.3M) and is particularly significant in Chad and Cameroon as well as among regional projects (where it accounts for 73%, 50% and 36% of the budget, respectively). Regional projects dedicated to SO2 represent €215.1M, followed by Mali (€90M), Chad (€83.6M) and Nigeria (€39.6M).

Economic and employment opportunities (SO1) are supported by 23% (or €472.6M) of the EUTF SLC budget. These types of activities are particularly important in West African coastal countries such as The Gambia (90% of the total funds for this country), Côte d'Ivoire (83%), Guinea (82%), Ghana (80%) and Senegal (56%). In absolute numbers, the countries with the largest amount of funding dedicated to SO1 are Senegal with €92.2M and Niger with €88.9M.

Finally, migration management (SO3) represents another 18% (€366.3M) of total EUTF funding in SLC. SO3 is funded primarily through regional programmes, which represent €210.3M. National country programmes dedicated to SO3 are prevalent in Niger (€53.9M) and Senegal (€27.9M).

Figure 6: Contracted budget breakdown by Strategic Objective, June 2023¹



¹ Share of budget for projects contracted and relevant to the MLS.

4. SITUATION AND RESULTS OVERVIEW

4.1. THE SAHEL AND LAKE CHAD REGION IN S1 2023

The security crisis in the Sahel has been escalating since early 2011, when violence began in northern Mali following the Libyan civil war. Initially confined to northern Mali, the conflict then spread to Burkina Faso, Niger, and spilled over across the border into Nigeria. Violent conflict in the region involves a broad range of actors, affiliated to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. More recently, the conflict has started to expand to the northern regions of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo.¹

In the first half of 2023, Burkina Faso and Borno State in Nigeria remained epicentres of jihadist violence. In Burkina Faso, the first semester of 2023 was the deadliest since the conflict's onset: the number of casualties from violent events more than doubled in S1 2023 compared to S2 2022.² In Nigeria, although attacks on civilian and government forces decreased, the fighting between two jihadist factions – Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad* (JAS) – intensified, leading to large population displacements.³

Moreover, several countries in the Sahel shifted their approach to counterterrorism, distancing themselves from France and other European countries. In January 2023, Burkina Faso formally requested the withdrawal of French troops from its territory.⁴ By the end of February, the withdrawal process was completed.⁵ Likewise, in Mali, the Junta demanded the immediate withdrawal of MINUSMA from its territory⁶, raising questions about the future development of the conflict in the region. At the same time, both countries have fostered ties with Russia, receiving security assistance, diplomatic backing and information operations support from Russia.⁷

Armed conflict directly fed into the ongoing displacement crisis in West and Central Africa, which continued to face rising number of IDPs and refugees. As of June 2023, UNHCR recorded 8.3 million IDPs, most of them in Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and Cameroon, and 1.9 million refugees and asylum seekers, mainly in Chad, Cameroon, and Niger.⁸ In S1 2023, the conflict in Sudan triggered an estimated refugee movement of 230,000 people into eastern Chad.⁹ In Burkina Faso, the number of IDPs increased in the first half of the year to 2.1 million, meaning that 9.1% of the country's population are displaced.¹⁰

Human development has significantly deteriorated in the Sahel and Lake Chad region since the onset of the conflict. Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Chad are in the bottom ten countries of the Human Development Index¹¹, having fallen by more than 20 spots from their ranks in 2010 (Burkina Faso from 161st to 184th, Mali from 160th to 186th, Niger from 167th to 189th, Chad from 163rd to 190th).¹²

In the first half of 2023, high food prices contributed significantly to increasing levels of food insecurity. The African Development Bank (AfDB) estimated that inflation in West Africa would reach

¹ ODI, 'The Sahel Conflict: economic & security spillovers on West Africa', April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² ACLED, ACLED Dashboard, consulted in November 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ ICG, 'Fighting among Boko Haram Splinters Rages On', 30 May 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ RFI, 'Le Burkina Faso confirme avoir demandé le départ des troupes françaises', 23 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ RFI, 'Les opérations des troupes françaises au Burkina Faso sont officiellement terminées', 20 February 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ France 24, 'Le Mali réclame le retrait immédiat de la MINUSMA, la mission de l'ONU', 16 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 'Russia's Growing Footprint in Africa's Sahel Region', 28 February 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ UNHCR, 'Regional bureau for West and Central Africa: Forcibly displaced and stateless population and trends from 2018-2023', June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ UNHCR, 'Emergency Situation in Chad: Update on arrivals from Sudan', 1 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ UNHCR, 'Regional bureau for West and Central Africa: Forcibly displaced and stateless population and trends from 2018-2023'. June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ UNDP, 'Human Development Insights', November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹² UNDP, 'Human Development Report 2010', November 2010. Retrieved [here](#).


17.5% in 2023.¹ Consequently, 45.2 million people across the region could be food insecure during the 2023 lean season², a 10% increase compared to 2022.³ West Africa's most populous country Nigeria, which suffers from protracted conflict, decelerated growth, and high inflation, accounts for 25.3 million of West Africa's food insecure population alone.

4.2. THE EUTF RESPONSE – OVERVIEW OF RESULTS

This section offers an analysis of the results of the EUTF's response to date against its four Strategic Objectives: economy and employment; resilience (food security and access to basic services); migration management; and governance and conflict prevention.

4.2.1. OVERVIEW OF EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Figure 7: Main achievements of EUTF-funded programmes in June 2023



The table below shows the aggregated values reported by SLC projects for the 38 EUTF common output indicators as of 30 June 2023.

¹ AfDB, 'West Africa Economic Outlook 2023: Mobilizing Private Sector Financing for Climate and Green Growth', 31 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).
² Cadre Harmonisé, 'Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023'. November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).
³ Cadre Harmonisé, 'Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2022 et projetée en juin-août 2022', March 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


Table 2: EUTF common output indicators for all SLC projects, June 2023¹

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	Total	Evolution
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	17,333	24,388	31,576	31,489	33,980	11,087	149,852	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	4,234	4,555	10,650	16,518	14,023	4,126	54,106	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	74,906	98,522	75,694	117,610	163,901	25,890	556,522	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	32,254	44,477	30,746	66,754	114,346	23,266	311,843	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	18	326	159	144	70	7	724	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	70	131	65	71	127	24	488	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	1,573	3,433	2,312	3,297	979	484	12,078	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	403,805	459,923	127,115	49,808	374,842	12,598	1,428,091	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	560,237	737,215	341,586	223,079	422,735	151,211	2,436,063	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	522,319	698,582	738,453	561,068	502,195	117,942	3,140,560	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	182	218	17	45	15	6	483	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	11,413	93,450	21,461	33,434	54,399	5,530	219,688	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	666,654	1,335,913	34,124,670	9,849,850	16,472,723	456,601	62,906,411	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	15,129	33,331	52,437	33,887	8,723	4,194	147,702	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	2,423,091	1,340,869	727,945	1,020,324	864,595	279,725	6,656,549	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	19	36	36	127	152	4	374	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	61,089	12,320	18,100	64,235	55,909	1,236	212,889	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	443,515	1,022,823	1,253,904	1,788,517	13,858,375	2,943,412	21,310,547	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	29,194	19,165	16,231	8,012	193	420	73,215	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	47,775	22,572	10,625	11,415	11	0	92,398	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	17,971	18,099	31,008	22,145	1,910	509	91,642	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	64	328	80	51	4	20	547	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	729	1,615	3,655	8,214	4,662	1,230	20,106	
3.8 Number of people of concern benefiting from evacuation and resettlement...	2,915	1,395	583	465	18	0	5,376	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	11	326	305	210	31	0	883	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	10,340	4,122	1,812	558	314	48	17,194	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	22	22	23	49	13	2	131	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	2,315	1,313	7,099	34,193	19,033	10,034	73,987	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	13,686	10,696	10,703	22,149	21,650	11,520	90,403	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	544,936	432,030	2,650,585	472,161	865,839	1,397,417	6,362,970	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	133	728	362	988	665	63	2,939	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	213	791	857	1,184	926	604	4,575	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	188	311	2,374	2,144	2,494	24	7,535	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	158	201	150	573	602	257	1,941	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	47	44	24	37	19	12	183	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	11,465,917	2,147,301	6,844	0	13,620,062	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	745,288	1,120,130	3,554,229	0	5,419,647	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	1,234	1,130	195	17	2,577	

¹ Trendlines represent quarterly non-cumulated outputs across time.

4.2.2. GREATER ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

Figure 8: Strategic Objective 1 dashboard, SLC, June 2023¹



¹ Budget figures are related to projects which are contracted, relevant to the MLS, and providing data.

In 2023, inflation in West Africa is expected to remain high amidst a struggling global economy and continued depreciation of local currencies. According to AfDB estimates, inflation will stabilise at 17.5% in 2023, compared with 17% in 2022, and only start to decline in 2024.¹ Inflation continued to be particularly high in Ghana with 45% in March 2023.² The main drivers of the price surge in West Africa were supply chain disruptions, the war in Ukraine, as well as local currency depreciation caused by a strengthened US dollar.³ Again, Ghana was most concerned with a loss of 30% of the Ghanaian cedi against the US dollar in 2022.⁴ In the first half of 2023, however, the Ghanaian government managed to stabilise its currency.⁵ Many West African central banks responded to inflation by raising policy rates, thereby decelerating economic activities.⁶ Nevertheless, GDP growth in 2023 was expected to reach 3.9%, compared to 3.8% in 2022.⁷ High consumer prices and depreciated local currencies substantially weakened households' purchasing power and were one of the main obstacles to fighting poverty and food insecurity. For example, the World Bank estimated that in Nigeria, 2.8 million additional people would fall below the international poverty rate of \$2.15 a day in 2023.⁸

In a context of moderate growth, high inflation, and currency depreciation, public debt in the ECOWAS region was projected to increase to 50% of GDP in 2023. In 2022, the debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 48.4%.⁹ Public debt in West Africa, like elsewhere, surged during the COVID-19 pandemic, when governments invested heavily into health services and economic mitigation measures. Following the pandemic, high inflation increased the cost of public services, while decelerated growth reduced state revenues, further exacerbating the risk of debt distress in some countries.¹⁰ Additionally, local currency depreciation made debt servicing in foreign currencies more expensive.¹¹ This was the case particularly for Eurobonds, which have been issued by some West African countries since the 2010s, and to a larger extent during the pandemic (Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Benin).¹² The increasing reliance on Eurobonds was part of a broader diversification of debt portfolios in West Africa, as more countries gained access to capital markets and deepened domestic financial markets. While this development allowed governments to mobilise additional financial resources without the policy conditionalities that are typically attached to multilateral or bilateral borrowing, it also came with less favourable borrowing conditions and higher risks.¹³

Against this backdrop, the risk of debt distress in West Africa is increasing, amidst ongoing discussions on the international sovereign debt restructuring architecture.¹⁴ As of June 2023, Ghana was in debt distress and Chad and The Gambia faced a high risk of debt distress according to World Bank and IMF debt sustainability analyses.¹⁵ While in most West African countries sovereign default remains an unlikely scenario, debt service did eat up substantial revenue shares, which could otherwise be invested in development.¹⁶ Meanwhile, the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatment

¹ AfDB, 'West Africa Economic Outlook 2023: Mobilizing Private Sector Financing for Climate and Green Growth', 31 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² IMF, 'Ghana: Request for an arrangement under the extended credit facility', 17 May 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ EBID, 'West African Development Outlook - A mixed bag outlook: debt distress, flagging growth and declining inflation', June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Bank of Ghana, 'Monetary Policy Committee Press Release', 30 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Bank of Ghana, 'Monetary Policy Committee Press Release', 25 September 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ EBID, 'West African Development Outlook - A mixed bag outlook: debt distress, flagging growth and declining inflation', June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ AfDB, 'West Africa Economic Outlook 2023: Mobilizing Private Sector Financing for Climate and Green Growth', 31 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ World Bank, 'Nigeria Macro Poverty Outlook', October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ EBID, 'West African Development Outlook - A mixed bag outlook: debt distress, flagging growth and declining inflation', June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ AfDB, 'West Africa Economic Outlook 2023: Mobilizing Private Sector Financing for Climate and Green Growth', 31 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ United Nations, 'Eurobonds, Debt Sustainability in Africa and Credit Rating Agencies', February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹² AfDB, 'West Africa Economic Outlook 2023: Mobilizing Private Sector Financing for Climate and Green Growth', 31 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹³ IMF, 'Navigating Fiscal Challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa: Resilient Strategies and Credible Anchors in Turbulent Waters', September 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁴ Council on Foreign Relations, 'The Common Framework and Its Discontents', 26 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁵ World Bank, 'Debt & Fiscal Risks Toolkit', consulted in October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁶ United Nations, 'Eurobonds, Debt Sustainability in Africa and Credit Rating Agencies', February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

did not yield the expected results and the G20, IMF and World Bank set up a Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable in February 2023 to improve processes and practices for debt restructuring.¹ While Chad was the first country to reach an agreement under the Common Framework in November 2022 after two years of negotiations, Ghana started the process in January 2023 after defaulting on most of its foreign debt in December 2022.²

The EUTF has contracted €473M (23% of the total EUTF SLC budget) to enhance economic and employment opportunities (SO1) in the region. The Trust Fund primarily targets inclusive job creation focusing on the most vulnerable, both through the job market and by supporting people to develop income generating activities (IGA). In addition, it aims to strengthen micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) through improved governance, access to funding, enterprise development, as well as by building, renovating, and expanding business infrastructure. Finally, its programmes support professional training (TVET) and skills development. As of June 2023, 22 programmes focusing on SO1 had been completed, representing 62% of the budget allocated to SO1, and 11 programmes were ongoing, representing 38% of the budget allocated to SO1. Ongoing projects were being implemented in nine countries, with the highest budget still in implementation allocated to Guinea.

Job creation through TVET and skills development

In 2023, lack of fiscal space limited West African countries' ability to mitigate the effects of economic shocks on labour markets. Most significantly, high inflation, tightened monetary policies and currency depreciations in S1 2023 slowed down investments, thereby also affecting employment. In its latest Monitor on the world of work, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) emphasised the impact of debt distress on job gaps: because countries in debt distress face strong fiscal constraints, economic imbalances have a greater impact on labour market conditions in these countries.³ Governments thus face difficult policy choices between managing inflation, supporting debt sustainability, and promoting economic activity.⁴

In the first half of 2023, EUTF-funded programmes created or supported 11,087 jobs, increasing the total since the Trust Fund's creation to 149,852 jobs (indicator 1.1). 71% of the 11,087 jobs reported in S1 2023 were created or supported in Niger (30%), Guinea (28%), and Senegal (14%). Four programmes accounted for 82% of the S1 2023 result: INTEGRA⁵ (28%), ARCHIPELAGO⁶ (21%), *Pôles Ruraux*⁷ (20%), and *Migration SN*⁸ (13%). In comparison, eight programmes had accounted for 82% of the in S2 2022 jobs. This shows that many programmes with high employment results have come or are coming to an end. Accordingly, the overall number of jobs reported is also decreasing: from an all-time high of 20,399 jobs in S1 2022 to 13,580 jobs in S2 2022 and, ultimately, to 11,087 jobs this semester.

TVET and skills development was a key strategy in S1 2023 to support job creation. Half of the beneficiaries of job creation and support in S1 2023 were supported with TVET. Linked to this, 51% of the jobs created or supported were skilled, whereas 21% were unskilled. TVET and skills development is an important strategy for EUTF-funded programmes to support areas of origin, transit and return of migrants. INTEGRA, for instance, targets potential migrants and returning migrants in Guinea to prevent irregular migration and support reintegration of returning migrants. With 3,067 jobs created or supported in S1 2023, the programme accounted for the largest share of employment support this semester (28%).

¹ IMF, 'Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable', 31 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² VOA, 'Ghana Seeks Debt Relief', 4 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#)

³ ILO, 'ILO Monitor of the world of work. Eleventh edition', 31 May 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ GN-01: *Programme d'appui à l'intégration socio-économique des jeunes*.

⁶ REG-15: ARCHIPELAGO: an African-European TVET initiative.

⁷ NE-01: *Projet d'appui aux filières agricoles dans les régions de Tahoua et Agadez*.

⁸ SN-06: *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Sénégal et accompagnement des investissements de la diaspora sénégalaise*.

To achieve these results, the programme implemented short-term trainings and continued professional trainings for young people in four provinces on the Conakry-Labé axis.

TVET and skills development to strengthen productivity and entrepreneurship

The economic potential of TVET remains largely unexploited in low and middle-income countries because TVET systems are often unresponsive to labour market needs, as illustrated by a 2023 joint report published by the World Bank, ILO, and UNESCO. Major challenges include inadequate access for TVET learners, poor quality of training, and lack of accountability of TVET providers.¹ Ineffective TVET systems directly contribute to low labour productivity: in 2019, 63% of total employment in sub-Saharan Africa was low-skilled and 27% was semi-skilled, while only 10% was high-skilled. It is noteworthy that this distribution has hardly changed since 1991 (66% low-skilled, 24% semi-skilled, 10% high-skilled). Linked to this, children born in 2020 will reach somewhere between 30% and 40% of their potential labour productivity, according to a World Bank estimate.²

In the first half of 2023, 22,266 people benefitted from TVET and skills development, with activities ranging from formal technical apprenticeships to ad hoc digital financial literacy trainings (indicator 1.4). GrEEEn GH³ accounted for 55% of the people reached, notably through the GrEEEn GH UNCDF project which aims to promote green local economic development, skills enhancement, and access to finance in Ghana. In S1 2023, the project trained 11,315 people in financial literacy or on pitching their business. The project cooperated with various financial intermediaries in developing target-specific trainings, which were rolled out both in-person and remotely in order to reach the largest number of beneficiaries possible. For instance, the project co-developed a training for smallholder farmers on basic financial concepts, including how to calculate profits and losses, the effects of interest rates, as well as loan options and financial services available to farmers. Digital solutions and an interactive voice response platform helped achieve the high number of beneficiaries, including in remote areas.

Bab Al Amal, in Chad,⁴ was the only programme which supported formal apprenticeship trainings of more than one year in S1 2023. During this semester, it trained 167 people who benefitted from dual training – which divides trainees between 80% practice and 20% theory. Since its beginning, the programme has provided formal apprenticeship training to 854 people. The beneficiaries received the training at a recognised TVET institute for two years on automotive mechanics, steel construction, woodwork, and others. The programme also supported the National Fund to Support Professional Training⁵ to strengthen the national TVET system and help Chadian actors upscale TVET opportunities. The Fund administers the revenues from the tax on learning and professional training on Chadian companies and its mission is to invest these revenues into TVET activities to benefit both companies which conduct professional training and public TVET institutes.

¹ World Bank, ILO, UNESCO, 'Building Better Formal TVET Systems', 10 October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² World Bank, 'Africa's Pulse. Delivering Growth to People Through Better Jobs', October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


³ GH-02: Boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in Ghana.

⁴ TD-03: *Projet de soutien à l'insertion socio-professionnelle des jeunes tchadiens en situation de vulnérabilité*.

⁵ *Fonds national d'appui à la formation professionnelle (FONAP)*.

4.2.3. STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE OF COMMUNITIES

Figure 9: Strategic Objective 2 dashboard, SLC, June 2023



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An unprecedented situation loomed in the region, as some 45,000 people were forecast to reach catastrophic (phase 5) levels of hunger in 2023, including 42,694 in Burkina Faso and 2,507 in Mali.¹ The *Cadre Harmonisé* estimated that, from June to August 2023, over 45.2 million people were likely to experience crisis or worse levels of food insecurity and malnutrition², reflecting an 11% increase from the 40.7 million from June to August 2022.³ Food insecurity was worsened by substantial inflation. Staple cereal prices were high (+30 to 40%) compared to the five-year average, with peaks in Ghana (160%), and Nigeria (62%), further affecting the most vulnerable households.⁴

In a context of escalating violence, acute food insecurity, and displacement, humanitarian assistance was urgently needed across the SLC region in 2023. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in 2023, more than 37.7 million people across Burkina Faso, the Far North of Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Niger, and Northeast Nigeria would require humanitarian life-saving assistance. Adding to the complexity, delivering humanitarian assistance became increasingly difficult. Physical access continued to be hindered by poor infrastructure, complex administrative requirements, and security concerns for humanitarian workers, as evidenced by the eight incidents that targeted them in the first quarter of 2023 alone.⁵ Violent climate events can also hinder the delivery of humanitarian aid. Chad experienced a massive influx of refugees, surpassing 230,000 individuals, including 192,473 refugees and around 43,000 repatriated Chadians, as of June 2023, resulting from the conflict that started in Sudan on 15 April the same year.⁶ This influx coincided with the lean season and the arrival of heavy rains, posing significant challenges in delivering crucial food assistance to the refugees and other vulnerable groups. An estimated 1.9 million people in Chad were projected to be severely food during the 2023 lean season (June-August).⁷

Violence in the Sahel and West Africa intensified in the first half of 2023, with a sharp rise in conflict-related fatalities. 11,950 fatalities were recorded from January to June 2023, representing a 27% increase from the 9,502 deaths documented in the latter half of 2022.⁸ The Liptako-Gourma region, which encompasses Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, bore the brunt of these conflicts, accounting for 7,068 fatalities. Additionally, Nigeria continued to grapple with the Boko Haram insurrection, which resulted in 4,502 reported fatalities in the first half of 2023. Violence notably affected access to education, especially in the Sahel region. During the first semester of 2023, over 7,800 schools were closed in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, 23% more than in 2022. Affected children surged by 17% to 1.4 million. Burkina Faso accounted for the largest increases – closed schools increased by 43% to over 5,300, while impacted children rose by 46% to nearly 879,000.⁹

The SLC region continued to face a persistent high number of displaced persons, at around 10 million, most of them in Nigeria (3.7 million), Cameroon (2.2 million) Burkina Faso (2.1 million), Mali (1.3 million) and Chad (1.2 million).¹⁰ These displacements exacerbate existing strains on limited regional resources and make migrants highly vulnerable to inadequate access to essential needs. This situation is reflected in the circumstances of over 8,000 expelled migrants who arrived in the border village of Assamakka in Niger between January and May 2023. With resources in the area already

¹ *Cadre Harmonisé, 'Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023'*, November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² *Ibid.*

³ *Cadre Harmonisé, 'Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2022 et projetée en juin-août 2022'*, March 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ The Food Crisis Prevention Network, 'Press Release on Food and Nutrition Situation in the Sahel and West Africa', 16 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ United Nations Security Council, 'Activities of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel', 30 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ OCHA, '*Tchad Mise à jour humanitaire*', June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ *Cadre Harmonisé, 'Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023'*, November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ ACLED, ACLED Dashboard, consulted in November 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Save the Children, 'Sahel School Closures Increase by 20% In Past Year, With 200,000 More Children Out of Class', 8 September 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ UNHCR, 'Regional bureau for West and Central Africa: Forcibly displaced and stateless population and trends from 2018-2023'. June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

strained, this large influx of people overwhelmed local capacity to meet even essential needs. As of 1 May, around 3,600 remained stranded there without access to water or basic services.¹

Strengthening infrastructure's resilience for access to basic services

In the challenging context of persistent conflict in the Sahel and West Africa region, the consequences of destruction were stark. In June 2023, Burkina Faso recorded the closure of 373 health centres. This situation significantly impacted medical accessibility, affecting approximately 3.5 million people across the country. In the rest of the Sahel region, more than 84 health centres were forced to shut down, curtailing healthcare access for nearly 964,000 individuals.²

In response to these challenges, the PDU programme³ continues to be an important initiative, ensuring sustained support and addressing the needs of the beneficiaries. In Burkina Faso for example, the programme constructed 253 water fountains and drinking water connections in Dori and Djibo during S1 2023 (indicator 2.1 bis). As a result, 4,050 people gained improved access to clean water (indicator 2.9). The programme also provided three kits for chlorine production to facilitate water cleaning and treatment in healthcare centres, benefitting a catchment area of 10,202 people (indicator 2.9). During the same period, PDU also constructed or rehabilitated 18 WASH infrastructures in Chad (indicator 2.1 bis), including the construction of 12 new wells, the rehabilitation of 1 existing well, and the establishment of 5 hydraulic production units, improving access to better WASH services for 8,650 individuals (indicator 2.9).

In Niger as of June 2023, 28% of health facilities lacked access to water, and 26% lacked sufficient sanitation facilities.⁴ The EUTF started addressing this issue this semester through the PDU programme, which rehabilitated 6 health structures in the Tillabéri region, including sanitation elements and water supply in care rooms.

Beyond PDU, Mali's PROJES⁵ rehabilitated 40 water infrastructure in the Mopti (indicator 2.1 bis). This marked the first time the programme rehabilitated infrastructure since 2021.

Addressing severe malnutrition in young children: persistent challenges in the SLC region

In the SLC region, severe acute malnutrition among children under the age of five years remains a pressing concern. An estimated 970,000 children under five were expected to suffer from severe acute malnutrition in 2023 across Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. The burden of severe acute malnutrition was heaviest in Niger, where approximately 430,000 children were anticipated to be affected in 2023. While this represented a decrease of 60,000 children compared to 2022, thanks to increased efforts from the government of Niger and development partners, it remained a serious issue. In Mali, the prevalence of severe acute malnutrition among children under five was forecast to rise by 18.4% in 2023, impacting around 367,000 boys and girls, or 58,000 more than the previous year.⁶

In response to these concerning malnutrition rates, the EUTF aims to support sustainable investment in the central Sahel region. All activities to fight malnutrition in S1 2023 were carried out through the PDU and the PST-ML programme (indicator 2.3). The latter primarily targeted Burkina Faso (46%), Niger (34 %) and to a lesser extent Mali (18%) and Chad (2%). Most of the beneficiaries (64%) were females. Almost all PDU activities withing nutrition assistance (94%) focused on screening for acute malnutrition and establishing community referral systems. This helped to screen 104,611 children

¹ IOM, 'Niger: Response plan to the humanitarian situation in Assamaka (May 2023)', 21 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² Amnesty International, 'Burkina Faso: Armed groups committing war crimes in besieged localities' 2 November 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ SAH-REG-18: *Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel*.

⁴ WHO, 'HeRAMS Niger Rapport de référence 2023', 26 October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


⁵ ML-10: *Programme Jeunesse et Stabilisation – PROJES – régions du centre du Mali*.

⁶ UNICEF, 'Près d'un million d'enfants de moins de 5 ans souffrant de malnutrition aiguë sévère en 2023, au Centre Sahel', 7 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

(indicator 2.3) who were then referred to the nearest health facility for treatment. The programme also worked on revitalising community malnutrition prevention groups, resulting in 3,145 children being screened, mostly in Mali.

4.2.4. IMPROVED MIGRATION MANAGEMENT

Figure 10: Strategic Objective 3 dashboard, SLC, June 2023¹



During the first semester of 2023, West and Central Africa again saw a massive increase in the number of internal and cross-border displacements. As of 30 June, the UNHCR reported 8.3 million internally displaced people and 1.9 million refugees and asylum-seekers in the region.² Violent events between various state and non-state armed groups in the beginning of 2023, in Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Sudan particularly, intensified the displacements in these areas.

The conflict that erupted across multiples cities in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on 15 April, generated a wave of internal and cross-border displacements. IOM estimated that 2,152,936 people were internally displaced as a result of the conflict, between 15 April and 27 June. In addition, 644,861 individuals were reported to have sought refuge in neighbouring countries, particularly in Egypt (40%), Chad (28%) and South Sudan (21%).³ The estimated 230,000⁴ people that crossed the border into Chad joined the 409,819 Sudanese refugees that were already present⁵, bringing their total to 639,819. IOM estimated that more than 38,100 of those who entered Chad, were in fact Chadian returnees⁶, thus illustrating the continuing back and forth of populations fleeing violence in both countries.

Following a similar pattern, the conflict in Burkina Faso led to the internal displacement of 2,098,917 people in June.⁷ At the same time, Burkina Faso itself hosted 36,791 refugees and asylum-seekers, 99% of them from Mali.⁸ The unstable security situation in the Sahel countries also caused displacements spreading southward to the coastal countries. Between April and May, 12,684 Burkinabe refugees have fled to bordering countries - Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo - bringing to 59,031 the number of Burkinabe refugees recorded in these four countries as of May 2023.⁹

Nigeria is also experiencing an increase in internal displacements, mostly due to intensified fighting among ISWAP and JAS factions in the North of the country.¹⁰ The number of internally displaced people rose between December 2022 and June 2023 from 220,536 persons, with an additional 190,879 people in the north-east of the country^{11,12}, bringing to 3,578,996 the total number of IDP in Nigeria as of 30 June 2023.¹³

The EUTF has contracted €366.3M (18% of EUTF total funding) to 22 programmes aiming to implement migration management-related activities. Half of this funding (57%) was allocated to 7 regional programmes.

In the first half of 2023, 16 programmes remained active. Four of them ended by the end of the semester: Protection CMR 11¹⁴, active in Niger, the last two national programmes implementing migration-related activities in Mali (Migration ML¹⁵ and POC Mali¹⁶) as well as the EU-IOM Joint

¹ Budget figures are related to projects which are contracted and relevant to the MLS.

² UNHCR, 'Regional bureau for West and Central Africa: Forcibly displaced and stateless population and trends from 2018-2023'. June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ OIM, 'DTM Sudan – Situation Report (10)', 25 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ UNHCR, 'Emergency Situation in Chad: Update on arrivals from Sudan', 1 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ UN, 'Urgent support needed for Chad, as arrivals from Sudan top 100,000', 1 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ IOM, 'Chad — Sudan crisis response: Flash update 8', 25 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ OIM, 'Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre — Tableau de bord mensuel sur la situation au Liptako-Gourma et Sahel Central', June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ UNCHR Operational Data Portal, 'Réfugiés et Demandeurs d'asile au Burkina Faso', 30 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ GRANIT, 'Outil de veille multirisques pour les pays côtiers d'Afrique de l'Ouest: Bénin - Côte d'Ivoire - Ghana - Togo', 31 May 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ ICG, 'Fighting among Boko Haram Splinters Rages On', 30 May 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ UNHCR, 'Nigeria: All population snapshot', 31 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹² UNHCR, 'Nigeria: All population snapshot', 30 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹³ UNHCR, Data Operational Portal, Nigeria, 30 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁴ REG-04: Protection and sustainable solutions for migrants and refugees along the Central Mediterranean route.

¹⁵ ML-07: *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Mali.*

¹⁶ ML-13: *Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint, de lutte contre l'immigration irrégulière, le trafic de migrants et la traite des êtres humains en République du Mali.*

Initiative¹ covering Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, the Gambia, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria.

Six programmes are continuing into the second semester of 2023, two regional programmes (*TEH Golfe de Guinée*² and Protection West Africa³) and national programmes in Côte d'Ivoire (*Etat Civil CI*⁴), Senegal (Migration SN⁵), Ghana (Border Security GH⁶) and Mauritania (POC MR⁷).

Raising awareness on irregular migrations' risks and supporting community ties

From January to June 2023, 30,805 illegal border-crossing from West African nationals were detected along various migratory routes, in particular the Central Mediterranean (25,447) and the Atlantic (3,938) routes. This represents 6,626 more people in S1 2023 than in all of 2022 (24,179).⁸

In the first semester of 2023, the EUTF continued funding activities focusing on raising awareness on the risks associated with irregular migration, reaching 2,943,412 people (indicator 3.3). An effort was made to spread the campaigns at a local scale, with programmes implementing actions at the community level. In Ghana, Border Security GH⁹ involved communities, schools and local associations in awareness-raising campaigns that reached 10,369 persons. Through the Protection West Africa programme,¹⁰ another 102,588 people (43,090 women and 59,498 men) were reached in Senegal (24%), Niger (22%), Côte d'Ivoire (17%), the Gambia, Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea.¹¹ These campaigns were conducted in strategic places such as bus and train stations, but also markets, youth centres and neighbourhood associations. They focused on risks, but also highlighted existing protection services. The YEP programme¹² sensitised 87,765 people in the Gambia, on the risks of irregular migration, but also on how to make a living in the country. Lastly, *TEH Golfe de Guinée*¹³ reached 11,373 people in Ghana and 1,168 in Côte d'Ivoire, accentuating the risks of falling prey to trafficking in human beings while on the move.

Another facet of the information campaigns supported by EUTF focused on mobilising and orienting diaspora funds towards productive and sustainable investments, particularly in Senegal. Through PASPED¹⁴, an estimated 2,724,379 people were sensitised and informed on financing opportunities available to the diaspora so they can prioritise investments in growth sectors. This also aims to strengthen economic opportunities that could benefit likely migrants.

Supporting the return and reintegration of migrants in their countries of origin

In 2022, the IOM assisted the voluntary return of 69,282 migrants to their country of origin. The majority of the migrants assisted by the IOM come from West and Central Africa and accounted for 47% of the total returns facilitated by the organisation this year.¹⁵

¹ *Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants.* This programme is implemented through various programmes at both regional (REG-08) and national levels, in Burkina Faso (BF-04), Cameroon (CM-04), Mauritania (MR-03), Niger (NE-07), Nigeria (NG-04) and the Gambia (GM-02).

² REG-12: *Appui à la Lutte contre la Traite des Personnes dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée.*

³ REG-13: *Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest.*

⁴ CI-02: *Appui à la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale de l'état civil et de l'identification en Côte d'Ivoire .*

⁵ SN-06: *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Sénégal et accompagnement des investissements de la diaspora sénégalaise.*

⁶ GH-01: Strengthening Border Security in Ghana.

⁷ MR-09: *Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint pour la Mauritanie.*

⁸ FRONTEX, 'Monitoring and risk analysis - Migratory Map', October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ GH-01: Strengthening Border Security in Ghana.

¹⁰ REG-13: *Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest.*

¹¹ Another 30% of these actions were not reported at the national level but had a regional reach.

¹² GM-01: Youth Empowerment Project.

¹³ REG-12: *Appui à la Lutte contre la Traite des Personnes dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée.*

¹⁴ SN-09: *Programme de contraste à la migration illégale à travers l'appui au Secteur Privé et à la création d'emplois au Sénégal*

¹⁵ IOM, 'Return and reintegration key highlights 2022', 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

In S1 2023, EUTF funding supported returning migrants throughout both their journey and reintegration in their country of origin. To begin with, Stabilisation Agadez¹ supported 420 voluntary returns (indicator 3.4). The programme notably facilitated the return journey of 420 migrants (304 men and 116 women) to Niger. 91% were under 35 and 95 were minors. The migrants had been rejected by Algeria and were stranded in the area between Assamakka and Arlit in Niger, on the outskirts of towns, without access to any hosting or hygiene and sanitation facilities.

EUTF funded programmes also implemented actions to assist the reintegration of 509 returning migrants (indicator 3.5 bis). Most of these actions were geared towards creating more favourable conditions for professional reintegration. In Chad, the DIZA programme² promoted, among others, inclusive actions benefitting refugees, returnees and host communities. In this context, 292 women and 188 men, took part in various activities, including training, capacity building or the sharing of good practices related to cooperatives in the shea and groundnut sectors. These actions aimed to support the professional integration of migrants and returnees by strengthening social cohesion in host communities. In the Gambia, the YEP programme³ assisted eight returnees this semester with skills trainings conducted with selected TVET institutions, in areas such as repair of electronic devices, solar installations, or agribusiness. This programme, which is now completed, assisted a total of 286 persons with this kind of action.

Lastly, the *TEH Golfe de Guinée*⁴ regional programme also allowed 21 women to access rehabilitation and reintegration programmes implemented by local NGOs in Nigeria.

This brings the total number of returning migrants who have benefitted from reintegration assistance to 91,642 since EUTF's launch (indicator 3.5 bis).

¹ NE-12: *Stabilisation et renforcement socio-économique des populations affectées par la migration irrégulière dans les zones de transit au Niger.*


² TD-07: *Programme de développement inclusif dans les zones d'accueil.*

³ GM-01: Youth Empowerment Project.

⁴ REG-12: *Appui à la Lutte contre la Traite des Personnes dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée.*

4.2.5. IMPROVING GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

Figure 11: Strategic Objective 4 dashboard, SLC, June 2023¹



¹ Budget figures are related to projects which are contracted, relevant to the MLS, and providing data.

The stability of governance in the Sahel and Lake Chad area remained a complex challenge in the first half of 2023. Following a series of military coups in 2020, 2021 and 2022, ECOWAS suspended Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso's membership in the organisation and applied pressure on their military juntas to establish clear paths back to civilian governance through elections. Mali, after its 2020 and 2021 coups, faced demands from ECOWAS for a definitive electoral timetable, which resulted in a decree outlining a 24-month transition period starting March 2022¹ and with elections scheduled for February 2024.² In June 2023, Mali held a referendum to approve a new Constitution.

In Burkina Faso, following two coups in 2022, with ECOWAS's mediation, the military government agreed to a transitional period leading to democratic elections in July 2024.³ Similarly, Guinea has charted a two-year transition following its 2021 coup, with Colonel Doumbouya initiating the drafting of a new Constitution in February 2023, and pledging to cede power ahead of elections set for early 2025.⁴

In Chad, the battlefield death of President Idriss Déby triggered a military takeover led by his son, Mahamat Idriss Déby. Initially, an 18-month transition was announced, but it has since been extended by an additional two years, pushing the electoral timeline to October 2024.

The landscape of democracy and elections in Nigeria has recently been characterised by controversy and public dissatisfaction. In the January 2023 presidential elections, Bola Tinubu from the All Progressive Congress (APC) party secured the presidency with 36% of the vote, amid widespread discontent regarding the electoral process.⁵ This sentiment was echoed by the European Union Election Observation Mission, which found that the 2023 general elections had fallen short of delivering a well-administered, transparent, and inclusive democratic process.⁶ All these developments underscore the fragility of governance structures in the region.

The Sahel region is experiencing an escalating wave of violence, with significant activity from militant groups such as the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), which is affiliated with al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). These groups have been particularly active in Burkina Faso and Niger, where major offensives and deadly attacks have been reported, notably in February.⁷

This violence is spreading southward, reaching the coastal nations of the Gulf of Guinea, including Togo, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea.⁸ These countries are witnessing jihadist attacks against military posts along their northern borders and, increasingly, raids on villages. With operational bases established in the southern regions of Mali and Burkina Faso, al-Qaeda's Sahelian affiliates are intensifying their attacks, causing a rise in deadly incidents in the area.

EUTF has contracted €692.1M (34% of the EUTF SLC budget) to improve governance and conflict prevention. These funds were disbursed across 31 programmes operating in 13 countries. The funds were contracted at the regional level (20%) and in the countries most affected by the ongoing security crises, namely Mali (20%), Burkina Faso (20%), Niger (17%), and Nigeria (10%).

In the first half of 2023, 14 active programmes addressed a range of governance and security challenges in the region. Initiatives such as AJUSEN⁹, *ECI Terrorisme*¹⁰ and Justice BF¹¹ focused on

¹ Al Jazeera, 'ECOWAS unhappy with Mali's 24-month transition decision', 8 June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² House of Commons, 'Mali: Why have elections been delayed until 2024?', 11 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ European Parliament, 'The Situation in Burkina Faso following the coup d'état', 20 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ AP News, 'Guinea junta agrees with bloc to hold vote in early 2025', 22 October 2022 Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ New York Times, 'Nigerian Election 2023 and Bola Tinubu's Victory: What to Know', 1 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ EU, 'Election Observation Mission Nigeria 2023: Final Report', 27 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ ACLED, 'Regional Overview Africa: February 2023', 3 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Institut Montaigne, 'Gulf of Guinea: Can the Sahel Trap be Avoided?', 1 February 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ NE-06: *Contrat relatif à la Reconstruction de l'État au Niger en complément du SBC II en préparation / Appui à la Justice, Sécurité et à la Gestion des Frontières au Niger.*

¹⁰ NE-15: *Création d'une Équipe Conjointe d'Investigation (ECI) pour la lutte contre les réseaux criminels liés au terrorisme.*

¹¹ BF-11: *Appui à la justice au Burkina Faso pour renforcer la lutte contre l'impunité au travers d'une justice plus accessible et efficace.*

enhancing judicial systems. Programmes like *Etat Civil SN*¹ and GESTDOC² facilitated citizens' access to essential legal documentation. In Mali, the PST-ML³ programme was tailored to aid the nation's transitional governance process.

Several programmes concentrated on conflict prevention and strengthening border management. PEV⁴ and *Radio Jeunesse Sahe*⁵ directed their efforts towards preventing violent extremism, while GAR-SI⁶, POC SN⁷, Security G5 Sahel⁸, PAGES II⁹, and Nexus SRD¹⁰ aimed to bolster border management and security.

The One UN Response Plan¹¹, which addressed the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, complements these efforts.

Supporting good governance and the respect of human rights in the Sahel and Lake Chad region

In the first half of 2023, 11,520 staff members from various institutions across the Sahel region were trained on governance, conflict prevention, and human rights (indicator 4.2). Most of these trainees were in Mali (77%), followed by Burkina Faso (11%), Niger (4%), Côte d'Ivoire (3%), and Mauritania (2%). The trainings covered a broad range of topics, each tailored to the specific needs and challenges of the individual countries. Subjects ranged from human rights to justice, good governance, civil registration, security and border management.

Trainings on improved governance (78% of beneficiaries) were delivered in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger to support democratic processes (indicator 4.2). In Mali, the PST-ML programme supported the transition period, empowering citizens and civil society organisations (CSOs) to facilitate transparent elections. One of this initiative's notable achievement was the training of 8,823 individuals and organisations to be deployed for the referendum on the new Constitution in June 2023. Meanwhile, in Niger, the trainings focused on the management of natural resources, and in Burkina Faso, an emphasis was placed on enhancing good governance practices at the local administration level.

Trainings were also delivered on conflict prevention, peacebuilding, preventing violent extremism (PVE) and human rights (16% of beneficiaries) in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger (indicator 4.2). These sessions aimed to promote social cohesion through mediation, positive communication, and conflict transformation, especially within agro-pastoral communities. In Niger, the AJUSEN programme provided comprehensive training on international human rights law to civilian institutions, local security forces, CSOs and youth ambassadors. This was complemented by the G5 Security Sahel's training of national security forces in Niger and Mali, and PDU's monitoring training for local civilian institutions.

A smaller portion of the results (3% of beneficiaries) came from civil registration in Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau, where the projects enhanced the skills of employees in civil registration and identification services (indicator 4.2). 2% of beneficiaries were dedicated to security and border management in Cabo Verde, Ghana, Mauritania, and Senegal, with a focus on improving the intervention capabilities of personnel in these areas. Lastly, in Burkina Faso and Mauritania, judicial training programmes enhanced the capabilities of judges and legal sector workers (1% of training

¹ SN-07: *Programme d'appui au renforcement du système d'information de l'état civil et à la consolidation d'un fichier d'état national d'identité biométrique au Sénégal.*

² REG-14: Modernizing and strengthening secure identity chains and documental security.

³ ML-14: *Programme de soutien à la transition en République du Mali.*

⁴ BF-02: *Rebâtir une cohésion sociale au Nord du Burkina à travers un meilleur suivi de la radicalisation, la promotion du dialogue et la valorisation de l'économie pastoraliste.*

⁵ REG-25: *Radio Jeunesse Sahel – Appui européen à la phase de démarrage de la radio.*

⁶ REG-04: *GAR-SI SAHEL (Groupes d'Action Rapides – Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel).*

⁷ SN-10: *Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint de lutte contre l'immigration irrégulière, la traite et le trafic de migrants au Sénégal.*

⁸ REG-01: *Appui à la coopération régionale des pays du G5 Sahel et au Collège Sahélien de Sécurité.*

⁹ REG-20: *Programme d'Appui au G5 pour la Sécurité au Sahel Phase II.*

¹⁰ MR-08: *L'UE pour le nexus sécurité-résilience-développement en Mauritanie.*

¹¹ NG-09: EU Support to the United Nations 'One UN Response Plan to COVID-19 in Nigeria.

results) on procedural execution and the integration of customary and alternative justice mechanisms to boost the justice system's effectiveness.

Supporting social cohesion and peacebuilding

In the first half of 2023, EUTF programmes supported social cohesion and peacebuilding by delivering conflict prevention and human rights activities that reached 1,397,417 people in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger (indicator 4.3). 76% of these results were achieved through a variety of awareness raising activities on conflict-prevention and peacebuilding. These efforts included mass communication campaigns, notably using radio broadcasts, as well as direct engagement through face-to-face sessions, the establishment of peace clubs, and the formation and revitalisation of local committees.

The remaining 24% of results were achieved through community dialogue and engagement activities. In Burkina Faso and Mali, 292,841 people were involved in drafting "social cohesion plans" during one-day workshops. These plans were designed to manage ongoing conflicts and prevent future ones by outlining necessary resources, responsible parties, and timelines for action implementation.


Lastly, community dialogues and cross-community activities engaged 38,031 individuals in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger (indicator 4.3). Participants joined forums fostering communication between citizens and state representatives, attended meetings led by religious and community leaders, and took part in school events promoting human rights and diversity. Cultural events such as theatre, dance, and music events also served as vehicles for engagement.

5. ANALYSIS BY COUNTRY

5.1. BURKINA FASO

5.1.1. BURKINA FASO IN S1 2023

Figure 12. Burkina Faso – Key facts and figures, June 2023



During the first half of 2023, Burkina Faso witnessed a significant escalation in conflict, making it the deadliest semester since the conflict's onset. ACLED data reported 922 political violence events, resulting in 4,895 fatalities, more than 2022's total casualties. Most of this violence was concentrated in regions bordering Mali and Niger, with the Sahel region accounting for 22% of deaths, and Nord, Est, and Centre-Nord each recording 16%.¹

Ibrahim Traore's transition government shifted its approach to counterterrorism. The government opted to reduce its reliance on foreign assistance. As a major step in this direction, in January, Burkina Faso formally requested the withdrawal of French troops from its territory.² By the end of February, the withdrawal process was complete.³ Highlighting the gravity of the security situation, on 30 March, Burkina Faso's government declared a state of emergency in 8 out of 13 regions.⁴ This emergency measure covers half of the country's territory and is geared to bolster the state's counterterrorism efforts. Following this, the government issued a decree for a general mobilisation to strengthen its capacity to combat the terrorist threat. The decree stipulates that all individuals aged 18 and above could be called into the nation's fight against terrorism if needed.⁵

As a result of pervasive violence, Burkina Faso is grappling with an acute and escalating displacement crisis. Millions of civilians have been compelled to flee their homes. In S1 2023, displacement numbers reached 2,062,535 IDPs⁶, while the count of refugees crossing borders

¹ ACLED, ACLED Dashboard, consulted in November 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² RFI, 'Le Burkina Faso confirme avoir demandé le départ des troupes françaises', 23 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ RFI, 'Les opérations des troupes françaises au Burkina Faso sont officiellement terminées', 20 February 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ RFI, 'Burkina Faso: l'état d'urgence entre en vigueur dans huit régions', 30 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ RFI, 'Burkina Faso: les détails de la mobilisation générale connus suite à la signature d'un décret', 20 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


⁶ UNHCR Operational Data Portal, 'IDPs in Burkina Faso', March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

amounted to 92,000, spreading across six countries.¹ Between April and May, 12,684 Burkinabe refugees fled to Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Togo.²

In S1 2023, approximately 4.6 million people, or one in every five Burkinabe, urgently required humanitarian aid³, and, of these, 3.4 million were in IPC Phase 3.⁴ The situation was further exacerbated by the lack of adequate funding for the humanitarian response. In June 2023, only 23% of the funding required for the appeal had been mobilised.⁵

5.1.2. EUTF IN BURKINA FASO

Figure 13: EUTF portfolio in Burkina Faso, June 2023^{6,7}



The EUTF has contracted €190.8M in Burkina Faso. 69% of the funds have been allocated to governance and conflict prevention (SO4), followed by resilience programmes (SO2 – 16%), employment-related programmes (SO1 – 11%) and, lastly, migration-related programmes (SO3 – 4%). In June 2023, 98% of the EUTF-contracted budget in Burkina Faso had been spent.


Since its launch, the EUTF has funded 10 programmes in Burkina Faso, focusing on governance and conflict-prevention (Justice BF⁸, PEV⁹, ProGEF¹⁰, Protection BF¹¹, PUS BF¹²), communities' resilience

¹ UNHCR, 'Rising violence drives refugees from Burkina Faso to neighbouring countries', 20 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).
² GRANIT, 'Outil de veille multirisques pour les pays côtiers d'Afrique de l'Ouest: Bénin - Côte d'Ivoire - Ghana - Togo', 31 May 2023. Retrieved [here](#).
³ OCHA, 'Sahel Crisis Humanitarian Needs and Requirements Overview 2023', 8 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).
⁴ This categorisation indicates significant food consumption gaps, heightened malnutrition rates, or the need for individuals to resort to emergency coping strategies to meet their basic needs.
⁵ OCHA, 'Burkina Faso : HRP 2023 – Aperçu des financements au 30 juin 2023', 30 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).
⁶ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.
⁷ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.
⁸ BF-11: *Appui à la justice au Burkina Faso pour renforcer la lutte contre l'impunité au travers d'une justice plus accessible et efficace*.
⁹ BF-08: *Rebâtir une cohésion sociale au Nord du Burkina à travers un meilleur suivi de la radicalisation, la promotion du dialogue et la valorisation de l'économie pastoraliste*.
¹⁰ BF-03: *Programme d'appui à la gestion intégrée des frontières au Burkina Faso*.
¹¹ BF-07: *Protection des jeunes dans les zones à risque au Burkina Faso à travers l'éducation et le dialogue*.
¹² BF-09: *Appui budgétaire pour la mise en œuvre du Programme d'Urgence Sahel du Burkina Faso*.

(*Résilience BF*¹), job creation (Emploi BF², *Stabilisation Séno*³, and TUUMA⁴), and migration management (EU-IOM JI Burkina Faso⁵). In addition to national programmes, 16 regional programmes have implemented activities in Burkina Faso.

During the first semester of 2023, nine programmes were active: three national programmes – Justice BF, PEV and TUUMA – and six regional programmes – ARCHIPELAGO⁶, IPDEV2⁷, PDU⁸, Protection West Africa⁹, *Radio Jeunesse Sahel*¹⁰ and Security G5 Sahel.¹¹ TUUMA, ARCHIPELAGO, and Protection West Africa finalised their activities during the first semester of 2023. IPDEV2, *Radio Jeunesse Sahel* and Security G5 Sahel will finalise their activities by the end of 2023. PEV, PDU and Justice BF will continue implementing activities into 2024.

Figure 14: Selected EUTF outputs in Burkina Faso, June 2023



¹ BF-01: Programme "LRRD" de renforcement de la résilience des communautés vulnérables à l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle dans les zones frontalières septentrionales au Burkina Faso.

² BF-05: Programme d'appui à l'Emploi dans les zones frontalières et périphériques.

³ BF-02: Insertion et Stabilisation Socio - Économique des Jeunes et Femmes dans la Province du Séno.

⁴ BF-06: Appui à la compétence professionnelle, l'entreprenariat et l'emploi des jeunes et des femmes dans les régions rurales du Burkina Faso.

⁵ BF-04: Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Burkina Faso.

⁶ REG-15: ARCHIPELAGO: an African-European TVET initiative.

⁷ REG-11: Soutenir les entrepreneurs et les petites PME en Afrique de l'Ouest.

⁸ REG-18: Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.

⁹ REG-13: Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest.

¹⁰ REG-25: Radio Jeunesse Sahel - Appui européen à la phase de démarrage de la radio.


¹¹ REG-01: Appui à la coopération régionale des pays du G5 Sahel et au Collège Sahélien de Sécurité.

Meeting humanitarian needs across key regions in Burkina Faso

OCHA conducts Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO) to assess humanitarian needs in crisis-affected countries. According to the HNO conducted in Burkina Faso in 2023, WASH, food security, and protection were the most pressing needs. The regions with the highest number of people in need were Sahel (930,073 people), Centre-Nord (903,223), Nord (786,451), Est (756,468) and Boucle du Mouhoun (331,335).¹

During the initial half of 2023, PDU was the only active EUTF programme facilitating people's access to basic services. Through this programme, 2,634 individuals received cash transfers (indicator 2.9), meant to enable recipients to address their most pressing needs. In addition, a total of 306 WASH facilities were either rehabilitated or constructed in Sahel Region. This included the establishment of 53 new latrines and the expansion of potable water networks by adding 250 connections (indicator 2.1bis). Three water treatment kits were also set up in health centres (indicator 2.1bis), improving access to clean water for some 10,202 patients (indicator 2.9). In addition, 580 girls were provided with hygiene kits (indicator 2.2).

Figure 15: EUTF indicator 2.3, in Burkina Faso, June 2023



68,863 children and adults benefitted from nutrition-related activities in various regions, including Boucle du Mouhoun, Est, and Sahel (indicator 2.3). PDU screened 51,805 children and treated 509

¹ OCHA, 'Aperçu des besoins humanitaires 2023', Retrieved [here](#).

children for malnutrition. In addition, 11,034 female heads of households were trained to identify early symptoms of malnutrition. Communication campaigns aimed at promoting hygiene practices through the BabyWASH approach successfully reached 5,515 individuals (indicator 2.3).


Strengthening respect for human rights

Since 2015, Burkina Faso has grappled with an Islamist insurgency, resulting in the loss of thousands of lives. The conflict has intensified, with large regions of the country now under armed group control.¹ The latter have escalated their violent activities, perpetrating mass killings, summary executions, rapes, and conducting extensive looting.² At the same time, Burkina Faso's own armed forces and associated pro-government militias have allegedly committed serious abuses during counter-insurgency operations.³ In response to these events, in April 2023, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) decried the continuous violence, urging the government to adopt measures to protect civilians, especially during military operations against terrorism.

EUTF-funded programmes have delivered activities to strengthen respect for human rights, through the PDU and Security G5 Sahel programmes. In the first half of 2023, Security G5 Sahel primarily collaborated with security forces and trained 474 internal security forces, focusing on human rights adherence (indicator 4.2). It also produced a procedural document for the Security Forces to routinely conduct internal audits to ensure adherence to human rights within their ranks (indicator 4.6).

PDU centred its efforts on informing people of their fundamental rights. During the first semester of 2023, 11,532 individuals participated in dialogues centred on their rights (indicator 4.3). The programme also facilitated 1,913 legal consultations through dedicated structures, ensuring that individuals understand and access their legal rights (indicator 2.2).

Figure 16: EUTF indicator 4.2, in Burkina Faso, June 2023



¹ Al Jazeera, 'State controls just 60 percent of Burkina Faso: ECOWAS mediator', 18 June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Human Rights Watch, 'Burkina Faso: Armed Islamists Kill, Rape Civilians', Retrieved [here](#).

³ Human Rights Watch, 'Burkina Faso: Unlawful Killings, 'Disappearances' by the Army', 29 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

5.1.2. BURKINA FASO AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 3: EUTF common output indicators for Burkina Faso, June 2023

Indicateur FFU	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	Total	Evolution
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	2,277	2,414	6,151	1,447	3,971	110	16,371	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	55	200	1,854	634	472	68	3,283	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	4,475	12,644	4,640	4,259	5,047	2,279	33,344	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	956	5,747	4,195	11,642	5,090	9	27,639	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	3	14	19	18	2	0	56	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	0	33	18	0	0	0	51	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	522	1,445	386	858	595	306	4,112	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	98,553	58,101	4,405	6,273	46,043	4,086	217,461	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	282,181	100,124	26,270	140,916	275,715	68,863	894,069	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	150,574	217,432	173,568	192,255	242,776	1,237	977,842	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	23	71	4	41	1	0	140	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	1,402	1,003	625	462	380	1	3,872	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	341,434	524,022	234,888	237,126	417,930	188,963	1,944,363	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	7,354	11,919	11,016	3,439	3,873	168	37,769	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	333,002	383,674	65,694	62,732	193,848	17,006	1,055,956	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	190	442	1,736	12,389	16,747	0	31,504	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	9,018	27,040	13,248	20,794	63,812	2,160	136,072	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	1,635	1,260	5,683	64	0	0	8,642	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	1,580	822	662	476	0	0	3,540	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	1,244	258	242	535	171	0	2,450	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	30	1,145	208	28	1,411	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	2	23	16	6	0	0	47	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	20	68	0	15	7	1	111	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	3	0	1	16	8	1	29	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	924	9	1,210	10,944	1,212	104	14,403	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	994	1,667	1,436	6,845	4,577	1,296	16,815	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	3,283	83,035	2,069,885	198,931	372,575	1,295,262	4,022,971	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	7	138	123	255	86	22	631	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	91	430	380	334	119	25	1,379	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	70	184	615	1,241	458	1	2,569	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	13	45	4	24	26	11	123	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	10	1	4	15	0	0	30	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	302,840	0	0	0	302,840	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	8,509	0	0	0	8,509	

5.2. CHAD

5.2.1. CHAD IN S1 2023

Figure 17: Chad – Key facts and figures, June 2023



Since the outbreak of the armed conflict in Sudan in April 2023, an estimated 230,000 people have fled to eastern Chad until June, most of them women and children.¹ Chad was already hosting 409,819 Sudanese refugees before the current crisis.² The Chadian regions most affected by the latest influx were Ouaddaï, Sila and Wadi Fira, which are located along the Sudanese border.³ In a survey of 2,805 displaced households in 13 villages in these regions, 20% indicated having been victims of physical violence, 26% of respondents had no documents, and 64% had no intention to return to Sudan, with many waiting for family members to join them when the situation allows. In addition, 83% reported that they felt integrated in their new community.⁴ As the rainy season approached, the urgency to relocate refugees from informal settlements near the border intensified. Without relocation, these communities faced the risk of being cut off from assistance as areas become inaccessible.⁵ As of June, 42,997 people had been relocated to refugee camps in eastern Chad, meaning that most refugees still resided in makeshift camps and villages near the border.⁶ As the number of new arrivals increases, access to land and housing becomes increasingly scarce, potentially leading to conflicts in the affected areas.⁷

On 27 June, the National Transition Council adopted a new Constitution, ahead of the November 2023 constitutional referendum, as well as the legislative and presidential elections that are planned for 2024. 96% of deputies in the transitional assembly voted in favour of the Constitution, thus settling the dispute between proponents of a federal and centralised state, in favour of the latter.⁸ The commissions in charge of drafting the new Constitution have been criticised for being largely dominated by transitional authorities. Since the government crackdown on protests in October 2022, Chadian civil society and opposition leaders have continuously raised concerns over lack of inclusion of transitional

¹ UNHCR, 'Emergency Situation in Chad: Update on arrivals from Sudan', 1 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² UN, 'Urgent support needed for Chad, as arrivals from Sudan top 100,000', 1 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ UNHCR, 'Emergency Situation in Chad: Update on arrivals from Sudan', 1 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ UNHCR, 'Urgence Soudanaise: Dashboard Monitoring de protection', 30 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Reuters, 'Red Cross warns of possible humanitarian disaster on Sudan-Chad border', 23 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ UNHCR, 'Emergency Situation in Chad: Update on arrivals from Sudan', 1 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


⁷ ICG, 'The Fallout in Chad from the Fighting in Darfur', 10 August 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Jeune Afrique, 'Au Tchad, les députés adoptent le projet de Constitution', 28 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

politics.¹ According to an International Crisis Group analysis, a statement by the Prime Minister indicated that the transitional government could use the emergency situation in eastern Chad to further delay the transitional calendar and postpone elections beyond October 2024.²

5.2.2. THE EUTF IN CHAD

Figure 18: EUTF portfolio in Chad, June 2023^{3,4}



The EUTF's total contracted budget in Chad amounts to €113.9M, of which about 98% have already been spent as of 30 June 2023. 73% of the budget accounts for programmes focusing on resilience (SO2), 18% for programmes focusing on security and governance (SO4), and 9% for programmes focusing on economic and employment opportunities (SO1). During the first half of 2023, three programmes were still implementing activities (PRCPT⁵, *Bab-al-ama*⁶, and DIZA⁷). Of the three active programmes, two focused on resilience (SO2) and one on economic and employment opportunities (SO1). PRCPT ended during the semester. DIZA (SO2) is expected to come to an end in the second half of the year so that only *Bab-al-ama* (SO1) will implement activities beyond 2023.

¹ ISS, 'Chad two years later: little progress, plenty to worry about', 4 May 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² ICG, 'The Fallout in Chad from the Fighting in Darfur', 10 August 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.


⁴ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁵ TD-02: *Projet de Renforcement de la Résilience et de la Cohabitation Pacifique au Tchad*.

⁶ TD-03: *Projet de soutien à l'insertion socio-professionnelle des jeunes tchadiens en situation de vulnérabilité*.

⁷ TD-07: *Programme de développement inclusif dans les zones d'accueil*.

Figure 19: Selected EUTF outputs in Chad, June 2023



Climate-resilient livelihoods

The 1,289,069 forcibly displaced people in Chad¹ face a high risk of precarious livelihoods, which is further exacerbated by climate change. Livelihoods are particularly vulnerable where conflict, displacement, and climate change interact, as is the case in the Lake Chad Basin. According to the Expert Group on Climate-related Security Risks, climate change in the Lake Chad Basin fuels conflict by increasing competition over scarce resources.² At the same time, adjusting to climate change, for example by switching between farming, livestock herding and fishing, becomes more difficult as natural resources deteriorate.³ Chad is more vulnerable to climate change than almost any other country in the world: in the University of Notre Dame's 2021 climate change vulnerability index, Chad was second highest in terms of vulnerability (among 185 countries) and third lowest in terms of readiness (among 192 countries).⁴ In a survey conducted in 2018, 83% of respondents in the Chadian Lac Province reported that they had lost their livelihoods, with only 23% reporting that they had found a new one.⁵ Growing livelihood insecurity is in turn often linked to recruitment into armed groups and intercommunal conflict.⁶

¹ UNHCR, 'Chad : Personnes déplacées de force et apatrides', June 2023. Retrieved [here](#). The number includes refugees, asylum seekers, IDPs, and returnees.

² Refugees International, 'Climate-fuelled Violence and Displacement in the Lake Chad Basin: Focus on Chad and Cameroon', 19 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ IOM, 'Climate Change, Food Security and Migration in Chad: A Complex Nexus', 30 July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


⁴ University of Notre Dame, 'ND-GAIN: Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative', consulted in October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ IOM, 'Climate Change, Food Security and Migration in Chad: A Complex Nexus', 30 July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Expert Working Group on Climate-related Security Risks, 'Lake Chad Region: Climate-related security risk assessment', July 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

DIZA Sud¹ provided improved seeds and farming tools to 35,376 farmers in the first half of 2023 (indicator 2.4) to ease pressure on the land and support livelihood opportunities for refugees, returnees and host communities. Benefitting farmers were located in the regions of Logone-Oriental (46%), Mandoul (40%) and Moyen-Chari (14%), at the border with Cameroon and the Central African Republic. DIZA was the only active programme delivering food security activities in S1 2023, notably because PRODECO², RESILAC³ and RESTE⁴ came to an end in 2021 and 2022. In addition, DIZA Sud supported 480 returnees (292 women and 188 men) in the same regions to be included in the peanut, shea, or sesame sector (indicator 3.5 bis). Since the project's beginning, DIZA Sud has provided reintegration assistance to 6,688 returning migrants.

Figure 20: EUTF indicator 2.4, in Chad, June 2023



Conflict prevention in displacement-affected communities

In the first half of the year, EUTF funded programmes reached 74,777 people (46% women, 54% men) with conflict prevention and human rights activities, increasing the total for this indicator in Chad to 489,364 (indicator 4.3). This represents the second highest biannual result since 2018. Two projects contributed to these results: PRCPT (73,814 beneficiaries) and DIZA Sud (963 beneficiaries). Both projects used cultural activities including theatre, music, and dance to convey messages of tolerance and non-violence. DIZA Sud worked with an association to develop artistic performances in refugee camps and displacement affected communities in the southern region of Logone-Oriental, which is situated near the border of Cameroon and the Central Africa Republic. The performances addressed farmer-herder conflicts, acceptance of others, and peaceful cohabitation.

¹ TD-07-02: DIZA Sud


² TD-06: *Appui au déminage, à la protection sociale et au développement des personnes vulnérables.*

³ REG-05: *RESILAC – Redressement économique et social inclusif du Lac Tchad.*

⁴ TD-01: *Résilience et emploi au lac Tchad.*

PRCPT, which mostly worked in regions along the border with Cameroon on this indicator, also supported frameworks for dialogue, interreligious clubs, sports events and broadcast radio spots.

Figure 21: EUTF indicator 4.3, in Chad, June 2023



5.2.3. CHAD AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 4: EUTF common output indicators for Chad, June 2023

Indicateur FFU	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	Total	Evolution
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	2,081	2,170	1,973	1,213	795	180	8,412	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	32	44	80	168	12	336	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	5,268	17,104	9,749	21,369	16,873	2,143	72,506	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	230	2,488	2,465	3,808	3,568	1,795	14,354	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	3	24	11	16	19	0	73	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	26	56	19	45	43	4	193	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	139	264	298	307	56	26	1,090	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	660	2,567	17,824	14,262	56,637	875	92,825	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	18,546	10,477	8,684	10,083	5,856	3,611	57,257	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	34,999	18,610	93,082	54,258	5,566	35,376	241,891	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	8	40	9	3	0	0	60	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	70	225	1,496	6,991	0	0	8,781	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	21,672	30,707	183,797	11,342	5,787	3,059	256,364	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	57	1,622	430	286	941	378	3,713	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	35,160	221,000	14,206	50,195	80,999	12,550	414,110	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	0	43	300	458	0	0	801	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	0	605	1,468	15,621	0	0	17,694	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	9	119	360	309	0	0	797	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	10	1,228	2,958	2,035	133	480	6,844	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	86	446	23	294	0	850	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	0	16	23	12	0	0	51	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	0	0	16	0	0	0	16	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	216	709	130	5,186	53	6,294	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	667	1,205	3,118	2,905	4,619	30	12,544	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	60,527	233,942	69,314	18,472	32,332	74,777	489,364	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	1	1	5	4	0	0	11	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	17	206	131	227	243	2	827	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	5	12	157	143	150	0	467	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	10	20	8	2	1	0	41	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	8	0	4	1	0	0	13	

5.3. CÔTE D'IVOIRE

5.3.1. CÔTE D'IVOIRE IN S1 2023

Figure 22: Côte d'Ivoire – Key facts and figures, June 2023



During the first semester of 2023, Côte d'Ivoire geared up for its local and regional elections, which are scheduled for September 2023. In May, the electoral commission prepared for the vote by publishing electoral lists across 10,862 polling stations.¹ These elections, which encompass municipal and regional contests, were seen as crucial, as a predictor for the 2025 presidential race.² Political parties aim to prevent post-electoral crises similar to the ones in the 2010 and 2020 disputed presidential elections.

Côte d'Ivoire's economy has demonstrated resilience in the face of challenges including the repercussions from the Ukraine conflict, global monetary policy shifts and regional political instability. The economic growth rate, although slightly lower at 6.7% in 2022 than 7% in 2021, signalled continued economic momentum. Forecasts for 2023 remained optimistic, with an anticipated real GDP growth of 6.3%.³ Reforms and investments outlined in the 2021-2025 National Development Plan (NDP) were set to gain momentum, coinciding with the start of production at the Baleine gas and oil field which was discovered in 2021-22. This growth was expected to be driven by a variety of sectors including energy, construction, mining, agribusiness, trade, telecommunications, and agriculture, alongside boosts from both investment and consumption.⁴

Côte d'Ivoire has secured support from international financial institutions to support its development. The IMF has committed \$3.5 billion, aimed at ensuring the sustainability of public finances and debt while promoting deeper economic transformations aligned with the NDP 2021-25.⁵ Concurrently, the World Bank has launched its 2023-2027 strategy, focusing on territorial development by targeting the

¹ RFI, 'Élections locales en Côte d'Ivoire: calendrier et mode d'emploi des listes électorales', 30 Mai 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² Jeune Afrique, 'En Côte d'Ivoire, des élections locales à double tranchant – par Marwane Ben Yahmed', 12 Juin 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ World Bank, 'Macro-Poverty Outlook', 4 October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ ADB, 'Côte d'Ivoire Economic Outlook', November 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ IMF, 'Le FMI et la Côte d'Ivoire sont parvenus à un accord au niveau des services sur 3,5 milliards de dollars au titre du mécanisme élargi de crédit (MEDC) et de la facilité élargie de crédit (FEC)', 5 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


less developed northern and south-western regions of the country. This framework aims at balanced regional growth and enhanced overall economic performance.¹

The Sahel crisis continued to present a risk of instability to the northern territories of Côte d'Ivoire, as jihadist elements extended their reach south, from Mali and Burkina Faso. The proximity of conflict has led to an influx of 27,693 Burkinabe and Malian refugees into northern Côte d'Ivoire², as recorded by the UNHCR, highlighting the tangible spillover effects of regional instability.

The progression of jihadist armed groups towards the littoral states of West Africa has raised alarms about the potential establishment of new strategic strongholds. The Government of Côte d'Ivoire has escalated its counterterrorism response, implementing enhanced security protocols and socio-economic initiatives aimed at strengthening the resilience of the northern regions.³ Côte d'Ivoire also dispatched military support to Burkina Faso to aid in countering the insurgent threat.⁴ In parallel, the United States has pledged to support the fight against terrorism in Côte d'Ivoire.⁵

5.3.2. EUTF IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Figure 23: EUTF portfolio in Côte d'Ivoire, June 2023^{6,7}



The EUTF has contracted €28.9M to two programmes in Côte d'Ivoire. 83% of the funds have been allocated to an employment-related programme (PSRE COVID⁸), whereas the remaining 17% have been allocated to a migration programme (*Etat Civil*⁹). As of June 2023, 62% of the budget has been spent, with 38% of the budget left to be spent. Compared to other countries, Côte d'Ivoire has the largest share of EUTF funds remaining to be spent.

Regional programmes have been implementing activities in the country as well. Eight regional programmes were funded, to support job creation and economic development (ARCHIPELAGO¹⁰ and

¹ World Bank, 'Côte d'Ivoire - Country Partnership Framework for the Period FY23-FY27', 2 February 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² UNHCR, 'UNHCR Côte d'Ivoire Dashboard: Situation Report on asylum seekers in the North', 19 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ ICG, 'Keeping Jihadists Out of Northern Côte d'Ivoire', 11 August 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ RFI, 'La Côte d'Ivoire livre du matériel militaire au Burkina Faso pour lutter contre l'insécurité', 18 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ RFI, 'Washington annonce une aide à la Côte d'Ivoire, au Togo et au Bénin contre le terrorisme', 8 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁷ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.


⁸ CI-03: *Programme de soutien et de relance à l'économie dans le contexte de la crise du COVID-19 en Côte d'Ivoire*.

⁹ CI-02: *Appui à la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale de l'état civil et de l'identification en Côte d'Ivoire*.

¹⁰ REG-15: ARCHIPELAGO: an African-European TVET initiative.

IPDEV2¹), migration management (Protection West Africa², *TEH Golfe de Guinée*³, EU-IOM Joint Initiative⁴, Erasmus+ West Africa⁵), security and governance (PEV⁶ and WAPIS⁷). In S1 2023, five regional programmes were still active, namely ARCHIPELAGO, IPDEV2, PEV, Protection West Africa and *TEH Golfe de Guinée*.

Figure 24: Selected EUTF outputs in Côte d'Ivoire, June 2023



Supporting the government's efforts towards economic development

The NDP 2021-25⁸ for Côte d'Ivoire is set to deliver access to essential services for the population and to bolster the private sector as the economy's driving force. Focusing on six key pillars, the plan aims to accelerate economic transformation through industrialisation and cluster development, enhance human capital and employment, stimulate private sector and investment growth, strengthen inclusion and social action, promote balanced regional development with environmental preservation and climate change mitigation, and reinforce governance alongside state modernisation and cultural transformation.

Two regional programmes, ARCHIPELAGO and IPDEV2, support the government's efforts towards economic development. ARCHIPELAGO facilitates partnerships between European and African Business Membership Organizations to provide vocational training aligned with the labour market, thus improving youth employability, and fostering entrepreneurial skills among managers of microenterprises and MSMEs. Meanwhile, IPDEV2 focuses on creating dedicated investment funds for startups and informal SMEs, which are pivotal for job creation and value addition. It aims to bolster MSME financing and support through seed funding, technical assistance, and a guarantee mechanism that mitigates investment losses and catalyses equity investments.

In the first half of 2023, these programmes showed remarkable success. 706 jobs were created (indicator 1.1), representing 46% of the total jobs created since the programmes' inception. This achievement included a diverse workforce, with 30% of the opportunities being secured by women. At the same time, 64 MSMEs were supported (indicator 1.2) in the sectors of agriculture, fishery, and livestock production. Lastly, 670 individuals benefitted from vocational education aimed at boosting industry, tourism, and service-related skills (indicator 1.4). This educational drive comprised 31% of all trainees reported under the programmes to date.

¹ REG-11: *Soutenir les entrepreneurs et les petites PME en Afrique de l'Ouest.*

² REG-13: *Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest.*

³ REG-12: *Appui à la Lutte contre la Traite des Personnes dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée.*

⁴ REG-08: Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Chad.


⁵ REG-05: Erasmus+ in West Africa and the Horn of Africa.

⁶ BF-08: *Rebâtir une cohésion sociale au Nord du Burkina à travers un meilleur suivi de la radicalisation, la promotion du dialogue et la valorisation de l'économie pastorale.*

⁷ REG-03: Support to the strengthening of police information systems in the broader West Africa region.

⁸ Gouvernement de Côte d'Ivoire, 'Plan National de Développement : 2021-2025', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

Figure 25: EUTF indicator 1.4, in Côte d'Ivoire, June 2023



5.3.2. CÔTE D'IVOIRE AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 5: EUTF common output indicators for Côte d'Ivoire, June 2023

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	Total	Evolution
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	0	71	2,375	722	706	3,874	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	0	9	182	65	64	320	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET) ...	0	0	0	1,024	462	670	2,156	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	0	0	0	6	0	0	6	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	0	0	0	142	237	0	379	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	0	0	23	25	0	48	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	0	0	0	36	240	460	736	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	4	3	2,344	1,336	1,630	746	6,063	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	12,400	41,852	9,881	3,094	86,533	18,811	172,571	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	5	11	307	4	0	0	327	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	3,778	1,927	885	1,462	0	0	8,052	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	1,625	1,149	1,263	1,659	107	0	5,803	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	0	1	1	2	0	4	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	129	664	692	429	1,914	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	64	55	36	0	0	155	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	10	343	102	0	1	5	461	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	0	0	0	15	0	0	15	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	0	0	17	0	0	17	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	0	0	10	740	890	337	1,977	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	0	0	0	2	109	12	123	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	0	1	3	2	5	0	11	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	0	0	4	42	1	47	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	0	0	1	4	4	2	11	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	0	1	2	1	0	4	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	

5.4. GHANA

5.4.1. GHANA IN S1 2023

Figure 26: Ghana – Key facts and figures, June 2023



In the first half of 2023, Ghana tried to control its macroeconomic crisis by engaging in debt restructuring and a \$3 billion IMF programme. Following debt acceleration, currency depreciation and spiralling inflation, Ghana had defaulted on most of its foreign debt in December 2022, when its overall public debt reached 88.1% of GDP. Because of higher interest rates on domestic debt compared to foreign debt, the former accounted for over 80% of the country's debt services.¹ To mitigate the financial burden of domestic debt, the government managed to exchange most local currency bonds for new bonds with longer maturities and lower interest rates in February.² At the same time, discussions led by France and China on bilateral foreign debt restructuring under the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments continued. Based on these processes, Ghana concluded a \$3 billion programme with the IMF in May, forcing President Akufo-Addo to give up on his promise of "Ghana beyond aid".³ The IMF programme foresees reforms in the areas of tax policy, revenue administration, and public financial management, while putting an end to monetary financing. A tightened monetary policy and flexible exchange rates are supposed to get inflation under control and rebuild international reserves.⁴

Negative per capita growth and high cost of living stalled the fight against poverty and food insecurity. According to IMF projections, real GDP per capita in 2023 was estimated to be negative (-1.1%, down from 1% in 2022). Notably, the economic crisis was most severe in non-extractive outputs (0.7% GDP growth), whereas extractive industries were expected to expand by 6.1%.⁵ One of the drivers of economic turmoil was high inflation. Most importantly, food inflation stood at 54%⁶ in June 2023 and annual average inflation is projected to reach 44% in 2023⁷, putting high pressure on household budgets. Between March and May, 1.4 million people in Ghana were food insecure⁸,

¹ IMF, 'Ghana: Request for an arrangement under the extended credit facility', 17 May 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² Business Insider Africa, 'Half of Ghana's \$7 Billion government debt has been erased', 31 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ France24, 'Ghana beyond aid' no longer: West Africa's former model student forced to turn to IMF', 21 May 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ IMF, 'Ghana: Frequently Asked Questions', 10 August 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ IMF, 'Ghana: Request for an arrangement under the extended credit facility', 17 May 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ WFP, 'Ghana Country Brief', 30 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ IMF, 'Ghana: Request for an arrangement under the extended credit facility', 17 May 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


⁸ *Cadre Harmonisé*, 'Ghana: Results of the Current (March to May 2023) and Projected (June to August 2023) Acute Food Security and Nutrition Analysis', 25 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

compared to 0.4 million between January and May last year.¹ In the same vein, poverty was projected to increase in 2023 as a result of heightened electricity and water tariffs, rising food prices and an increase in the value-added tax. The macroeconomic crisis thus directly affected the more vulnerable segments of society, who spend a larger share of their income on food.²

Meanwhile, the security crisis in Burkina Faso increasingly affected the northern part of Ghana. Most importantly, 8,000 refugees from Burkina Faso have crossed the border into the Ghanaian Upper East and Upper West regions. In the Upper East Region, which was most affected by new arrivals, authorities set up a reception centre to deal with the influx of refugees.³ Although Ghana has been spared from jihadist violence, unlike neighbouring Togo and Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana's defence minister warned about the threat of terrorism in the northeast of the country.⁴ After a security incident in April in the border town of Bawku, which suffered from long-standing inter-communal conflict, the government deployed 1,000 special forces to the border region.⁵

5.4.2. THE EUTF IN GHANA

Figure 27: EUTF portfolio in Ghana, June 2023^{6,7}



The EUTF has contracted two programmes amounting to €24.6M in Ghana. The GrEEn programme⁸ focuses on supporting the creation of green employment and enterprise opportunities (SO1). It accounts for 80% of the funding and is implemented through two projects (GrEEn SNV and GrEEn UNCDF). The other programme pertains to migration management (SO3) and aims to strengthen local and national capacity for migration and border management (Border Security GH⁹). Both programmes have been extended and are now expected to come to an end in 2024.

¹ *Cadre Harmonisé* and IPC estimations for West and Central Africa, January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² World Bank, 'Ghana Macro Poverty Outlook', 5 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Voice of Africa, 'UNHCR Concerned About Forced Repatriation of Burkinabe Refugees from Ghana', 13 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ France24, 'Attempted bombing in north Ghana fuels jihadist fears', 9 February 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Voice of Africa, 'Ghana Beefs Up Security Near Burkina Border as Ethnic War Attracts Terrorists', 7 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


⁶ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁷ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁸ GH-02: Boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in Ghana.

⁹ GH-01: Strengthening Border Security in Ghana.

Figure 28: Selected EUTF outputs in Ghana, June 2023



Border management in an increasingly volatile environment

Because of escalating violence in Burkina Faso, border management became an increasing concern in northern Ghana. While border security is a key component of preventing the spread of violent extremism into Ghanaian territory, many livelihoods in the area depend on cross-border activities.¹ A recent IOM security perception assessment conducted between August and November 2022 among border residents in six communities in northern Ghana found that 71% of the respondents had crossed the border in the past for commercial reasons. When asked about their perception of security problems encountered at the border, 61% mentioned smuggling of goods, 50% livestock and crop theft, and 42% attacks by armed bandits. In addition, 69% of respondents thought that the measures taken to secure the border were sufficient, whereas 14% judged them to be insufficient.² It is notable that the figures varied considerably between the communities which were included in the poll.


The Border Security GH programme worked with the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) to strengthen their capacities, provide them equipment, and reinforce their accountability. In the first half of 2023, the programme provided 550 items of border patrol equipment to increase the GIS's operational and reaction capacities (indicator 4.1 bis). While most of the equipment was delivered to the headquarters in Accra, 36% and 18% of the items were distributed to the Service's staff in the Bono region, which borders Côte d'Ivoire, and the Upper East region, bordering Burkina Faso, respectively. Furthermore, the programme supported the elaboration of a code of conduct and reporting mechanism

¹ IOM, 'Country Strategy for Ghana 2022-2025', 26 July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² IOM, 'A security perception / vulnerability assessment in selected border communities in Northern Ghana', 17 May 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

for the GIS during a workshop in June. The new policy aims to improve internal ethics and transparency, as well as strengthen internal and external mechanisms to report incidents of misconduct.

Figure 29: EUTF indicator 4.1 bis, in Ghana, June 2023



The programme also supported Ghanaian CSOs’ and universities’ capacities to engage in border-related discussions and activities. Four grantees were selected from the programme’s demand-driven facility’s second call for proposals to implement projects related to border management and mobility. One of the proposals is implemented by Bok Africa Concern and focuses on concerted action in border management, awareness raising on irregular migration and trafficking, as well as promoting economic empowerment in the Bono and Bono East regions. In the first half of 2023, Bok Africa Concern reached 10,369 people (indicator 3.3) through 37 in-person awareness raising events (indicator 3.11) on migration. Additionally, 13 associations or clubs received trainings to improve their leadership capacities (indicator 3.6). Because of delays in the approval and preparation of the projects under the second call for proposals, most results are expected for the second half of 2023 and first half of 2024.

Climate-resilient infrastructure investments on the local level

Investment gaps for climate change adaptation, especially at the local level, are on the rise in Ghana. Climate change has led to an increased frequency of floods, droughts, and heatwaves in the country. Since 1960, the average annual mean temperature has increased by around 1°C and floodings affect some 45,000 Ghanaians every year and the effects of climate change are projected to increase further. By 2050, the annual average loss due to floods could double to \$200M and total rainfall could decline by 12%, according to pessimistic models. The World Bank estimates that a climate resilient and low carbon development pathway would require around \$2 billion in additional investments every year.¹ Investment gaps are particularly large at the local level, for which 70% of climate change adaptation programmes between 2013 and 2021 could not be completed successfully because of limited financing.² Ghana’s 2021 updated Nationally Determined Contribution outlines 13 programmes of action on adaptation, such as building resilience and promoting livelihood opportunities for youth and


¹ World Bank, ‘Ghana: Country Climate and Development Report’, October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² APRI, ‘Climate Change Adaptation in Ghana: Strategies, Initiatives, and Practices’, 6 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

women in climate-vulnerable agriculture landscapes and food systems. Investment needs for this programme alone amount to \$1.9 billion.¹

In the first half of 2023, the GrEEn UNCDF project² supported 29 climate resilient infrastructures in 10 Ghanaian districts in Ashanti and Western Regions (indicator 2.1 bis). One of the project's objectives is to promote green and climate-resilient local economic development. To achieve this objective, GrEEn UNCDF developed a performance-based climate resilience grant system to channel climate finance from international, private and diaspora sources to the local level. Taking advantage of this new system, local policy makers selected infrastructure projects based on district-specific vulnerability assessments and local adaptation planning. Most of the infrastructures focused on water and sanitation (e. g. pipe culverts, storm drains, boreholes, hand pumps) but they also included open market sheds and a footbridge. During the three-month construction period, 663 workers, including 65 returnees, benefitted from temporary employment through a cash-for-work scheme. As a result of the interventions, some 120,151 people in the ten targeted districts benefitted from improved access to basic services (indicator 2.9).

Figure 30: EUTF indicator 2.1 bis, in Ghana, June 2023



¹ Republic of Ghana, 'Updated Nationally Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement (2020-2030)', September 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² GH-02-02: Boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in Ghana.

5.4.3. GHANA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 6: EUTF common output indicators for Ghana, June 2023

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	Total	Evolution
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	0	2	2,132	4,463	390	6,987	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	0	5	696	1,151	1,858	3,710	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	0	0	79	10,622	100,801	2,889	114,391	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	0	5	679	8,533	73,416	12,572	95,205	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	0	0	0	10	0	0	10	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	0	0	0	12	0	29	41	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	0	0	0	62	93	0	155	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	0	0	280	160,000	1,803	162,083	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	0	0	90,156	0	120,151	210,307	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	0	0	0	3	2	0	5	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	0	0	5	7	0	0	12	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	3,164	25,290	826,213	4,655	60	21,742	881,124	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	0	0	5	17	0	0	22	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	843	298	753	185	11	0	2,090	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	177	268	444	598	53	0	1,540	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	0	2	2	1	13	18	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	235	519	468	175	1,397	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	5	88	64	64	4	0	225	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	29	57	203	6	3	37	335	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	0	31	0	70	550	651	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	140	40	49	805	127	23	1,184	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	0	0	0	29	70	0	99	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	0	19	173	109	0	301	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	0	0	2	10	13	3	28	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	0	13	4	40	3	60	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	1	0	0	3	1	0	5	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	32,000	0	0	0	32,000	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	7,000	182,763	0	0	189,763	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	10	10	0	0	20	

5.5. GUINEA

5.5.1. GUINEA IN S1 2023

Figure 31: Guinea – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2023



In the first half of 2023, Guinea's transitional period saw significant developments. In February 2023, Colonel Mamady Doumbouya launched the drafting of a new Constitution and declared his intention to step down at the end of 2024.¹ Regardless, in May 2023, the *Force Vives* of Guinea (FVG) -a coalition of opposition parties, trade unions, and NGOs- organised demonstrations against the military rule demanding the start of a credible dialogue towards restoring civilian rule. These demonstrations escalated into violence, resulting in at least two fatalities and 50 injured.² During the demonstrations, the authorities released three FNDC³ leaders who had been detained since July 2022 and January 2023.⁴

In response to these dynamics, the President of the African Union (AU) made a visit to Guinea in June⁵, signalling the AU's commitment to reinforcing civilian governance and its readiness to support Guinea's transition back to constitutional rule. The visit served as a reminder to the transitional government to honour its commitments in line with the roadmap agreed upon with ECOWAS.

Since Frontex began recording data in 2009, a total of 73,219 Guineans has been documented as entering Europe through irregular means. 2016-2018 was a peak period, with arrivals representing 22%, 18% and 18% of all arrivals year on year. After a decrease, the first half of 2023 alone saw 8,954 recorded irregular entries by Guineans into Europe, suggesting a potential return to peak migration figures. Most of these recent arrivals came from the Central Mediterranean Route (88%) while only 9% arrived through the Western Mediterranean Route.^{6,7}

Amidst these migration trends, Guinea's transitional government is prioritising the implementation of the National Migration Policy (2021), which engages various ministries and civil society entities. One of

¹ *Jeune Afrique*, 'Mamadi Doumbouya réaffirme qu'il quittera le pouvoir à la fin de la transition', 22 February 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² Amnesty International, 'Guinée : Amnesty International demande une enquête sur les morts par balle lors du rassemblement des Forces vives', 12 May 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ The FNDC is the *Front national pour la défense de la constitution*, the National Front for the Defence of the Constitution in English. The FNDC had notably protested constitutional changes for a third presidential term in 2019.

⁴ *Jeune Afrique*, 'En Guinée, trois figures du FNDC relaxées par la justice', 14 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ RFI, 'Guinée: le chef de la junte reçoit le président de l'UA qui n'oublie pas la transition promise', 25 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


⁶ Frontex, 'Monitoring and Risk Analysis'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ The remaining 3% travelled through other routes.

this policy's key goals is to harness the Guinean diaspora's contribution to the nation's socio-economic growth, by leveraging both their human and financial capital. In March, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Integration, and Guineans Abroad launched the National Consultation Framework on Migration, which is tasked with the comprehensive and effective execution of the National Migration Policy.¹

5.5.2. THE EUTF IN GUINEA

Figure 32: EUTF portfolio in Guinea, June 2023^{2,3}



The EUTF has contracted €73.0M to three programmes in Guinea. 82% of the funds have been allocated to an employment-related programme (INTEGRA⁴), 11% to a resilience programme (RESIGUI⁵) and 7% to a governance programme (*Etat Civil GN*⁶). As of June 2023, 80% of the budget has been spent, with 20% of the budget left to be spent.

In S1 2023, five programmes were active in Guinea: two national programmes (INTEGRA and *Etat Civil*) and three regional programmes (IPDEV2⁷, Protection West Africa⁸, *TEH Golfe de Guinée*⁹). Of the regional programmes, IPDEV2 supported economic development (SO1), Protection West Africa and *TEH Golfe de Guinée* supported migration management (SO3).

¹ IOM, 'IOM Welcomes Guinea's First Ever Migration Governance Framework', 15 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

³ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁴ GN-01: *Programme d'appui à l'intégration socio-économique des jeunes en République de Guinée.*

⁵ GN-04: *Améliorer la résilience des populations vulnérables de Guinée.*


⁶ GN-05: *Projet pilote d'amélioration des performances de l'état civil guinéen par le recours à la digitalisation.*

⁷ REG-11: *Soutenir les entrepreneurs et les petites PME en Afrique de l'Ouest.*

⁸ REG-13: *Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest.*

⁹ REG-12: *Appui à la Lutte contre la Traite des Personnes dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée.*

Figure 33: Selected EUTF outputs in Guinea, June 2023



Supporting youth employment

Approximately 70% of Guinea's population is under the age of 30¹, highlighting its young demographic profile. With a poverty rate estimated at 43.8% in 2023², prioritising investment in young people remains a crucial strategy for accelerating poverty alleviation.

The National Rally and Development Committee (CNRD), Guinea's transitional military junta, released the Interim Reference Programme 2022-2025.³ This programme sets out the priorities of the government during the duration of the transition. It emphasises the reduction of socio-economic inequalities, with a focus on job creation and the promotion of gender equity.

The EUTF facilitates the economic integration of Guinean youth through two key programmes: INTEGRA and IPDEV2. INTEGRA is designed to promote the sustainable socio-professional integration of young Guineans through activities including cash-for-work, skills development, support to entrepreneurship, and access to finance. Meanwhile, IPDEV2 focuses on creating dedicated investment funds for startups and informal SMEs, which are pivotal for job creation and value addition. Both programmes align closely with the Guinean government's focus on creating economic opportunities for the youth.

In the first half of 2023, both INTEGRA and IPDEV2 continued to support job creation in Guinea. INTEGRA was responsible for nearly all employment results, accounting for 99% of the total 3,083 jobs created in S1 2023, complemented by IPDEV2. Most of the S1 2023 jobs (98%) were permanent, long-

¹ Global Data Lab, 'Guinea Population', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


² World Bank, 'Macro-poverty Outlook: Guinea', October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ République de Guinée, 'Programme de Référence Intérimaire de la Transition', 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

term positions (indicator 1.1). They were created by funding entrepreneurial ventures and MSMEs, and providing technical and vocational training that directly led to employment opportunities. The jobs were spread across Conakry (49% of jobs) and other regions (Kindia - 10%, Labé - 19%, Mamou - 22%), showcasing the geographical reach of these initiatives.

In the same period, 3,543 individuals benefitted from TVET and skills development programmes (indicator 1.4). These were delivered through a mix of training sessions, internships brokered via public-private partnerships, and capacity building of vocational training institutes. These measures not only prepare youth for the job market but also ensure they are equipped with skills that are relevant to market needs. Recognising the need for gender inclusion, women represented almost half of the beneficiaries in job creation (46%) and skills development (43%) activities this semester, aligning with the government's commitment to gender equity.

Figure 34: EUTF indicator 1.1, in Guinea, June 2023



5.5.3. GUINEA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 7: EUTF common output indicators for Guinea, June 2023

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	Total	Evolution
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	55	1,363	1,080	3,074	3,083	8,654	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	444	1,058	443	907	864	3,716	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	0	1,246	1,278	10	0	0	2,534	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	0	2,026	4,551	16,479	3,413	3,543	30,012	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	0	3	2	1	8	1	15	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	1	0	0	128	3	0	132	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	0	0	0	1,366	4,128	0	5,494	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	0	0	17,996	0	0	17,996	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	0	0	0	827	0	0	827	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	0	8,787	14,864	8,439	0	32,090	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	0	74	0	1,779	116	0	1,969	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	0	6,975	108,535	50,580	0	166,090	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	1	3	36	2,315	5,027	123	7,505	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	21,155	21,161	5,967	9,652	24,585	757	83,277	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	1	5	11	9	0	0	26	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	9,271	3,958	2,972	3,098	0	0	19,299	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	2,898	1,908	1,809	6,787	519	0	13,921	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	174	1	1	1	3	180	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	1,047	536	644	57	2,284	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	672	107	91	50	35	0	955	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	0	0	0	8	0	8	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	0	0	0	2	2	0	4	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	8	1	3	73	450	535	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	0	8	1	6	4	4	23	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	15	1	12	12	0	40	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	0	36	0	0	0	1	37	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	23,015	2,106	0	0	25,121	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	4,035	1,053	0	0	5,088	

5.6. MALI

5.6.1. MALI IN S1 2023

Figure 35: Mali – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2023



In the first half of 2023, the country's political situation remained tense. The government has been led by interim president colonel Assimi Goïta since the coup d'état in 2021. The transition calendar, which outlines the stages which will lead the country to a civilian and elected government, has known a few adjustments and delays in the last two years. In October 2022 a new Constitution was elaborated, and a referendum date was set for March 2023. This date was not observed, but two months later, in May, the Government announced that the vote would take place on 18 June.¹ The Constitution was finally presented and approved with 97% of the votes in favour.² However, this Constitution does not have unanimous support among civilians, political opponents, and some religious leaders. In fact, most of the population did not vote in the referendum: only about a third of the eligible population (38%) voted in the referendum.³ Voting was hampered in some regions due to the fear of terrorist attacks or obstruction by opponents. This was the case for example in the northern region of Kidal, which is a stronghold of the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA).⁴

The transition Government confirmed its diplomatic stance distancing itself from France and western institutions whilst fostering closer ties with Russia. For instance, the new Constitution removes the use of the French language as official language. At the same time, on 24 February, Mali showed its support to Russia when it was one of the seven countries that voted against the UN Resolution calling for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine. More significantly, after declaring *persona non grata* and expelling the head of MINUSMA's human rights section⁵ at the beginning of the year, on 16 June, Mali asked for the immediate withdrawal of MINUSMA.⁶ On 30 June, the United Nations Security Council unanimously voted the end of its ten-year peacekeeping mission in Mali.⁷

¹ Maliactu, 'Mali : Le référendum constitutionnel fixé au 18 juin 2023', 5 May 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² RFI, 'Mali's new constitution adopted after court validation', 22 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Cour Constitutionnelle du Mali, 'ARRET N° 2023-08 CC/Réf du 21 juillet 2023 portant proclamation des résultats définitifs du referendum du 18 juin 2023', 21 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Africanews, 'Mali : autorités et observateurs divisés sur le référendum à Kidal', 20 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ RFI, 'Le chef de la division droits de l'homme de la MINUSMA expulsé du Mali', 6 February 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ France 24, 'Le Mali réclame le retrait immédiat de la MINUSMA, la mission de l'ONU', 16 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ UN, 'Security Council Terminates Mandate of United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2690 (2023)', 30 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

The CMA's armed groups consider MINUSMA a crucial actor in the implementation of the Peace Agreement signed with the government in 2015: within the Peace Agreement's framework, MINUSMA was one of the actors in charge of monitoring the parties' compliance with the ceasefire on the ground. The CMA fears that the Malian army, backed by Russians, could take advantage of the peacekeeping Mission's withdrawal to attempt to regain control of the northern regions.¹ Thus, the Mission's planned departure further fuelled tensions between the government and the northern armed groups, which had been rising since the beginning of 2023 despite Algerian mediation as each side accuses the other of not committing to the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali² that binds them.³

Violent events and violence against civilians have been on the rise, mostly driven by the country's main armed actors, including the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA), mercenary groups such as the Wagner Group, and militant jihadist groups such as *Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin* (JNIM) and the Islamic State - Sahel Province (ISSP).⁴ These events increasingly affected the central and southern regions of the country in S1 2023. In particular, Kayes and Tombouctou faced as many violent events in the first half of 2023 as in all of 2022.⁵

In addition, in the beginning of 2023, Mali faced harsh weather conditions, which impacted both nomadic and sedentary agricultural activities. Severe drought, fertilizer shortages, water accessibility challenges and insect infestations affected some of the most important agricultural production, such as livestock farming and cotton production.⁶ Mali, which was the top regional cotton producer in 2022, fell to the third place in early 2023, with a near 50% decline in production, plummeting from 777,000 tons in 2022 to 390,000 tons in 2023.⁷

Armed conflict and severe weather conditions persistently impacted the population's living conditions, prompting displacements, as people sought safety and more favourable conditions for agricultural activities. UNHCR reported that 375,539 people had been displaced as of April 2023, and that 8.8 million people were in need of life-saving humanitarian assistance.⁸

¹ RFI, 'Mali: le départ de la MINUSMA, « un coup fatal contre l'accord de paix », selon les groupes armés signataires', 22 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² *Accord sur la paix et la réconciliation au Mali*.

³ Jeune Afrique, 'Accord de paix au Mali : « La moindre étincelle peut faire dégénérer la situation »', 13 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ ACLED, 'Fact Sheet: Attacks on Civilians Spike in Mali as Security Deteriorates Across the Sahel', 21 September 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ ACLED, ACLED Dashboard, consulted in November 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


⁶ World Bank, 'World Bank Says Mali's Economy Showed Signs of Resilience Despite Sanctions and Climate Shocks', 26 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ MaliJet, 'Production cotonnière 2022-2023 en zone PR-PICA : le Mali classé 3^e', 19 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ UNHCR, 'Mali: Situation of Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Returnees as of 30 June 2023', 30 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

5.6.2. THE EUTF IN MALI

Figure 36: EUTF portfolio in Mali, June 2023^{1,2}



Since its launch, the EUTF has contracted €288.4M in Mali, 88% of which have already been spent as of 30 June 2023. Most of the funds have been allocated to governance and conflict-prevention (SO4 - 49%) and resilience programmes (SO2 - 31%). The remaining 14% and 6% of the funding, focused respectively on economic and employment opportunities (SO1) and migration-related programmes (SO3).

The EUTF has funded 13 programmes in Mali, 6 of which were still running in the first semester of 2023, with two programmes ending during the semester, Migration ML³ and POC Mali⁴, both focusing on migration. Four programmes will continue in the second half of 2023: PST-ML⁵, which represents 21% of the total EUTF funds in Mali, Diaspora Mali⁶ (last programme working on SO1), PROJES⁷ (last programme focusing on SO2 and representing 48% of SO2 funds in Mali) and PARSEC⁸, last programme, along with PST-ML⁹ pertaining to SO4.

In addition to national programmes, 17 regional programmes have implemented activities in Mali, 6 of which were still active in S1 2023.

¹ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

² This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

³ ML-07: *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Mali.*

⁴ ML-13: *Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint, de lutte contre l'immigration irrégulière, le trafic de migrants et la traite des êtres humains en République du Mali.*

⁵ ML-14: *Programme de soutien à la transition en République du Mali.*


⁶ ML-15: *Projet d'appui aux investissements de la diaspora malienne dans les régions d'origine.*

⁷ ML-10: *Programme Jeunesse et Stabilisation – régions du centre du Mali.*

⁸ ML-06: *Programme d'Appui au Renforcement de la Sécurité dans les régions de Mopti et Gao et à la gestion des zones frontalières.*

⁹ ML-14: *Programme de soutien à la transition en République du Mali.*

Figure 37: Situation in Mali and EUTF outputs – as of June 2023¹



Improving governance through capacity building on electoral monitoring

Amid various changes in the transition calendar stages, and with very short notice, the EUTF-funded programme PST-ML² managed to train 8,823 staff from governmental institutions, internal security forces and relevant non-state actors on governance, conflict prevention and human rights (indicator 4.2) during the first half of 2023. This is the highest number of people reached by this kind of action in a semester in Mali since the EUTF's launch, bringing to 20,769 the total number of beneficiaries. Among these 8,823 persons, 5,712 electoral agents were trained through a cascade training programme led by the electoral management body³ and supported by the PST-PAREM project⁴. Another 3,000 people from civil society and non-governmental organisations were trained on citizen electoral observation by the PST-*Observation Citoyenne* project⁵: 41% of women and 59% of men. These 3,000 observers were deployed to all regions to supervise the vote on the day of the referendum. However, electoral observation could not take place in Kidal, as opponents obstructed the vote there.

¹ Is considered low human development any score below 0.55. In 2021, Mali's global HDI was 0.428 and the World's HDI was 0.732.

² ML-14: *Programme de soutien à la transition en République du Mali*.


³ *Organe de gestion des élections* (OGE).

⁴ ML-14-01: *Projet d'Appui aux Réformes et aux Élection au Mali*.

⁵ ML-14-02: *Projet d'appui à l'observation citoyenne du cycle électoral de la transition 2020-2024 au Mali*.

PST-ML showed adaptability and responsiveness considering the political situation and the multiple changes in the transition calendar. *PST-Observation Citoyenne* reoriented its activities to follow political developments in the country. For example, in periods when there were no elections and no possibilities to implement electoral observation activities, the project adapted its interventions, promoting citizen monitoring of the political situation and building capacity on electoral/democratic culture.

Figure 38: EUTF indicator 4.2, in Mali, June 2023



Awareness-raising and capacity building on the prevention of malnutrition

Malnutrition remains a major public health concern in Mali. As of May 2023, 760,887 people, were still in a situation of food crisis or worse, especially in the regions of Mopti (27%) and Gao (36%).¹ Mali has taken part in various regional initiatives and adopted successive national policies on the matter to address the issue. In May 2019, a National Policy for food security and nutrition 2019-2028 was adopted with the objective of ensuring food security for the Malian population, improving the nutritional situation of the most vulnerable groups, and increasing their resilience.²

The EUTF addresses this issue through two approaches: food security and nutrition assistance. In the first half of 2023, 74,785 people were reached by food security assistance (indicator 2.4) by PST-ML³ as the programme provided safety nets through unconditional cash transfers to meet people’s immediate food needs.

EUTF-funded programmes also emphasised prevention of malnutrition. In the first semester of 2023, 27,946 people benefitted from nutrition assistance (indicator 2.3), mainly in Gao (36% of beneficiaries) and Mopti (27% of beneficiaries) regions.⁴ This represents a 29% increase compared to the previous semester (+39% in Gao and +169% in Mopti). The PDU programme⁵ helped screen 12,613

¹ Cadre harmonisé, 'Mali - Résultats de l'analyse de la situation de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë actuelle et projetée', 18 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² République du Mali, 'Politique Nationale de Sécurité Alimentaire et de Nutrition (PoINSAN)', May 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

³ ML-14: Programme de soutien à la transition en République du Mali.


⁴ 1% of the people were reached in Timbuktu, and the other 35% in unspecified regions.

⁵ REG-18: Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.

children (6,435 girls and 6,178 boys) for malnutrition. Most of them were in the regions of Gao (9,598) and Mopti (2,599). At the same time, PST-Resilience¹ delivered vouchers or monetary transfers to prevent malnutrition to 9,876 people: 1,550 girls, 1,490 boys and 6,836 pregnant and lactating women.

Efforts were also made towards resilience-building practices by strengthening the communities' abilities to detect and prevent malnutrition: **112,870 people were reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience-building practices and basic rights (indicator 2.7)**, including 96,982 on nutrition and food security. Most of the people reached benefitted from face-to-face trainings and in person trainings and demonstrations (95%). Women were highly involved (representing 84% of the beneficiaries), especially pregnant, breastfeeding, or of childbearing age women (totalling 30,357 women, or 31% of the overall beneficiaries). The training sessions aimed to tackle infant and young child feeding issues (25,413) and to train participants on the mid-upper arm circumference approach (19,853).

Figure 39: EUTF indicator 2.3, in Mali, June 2023



¹ ML-14-12: Résilience et développement durable sur la bande agropastorale du Mali.

5.6.3. MALI AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 8: EUTF common output indicators for Mali, June 2023

Indicateur FFU	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	Total	Evolution
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	2,198	1,307	2,927	1,231	36	7,699	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	950	1,664	718	575	37	2	3,946	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	18,499	30,552	20,574	55,860	5,753	2,757	133,995	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	3,689	5,511	5,998	9,229	1,636	337	26,400	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	7	58	19	40	0	0	124	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	0	0	0	0	9	0	9	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	248	241	120	739	99	74	1,521	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	3,813	2,344	1,290	11,210	222,836	7,252	248,745	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	108,815	190,481	63,346	17,883	39,029	27,946	447,500	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	38,880	69,426	56,314	22,561	154,307	74,785	416,273	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	10	2	0	0	0	0	12	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	5,133	4,736	4,152	17,512	12	0	31,545	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	31,343	176,408	314,206	544,346	2,032,311	112,870	3,211,484	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	633	5,124	364	678	1,032	356	8,187	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	1,749,378	284,844	233,291	176,144	271,786	18,491	2,733,933	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	0	0	21	9	15	0	45	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and DPs protected...	6,088	3,021	1,692	18,191	17,299	71	46,362	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	0	91,476	42,729	218,702	72,561	543	426,011	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	1,885	981	349	321	0	0	3,536	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	9,612	6,212	2,292	2,879	0	0	20,995	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	2,046	4,364	3,111	3,723	20	0	13,264	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	3	19	18	23	0	0	63	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	25	0	281	1,247	254	56	1,863	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	2	14	6	9	0	0	31	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	0	0	31	33	5	0	69	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	3	2	3	2	2	0	13	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	837	6	1,318	4,777	2,726	695	10,359	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	610	1,930	1,074	3,969	4,218	8,878	20,679	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	265	1,342	2,070	13,975	142,464	20,227	180,343	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	37	381	134	290	388	6	1,236	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	12	26	53	270	148	0	509	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	17	16	808	426	1,008	4	2,279	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	34	26	15	396	400	194	1,065	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	8	0	8	3	2	2	23	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	102,641	0	0	0	102,641	

5.7. MAURITANIA

5.7.1. MAURITANIA IN S1 2023

Figure 40: Mauritania – Key facts and figures, June 2023



In May 2023, President Mouhamed Ould Ghazouani's party, El Insaf, won the parliamentary, regional and local elections, which were considered an important test for the 2024 presidential elections. The presidential party won 107 out of 176 seats in the National Assembly and dominated the regional and local elections.¹ El Insaf also won a majority in the Nouakchott municipal council for the first time. After the elections, the opposition accused the ruling party of massive election fraud and called for protests.² Although President Mouhamed Ould Ghazouani has not announced his candidacy for the upcoming presidential elections yet, observers expect that he will run for a second term.³

Thanks to a good rainy season, fewer people were expected to be food insecure in 2023, although food prices remained high. During the 2023 lean season (June to August), 472,275 people were projected to be food insecure⁴, whereas during the 2022 lean season, 878,921 people were estimated to be food insecure⁵ Cereal production was expected to rise by 10% compared to 2022 and yields were expected to be 35% above the average of the last five years, ensuring a supply of staple foods to households. Despite the anticipated increase in cereal production, food prices remained exceptionally high because of diminished imports and undersupplied world markets following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. For example, the price of wheat on the Mauritanian market increased by 63% in 2023, in comparison to the previous five years' average.⁶ The World Bank estimated that inflation would remain elevated in Mauritania in 2023 (6%) and only drop in subsequent years (2024: 3%, 2025: 2%).⁷

¹ AfricaNews, 'Mauritania: Ruling party confirms landslide victory in second round of legislative elections', 29 May 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² Jeune Afrique, 'Élections en Mauritanie : face à Ghazouani, l'opposition se rebiffe', 26 May 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Le Monde, 'Triple scrutin en Mauritanie : large victoire du parti au pouvoir', 22 May 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Cadre Harmonisé, 'Mauritanie : Résultats de l'analyse de la situation de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë actuelle', 18 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


⁵ WFP, 'Mauritania Country Brief', 28 July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Cadre Harmonisé, 'Mauritanie : Résultats de l'analyse de la situation de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë actuelle', 18 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ World Bank, 'Mauritania Macro Poverty Outlook', October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

5.7.2. THE EUTF IN MAURITANIA

Figure 41: EUTF portfolio in Mauritania, June 2023^{1,2}



The EUTF has contracted €81.5M to programmes in Mauritania. 36% of the funds were spent on security and governance (SO4), through two completed programmes: Nexus SRD³, which supported Mauritanian institutions on the security-resilience-development nexus, and CORIM⁴, which supported deradicalisation efforts. Another 33% of the budget was contracted to programmes focusing on economic and employment opportunities (SO1): PECOBAT, Promopêche GIZ/ILO and Promopêche AECID⁵ aim to support job creation and technical training focusing on high-potential sectors such as fishing and construction. Finally, programmes on migration management (SO3: AFIA, EU-IOM JI Mauritania and POC MR⁶) and strengthening resilience (SO2: SAFIRE⁷) comprise respectively 19% and 12% of EUTF funding. As of mid-2023, five programmes have been completed; two more were meant to come to an end in the second half of 2023 and two were planned to continue into 2024.

¹ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

² This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

³ MR-08: *L'UE pour le nexus sécurité-résilience-développement en Mauritanie.*


⁴ MR-06: *Résilience pour la cohésion sociale et culturelle en République Islamique de Mauritanie.*

⁵ MR-01: *Programme de renforcement de la résilience des communautés urbaines et rurales vulnérables en Mauritanie*; MR-04: *Création d'emplois décents et consolidation de l'emploi existant pour les jeunes et potentiels migrants dans le secteur de la pêche artisanale*; MR-05: *Promotion de l'emploi et amélioration des conditions de vie des pêcheurs artisanaux côtiers, jeunes et femmes aux alentours des espaces naturels protégés du secteur nord de Mauritanie.*

⁶ MR-02: *Renforcement des capacités pour une meilleure gestion de la migration afin de protéger l'enfance migrante contre l'exploitation et la traite*; MR-03: *Contribuer au renforcement de la gouvernance et de la gestion des migrations et des frontières, et faciliter la protection, le retour et la réintégration durable de migrants en Mauritanie*; MR-09: *Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint pour la Mauritanie.*

⁷ MR-07: *Programme de renforcement de la résilience des communautés urbaines et rurales vulnérables en Mauritanie.*

Figure 42: Selected EUTF outputs in Mauritania, June 2023



Increasing economic resilience through financial inclusion and skills development

In the first semester of 2023, the Mauritanian economy remained vulnerable to external shocks due to limited diversification and low investments in human and physical capital. Although in the first half of the year the country started to leave behind the economic difficulties related to high imported inflation, its external vulnerability remained high. Mauritania's economy depends largely on extractives and suffers from low access to finance in non-extractive sectors such as fishery and agriculture.¹ Obstacles to access financial resources are particularly high for households and the informal sector. As of 2022, only 20% of Mauritians above the age of 15 had an account at a financial institution and only 10% had a mobile money account. To save money, 18% used a savings club or a person outside the family, 9% used a financial institution, and 2% used a mobile money account.² The country's strategy of accelerated growth and shared prosperity (SCAPP) 2016-2030 aims at strong, sustainable, and inclusive growth, by strengthening access to finance for SMEs, microenterprises, and the population, amongst others.³ In 2021, the Parliament adopted a new law on electronic payment services to enhance access to low-value, transactional payment services.⁴

¹ World Bank 'Mauritania Macro Poverty Outlook', 4 October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² World Bank, 'The Global Findex Database 2021', dataset downloaded in October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


³ Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances, 'Stratégie Nationale de Croissance Accélérée et de Prospérité Partagée SCAPP 2016-2030', 1 January 2016. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ IMF, 'Staff Report for the 2022 Article IV Consultation and Requests for 42-Month Arrangements under the Extended Credit Facility and the Extended Fund Facility', December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

In the first half of 2023, the SAFIRE GRET project¹ facilitated the participation of 1,246 people in Savings and Internal Lending Communities (SILC) in southern Mauritania (indicator 1.3). SILC are groups of 5 to 30 people who jointly save money, which allows the participants to take out small loans or finance joint investments in productive activities. The funds are administered autonomously by the group through democratic decision-making. For instance, members decide on the amounts to be regularly saved, the conditions to take out loans, and the admission of new members. SAFIRE GRET trained SILC counsellors, sensitised the population on the approach, facilitated the constitution of the groups, and accompanied their organisation and the management of funds in the wilayas of Brakna, Trarza, Gorgol and Nouakchott. The project thus contributed to bridging the access to finance gap among vulnerable populations in Mauritania. Since its beginning, the project has helped establish SILC for 1,900 beneficiaries.

Promopêche AECID provided training and material support to Mauritanian artisanal fishermen and fish processing workers, further developing a key sector for economic diversification. In Mauritania, the fishery sector contributes 9% of GDP and 16% of public revenue.² Investments into infrastructure, value chains, and human capital are needed³ to integrate the fishery sector into the national and global economy while assuring its economic and environmental sustainability (SCAPP 2016-2030).⁴ Promopêche AECID aims to strengthen artisanal fishing in a sustainable way to foster employment and income generation. In the first half of 2023, the project provided material to 793 men and 49 women (indicator 1.3) and trained 284 men and 120 women – more than in any previous semester – (indicator 1.4) in the artisanal fishing sector. Trainings focused on techniques for artisanal fishing (55%), fish processing and selling (20%), as well as interdisciplinary competences (15%). Most beneficiaries were trained in nationally accredited institutions (76%). Since the beginning of the project, 807 women and 639 men have benefitted from professional training and skills development.

Figure 43: EUTF indicator 1.3, in Mauritania, June 2023



¹ MR-07-03: *Projet d'appui à l'inclusion économique et sociale pour la stabilité et l'emploi des jeunes en Mauritanie – PIESSE (SAFIRE PIESSE)*.

² Jeune Afrique, 'Pour la pêche en Mauritanie, un seul défi : la transformation', 11 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Jeune Afrique, 'Pour la pêche en Mauritanie, un seul défi : la transformation', 11 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances, 'Stratégie Nationale de Croissance Accélérée et de Prospérité Partagée SCAPP 2016-2030', 1 January 2016. Retrieved [here](#).

5.7.2. MAURITANIA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 9: EUTF common output indicators for Mauritania, June 2023

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	Total	Evolution
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	46	325	1,888	1,078	869	323	4,528	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	18	468	595	520	4	1,605	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	5,160	7,678	4,205	5,890	3,330	2,101	28,364	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	533	1,747	3,562	4,202	2,978	582	13,604	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	4	11	47	13	2	0	77	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	404	204	334	180	0	0	1,122	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	3,098	40,332	587	3,124	130	47,271	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	0	5,422	13,367	5,388	280	596	25,053	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	8	12	14	0	32	0	66	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	87,260	298,839	6,500	11,280	2,766	406,645	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	0	170	14	203	60	9	456	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	0	1,375	0	125	0	1,500	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	213	1,380	2,627	3,383	632	0	8,235	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	6,558	14,138	1,524	0	0	0	22,220	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	906	2,525	373	483	0	0	4,287	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	9	19	11	17	0	0	56	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	9	7	7	15	0	0	38	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	15	76	44	12	0	0	147	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	65	773	50	822	0	12	1,722	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	3	0	3	0	0	6	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	13	30	10	0	0	0	53	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	2	2	0	0	1	0	5	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	31	0	1,628	7,176	3,709	1,888	14,432	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	223	339	961	1,142	575	248	3,488	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	15,250	511	62,716	8,324	856	185	87,842	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	39	10	17	144	5	2	217	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	26	122	23	10	0	181	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	13	6	269	122	311	2	723	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	5	32	32	8	5	4	86	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	9	0	1	1	3	0	14	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	35,207	10,041	5,554	0	50,802	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	6,662	4,707	2,795	0	14,164	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	95	10	1	0	106	

5.8. NIGER

5.8.1. NIGER IN S1 2023

Figure 44: Niger – Key facts and figures, June 2023



Violence trends exhibited a decline during the first semester of 2023, with a 39% decrease in political violence and fewer civilian casualties compared to the previous six months.¹ This significant decline can be attributed to President Mohamed Bazoum's multi-pronged strategy involving negotiations with some groups, reintegrating defectors, development efforts, and military operations against terrorists – supported by French, US and increased drone resources.² Despite this positive trend, the Tillabéri, Diffa, and Tahoua regions along Niger's borders continue to remain active areas for jihadist activities and further efforts are needed to eradicate the threat.

Conflict and violence continue to be the main driver for population displacement in Niger.³ As of mid-2023, the UNHCR reported a total of 698,096 individuals seeking protection and aid in Niger. This comprised 358,185 internally displaced persons, 251,760 refugees, 50,377 asylum seekers, and 37,774 other persons of concern such as returnees.⁴ The significant decrease in violence in parts of the country over the first half of 2023 has allowed the figures to remain relatively stable compared to the 716,444 individuals reported in January 2023.⁵

Food insecurity remained a critical component of Niger's ongoing humanitarian crisis, driven by climate shocks, insecurity and the country's structural demographic challenges. According to the *Cadre Harmonisé* analysis, approximately 3.28 million people (13% of the population) are projected to experience acute food insecurity during the June-August 2023 lean season, with over 150,000 in emergency conditions (IPC Phase 4).⁶ These figures mark a decrease from 2022 levels on the same period, when 4.4 million people were estimated to face food insecurity, including 425,805 in

¹ ACLED, 'Fact Sheet: Military Coup in Niger', 3 August 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² France 24, 'In the fight against jihadist groups, Niger has no better allies than France and the US', 3 August 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ OCHA 'Aperçu des Besoins Humanitaires - Niger', January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ UNCHR, 'Niger, June operational update', June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ UNHCR, 'Niger, January Operational Update', January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


⁶ *Cadre Harmonisé, Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2023 et projetée en juin-août 2023*, March 2023. Retrieved [here](#)

emergency conditions¹, partially attributed to an unfavourable prior harvest and severe COVID-19 pandemic and conflict impacts. The 2023 assessment reflects comparatively improved production as these crises become less pronounced.²

Despite the humanitarian challenges, Niger's economy displayed promising signs of growth. Projections by the African Development Bank anticipate a real GDP growth rate of 7% in 2023. All sectors are projected to grow over 5% in 2023 due to increased consumption, oil investments, and oil exports enabled by a new pipeline connecting Niger to Benin.³ Planned for completion in July 2023, this pipeline represents a major turning point for Niger's oil industry. The pipeline will substantially increase Niger's production capacity to 110,000 barrels daily (up from 20,000 barrels per day). The increased oil production is expected to account for around 50% of the country's tax revenue, compared to the current figure of 19%.⁴

5.8.2. THE EUTF IN NIGER

Figure 45: EUTF portfolio in Niger, June 2023^{5,6}



The EUTF has contracted €287.7M to projects in Niger. Most of the funding (40% under SO4) supported governance and conflict prevention initiatives focused on justice, security, and border management, specifically through the AJUSEN⁷, ECI⁸, *ECI Terrorisme*⁹ and EP-GNN¹⁰ programmes. Close behind, 31% of the funds were allocated to creating employment opportunities through the *Pôles*

¹ Cadre Harmonisé, 'Résultats de l'analyse de l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle aiguë courante en mars-mai 2022 et projetée en juin-août 2022', March 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² IFRC, 'Emergency Appeal Operational Strategy Niger', 16 July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ AfDB, 'Niger Economic Outlook', April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ France 24, 'Dans le sud du Niger, le plus grand oléoduc d'Afrique prend corps', 13 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁶ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁷ NE-06: Reconstruction de l'État au Niger en complément du SBCII en préparation / Appui à la Justice, Sécurité et à la Gestion des Frontières au Niger.

⁸ NE-05: Création d'une Equipe Conjointe d'Investigation (ECI) pour la lutte contre les réseaux criminels liés à l'immigration irrégulière, la traite des êtres humains et le trafic des migrant.

⁹ NE-15: Création d'une Equipe Conjointe d'investigation (ECI) pour la lutte contre les réseaux criminels liés au terrorisme.

¹⁰ NE-16: Soutien à la création d'un escadron polyvalent de la Garde Nationale du Niger (EP-GNN).

*Ruraux*¹, *A-FIP*², *Emploi Niger*³, *PAEIRA*⁴, *Stabilisation Agadez*⁵ and *ProEMPLOI*⁶ programmes. A significant portion of funding (19%) targeted migration initiatives under SO3, with support provided to programmes such as the *EU-IOM JI NIGER Sureni*⁷ and *MRRM*⁸, and *ProGEM*⁹. Finally, 10% of the funds went to SO2 with the *Shimodu*¹⁰, *Kallo Tchidaniwo*¹¹ and *Résilience ASP*¹² programmes.

By June, 97% of funds had been disbursed. Five programmes are still ongoing. Two are expected to end in the second half of 2023 (*ProEMPLOI* and *ECI Terrorisme*) while the three remaining will close their activities in 2024 (*Stabilisation Agadez*, *Résilience ASP* and *AJUSEN*).

¹ NE-03: *Projet d'appui aux filières agricoles dans les régions de Tahoua et Agadez.*

² NE-04: *Appuyer la formation et l'insertion professionnelle des jeunes filles et garçons des régions d'Agadez et Zinder en vue de contribuer au développement socioéconomique de ses deux régions.*

³ NE-11: *Création d'emplois et d'opportunités économiques à travers une gestion durable de l'environnement dans les zones de transit et départ au Niger.*

⁴ NE-08: *Plan d'Actions à Impact Économique Rapide à Agadez.*

⁵ NE-12: *Stabilisation et renforcement socio-économique des populations affectées par la migration irrégulière dans les zones de transit au Niger.*

⁶ NE-13: *Promotion de l'emploi pour le renforcement de la résilience économique des communautés dans la région de Tillabéry.*

⁷ NE-07: *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour durable au Niger.*

⁸ NE-01: *Migrant Resource and Response Mechanism (MRRM).*


⁹ NE-02: *Renforcement de la gestion durable des conséquences des flux migratoires.*

¹⁰ NE-10: *Projet intégré d'appui à la résilience des populations vulnérables réfugiées, déplacées, retournées et hôtes de la région de Diffa, Niger.*

¹¹ NE-09: *Soutien à la résilience institutionnelle et communautaire dans la région de Diffa.*

¹² NE-14: *Résilience agro-sylvo-pastorale, Ouest Niger - Volet Sécurisation/résilience Parc W Niger et périphérie.*

Figure 46: Selected EUTF outputs in Niger, June 2023



Strengthening Niger's judiciary: addressing challenges in counter-terrorism efforts

The situation in Niger is characterized by chronic conflict and violence, which severely undermine the country's development perspectives. Having an efficient anti-terrorist judiciary system, which Niger currently lacks, is critical to address this violence. According to Ministry of Justice statistics, the anti-terrorist pole was only established in 2015, and even then, the number of cases handled remained minimal: 19 cases were handled between 2020 and 2021, no cases were reported between 2017 and 2020, highlighting an urgent need for improvement in effectively addressing terrorism-related offenses within the legal framework.¹ Communication gaps among the various actors in the criminal justice system further hinder effective collaboration and understanding. Additionally, limited regional cooperation and a lack of knowledge regarding criminal procedural rules among investigators contribute to the challenges faced in addressing threats to stability.

In response to these challenges, the *ECI Terrorisme*², which ends in August 2023, was implemented to foster intelligence and investigative collaboration between European and Nigerien experts through a joint team. Significant progress was made in the initiative as 213 staff were trained including 111 in the first half of 2023 alone. (indicator 4.2).


However, the Nigerien context limited the efficient scaling up of the programme. The judiciary system faces significant challenges, primarily due to its lack of capacity. Insufficient personnel and a deficient penal chain contribute to prisons operating beyond their intended limits, leading to prolonged

¹ Ministère de la Justice - Secrétariat General Direction des Statistiques, 'Tableau de Bord Statistique Quelques Indicateurs de La Justice', 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² NE-15: Création d'une Équipe Conjointe d'investigation (ECI) pour la lutte contre les réseaux criminels liés au terrorisme.

custody periods that often impact innocent individuals. These conditions also expose detainees to the risk of radicalisation.

Figure 47: EUTF indicator 4.2, in Niger, June 2023



Progress in building agricultural resilience

Agriculture is a vital sector for Niger as most of its population relies on it for their livelihoods.

As 83% of the workforce in Niger depends on agriculture for income, once displaced, populations face challenges in resuming their farming livelihoods or finding stable employment.¹ In addition, agricultural output in Niger is highly vulnerable to the country's semi-arid climate, which relies on unpredictable rainfall patterns. Projections for the year 2050 indicate a potential decrease of 10% to 20% in the yields of most rain-fed crops compared to 2020 yields. Only 1.1% of agricultural land is currently irrigated in Niger, exacerbating dependency on rainfall and susceptibility to climate fluctuations.² Niger has one of the world's fastest growing population (+3.7% in 2022)³ and is projected to reach 70 million in 2050 against 26 million in 2022, which will exert considerable pressure on resources.⁴

In S1 2023, the EUTF continued to actively support Niger's agricultural sector in order to strengthen food and climate resilience. In anticipation of the rainy season, sustainable management practices (indicator 2.6) were scaled up in the first half of 2023. Sustainable land management practices were introduced on 5,529 hectares of agricultural and pastoral land during the semester (twice the area of 2,547 hectares supported the previous semester). Most of this area (5,092 ha) received support from the *Pôles Ruraux* programme⁵, which built water spreading and infiltration weirs in the Tahoua and Agadez regions. The weirs help to control erosion and enable floodwater spreading, thereby improving rainfed lands by enhancing water infiltration and groundwater recharge in the rainy season. The remaining portion included 433 hectares of pastoral land restored by *Résilience ASP*⁶ in the Dosso, Tahoua and Tillabéri regions and 4 hectares from PDU.⁷

¹ Conseil National de L'Environnement pour un Développement Durable, 'Plan National d'Adaptation aux Changements Climatiques', October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ World Bank Databank, 'Population growth (annual %) - Niger', 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


⁴ World Bank Blogs, 'Le Niger peut-il échapper au piège démographique?', January 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ NE-03: *Projet d'appui aux filières agricoles dans les régions de Tahoua et Agadez*.

⁶ NE-10: *Projet intégré d'appui à la résilience des populations vulnérables réfugiées, déplacées, retournées et hôtes de la région de Diffa, Niger*.

⁷ REG-18: *Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel*.

Figure 48: EUTF indicator 2.6, in Niger, June 2023



5.8.3. NIGER AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 10: EUTF common output indicators for Niger, June 2023

Indicateur FFU	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	Total	Evolution
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	4,831	4,488	8,100	5,443	11,802	3,294	37,959	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	91	127	399	708	690	362	2,377	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	5,940	5,332	8,623	12,989	22,578	12,734	68,197	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	6,110	7,875	3,757	4,788	5,509	1,288	29,327	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	0	212	72	32	22	6	344	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	26	29	21	13	42	20	151	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	62	852	749	941	181	46	2,832	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	1,020	6,340	5,254	7,086	1,439	385	21,524	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	184	3,455	35,614	45,016	50,661	134,930	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	70,386	123,818	125,031	99,141	86,255	5,948	510,579	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	0	0	0	1	14	6	21	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	4,680	82,858	13,467	6,542	53,965	5,529	167,041	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	3,669	196,270	380,075	283,148	53,525	916,687	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	651	1,426	1,316	4,035	1,275	556	9,259	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	144,191	266,542	211,714	281,618	176,677	7,625	1,088,367	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	54,592	7,335	8,585	16,696	12,146	0	99,354	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	263,488	199,745	8,806	59,872	136,332	22,677	690,920	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	24,718	14,165	9,014	6,697	193	420	55,207	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	2,624	1,450	351	139	0	0	4,564	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	30	134	1,192	822	344	0	2,522	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	45	14	10	5	0	3	77	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	639	756	291	227	291	41	2,245	
3.8 Number of people of concern benefitting from evacuation and resettlement...	2,915	1,395	583	465	18	0	5,376	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	6	4	6	0	0	16	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	9,233	2,996	22	0	0	0	12,251	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	10	0	0	14	0	1	25	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	489	1,082	1,433	10,871	5,728	1,744	21,347	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	1,607	1,784	781	2,541	2,835	485	10,034	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	395,666	78,363	46,964	186,719	280,375	4,264	992,350	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	7	40	16	24	77	4	168	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	46	40	88	102	36	3	315	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	48	58	451	175	511	2	1,245	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	29	17	13	24	53	18	154	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	8	7	5	7	10	0	37	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	3,713	1,696	0	0	5,409	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	867	3,913	0	0	4,780	
6.3 Number of entities benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	20	0	0	0	20	

5.9. NIGERIA

5.9.1. NIGERIA IN S1 2023

Figure 49: Nigeria – Key facts and figures, June 2023



In Nigeria, Bola Tinubu of the All Progressives Congress (APC) party won the presidential election with 36% of the vote. The former governor of Lagos defeated his main competitors Atiku Abubakar (People's Democratic Party, PDP) and Peter Obi (Labour Party, LP).¹ The APC also won the elections in 16 states, ahead of the PDP which won in 10 states.² The elections recorded the lowest-ever voter turnout (27.1%), highlighting high popular discontent with the electoral process. On one hand, the Nigerian Independent National Electoral Commission did not manage to display result forms from polling units on the Results Viewing Portal in real-time, as promised.³ On the other hand, despite cash scarcity following the redesign of the Nigerian naira, vote-buying was widespread, according to observers.⁴ Consequently, civil society called for an independent audit of the entire process and many candidates challenged the results in court, including for the presidential election. In its final report, the EU Election Observation Mission concluded that the "2023 general elections did not ensure a well-run, transparent, and inclusive democratic process as assured by the Independent National Electoral Commission."⁵

After taking office in May, the government initiated economic reforms to mitigate the challenging macroeconomic environment, including by eliminating the petrol subsidy. Costs for the petrol subsidy had skyrocketed from 1.1% of total revenues in 2020 to 32.4% in 2022⁶, substantially diminishing fiscal space, which was under additional pressure due to declining revenues from the oil sector.⁷ As households with lower revenues use less petrol, the subsidy mainly benefitted better off households, as well as firms, transport operators and public institutions. In the short term, the elimination of the subsidy was expected to increase inflation further, from 18.8% in 2022 to 25% in 2023.⁸ As a result of declining purchasing power, an estimated 4 million Nigerians had already fallen into poverty between January and May 2023 – before the introduction of the reform. According to the

¹ New York Times, 'Nigerian Election 2023 and Bola Tinubu's Victory: What to Know', 1 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² EU, 'Election Observation Mission Nigeria 2023: Final Report', 27 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ ISS, 'Ironing out Nigeria's polling process for a smoother future', 23 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ EU, 'Election Observation Mission Nigeria 2023: Final Report', 27 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ World Bank, 'Nigeria Development Update: Seizing the opportunity', June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ World Bank, 'Nigeria Macro Poverty Outlook', 5 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ World Bank, 'Nigeria Development Update: Seizing the opportunity', June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

World Bank, without compensation, the reform could push an additional 7.1 million people into poverty. However, the removal of the subsidy was also meant to release state revenues to the equivalent of 1.6% of GDP.¹ President Tinubu announced that the government would invest the fiscal gains into transportation infrastructure, education, regular power supply, healthcare, and other public utilities, without specifying, however, when and how this would happen.²

Linked to the economic challenges, food insecurity was on the rise in the first half of 2023.

Between March and May 2023, 17.7 million people were food insecure, 3.2 million more than in the same period of 2022.³ The number was projected to increase to 24.8 million people in the lean season of 2023⁴, 5.3 million more than the previous year.⁵ Rising food insecurity resulted from high inflation, protracted conflict, and the 2022 floods. Furthermore, the poorly planned naira redesign led to cash scarcity, limiting market functioning and economic access to food and non-food items.⁶ Cash scarcity was caused by the short transition period to replace old naira notes with new ones, adversely affecting the economic activities of large parts of the population and leading to the emergence of a black market for new notes.⁷

In S1 2023, the humanitarian situation was particularly difficult in Borno State, where 24% of the population was food insecure in May 2023.⁸ In the first half of 2023, Borno remained the epicentre of jihadist violence in Nigeria, despite a drop in the number of attacks on civilians and government forces since the end of 2022. According to the International Crisis Group, this was explained by intensified fighting among ISWAP and JAS factions.⁹ The continued increase in the number of IDPs in the BAY states -from 2,012,660 in December 2022¹⁰ to 2,210,834 in June 2023¹¹- also indicates that the level of violence remained extremely high during that time.

¹ World Bank, 'Nigeria Development Update: Seizing the opportunity', June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² AlJazeera, 'Fuel subsidy cut will save Nigeria but impose burden: President', 12 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ *Cadre Harmonisé* and IPC estimations for West and Central Africa, October 2023. Retrieved [here](#)

⁴ *Cadre Harmonisé* and IPC estimations for West and Central Africa, 'Nigeria: Results of the Analysis of Current Period (March to May 2023) and Projected Period (June to August 2023)', 16 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ *Cadre Harmonisé* and IPC estimations for West and Central Africa, 'Nigeria: Results of the Analysis of Current Period (March to May 2022) and Projected Period (June to August 2022)', 11 March 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ *Cadre Harmonisé* and IPC estimations for West and Central Africa, 'Nigeria: Results of the Analysis of Current Period (March to May 2023) and Projected Period (June to August 2023)', 16 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ World Bank, 'Nigeria Development Update: Seizing the opportunity', June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ *Cadre Harmonisé* and IPC estimations for West and Central Africa, October 2023. Retrieved [here](#)


⁹ ICG, 'Fighting among Boko Haram Splinters Rages On', 30 May 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ UNHCR, 'Nigeria: All Population Snapshot', 13 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ UNHCR, 'Nigeria: All Population Snapshot', 7 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

5.9.2. EUTF IN NIGERIA

Figure 50: EUTF portfolio in Nigeria, June 2023^{1,2}



The EUTF has contracted €125.9M in Nigeria, mostly to security, governance and conflict-prevention (SO4, 56% of the country's portfolio) and resilience (SO2, 31%) programmes. As of June 2023, 95% of the budget allocated to Nigeria had been spent. In the first half of 2023, two programmes came to an end (MCN and EU-IOM JI Nigeria³), so that only one will continue into the second half of the year: the One UN Response Plan.⁴ This programme supports the Nigerian government's implementation of the National COVID-19 Multi-Sectoral Pandemic Response Plan through a multi-donor basket fund. The One UN Response Plan and the regional programme *TEH Golfe de Guinée*⁵ were the only programmes that reported results to the MLS in Nigeria for the first half of 2023.

¹ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.


² This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

³ NG-03: Enhancing state and community level conflict management capability in North Eastern Nigeria; NG-04: Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants in Nigeria

⁴ NG-09: EU Support to the United Nations 'One UN Response Plan to COVID-19 in Nigeria'.

⁵ REG-12: *Appui à la Lutte contre la Traite des Personnes dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée.*

Figure 51: Selected EUTF outputs in Nigeria, June 2023



Supporting Nigerian MSMEs in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic

In Nigeria, MSMEs account for 46% of the national GDP, and microenterprises¹ alone for 97% of businesses and 88% of employment.² The National Policy on Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises 2021-2025 (National MSME Policy) aims to make financial and non-financial services widely available to MSMEs in order to create an enabling ecosystem for them.³ By improving product registration and licencing approval processes, it promotes products' and services' compliance with national and international quality standards. This is not only an important aspect of national consumer protection but also a precondition to access regional and international markets. According to the Government of Nigeria's 2021 MSME survey, only 7.7% of Nigerian MSMEs exported their products or services.⁴ In 2023, the government created the National Quality Council, which is supposed to enhance Nigerian quality infrastructure by supporting internationally compatible product quality and safety standards.⁵ The Council's mandate is to implement the National Quality Policy 2020-2025, which, among other things, supports SMEs to conform to national standards and comply with technical regulations.⁶

In the first half of 2023, the One UN Response Programme supported 516 MSMEs, including on product certification processes (indicator 1.2). During the COVID-19 pandemic, 53.9% of Nigerian MSMEs had to temporarily close their business, and 5.6% had to close permanently.⁷ Some MSMEs

¹ Less than 10 employees (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 'National Policy on Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises: 2021-2025 Edition'. Retrieved [here](#).)

² Federal Republic of Nigeria, '2021 MSME Survey Report', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Federal Republic of Nigeria, 'National Policy on Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises: 2021-2025 Edition'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Federal Republic of Nigeria, '2021 MSME Survey Report', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


⁵ Voice of Nigeria, 'Exports Rejects: Nigeria Establishes National Quality Council', 21 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Federal Republic of Nigeria, 'Nigeria National Quality Policy 2020-2025'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Federal Republic of Nigeria, '2021 MSME Survey Report', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

decided to shift business activities towards the production of face masks, hand gloves and sanitisers. While the One UN Response Programme supported this adjustment during the height of the pandemic, it now focuses on ensuring the viability and sustainability of these new business models. Product certification at national certification institutions, such as the National Agency for Food & Drug Administration and Control, is key to achieve this objective. Other important elements include improving quality management systems, developing trainings on labelling, product packaging and manufacturing, female management mentoring, the development of bankable business plans, and sensitisation on labour standards and decent work conditions.

Figure 52: EUTF indicator 1.2, in Nigeria, June 2023



5.9.3. NIGERIA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 11: EUTF common output indicators for Nigeria, June 2023

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	Total	Evolution
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	4,575	1	0	0	0	0	4,576	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	257	27	37	9,362	7,505	516	17,704	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	17,101	5,621	5,025	1,508	2,065	0	31,320	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	774	1,022	286	2,162	901	0	5,145	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	0	0	0	3	0	0	3	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	12	0	0	0	1	0	13	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	431	25	534	200	3	1	1,194	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	186,085	315,828	66,595	6,581	43,301	0	618,390	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	0	10,000	0	0	0	10,000	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	170,961	200,430	246,044	163,430	252	0	781,117	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	0	873	467	230	0	0	1,570	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	114,224	9,388	32,036,353	8,443,007	13,423,365	78	54,026,415	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	5,624	1,813	34,559	23,225	899	100	66,220	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	136,160	17,965	94,653	213,742	45,392	333	508,245	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	0	0	9	1	0	0	10	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	1,265	11,020	53,843	7,620	6,042	0	79,790	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	7	3	7	1	0	0	18	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	11,393	4,500	1,124	1,097	0	0	18,114	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	5,700	4,442	1,522	2,058	239	21	13,982	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	0	3	1	0	0	4	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	45	1,448	266	68	1,827	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	41	71	12	0	0	124	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	10	65	125	152	83	0	435	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	4	17	3	0	0	0	24	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	0	60	0	0	0	60	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	9,093	3,279	2,600	1,812	2,453	0	19,238	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	24,587	18,259	62,283	42,376	31,392	0	178,897	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	9	2	8	17	61	0	97	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	33	1	22	1	0	0	57	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	16	12	4	3	3	0	38	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	28	10	5	2	1	0	46	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	10,769,181	2,033,343	1,290	0	12,803,814	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	425,784	924,904	3,551,434	0	4,902,122	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	615	372	194	17	1,198	

5.10. SENEGAL

5.10.1. SENEGAL IN S1 2023

Figure 53: Senegal – Key facts and figures, June 2023



In Senegal, the initial months of 2023 were marked by political instability. Demonstrations took place in Dakar and across the country in March¹, May² and June³, coinciding with the tribunal hearings of opposition leader Ousmane Sonko. The situation escalated in June, when violent protests erupted following Sonko's sentencing, which effectively prevents him from running in the 2024 presidential elections.⁴ In response to the rising tensions, in May, President Macky Sall launched a political dialogue, which aimed to cover several issues, including notably the potential reform of the electoral rules, which could allow previously disqualified candidates to run in the presidential elections.⁵ In a move designed to assert their independence from the government, the F24 opposition platform initiated their own "dialogue of the people", engaging with political parties and civil society groups that were absent from the government-led talks.⁶

Senegal entered into several financing agreements aimed at paving the way for sustainable development and inclusive growth. In May 2023, the IMF and Senegal finalised a \$1.85B financing agreement⁷ that aims to support fiscal consolidation and strengthen governance, as well as enhance the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism framework. In June, Senegal entered the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) with the G7 nations and the EU.⁸ Thanks to this agreement, international partners and development banks will allocate €2.5B over 3 to 5 years beginning in 2023 to support Senegal's goals of universal energy access and the development of a sustainable energy system.⁹

In the first half of 2023, Senegal continued to be a country of departure for migrants travelling through irregular routes to Europe. IOM data highlighted that there were 24 departures carrying a total of 2,325

¹ RFI, 'Sénégal : la coalition d'opposition Yewwi Askan Wi annonce une nouvelle série de mobilisations', 24 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² Al Jazeera, 'One dead, 30 injured in new wave of unrest in Senegal', 10 May 2023. Retrieve [here](#).

³ ISS, 'Éviter le scénario du pire au Sénégal', 22 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ RFI, 'Sénégal : lancement du dialogue national dans un climat de tensions politiques', 30 May 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ RFI, 'Sénégal : la plateforme d'opposition F24 lance son « dialogue du peuple »', 20 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Jeune Afrique, 'Macky Sall décroche le feu vert pour les 1,8 milliard de dollars du FMI', 27 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


⁸ European Commission, 'The EU and the International Partners Group announced a Just Energy Transition Partnership with Senegal combining climate and development goals', 22 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Natural Resource Governance Institute, 'Senegal's New JETP: Four Crucial Next Steps', 22 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

people from Senegal on the Atlantic Route during this semester.¹ This is twice as many as the same period in 2022, when IOM recorded 1,157 people departing towards the Canary Islands.² IOM data also reported that there were 22 shipwrecks on the route, although the figure is probably underestimated as data is scarce and incomplete.³ The NGO *Caminando Fronteras* reported 778 deaths along the Atlantic Route in the first half of 2023.⁴

5.10.2. THE EUTF IN SENEGAL

Figure 54: EUTF portfolio in Senegal, June 2023^{5,6}



The EUTF has contracted €164.5M in Senegal. 56% of the funds have been allocated to employment-related programmes (SO1), followed by governance and conflict-prevention programmes (SO4 – 22%), migration-related programmes (SO3 – 17%) and resilience programmes (SO2 – 6%). In June 2023, 92% of the EUTF-contracted budget in Senegal had been spent.

Since its launch, the EUTF has funded nine programmes in Senegal, focusing on: job creation (DES⁷, PASPED⁸, PACERSEN⁹, and PARERBA¹⁰), resilience (RSAN Matam¹¹, *Yellitaare*¹²), migration

¹ OIM, 'État des lieux des départs : Sénégal Mouvement vers les Îles Canaries'. Retrieved [here](#). (Data collated for January-February, March-April, May-June 2023).

² IOM, 'Sénégal : État des lieux des départs', 2022. Retrieved [here](#). (Data collated for January-February, March-April, May-June 2022).

³ Ibid.

⁴ *Caminando Fronteras*, 'Right to Life – First semester 2023', 6 July 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁶ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁷ SN-04: *Développer l'emploi au Sénégal : renforcement de la compétitivité des entreprises et de l'employabilité dans les zones de départ*.

⁸ SN-09: *Programme de contraste à la migration illégale à travers l'appui au Secteur Privé et à la création d'emplois au Sénégal*.

⁹ SN-05: *Projet d'Appui à la réduction de la migration à travers la Création d'Emplois Ruraux au Sénégal*.

¹⁰ SN-08: *Projet d'Appui à la Réduction de l'Émigration rurale et à la Réintégration dans le Bassin Arachidier par le développement d'une économie rurale sur base des périmètres irrigués*.


¹¹ SN-03: *Projet de renforcement de la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle dans la région de Matam*.

¹² SN-01: *Résilience des populations les plus vulnérables face aux crises nutritionnelles et alimentaires dans les zones de départ de Podor, Ranérou, Matam et Kanel*.

management (*Migration SN*¹), and good governance and security (*Etat Civil SN*², POC³). In addition to national programmes, several regional programmes implemented activities in Senegal, namely ARCHIPELAGO⁴ and IPDEV2⁵ supporting economic development (SO1), Erasmus+ West Africa⁶ and Protection West Africa⁷ supporting migration management (SO3), and GAR-SI⁸ supporting good governance and security (SO4).

In S1 2023, eight programmes were active in Senegal: four national programmes (PASPED, POC, Migration SN and *Etat Civil SN*), and four regionals (ARCHIPELAGO, GAR-SI, IPDEV2 and Protection West Africa). PASPED and ARCHIPELAGO came to an end during the first semester of 2023. POC, GAR-SI and Protection West Africa will finalise activities in the second semester of 2023. Migration SN and *Etat Civil SN* will continue to implement activities into 2024 and 2025, respectively.

Figure 55: Selected EUTF outputs in Senegal, June 2023



¹ SN-06: Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Sénégal et accompagnement des investissements de la diaspora sénégalaise.

² SN-07: Programme d'appui au renforcement du système d'information de l'état civil et à la consolidation d'un fichier d'état national d'identité biométrique au Sénégal.

³ SN-10: Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint (POC) de lutte contre l'émigration irrégulière, la traite et le trafic de migrants au Sénégal.

⁴ REG-15: ARCHIPELAGO: an African-European TVET initiative.

⁵ REG-11: Soutenir les entrepreneurs et les petites PME en Afrique de l'Ouest.

⁶ REG-05: Erasmus+ in West Africa and the Horn of Africa.

⁷ REG-13: Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest.

⁸ REG-04: GAR-SI SAHEL (Groupes d'Action Rapides – Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel).

EUTF supports government presence across the territory


In 2023, the EUTF continued its concerted efforts to strengthen governance, security, and development through various continuing programmes (*Etat Civil*, GAR-SI, *Migration SN* and POC). These initiatives aimed to enhance the nation's institutional capacities, secure its borders, and support its local development agenda.

The *Etat Civil* programme continued to support the government's civil registration department to enable Senegalese citizens to access legal documents, including birth/death and marriage certificates. These are foundational legal document that ensure access to various rights, services and protections. *Etat Civil* provided 2,031 pieces of equipment, including electronic systems and servers for interconnectivity and archiving, to civil registries nationwide (indicator 4.1 bis). Concurrently, the programme trained staff from local authorities and service providers to ensure that all actors involved (the Directorate of Civil Status, civil status officers, magistrates, heads of health facilities, village chiefs, neighbourhood delegates, and religious guides) have a shared understanding of civil registry processes and standards (indicator 2.8).

EUTF also continued to reinforce the presence of security forces at the border area with Mali and Mauritania through the GAR-SI programme, which supports operations that target transnational crime, including trafficking in persons and smuggling of illegal goods. During the first semester of 2023, GAR-SI provided national security forces with 2,931 pieces of equipment, including vehicles, collective equipment (indicator 4.1 bis). Complementing this work, the POC programme trained justice officials and national civilian institution members on border management and security (indicator 4.2), to contribute to fighting against trafficking in and smuggling of persons.

Lastly, Migration SN supported the implementation of regional action plans for migration and development in 14 regions (indicator 4.6). These plans are executed by the Reception, Orientation and Follow up Offices (or BAOS in French¹) with technical input from the Regional Development Agencies² aspire to support development and the reintegration of returned migrants, notably by financing productive micro-projects. Migration SN also provided equipment to each of the 14 regional BAOS (indicator 4.1 bis), to support the socio-economic reintegration of returning migrants.

Figure 56: EUTF indicator 4.1 bis, in Senegal, June 2023



¹ Bureau d'accueil, d'orientation et de suivi (BAOS).

² Agence régionale de développement (ARD).

5.10.3. SENEGAL AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 12: EUTF common output indicators for Senegal, June 2023

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	Total	Evolution
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	553	2,900	9,181	7,599	3,317	1,539	25,088	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	1,688	1,146	4,278	1,134	901	327	9,474	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	6,207	7,106	2,788	223	1,391	987	18,702	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET) ...	9,757	7,043	2,583	1,236	12,795	662	34,077	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	0	0	0	0	19	0	19	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	6	11	7	0	32	0	57	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	3	56	13	37	17	1	127	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	5,378	2,781	304	0	0	0	8,463	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	67,575	327,702	168,358	0	53,995	0	617,630	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	23,153	21,280	19,857	23,361	4,059	0	91,710	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	0	40	0	0	0	0	40	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	23	667	432	525	0	0	1,648	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	42,939	180,400	357,769	100,535	30,904	5,360	717,908	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	194	1,997	102	28	137	2,167	4,625	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	2,400	10,737	15,933	35,581	45,188	103,569	213,408	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	19	36	15	115	100	4	289	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	0	8	731	1,478	1,507	161	3,885	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	103,918	506,419	142,382	1,133,758	13,157,410	2,754,838	17,798,726	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	10	7	119	80	0	0	216	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	2,950	913	521	857	0	0	5,241	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	268	2,110	16,940	2,316	22	0	21,656	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	8	0	2	0	0	10	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	368	303	447	148	1,266	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	36	50	48	0	0	134	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	221	73	548	131	28	3	1,004	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	0	0	0	2	2	0	4	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	34	0	702	278	325	4,976	6,315	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	150	50	141	662	690	67	1,760	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	9	28	10	53	18	22	140	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	44	9	27	49	9	138	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	8	9	3	5	27	1	53	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	14	5	16	33	27	7	102	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	84,525	0	0	0	84,525	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	251,687	0	0	0	251,687	
6.3 Number of entities benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	93	0	0	0	93	

5.11. THE GAMBIA

5.11.1. THE GAMBIA IN S1 2023

Figure 57: The Gambia – Key facts and figures, June 2023



In the first half of 2023, The Gambia's constitutional reform and transitional justice activities aimed at consolidating democracy and promoting good governance.¹ In May, Gambian President Adama Barrow unveiled the White Paper action plan, based on the recommendations from the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission (TRRC). The TRRC had investigated human rights breaches that occurred during Yahya Jammeh's 22-year leadership, which ended in 2016. The Commission offered 265 recommendations for transitional justice in the country. The White Paper action plan is set to enact these recommendations over a period of four years, from 2023 to 2027.

In June, President Barrow, during the State of the Nation Address, provided an update about the ongoing constitutional reform.² Upon taking office in 2017, President Barrow's government committed to revising the 1997 Constitution, which had prevailed during Jammeh's leadership.³ A draft in 2020 proposed significant changes regarding presidential term limits, quotas for women's participation, and a progressive bill of rights, thus distinguishing it from the 1997 Constitution.⁴ However, this draft was rejected in its initial reading by the National Assembly, with an amended version forthcoming. In his address, President Barrow hinted at delays in presenting the revised Constitution to Parliament, suggesting a potential deferral beyond 2023.

In the first semester of 2023, The Gambia's economic recovery continued to be affected by recent global shocks. The aftermath of the war in Ukraine, combined with the lingering repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic, have placed strain on The Gambia's socio-economic stability. Inflation was projected to reach 17% in 2023 and public debt was forecast at 81% of GDP.⁵ In response to these challenges, financial interventions were sought and in June, the IMF approved an immediate disbursement of \$6.66

¹ Financial Times, 'Gambia's 'baby democracy' struggles to take root as disillusionment deepens', 9 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² Gainako, 'President Barrow Announces 2023 Legislative Plans at 2023 SONA', 8 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Justice Info.Net, 'Is The Gambia a step closer to moving on with trials and reparations?', 1 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


⁴ Commonwealth Lawyers Association, 'Gambia Constitutional Building Process – A Second Bite at that Cherry', 13 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ World Bank, 'Macro-poverty outlook: The Gambia', October 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

million to address the nation's pressing financing needs.¹ This disbursement brings the total financial support to \$94 million since March 2020.

5.11.2. EUTF IN THE GAMBIA

Figure 58: EUTF portfolio in The Gambia, June 2023^{2,3}



The EUTF has dedicated €37.4M to programmes in The Gambia. 90% of these funds went to programmes aimed at creating employment opportunities (SO1), through YEP⁴ and MIITG.⁵ The remaining 10% went to the EU-IOM Joint Initiative in The Gambia⁶ which addressed migration issues (SO3) with a focus on migration management, providing post-arrival support and reintegration assistance to returning migrants, and raising awareness on the risks of irregular migration. In addition to national programmes, the Protection West Africa⁷ regional programme implemented activities in The Gambia during the first semester of 2023.

As of June 2023, 98% of EUTF-contracted budget in The Gambia has been spent. All EUTF-funded programmes active in The Gambia will end in 2023. YEP and the EU-IOM JI The Gambia phased out their activities during the first semester of 2023, and MIITG and Protection West Africa will be finalising their activities by the end of 2023.

¹ IMF, 'IMF Executive Board Completes the Sixth and Final Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement for The Gambia and Approves US\$ 6.66 Million Disbursement', 12 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

³ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.


⁴ GM-01: Youth Employment Project.

⁵ GM-03: Building a future – Make it in The Gambia.

⁶ GM-02: Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants in the Gambia.

⁷ REG-13: *Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest*.

Figure 59: Selected EUTF outputs in The Gambia, June 2023



Supporting youth employment in The Gambia

Employment and economic integration of the youth are priorities of The Gambia's current government. Demographic data indicates that 40% of the population are 15-24 years old.¹ The National Youth Policy 2019-2028 provides a framework to ensure youth development for national needs. This policy seeks to enhance the employability and entrepreneurial capabilities of the youth, allowing them to contribute to the nation's growth and development. However, prevailing statistics depict a challenging scenario. The labour force participation rate for the youth remained low at 34.2% for men and 32.8% for women, in contrast to the 62.1% rate observed in the 35-64 age group.² Furthermore, 37% of the youth were currently neither engaged in education, employment, nor training.³

In The Gambia, the EUTF focused on enhancing opportunities for the youth. Both the YEP and MIITG programmes supported the employment sector by working on various entry points: TVET and IGA for job creation, strengthening MSMEs, and developing productive rural infrastructure.

YEP focused on upskilling the youth, particularly through vocational training. In S1 2023, 472 youths benefitted from technical and professional training (indicator 1.4), with a 69% female and 31% male distribution. Consequently, in S1 2023, 356 youths obtained permanent jobs after YEP training (indicator 1.1), and 96 became self-employed, as a result of income generating activities delivered in previous semesters (indicator 1.1).⁴ Since the inception of the project, 6,906 youths have been employed thanks to YEP interventions (indicator 1.1). In addition to supporting job creation, YEP sought to connect MSMEs to markets. In S1 2023, YEP improved quality and safety standards within 45 MSMEs to facilitate access to international markets (indicator 1.2).

Meanwhile, MIITG Enabel⁵ prioritised the construction and rehabilitation of rural infrastructure in the North Bank Region and the Central River Region to help rural communities to better produce, store,

¹ UNFPA, 'Adolescents and Youth Dashboard – Gambia', Data from 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

² World Bank, 'The Gambia: Human Capital Review', 6 June 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


³ Ibid.

⁴ The 1 job which is not accounted for here is covered in the next paragraph, as an aggregation of man-days.

⁵ GM-03-04: Make it in The Gambia - Rural Infrastructures for Employment Creation – RIEC.

transport, transform and market agricultural products. As a secondary effect, MIITG Enabel injected cash into rural communities, through its "cash-for-work" scheme, adding up to 319 man-days in S1 2023 (indicator 1.1).

Figure 60: EUTF indicator 4.1 bis, in The Gambia, June 2023



5.11.2. THE GAMBIA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 13: EUTF common output indicators for The Gambia, June 2023

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	S1 2023	Total	Evolution
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	370	1,681	1,514	5,804	1,102	453	10,924	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	335	306	1,633	1,985	698	45	5,002	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	1,770	2,956	3,114	3,612	3,345	0	14,797	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET) ...	767	2,877	955	2,437	1,601	472	9,109	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	0	5	8	30	0	0	43	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	0	0	7	9	23	1	40	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	0	21	42	61	0	0	124	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	0	241,939	85,550	99,430	87,765	514,684	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	0	42	257	73	53	0	424	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	688	2,400	1,621	0	0	4,709	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	0	2	32	764	921	135	1,854	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	8,775	74,560	97,530	299,828	310,431	91,491	882,615	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	3	5	1	24	0	0	33	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	2,710	1,091	340	650	0	0	4,791	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	2,131	1,225	568	523	104	8	4,559	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	710	184	725	30	1,649	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	10	5	0	0	0	15	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	65	215	292	151	148	2	873	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	4	1	1	1	0	1	8	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	4	4	3	0	0	0	11	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	1	7	5	1	0	14	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	112,796	100,114	0	0	212,910	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	40,744	2,790	0	0	43,534	
6.3 Number of entities benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	402	738	0	0	1,140	


CONCLUSIONS

In S1 2023, the SLC region continued to struggle with inflation and increasing debt, political instability, and intensified conflict, causing intertwined security, political and humanitarian challenges. The multiple crises pushed ever more people into food insecurity, increasing the total of food insecure people to 31.6 million. Relatedly, displacement figures also grew: at the end of the semester, SLC countries hosted 8.3 million IDPs and 1.9 million refugees, representing, respectively, an 8% and a 19% increase compared to the end of 2022.

THE EUTF PORTFOLIO IN 2022

For the first time since the MLS started, the EUTF contracted portfolio in the SLC window did not grow and stayed at 213 operational contracts worth €2.07B in October 2023. The Trust Fund reached its peak in spending during the first half of 2020, and 7% of the budget remains to be implemented.

The EUTF efforts to mitigate the impact of the pandemic in the SLC region now solely consist in funding the One UN Response programme in Nigeria, which is scheduled to complete by the end of 2023.



THE MLS

This report is the outcome of the 12th round of data collection conducted by the MLS team for the EUTF's SLC window.

Data collection for the S1 2023 report lasted from the beginning of September 2023 to the beginning of November 2023. Many IPs also provided the MLS team with qualitative information on programme implementation, which supported the analysis and contextualisation of collected data.

This report includes data from 207 projects, a number that has been gradually increasing: 71 projects had been included in the first report in 2018, 129 in the 2019 annual report, 166 in 2020, 194 in 2021 and 205 in the 2022 annual report.

S1 2023 KEY ACHIEVEMENTS

Substantial results continued to be reported against all Strategic Objectives in S1 2023:

- **Economy and employment:** The EUTF supported the creation of 11,087 jobs in the SLC region in the first half of 2023, for a total of 149,852 jobs created or supported since the beginning of activities (indicator 1.1). During the semester, 25,890 people benefitted from assistance to develop income generating activities (indicator 1.3), and 23,266 people benefitted from TVET and/or skills development (indicator 1.4). Additionally, 4,216 MSMEs were created or supported in S1 2023 (indicator 1.2). Finally, seven business and productive infrastructures were built or rehabilitated over the course of the semester (indicator 1.5).
- **Resilience:** EUTF-funded programmes supplied 117,942 people with food security-related assistance (indicator 2.4) and 151,211 beneficiaries with nutrition assistance (indicator 2.3) in S1

¹ Estimates based on known contracts' budget, start and end dates. Only contracted and operational projects are included.

2023. EUTF-funded programmes also supported the delivery of 12,598 basic social services (indicator 2.2), and improved access to basic services for 279,725 people (indicator 2.9) during the semester. Furthermore, 484 social infrastructures were built or rehabilitated (indicator 2.1 bis), and 4,194 people were trained in the provision of services (indicator 2.8). Finally, 456,601 people were reached by resilience campaigns in S1 2023 (indicator 2.7).

- **Migration:** EUTF-funded programmes provided assistance or protection to 1,236 migrants in transit, refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs during the first half of 2023 (indicator 3.2). Programmes also provided capacity building or operational support to 1,230 staff (indicator 3.7) and 20 institutions (indicator 3.6) in S1 2023 in order to improve migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination. Campaigns on the risks of irregular migration reached 2,943,412 migrants and potential migrants over the course of the semester (indicator 3.3). Finally, EUTF-funded activities supported 420 returnees with post-arrival assistance (indicator 3.5) and 509 with reintegration assistance (indicator 3.5 bis).
- **Governance, security and conflict prevention:** EUTF-funded programmes supported the drafting of 63 laws, plans and policy documents aimed at improving governance and policymaking efforts in S1 2023 (indicator 4.6). Furthermore, 1,397,417 individuals participated in peacebuilding activities centred around social cohesion and conflict resolution during the semester (indicator 4.3). EUTF-funded programmes also delivered conflict prevention and security-related training to 11,520 staff members and key actors involved in social cohesion and peace dynamics (indicator 4.2). Finally, two governance infrastructures were supported (indicator 4.1) and 10,034 items of equipment (indicator 4.1 bis) were provided to support governance and security in S1 2023.

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