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Belonging, Labelling and Livelihoods in Three Somali Cities



Research and Evidence Facility
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1. Executive summary

Somalia is experiencing a complex situation of protracted and new internal displacement, organised and spontaneous repatriation of refugees, people returning from the diaspora, and arrival of deported asylum seekers and migrants from other countries. The enormous scale of these movements towards major cities has led to overcrowding and added pressure on infrastructure, housing and services. Poor living standards, insecurity, protection issues and restricted livelihoods are the norm for many displaced and returning people.

This research aims to provide a contextualised and evidence-based analysis of the different factors that shape displacement, return and (re)integration in Somalia by investigating the following questions:

1. What are the underlying issues that influence processes of displacement, return and (re)integration?
2. What factors shape people's decisions concerning displacement, return and (re)integration in Somalia?
3. What is the impact of displacement, return and (re)integration on the wider community?
4. What role do state and donor interventions play in promoting sustainable return and (re)integration?

Field research was conducted between January and May 2018 in Baidoa, Kismayo and Mogadishu, Somalia, and in Nairobi, Kenya. The research teams carried out qualitative primary data collection through semi-structured interviews and key informant interviews. In total, 439 interviews were conducted with internally displaced people (IDPs), returnees, refugees, diaspora, deportees, host communities, and key informants from government, international community and civil society.

1.1. Key findings

The key findings of the research are outlined below. They are grouped according to the different sections of the report, which covers migration decisions and experiences, as well as a number of key themes that emerged during the field work, and which have a strong bearing on processes of displacement, return and (re)integration. Given their relevance to the issues at hand, suggested recommendations for policy and programmes have been tied to each of these key themes.

Migration decisions and the factors that shape them

1. Most people attributed their movement not to a single cause, but to a variety of factors. While insecurity and climate constraints were cited as the main drivers, the search for a 'better life' was also a contributing factor. This layering of motivations for

movement complicates conventional concepts of forced and voluntary movements which seek to explain and categorise people on the move in terms of single drivers.

2. Returns are shaped by the interplay between negative pressures in places of displacement and optimism about the potential benefits in places of return. The balance between these factors depends on who is returning and where they are returning from.
3. While most IDPs expected to remain in cities, just under half (and particularly those living in Mogadishu) expressed a desire to return to their place of origin (outside the cities) at some point and under the right conditions.
4. A move to the nearest, safest location combines with clan dynamics to determine where people move to, with implications for the socio-political makeup of places of destination.
5. High expectations of support available in cities may encourage the displaced to move to urban settings. However, levels of assistance on arrival are generally very limited leading to high levels of disappointment among those who move there.

Experiences of migration and the factors that influence them

6. How and why people have moved greatly influences their experiences and the extent to which they are vulnerable to different forms of hazards, including impoverishment, eviction, hunger, violence and insecurity. In general terms, IDPs are exposed to the highest levels of vulnerability, followed by refugees, returnees, deportees and diaspora.
7. Security and protection are key issues for all respondents, but especially for male IDPs, high-profile diaspora returnees, and women and girls in IDP/returnee settlements.
8. Basic living conditions are extremely poor for those lacking the social and financial resources to rebuild their lives in the city. While remittances can be an important safety net, most do not receive them and must rely instead on multiple sources of income.
9. Livelihood and employment opportunities are limited for all groups and especially for those with low skills and education, although new opportunities do emerge for some women.
10. Hosts typically associate in-migration with negative outcomes, but not all migrants are viewed in the same way. Some hosts do recognise the economic and investment benefits for themselves and their community.

Building a sense of belonging to promote integration

11. A combination of factors, including geography, time, living standards, livelihoods, housing and social ties help to build a sense of belonging among displaced groups.
12. Those identified as IDPs feel more excluded than other groups, particularly those living in Mogadishu. This is a result of their difficult experiences, and the emotional, social and physical estrangement associated with their displacement. Discrimination and their weak economic and political position (especially where they are members of minority clans) also contributes to IDPs' sense of exclusion.
13. While some displaced people may feel alienated from the physical place they have moved to, they do express a sense of belonging to each other through a redefined sense of community and identity in displacement based on shared experiences. The fact that belonging can be associated with people (rather than connection to a physical place) explains why successful integration does not necessarily entail the end of mobility.

Strengthening rural-urban linkages to promote local integration and sustainable returns

14. In the context of drought and urbanisation, the focus of policy and programmes is shifting from rural development to urban resilience. How one interprets internal movements (as either rural-urban migration or internal displacement) has also influenced this shift.
15. Many displaced households stay connected across rural and urban settings in order to diversify livelihoods, access resources and maintain land and other assets. The socioeconomic support that these rural-urban linkages provide can promote sustainable return and (re)integration in places of origin and destination.

Challenging conventional categories and labels associated with migration and displacement

16. There is little to distinguish those recognised as IDPs from those seen as rural-urban migrants when it comes to their reasons for moving and their humanitarian needs.
17. The term IDP is skewed towards the poorest members of society, and excludes those who, despite moving for the same reasons, are not identified as an IDP (either by themselves or others) due to greater social and financial resources.
18. Those labelled as IDPs face discrimination as a result of perceived social, cultural or language differences, and reduced access to rights and freedoms.

Addressing housing, land and property concerns and forced evictions

19. Forced evictions undermine local integration by eroding living standards, livelihoods and a sense of belonging among IDPs and others living in informal settlements.
20. The ability to reclaim assets left behind during displacement is a key determinant of returns for IDPs, although sustainable returns will ultimately depend on improvements to rural security and livelihoods.

Improving consensus and coordination on displacement issues

21. The lack of clarity over government mandates with respect to assistance and protection of the displaced undermines potential progress on normative frameworks associated with migration and displacement.
22. Despite efforts by the international community to promote better harmonisation, policy and programmes continue to be duplicated and run in parallel to existing structures.
23. There is a lack of alignment between donors and district-level government, especially when it comes to policy, programming and durable solutions for IDPs.

1.2. Recommendations for policy and programmes

To build a sense of belonging to promote integration, policy and programmes should:

1. Increase investments in a range of basic services, livelihoods, housing, security and protection in cities so that displaced people (in particular IDPs and returnees) can not only feel they belong to the city, but also enjoy better living standards, which are currently very poor for many displaced and returning people.
2. Promote better social cohesion and understanding between the displaced and the local community. Migrants and their hosts face many similar challenges, and initiatives that highlight shared experience and the potential for mutual benefit could be the first (in a long line of) steps in bringing people together around a shared sense of belonging. The provision of assistance according to need rather than migrant status can help to ensure that vulnerable host communities are included in support mechanisms, thereby reducing the potential for tensions. Likewise, participation of hosts and migrants in project planning, implementation and monitoring through dedicated committees and forums can ensure that grievances of different parts of the community are adequately taken into account.
3. Build awareness into project design and planning of the mobile lifestyles and livelihoods of many Somali communities. This will require greater flexibility in policy and programming to provide for a range of workable options that are sensitive to

different needs and contexts, and changes over time. To achieve this, the provision of aid and assistance should move beyond sedentary structures that depend on people either staying put in cities or returning to rural areas, and cater for those who move between settings. For example, facilitating urban aid recipients to share assistance with relatives in rural areas, which represents an efficient way of providing assistance to less accessible areas, which are often out of reach of conventional service providers.

To strengthen rural-urban linkages to promote sustainable returns and local integration, policy and programmes should:

4. Support and strengthen social networks and livelihood strategies that span rural-urban settings. This could be achieved by facilitating circular and seasonal movements, and enabling repeated (rather than one-off) return visits and regular communications so that displaced people can stay informed of the situation in their places of origin. More systematic tracking and monitoring of returns to rural areas could also contribute to a better understanding of how to bring about sustainable returns.
5. Maintain investments in both rural and urban settings, so that people can integrate sustainably in the place of their choosing (whether in cities or rural areas). At the same time, invest in satellite cities and/or regional capitals to reduce pressure on major cities (Baidoa, Kismayo and Mogadishu) and bridge rural-urban divides. Failure to distribute resources and opportunities more widely across multiple settings could inadvertently fuel conflict between competing parties.
6. Identify alternative service providers where conventional actors' (government and NGOs) access in rural areas is constrained by security and cost. Depending on local context, these could include the private sector and even IDPs themselves, many of whom are already making return trips to rural areas. Mobile money and voucher systems of support may also be more cost effective in difficult to access areas.

To challenge conventional categories and labels associated with migration and displacement, policy and programmes should:

7. Support all groups rendered vulnerable to destitution and the violation of basic rights by displacement and return, regardless of their label or category (IDP, refugee, returnee, rural-urban migration, host, etc). Area-based approaches which, by defining a geographic area (rather than a sector or target group) as the main entry point, can be a useful way of incorporating the needs of all groups.
8. Pay greater attention to defining vulnerabilities and generating a better understanding of what people are vulnerable to. Instead of defining vulnerability on a predetermined set of categories based on migration status and allocating assistance accordingly, support should be provided according to people's actual needs (food,

health, education, water, housing, livelihoods, security, etc) regardless of whether they are IDPs, refugees, returnees, rural-urban migrants or hosts. It is also important to consider broader qualities that cut across these groups, such as gender, age, origins, income, assets, rights and access to services.

9. Build awareness into project design and planning of the potential for discrimination associated with labelling, and especially the term IDP, so that programmes do not inadvertently restrict people's rights or undermine community cohesion.

To address housing, land and property concerns and forced evictions, policy and programmes should:

10. Support negotiations between national authorities and stakeholders to reform land administration and implement improved land policy. Displaced groups and women should be consulted as active stakeholders in reform processes and programme design.
11. Encourage regional administrations to build on tentative progress made in Kismayo to allocate viable land with secure tenure for IDPs and returnees. More needs to be done to integrate land allocations within the wider community, and link these up to service delivery (in particular transport, health, education, WASH) to ensure that people living in peripheral areas are still able to establish livelihoods and access basic services.
12. Prevent forced evictions at all costs by including displaced groups in urban planning processes, and working towards long-term planning for hosting and integrating IDPs and returnees. When evictions are unavoidable, they should adhere to international guidelines, in particular the right to consultation and information, sufficient notice before eviction, and protection from force.¹ National guidelines, such as the 2013 'Compact on the Protection Against Evictions of Internally Displaced Persons in Mogadishu' (which remains unendorsed) should also be drafted and adopted.

To improve consensus and coordination on displacement issues, policy and programmes should:

13. Build on existing structural and normative frameworks, adopt a 'whole of government' approach that promotes cross-ministerial representation, and involve displaced people in planning and decision-making. These recommendations are not new, and have been advocated for some time by a range of different stakeholders. Nevertheless, practical implementation is still in short supply, so this report underscores the importance of these recommendations for policy makers in the hope that they are taken up more widely.

¹ An example of international guidelines is the 'Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement' (OHCHR).

14. Integrate and align displacement and return interventions within wider development programming and goals. The upcoming renewal of the National Development Plan could represent a well-timed opportunity for building on this. Better alignment and integration will also require greater clarity on governmental roles and responsibilities, greater coordination between humanitarian and development actors on programming, as well as a move beyond short-term funding envelopes towards longer-term investments by donors.
15. Make local integration of IDPs more attractive for local government counterparts by demonstrating that displaced groups can be an asset to cities, in particular when it comes to contributing to the local economy. To achieve this, interventions should promote education, livelihood and employment opportunities for displaced people while in exile and upon return, whilst also including host communities so that they are not left behind. Government rhetoric on IDP integration has been more conciliatory of late, which could represent a window of opportunity for engaging more proactively with local administrations (and not just central government) on these issues.

2. Introduction

2.1. Context

In 2018, Somalia is experiencing a complex situation of internal displacement, organised and spontaneous repatriation of refugees, people returning from the diaspora, and arrival of deported asylum seekers and migrants from other countries. The central and southern regions of Somalia have been particularly affected by displacement issues, as the majority of displaced originate from and remain within them. Three quarters of Somali IDPs originate from Lower Shabelle, Bay, Mudug and Bakool, and the vast majority of IDPs, returnees and diaspora move to Baidoa, Kismayo and Mogadishu.²

The enormous scale of these movements towards the cities has led to overcrowding and added pressure on infrastructure, housing and services within them. Poor living standards, protection issues and restricted livelihoods are the norm for many displaced and returning people. Forced evictions are also a major concern as these push vulnerable groups to increasingly peripheral areas of the cities, and undermine their access to basic services and livelihoods.

Categories and Numbers

IDPs: Somalia is coping with an “internal displacement crisis” (Amnesty International, 2017). In addition to the protracted displacement of around 1.1 million people, a further 1.5 million people have become internally displaced in Somalia since 2017. This brings current estimates of the IDP population to more than 2.6 million (UN Somalia, 2018).

Returning and other refugees: 900,000 Somalis are currently displaced to neighbouring countries in the Horn as refugees (UNHCR, 2018).³ Between 2014 and 2018, over 112,000 refugees returned to Somalia from Kenya and Yemen (UNHCR, 2018).⁴ At the same time, Somalia hosts nearly 30,000 refugees and asylum seekers, mainly from Yemen and Ethiopia (UNHCR, 2018).⁵

Diaspora: Large numbers (exact figures not available) reside in East and South Africa (the ‘near diaspora’), the USA, Canada, Europe and the Middle East (‘far diaspora’).⁶ The total

² Among IDPs, 22% move to Mogadishu, 20% to Baidoa and 12% to Kismayo (UNHCR- PRMN). Among returnees from Kenya, 64% move to Kismayo, 18% to Mogadishu and 12% to Baidoa (UNHCR, 2018).

³ An estimated 875,939 Somali refugees are displaced in the Horn of Africa, including some 313,255 (36%) in Kenya, 255,894 (29%) in Yemen and 254,274 (29%) in Ethiopia (UNHCR, 2018).

⁴ 76,589 or 68% of the returnees returned from Kenya, and 35,529 or 32% of the returnees returned from Yemen (UNHCR, 2018).

⁵ Of the 15,041 refugees, 11,122 (74%) are from Yemen, 3,665 (24%) from Ethiopia and the rest (251) from Syria, Eritrea or elsewhere. Of the 14,707 asylum seekers, 14,461 (98%) are from Ethiopia, and the rest (246) are from Tanzania, Yemen, Eritrea or elsewhere. The vast majority reside in Somaliland (58%) and Puntland (24%) (UNHCR, 2018).

⁶ According to some reports, as many as 300,000 Somalis live in East and South Africa, 200,000 in the Middle East, 150,000 in the USA, 150,000 in the UK, and 100,000 in other European countries (Shire, 2008). However,

diaspora population is estimated to be well in excess of 1 million people (Sheikh & Healy, 2009). As security and socioeconomic prospects in Somalia improve, growing numbers are choosing to return. Some plan to remain permanently in Somalia, while others divide their time between Somalia and one or more other locations.

Deportees: At the same time, many others are being deported back to Somalia, as places like Saudi Arabia, the US and European countries introduce tougher migration management policies. In mid-2017 Saudi Arabia renewed its deportations of illegal workers to Somalia, Yemen and Ethiopia. This study interviewed 20 recent deportees to Mogadishu from Saudi Arabia.

Insecurity is central to understanding displacement and return in Somalia and is a cross-cutting issue throughout the report. It was the main driver of initial displacement and is a key determinant of when people choose to return, with many respondents saying that they will not return to rural areas before peace and security are re-established. The presence of Al Shabaab, which remains in control of large swathes of rural Somalia, has resulted in violent conflict with pro-government forces, imposition of punitive laws associated with Sharia Law, forced conscription and heavy taxation. Intra and inter-clan conflict is also a problem, typically arising over power politics, and control over land, water and grazing rights.

Another cross-cutting theme is the cyclical drought that has devastated rural livelihoods again and again. This was a key determinant of displacement and return among respondents. In 2017 alone, over 1.7 million people were estimated to be affected by drought, with 770,000 displaced from their homes in search of food and water (OCHA, 2017). Famine was fortunately avoided in 2017 due to collective early action and the rapid scaling up of humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, food insecurity and malnutrition remain at critical levels due to widespread loss of crops, livestock and livelihoods, and over half the population (some 6.2 million people) require humanitarian assistance (OCHA, 2018).

In this context, the protracted and acute nature of displacement and return has seen the mobilisation of the Federal and Regional administrations in Somalia, the international community and civil society. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) has made durable solutions a priority, enshrined in the National Development Plan (NDP) and 2017 National Policy for Refugee-Returnees and IDPs.⁷ In 2017, the FGS led a Drought Impact Needs Assessment (DINA) to inform a Recovery and Resilience Framework (RRF).⁸ The RRF will provide a platform for long-term investments into drought recovery, resilience, disaster preparedness and durable solutions. The March 2017 Special IGAD Summit (on protection and durable solutions for Somali refugees and reintegration of returnees in Somalia) saw Somalia's neighbours reiterate their commitments to alleviating the refugee crisis and working closely with the FGS to formulate relevant policy.

these figures are almost certainly underestimates and do not count the many thousands of Somali children who have been born outside the country after their parents left Somalia.

⁷ The 2017-2019 National Development Plan highlights IDPs, returnees and refugees as a priority group to be included in social and economic initiatives.

⁸ The DINA was conducted in partnership with Federal Member States, the Banadir Regional Administration, the European Union, the United Nations and the World Bank to address the impact of recurrent drought and famine risk.

At the same time, donors have contributed new and significant funding to address displacement and return, such as the European Union Trust Fund (EUTF) RE-INTEG⁹ and the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (UNPBF) project Midnimo.¹⁰ A number of regional and global platforms have also been established to coordinate progress on these issues, such as the Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS), the Durable Solutions Initiative (DSI) and the Solutions Alliance.

The key to finding solutions to displacement has frequently been linked to longer-term stability and development within Somalia.¹¹ Durable solutions for displaced people (both refugees and IDPs) fall into three main categories: voluntary repatriation or 'return',¹² local (re)integration¹³, and (re)settlement¹⁴ (although return and (re)integration are the main focus given the very limited opportunities for resettlement outside of Somalia). This report uses the term '(re)integration', rather than reintegration to underline the fact that when people return to their country or even region of origin, they may be integrating into an area with which they have no familiarity. Indeed, most returning refugees and diaspora interviewed by this project were living in places that were different to where they had originally been displaced from. Ninety-three per cent of returnees and 56% of diaspora had not returned to the place that they had left.

But what do we mean by durable solutions, and in particular sustainable return and (re)integration? How do we recognise a sustainable solution when we see it? At a very basic level, a solution can be described as being sustainable when a person's history of migration no longer has a bearing on their living conditions. Echoing the IASC definition of integration of the displaced, they no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their migration/displacement history and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination (IASC, 2010).

2.2. Research objectives

In this context, the research aims to provide a contextualised and evidence-based analysis of the different factors that shape displacement, return and (re)integration by seeking answers to the following questions:

⁹ Midnimo is jointly implemented by IOM and UN-HABITAT and aims to: Promote durable solutions for returnees and IDPs; Increase their social cohesion with host community, and; Improve governance at the Federal Member State and district levels in urban and peri-urban settings in Somalia (IOM, 2017).

¹⁰ For an overview of REINTEG, see: <https://rsr.akvo.org/en/project/5419/> or <http://regionaldss.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/EU-REINTEG-Infographic-copy.pdf>.

¹¹ Somalia's 'peace and development trajectory is closely linked to resolving the longstanding challenge of displacement and finding durable solutions for the hundreds of thousands of Somalis affected' (UN Somalia).

¹² Defined as sustainable reintegration at the place of origin.

¹³ Defined as sustainable integration in areas where displaced persons take refuge. This is a 'legal, economic and social process' that incorporates acquisition of rights and entitlements (to employment, movement, property and public services) and sustainable livelihoods, without 'fear of systematic discrimination and intimidation' (Crisp, The local integration and local settlement of refugees: a conceptual and historical analysis, 2004).

¹⁴ Defined as sustainable integration in a third country.

1. What are the underlying issues that influence processes of displacement, return and (re)integration?
2. What factors shape people's decisions concerning displacement, return and (re)integration in Somalia?
3. What is the impact of displacement, return and (re)integration on the wider community?
4. What role do state and donor interventions play in promoting sustainable return and (re)integration?

Particular attention is paid to the different groups of people affected by or involved in issues of displacement, return and (re)integration. This includes internally displaced people (IDPs),¹⁵ returnees,¹⁶ refugees,¹⁷ diaspora, deportees, host communities, and key informants from government, international community and civil society.

The report starts with an analysis of migration decisions and experiences, and the factors that shape and influence these. The remainder of the report looks at five key themes (outlined below) that emerged as prominent issues during the field work, and which have a strong bearing on processes of displacement, return and (re)integration. Given their relevance to the issues at hand, suggested recommendations for policy and programmes have been tied to each of these themes and incorporated at the end of each sub-section.

1. Building a sense of belonging to promote integration.
2. Strengthening rural-urban linkages to promote local integration and sustainable returns.
3. Challenging conventional categories and labels associated with migration and displacement.
4. Addressing housing, land and property concerns and forced evictions.
5. Improving consensus and coordination on displacement issues.

¹⁵ IDPs are 'Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border' (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998).

¹⁶ Returnee is 'a person who was a refugee, but who has recently returned to his/her country of origin. This definition is determinant on a person's prior refugee status.' (OHCHR, 2001)

¹⁷ Refugee is any person who 'owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.' (UNHCR, 2011)

2.3. Field work & desk review

Field research was conducted between January and May 2018. Research teams were deployed in Baidoa, Kismayo and Mogadishu each comprising of a Team Leader, Focal Point (local expert who identified respondents and locations) and three Field Researchers. Mindful of the potential for bias in the data collection, the recruitment of the research teams aimed to achieve both clan and gender balance to create adequate representation in the field (with the exception of Kismayo where it was not possible to recruit a woman researcher). Research teams were from the clans represented in each of the cities, and in most cases came from the cities that they were assigned to study.

In Baidoa, field work was conducted in Berdale, Hawl-Wadag, Horseed and Isha. In Kismayo, research took place in Alanley, Farjano and Shaqalaha. In Mogadishu, the focus was on the districts of Bondhere, Dayniile, Dharkenley, Hodan and Shangani. These locations can be found in the map on page 13 and in more detailed city maps in Annex 2. While security was a concern, it was not a major problem in most of the research locations, in part because the local researchers were familiar with the context they were working in. In Kismayo, additional security was provided on one occasion to escort the research team along a stretch of road that had been targeted by Al Shabaab in the past, so that they could safely reach a settlement located outside of the city.

The research teams carried out qualitative primary data collection through semi-structured interviews and key informant interviews. Respondents were identified through purposive and snowballing sampling techniques. When it came to interviewing IDPs and returnees, most of the fieldwork took place in informal camps and settlements. This was a proactive decision taken by the research teams to access some of the most vulnerable displaced people in the cities, the majority of which have ended up living in informal settlements. But it also reflects a wider issue of the difficulties in accessing and identifying large numbers of people who have self-settled in cities.


In order to ensure comparability of findings, a set of common research protocols was prepared for each of the respondent groups: IDPs, returnees, refugees, diaspora, deportees, host communities and key informants. These were developed in a preparatory workshop in Addis Ababa, which brought the research teams together to plan their approach, refine the questions and design the sampling strategy. It also provided an opportunity to discuss the critical issues of security and ethics for the research teams and the respondents. The research team followed the ethical guidelines prepared by SOAS, which ensure data is collected on the basis of informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality, and data is kept securely.

Following completion of the fieldwork, an analysis workshop was conducted in Nairobi in May 2018 with a select group of stakeholders to share initial findings. A key aim of the session was to test some of the emerging recommendations for policy and programmes and to build and improve on these through feedback from the group.

In addition to collecting primary data, an extensive desk review was carried out of existing literature, reports and data from academics, UN agencies, NGOs, government bodies and other sources, on migration and displacement-related themes in Somalia. Findings and data

from the desk review have been incorporated throughout the report, and a full bibliography can be found in Annex 3.

Map 1. Research Locations¹⁸



¹⁸ The source of this map is OCHA, and it was adapted for this report by Sahan.

2.4. Respondents

A total of 439 interviews were conducted with IDPs, returnees, refugees, diaspora, deportees, hosts and key informants in Baidoa, Kismayo, Mogadishu and Nairobi. These are summarised in Table 1.¹⁹

Table 1. Interviewee groups, per location

	Baidoa	Kismayo	Mogadishu	Nairobi	Total
IDPs	29	25	29	-	83
Returnees	25	46	25	-	96
Refugees	-	1	26	-	27
Diaspora	-	19	20	-	39
Deportees	20	-	-	-	20
Hosts	25	24	25	-	74
Key informants	26	25	25	24	100
Total	125	140	150	24	439

A range of key informants were interviewed by the research teams. These include representatives from federal and regional administrations in Somalia, UN, international and local NGOs, religious and community leaders, journalists, teachers, health workers, women's groups and students. The full list of key informants (listed by office rather than name, to protect anonymity) can be found in Annex 4.

Sixty percent of the total respondents were men, and 40% were women. The average age of respondents was 40 years. When it comes to place of origin:

- Among Mogadishu respondents, 65% of returnees and 63% of diaspora respondents originated from Banadir. Most IDPs in Mogadishu came from Lower Shabelle (48%), Bay (19%) and Middle Shabelle (14%).
- Among Baidoa respondents, most came from neighbouring districts in Bay region: Ninety-five per cent of deportees, 52% of returnees and 50% of IDPs. Forty-two per cent of IDPs also came from neighbouring regions of Bakool, and 35% of returnees were from Middle Juba.
- Among Kismayo respondents, most IDPs (41%), returnees (55%) and diaspora (63%) originated from neighbouring districts of Lower Juba (or Kismayo itself in the case of returnees and diaspora). Twenty-seven per cent of IDPs and 20% of returnees also originated from Middle Juba, while 21% of diaspora came from Banadir.

(For a full breakdown of respondents' gender, age and places of origin, refer to Annex 5.)

¹⁹ It was not possible to locate all groups of respondents in every location, which is why gaps emerge for refugees, diaspora and deportees in some locations.

3. Migration decisions and the factors that shape them

This section considers key questions around decisions to move or return. What factors shape these decisions? How do people decide where to move to? How do levels of freedom and autonomy vary when it comes to decision-making? How do these factors facilitate or impede processes of return and (re)integration?

The literature highlights a combination of structural, individual and policy conditions when understanding how decisions to return are formed (Koser & Kuschminder, 2015).²⁰ Taking this logic as a starting point, this research examines (i) individual experiences, (ii) the social, economic, political and security conditions, and (iii) the role of policy, in places of origin and destination, in order to identify why people move in the way they do, and with what outcomes. Recognising a range of individual, structural and policy factors across multiple locations reminds us that simply resolving the issues that lead to initial displacement does not guarantee that people will return. It is also important to recognise the role of gender, age and family in decision-making as, within traditional systems and norms, women and younger generations typically have less say than adult male relatives.

A number of studies have sought to identify links or trends between the factors that influence the initial decision to move, and patterns of subsequent return and (re)integration. For example, some studies have found that people who migrate for economic reasons may be more likely to integrate into their new environments than those who move for political or security factors (Black, et al., 2004). Likewise, those who move as a result of insecurity frequently choose not to return home, even when security seems to have improved (Crisp, Morris, & Refstie, 2012). This is particularly true if their displacement is protracted, lasting several years or even generations. The Somali displacement context defies such generalisations. As indicated above, the factors that contribute to decisions around displacement, return and (re)integration are multiple, complex and overlapping. What is more, cyclical and intermittent conflict and drought over the past three decades have led to multiple layers of displacement, which further complicate matters. Nevertheless, some patterns do emerge from this research and these have been outlined in the rest of this section.

Most people attributed their movement not to a single cause, but to a variety of factors. While insecurity and climate constraints were cited as the main drivers, the search for a 'better life' was also a contributing factor. This layering of motivations for movement complicates conventional concepts of forced and voluntary movements which seek to explain and categorise people on the move in terms of single drivers.

When asked why they decided to move, most IDPs highlighted multiple reasons; as illustrated by an interviewee who attributed her displacement to, *"War, insecurity, drought, Al Shabaab,*

²⁰ Black et al's model also incorporates political, economic and social conditions in both the country of origin and destination, as well as social factors, such as family and networks (Black R. , et al., 2004).

lack of food, water, education, housing, crops not growing, and livestock dying one by one."²¹ These multiple responses can be broadly grouped into three categories: insecurity, climate and the search for a 'better life'. Of these, insecurity was most commonly voiced by IDP respondents (44%), followed by climate (37%) and a better life (19%); a finding supported by other studies.²²

Within 'insecurity', the presence of Al Shabaab and inter-clan conflict were key factors in people's decisions to move. Interviewees spoke of localised conflict, air strikes, destruction of property, limited freedom of movement, forceful conscription, and extortion through taxation on assets and produce. Within 'climate', interviewees described moving as a result of drought, erratic rainfall and flooding, which had led to loss of livestock, low agricultural productivity, food and water shortages, and disease. Respondents searching for a better life believed that, by moving elsewhere, they would have greater access to improved basic services (in particular health and education), employment and livelihood opportunities, and improved shelter and housing.

While refugees displaced from other countries in the region to Somalia typically gave fewer reasons for moving, these were still multiple nonetheless. Given the escalation of fighting between Houthi forces and the Saudi-led coalition, it is not surprising that the vast majority (74%) of Yemeni refugees identified insecurity as the principle reason for moving. One respondent explained: *"I decided to leave Yemen due to the effects of civil war, and I came to Somalia to live in safety, security and peace."*²³ Nevertheless, other factors also contribute (albeit less significantly) to migration decisions, in particular employment opportunities (highlighted by 20% of Yemeni respondents) and access to basic services (6% of respondents). *"As consequence of Yemen's brutal civil war there has been poverty and insecurity. Also, I have heard that there are jobs in Somalia, which is why I have decided to come here,"* explained one interviewee.²⁴

The fact that IDP and refugees' reasons for moving were frequently interlinked with a desire for greater socioeconomic and livelihood opportunities suggests some degree of agency or choice in people's movements. In practice, choice enters into migration and displacement processes at different points. For example, even if the displacement itself was forced, decisions about where to move to and who to seek support from are very often conditioned by questions of where the greatest opportunity lies. These nuances raise questions about the usefulness of labels (such as IDP or rural-urban migrant, and refugee or economic migrant) that seek to differentiate between people who move, based on whether these are forced or voluntary movements. This topic is addressed in more detail in Section 5.3.

²¹ 50-year-old male IDP originally from Lower Shabelle, and now living in Mogadishu.

²² The 'Internal Displacement Profiling in Mogadishu' conducted by JIPs found that the most frequent reason for initial displacement is armed conflict and fighting (74%), followed by natural disasters (49%), then loss of livelihood (19%) and access to services (6%) (JIPS, 2016).

²³ 23-year-old male refugee originally from Yemen, and now living in Mogadishu.

²⁴ 34-year-old male refugee originally from Yemen, and now living in Shibis District, Mogadishu.

Returns are shaped by the interplay between negative pressures in places of displacement and optimism about the potential benefits in places of return. The balance between these factors depends on who is returning and where they are returning from.

When it comes to returns, decisions are typically shaped by the shifting balance between, on the one side, negative pressures in places of displacement and, on the other, optimism about the potential prospects in Somalia upon return. The interplay between these two factors shifts depending on who is returning (refugees, deportees or diaspora) and the differing levels of choice and agency they enjoy. It also depends on where they are moving from (typically Yemen, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, US and Europe), and the diverse conditions and opportunities they experience there.

For example, Somali refugees returning from Yemen were most likely to cite negative pressures in Yemen as the main or only reason for their return. *“The only reason we decided to return to Somalia is because the war broke out in Yemen,”* explained a returnee in Mogadishu.²⁵ According to another, *“We decided to come back to Mogadishu because the civil war became worse, with air strikes and artillery everywhere causing deaths.”* In a context of intense fighting and insecurity in Yemen, it may be more accurate to describe Somali refugees returning from Yemen as being forcibly displaced (often for a second or third time) rather than being a voluntary returnee.

While serious concerns have been raised about the voluntary nature of returns from Kenya,²⁶ it is clear that Somali refugees returning from places like the Dadaab refugee camp have greater choice and agency than those fleeing conflict in Yemen. This may explain why returnees from Kenya tended to cite both negative pressures as well as optimism about the future of Somalia when explaining why they moved. Interviews revealed reduced in-camp assistance (whether as a deliberate cause or a side effect), restrictions on movements and hostility from government and host community as reasons for moving from Kenya. *“I decided to return because life in Dadaab refugee camp became unbearable due to a shortage of food supplies,”* explained one interviewee.²⁷ According to another, *“We returned to Somalia because life in the camp became extremely difficult as humanitarian assistance, food, health and education services were significantly reduced.”*²⁸

However, in many cases, these negative pressures are balanced with optimism about social, economic and political developments in Somalia. This is summed up a Dadaab returnee: *“I decided to return to Somalia because I thought the country is going in the right direction. Plus, I am tired of being a refugee with restricted movement and growing pressure from Kenyan laws.”*²⁹ *“I returned to Mogadishu because I have heard that life is returning to normal and*

²⁵ 58-year-old male returnee originally from Kismayo, and now living in Mogadishu after returning from Yemen.

²⁶ See, for example, Human Rights Watch report: *Kenya: Involuntary Refugee Returns to Somalia* (2016).

²⁷ 56-year-old female refugee originally from Afgooye, Lower Shabelle, and now living in Bondhere, Mogadishu after returning from Dadaab, Kenya.

²⁸ 38-year-old male refugee originally from Kismayo, and now living in Karaan, Mogadishu, after returning from Dadaab, Kenya.

²⁹ 38-year-old male refugee originally from Kismayo, and now living in Mogadishu after returning from Dadaab, Kenya.

the rebuilding has started,” explained another returnee.³⁰ This optimism about Somalia was not mentioned by any of the returnees from Yemen.

In contrast to returning refugees, diaspora interviewees only cited enthusiasm about re-engaging with Somalia as the reason for their returns. This reflects the fact that, of all groups, their movement was the most free and deliberate. It also highlights the better security and freedoms they enjoyed abroad relative to other groups of migrants. The factors that influenced their decisions were nearly always positively driven by a desire to engage in business opportunities and to contribute to the social and political fabric of Somali life. Interviewees also expressed their wish to be reunited with extended family, now that Mogadishu and other urban settings enjoy greater stability and prosperity. In support of this, a diaspora interviewee explained: *“I heard and watched from the media that Mogadishu has changed peacefully and life is getting back to normal. I wanted to bring my children back to our home country and learn about the culture and life here.”*³¹

While most IDPs expected to remain in cities, just under half (and particularly those living in Mogadishu) expressed a desire to return to their place of origin (outside the cities) at some point and under the right conditions.

It is generally assumed that the majority of IDPs will remain in cities. While this may be true, the number of IDPs who express a desire to return to their rural areas of origin in the future is significant and should not be overlooked. This research found that while 53% of IDP interviewees prefer to integrate into cities, 47% want to return to their place of origin. Context is important, and a desire to return is much higher among IDPs in Mogadishu than in Baidoa and Kismayo, in part due to the harsh and competitive environment of Mogadishu, which, as one UN informant put it, is designed to prevent people from settling. Thirty-three per cent of IDPs in Baidoa, 36% in Kismayo and 67% in Mogadishu expressed their desire to return to their place of origin.³² Gender was less of a determining characteristic, and intended rates of return were similar across male and female respondents. However, the amount of time displaced in cities did appear to influence returns, with the longer the duration, the lower the likelihood of wanting to return. Sixty-five percent of IDP respondents displaced for less than one year wanted to return, which compares to 42% who had been displaced in cities for one to 10 years, and 27% for over a decade.

At the same time, an expressed desire to return does not necessarily translate into a tangible return. Firstly, decisions to move are not always final, as displacement, return and (re)integration are ongoing processes within which preferences and decisions vary, shift and evolve over time, depending on individual, structural and policy conditions. Secondly, return often hinges on certain conditions in rural areas, in particular improvements to security and

³⁰ 40-year-old female refugee originally from Hamarweyne, Mogadishu, and now living in Shangani, Mogadishu, after returning from Dadaab, Kenya.

³¹ 39-year-old female diaspora originally from Shangani, Mogadishu, and now living again in Shangani District after returning from Germany.

³² It is worth noting that these rates of intended return were significantly higher than those captured by JRIA and JIPS perception studies which found that 8% of IDPs in Kismayo (JRIA, 2016) and 37% in Mogadishu (JIPS, 2016) wanted to return.

livelihoods. Given the ongoing challenges of insecurity and drought in Somalia, it is unclear when circumstances in rural areas will be sufficiently safe and viable to encourage sustainable returns (see Section 5.4. for more details). Thirdly, as the likelihood of returns diminishes in protracted displacement, the longer these challenges persist, the less likely it is that returns will actually occur.

A move to the nearest, safest location combines with clan dynamics to determine where people move to, with implications for the socio-political makeup of places of destination.

Most people who have been displaced or are returning move to Baidoa, Kismayo and Mogadishu as a result of the relative safety and security of these urban centres in relation to other smaller cities or more rural areas. *“I was expecting to live in peace, and I found that Kismayo is a very safe place to live,”* explained an IDP interviewee.³³ As well as safety, the decision about where to move is also influenced by proximity. IDPs settling in Mogadishu tend to come from nearby Lower Shabelle and Bay, and IDP arrivals in Kismayo are mainly from Lower Juba (UNHCR PRMN, 2017). The majority of IDPs who settle in Baidoa come from neighbouring Bay and Bakool regions (ibid). According to a woman IDP, *“Baidoa was the closest place. It’s only 30 kilometres from my hometown. I thought that was the most rational thing to do.”*³⁴

A move to the nearest and safest place is often the result of people being too poor to move further away. However, it is also the outcome of wanting to remain close to social networks. Where possible, most displaced or returnees prefer to settle near to their clans or, for minority clans, close to dominant clans they are affiliated to (as long as those ties are still intact). In Baidoa, minority clans from surrounding areas tend to be affiliated with the dominant Rahanweyn and share a common dialect. As a result, IDP respondents in Baidoa typically experienced less discrimination and greater support from the local community relative to Kismayo or Mogadishu. A similar story emerged from returnee interviews. When asked whether she felt part of Baidoa, one returnee responded, *“I am confident and I feel part of the city because I am originally from Baidoa. This is home and I was given support here. I could not get this in Mogadishu where I first returned to.”*³⁵

While some people move towards social networks, a minority of respondents proactively moved away from their clan, often due to fear of retaliation. This explains why some respondents chose to move to Mogadishu, as the socially diverse nature of a large city provides greater anonymity. *“I chose to stay in Mogadishu as it is a cosmopolitan town where you can hide your identity and clan linkage, which is important as clan revenge is very rampant in Galmudug region [where I am from]”,* stated a diaspora returnee.³⁶

³³ 75-year-old female IDP originally from Galkayo, and now living in a camp in Kismayo.

³⁴ 48-year-old female IDP originally from Gofgadud Shabellow, Baidoa, and now living in a camp in Baidoa town.

³⁵ 58-year-old female refugee originally from Merca, Lower Shabelle, and now living in Baidoa town after returning from Saudi Arabia.

³⁶ 30-year-old male diaspora originally from Galmudug and now living in Wadajir, Mogadishu after returning from the US.

However, social connections may be weaker for some groups than others, and therefore have less of an impact on where people move to. The majority of returnees and IDPs come from minority farming clans and groups (mainly the Digil-Mirifle and Bantu) whose status and mutual support obligations are weaker than more dominant pastoral clans (Menkhaus, 2017). The trials of displacement can further weaken clan allegiances. IDP interviewees were more likely than any other group of respondents to express a disconnect with clan structures, often attributing this to displacement, economic hardship and social division. *“The role of the clan has changed. This is mainly because we are IDPs, living in hardship without homes or food. People are tired of hearing about clans; we just want to have a normal life,”* said a 70-year-old male IDP in Mogadishu.³⁷ This sentiment was echoed by other respondents. While clan relations are certainly changing, this should not be overstated either, as the composition of many IDP settlements continues to fall along clan lines, with camp residents typically from the same community and village.

Whatever the case, people’s decisions about where to move will have significant implications for the social makeup of these cities. New arrivals may re-concentrate social groups and power, or diversify communities, ‘leading to new forms of social and political interconnection, cooperation and contestation’ (Lindley, 2013). These sensitive clan dynamics will ultimately play a key role in determining responses to IDPs, particularly when it comes to policy and legislation. Failure to recognise this could be a recipe for disaster, mainly in the form of hostility, harassment, forced evictions and violence towards IDPs from ‘host’ communities. Indeed, NGO informants expressed concern about how shifts in social dynamics (brought about by displacement and return) may impact peace and stability.

Local concerns over clan balances are already having a direct impact on processes of return and (re)integration. For example, one Dadaab returnee acknowledged that clan elders in rural areas, alarmed by the influx of IDPs, were actively encouraging return of their kinsmen to re-balance clan numbers even if conditions are not ready for returns. Similarly, according to some NGO and government informants, the Jubaland authorities had decided to halt returns from Dadaab in August 2016, not only due to a lack of humanitarian assistance (as claimed), but also because of concerns about the clan makeup of the returnees.

High expectations of support available in cities may encourage the displaced to move to urban settings. However, levels of assistance on arrival are generally very limited leading to high levels of disappointment among those who move there.

The availability of support and services also influences decisions about where to move and is a significant factor in why people move to cities. Challenges of security and access in rural areas mean that assistance tends to be distributed in cities. Indeed, 50% of IDP interviewees and 25% of returnees said that they expected to receive support by moving to urban centres. At this juncture, it should be stressed that while the possibility of receiving assistance and support may determine where respondents move (to the cities), it was not necessarily a factor in their initial decision to move. When asked *why* they had decided to move, only 7% of interviewed IDPs and none of the returnees identified assistance as a reason.

³⁷ 70-year-old male IDP originally from Galgaduud, and now living in a camp in Dayniile, Mogadishu.

In this context, government respondents tended to be critical of assistance, blaming it for attracting large numbers of people to the cities. Worryingly, this has led some within government to call for the withholding of assistance as a means of reversing movements to the cities. *“It is better that the international community does not support IDPs in the city so that they return to their original areas for a better life,”* stated one government informant in Mogadishu.

In contrast to people’s expectations, levels of assistance and support are generally very limited in Somalia. While it is true that most respondents admitted to receiving some form of assistance (63% of IDPs, 64% of refugees, and 76% of returnees), nearly all of those that did complained that this was extremely limited and often a one-off contribution. *“It’s very rare that we receive humanitarian assistance. Once in a blue moon, mostly during Ramadan we might receive some food,”* stated one IDP living in a camp in Mogadishu.³⁸ This is a clear gap and one which the Mayor of Mogadishu raised in April 2018 by launching an urgent appeal for humanitarian assistance to support IDPs in camps (BRA, 2018).

Similar responses were captured from returning refugees. One respondent described receiving “short-term assistance” of money and vouchers,³⁹ and another reported receiving three months’ worth of food and US\$ 150 in cash when she first arrived,⁴⁰ neither of which were enough to sustain them in the medium or long-term. Context matters, and access to assistance was higher in Baidoa than in Kismayo and Mogadishu. 83% of respondents claimed to have received support in Baidoa, compared with 63% in Kismayo and 61% in Mogadishu.

The very limited nature of assistance and support casts doubt on allegations made by some key informants that aid is leading to dependency amongst these groups. It also undermines claims by a number of government informants that IDPs are ‘diverting’ assistance (goods and money) to rural areas. *“IDPs send half of the aid assistance back to their families in the village”*, complained one government respondent. Nevertheless, when asked about this, 75% of IDP interviewees said they did not send money or goods to relatives, as what little they received, was quickly depleted by their daily needs. *“I don’t send money to relatives or receive anything from them, because we are all poor and can’t assist each other,”* revealed an IDP interviewee in Kismayo.⁴¹ Rather than being criticised, the sharing of assistance with relatives in rural areas should be welcomed, as it represents an efficient way of providing assistance to less accessible areas, which are often out of reach of conventional service providers. This assistance can help support community resilience, thereby preventing the further displacement of people into urban centres.

³⁸ 27-year-old male IDP originally from Kunturwaare, Lower Shabelle, and now living in a camp in Bondhere, Mogadishu.

³⁹ 38-year-old male refugee originally from Kismayo, and now living in Karaan, Mogadishu, after returning from Dadaab, Kenya.

⁴⁰ 40-year-old female refugee originally from Waberi, Mogadishu, and now living again in Waberi, after returning from Yemen.

⁴¹ 46-year-old female IDP originally from Afmadow, Lower Juba, and now living in a camp in Kismayo.

4. Experiences of migration and the factors that influence them

It is often assumed that displacement represents a painful rupture with one's identity, culture and traditions, and that experiences of displacement are subsequently traumatic and problematic. Following this rationale, a return to one's place of origin represents a positive return 'home', and the normalisation and resumption of everyday life. This sedentarist bias has been widely criticised in the literature, which reasserts the notion that while displacement can represent a painful 'rupture', there is also the potential for positive outcomes. At the same time, return can represent the beginning of a new and difficult cycle (Malkki, 1992; Warner, 1994; Black & Koser, 1999; Hammond, 1999).

Within this context, this research identified positive experiences of both displacement and return. For example, respondents who moved from rural areas affected by conflict welcomed the greater peace and security found in an urban setting. Likewise, returnees and diaspora spoke positively about being reunited with extended family and networks, and the new business and financial opportunities they were able to access in cities like Mogadishu. For the most part, however, interviews tended to emphasise the challenges associated with both displacement and return, in particular in relation to security, livelihoods and living standards. This may be due as much to the difficulties associated with displacement (rebuilding lives in a new place), as to more structural challenges in Somalia (decades of conflict, insecurity, weak governance and under-development) which destabilise many aspects of people's daily lives.

This emphasis on the challenges rather than opportunities may also be due to the very high expectations that respondents had on moving. The majority expected to see improved living standards, peace and security, access to jobs and business opportunities, and assistance and support, and when these improvements did not occur, they were very disappointed. *"I had expectations that a lot of jobs had been created by the government, and that we would receive food, health and housing. However, upon arrival, I received nothing,"*⁴² declared a returnee from Yemen, now living in Mogadishu. According to an IDP living in Mogadishu, *"Honestly the reality on the ground was completely contrary to our expectations. We were expecting to find adequate food to live, but we survive on wet food provided by a charitable organisation."*⁴³

In this context, it is perhaps surprising that more respondents did not regret their decision to move, either internally or back to Somalia. Only 20% of returnees, 22% of IDPs and 32% of refugees said that they were unhappy with their decision to move. IDPs, refugees and some returnees' movements occur in contexts of extreme hardship or danger, which can make conditions in places of arrival (however challenging) seem relatively better than in places of origin. Faced with these realities, they may be less likely to regret their decision than might be assumed.

⁴² 68-year-old male refugee originally from Afgooye, Lower Shabelle, and now living in Mogadishu after returning from Yemen.

⁴³ 60-year-old female IDP originally from Ramdhuure, Bakool, and now living in Dharkenley, Mogadishu.

How and why people have moved greatly influences their experiences and the extent to which they are vulnerable to different forms of hazards, including impoverishment, eviction, hunger, violence and insecurity. In general terms, IDPs are exposed to the highest levels of vulnerability, followed by refugees, returnees, deportees and diaspora.

While the overall challenges may be similar, not all impacts are felt equally by everyone, and some groups are affected more than others. In this context, a continuum of vulnerability comes across through the research, with IDPs at the bottom, followed by refugees, returnees, deportees and diaspora at the top. The reasons for these differences in experience vary between individuals but, broadly speaking, can include gender, age, socioeconomic status, level of education, migrant status and clan linkages.

Interviews reveal that those identified as IDPs are among those most vulnerable to the widest array of deprivations; typically enduring the worst living conditions, protection mechanisms, and livelihood prospects, relative to hosts and other groups of migrants. Indeed, the challenges identified by IDP interviewees are enormous, and touch on all aspects of their daily lives: a lack of food, clean drinking water, health, education, WASH, shelter, sexual abuse and poor security. When asked about the challenges that she and her family faced, an IDP in Mogadishu listed lack of education, rape, robbery, forced evictions, unemployment, clan-related attacks and exploitation in the workplace.⁴⁴ Another respondent highlighted rape, limited livelihoods and incomes, domestic violence, forced marriage, lack of health care, restrictions on freedom of movement, discrimination, insecurity, forced evictions and child trafficking.⁴⁵

Refugees (for the most part from Yemen) residing in Somalia face similar challenges to IDPs. *“To my dismay I have a lot of challenges, including housing, employment, health and social services,”* lamented one interviewee.⁴⁶ In spite of their refugee status, many respondents said that they had not received any, or very little, assistance. Language barriers were another key challenge identified by refugees from Yemen, which limits work opportunities and social interactions (although displaced Somalis who speak a different dialect to their hosts are likely to face similar challenges). According to one refugee, *“The main challenge is language as we cannot go to the market, get a job, or provide for our family.”*⁴⁷

While some returning refugees become de facto IDPs (living in camps and experiencing the same problems), most enjoy relatively higher (though still challenging) living standards, greater financial support and marginally better jobs. While many respondents reported working as unskilled labourers or domestic workers, some were working as teachers, tailors and carpenters or had established small-scale businesses. This divergence in experiences between IDPs and returnees was highlighted by a government informant in Mogadishu who stated that, *“Returnees are not like IDPs. They are integrated within the local community and have opportunities unlike IDPs.”* In spite of returnees’ advantage in terms of social and

⁴⁴ 47-year-old female IDP originally from Bualle, Lower Juba, and now living in a camp in Bondhere, Mogadishu.

⁴⁵ 43-year-old female IDP originally from Golaleey, Lower Shabelle, and now living in a camp in Bondhere, Mogadishu.

⁴⁶ 26-year-old male refugee from Yemen, now living in Shibis, Mogadishu.

⁴⁷ 33-year-old female refugee from Yemen, now living in Afgooye, Mogadishu.

financial capital relative to IDPs and refugees, limited assistance and high living costs mean that their day-to-day lives remain extremely challenging.

Deportees (most of whom had been deported from Saudi Arabia) enjoy some economic benefits over other groups of displaced people. For example, greater earning potential whilst living and working abroad enabled some respondents to purchase land and property in Somalia, which strengthened their socioeconomic position upon return. Likewise, those who still had family and relatives living abroad reported receiving remittances (although this only applied to a minority of respondents). Overall, however, interviews revealed that many deportees faced similar housing and employment challenges to other vulnerable groups. In many cases, their daily needs are not being met, and some rely on assistance from NGOs for survival. According to one interviewee, *“I am jobless and have no income at all. I do not send money or goods to my [extended] family as I can barely provide for my wife and kids. My relatives send me sorghum from their farm to feed my children.”*⁴⁸

Given their greater wealth and resources, it is perhaps not surprising that of all those interviewed, returning diaspora appear to have by far the most positive personal experiences of return. Interviewees, for the most part, enjoyed better housing, employment and business opportunities than all other migrant groups. This explains why, when asked whether they were happy with their decision to return, diaspora returnee respondents overwhelmingly replied that they were. *“I am completely happy with my decision to return to Somalia, and I hope to live here with all of my relatives, children, and family together and happily,”* stated a diaspora returnee in Mogadishu.⁴⁹

Security and protection are key issues for all respondents, but especially for male IDPs, high-profile diaspora returnees, and women and girls in IDP/returnee settlements.

While some respondents reported greater peace and security relative to their place of origin, insecurity was a key challenge identified by all respondents; in particular localised criminal activity, assault by armed militias, attacks by Al Shabaab, and recruitment of young men into armed groups. The ongoing nature of insecurity can be explained by the fact that, in the context of Somalia, displaced people tend to move from one insecure place to another, as opposed to from a zone of conflict to one of safety (Lindley, 2013).

Coming from rural areas controlled by Al Shabaab, male IDPs are most likely to be suspected of (and subsequently arrested for) extremist sympathies and activities, and are therefore regarded with suspicion by their hosts. According to a government informant in Mogadishu, *“The local communities view IDPs with suspicion because it is believed that when they move to the city, they are used by Al Shabaab to carry out assassinations.”* This perspective was shared by a Kismayo government official, who declared that IDPs left behind in rural areas are not necessarily safeguarding land and property, but have actually been recruited by Al Shabaab. In Baidoa, these suspicions have contributed to large numbers of female-headed

⁴⁸ 25-year-old male deportee, originally from Baidoa, and now living again in Baidoa after being deported from Saudi Arabia.

⁴⁹ 47-year-old male diaspora returning from the US to Bondhere, Mogadishu.

IDP households, as men and boys fear crossing the security perimeter around the city and so remain in rural areas. In a perception study conducted by the Danish Refugee Council, 73% of 2,000 IDP households interviewed in Baidoa were female-headed (DRC, 2017).

Security was the only area where diaspora experiences were more challenging than other groups. Wealthy and influential diaspora expressed concern at being at greater risk of targeted attack than other migrants with a lower profile. *“The biggest insecurity and fear we have is Al Shabaab indiscriminate killings,”* explained a diaspora interviewee in Mogadishu.⁵⁰ Returning diaspora have taken up positions within the FGS and regional administrations, and make up around a third of MPs in Parliament (International Crisis Group, 2017). This high visibility makes them particularly vulnerable to targeted attack from Al Shabaab, which has adopted a deliberate strategy of political assassinations.

Protection challenges were also commonly highlighted by all groups of respondents, with women and girls in settlements at particular risk of domestic abuse, rape, sexual exploitation, assault, female genital mutilation (FGM) and child and forced marriages. Not all respondents saw gender-based violence as an issue, although this may be due to a reluctance to talk about a ‘taboo’ issue. According to an IDP father in Mogadishu, *“Women face many challenges, including beatings, denial of their rights, and arbitrary arrest. Sometimes armed men come to rape or forcefully take our daughters.”*⁵¹ When asked what would make them feel more secure, residents often highlighted greater police and security presence around the settlements.

Security and protection risks, together with cultural norms, have severely limited women’s mobility and freedom of movement within cities. This issue was raised by many respondents, one of whom explained that the *“inability to move freely is a challenge faced by women. There is a shortage of water in this camp, but the women are scared to go out in search of water.”*⁵² This statement was supported by another IDP in Mogadishu who said that *“Women are at significant risk of rape when they go outside the camp to look for firewood.”*⁵³ These statements are striking as they suggest that, while female camp residents are at greater risk of abuse, this abuse may be just as (or even more) likely to occur when they move outside the camp. This suggests that women and girls’ vulnerability to abuse may be as much an outcome of socioeconomic status and access to rights (associated with being a woman and an IDP) as of living in a camp per se.

Basic living conditions are extremely poor for those lacking the social and financial resources to rebuild their lives in the city. While remittances can be an important safety net, most do not receive them and must rely instead on multiple sources of income.

Access to basic services, such as health, education, clean drinking water and sanitation is a key challenge for people who have moved to the cities, particularly those from poorer

⁵⁰ 43-year-old female diaspora originally from Jamame, Lower Juba, and now living in Waberi, Mogadishu, after returning from Egypt.

⁵¹ 33-year-old male IDP originally from Janale District, Lower Shabelle, and now living in Bondhere, Mogadishu.

⁵² 40-year-old female IDP originally from Qansaxdheeree, Bay, and now living in a camp in Baidoa.

⁵³ 60-year-old female IDP originally from Rabdhure, Bakool, and now living in Dharkeeley, Mogadishu.

backgrounds who lack the resources to rebuild their lives in a new setting. Interviews reveal inadequate health care and support (in particular maternal and delivery facilities), spread of communicable diseases (cholera and acute watery diarrhoea), poor hygiene and sanitation associated with a lack of latrines and running water, and a shortage of affordable schools. This is summed up by a female returnee who explained that she wanted to return to Kenya as, *“I am not happy as there is no life here, no schooling and no hospitals.”*⁵⁴

Difficulty in securing safe and inexpensive housing is another major challenge that undermines living conditions, and which is explored in more detail in Section 5.4. IDPs, refugees, returnees and the urban poor are most likely to live in informal camps and settlements, and are subsequently more likely to endure worse living conditions and forced evictions than those with the resources to rent or maintain their own property. Interviews highlight insecure, overcrowded and poorly constructed accommodation in settlements (such as *buuls*⁵⁵, tents, corrugated iron and traditional structures) as well as limited (or non-existent) sanitation facilities and other infrastructure.

In the absence of strong of formal state structures, settlements tend to be managed by so-called ‘gatekeepers.’ Gatekeepers can be landowners or individuals who identify an empty plot and attract IDPs to it, or they may be appointed to run a settlement by local leaders (Tana; iDC, 2013). By controlling access to land and assistance, they emerge as informal yet powerful brokers between IDPs and service providers and profit from the distribution of aid and the rents they charge to residents. While gatekeepers have been widely criticised for diverting aid, abusing camp residents and a lack of accountability (Human Rights Watch, 2013), it is also increasingly recognised that they are an important and unavoidable stakeholder that should be engaged with more proactively by the FGS and the international community (Tana, 2017).

Remittances (in the form of money or goods) are an important safety net for those who can access them and (depending on the amount received) a significant boost to living standards. Returning diaspora typically reported receiving the largest sums (between US\$ 100 to US\$ 500), followed by refugees (between US\$ 50 to US\$ 400) and returnees (between US\$ 50 to US\$ 300). IDPs on the whole received the smallest contributions (in the tens of dollars, rather than the hundreds) and these tended to come from within Somalia (rather than from abroad) and were not regularly provided. To illustrate this, an IDP living in Mogadishu explained, *“We receive at the most US\$ 25 a month contributed by my mother and father.”*⁵⁶ However, in general, the likelihood of receiving remittances was fairly low across all groups. Fourteen per cent of diaspora respondents reported receiving remittances, 12% of refugees, 11% of returnees and only 8% of IDPs. This suggests that most people have to rely on alternative or multiple sources of income to survive in the cities. When asked about their income, respondents typically highlighted a range of sources, including remittances, salaries, support from friends and community, small-scale business, farming and NGO assistance.

⁵⁴ 40-year-old female refugee originally from Bardhere, Gedo, and now living in Kismayo after returning from Dadaab, Kenya.

⁵⁵ ‘Buuls’ are a traditional Somali shelter typically made out of clothes, rags or vegetation, and then often improved over time with plastic sheets, tin and iron sheets in some cases.

⁵⁶ 52-year-old male IDP originally from Qoryoley District, Lower Shabelle, and now living in a camp in Dayniile, Mogadishu.

Livelihood and employment opportunities are limited for all groups and especially for those with low skills and education, although new opportunities do emerge for some women.

Livelihood and employment opportunities remain constrained for all groups, mainly due to a weak labour market, high living costs, and clan bias (which limits opportunities for members of less powerful clans to obtain employment in certain sectors or areas). Nevertheless, those with relevant skills and better education were able to earn higher and more reliable incomes and, in the case of the diaspora, find work in the formal and public sectors, or establish successful businesses. The relevance of skills and education when it comes to securing livelihoods is perhaps best conveyed through a comparison of IDP and returnee experiences.

Most IDP respondents are farmers and agro-pastoralists from rural areas, whose skills are not closely aligned with an urban market, and who received little or no formal education due to shortage of schools and opportunities. Seventy-nine percent of IDP respondents had never received any formal schooling, 17% had reached primary level, and 3% had attended secondary school. As a result of low skills and schooling, IDPs struggled more than any other group to make a living in the city. *“There is no source of income and we depend on begging from the town people,”* revealed an IDP in Kismayo.⁵⁷ In spite of this, and as a sign of their resilience, most respondents were able to earn small amounts of money from the informal sector. While interviewees complained of low and unreliable pay, typical household incomes ranged from around US\$ 20 to US\$ 300 per month. As an example of this resilience, one IDP described how, *“[My husband I] both do tailoring. We share one machine and change shifts. If I do the morning shift he does the afternoon and this is how we make a living for our family.”*⁵⁸ Other IDPs reported working as petty traders, dock workers, charcoal burners, firewood collectors, carpenters, clothes washers, shoe shiners, porters and domestic workers.

Returnee interviewees typically enjoyed higher levels of education than IDPs due to superior schooling gained in Kenya and Yemen. Indeed, several returnees from Dadaab had opted to leave their children behind in the camp so that they could continue to benefit from the Kenyan education system. While 60% of interviewees reported never attending school, 21% had reached primary level, 12% secondary level and 7% were university graduates. Others reported returning from Kenya with new skills and knowledge gained through vocational and training schemes offered in refugee camps, and experience working for NGOs. These facilitated their employment prospects in Somalia, and made them more likely to find better-paid (albeit usually informal) work than IDPs. In support of this, typical monthly incomes amongst returning refugees ranged from US\$ 50 to US\$ 700. Nevertheless, in a context of low incomes and high living costs, returnee livelihoods, like those of IDPs, are not sufficient, as highlighted by a returnee interviewed in Mogadishu, *“It is not easy to survive on casual work and money sent by my relatives, as life in Mogadishu is very expensive and you need at least US\$ 200 USD [per month] to live.”*⁵⁹

⁵⁷ 48-year-old female IDP originally from Afmadow, Lower Juba, and now living in a camp in Baidoa.

⁵⁸ 27-year-old female IDP originally from Wajid, Bakool, and now living in a camp in Baidoa.

⁵⁹ 30-year-old male refugee originally from Wanleweyn, Lower Shabelle, and now living in Bondhere, Mogadishu, after returning from Dadaab, Kenya.

While skills and education are important, gender can also determine livelihood opportunities. Interviews reveal that women have become the breadwinners in many IDP households, sometimes for the first time. In many cases, this is because male family members have stayed behind or moved elsewhere, leaving female relatives with little choice but to look for work. However, it is also a reflection of mismatched skillsets, which, as outlined earlier, restrict the opportunities for men. *“I am an old man and I don’t have the strength or the right skills to earn a living. My teenage daughter is now the breadwinner,”* confessed one 68-year-old male IDP.⁶⁰ Similar findings have been found by other studies, which reveal a marked shift in gendered expectations, roles and relations within the family unit as a result of conflict and displacement (Rift Valley Institute, 2015).

However, it is not clear that this shift in gender dynamics inevitably results in positive outcomes for either men or women. Some male interviewees complained that unemployment has undermined their traditional roles and upset family dynamics: *“The men are emasculated as they cannot provide for their families and this creates tension in the homes.”*⁶¹ At the same time, greater exposure to the workplace has not necessarily improved women’s bargaining power or position in society. They continue to work in the worst paid and least skilled roles as they *“lack the skills to do business or other professional jobs.”*⁶² Working in the informal sector also leaves them vulnerable to unscrupulous employers who, according to respondents, hold back wages and demand long working hours. Furthermore, it is often young girls (interviews reveal as young as ten years) who are sent to work as domestic workers or street vendors, which interrupts schooling and also puts them at risk of abuse.

Hosts typically associate in-migration with negative outcomes, but not all migrants are viewed in the same way. Some hosts do recognise the economic and investment benefits for themselves and their community.

Processes of displacement and return affect host communities as well as those who move. Hosts, and especially the urban poor, face many similar challenges to displaced groups, not only because they are hosts (who are sharing their resources with displaced people), but also because they too are living in conditions of destitution and insecurity. For these reasons, approaches that take into account all stakeholders, and not just the displaced (such as area-based,⁶³ participatory and conflict sensitive approaches) can be helpful in addressing these multiple needs and minimising tensions that can arise when assistance is given to some groups and not others. Indeed, there was a perception among hosts that the displaced are unfairly benefiting from a higher proportion of assistance and support than local residents. This was summed up by a Mogadishu resident who complained that, *“Government and NGOs only assist IDPs and returnees so, as a local community, we don’t get any programmes or assistance.”*⁶⁴

⁶⁰ 68-year-old male IDP, originally from Barawe, Lower Shabelle, and now living in a camp in Mogadishu.

⁶¹ 40-year-old male IDP originally from Dinsoor, Bay, and now living in a camp in Baidoa.

⁶² 38-year-old male returnee, originally from Kismayo, and now living in Karaan, Mogadishu.

⁶³ An area-based approach ‘defines an area, rather than a sector or target group, as the main entry point. All stakeholders, services and needs are mapped and assessed and relevant actors mobilised and coordinated within it.’ (ReDSS)

⁶⁴ 49-year-old female host informant residing in Hodan District, Mogadishu.

Increasing pressure on urban resources, services and facilities (in particular health, education, water and traffic) was a common complaint raised by hosts and local informants. Inflation of rents and prices of land and property, and overcrowding of settlements were also cited as driving down living conditions, and resulting in health risks. Insecurity associated with an increase in both generalised crime (typically linked to “idle” or unemployed youth) and extremist activity (attributed to links between IDPs and Al Shabaab) were raised. Interviews also reveal resentment at unemployment and downward pressure on wages, associated with greater labour market competition.

However, not all migrants are viewed by hosts in the same way. While job-seeking IDPs are associated with exacerbating local unemployment, returning diaspora are positively linked to job creation through the establishment of new businesses and opportunities. What is more, it should be recognised that migrants are often convenient scapegoats for wider issues. For instance, rising housing costs can be attributed to a general increase in real estate investment in recent years, and not just to increased competition from IDPs or returnees. Likewise, pressures on basic services and facilities are not only influenced by an influx of IDPs and returnees but also by insufficient urban investment and planning by local authorities.

As well as the negatives, displacement and return can bring about positive impacts for the wider community, such as new paying consumers, increased demand for goods and services, potential tax contributions, and associated investments from the international community. In support of this, a government informant in Baidoa acknowledged that *“Health services have improved since many humanitarian agencies stepped in to provide health services. Businesses have also improved as a result of food and cash voucher distribution.”* A number of community informants reported that business was going well as a result of new IDP customers. A civil society informant interviewed in Kismayo also acknowledged that the influx of people into the city has brought about new business opportunities and investors.

While these potential benefits do not necessarily offset the above-mentioned negative effects, they can go some way to rebalancing dominant discourses. Indeed, while interviews, for the most part, exposed resentment and hostility towards IDPs, some also revealed sympathy and compassion, especially towards those living in poverty and destitution. Examples emerged of local shopkeepers and businesses providing small loans and credit to IDPs, which function as a vital safety net during times of stress. Community, business and religious leaders also report mobilising money, food and other goods on behalf of displaced people.

5. Analysis of key themes associated with displacement, return and (re)integration

A number of key themes have emerged during the research, which have a strong bearing on processes and outcomes of displacement, return and (re)integration. They are:

1. Building a sense of belonging to promote integration.
2. Strengthening rural-urban linkages to promote local integration and sustainable returns.
3. Challenging conventional categories and labels associated with migration and displacement.
4. Addressing housing, land and property concerns and forced evictions.
5. Improving consensus and coordination on displacement issues.

Using the earlier analysis on decisions and experiences as a starting point, we now explore these key themes in greater detail. Given their relevance to the issues at hand, suggested recommendations for policy and programmes have been tied to each of these themes and incorporated at the end of each sub-section.

5.1. Building a sense of belonging to promote integration

Sense of belonging is linked to the idea of ‘emplacement’ which, for the displaced, is a continuous and ongoing process to construct a physical, social and emotional ‘home’ in a new setting (Hammond, 2004; Turton, 2005; Rodman, 1992; Kibreab, 1999). The process of emplacement is enacted through the ‘innumerable processes that make up everyday life’, and which shift ‘place’ from the unknown to known, through activities such as housebuilding, farming, trading and religion (Hammond, 2004).

Sense of belonging matters, as people who feel included, involved in and supported by the wider community are more likely to want to, and be able to, (re)integrate into that society, either during displacement or upon return. Seventy-five percent of respondents (IDPs, returnees, diaspora and deportees) who said they felt part of Baidoa, Kismayo or Mogadishu, also said they planned to stay and integrate into these cities, and not move elsewhere. Given that a large proportion of IDPs will ultimately remain in cities rather than return to rural areas, enabling them to locally (re)integrate in an urban setting will be paramount when it comes to durable solutions. But how does a sense of belonging manifest itself for the displaced, many of whom may return after many years to an altered context, or to a geographically different place?

A combination of factors, including geography, time, living standards, livelihoods, housing and social ties help to build a sense of belonging among displaced groups.

Geography contributes to a sense of belonging, and research participants who had returned to the same place they left did generally feel a stronger sense of attachment. *“I really feel that I am part of Mogadishu city, because this is where I was born and grew up and all my family are here,”* revealed a returnee in Mogadishu.⁶⁵ When asked whether he felt part of the town, a diaspora returnee replied, *“Of course! I am happy because Kismayo is my home town.”*⁶⁶

However, time is another contributing factor, and returnees who have been absent for many years have often lost key networks or connections upon return, and no longer feel part of the place where they were born. *“I don’t know the city and rarely go out of my house. I feel like a stranger in my own country as I don’t see familiar faces and the city has changed. I feel like a blind person,”* admitted a Somali refugee who had returned to Mogadishu after decades spent living in Yemen.⁶⁷ These connections can be re-established over time, as indicated by a returnee from Kenya, *“I feel like I am part of Mogadishu because I am getting used to living here. I believe that by staying longer, I will make it finally in the end.”*⁶⁸ Nevertheless, protracted stay does not guarantee a sense of belonging either, and some IDP interviewees confess to feeling excluded even after decades of living in the same place. According to one IDP, *“Even after 27 years living in the camp, I still don’t feel like I am part of Mogadishu city.”*⁶⁹

Tangible factors associated with living standards also contribute to feelings of exclusion. When asked whether they felt they belonged to the city, interviewees who said they did not often attributed this to inadequate living conditions, poor housing and a lack of general support. *“I don’t feel part of the city as I haven’t received any help from anyone or from the government,”* admitted one respondent.⁷⁰ *“I feel that I am a foreigner and don’t belong here, but if I get a job then my perception may change”,* stated a Yemeni refugee in Mogadishu.⁷¹ Access to land and property is important, and IDPs and returnees who had been allocated land often attributed this to why they felt they belonged: *“I feel at home and comfortable because I was given a plot of land”,* explained a recent returnee in Kismayo.⁷²

Social ties associated with clan, appearance, dialect and culture are also important for building a sense of belonging. Respondents from resident or dominant clans typically enjoyed a stronger sense of belonging than minority groups. *“I feel 100 per cent that I am part of Kismayo people because my clan is the majority here, and I have integrated with them,”*

⁶⁵ 40-year-old female refugee, originally from Hamar Weyne, Mogadishu, and now living in Shangani, Mogadishu, after returning from Dadaab, Kenya.

⁶⁶ 35-year-old male diaspora, originally from Kismayo, and now living again in Kismayo after returning from the US.

⁶⁷ 68-year-old female refugee originally from Agooye, Lower Shabelle, and now living in Mogadishu after returning from Yemen.

⁶⁸ 30-year-old male refugee originally from Wanleweyn, Lower Shabelle, and now living in Bondhere, Mogadishu, after returning from Yemen.

⁶⁹ 75-year-old male IDP originally from Mahaday, Middle Shabelle, and now living in Shangani, Mogadishu.

⁷⁰ 58-year-old male refugee originally from Kismayo, and now living in Mogadishu after returning from Yemen.

⁷¹ 42-year-old male refugee from Yemen, now living in Shibis, Mogadishu.

⁷² 36-year-old male refugee, originally from Kismayo, now living again in Kismayo after returning from Kenya.

confirmed an IDP.⁷³ The same was true for IDPs from surrounding areas of Baidoa, who tend to share a common culture and language with the city's residents. *"I feel part of the city because I am originally from Baidoa. I speak the dialect, and they identify me as one of their own,"* confirmed another IDP interviewee.⁷⁴

Those identified as IDPs feel more excluded than other groups, particularly those living in Mogadishu. This is a result of their difficult experiences, and the emotional, social and physical estrangement associated with their displacement. Discrimination and their weak economic and political position (especially where they are members of minority clans) also contributes to IDPs' sense of exclusion.

When asked whether they felt part of the city, respondents' answers varied significantly depending on who was being asked and where. Of all the groups of interviewees, IDPs were the most likely to feel excluded, with just under half (44%) of all those interviewed saying they did not feel like they belonged to Baidoa, Kismayo or Mogadishu. In contrast, the majority of returnees (70%) and nearly all diaspora (92%) felt a sense of belonging. Context is also important, and the degree to which people felt they belonged varied depending on the location. Interviewees felt significantly more 'at home' in Baidoa than in Mogadishu, where sense of belonging was weakest. 88% of IDPs and returnees felt a sense of belonging in Baidoa, compared to 56% in Kismayo, and only 44% in Mogadishu. Sense of belonging was particularly weak among IDPs in Mogadishu, 71% of whom said they felt excluded from the city.

As indicated above, the factors that contribute to a sense of belonging are multiple and complex; however some common trends do emerge that can help to explain such clear contrasts between the different groups and locations. Firstly, building a sense of belonging is destabilised by difficult experience, in particular adversity and hardship, which (as outlined in Section 4) are most commonly encountered by IDPs, and most acute in Mogadishu. *"I do not feel that I am part of the city because life here is hard and very tough,"* admitted an IDP living in a camp in Mogadishu.⁷⁵ This contrasts with experiences in Baidoa which (while still challenging for many groups) offers perhaps the most conducive conditions for integration as a result of better living conditions and (for some groups at least) a less discriminatory and restrictive environment. This is due in large part to local clan dynamics as many of the IDPs come from the surrounding area and are affiliated with the dominant Rahanweyn clan. *"My brothers and sisters live in Baidoa town and they have faced no adversity in terms of discrimination hence they feel just as I do, that I am part of the city,"* explained one IDP.⁷⁶ According to another, *"I feel part of the city because I have the freedom to move and go about the city without any fear or restrictions."*⁷⁷

Another factor that explains why IDPs are less likely to feel they belong is their status. IDP status discourages belonging by fostering a sense of differentiation on an emotional, cultural

⁷³ 20-year-old female IDP originally from Mogadishu, and now living in Kismayo.

⁷⁴ 48-year-old female IDP from Gofgadud Shabellow, Baidoa, and now living in a camp in Baidoa town.

⁷⁵ 47-year-old female IDP originally from Bualle, Lower Juba, and now living in a camp in Bondhere, Mogadishu.

⁷⁶ 25-year-old female IDP originally from Bardale, Bay, and now living in a camp in Baidoa.

⁷⁷ 70-year-old female IDP originally from Bardale, Bay, and now living in a camp in Baidoa.

and physical level. Feeling like an IDP creates an emotional difference and inferiority towards others, as explained by one interviewee: *“I do not feel that I am part of Baidoa people, as these people are different from me. I am an IDP and they are rich and have property while I am still in an IDP camp.”*⁷⁸ On a cultural level, IDP status marks people out as outsiders with different social and cultural backgrounds, as echoed by a key informant in Mogadishu, *“The new IDP arrivals are totally different to the people in the city because their dress, walk, talk and dialects are different.”* On a physical level, life in settlements (often located on the outskirts of the city) contributes to physical exclusion and isolation. *“I am absolutely not part of Kismayo people, as I am still living in an IDP corner of the town,”* explained one IDP.⁷⁹ Many IDP interviewees confessed to rarely leaving the camps (often due to distance, fear or intimidation), which further undermined their integration into wider society. *“I don’t interact with people in the city. I only interact with IDPs who live with me inside the camp,”* explained an IDP living in Mogadishu.⁸⁰

While some displaced people may feel alienated from the physical place they have moved to, they do express a sense of belonging to each other through a redefined sense of community and identity in displacement based on shared experiences. The fact that belonging can be associated with people (rather than connection to a physical place) explains why successful integration does not necessarily entail the end of mobility.

While some felt alienated from the city, they did feel included within their own community thanks to shared experiences, collaboration and cooperation. This suggests that it is possible to build a sense of belonging to people or community, as well as place. *“I don’t interact with people a lot but I do maintain relations with other IDP families and neighbours,”* confessed an IDP in Kismayo.⁸¹ Likewise, most returning refugees from Kenya and Yemen admitted to living with family members and other returnees. *“I don’t know local people. I only know other returnees who live together with me in this camp,”* explained one returnee.⁸² A similar scenario emerged through interviews with Yemeni refugees who, while feeling isolated from the city (mainly due to language barriers), did feel a sense of belonging to each other. This was strengthened by living in the same areas as other Yemeni refugees and relying on each other for support and assistance. *“I don’t feel like I belong in Mogadishu. I don’t speak the language. I only interact with other [Yemeni] refugees. We refugees help each other.”*⁸³

Respondents’ sense of belonging to each other emerged in a number of ways. In many cases, these connections were forged before moving, as many IDPs and returnees have moved together with people from their community, and continue to live together in displacement or upon return. One IDP described living in the same area as thirty other families from his village

⁷⁸ 27-year-old female IDP originally from Wajid, Bakool, and now living in a camp in Baidoa.

⁷⁹ 48-year-old female IDP originally from Afmadow, Lower Juba, and now living in Galbeet, Kismayo.

⁸⁰ 60-year-old male IDP originally from Kuntuwaareey, Lower Shabelle, and now living in a camp in Dayniile, Mogadishu.

⁸¹ 40-year-old male IDP originally from Dinsoor, Bay, and now living in a camp in Kismayo.

⁸² 60-year-old male returnee, originally from Afmadow, Lower Juba, and now living in New Kismayo, Kismayo, after returning from Dadaab, Kenya.

⁸³ 26-year-old male refugee from Yemen, now living in Shibis district, Mogadishu

of origin,⁸⁴ while a returnee from Kenya explained that all of his neighbours are people he knew from Dadaab.⁸⁵ Camps also play a role and, while living in designated settlements may result in isolation from wider society, it also creates a sense of safety and belonging to one's own community. Finally, sense of belonging to community can also be explained by the very process of being displaced, as the shared experiences of displacement and return can create a redefined sense of community and identity among people who did not know each other before, and may be from different backgrounds and social groups. This is strengthened by the sharing of money, food and materials during times of need, and a sense of a greater safety and support together than alone. When asked who they turned to in times of financial need, IDPs typically mentioned relatives, neighbours and friends from within the camps, *"I approach IDP households from the community around me for assistance, as well as my neighbours and friends."*⁸⁶

The fact that for some respondents a sense of belonging may be associated with particular people suggests their idea of home is not necessarily or completely fixed on one place of origin. Their place of belonging can move with the people and also with the changing conditions. Hence, any process of integration has to recognise this possibility, or even likelihood of future mobility. This was made most clear by diaspora respondents who expressed the strongest sense of belonging in the three cities but were also among the most likely to admit to ongoing, circular movements between Somalia and the countries they had left. *"I feel that I am part of Mogadishu. I hope to be living here, although I am intending to travel to the US half of my time and continue working in Somalia for the other half"* explained one interviewee.⁸⁷ Viewed from this perspective, it is possible to feel belonging to more than one place, particularly when family members are living in multiple locations, or when displacement has resulted in living for extended durations in more than one country. For IDPs, returnees and rural-urban migrants, the range of movements may be geographically more limited but they are still likely to retain a sense of belonging in more than one place (see 5.2).

Recommendations for policy and programmes

When it comes to policy and programmes, there is considerable scope for interventions to have an effect on people's emerging sense of belonging. To build a greater sense of integration and inclusion, policy and programmes should:

- 5.1.1. Increase investments in a range of basic services, livelihoods, housing, security and protection in cities so that displaced people (in particular IDPs and returnees) can not only feel they belong to the city, but also enjoy better living standards, which are currently very poor for many displaced and returning people.

⁸⁴ 27-year-old male IDP, originally from Kunturwaare, Lower Shabelle, and now living in a camp in Bondhere, Mogadishu.

⁸⁵ 61-year-old male returnee, originally from Buale, Middle Juba, and now living in Kismayo, after returning from Dadaab, Kenya.

⁸⁶ 60-year-old female IDP, originally from Rabdhure, Bakool, and now living in a camp in Dharkenley, Mogadishu.

⁸⁷ 44-year-old female diaspora, originally from Mogadishu, and living in Mogadishu and the US.

- 5.1.2. Promote better social cohesion and understanding between the displaced and the local community. Migrants and their hosts face many similar challenges, and initiatives that highlight shared experience and the potential for mutual benefit could be the first (in a long line of) steps in bringing people together around a shared sense of belonging. The provision of assistance according to need rather than migrant status can help to ensure that vulnerable host communities are included in support mechanisms, thereby reducing the potential for tensions. Likewise, participation of hosts and migrants in project planning, implementation and monitoring through dedicated committees and forums can ensure that grievances of different parts of the community are adequately taken into account.
- 5.1.3. Build awareness into project design and planning of the mobile lifestyles and livelihoods of many Somali communities. This will require greater flexibility in policy and programming to provide for a range of workable options that are sensitive to different needs and contexts, and changes over time. To achieve this, the provision of aid and assistance should move beyond sedentary structures that depend on people either staying put in cities or returning to rural areas, and cater for those who move between settings. For example, facilitating urban aid recipients to share assistance with relatives in rural areas, which represents an efficient way of providing assistance to less accessible areas, which are often out of reach of conventional service providers.

5.2. Strengthening rural-urban linkages to promote local integration and sustainable returns

The vast majority of people who are displaced within Somalia move from rural to urban areas, and are joined in cities by returning refugees, deportees and diaspora seeking safety and opportunities in urban settings. With this in mind, rural-urban dynamics are clearly central to understanding processes of displacement, return and (re)integration in Somalia. But in a context of rapid urbanisation, is there a danger of overstating a focus on either rural or urban populations? How relevant are the linkages between the two? And how do these influence processes of return and (re)integration?

In the context of drought and urbanisation, the focus of policy and programmes is shifting from rural development to urban resilience. How one interprets internal movements (as either rural-urban migration or internal displacement) has also influenced this shift.

Interviews with key informants (particularly those from the development community) reveal a growth in urban programming, away from a more traditional focus on rural development. In support of this, an NGO informant in Nairobi admitted, *“While there is still a focus on promoting agricultural production in rural and riverine areas, there is a definite shift away from sustaining pastoralism towards urban resilience and development. This is in part a response to repeated cycles of drought which deplete pastoralist assets again and again, and are expensive to replace and rebuild.”* While this shift may be a response to cyclical drought,

it is also the outcome of rapid urbanisation, which has refocused attention (often rightly so) on the need for investments in urban planning, infrastructure and development.

However, it can also be argued that this perspective is couched in how internal movements within Somalia are interpreted: as either internal displacement (which suggests that movement is forced) or rural-urban migration (which implies a degree of choice and agency). If a person moves against their will, it can logically be argued that they are more likely to want to return to rural areas once conditions allow. If someone actively chooses to move from rural areas in search of better opportunities in the city, it is feasible to assume that, as long as their expectations in moving are being met, they will not seek a return to rural areas in the near future. Making these kinds of clear distinctions between groups of migrants is not easy (or very accurate), however, where one sits in relation to these questions can determine where support should be provided. Very broadly speaking, among UN and NGO informants, those who emphasise rural-urban migration are more likely to advocate for urban investments. In contrast, respondents who describe internal displacement tended to reposition the focus back on rural investments in the assumption that the displaced will look to return at some point.

But what are the implications of this shift for processes of return and (re)integration? Urban development initiatives can improve living standards for the many displaced people living in cities, enabling them to integrate more easily into an urban setting. However, an urban shift may divert focus and funding away from rural support packages and development, thereby undermining opportunities for sustainable return and (re)integration to rural areas. While urban investments are cheaper, safer and easier than in rural areas (where access and security remain major challenges) a focus on 'value for money' should not detract from the fact that many IDPs do express an intention to return to places of origin, should conditions there improve. *"I want to be reunited with my family if the situation improves and we are provided with restocking programmes in order to return to nomadic life styles,"* explained an IDP in Mogadishu. In this context, parallel support to rural and urban areas is needed, so that those who want to stay in the rural areas can be helped to do so, and those for whom returning is no longer a viable option can be supported in the cities.

Many displaced households stay connected across rural and urban settings in order to diversify livelihoods, access resources and maintain land and other assets. The socioeconomic support that these rural-urban linkages provide can promote sustainable return and (re)integration in places of origin and destination.

Approaches that centre on rural development or urban support may be less helpful than one that focuses on the linkages between the two. Indeed, it is often these enduring connections that provide the greatest opportunities for sustainable return and (re)integration in places of origin and destination. IDPs, returnees, refugees, deportees and diaspora interviewed by this research describe how family members are dispersed across urban and rural locations, both within Somalia or abroad. Nearly all IDPs reported having family members "scattered" across rural and urban settings, and most maintained weekly or monthly communications with relatives elsewhere. According to an IDP living in a camp in Baidoa, *"My daughter is in Baidoa town, and my other relatives are in Qansahdhere. We communicate weekly by phone and I*

am aware of their problems and daily life."⁸⁸ Another IDP living in Mogadishu described having four siblings in settlements, one in Bossaso and another in Yemen.⁸⁹

For some, having family spread out across different locations is an outcome of poverty and displacement rather than choice. However, for others, it represents a proactive strategy to access jobs, education and assistance in urban centres or settlements, whilst also maintaining land, livestock and agricultural productivity in places of origin. *"We have a house, property, farmland and furniture, which my mother safeguards by going back [to our village]"* explained an IDP in Mogadishu.⁹⁰ Other respondents described sending food (such as rice, oil and sorghum) from the countryside to the city, and vice versa, in order to sustain family members living elsewhere. Rural-urban linkages were particularly important during crop seasons as they enabled households (in particular IDPs) to maintain food production even during displacement. An IDP described travelling temporarily back to his home village to cultivate his farm during the rainy season, before returning again to the Mogadishu camp where he was living.⁹¹

These kinds of rural-urban linkages are important as they can have a positive influence on sustainable return and (re)integration. Maintaining assets and networks through rural-urban linkages makes people more likely to return should conditions improve. Indeed, respondents who had lost land, livestock and crops, and whose social networks had also disappeared were less likely to express a desire to return. *"I will not return to my village as I have nothing to go back to, as I lost my livestock and the little property I had,"* conceded an IDP now living in Mogadishu.⁹² Rural-urban linkages also enable respondents to make regular return visits to their place of origin. These visits can contribute to sustainable returns as they enable people to make informed decisions based on the actual context on the ground. When it comes to (re)integration, rural-urban linkages (and the financial and social security they provide) can enable migrants to stay in cities and integrate locally thanks to pooled resources and the sending and receiving of money and goods from family elsewhere, whilst also enabling other family members to stay in rural areas thanks to support from their urban kin.

It seems likely that these rural-urban linkages will continue even once return and (re)integration have taken place. According to another study, 30% of IDP respondents who said they would return permanently to rural areas, indicated that some family members would remain in cities in order to maintain access to support and assistance (DRC, 2017). This is another reminder that return and (re)integration are not inherently sedentary processes, and that rural-urban linkages that rely on mobility are likely to persist even when displacement ends.

⁸⁸ 40-year-old female IDP originally from Qansahdhere, Bay, and now living in a camp in Baidoa.

⁸⁹ 59-year-old female IDP originally from Bardale, Bay, and now living in a camp in Hodan, Mogadishu.

⁹⁰ 27-year-old male IDP originally from Kunturwaare, Lower Shabelle, and now living in Bondhere district, Mogadishu.

⁹¹ 68-year-old male IDP originally from Barawe, Lower Shabelle, and now living in a camp in Dharkenley, Mogadishu.

⁹² 46-year-old male IDP originally from Qoryoley, Lower Shabelle, and now living in a camp in Hodan, Mogadishu.

Recommendations for policy and programmes

Rural-urban linkages are already occurring in the daily lives of displaced people as a means of diversifying livelihoods and safeguarding land, livestock and agricultural productivity. In the short-term, these linkages allow people to pool resources, supplement incomes and, in some cases, survive. In the medium to long term, they can bring about sustainable return and (re)integration. To strengthen existing rural-urban linkages and foster new ones, policy and programmes should:

- 5.2.1. Support and strengthen social networks and livelihood strategies that span rural-urban settings. This could be achieved by facilitating circular and seasonal movements, and enabling repeated (rather than one-off) return visits and regular communications so that displaced people can stay informed of the situation in their places of origin. More systematic tracking and monitoring of returns to rural areas could also contribute to a better understanding of how to bring about sustainable returns.
- 5.2.2. Maintain investments in both rural and urban settings, so that people can integrate sustainably in the place of their choosing (whether in cities or rural areas). At the same time, invest in satellite cities and/or regional capitals to reduce pressure on major cities (Baidoa, Kismayo and Mogadishu) and bridge rural-urban divides. Failure to distribute resources and opportunities more widely across multiple settings could inadvertently fuel conflict between competing parties.
- 5.2.3. Identify alternative service providers where conventional actors' (government and NGOs) access in rural areas is constrained by security and cost. Depending on local context, these could include the private sector and even IDPs themselves, many of whom are already making return trips to rural areas. Mobile money and voucher systems of support may also be more cost effective in difficult to access areas.

5.3. Challenging conventional categories and labels associated with migration and displacement

The language around migration and displacement includes multiple and sometimes competing labels to define people on the move: refugee, returnee, IDP, deportee, diaspora, economic migrant, rural-urban migrant, and so on. On the one hand, these categories are useful when it comes to monitoring people's movements or identifying beneficiaries of aid. Indeed, when conducting field research, this research relied on these categories to identify respondents, and labels have been used throughout this report to differentiate between them. On the other hand, an over-reliance on labelling by policy and programmes risks missing the more nuanced realities of people who move. Furthermore, when these labels are used without critique or an understanding of the local context, they can also cause harm and discrimination. This raises serious questions about calls to officially register IDPs, returnees

and refugees in Somalia, a move that is supported by some within government and the international community.⁹³

The need to challenge conventional categories is particularly relevant when it comes to understanding internal movements within Somalia. How useful is it to seek to group the internally displaced together as one group, when experiences differ and when some are excluded for not fitting conventional stereotypes of what an 'IDP' should look like? Likewise, how helpful is it to separate IDPs from other groups, such as rural-urban migrants and hosts, who move for similar reasons or face similar challenges? What are the benefits or risks of categorising internally displaced as IDPs, and who stands to gain from this? The politics of categorisation, and the ends that it serves, need to be carefully considered by policy makers and assistance providers to ensure that support to particular groups does not reinforce or exacerbate divisions within society.

There is little to distinguish those recognised as IDPs from those seen as rural-urban migrants when it comes to their reasons for moving and their humanitarian needs.

As highlighted in the previous section, there is much debate within the international community about how to interpret internal migration in Somalia; as either internal displacement or rural-urban migration. Strong opinions exist on both sides of the divide, as highlighted by diverging statements from two UN informants. According to one of these informants, who placed the emphasis on internal displacement, *"There is no such thing as rural-urban movement, as movement is almost always underpinned by conflict or drought."* According to the other, *"While people are labelled as IDPs, this definition has become stretched as, in many cases, this is more about rural-urban migration than displacement."*

But how useful is it to differentiate between these groups of people? In practice, not much separates IDPs from rural-urban migrants. Given the general conditions faced by the rural population of Somalia, reasons for their movement are often similar and revolve around a combination of insecurity, drought and the search for a better life. These decisions are therefore made within a context of vulnerability and in the absence of any safe and viable options for remaining in place. Likewise, rural-urban migrants arrive in the cities with very few resources and struggle to find places to settle, often ending up in situations very similar to those of IDPs.

With this in mind, we see that the IDP category can be challenged, both as a marker of forced movement within the country and as a marker of humanitarian need. This suggests that restricting assistance to certain categories of people risks cutting off support to others who have a similar or even greater need, but are not eligible due to their label, such as hosts and rural-urban migrants. In this context, it may be more appropriate to target assistance according to people's vulnerabilities rather than categories.

⁹³ For example, the 2017 'National Policy for Refugee-Returnees and IDPs' Action Plan calls for the biometric registration of refugees, returnees and IDPs.

The term IDP is skewed towards the poorest members of society, and excludes those who, despite moving for the same reasons, are not identified as an IDP (either by themselves or others) due to greater social and financial resources.

The IDP label is widely used as a way to identify those who may be in need of humanitarian aid or other support. However, it is often rather limited as it captures a subset not just of those who share similar forms of vulnerability, but also of those who are displaced. For the former, it excludes those such as rural-urban migrants who are not identified as internally displaced but are nonetheless vulnerable to the same challenges. For the latter, it excludes those who are displaced but who have sufficient economic or social resources to avoid identifying themselves as IDPs, or being marked out with this label through their residence in camps or reliance on aid. While the formal definition of IDP emphasises the forced nature of a person's movements regardless of socioeconomic status, in practice, it only applies to the poorest and most vulnerable amongst the internally displaced.⁹⁴ This is a problem, because the very use of the term IDP tends to reinforce the idea that the primary challenge facing people is their displacement. Moreover, as this research showed, being labelled as an IDP exposes people to new challenges.

The internally displaced with greater capital tend to leave Somalia and become refugees, or move to cities like Baidoa, Kismayo and Mogadishu and use their networks and resources to build up new lives without presenting themselves to government authorities or aid agencies as IDPs. While our research sample is biased towards those widely recognised as 'IDPs', we were able to interview a number of internally displaced who did not identify themselves in this way. These interviews were picked up by chance and, perhaps tellingly, were viewed by the research team as 'host community' informants (rather than IDPs), and categorised as such, as a result of their higher social and financial status.

Interestingly, interviews also reveal that the respondents themselves did not self-identify as IDPs, either because they did not want or need to, or because it had never crossed their mind that they could be viewed as IDPs. When asked whether she had received any assistance, one respondent (who admitted to owning multiple properties and businesses) replied, *"I don't receive humanitarian assistance. NGOs only provide support to IDPs and returnees."*⁹⁵ When asked the same question, another respondent (who had been internally displaced by conflict) replied that he didn't need any assistance and was planning to move to Sweden to continue his studies.⁹⁶ In another interview, a respondent who had been forced to flee conflict in 2006, said that she was *"part of the people of Kismayo"* and (in contrast to identified 'IDPs') had been able to buy land, build a house, and was planning to move to Sweden.⁹⁷

Why is it relevant to include wealthier internally displaced, who do not identify as IDPs, in the analysis? Firstly, while interventions should of course respond to the poverty and vulnerability of recognised 'IDPs', it is important to take stock of the wider group in order to target interventions more effectively. For example, if there are wealthier (uncategorised) IDPs who have been able to successfully carve out a place for themselves in the city despite belonging

⁹⁴ The term IDP refers to 'persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence' (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998).

⁹⁵ 55-year-old female displaced from Mogadishu displaced by conflict, and now living in Kismayo.

⁹⁶ 38-year-old male displaced from Gobewein, and now living in Kismayo.

⁹⁷ 30-year-old female displaced from Fanoole, Lower Juba, and now living in Kismayo town.

to minority clans, this suggests there may be a greater role for economic factors in facilitating integration.

Secondly, including wealthier individuals in the analysis reminds us that labels or categories do not always ‘fit’ the people they are supposed to represent, as a result of pre-conceived notions of how its constituents should look and act. This raises questions about who is doing the labelling and on what basis labels are attributed. It also casts doubt about whether people want to be labelled at all, as a result of the baggage and even discrimination that labels such as ‘IDP’ can incur. This underlines again the importance of identifying alternatives to labels and categories when it comes to allocating aid and assistance.

Those labelled as IDPs face discrimination as a result of perceived social, cultural or language differences, and reduced access to rights and freedoms.

While the label ‘IDP’ can give access to humanitarian assistance, it can also lead to greater discrimination by marking people out as ‘*galti*’ (outsider or guest) rather than ‘*degan*’ (resident). This denies them their full citizenship rights on the basis that these are only provided in full in their ‘home’ regional state (Menkhaus, 2017). In this context, interviews reveal considerable bias against IDPs from host communities and key respondents, often couched in terms of social, cultural or language differences. For example, a government informant interviewed in Kismayo revealed that IDPs are often pejoratively nicknamed as ‘*barakaca*’ (displaced) or ‘*baahane*’ (hungry). According to another government informant in Mogadishu, *“It is very difficult for IDPs to be guests in a town where they don’t know its way of life, as the nomadic and urban lifestyles are totally different in terms of way of life and culture.”* In some cases, this bias extended to outright hostility, especially when IDPs were (often unfairly) associated with the spread of disease, high unemployment and worsening insecurity. A key informant in Mogadishu described IDPs being threatened and attacked by members of the local community who suspected them of being thieves.

IDP respondents were extremely aware of the bias and discrimination associated with being labelled as an IDP, and they raised this topic directly during interviews. *“I am not happy and I do not feel like I belong because I am referred to as an IDP and suffer discrimination,”* explained an IDP.⁹⁸ Another interviewee explained that her status as an IDP from a minority clan meant that she had no recourse to legal support when her rights were abused by more powerful groups.⁹⁹ Discrimination associated with a lack of rights was perhaps most succinctly expressed by an IDP living in Mogadishu, who said *“I want to live in an IDP-free place because I want to live like any other citizen with all his freedoms and [be] entitled to all the rights enshrined in the constitution.”*¹⁰⁰ These concerns raise serious questions about the advantage of using the term IDP beyond being a tool for measuring displacement and delivery assistance. It can lead to social stigmatisation and further exclusion of the poorest of the poor from active participation in the city.

⁹⁸ 40-year-old male IDP originally from Dinsoor, Bay, and now living in a camp in Baidoa.

⁹⁹ 43-year-old female IDP originally from Golaleey, Lower Shabelle, and now living in a camp in Bondhere, Mogadishu.

¹⁰⁰ 68-year-old male IDP originally from Barawe, Lower Shabelle, and now living in a camp in Dharkenley, Mogadishu.

Recommendations for policy and programmes

Governments, the international community and NGOs rely on labels associated with migration and displacement in order to monitor different types of movements, and identify groups of beneficiaries based on their perceived needs and vulnerabilities. With this in mind, policy makers and programmers must play a central role in improving how we use categories, and how we make sure that any unintended consequences are minimised. To challenge conventional categories and labels associated with migration and displacement, policy and programmes should:

- 5.3.1. Support all groups rendered vulnerable to destitution and the violation of basic rights by displacement and return, regardless of their label or category (IDP, refugee, returnee, rural-urban migration, host, etc). Area-based approaches which, by defining a geographic area (rather than a sector or target group) as the main entry point, can be a useful way of incorporating the needs of all groups.
- 5.3.2. Pay greater attention to defining vulnerabilities and generating a better understanding of what people are vulnerable to. Instead of defining vulnerability on a predetermined set of categories based on migration status and allocating assistance accordingly, support should be provided according to people's actual needs (food, health, education, water, housing, livelihoods, etc) regardless of whether they are IDPs, refugees, returnees or hosts. It is also important to consider broader qualities that cut across these groups, such as gender, age, origins, income, assets, rights and access to services.
- 5.3.3. Build awareness into project design and planning of the potential for discrimination associated with labelling, and especially the term IDP, so that programmes do not inadvertently restrict people's rights or undermine community cohesion.

5.4. Addressing housing, land and property concerns and forced evictions

Housing, land and property (HLP) concerns are widely recognised as an explosive issue in Somalia's urban centres, and especially in Mogadishu. Mogadishu residents consider land disputes to be among the leading drivers of conflict in the city (OCVP; HIPS, 2014), and it has been argued that sustainable political reconciliation can only be achieved by resolving competing claims to land (Besteman & Cassanelli, 2000). HLP concerns have been exacerbated by high demand (in the context of rapid urbanisation, investment and development) and rocketing land prices. This has been compounded by competing claims on land coupled with a weak legal framework and, often corrupt, land administration system.

In this context, respondents' experiences of HLP differed significantly depending on the financial and social capital they are able to draw upon. Given their greater wealth and connections, returning diaspora experienced the least obstacles in accessing HLP on their return, with 72% of respondents in Mogadishu able to reclaim property left behind with minimal challenges. In contrast, marginalised IDPs and returnees from minority groups were particularly vulnerable to land grabs, forced evictions and deplorable housing conditions, and

were the most likely to live in settlements. For example, a returnee described how his house and shop had been occupied by members of a more powerful clan, and he had no recourse to reclaim them. In another interview, an IDP in Mogadishu described how *“Life in this city is hard. You cannot pay the cost of renting a house. IDP families cannot survive here due to inflation and high prices.”*¹⁰¹

But how do these issues influence durable solutions for displaced people? What is the impact of forced evictions on processes of (re)integration, and how does the ability to reclaim land left behind during displacement influence returns?

Forced evictions undermine local integration by eroding living standards, livelihoods and a sense of belonging among IDPs and others living in informal settlements.

HLP issues, and particularly forced evictions, contribute to a constant erosion of living standards, livelihoods and belonging, which ultimately undermine people’s ability and desire to locally integrate in cities. Access to land and security of tenure are important determinants of vulnerability, and IDPs and returnees settled on private or government land are under constant threat of eviction. Forced evictions are a longstanding issue in Mogadishu,¹⁰² however the eviction of 5,807 households (an estimated 34,734 individuals) in December 2017 drew widespread international condemnation. Many of the IDPs evicted in December had been long-term camp residents, and such secondary displacements represent ‘a painful reversal of years, if not decades, of incremental recovery efforts to rebuild lives’ (NRC, 2018).

By destroying assets, and disrupting social networks and daily routines, forced evictions significantly undermine living standards and livelihoods. The threat of eviction deters people from investing, whether financially or emotionally, in a place for fear of being moved, thereby undermining the likelihood of local integration. According to an IDP in Mogadishu, *“We live in fear of eviction. We were allowed to settle here, but we can be evicted at any time.”*¹⁰³ Threat of evictions also deters aid agencies from investing in sustainable support and infrastructure as, in many cases, assets (such as schools, water points and latrines) are also destroyed during the eviction process. Furthermore, evicted IDPs generally relocate to the city’s outskirts, which increases their marginalisation and further undermines opportunities for sustainable livelihoods within the city due to an absence of transport links and other services.

Research findings suggest that HLP concerns are more severe in Mogadishu than in Baidoa and Kismayo, where respondents seemed to be relatively more satisfied with their living arrangements. Interviewees in Mogadishu (in particular IDPs, refugees and returnees) had settled in government-owned buildings, or camps that are often located on privately-owned land, which left them at the mercy of gatekeepers and vulnerable to evictions. The situation in Kismayo was quite different, as the authorities have been credited by many observers with

¹⁰¹ 47-year-old female IDP originally from Bualle District, Lower Juba, and now living in a camp in Bondhere, Mogadishu.

¹⁰² 77% of forceful evictions across Somalia take place in Mogadishu (NRC, 2018). Small scale evictions occur on a daily basis, and over 150,000 individuals were evicted in 2017 (NRC, 2018).

¹⁰³ 46-year-old male IDP originally from Qoryoley District, Lower Shabelle, and now living in Hodan, Mogadishu.

allocating specific areas of land to IDPs and returnees. This gives people greater security of tenure and reduces the likelihood of forced evictions. *“I am comfortable as I was given land to settle”*, admitted an IDP in Kismayo.¹⁰⁴

Nevertheless, not everyone in Kismayo has benefited. Some IDPs and returnees had not been allocated any land or, even when they had, still felt at risk of eviction. In other cases, land was not viable and susceptible to flooding, as explained by a returnee who had been forced to sleep outside with her children as her house was near collapse as a result of floods. Some hosts complained that their land had been taken from them in order to make space for IDPs and returnees, suggesting that making way for one group of people may inadvertently displace others. *“The government grabs land, mostly the open spaces outside the town, and gives it to the returnees and IDPs, even though these have sometimes been claimed by existing residents,”* claimed a local informant. Finally, settling IDPs and returnees in designated parcels of land undermines integration into wider society, especially when settlements are disconnected from basic services and other amenities. This was summed up by a returning refugee who confessed to *“not feeling even one per cent part of Kismayo town, because I am living in an isolated area called New Kismayo.”*¹⁰⁵

The ability to reclaim assets left behind during displacement is a key determinant of returns for IDPs, although sustainable returns will ultimately depend on improvements to rural security and livelihoods.

Debates about land issues tend to centre around urban settings, however land issues in rural areas are also significant, particularly when it comes to returns. Interviews with IDPs reveal the clearest connection between access to HLP in rural areas and decisions to return. IDPs who could not reclaim HLP (either because these were destroyed or occupied by somebody else) were the least likely to want to return to rural areas. *“I can return to my area of origin. I have no obstacles. But I don’t want to return because prolonged drought has left me with no property or animals,”* explained an IDP interviewed in Kismayo.¹⁰⁶ In many cases, a combination of conflict and drought had devastated dwellings and productive assets (such as farmland and livestock). *“There is nothing left: the livestock is dead, the Shabelle river has dried up, clan conflict has devastated the property, and the local community has run away in search of a better life,”* lamented another IDP in Mogadishu, who also admitted that he would not be returning.¹⁰⁷ In other cases, Al Shabaab or people from more dominant clans had seized land, property, livestock, vehicles and other assets. *“My property was snatched away [by another clan] during conflict and I don’t know anything about it,”* declared an IDP who planned to stay in Baidoa and not return”.¹⁰⁸ *“My house and cars are forcefully in the hands of Al Shabaab,”* complained another IDP from Lower Juba, who would also not be returning.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁴ 76-year-old female IDP originally from Garowe, and now living in a camp in Kismayo.

¹⁰⁵ 40-year-old female refugee originally from Bardhere, Gedo, and now living in Kismayo after returning from Dadaab, Kenya.

¹⁰⁶ 76-year-old female IDP originally from Garowe, and now living in Galbeet, Baidoa.

¹⁰⁷ 57-year-old female IDP originally from Qoryoley, Lower Shabelle, and now living in a camp in Dharkenley, Mogadishu.

¹⁰⁸ 40-year-old female IDP originally from Bardale, Bay, and now living in a camp in Baidoa.

¹⁰⁹ 35-year-old male IDP originally from Lower Juba, and now living in Kismayo.

In contrast, interviewees who had been able to maintain access to assets left behind (often through rural-urban linkages) are more likely to express a desire to return. However, there seemed little incentive amongst this group to try to retrieve these assets as long as prevailing conditions of insecurity and drought continue and without financial support to do so. *“I had a house and livestock, and I would like to go back if it becomes safe and if I can find the financial cost to go back,”* explained an interviewee in Baidoa.¹¹⁰ *“Yes, I left my house, and I am not planning to go back unless I see a strong government that can guarantee our security,”* stated another.¹¹¹ These IDP testimonials are supported by an NGO informant in Nairobi who stated that, *“Ultimately, few people will be moving back, unless they have productive lands to go back to, and receive the right support packages.”* While access to HLP is clearly a key factor in decisions to return, it is not the only one, and significant improvements to security and livelihoods are still needed before IDPs will be willing to make a sustainable return to rural areas.

Recommendations for policy and programmes

The scale and complexity of HLP concerns are daunting when it comes to suggesting recommendations for interventions. Nevertheless, gaps for careful and targeted interventions did emerge from the research. To address HLP concerns, policy and programmes should:

- 5.4.1. Support negotiations between national authorities and stakeholders to reform land administration and implement improved land policy. Displaced groups and women should be consulted as active stakeholders in reform processes and programme design.
- 5.4.2. Encourage regional administrations to build on tentative progress made in Kismayo to allocate viable land with secure tenure for IDPs and returnees. More needs to be done to integrate land allocations within the wider community, and link these up to service delivery (in particular transport, health, education, WASH) to ensure that people living in peripheral areas are still able to establish livelihoods and access basic services.
- 5.4.3. Prevent forced evictions at all costs by including displaced groups in urban planning processes, and working towards long-term planning for hosting and integrating IDPs and returnees. When evictions are unavoidable, they should adhere to international guidelines, in particular the right to consultation and information, sufficient notice before eviction, and protection from force.¹¹² National guidelines, such as the 2013 ‘Compact on the Protection Against Evictions of Internally Displaced Persons in Mogadishu’ (which remains unendorsed) should also be drafted and adopted.

¹¹⁰ 40-year-old female IDP originally from Hudur, Bakool, and now living in Baidoa.

¹¹¹ 75-year-old female IDP originally from Galkayo, and now living in a camp in Kismayo.

¹¹² An example of international guidelines is the ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement’ (OHCHR).

5.5. Improving consensus and coordination on displacement issues

There is a clear lack of clarity, agreement and harmonisation over the mandates, policy and programmes of the many different actors involved in displacement issues. This lack of consensus and coordination is most apparent within government and the international community, and the uncertainty and misunderstandings this creates is undermining wider progress on durable solutions.

The lack of clarity over government mandates with respect to assistance and protection of the displaced undermines potential progress on normative frameworks associated with migration and displacement.

Somali structures of government are complicated by federal-regional dynamics, political affiliations, clan relations and power struggles. Confusingly, a number of different ministries and offices deal with migration and displacement issues: (i) the National Commission for Refugees and IDPs (NCRI), under the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation; (ii) the Special Envoy for Migrants and Children's Rights, under the Office of the Prime Minister, and; (iii) the Disaster Management Agency (DMA) within the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs. Poor coordination is not restricted to the federal level, as regional agencies, policies and laws are not in step with those at the national level (where these exist). For example, Somaliland and Puntland have developed their own IDP policies and Federal Member States such as South West State (SWS) might elaborate such documents, even while the FGS still lacks a specific national instrument (UNSOM, 2018).

NGO and donor informants frequently expressed their frustration at ambiguity over the mandates of the different ministries and agencies, and the subsequent lack of coordination and progress on developing policy to deal with displacement and return. According to one NGO source, *“Political tensions and rivalries between ministries are undermining progress in developing migration policy and associated legal framework. It is very difficult for donors and [the] international community to work with one or the other, or find a common ground across the two sides.”*

As a consequence, normative frameworks remain weak and limited in their implementation, often because they lack buy in from all of the different government stakeholders. A clear example of this is the 2014 'Policy Framework on Displacement' and the 2017 'National Policy for Refugee-Returnees and IDPs', both of which remain in draft form and not implemented at the time of writing. Concerns have also been raised by some stakeholders that the Somalia National Action Plan (which comes out of commitments made at the Nairobi Declaration) is not closely aligned with other planning processes (such as the National Development Plan, the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility Annual Work Plan, and the Recovery and Resilience Framework), and that it does not do enough to define government responsibilities or link humanitarian and development interventions when it comes to its implementation.

Despite efforts by the international community to promote better harmonisation, policy and programmes continue to be duplicated and run in parallel to existing structures.

Similar challenges are apparent within the international community. Government and NGO informants frequently complained of programme duplication, parallel systems and structures, competition over influence and resources, and disconnect between humanitarian and development approaches. These issues occurred between organisations and, in the case of the UN, within them as a result of ambiguity or expansion in the mandates of the different agencies working on migration and displacement. According to an NGO informant in Nairobi, *“You have every organisation working on durable solutions programming, creating their own frameworks and benchmarks. This is a waste of resources.”* This statement was supported by a government informant in Mogadishu who complained that, *“Agencies are not doing what they are mandated to do, because they are attracted to where the current interest and money is. This is where the confusion comes in, and agencies and donors need to stick to their mandates.”*

Efforts are being made to harmonise activities, with widespread recognition that programme and policy should adopt an ‘area-based, multi-sectoral, multi-stakeholders, rights and needs based approach involving simultaneously humanitarian and development partners under the leadership of government authorities’ (UN Somalia, 2017). However, the fact that similar messaging has already been encapsulated in multiple approaches (“whole-of-society”,¹¹³ “new way of working”,¹¹⁴ and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF))¹¹⁵ points to an ongoing and unresolved lack of coordination and harmonisation within the international community’s approach. Furthermore, while the theory may sound good, implementation of these approaches in practice is less clear, and many key informants from both government and the international community expressed frustration at the lack of progress on the ground. *“We hear of ‘government led, government owned’”,* complained one government informant, *“yet when donors come, they don’t work within the set structures.”*

There is a lack of alignment between donors and district-level government, especially when it comes to policy, programming and durable solutions for IDPs.

A lack of coordination can also be seen between state and donor structures. Mechanisms such as the Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility (SDRF) and Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF) are designed to improve coordination, however key

¹¹³ A “whole-of-society” approach includes ‘local authorities, international organisations, civil society partners, the private sector, media and refugees’, in order to ensure that ‘local voices (refugees, hosts, authorities, civil society, etc.) are engaged’ (UNHCR, 2017).

¹¹⁴ The “new way of working” ‘frames the work of development and humanitarian actors, along with national and local counter-parts, in support of collective outcomes that reduce risk and vulnerability and serve as instalments toward the achievement of the SDGs’ (OCHA, 2017).

¹¹⁵ The CRRF calls upon ‘governments, humanitarian and development actors, civil society, refugee and host communities, and other stakeholders to work together to ease pressure on host governments, increase self-reliance of refugees, expand third-country solutions, and support conditions of return in countries of origin’ (UNHCR, 2018).

informants on both sides complained of a lack of consultation and alignment.¹¹⁶ According to a donor informant, *“There is significant underlying tension between government structures and their backers, with both sides wanting to own the space for leading on displacement. This is, to some extent, the outcome of internal fighting within government, as well as competition between partners.”* This statement is supported by a government informant in Mogadishu who complained that donors were creating confusion by not consulting government counterparts sufficiently on new projects.

The lack of consensus between state and donors is perhaps most clearly highlighted by diverging views on durable solutions for IDPs. The international community advocates for a dual approach that incorporates both local integration and return depending on the preferences of IDPs.¹¹⁷ In contrast, district administrations interviewed by this research revealed a strong preference for IDPs to return rather than locally integrate in cities. *“The district administration is fed up with the IDP influx. We always recommend that IDPs return to their original places with the support of the international community, otherwise their needs will exist forever,”* stated a local government informant in Mogadishu. This stance is not unusual, and many governments are reluctant to support integration in the belief that rural-urban migration transfers poverty to cities (Kirbyshire, Wilkinson, Le Masson, & Batra, 2017). What is more, a lack of capacity and resources at central and local level make the task of dealing with the enormous challenges associated with displacement and returns a daunting prospect for government stakeholders.

In spite of district-level reluctance, there are signs of greater openness and responsiveness at the regional level. For example, in May 2018, the Mayor of Mogadishu publicly declared that IDPs are an asset to the city, whose full integration into the community will boost the economy and make positive and valuable contributions to the region (BRA, 2018). These kinds of statements are encouraging, and should be used as a basis for countering conventional opinion and rhetoric, and pushing for wider buy in from other government counterparts at all levels.

Achieving successful durable solutions for IDPs will depend on government buy in at all levels and across a range of workable options, including local integration. Nevertheless, Somalia remains in a political transition, in which the architecture of federalism is currently incomplete. Political decisions about the nature of federalism will determine fundamental issues relating to social, political and economic rights. Policy and programmatic decisions that pre-empt the answers to these larger questions cannot realistically be considered “durable solutions” and may actually lead to future complications. Sequencing of these decisions must therefore be carefully considered, and it may be necessary for the international community

¹¹⁶ The SDRF is the ‘main national coordination framework and financing architecture to implement the NDP in Somalia between the FGS and international community.’ The MAF was adopted by the High-Level Somalia Partnership Forum in December 2017, and ‘sets out common commitments and milestones for the cooperation between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the international community throughout the lifetime of the NDP’ (UNSOM, 2018).

¹¹⁷ For example, UN Somalia calls for ‘differentiated solutions responding to different needs and patterns of displacement’, which includes ‘local integration and urban solutions for protracted IDPs who want to permanently settle in urban/ peri-urban areas’ as well as ‘return to the place of origin and rural solutions for conflict/drought affected IDPs opting go back to their places of origin if/when the security and environmental conditions permit’ (UN Somalia).

to focus on supporting vulnerable groups while wider issues relating to citizenship are resolved.

Recommendations for policy and programmes

Improvements to consensus and coordination are urgently needed at all levels of government and international community in order to bring about sustainable return and (re)integration in the long-term. To improve consensus and coordination, policy and programmes should:

- 5.5.1. Build on existing structural and normative frameworks, adopt a ‘whole of government’ approach that promotes cross-ministerial representation, and involve displaced people in planning and decision-making. These recommendations are not new, and have been advocated for some time by a range of different stakeholders. Nevertheless, practical implementation is still in short supply, so this report underscores the importance of these recommendations for policy makers in the hope that they are taken up more widely.
- 5.5.2. Integrate and align displacement and return interventions within wider development programming and goals. The upcoming renewal of the National Development Plan could represent a well-timed opportunity for building on this. Better alignment and integration will also require greater clarity on governmental roles and responsibilities, greater coordination between humanitarian and development actors on programming, as well as a move beyond short-term funding envelopes towards longer-term investments by donors.
- 5.5.3. Make local integration of IDPs more attractive for local government counterparts by demonstrating that displaced groups can be an asset to cities, in particular when it comes to contributing to the local economy. To achieve this, interventions should promote education, livelihood and employment opportunities for displaced people while in exile and upon return, whilst also including host communities so that they are not left behind. Government rhetoric on IDP integration has been more conciliatory of late, which could represent a window of opportunity for engaging more proactively with local administrations (and not just central government) on these issues.

6. Conclusions

Displacement, return and (re)integration are complex processes that are influenced by a wide range of underlying issues.

Five key themes emerged from the research that have a strong bearing on processes and outcomes of displacement, return and (re)integration, and which have been analysed in detail in the report. The first is the importance of a sense of belonging, and the notion that people who feel included, involved in and supported by the wider community are more likely to want to, and be able to, (re)integrate into that society, either during displacement or upon return. The second key theme is that promoting rural-urban linkages will help support processes of sustainable return and (re)integration by helping people to maintain assets and networks in places of origin and destination. Third is the need to challenge conventional categories and labels (in particular the term IDP) which have become skewed as markers of movement or humanitarian need, and can discriminate against the people they describe. The fourth key theme relates to the urgent need to address Housing, Land and Property (HLP) concerns, as poor housing and forced evictions undermine opportunities for local integration, while the ability to reclaim assets left behind during displacement is a key determinant of returns (in conjunction with improvements to rural security and livelihoods). The fifth theme is the need for consensus and coordination on displacement issues, and the urgent need to harmonise policy and programmes if sustainable returns and (re)integration are to be achieved in the long-term.

At the same time, outcomes of displacement, return and (re)integration are influenced by a number of other underlying themes that are central to the Somali context, and which are cross-cutting issues throughout this report. Insecurity and drought are the main drivers of displacement, and a key determinant of when, and if, people will choose to return to their place of origin. Clan dynamics also play a key role in determining why people move, where they move to, and the level of support and protection they can expect to receive. Clan will also be a major factor in determining the legislative and policy frameworks that will ultimately frame long-term 'solutions' for IDP. Finally, urbanisation, and the rapid growth of Somalia's urban centres, has become the backdrop for many of these issues, and determines how people on the move are labelled, where assistance should be targeted, and what form it should take.

Decisions and experiences vary depending on the person and the context.

It is clear from the research that decisions and experiences of displacement and return vary considerably when individual, structural and policy conditions are taken into account. Gender, age, access to social and financial resources, migrant status and context all contribute to bringing out these differences. With this in mind, policy and programmes should be flexible enough to provide for a range of workable options that are sensitive to different needs, contexts and changes over time.

Not only are gendered roles and expectations challenged by displacement, but men and women experience displacement differently. For example, while women and girls are more

likely to experience protection risks associated with abuse and exploitation, men and boys are more likely to be suspected of (and subsequently arrested for) extremist sympathies and activities. Gender interacts with migrant status, and a continuum of vulnerability emerged from the research, with IDPs at the bottom, followed by refugees, returnees, deportees and diaspora at the top.

Context also contributes to different outcomes, and experiences in Mogadishu were generally more difficult than in Baidoa or Kismayo. Respondents in Mogadishu reported harsher living conditions, higher threat of forced evictions, and worse access to services and support than those living in Baidoa and Kismayo. As a result, people who were displaced or returned to Mogadishu typically felt the least sense of belonging, the greatest regret at moving, and were the most likely to want to move elsewhere.

While a broadly negative picture of displacement and return emerges, there is scope for some optimism.

The picture of displacement and return that emerges from the research is disheartening. People affected by these issues experience a wide range of challenges associated with poor living conditions, forced evictions, restricted livelihood opportunities, lack of security and protection, and limited support and assistance. Many of these problems are introduced after displacement or return has occurred and are not strictly speaking the products of the movement itself. The challenges identified by IDPs were particularly discouraging, and touch on all aspects of their daily lives. This pessimism is reflected in dominant narratives that legitimately describe the current situation, as a “continuing crisis” (OCHA, 2017); language which was often mirrored during interviews with key informants from government and the international community.

Nevertheless, the research did uncover some positive examples of progress and resilience, which suggest that there can be grounds for (guarded) optimism and hope. For example, in spite of limited livelihood opportunities, some women had become family breadwinners for the first time. In addition, many households were proactively engaging in mobile livelihood strategies between rural and urban locations in order to access jobs, education and assistance, whilst also maintaining land, livestock and agricultural productivity in places of origin. While local government and hosts were critical of migration’s impact on urban resources and infrastructure, there was a softening of rhetoric around the potential for new economic opportunities. Stakeholders should take some comfort from these examples of progress and resilience, and use them as a starting point for building towards more positive narratives and outcomes of displacement, return and (re)integration in Somalia.

Annex 1: List of acronyms

BRA	Banadir Regional Administration
CRRF	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework
DMA	Disaster Management Agency
DINA	Drought Impact Needs Assessment
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
DSI	Durable Solutions Initiative
EUTF	European Union Emergency Trust Fund
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
HIPS	Heritage Institute for Policy Studies
HLP	Housing, Land and Property
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
JIPS	Joint IDP Profiling Service
JRIA	Jubaland Refugees and IDPs Affairs
MAF	Mutual Accountability Framework
NCRI	National Commission for Refugees and IDPs
NDP	National Development Plan
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OCVP	Observatory of Conflict and Violence Prevention
PRMN	Protection and Return Monitoring Network
ReDSS	Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat
RMMS	Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat
RRF	Recovery and Resilience Framework
RVI	Rift Valley Institute
SDRF	Somalia Development and Reconstruction Facility
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNPBF	United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
WASH	Water, sanitation and health

Annex 2: Maps of Baidoa, Kismayo, Mogadishu


Map 2. Map of Baidoa city (Source: UNSOA)



Map 3. Map of Kismayo city (Source: UNSOA)



Map 4: Map of Mogadishu city (Source OCHA, adapted by Sahan)



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Annex 4: List of key informants

Table 4. Key informants from Baidoa, Kismayo, Mogadishu and Nairobi

	Government	Non-government
Baidoa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bay Regional Administration • Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs • District Commission for Social Affairs • Member of Parliament • Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs & Disability • Ministry of Resettlement & Diaspora Affairs • Ministry of Security 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Baidoa Women’s Group • Baidoa Youth Council • Council of Elders • Gate Keepers • IOM • Journalist • Member Council of Imams • Police • SOSWENSA • UNHCR
Kismayo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Calenley District Administration • Central Police Station • Jubaland Refugee and IDP Affairs • Justice Department • Lower Juba Regional Administration • Ministry of Education • Ministry of Gender and Human Rights Affairs • Ministry of Health • Ministry of Interior • Ministry of Sports • Office of the Speaker, Jubaland Parliament 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ARC • Civil society activist • GTC Global • Journalist • Jubaland Civil Society (JUNSA) • Maternal health worker • Muslim Aid • Raabi Foundation • Religious leader • Safer World • Teacher • University student • WASDA • Women’s groups
Mogadishu	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Abdi Aziz District Administration • Dayniile District Administration • Dharkenley District Administration • Hodan District Administration • Kahda District Administration • Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management • National Commission for Refugee & IDPs (NCRI) • Office of the Special Envoy for Migrants and Children’s Rights • Shangani District Administration • Waberi District Administration • Wadajir District Administration • 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Action for Relief and Development (ARD) • CARE • Danish Refugee Council • DRC • IRC • CTG Global • NRC • Peace Action Organization for Somalia • WARDO
Nairobi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IGAD Regional Secretariat on Forced Displacement and Mixed migration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • American Friends Service Committee • CARE International • Concern Worldwide • DDG • DRC

	Government	Non-government
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FAO • Human Rights Watch • INTERSOS • IOM • NRC • ReDSS • RMMS • Sahan • Samuel Hall • Save the Children • Somalia NGO Consortium • UN HABITAT • UNHCR • UNSOM • World Bank • World Vision

Annex 5: Respondents' gender, age and areas of origin

Table 3. Breakdown of respondents' gender

	Baidoa		Kismayo		Mogadishu		Nairobi		Total	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
IDPs	17%	83%	33%	67%	92%	8%	-	-	49%	51%
Returnees	24%	76%	52%	48%	52%	48%	-	-	45%	55%
Refugees	-	-	-	-	85%	15%	-	-	85%	15%
Diaspora	-	-	63%	37%	80%	20%	-	-	71%	29%
Deportees	45%	55%	-	-	-	-	-	-	45%	55%
Host	56%	44%	50%	50%	56%	44%	-	-	54%	46%
Key informants	92%	8%	88%	12%	92%	8%	48%	52%	81%	19%
Total	48%	52%	58%	42%	76%	24%	48%	52%	60%	40%

Table 4. Breakdown of respondents' age

	Baidoa	Kismayo	Mogadishu	Average
IDPs	42	49	51	47
Returnees	39	44	39	41
Refugees	-	-	36	36
Diaspora	-	42	41	42
Deportees	35	-	-	35
Host	37	37	47	40
Average	38	43	43	40

Table 5. Breakdown of respondents' area of origin

Region	District/ Town	Baidoa			Kismayo			Mogadishu		
		IDPs	Returnees	Deportees	IDPs	Returnees	Diaspora	IDPs	Returnees	Diaspora
Bay	Baidoa	21%	22%	80%				5%		
	Bardale	21%	4%					5%		
	Burhakaba			15%						
	Dinsoor		4%		5%			10%		
	Qansahdhere	8%	22%							
	TOTALS	50%	52%	95%	5%	0%	0%	19%	0%	0%
Bakool	Hudur	21%	4%				5%			
	Rabdhure	4%						5%		
	Tieglow			5%						

Region	District/ Town	Baidoa			Kismayo			Mogadishu		
		IDPs	Returnees	Deportees	IDPs	Returnees	Diaspora	IDPs	Returnees	Diaspora
	Wajid	17%				2%				
	TOTALS	42%	4%	5%	0%	2%	5%	5%	0%	0%
Banadir	Abdi Aziz								4%	
	Hamar Weyne								13%	13%
	Hodan						5%		4%	
	Mogadishu						11%		17%	31%
	Waberi						5%		17%	
	Wadajir					2%				6%
	Wardhiigley									13%
	Yaqshid								9%	
	TOTALS	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	21%	0%	65%	63%
Galgadud	Adado									6%
	Abdudwaq				5%					
	El Buur							5%		
	TOTALS	0%	0%	0%	5%	0%	0%	5%	0%	6%
Gedo	Bardhere	8%				11%				
	El Wak					5%				
	Garbaharey				5%		5%			
	Luuq		4%		5%					
	TOTALS	8%	4%	0%	9%	16%	5%	0%	0%	0%
Hiraan	Beled Weyne								4%	
	TOTALS	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	4%	0%
Lower Juba	Afmadow				9%	11%	5%			
	Badhade					5%	5%			
	Dhobley					7%				
	Jamame				27%	7%	5%	5%		6%
	Kamsuuma				5%					
	Kismayo					23%	47%		13%	19%
	Xagar					2%				
	TOTALS	0%	0%	0%	41%	55%	63%	5%	13%	25%
Lower Shabelle	Afgoye								13%	
	Barawe							14%		
	Janale							10%		
	Kunturware							14%		
	Merca		4%			5%				
	Qoryoleyey				5%			10%		

Region	District/ Town	Baidoa			Kismayo			Mogadishu		
		IDPs	Returnees	Deportees	IDPs	Returnees	Diaspora	IDPs	Returnees	Diaspora
	Wanlaweyn								4%	
	TOTALS	0%	4%	0%	5%	5%	0%	48%	17%	0%
Middle Juba	Bualle		4%		9%	16%		5%		
	Jilib				14%	5%				6%
	Sakow		30%		5%					
	TOTALS	0%	35%	0%	27%	20%	0%	5%	0%	6%
Middle Shabelle	Balad							5%		
	Jowhar							10%		
	TOTALS	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	14%	0%	0%
Mudug	Galkayo				5%		5%			
	TOTALS	0%	0%	0%	5%	0%	5%	0%	0%	0%
Nugaal	Garowe				5%					
	TOTALS	0%	0%	0%	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%