



EUTF Monitoring and Learning System SLC

S1 2022 REPORT
COVERING UNTIL 30 JUNE 2022

Altai Consulting for the European Union – December 2022



This project is funded by the European Union



© European Union

December 2022

Unless specified otherwise, all pictures in this report are credited to Altai Consulting.

This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of Altai Consulting and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

Cover photo: Yaoundé, Cameroon, June 2021

ALTAI CONSULTING

Altai Consulting provides research and monitoring & evaluation services to public institutions and international organisations in developing countries.

Our teams operate in more than 50 countries in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. Since its inception 18 years ago, Altai Consulting has developed a strong focus on migration, governance and sustainable development related research and programme evaluations.

Contact Details:

Philibert de Mercey (Project Director): pdemercey@altaiconsulting.com

Eric Davin (Altai Partner): edavin@altaiconsulting.com

www.altaiconsulting.com

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This report was prepared by Eric Davin, Justine Rubira, Philibert de Mercey, Sarah Akesbi, Catherine Crowley, Matthieu Rouyer, and Rim Wazni.

We gratefully thank project staff from the implementing partners who took the time to sit with us and comply with our reporting requirements. We are indebted to:

- ACF, ADA, AICS, APSS, COGINTA, DGLPAP, Diakonia, *Eau Vive*, Educo, Enabel, *Expertise France*, GIZ, *Humanité & Inclusion*, IOM, Keoogo, LVIA, *Ministère de l'Education Nationale et de l'Alphabétisation au Burkina Faso*, *Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances et du Développement au Burkina Faso*, OXFAM, PMLAL, Promediation, SEMFILMS, Solidar Suisse, *Terre des Hommes* and VSF in Burkina Faso;
- ACF, AFD, GIZ, IOM and SNV in Cameroon;
- AFD, Berthy, *Caritas Suisse*, COGINTA, Concern Worldwide, Geysers SA, GIZ, *Humanité & Inclusion*, OXFAM, *Société moderne de construction au Tchad*, UNHCR and Vergnet in Chad;
- CIVIPOL in Côte d'Ivoire;
- ICMPD, SNV and UNCDF in Ghana;
- Enabel, GIZ, ITC, and WFP in Guinea;
- AECID, AFD, CIVIPOL, Enabel, *Expertise France*, GIZ, *Humanité & Inclusion*, IFAD, IOM, LuxDev, LVIA, SNV World and SOS SAHEL in Mali;
- AECID, *Croix-Rouge Française*, *Expertise France*, FIIAPP, GIZ, GRET, ILO, IOM, OXFAM and Save the Children in Mauritania;
- ACTED, AFD, AICS, CISP, CIVIPOL, COGINTA, Enabel, FIIAPP, Garkua, GIZ, HACP, IOM, Karkara, LuxDev, SNV World and UNHCR in Niger;
- British Council, DRC, FAO, IOM, IRC, Mercy Corps, NRC, UNDP, UNICEF, UN Women and WFP in Nigeria;
- 20STM, ACTED, AECID, AF Consulting, AFD, AICS, CIVIPOL, Enabel, GRET, IOM, LuxDev, and PPI in Senegal;
- Enabel, GIZ, IMVF, IOM and ITC in The Gambia;
- ACF, ACH, AFD, Camoes, *Caritas Suisse*, *Centre pour le Dialogue Humanitaire*, CIVIPOL, *Croix-Rouge Burkina Faso*, *Croix-Rouge espagnole*, DIHR, *Expertise France*, FIIAPP, *Humanité & Inclusion*, *Investisseurs & Partenaires*, International Rescue Committee, Interpol, IOM, ITC, LuxDev, *l'Organisation internationale de la Francophonie*, *l'Office Nationale de l'Eau et l'Assainissement*, OXFAM, PMLAL, Promediation, Save the Children, Sequa, *Terre des hommes*, UNHCR and WFP at the regional level.

We would also like to thank the European Union (EU) Delegations to Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and The Gambia as well as the EUTF team in Brussels.

CONTENTS

CONTENTS	4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	5
1. INTRODUCTION	7
1.1. Background	7
1.2. The EUTF SLC window in S1 2022	7
2. METHODOLOGY	8
2.1. MLS methodology	8
2.2. Challenges and limitations in the 2022 Report	9
3. PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW	11
3.1. Budget and number of contracts by status	11
3.2. Budget distribution by country, implementing partner and Strategic Objective	14
3.3. Budget allocated to the COVID-19 response	16
4. SITUATION AND RESULTS OVERVIEW	17
4.1. The Sahel and Lake Chad region in S1 2022	17
4.2. The EUTF response – overview of results	18
5. ANALYSIS BY COUNTRY	38
5.1. Burkina Faso	38
5.2. Chad	47
5.3. Côte d'Ivoire	53
5.4. Ghana	58
5.5. Guinea	63
5.6. Mali	69
5.7. Mauritania	78
5.8. Niger	84
5.9. Nigeria	93
5.10. Senegal	100
5.11. The Gambia	108
CONCLUSIONS	115
6. INDEX	117
6.1. Tables	117
6.2. Figures	117
6.3. Outcome analyses	119


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the tenth report prepared by the Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) for the Sahel and Lake Chad window, covering all outputs achieved through funding from the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced people in Africa (EUTF) in the Sahel and Lake Chad (SLC) region, from the start of activities until the end of June 2022, with a specific focus on outputs generated in the first semester of 2022 (S1 2022).

This report includes outputs from programmes implemented in Burkina Faso, Benin, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, The Gambia and Togo.¹

As of June 2022, the EUTF for Africa has committed (i.e. funds allocated following decisions by the Operational Committees) €5.0B (billion), including €2.2B to 114 decisions in the SLC window. A total of 218 operational projects have been contracted in the SLC region, including 91 completed projects, 114 projects in implementation and 13 projects in inception. 106 of the projects currently in implementation have data or other qualitative information to report and eight are either too early in their implementation phase to be able to report outputs or their activities have not yet generated outputs that are relevant to the EUTF indicators. The current report includes data on 197 projects (equivalent in funding to €2.0B), comprising 91 completed projects, as well as 106 projects in their implementation phase with data to report.

Figure 1: Contracted budget breakdown by country and Strategic Objective, June 2022²



Strategic Objective 1: Greater economic and employment opportunities

GDP growth is forecast at 4.1 percent in West Africa and 4.6 percent in Central Africa in 2022. Economic transformation for SLC countries rests upon the skills of its workforce. As of June 2022, EUTF-funded programmes have delivered TVET and skills development to 247,217 individuals (indicator 1.4), including 66,765 beneficiaries during S1 2022, the largest number for any semester since the beginning of EUTF-funded activities. During S1 2022, the interventions of EUTF-funded programmes for job creation or support were two-pronged: In Sahel countries (particularly Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali), interventions rested upon the creation of jobs in mostly rural, remote areas, prone to instability and with less access to basic services, while in coastal countries (such as Senegal, Ghana and Guinea), which are less prone to conflict and violence, interventions aimed at the creation of more formal, long-term jobs. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger accounted for 57% of all jobs created or supported during S1 2022 (indicator 1.1, 9,547 jobs).

¹ Outputs in Benin, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Togo are collected through regional programmes.

² Share of budget for projects contracted and relevant to the MLS. The total displayed in the visual does not reflect the budget allocated to cross-cutting activities, which represents €5.0M.

Strategic Objective 2: Strengthening resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable including refugees and other displaced people

The Sahel region is experiencing a breakdown in basic services due to ongoing conflict. The consequences of droughts and inflation from 2021 are also being felt, and households struggle to afford food commodities. Increasing levels of stressors such as conflict, displacement and food insecurity force populations in the Sahel to change their habits to adapt to resource shortages. During the first semester of 2022, EUTF-funded campaigns on resilience-building practices and basic rights reached 9,024,588 million people (indicator 2.7) and 127,418 people were provided with food security assistance (indicator 2.4).

Strategic Objective 3: Improved migration management in countries of origin, transit, and destination

The SLC region continues to be an important transit area for migrants who intend to reach Europe through the Mediterranean or Atlantic Routes. In the first half of 2022, EUTF-funded programmes protected and/or assisted 35,840 migrants in transit, bringing the total to 190,390 (indicator 3.2). This output is substantially driven by one programme, Protection West Africa (REG-13), which provides protection and assistance efforts to migrants in transit. In addition to direct assistance to migrants in transit, EUTF-funded programmes trained 1,321 people this semester on migrant protection matters, accounting for 65% of the semester's trainings (indicator 3.7). In the first half of 2022, 112 projects and initiatives were supported by diaspora members through EUTF-funded projects, representing an increase of 51% compared to the results achieved by 31 December 2021 (indicator 3.1).

Strategic Objective 4: Improved governance, security and conflict prevention

The security situation in the SLC region kept on deteriorating during the first half of 2022, particularly in the Sahel. To address rising violence in the region, EUTF-funded programming in S1 2022 focused on promoting local solutions adapted to local contexts. In S1 2022, 7,279 out of 11,581 people trained on governance and conflict prevention (indicator 4.2) were local civilian actors including community representatives, members of local civilian institutions and traditional elders. This was the highest number reached for any semester, both in absolute and relative terms (63%). 734 strategies, laws, policies and plans related to conflict resolution and peacebuilding (indicator 4.6) drafted this semester were "local" or "community-based" (81% of the semester's output). EUTF programming in S1 2022 conducted large-scale conflict-prevention campaigns: This semester, awareness-raising activities for peace reached 409,105 (49% women) people (indicator 4.3), an increase of 13% over the previous total, and more than the entire output for 2021.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND

The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced people in Africa (EUTF for Africa or EUTF) was launched in November 2015. It is composed of three geographical 'windows': 'North Africa' (NoA), 'Horn of Africa' (HoA) and 'Sahel and Lake Chad' (SLC), which includes 12 'main' countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and The Gambia. Neighbouring countries are also eligible for regional programmes. This report includes outputs from programmes implemented in 16 countries: the 12 mentioned above as well as Benin, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Togo.¹

This is the tenth report prepared by the Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) for the EUTF SLC window, covering all the outputs achieved with EUTF funding in the SLC region, from the start of activities until the end of June 2022, with a specific focus on outputs generated in S1 2022. Previous reports can be found [here](#).

In response to the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the European Union (EU) decided to reorient funds in the EUTF SLC portfolio, and some implementing partners (IPs) chose to adjust their activities. Three new COVID-19 specific indicators were added to the EUTF common indicators to better capture the outputs generated through these initiatives in MLS reporting.

1.2. THE EUTF SLC WINDOW IN S1 2022

As of June 2022, the EUTF had committed (i.e., allocated funds following decisions by the EUTF Operational Committees) €5.0B (billion euros). The SLC window is the first in size in terms of funding, with €2.2B committed across 114 decisions. There are 218 operational contracts and of interest to the MLS.² Of these, 91 projects worth €683M (million) are completed, 114 projects worth €1.3B, are being implemented, and 13 projects (€64M) are in inception. Out of the 114 projects currently implementing, 106 have data to report.³ This report presents data from 197 projects, including 91 completed projects, covering a total contracted amount of €2.0B. As such, it covers four projects and €40M more funding than the annual 2021 report. Funding and implementation continue to follow the EUTF's four Strategic Objectives⁴ (SOs) and the strategic priorities set by the EUTF Strategic Board and ratified in September 2019 i.e. i) returns and reintegration; ii) refugee management; iii) completing progress on the securitisation of documents and civil registry; iv) anti-trafficking measures; v) essential stabilisation efforts; and vi) migration dialogue.

¹ Outputs in Benin, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Togo are collected through regional programmes and are presented in the overview of results section (4.2) of this report.

² Projects are considered operational when they deliver outputs to beneficiaries. Administrative projects and non-operational projects (such as projects contracted under the Research and Evidence Facility and the Technical and Cooperation Facility, feasibility studies, audits, etc.) are not included in the analysis.

³ Five projects are either too early in their implementation phase to be able to report outputs or their activities did not yet generate outputs that are relevant to the EUTF indicators.

⁴ The four Strategic Objectives (SO) of the EUTF are: SO1 'Greater economic and employment opportunities'; SO2 'Strengthening resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable including refugees and other displaced people', SO3 'Improved migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination' and SO4 'Improved governance and conflict prevention and reduction of forced displacement and irregular migration'.

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1. MLS METHODOLOGY

2.1.1. OUTPUT MONITORING

The Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) team works with each implementing partner (IP) to develop a reporting system that allows the MLS to collect the most detailed and granular level of data common to all IPs. To that end, the MLS has developed a reporting template that it uses with most IPs, although the reporting template is tailored to each project through a drafting and feedback process with respective IPs. Given the complexity and diversity of the EUTF portfolio, and the fact that IPs and M&E systems have different resources, limitations and capacities, the MLS tries to offer as much flexibility as possible with regard to the quantity, disaggregation and format of data collected from IPs.

The MLS then aggregates the collected data using a standardised methodology (and later disaggregates it again along various lines of analysis for reporting). This approach allows the MLS to help IPs map their own activities and outputs against the list of EUTF common output indicators and to have access to a finer level of disaggregation (e.g., by gender, beneficiary type, location, etc.). It also gives the MLS significant flexibility in changing the way data is analysed or presented as needed.

Based on the information received, the MLS team completes output indicator mappings for each project, collects the relevant data from each IP, checks the data for quality and enters it into the MLS database for aggregation, further quality checking and analysis.

During the S1 2020 reporting period, the EUTF revised its common output indicators and their respective methodologies. The resulting revisions have been formalised through a set of methodological notes, which can be found in the annexes to the S1 2020 report. For more information about this process, please see the S1 2020 report.

2.1.2. OUTCOME ANALYSIS

In addition to output monitoring, the EUTF MLS started to include project- and programme-level outcome analysis in S2 2020 in the form of focus boxes for certain completed projects. As explained in previous reports as well as in this [MLS methodological note](#), aggregating outcome data for the EUTF portfolio is not possible in the way that it is for output data, because there are no common and standardised EUTF outcome indicators. This means that no methodologically harmonised outcome data has been collected by EUTF projects, without which comprehensive and meaningful outcome analysis is impossible. Therefore, it was agreed that the MLS would not undertake a comprehensive quantitative aggregation of outcome indicators across projects.

However, as part of the MLS's broader efforts to assess potential large-scale changes effected by the EUTF in its areas of implementation, in March 2022 the team conducted a review of all outcome indicators reported on by projects which had completed before July 2021,¹ to assess whether partial aggregation could be feasible in some cases, and if limited conclusions could be drawn about the potential outcomes of the EUTF portfolio beyond specific projects and programmes.

A total of 56 projects that ended before S2 2021 in the SLC window were assessed as part of this exercise.² Out of these 56, 35 projects had shared a final evaluation report with the MLS team. The

¹ According to EUTF directives, projects are required to deliver their final report no later than six months after the end of their project, hence the choice of this deadline for the inclusion of projects in the study. It should be noted, however, that the lack of a final report after this deadline may be due to a number of factors, including the possibility that reports were not made available to the MLS team.

² See footnote 1.

remaining 21 projects were either not relevant for a final evaluation, pending a final evaluation because they had recently ended, were part of a programme which was still ongoing, or did not make the documents available to the MLS team. Collectively, these projects reported on 514 outcome and impact indicators, of which 370 were categorised by the MLS to be 'true' outcomes indicators.¹ Among those, 313 indicators were assessed by the team to be SMART.² Combining results in initial SLC and HoA analysis, 33 common outcome indicator categories were identified. Twenty of these were relevant to outcomes mapped under SLC projects.

However, while categories allow to group indicators in batches of similar expected outcomes, the way indicators are measured or defined often prevents aggregation. Even in cases where outcome indicators are exactly equivalent, aggregated values cannot be weighted or calculated without knowing the relevant population or sample size. Furthermore, limitations in the quality and availability of project indicator descriptions and data negatively affect their aggregation potential. In many cases, indicators measured at baseline were not measured again at endline (or vice versa), or the endline evaluation collected data for a similar but incomparable indicator to the one used at baseline.

As such, it is only possible to aggregate a limited number of indicators across EUTF projects, and even in these cases methodological limitations and caveats must be considered. These aggregable indicators were then analysed in the SO sections of the 2021 annual report, and these analyses will be continually revised in future annual reports (as a critical mass of additional completed projects are required before the aggregated data can be significantly updated). Project-specific outcome analyses continue to be included as focus boxes in their respective country sections.

2.2. CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS IN THE 2022 REPORT

During the implementation of the methodological changes, some projects were unable to provide the additional disaggregation requested. In these cases, data was included under the 'unspecified' category in the MLS analyses. Others lacked data for the newly created indicators. Significant cases of this include:

- Due to the methodological changes to the common output indicators performed in S1 2020, not all previously gathered GIZ data could be transferred to the changed system. Therefore, the GIZ data included in this report is not complete and numbers may differ from earlier reports.³
- For completed projects where IPs could no longer be contacted, the MLS team has applied only those methodological changes that were feasible without consultation, taking as reference project documents such as final evaluations.

Data for S1 2022 was received from all projects for which it was expected, except for the following:⁴

- The regional PDU Interconsortia BF (REG-18-12) did not provide data this semester.
- The regional project PDU PROGRESS (REG-18-09) was only able to provide data for Q1 2022. Additional data for S1 2022 will be included in the next MLS report.
- In The Gambia, the project MIITG Enabel (GM-03-04) did not have any data to share for S1 2022.
- In Niger, the project *AJUSEN Justice* (NE-06-03) is currently undergoing a restructuring and did not have data to report for S1 2022.
- In Niger, the project *Kallo Tchidaniwo* (NE-09-01) did not have data to share for S1 2022.

¹ See footnote 2.

² Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, and Time-bound.

³ However, historical data for all projects was retroactively adapted to the methodological changes, whenever possible, and therefore data provided within the same report is comparable, even across reporting periods.

⁴ We estimate missing data for projects that have not been able to report on conducted activities would have contributed to less than 8% of the 6,000 data points collected for S2 2021. Missing data for this semester will as much as possible be gathered for the next report.


- In Niger, the project *Shimodu* (NE-10-01) did not have data to share for the period dating from January to April 2022, corresponding to the closing period for the project.
- In Niger, the project PASREP (NE-12-01) was not responsive to data collection requests.
- In Niger, the project PASP (NE-12-03) was not responsive to data collection requests.

3. PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW

3.1. BUDGET AND NUMBER OF CONTRACTS BY STATUS

As of June 2022, the EUTF for Africa had committed €5.00B, including €2.2B across 114 decisions in the Sahel and Lake Chad window, of which a total of €2.1B had been contracted to 218 operational projects.¹ The 218 contracted operational projects include 13 projects in their inception phase, 8 projects in their early implementation phase, with no data to report to the MLS yet, 106 projects in their implementation phase and with data to report and 91 completed projects. The current report includes data on 197 projects (equivalent in funding to €2.0B), comprising 91 completed projects as well as 106 projects in their implementation phase and with data to report.

Figure 2: Projects and budget covered by the current S1 2022 MLS report, June 2022



Since the publication of the previous report, the following projects have been added to the MLS database and to this report:

Table 1: Projects newly added to the MLS for the S1 2022 report, June 2022


Country	Programme Name	EUTF ID	Project Name	Lead IP	EUTF Budget
Burkina Faso	<i>Appui à la justice au Burkina Faso pour renforcer la lutte contre l'impunité au travers d'une justice plus accessible et efficace (Justice BF)</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-BF-11-02	<i>Appui au renforcement de la justice militaire et de la justice de proximité pour lutter contre l'impunité au Burkina Faso (AJUMJUP)</i>	COGINTA	€6,000,000
Mali	<i>Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint de lutte contre l'immigration irrégulière, le trafic de migrants et la traite des êtres humains en République du Mali (POC Mali)</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-ML-13-01	<i>Partenariat opérationnel conjoint de lutte contre l'immigration irrégulière, le trafic de migrants et la traite des êtres humains en république du Mali (POC Mali)</i>	CIVIPOL	€2,800,000
Niger	<i>Promotion de l'emploi pour le renforcement de la résilience économique des communautés dans la région de Tillabéry (ProEmploi)</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-NE-13-01	<i>Promotion de l'emploi pour le renforcement de la résilience économique des communautés de la région de Tillabéry (ProEmploi)</i>	GIZ	€7,860,000
Regional	<i>Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel (PDU)</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-REG-18-11	<i>Appui à la résilience et à la réduction de la conflictualité dans les communautés de Mopti au Mali et de Soum au Burkina Faso (PDU PARIC)</i>	IRC	€15,000,000

The graph below represents the evolution in the number of EUTF contracted operational projects as well as the number of projects included in the MLS reports, together with the corresponding funding amounts. Between January and June 2022, eight operational projects were contracted, equivalent to

¹ The 218 projects include only 'operational' projects: 111 projects worth approximately €62M and considered 'non-operational' are excluded from the overall analysis. They are mostly evaluations and audits, air services, mappings and plans, reports, communications and events.

€39.0M in funding. Over this period, the four projects listed above have been newly included in the MLS database. This represents an increase of €40M in funding covered by the MLS SLC reports.¹

Figure 3: Evolution of projects and budgets covered by the MLS in SLC, June 2022^{2,3}




The below graph shows the 218 contracted operational projects by budget, lifespan, and status of implementation. The graph uses shortened programme names for the sake of clarity. Budgets refer solely to the EUTF contribution. The length of the bars represents the lifespan of the project and the height/width the EUTF budget per project. The colour of the bars indicates the status of the project. Dates of completion are considered as of July 2022.

¹ The €37.8M increase in budget includes €31.7M for the four newly included projects as well as €6.1M for top-ups and/or budget amendments for already included projects.

² In 2020, the MLS shifted from a quarterly to a biannual reporting schedule, initially to accommodate the methodological changes process described in section 2.1, and later to make room for other complementary work streams that aim to support the EUTF and the EU in the medium- to long-term future.

³ A portfolio review has been conducted in March 2022, which led to some modifications on previous values.


Figure 4: EUTF SLC contracted projects by budget and implementation status, June 2022



3.2. BUDGET DISTRIBUTION BY COUNTRY, IMPLEMENTING PARTNER AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

As of July 2022, regional projects collectively represented the largest amount of contracted EUTF funding. A total of €602.0M (or 29% of the total) were contracted to 55 projects at the regional level. At the country level, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso have the largest portfolios, with respective budgets of €299.7M (15%), €276.4M (13%) and €190.8M (9%).

Figure 5: Budget distribution by country and implementing partner, June 2022^{1,2}



The EUTF SLC budget for operational contracted projects remains largely managed by member state agencies (€880.8M, or 43% of the budget), as well as United Nations (UN) agencies, funds and programmes (€442.1M, or 22%). Projects managed by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) represent 19% of the total budget, amounting to €395.8M. Recipient countries' governments directly receive 12% (or €244.8M) of the budget, mostly in the form of budget support actions, followed by international organisations and the private sector to a lesser extent, with 3% and 1% of the budget, respectively €68.2M and €24.9M.³ An additional 0.1% of the budget is contracted to other types of implementing partners, including projects implemented by the EU itself (€3.0M).

With regards to Strategic Objectives (SO), security and governance activities (SO4) receive the largest share of budget at 33% (€686.1M). SO4 is the main priority in Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Mali, Niger, Niger,

¹ The map shows the distribution of the combined SLC budget (€2.06B) for the 218 operational projects, per country.

² 'New' refers to projects newly added to the MLS for the S2 2021 report.

³ For many contracts, parts of the budgets are subcontracted by IPs (including member state agencies and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes) at least in part to NGOs and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs).


and Mauritania, where it accounts for 69%, 56%, 47%, 43%, and 36% of the budget, respectively. Regional projects, followed by country-level projects in Burkina Faso and Mali receive the largest amount of funding for SO4, with respectively €135.8M, €132.4M, and €129.1M dedicated to these activities.

Resilience building (SO2) represents 26% of the EUTF funds in the SLC window (€534.3M) and is particularly significant in Chad and Cameroon as well as among regional projects (where it accounts for 73%, 50% and 36% of the budget, respectively). Regional projects dedicated to SO2 represent €215.1M, followed by Mali (€90M), Chad (€83.6M) and Nigeria (€39.6M).

Economic and employment opportunities (SO1) are supported by 23% (or €473.1M) of the EUTF SLC budget. These types of activities are particularly important in West African coastal countries such as The Gambia (90% of the total funds for this country), Côte d'Ivoire (83%), Guinea (82%), Ghana (80%) and Senegal (56%). In absolute numbers, the countries with the largest amount of funding dedicated to SO1 are Senegal with €92.2M and Niger with €88.9M.

Migration management (SO3) represents another 18% (€366.3M) of total EUTF funding in SLC. SO3 is funded primarily through regional programmes, which represent €210.3M. National country programmes dedicated to SO3 are prevalent in Niger (€53.9M) and Senegal (€27.9M).

Figure 6: Contracted budget breakdown by Strategic Objectives, June 2022¹




¹ Share of budget for projects contracted and relevant to the MLS.

3.3. BUDGET ALLOCATED TO THE COVID-19 RESPONSE

To respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU reoriented funds in the EUTF SLC portfolio, and several IPs made adjustment to their activities. As part of the data collection process since 2020, the MLS team asked IPs to provide information on any reorientation of their activities toward the COVID-19 response and the EU to gather information on reallocation of funds.

Figure 7: Budget allocated to the COVID-19 response in the SLC, June 2022^{1,2}



As of June 2022, €124.0M have been allocated to the COVID-19 response through 61 projects. This represents 6% of the €1.98B EUTF budget covered by the MLS in the SLC window. Most projects (70%) undertook small activity adjustments while 28% involved agreements between the EU and IPs to reallocate funds. Two projects, the One UN Response Plan in Nigeria (€49.5M, NG-09)³ and the PSRE in Côte d'Ivoire (€24.0M, CI-03)⁴, are fully devoted to the COVID-19 response. While the One UN Response Plan was signed in the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic (May 2020) to support Nigeria's health response plan, the PSRE, which was signed in June 2021, focuses on the economic recovery post-COVID-19 through budget support to Côte d'Ivoire to support companies affected by the pandemic.

¹ The 61 projects with funds allocated to the COVID-19 response and 51 projects with COVID-19-response outputs are not necessarily the same projects, as some projects have reported COVID-19-response outputs but not reallocated funds and some projects with funds allocated to the COVID-19 response have not generated COVID-19-related outputs that are relevant to the EUTF indicators.

² The contribution of EUTF-funded projects to the response to COVID-19 is calculated only for projects currently implementing and with data to report (198 projects representing €1.98B).

³ EU Support to the United Nations 'One UN Response Plan to COVID-19 in Nigeria'.

⁴ *Programme de soutien et de relance à l'économie dans le contexte de la crise du COVID-19 en Côte d'Ivoire.*

4. SITUATION AND RESULTS OVERVIEW

4.1. THE SAHEL AND LAKE CHAD REGION IN S1 2022

Levels of violence remained high in the Sahel with continued activity by Al Qaeda and Islamic West Africa Province (ISWAP) militants.¹ Attacks in southern Burkina Faso have increased by 143% between January 2021 and May 2022, and violent incidents have also become more frequent in Ghana and Benin since the start of 2022 and, in May 2022 for the first time hit Togo.² The SLC region is also subject to a rising number of intercommunal violence, notably in northern Chad and northwestern Nigeria.³

In a deteriorating security context, the political situation in the SLC region remained unstable in the first half of 2022, despite positive developments at the end of the period. In January, a military coup in Burkina Faso ousted President Charles Kaboré and installed Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba as the new head of the country.⁴ In Chad, tensions remain high between the military regime of Mahamat Déby and opposition parties.⁵ A mediation led by ECOWAS in April paved the way for the lifting of economic and political sanctions in Burkina Faso, while, at the end of June, ECOWAS announced the imminent lifting of economic sanctions endured by Mali.⁶

Global food prices have rapidly increased since the onset of war in Ukraine and are gravely affecting African countries.⁷ As countries in the region are dependent on food and fuel imports, the impact of global commodity prices on States' budgets as well as domestic food, energy, and consumer prices is consequential.⁸ Debt payment defaults in Mali are rising to 180 million USD, in parts to the aforementioned external shock affecting the region but also due to economic sanctions imposed on the new military regime.⁹ Burkina Faso is also strongly affected by the funding freeze of large donors such as Sweden, and its public debt is now estimated to about €750M.¹⁰ In addition, due to the crisis, many donors have recently announced the reduction of their aid to Africa for the coming year.¹¹ **Correlated to the rise of commodity and food prices, as well as severe droughts, floods, and conflicts, the SLC region is facing its worst food crisis in over a decade.** An estimated 38 million people might be suffering from hunger in West Africa by June 2022.¹²

Internal displacement continued unabated in the SLC region. The number of internally displaced people continued to sharply increase in the SLC region: as of June 2022, 4.6 million people were either IDPs or refugees living in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania, against 4.2 million in December 2021.¹³

¹ ACLED, 'Regional Overview: Africa 18-24 June 2022', 30 June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² ReliefWeb, 'Gulf of Guinea Multidimensional Monitoring and Early Warning Tool: Benin – Cote d'Ivoire – Ghana – Togo', 21 July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ KOACI, 'Tchad : Affrontements meurtriers à Kouri Bougoudi, Mahamat Idriss prend des mesures drastiques', 10 June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Euronews, 'Le Burkina Faso suspendu par la Cédéao, conséquence du coup d'Etat', 28 January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ CIVICUS Monitor Tracking Civic space, 'Six Members and Supporters of Wakit Tama arrested, charged following protest', 6 June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Agence Ecofin, 'Levée des sanctions économiques contre le Mali : vers une décrispation des relations avec la CEDEAO', 4 July 2022. Retrieved [here](#) and [here](#).

⁷ World Bank, 'Western & Central Africa: Development news, research, data', consulted on 26 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ International Monetary Fund, 'Regional economic outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa: a new shock and little room to manoeuvre. World economic and financial surveys'. April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Jeune Afrique, 'Mali: les sanctions de plus en plus douloureuses?', 22 March 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ Jeune Afrique, 'Afrique de l'Ouest: La relance se confirme malgré l'insécurité', 24 March 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ OCHA, 'Financial Tracking Service', June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹² Oxfam France/Cadre Harmonisé, 'Crise alimentaire en Afrique de l'Ouest : la pire situation en dix ans, avec 27 millions de personnes souffrant de la faim'. April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹³ UNHCR R4Sahel Coordination Platform for Forced Displacements in Sahel, 'Situation Sahel Crisis', consulted on 26 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


Migration flows originating from, and/or transiting in West Africa to Europe also increased in the first semester of 2022. From January to June 2022, an estimated 9,026 people had arrived in the Canary Islands (Atlantic Route), a 29% increase compared to the same period in 2021.¹ During a February visit to Dakar, an EU delegation proposed an operational deployment of Frontex in Senegal and in Mauritania, a proposition currently being technically reviewed by both governments.²

4.2. THE EUTF RESPONSE – OVERVIEW OF RESULTS

This section offers an analysis of the results of the EUTF’s response to date against its four SOs: economy and employment; resilience (food security and access to basic services); migration management; and governance and conflict prevention.

4.2.1. OVERVIEW OF EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Figure 8: Main achievements of EUTF-funded programmes in S1 2022, June 2022



The table below shows the aggregated values reported by SLC projects for the 38 EUTF common output indicators as of 30 June 2022.

¹ UNHCR, ‘Spain Weekly snapshot – Week 26 (27 June – 3 Jul 2022)’. 3rd July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² ReliefWeb, ‘Plans to send Frontex guards to Senegal illegitimate attempt to stop migrants, asylum seekers’. 25 February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


Table 2: EUTF common output indicators for all SLC projects, June 2022¹

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	S1 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	17,333	24,769	32,020	14,422	17,289	16,546	122,378	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	4,234	4,555	10,971	5,212	11,562	6,625	43,159	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	74,906	98,273	75,162	40,428	74,062	84,047	446,878	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET) and/or skills development	32,254	44,477	30,772	22,814	49,135	66,765	246,217	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed, expanded or improved	18	326	159	65	80	32	679	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	70	131	65	41	31	40	378	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	1,573	3,432	2,313	1,496	1,795	1,125	11,733	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	403,805	459,856	127,182	18,438	32,551	154,961	1,196,794	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	560,237	737,215	341,586	117,322	107,426	165,424	2,029,210	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	522,319	698,582	738,453	349,587	211,184	127,418	2,647,544	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	182	218	17	20	25	0	462	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable management practices have been introduced	11,413	93,177	21,734	4,273	29,173	55,453	215,223	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience-building practices and basic rights	666,654	1,335,913	34,124,609	7,564,929	2,292,326	9,024,588	55,009,019	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers benefitting from capacity building to strengthen service delivery	15,129	33,292	52,542	27,111	6,870	4,156	139,102	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	2,423,091	1,340,869	736,461	481,578	540,982	471,119	5,994,100	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	19	36	36	53	74	112	330	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected and/or assisted	61,089	12,320	16,692	18,219	46,230	35,840	190,390	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	443,515	1,022,823	1,253,965	976,259	808,757	967,676	5,472,995	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	29,194	19,165	14,823	3,834	4,178	322	71,516	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	47,490	22,168	10,744	6,745	5,933	11	93,091	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	18,141	18,094	30,955	11,799	9,650	1,340	89,979	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	64	328	76	33	14	1	516	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	729	1,615	3,623	4,385	3,843	2,042	16,238	
3.8 Number of people of concern benefitting from evacuation and resettlement assistance or other durable solutions for evacuees	2,915	1,395	583	98	367	18	5,376	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	11	326	305	177	33	13	865	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	10,340	4,122	1,820	421	148	98	16,949	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	22	22	23	18	31	3	119	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	2,315	1,313	7,099	10,668	23,057	13,149	57,601	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	13,686	10,698	10,655	9,416	12,618	11,581	68,654	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention and human rights activities	544,936	433,900	2,655,109	308,485	170,161	514,963	4,627,555	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed and/or directly supported	133	728	362	137	745	903	3,007	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed and regularly gathering	213	791	857	574	1,054	1,037	4,526	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up, implemented and/or strengthened	188	311	2,376	1,073	1,094	94	5,136	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	158	199	152	86	111	139	845	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	47	44	24	20	19	5	159	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	11,465,917	2,101,774	45,527	5,998	13,619,216	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	745,288	581,774	538,356	3,307,422	5,172,840	
6.3 Number of entities benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	1,234	981	150	190	2,555	

¹ Trendlines represent quarterly non-cumulated outputs across time.

4.2.2. GREATER ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

Figure 9: Strategic Objective 1 dashboard, SLC, June 2022¹



¹ Budget figures are related to projects which are contracted, relevant to the MLS, and providing data.

The conflict in Ukraine is fuelling increases in global commodity prices, and inflation in food prices is of particular concern in the SLC region. While the war has limited direct impact in the region – with the exception of Senegal, which imported 51% of its wheat from Russia in 2020¹ – it is affecting the supply of key cereals, energy, and other food production inputs exported by Ukraine and Russia, thus raising prices of associated commodities globally. Year-on-year inflation of food prices exceeded 26% in Ghana and 18% in Nigeria by April 2022.² The conflict also affects local food production, as Russia is a key producer of fertilisers and natural gas, itself a key input into fertiliser production. Higher fertiliser and oil prices increase the costs for growing, harvesting, transporting, and processing food, putting further upward pressure on food prices.³ This particularly affects poor households which spend most of their income on food. The African Development Bank estimates that the economic fallout of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, if it persists, will push 1.8 million additional people in Africa into extreme poverty in 2022, and 2.1 million more in 2023.⁴

GDP growth is forecast at 4.1% in West Africa and 4.6% in Central Africa in 2022.⁵ Price increase in oil is benefitting the economies (although not necessarily trickling down to the population) of net oil exporters (Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad in SLC). For all other SLC countries which are net importers, higher oil and gas prices deteriorated terms-of-trade, negatively affecting trade balances and increasing living costs. Lower imports from key trading partners, such as the United States, the euro area and China, also impacted terms-of-trade.⁶

The EUTF has contracted €473.1M (23% of the total EUTF SLC budget) to enhance economic and employment opportunities (SO1). The Trust Fund primarily targets inclusive job creation focusing on the most vulnerable, both through the job market and by supporting people to develop income generating activities. In addition, it aims to strengthen micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) through improved governance, access to funding, enterprise development, as well as by building, renovating, and expanding business infrastructure. Finally, its programmes support professional training (TVET) and/or skills development. S1 2022 saw the completion of four projects: PAFAM (ML-02-01)⁷ which reinforced the cashew nut value chain in Mali; PECOBAT (MR-01-01)⁸ which fostered local value-added employment, and skills in Mauritania's construction sector; DURAZINDER (NE-11-02)⁹ which aimed to increase economic opportunities and local development through sustainable management of the environment in Niger; and DES GRET (SN-04-06)¹⁰ which provided young entrepreneurs in the south of Senegal with finance and training.

Building skills for today and tomorrow

Economic transformation for SLC countries rests upon the skills of its workforce. Yet, in the region and in West Africa more broadly, a lack of workforce skills continues to limit business success and reinforces unemployment, especially for young people. Finding sustainable approaches to delivering TVET and skills development is key to lift individuals out of poverty and encourage economic development.¹¹

¹ International Monetary Fund, 'Regional Economic Outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa', April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² World Bank, 'Global Economic Prospects', June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ International Monetary Fund, 2022, op. cited.

⁴ African Development Bank, 'African Economic Outlook 2022', May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ International Monetary Fund, 2022, op. cited.

⁷ *Création d'emplois par l'amélioration de la filière de l'anacarde, afin d'atténuer les causes de l'émigration, dans les régions de Sikasso, Kayes et Koulikoro.*

⁸ *Amélioration de l'employabilité des jeunes et des capacités des PME par le développement du sous-secteur du BTP en matériaux locaux et de la formation professionnalisante dans les chantiers-écoles construction.*

⁹ *Programme de création d'emplois et d'opportunités économiques à travers une gestion durable de l'environnement dans les zones de départ et de transit du Niger.*

¹⁰ *GRET – Développer l'emploi au Sénégal : faciliter l'accès au financement – Accompagnement des jeunes vers l'emploi au Sud du Sénégal.*

¹¹ World Bank, 'Western and Central Africa Education Strategy. From school to jobs: a journey for the young people of Western and Central Africa', 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

As of June 2022, EUTF-funded programmes have delivered TVET and skills development to 246,217 individuals (indicator 1.4), including 61,765 beneficiaries during S1 2022, the largest number for any semester since the beginning of EUTF-funded activities.

In the region, countries face trade-offs in the development of skills for its workforce, having to fill gaps in jobs for today while planning for the future. Building the necessary skills for greener economies is critical to put in place mitigation and adaptation strategies as sub-Saharan Africa is disproportionately affected by climate change and climate shocks.¹ At the same time, large swaths of the population are not in education, employment or training (NEET), with rates ranging from 69% in Niger to 11% in Guinea and a median of 34% at the SLC level.² Urgently providing them with skills for their socio-professional insertion is paramount.

Against this backdrop, in S1 2022, the delivery of trainings through EUTF-funded initiatives was designed to strengthen climate-resilient and green infrastructures but also to provide responses to immediate needs in skills development and agriculture in more remote areas. In Ghana, the GrEEEn programme (GH-02)³ was designed to improve the ability of women, youth and returning migrants to take advantage of jobs in green and climate resilient local economies and create and strengthen a local enabling environment that support youth and the growth of MSMEs. Part of its intervention aims to build the financial capability of beneficiaries, including those working in green and climate compatible infrastructure, thereby providing them with skills relevant for jobs in a greening economy. As of June 2022, 61,272 beneficiaries have been trained by the programme, including 55,904 in financial capability for working in green and climate compatible infrastructure. Other beneficiaries received package support for employability or entrepreneurship, or were placed as interns through support provided by the programme. Most of the outputs on financial capability were achieved in the first semester of 2022, with 46,560 beneficiaries trained, of whom 48% were women. Recently, a mid-term evaluation of the programme highlighted the need to put more emphasis on trainings relevant to green employment rather than generic business skills.

In the region, most of the workforce is employed in the informal sector, including in subsistence agriculture which provides low wages (or sometimes no wages at all) and low-productivity outputs with limited employment opportunities. Modernising agricultural jobs, including through trainings, can expand agricultural chains and job opportunities in the region, particularly for the youth.⁴

In S1 2022, EUTF-funded trainings contributed to the development of agricultural opportunities for the workforce in SLC countries. In total, 3,509 beneficiaries were trained in agriculture, fishery and livestock production during the semester. The largest contributor was *Emploi Niger* (NE-11),⁵ which trained 1,910 individuals in the agricultural sector, including 869 women. Beneficiaries received professional trainings or skills development in the agricultural sector (1,810) and training in farm schools for the development of agriculture in arid environments (100).

In addition, the TUUMA programme (BF-06)⁶ trained 2,961 beneficiaries and young people in creating and managing rural micro-firms, compared to 1,212 in S2 2021. Trainings provided to beneficiaries rested on (i) the development of skills related to their firms' activities and (ii) skills in business management to enable them to effectively manage the firms that they had created. Other relevant trainings provided during the semester were in construction (1,002), mainly through the INTEGRA programme (GN-01).^{7,8}

¹ World Bank, 2022. op. cit.

² World Bank, '% of youth total population, ILO data, retrieved October 2022'. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in Ghana.

⁴ World Bank, 2022. op. cit.

⁵ *Création d'emplois et d'opportunités économiques à travers une gestion durable de l'environnement dans les zones de transit et départ au Niger*.

⁶ *Appui à la compétence professionnelle, l'entrepreneuriat et l'emploi des jeunes et des femmes dans les régions rurales du Burkina Faso*.

⁷ *Programme d'appui à l'intégration socio-économique des jeunes*.

⁸ Remaining trainings that were not in low numbers provided during the semester were unspecified or dealing with other subjects.

Creating jobs: immediate relief in the Sahel, long-term employment in coastal countries

During S1 2022, the interventions of EUTF-funded programmes for job creation or support were two-pronged. In Sahel countries (particularly Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali), interventions focused on the creation of jobs in mostly rural, remote areas prone to instability and with less access to basic services. In coastal countries (such as Senegal, Ghana and Guinea) that were less prone to conflict and violence, interventions aimed at the creation of more formal, long-term jobs.

In the Sahel, unemployment rates remain high, particularly for the youth, and are correlated with insecurity and enrolment in terrorist groups.^{1,2} This is most acute in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, where young people represent by far the largest segments of the population, while their social status and economic opportunities remain limited.³

In S1 2022, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger accounted for 57% of all jobs created or supported (indicator 1.1, 9,476 jobs). Most of the jobs created in these three countries targeted young people in S1 2022 (4,388). Other created or supported jobs for which there was no age disaggregation were in cash-for-work activities (1,289) or construction (1,459) and, as such, are likely to have targeted young people, who are overwhelmingly represented in physical work. Using this reasoning, 75% of jobs created or supported in these countries are likely to have benefitted young people.

In the three Sahel countries, jobs were created in more remote areas, where access to basic services is scarcer and governance weaker. In Mali, the ADEL programme (ML-12)⁴ created or supported 1,080 jobs in S1 2022 in Tombouctou. The programme provides professional trainings to young people, who were then supported for insertion in the labour market. In Niger, the AICS-implemented component of the *Emploi Niger* programme (NE-11) and the *Pôles Ruraux* programme (NE-03)⁵ were active in the regions of Zinder, Tahoua and Agadez, which are the main transit areas for irregular migration in the country. These regions offer weak economic opportunities, especially after the criminalisation of migrant smuggling.⁶ In S1 2022, 2,770 jobs were created or supported in Zinder, and respectively 1,669 and 1,047 jobs were created or supported in Agadez and Tahoua, in construction or agricultural work. In Burkina Faso, the TUUMA programme (BF-06),⁷ which aims to strengthen the socio-economic resilience of young people in rural areas, created 1,881 jobs in S1 2022.

In the more stable coastal countries (such as Senegal, Ghana and Guinea), EUTF-funded initiatives created formal and/or long-term employment in S1 2022. Out of the 5,896 jobs created or supported in the three countries during the semester, 3,881 (66%) were permanent/long-term regular wage employment. In Ghana, the GrEEn programme (GH-02) created or supported 1,806 jobs in S1 2022, most of which consisted in permanent employment (94%), mostly through support provided to MSMEs and through direct entrepreneurship and employability trainings. In Guinea, the INTEGRA programme (GN-01),⁸ which provides trainings and economic insertion to youth in Guinea, created 1,579 jobs in S1 2022, including 1,266 long-term jobs. Finally, in Senegal, 926 long-term jobs were created or supported in S1 2022, mainly by the *Développer l'Emploi au Sénégal* (SN-01,⁹ 646 permanent jobs) and PARERBA (SN-08,¹⁰ 210 permanent jobs) programmes.

¹ France info, 'Le chômage des jeunes nourrit la criminalité et le terrorisme dans les pays africains', March 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Frimpong and Commodore, '#EndSARS Youth Protests in Nigeria: Lessons and Opportunities for Regional Stability.', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group, 'Development and security challenges in the Sahel region', December 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ *Appui au Développement Économique Local et à la prévention des conflits dans les régions de Tombouctou et Gao.*

⁵ *Projet d'appui aux filières agricoles dans les régions de Tahoua et Agadez.*

⁶ In Niger, transport to Libya, feeding of migrants and auxiliary related services employed large segments of the population in transit areas. The criminalisation of the activity in 2015 left the economies of transit areas in disarray. EUTF-funded programmes aim to provide opportunities for former migrant smugglers in these areas.

⁷ *Appui à la compétence professionnelle, l'entreprenariat et l'emploi des jeunes et des femmes dans les régions rurales du Burkina Faso.*


⁸ *Programme d'appui à l'intégration socio-économique des jeunes.*

⁹ *Développer l'emploi au Sénégal: renforcement de la compétitivité des entreprises et de l'employabilité dans les zones de départ.*

¹⁰ *Projet d'Appui à la Réduction de l'Émigration rurale et à la Réintégration dans le Bassin Arachidier par le développement d'une économie rurale sur base des périmètres irrigués.*

4.2.3. STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE OF COMMUNITIES

Figure 10: Strategic Objective 2 dashboard, SLC, June 2022



MLS SLC S1 2022 REPORT
24

Altai Consulting
December 2022

The Sahel region is experiencing a breakdown in basic services due to ongoing conflict. Armed groups in the Sahel, particularly in Mali's Ménaka region and in Niger, have increasingly targeted civilian infrastructure since late 2021, with more frequent attacks on livestock, vehicles, schools, health centres, granaries, and communications networks.¹ As of May, 7,900 schools were closed in the Sahel due to violence, an increase of 56% since 2021.² Most of the closed schools were in Burkina Faso, where over 700,000 children have lost access to education.³ In Niger's Tillabéri region, 817 schools were closed due to insecurity in the months before the school season.⁴ Insecurity has also strained healthcare systems, with 290 health centres in central Sahel not functioning.⁵ In Burkina Faso, the number of health centres closed due to violence increased by 64% during 2021.⁶ These closures have limited health systems' capacities to respond to outbreaks of COVID-19, and various other diseases in the region.

Displaced persons in the region have the most trouble accessing basic services. As of July 2022, there were 9.1 million displaced people in SLC countries, of which 7.6 million were internally displaced.⁷ In the central Sahel alone, conflict has led to a 40% increase in displaced persons in the last year, and as of May 2022, there were 2.4 million displaced persons.⁸ In the Lake Chad Basin, there are an estimated 5.3 million displaced persons, some 75% of whom are thought to be in Nigeria.⁹ Displaced persons have more difficulty gaining access to water points, a situation which is exacerbated by the frequent droughts that have degraded water infrastructure.¹⁰

Households' struggles to afford food commodities have worsened due to the drought and inflation since 2021. The lack of rainfall in 2021 was comparable to the severe droughts of 1983, 2004, and 2011, with rains starting late and ending early.¹¹ In Sahelian countries, experts forecast a 12% decline in cereal production for the 2021-2022 agricultural campaign compared to the five-year average, most severe in Chad and Niger (-47% and -36%, respectively).¹² At the same time, global markets have seen drops in production, stock retention and rising transport costs due to COVID-19 and the crisis in Ukraine.¹³ For example, the price of fuel in Nigeria is 139% higher than one year ago. The crisis in Ukraine has particularly hit Sahelian countries who rely heavily on wheat imports from Russia and Ukraine, particularly Mauritania, Cameroon, and Senegal. Furthermore, trade disruptions due to conflict and ECOWAS sanctions on Mali have stemmed the flow of products, with availability severely reduced in several rural areas.¹⁴

These factors have resulted in significant hikes in food prices, which worsened the food security crisis. Increased prices of fertiliser have meant that only 46% of fertiliser needs in West Africa and Sahel were met as of April 2022.¹⁵ Since January 2022, the price of food staples in the region have skyrocketed, with some rising 30-50% above the five-year average.¹⁶ Since January 2022, the price of wheat has risen by 55% in Nigeria and 46% in Chad, vegetable oil has gone up by 60% in Burkina Faso, and 54% in Niger.¹⁷

¹ The People's Coalition for the Sahel, 'The Sahel: What Has Changed', June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² OCHA, 'UN and NGO partners raise the alarm', 27 June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ UNICEF, 'Humanitarian Situation Report No.2: Burkina Faso', 10 August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Anadolu Agency, 'Niger: 890 écoles fermées pour insécurité (UNICEF)', 25 August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ OCHA, 'Humanitarian Needs and Requirements Overview', Accessed September 2022. Retrieved [here](#). This figure refers to Burkina Faso, northern Cameroon (Far North region), Chad, Mali, Niger, and north-east Nigeria (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe States)

⁶ The People's Coalition for the Sahel, 'The Sahel: What Has Changed', June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ UNHCR Data Portal, July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ OCHA, 'Humanitarian Needs and Requirements Overview', Accessed September 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ International Review of the Red Cross, 'The right to water or internally displaced persons in the Sahel region', May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ OCHA, 'Humanitarian Needs and Requirements Overview', Accessed September 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹² Ibid.

¹³ The Food Crisis Prevention Network, 'Information and Watch Newsletter', 1 July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ WFP, 'Food security implications of the Ukraine conflict' March 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁷ The Food Crisis Prevention Network, 'Information and Watch Newsletter', 1 July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

Promoting behavioural changes through sensitisation campaigns

Increasing levels of stressors such as conflict, displacement and the food security crisis, force populations in the Sahel to change their habits to adapt to shortage in resources. Behavioural changes are never fast nor simple, and appropriate coping techniques are not widespread, notably relating to hygiene, infant nutrition, food transformation and preparation. To mitigate unhealthy or dangerous coping mechanisms, integrated social and behavioural changes programmes attempt to promote positive practices through sensitisation campaigns.

During the first semester of 2022, EUTF-funded campaigns on resilience-building practices and basic rights reached 9,024,588 million people (indicator 2.7). Most of those who were sensitised this semester were in Nigeria, overwhelmingly touched by the One UN Response Plan (NG-09)¹. As part of its ongoing risk communication strategy for sustained community engagement and cooperation, the programme reached 8,007,881 people this semester on COVID-19 and essential family health practices, as well as risk communication and public engagement messaging.

Outside Nigeria, people reached by campaigns this semester were mainly in Mali, where 567,850 people were reached mostly by the PAECISIS (ML-08)² and CRIALCES (REG-24)³ programmes; in Burkina Faso, where essentially PDU (REG-18)⁴ and CRIALCES reached 190,852 people; and Niger, where the same two programmes reached 120,752 people. Campaigns focused on nutrition and food security (51%), legal assistance and civil documentation (29%), COVID-19 (10%), and a range of other topics including human rights and social protection, health, water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH), and education (10%).⁵

As a response to the food security crisis in the region, most of the campaigns other than those in Nigeria focused on nutrition and food security, reaching 383,974 people largely in the central Sahel regions. CRIACLES implemented massive behaviour change interventions encouraging improved nutrition practices across the central Sahel countries, which reached 256,547 people in Mali, 76,052 in Burkina Faso, and 50,000 in Niger. PDU led sensitisation efforts with 747 members of host communities in the Sahel region of Burkina Faso on strategic food stocking to better withstand pastoral crises. PDU projects also educated parents (mostly women) on nutrition for mothers and young children in Lac, Chad, and conducted workshops with 100 youth on resilience messaging in Tillabéri, Niger.

A lack of civil documentation leaves many vulnerable people without identity documents, particularly among IDP and refugee populations, which can prevent them from accessing basic services.⁶ This semester, 298,894 people participated in campaigns related to civil registration and legal assistance, mainly (99%) from the PAECISIS programme in Mali. PAECISIS, a €25M programme dedicated to supporting the establishment of a civil registration system in Mali, worked through CSOs to reach 20,615 people (52% women) on how civil registration is organised, sensitised 275,032 people (51% women) on childbirth registration, along with 50 assistants who worked on the organisation of the African Civil Registration Day in Mali. In Burkina Faso, PDU also sensitised 1,767 people on how to access civil documentation, and informed another 1,430 on their rights and the legal services they can access.

This semester, 8.1 million people were sensitised to topics related to COVID-19, often in combination with other health, resilience, or employability-related messaging. As mentioned above, most of those sensitised on COVID-19 were in Nigeria, for the greatest part reached by the One UN Response Plan to COVID-19, a €50M UN programme seeking to coordinate and align efforts to improve the response to COVID-19. In Nigeria as well, MCN (NG-03)⁷ led information campaigns on a range of

¹ One UN Response Plan to COVID-19 in Nigeria.

² *Programme d'appui au fonctionnement de l'état civil au Mali : appui à la mise en place d'un système d'information sécurisé*

³ *Réponse à la crise alimentaire au centre Sahel : support nutritionnel et relèvement*

⁴ *Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel*

⁵ Percentages in this paragraph are obtained when excluding data from the One UN Response Plan.

⁶ OCHA, 'Humanitarian Needs and Requirements Overview', Accessed September 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Enhancing state and community level conflict management capability in North Eastern Nigeria

resilience and human rights topics, including sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), drug abuse, COVID-19, peacebuilding, and reintegration, which sensitised 28,411 people this semester. Outside of Nigeria, another 98,647 people were reached in The Gambia by YEP's (GM-01)¹ mass media campaign covering the benefits of TVET education, environmentally friendly technologies, and COVID-19 prevention.

Excluding the massive One UN Response Plan media campaign, other sensitisation campaigns were mostly face-to-face (74%). Mass media campaigns were used to reach 12% of beneficiaries mainly on COVID-19 topics, and trainings or demonstrations were used to reach 11% of people, mainly for nutrition related campaigns.

Diminishing, yet significant food security assistance

With households struggling to afford food, the SLC region is facing a worsening food security crisis. For the period of January to May 2022, 27.3 million people in SLC countries were at crisis levels or above for food insecurity.² This number was projected to rise to 71.6 million for the period of June to August, or approximately 11% of the population.³ Compared to 2021, it was estimated that an additional 21.8 million people in SLC countries would experience crisis or above levels of food insecurity for the June-August period, an increase of 44%. In particular, districts of Nigeria's Borno Region, Burkina Faso's Sahel Region, and Niger's Tillabéri Region were facing emergency levels, as shown on the map below. In terms of increases, Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria experienced the most dramatic increases, with the number of people in crisis or above levels nearly doubling from the June-August period in 2021 to 2022. As a result, nutrition levels have suffered with 7.7 million children expected to experience malnutrition and about half of Sahelian households unable to afford nutritious diets.

Figure 11: Food insecure people in 2020 and projected to be food insecure in S1 2022⁴




Figure 12: Beneficiaries of EUTF-provided food security assistance (2.4), by semester


¹ Youth Empowerment Project

² *Cadre Harmonisé* and Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, 'Food security Data in West and Central Africa', consulted in August 2022. Retrieved [here](#). Excludes Mali, for which there is no data during this period. *Cadre Harmonisé* is a tool that collects food security data in West Africa, using the IPC Acute Food Insecurity classifications as a standard for measuring the severity and magnitude of food insecurity in an area. Crisis levels or above refers to people experiencing IPC level 3 (crisis), 4 (emergency), or 5 (catastrophe/famine).

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Number of people at levels 3 to 5 (crisis or above) of the IPC, 2020 and Jan-May 2022 (projections). Source: *Cadre Harmonisé*, op. cit.

Beyond sensitisation campaigns, diminishing yet still significant efforts were made during the first semester of 2022 to support food security.¹ During the semester, 127,418 people were provided with food security-related assistance (indicator 2.4). This is well below the average of about 330,000 per semester reported since 2019.



Several of the main programmes which contributed massively to this indicator until 2022 have indeed ended: RRR (NG-07)², which assisted 759,520 people in Nigeria and Pôles Ruraux (NE-03)³, which provided assistance to 245,915 beneficiaries in Niger, both ended in December 2021. Shimodu (NE-10)⁴ also completed in January 2022, after having assisted 103,698 people in Niger.

Yet, in a context of winding down EUTF operations, food security assistance remained significant, particularly in Burkina Faso (74,832 beneficiaries, 59%), Mali (28,409 beneficiaries, 22%), and Niger (15,286 beneficiaries, 12%), mainly thanks to two regional programmes, PDU and CRIALCES. During the semester, PDU assisted 66,551 people in Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali and Chad, by building food-security infrastructure such as food storage and drinking water wells, improving agricultural land, distributing food vouchers, livestock feed, agricultural inputs and tools and training vulnerable farmers. At the same time, CRIALCES assisted 51,919 people in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, mostly through technical assistance and tool distributions for improved agricultural production and processing.

¹ Conversely, the number of people receiving nutrition assistance (indicator 2.3) has increased compared to previous semesters' average (165,424 in the first semester of 2022 vs. an average of 94,389 by semester since 2020), thanks to PDU activities in Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali and Chad.


² EU Support to Response, Recovery and Resilience in Borno State.

³ *Projet d'appui aux filières agricoles dans les régions de Tahoua et Agadez.*

⁴ *Projet intégré d'appui à la résilience des populations vulnérables réfugiées, déplacées, retournées et hôtes de la région de Diffa, Niger.*

4.2.4. IMPROVED MIGRATION MANAGEMENT

Figure 13: Strategic Objective 3 dashboard, SLC, June 2022¹



As of 10 June 2022, there were 7,606,685 internally displaced persons and 1,547,241 refugees in SLC due to insecurity, conflicts and other natural disasters.² Conflict and violence were the main drivers of displacement in the first half of 2022,³ where attacks against civilians by non-state armed groups, a rise in criminal activities and counteroffensives by security forces combined triggered hundreds of thousands of displacements in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Nigeria.⁴ Figures for some of these countries reached all-time highs in June 2022.⁵ With conflicts affecting the region showing no signs of abating anytime soon,⁶ and harvests declining due to climate change, it is estimated that up to 32 million people in West Africa could be forced to move internally by 2050.⁷

In the first half of 2022 and as border controls increase, migrants continued to resort to the use of more hidden – and therefore more dangerous – routes.⁸ In particular, and despite efforts from Senegal and Mauritania to halt departures on the Atlantic Route, arrivals in the Canary Islands are at an all-time peak. As of the end of June 2022, an estimated 9,026 refugees and migrants had arrived in the Canary Islands via the Atlantic Route, a 29% increase over the same period in 2021.⁹ During the first semester of 2022, IOM recorded 344 deaths and disappearances along this route.¹⁰

The EUTF has contracted €366.3M (18% of the EUTF SLC budget) to improve migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination (SO3). The EU-IOM Joint Initiative (EU-IOM JI) represents the bulk of this budget with a total of €195.1M (53%) in SLC, in part facilitating the dignified return and sustainable reintegration of migrants. Programmes such as Protection West Africa aim to directly assist migrants in transit (REG-13, €20.0M).¹¹ The EUTF also provides capacity building and operational support to organisations and institutions to better manage mixed migration flows through programmes such as ProGEM (NE-02, €32.0M)¹² in Niger, AFIA (MR-02, €3.0M)¹³ in Mauritania or Border Security in Ghana (GH-01, €4.8M).¹⁴ EUTF-funded programmes aim to enhance capacities in the fight against trafficking in persons, notably through programmes such as the various '*Partenariat opérationnel conjoint*' (POC) in Mali and Mauritania (respectively ML-13, €2.8M and MR-09, €4.5M)^{15,16} or the regional TEH programme (REG-12, €17.4M).¹⁷

Supporting migrant protection

The SLC region continues to be an important transit area for migrants that intend to reach Europe through the Mediterranean and Atlantic Routes. The resurgence of the Atlantic Route is taking place in a regional context where push factors remain strong and are even intensifying in some cases.¹⁸ Along these routes, migrants often find themselves unable to access to basic services, such as health, housing, food or education, both during the journey, in their destination countries or during their journey.¹⁹ In the first half of 2022, EUTF-funded programmes protected and/or assisted 35,840 migrants in transit, bringing the total to 190,390 (indicator 3.2). This output is substantially driven by

¹ Budget figures are related to projects which are contracted and relevant to the MLS.

² UNHCR, 'West and Central Africa – Persons of concern', 30 June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Internal displacement monitoring centre, '2022 Mid-year update on forced displacement', August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ UNHCR, Country data dashboards, June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ UNHCR, 'Regional Bureau for West and Central Africa Education Update', 25 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ World Bank, '*Les migrations climatiques internes dans les pays d'Afrique de l'ouest*', 18 October 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Study conducted by MMC for UNODC to be published in 2022.

⁹ UNHCR, 'Spain weekly snapshot', 3 July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ Missing migrants project, 'Africa', July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ *Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest.*

¹² *Renforcement de la gestion durable des conséquences des flux migratoires.*

¹³ *Renforcement des capacités pour une meilleure gestion de la migration afin de protéger l'enfance migrante contre l'exploitation et la traite.*

¹⁴ Strengthening Border Security in Ghana.

¹⁵ *Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint, de lutte contre l'immigration irrégulière, le trafic de migrants et la traite des êtres humains en République du Mali.*

¹⁶ *Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint pour la Mauritanie.*

¹⁷ *Appui à la Lutte contre la Traite des Personnes dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée.*

¹⁸ Mixed Migration Centre, 'Migration in the Sahel: putting back human rights, cooperation and solidarity at the centre', 5 March 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁹ Protection West Africa Action Fiche. Retrieved [here](#).

one programme, Protection West Africa (REG-13), which provides protection and assistance efforts to migrants in transit.

EUTF-funded programmes offer a wide range of assistance to migrants in transit, depending on their needs and vulnerabilities. In the first half of 2022, Protection West Africa offered 33,877 non-food items, 20,731 psychosocial services, 11,417 medical treatment, 9,876 temporary housing services, and 5,484 legal assistance services to 35,122 migrants in transit (indicator 3.2).¹ During the same period, the Nexus SRD programme (MR-08)² assisted 632 migrants in transit through package support in Mauritania. Responding to the needs of vulnerable groups remained a priority this semester: in S1 2022, EUTF-funded programmes reached 5,485 children in transit, who represent 15% of beneficiaries this semester. Activities targeting children included establishing or reinforcing one-stop shops offering multiple services, enhancing child-friendly safe places, deploying mobile teams, and supporting foster families who cared for unaccompanied children on the move. In addition, given that migrant women and girls face specific challenges and protection risks in transit,³ women and girls represented 32% of the supported migrants this semester.⁴

This semester, assistance to migrants in transit continued to focus on the main migration routes in the region, whether sea or land. Most of the migrants in transit who were protected and/or assisted this semester were in Burkina Faso (32%), Niger (27%), or Mali (23%). These countries are all important transit points on the Central Mediterranean Route, but they are also currently facing increased levels of insecurity, which impair access to health, water and sanitation, food, and adequate housing, especially for transit migrants.⁵ Through the development of a network of protection and basic services providers, Protection West Africa can reach migrants in transit in affected areas with constrained access. In Burkina Faso, activities were mainly conducted in the transit regions of Centre-Nord (30%), Hauts-Bassins (17%) and Centre (15%). In Niger, activities were mostly implemented in the conflict-hit region of Tahoua (76%), but also in the Agadez region (22%), which is crossed by almost all migrants on their way to Libya. Similarly, in Mali, 71% of beneficiaries were in Tombouctou and 15% in Kayes, which are key transit points on the main migration routes to Algeria. Finally, in conjunction with the resurgence of the Atlantic Route, the Nexus SRD programme assisted 632 migrants in Mauritania in S1 2022, most of whom were rescued at sea.

In addition to providing direct assistance to migrants in transit, EUTF-funded programmes trained 1,321 people this semester on migrant protection matters, accounting for 65% of the semester's related trainings (indicator 3.7). The Protection West Africa programme provided all capacity building activities on protection this semester in the form of trainings. The training component of the programme aims to improve knowledge on protection principles and legal frameworks. Trainees were either key child welfare stakeholders (800) trained to address the protection needs of children on the move or community volunteers (521) trained in health, psychosocial and legal protocols. Most trainees were in The Gambia (26%), Côte d'Ivoire (23%), and Senegal (22%). Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali represent only 15% of the localities of this semester's trainees.

Mobilising the diaspora for the development of their countries of origin

In the SLC region, diasporas contribute significantly to the development of their countries through their remittances, entrepreneurship, investments and transnational relationships. Despite the role they play, they continue to face significant barriers in their ability to invest in their regions of origin, including administrative constraints, poor governance, lack of appropriate instruments for access to credit, or low internet penetration. In this context, some programmes financed by the EUTF

¹ Beneficiaries can receive more than one type of assistance, hence why the number of services does not add up to the number of beneficiaries.

² *L'UE pour le nexus sécurité-résilience-développement en Mauritanie.*

³ Such risks include family separation, psychosocial stress and trauma, health complications, particularly for pregnant women, physical harm and injury, and risks of exploitation and gender-based violence.

⁴ UN Women, 'Women refugees and migrants'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ OHCHR, 'Human Rights, Climate Change and Migration in the Sahel', 30 November 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

aim to support productive investment by the diasporas in the region, which also helps increase their impact on employment in the areas of origin.

In the first half of 2022, 112 projects and initiatives were supported by diaspora members through EUTF-funded projects, representing an increase of 51% compared to the results achieved by 31 December 2021 (indicator 3.1). While five EUTF-funded programmes contributed to this indicator this semester, the increase is mainly due to the implementation of the PASPED programme (SN-09)¹ in Senegal, which supported 46% of these projects and initiatives. The programme, implemented by AICS, aims to counter irregular migration and encourage the return of the Senegalese diaspora in Italy through the creation of jobs in migration-prone areas and the consolidation of the business environment for MSMEs. To this end, one of the programme's activities is to promote productive investment in the country by making information available to the diaspora on investment opportunities in Senegal and on existing financing, support and accompaniment structures. This is done by strengthening the capacities of support offices for Senegalese residents in Italy. It is through these trainings that 51 diaspora projects have been supported (indicator 3.1). The second largest contributor this semester is another Senegalese project, Diaspora Senegal (SN-06-02),² which supported 43 diaspora projects through financial and technical support. Thus, 84% of the projects supported by members of the diaspora this semester were in Senegal. The rest were in Mali (15 projects, or 13%), Ghana (2, 2%) and Mauritania (1, 1%).


Diaspora projects receive varying types of support depending on the EUTF programmes supporting them. This semester, most of these projects (85%) were supported through package support, which usually includes the selection of projects and their technical and financial support. The remaining 15% received solely financial support, most often in the form of a matching funding between the EUTF-funded implementing partners and investors from the diaspora. The topics on which these diaspora-supported projects and initiatives focused were diverse but remained relevant to identified growth sectors in each of the implementing countries.

¹ Programme de contraste à la migration illégale à travers l'appui au Secteur Privé et à la création d'emplois au Sénégal.

² Programme d'Appui aux Initiatives de Solidarité pour le Développement (PAISD) Phase III.

4.2.5. IMPROVING GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

Figure 14: Strategic Objective 4 dashboard, SLC, June 2022¹



¹ Budget figures are related to projects which are contracted, relevant to the MLS, and providing data.

The security situation in the SLC region kept deteriorating during the first half of 2022, particularly in the Sahel. This semester had the highest total recorded numbers for both security incidents (3,723) and fatalities (12,200) of any half-year period recorded for SLC countries in the ACLED database.¹ The increase in violent events and fatalities this semester compared to already high levels in previous years was driven by worsening conditions in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria.²

In the lake Chad Basin, ISWAP has consolidated its gains against rival factions of Boko Haram and broadened its regional influence. Since the death in May 2021 of Abubakar Shekau, former leader of *Jama'atu Ahlussunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad* (JAS), the main faction of Boko Haram,³ ISWAP has consolidated its territorial gains in Nigeria and launched operations across the country beyond its base in the northeast. The militant group has been elevated within the Islamic State's international hierarchy and is now coordinating activities of Islamic State franchises throughout the SLC region.⁴ Ansaru, another Boko Haram splinter faction which is affiliated to Al-Qaeda, renewed its attacks in the northwest of Nigeria after almost no activity in 2021, while the southeast of the country saw a spike in violence from Igbo separatist movements.⁵ Political violence in Nigeria caused 44% more fatalities in S1 2022 than on average during the four previous semesters.⁶

In both Mali and Burkina Faso, the Al-Qaeda-affiliated *Jama'at Nusrat Al Islam Wal Muslimin* (JNIM) continued to be the main threat to civilians. JNIM was responsible for the highest number of attacks and caused the most fatalities in both countries, including 400 attacks in 10 out of 13 regions in Burkina Faso.⁷ Meanwhile, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) appears to have strategically responded to the departure of the French and European forces from Mali and their partial relocation to Niger, intensifying attacks in northeast Mali and Burkina Faso against rival militias and civilians, while decreasing operations in Niger.⁸ Consequently, Niger saw a 12% decrease in fatalities in S1 2022 compared to the average of the four previous semesters.⁹

In Mali, counter-militancy operations undertaken by State forces and the Wagner group have resulted in high levels of state violence against civilians. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), mercenaries from Wagner group and soldiers from the Malian army executed hundreds of civilians on 27 March in the town of Moura in central Mali following a gunfight with jihadists from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).¹⁰ This example is representative of operations involving Wagner group in Mali, as 71% of Wagner's engagements in political violence in Mali have been against civilians, with members of the Fulani community particularly targeted.¹¹

In addition to its direct victims, the violence leads to instability which hampers access to services and drives food insecurity. In the most affected areas, economic activity and the provision of education and health services have been deeply disrupted. Forced displacement is a major driver of food insecurity, as displaced populations become unable to maintain their livelihood.¹² A feedback loop between food insecurity and violence is likely to worsen the crisis, as violence-driven food insecurity can in turn fuel instability. Respondents in half of the surveyed regions for a study in the Liptako-Gourma identified food insecurity as the number one security threat,¹³ matching findings on the contribution of rises in food prices to social unrest in various settings.¹⁴

¹ ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project dashboard', consulted in September 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² *Ibid.*

³ ISWAP leader Abu Musab Albarnawi had also been rumoured to have been killed in August 2021, but his death was never confirmed, and the group's operations do not appear to have been affected.

⁴ Humangle, 'ISWAP Rebrands, Expands Scope of Operations', October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ ACLED, 'Nigeria: Mid-Year Update', July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project dashboard', consulted in September 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ ACLED, 'Sahel: Mid-Year Update', July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project dashboard', consulted in September 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ Human Rights Watch, 'Mali: Massacre by Army, Foreign Soldiers', April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ ACLED, 'Wagner Group Operations in Africa', August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹² ICRC, 'Sahel: A food crisis fuelled by conflict is set to worsen during lean period', May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹³ Clingendael Institute, 'Customary characters in uncustomary circumstances', December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁴ Joe Weinberg and Ryan Bakker, 'Let them eat cake: Food prices, domestic policy and social unrest', 2015. Retrieved [here](#).

In the first semester of 2022, democratic rule continued to lose ground in the region. On 24 January, a military coup in Burkina Faso deposed President Roch Kaboré,¹ following military takeovers in Mali, Chad, and Guinea in 2021. Burkina Faso was suspended by ECOWAS,² but as of June 2022, no member of the economic bloc had been economically sanctioned other than Mali. While the new military regimes promised to organise free and fair elections at the end of transition periods, there has been little evidence of progress, as both Mali and Chad already announced delays to the initially announced timelines, and a ban on political protests has been declared in Guinea.^{3,4,5}

The EUTF has contracted €686.1M to 70 SO4-priority projects in the SLC region, about a third of the total EUTF SLC budget.⁶ Since December 2021, four new SO4 projects have been contracted in the SLC region, including two projects supporting elections and governance reform in Mali, and two justice sector projects in Niger. EUTF funding on SO4 is mainly contracted at the regional level (20%) and in the three states of the Liptako-Gourma: Burkina Faso (19%), Niger (19%), and Mali (19%). Regional programmes such as GAR-SI (REG-04)⁷ and Security G5 Sahel (REG-23)⁸ focus mainly on security. Meanwhile, most of the EUTF budget in Burkina Faso and Niger takes the form of budget support to the governments to strengthen the justice sector and service provision, and the EUTF budget in Mali focuses on support to the political transition process and the security sector.

Building local solutions for conflict prevention and peacebuilding

EUTF-funded programming in S1 2022 focused on promoting local solutions adapted to local contexts to address rising violence in the region. Research supports using a whole-of-society approach, arguing that purely militarised responses to extremist attacks have counterproductive results building resentment against the state and fuelling ethnic and farmer-herder tensions.⁹ Research in the Lake Chad Basin shows that state repression against economic activities perceived as valuable to insurgents often have perverse effects. Indeed, such policies can push local communities towards cooperation with insurgents, as well as strengthen the case for violence by reducing the economic viability of civilian life.¹⁰

In S1 2022, 7,279 out of 11,581 people trained on governance and conflict prevention (indicator 4.2) were local civilian actors including community representatives, members of local civilian institutions and traditional leaders. This was the highest number reached in any semester, both in absolute and relative terms (63%), and can be broken down in trainings for 5,593 community representatives, 1,622 local civilian institutions, and 64 traditional leaders.

In the Lake Chad Basin, DIZA (TD-07)¹¹ and RESILAC (REG-05)¹² gave community representatives tools to engage better with local governance issues, local governments, and other stakeholders (security institutions, civil society organisations, religious leaders, etc.). These activities are meant to foster accountability for those with power and resources, and peaceful engagement from the local populations, as perceptions of state abuse and corruption have been found to be the main factors driving some young people's decision to join armed groups.¹³ In S1 2022, DIZA organised training workshops in collaboration with local governments and stakeholders for 3,041

¹ David Rich, 'Coup d'État au Burkina Faso', France 24, January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Le Monde, 'Coup d'État au Burkina Faso : le pays suspendu de la CEDEAO', January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ France 24, 'Mali junta announces two-year delay until democratic rule', June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Africa News, 'Chad: Junta postpones reconciliation dialogue to a "later" date', May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Ougna Camara, 'Guinea Junta Bans Protests After Announcing Transition Timeline', Bloomberg, 14 May 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ This report includes 55 projects worth €618M.

⁷ *Groupes d'Action Rapides – Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel*

⁸ *Appui aux forces de sécurité des pays membres du G5 Sahel pour la lutte contre l'impunité et le renforcement de leurs liens avec les populations*

⁹ Laura Sanders, Rida Lyammouri, and Jordan Moss, 'Militarized Border Security Will Not Stop the Spread of Extremism', August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ Institute for Security Studies, 'Lake Chad Basin: Socio-economic resilience in the shadow of Boko Haram', March 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ *Programme de développement inclusif dans les zones d'accueil*.

¹² *Soutien aux populations du Bassin du Lac Tchad*.

¹³ International Alert, 'If victims become perpetrators, Factors contributing to vulnerability and resilience to violent extremism in the central Sahel', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

community representatives in Chad on good governance, planning, budgeting, and participatory management (indicator 4.2). Notably, 50% of the community representatives trained were women, strengthening their capacity to engage in local governance. RESILAC trained 803 community representatives who were members of local action committees on democratic governance methods (indicator 4.2) in Chad and Cameroon. These local action committees tackle a broad range of topics, from natural resources management to security and social issues, and send representatives to multi-stakeholder coordination platforms to reflect local needs and their communities' priorities.

Trainings provided to local non-state actors by PDU (REG-18),¹ ADEL (ML-12),² and MCN (NG-03)³ focused on conflict prevention and resolution at the community level. Along transhumance routes across the SLC region, PDU set up networks of mediators from agro-pastoral communities to support peaceful dialogue within and between nomadic communities. The programme trained 360 of these mediators (18% women) on the legal framework around pastoralism across borders and mediation techniques for non-violent conflict resolution in S1 2022. In Burkina Faso, PDU trained 235 community and religious leaders (all men) during a three-day workshop to support them in their roles as catalysts of peaceful community dialogue, while in Niger, 169 community representatives (27% women) were trained in conflict-prevention based on priorities identified from community-level local action plans. In Nigeria, MCN trained 381 community representatives and 42 traditional rulers in reconciliation techniques, while 47 community representatives and 22 traditional rulers were trained on conflict-prevention as part of community peace partnerships (CPPs) and community accountability fora within local councils. Finally, ADEL trained 728 members of CSOs (37% women) involved in conflict prevention and management in Gao and Tombouctou, Mali, based on tailored capacity-building action plans established within these organisations (indicator 4.3).

In parallel, training was also provided to administrators and representatives of local government institutions to strengthen their governance capacities. This semester, ADEL trained 586 administrators and representatives of Gao and Tombouctou's regional development agencies on improved governance, based on previously established diagnostics of their training needs (indicator 4.2). PDU trained 550 staff members of local civilian institutions on a broad range of topics based on local needs, such as good governance and accountability, conflict prevention, conflict-sensitive participatory approaches, legal parameters framing the use and ownership of pastoral land, and human rights (indicator 4.2).

Planning and policy-making activities also reflected a bottom-up approach. Indeed, 734 strategies, laws, policies and plans aiming for conflict resolution and peacebuilding (indicator 4.6) were drafted this semester (62% of the semester's output) were "local" or "community-based". The main contributor was the RESILAC programme which supported the elaboration of 700 locally negotiated conventions regarding land management and access to natural resources in the Lake Chad Basin region (4 in Niger and 696 in Cameroon).

Finally, the capacity building of local civilian actors were leveraged to organise community-based conflict-prevention activities. In S1 2022, 52,577 people participated in conflict prevention activities (indicator 4.3), excluding awareness raising. In Burkina Faso, PEV (BF-08)⁴ organised monthly community meetings led by religious and community leaders it had previously trained. The meetings were attended by 15,364 people. PDU organised trans-border social cohesion and conflict prevention meetings, first at the village level, then with each village sending delegates to larger-scale meetings. These activities were attended by 9,905 people this semester. In northern Nigeria, MCN organised dispute resolutions for local actors they had trained involving 9,541 people over the semester, counting both resolvers and parties to the disputes.

¹ Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.

² *Appui au développement économique local et à la prévention des conflits dans les régions de Tombouctou et Gao.*

³ Enhancing state and community level conflict management capability in North-Eastern Nigeria.

⁴ *Rebâtir une cohésion sociale au Nord du Burkina à travers un meilleur suivi de la radicalisation, la promotion du dialogue et la valorisation de l'économie pastoraliste.*

Promoting peace and combatting conflict-driving perceptions and ideas

Both perceived and actual grievances between communities and between governments and populations are significant drivers of conflict given the history and expanding nature of the violence. Disputes between farmer and herder communities, as well as relations between security forces and negatively stereotyped pastoralist communities have been exploited by armed insurgents for recruitment across the SLC region.¹ Alarms have also been raised in coastal states on the risk that security responses to terrorism threats could fuel further violence.²³

EUTF programming in S1 2022 conducted large-scale conflict prevention campaigns by raising awareness among populations. This semester, awareness-raising activities on peace reached 409,105 people (49% women, indicator 4.3), an increase of 13% compared to the previous total, and more than the entire output for 2021. Those reached by awareness-raising activities represent 89% of all people participating in peacebuilding activities (indicator 4.3). These activities were particularly focused on the Liptako-Gourma, with Burkina Faso accounting for almost half (48%) of those reached, while Mali and Niger reported slightly less than a quarter each (24%).

Campaigns diffused on mass and social media accounted for 96% of those reached by awareness-raising messages promoting peace. The main programme contributing to awareness-raising campaigns this semester was PDU, with 388,846 people reached in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger by local language audio programmes (indicator 4.3). Two main categories of content were produced and broadcast on radio and social media: On the one hand, short informational briefs aimed to increase local access to reliable information and combat the spreading of conflict-driving misinformation and on the other hand, more in-depth pieces tackled negative prejudices and stereotypes while highlighting local opportunities and initiatives contributing to social cohesion and peaceful resolution of conflicts. Meanwhile, PEV reached 5,468 persons in Burkina Faso with original video content on tolerance, peaceful cohabitation and social cohesion diffused through social media and television.

In addition, the PRCPT (TD-02)⁴ programme supported local cultural initiatives promoting peace, mutual understanding and shared fundamental values between communities. These events reached 14,431 people (indicator 4.3), were organised by a broad array of local organisations and stakeholders, and included sports, theatre, and music. They allowed socialisation between communities which have limited opportunities to do so otherwise. One third of attendees were women, overshooting the project's target of 20%. In parallel, PRCPT trained 558 state and non-state actors (56% women) to act as peace ambassadors and promote the peaceful resolution of conflicts (indicator 4.2).

¹ Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 'The Growing Complexity of Farmer-Herder Conflict in West and Central Africa', July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² Jeune Afrique, 'Côte d'Ivoire : la menace terroriste fragilise les relations intercommunautaires', May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Institute of Current World Affairs 'In Ghana, local problems threaten regional security', July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


⁴ *Projet de renforcement de la résilience et de la cohabitation pacifique au Tchad.*

5. ANALYSIS BY COUNTRY

5.1. BURKINA FASO

5.1.1. BURKINA FASO IN S1 2022

Figure 15. Burkina Faso – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2022



A military coup in Burkina Faso on 24 January deposed President Roch Kaboré, as the military seized control of a base in Ouagadougou, detained the President and declared the Government, Parliament, and Constitution dissolved.¹ The coup followed months of anti-government protests demanding Kaboré resign for his government's ineffectiveness against mounting insecurity threats. Despite increases in the national defence and security budget (from €241M in 2015 to €653M in 2021), polls for the Kaboré regime have shown a decline in satisfaction since 2017.² In particular, there was a public outcry after an attack on Solhan killed 100 people in June 2021. In November 2021, 53 police officers were killed after an attack on the Inata military post. Such incidents have sown distrust and frustration among soldiers against the political leadership.

ECOWAS suspended Burkina Faso after an emergency summit on 28 January, demanding a rapid political transition but refraining from imposing economic sanctions.³ Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, who led the coup and is considered a strong-man against jihadism, was inaugurated as transitional President for three years on 16 February.⁴ He approved an interim government in early March, retaining the same Defence Minister who served under Kaboré, General Barthelemy Simpore.⁵ Missing ECOWAS's 25 April deadline for transition plans, the country's military junta reiterated their need for a three-year transition back to constitutional rule despite pressure from ECOWAS to hold elections sooner.⁶

¹ David Rich, 'Coup d'État au Burkina Fas', France 24, 24 January 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

² Ornella Moderan, Fahiraman Rodrigue Koné, 'What caused the coup in Burkina Faso?', Institute for Security Studies, 3 February 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

³ Le Monde, 'Coup d'État au Burkina Faso : le pays suspendu de la CEDEAO', 28 January 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Al Jazeera, 'Burkina Faso coup leader Damiba inaugurated as president', 16 February 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ France 24, 'Burkina Faso's interim president approves new government after January coup', 3 June 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ France 24, 'Burkina Faso junta defends three-year plan for transition to constitutional rule', 28 April 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

The security threat in Burkina Faso remains high, and as of June 2022, 40% of the country's territory was outside of state control.¹ On the night of 11 June, IS Sahel militants launched an attack in Seytenga, Seno, killing at least 79 civilians.² According to ACLED data, there have been 905 violent events that resulted in 2,220 deaths in the country during the first half of 2022, which constitutes a 65% increase in fatalities compared to S2 2021.³ Burkina Faso's Minister for National Reconciliation, Yero Boly, has initiated an approach of dialogue between community leaders and fighters from local armed groups in the form of 'local dialogue committees', but the initiative's success is still unclear.⁴

Instability in the first half of 2021 continued to fuel internal displacement and food insecurity in the country. As of 30 April, there were 1.9 million IDPs in Burkina Faso, a 56% increase compared to the same date last year.⁵ Recent insecurity in Seytenga reportedly led to 23,362 displacements between 12 and 19 June alone.⁶ This instability also drove food insecurity, as arable land was deserted and influxes of displaced persons put strain on production and consumption structures in host communities.⁷ The Ministry of Agriculture reported that 412,000 hectares of land had been abandoned or not cultivated during the month of December 2021 alone.⁸

The *Cadre Harmonisé* projected that approximately 6.1 million people would experience crisis or above states of food insecurity from June to August 2022.⁹ In addition to insecurity, drought, flooding, and pests have also aggravated food deficits, particularly in the northern regions of the country.¹⁰ Furthermore, economic crises associated with COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine have led to disrupted supply and inflation that have diminished purchasing power and worsened the food crisis.¹¹

¹ Al Jazeera, 'Burkina Faso junta defends three-year plan for transition to constitutional rule', 18 June 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

² CIVIC, 'CIVIC Calls for Protection Measures Following Killing of Civilians in Burkina Faso', 14 June 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

³ Raleigh, Clionadh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre and Joakim Karlsen. (2010). 'Introducing ACLED-Armed Conflict Location and Event Data.' *Journal of Peace Research* 47(5) 651-660.

⁴ Africa News, 'Burkina Faso attempts uncertain dialogue with armed groups', 26 April 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ UNHCR, 'Country Data Portal Burkina Faso', 31 July 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ *Conseil National de Secours d'Urgence et de Réhabilitation*. Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 'Burkina Faso', Accessed September 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ IFRC, 'Burkina Faso: Hunger Crisis', 5 June 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ *Ibid*.


⁹ *Cadre Harmonisé* and Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, 'Food security Data in West and Central Africa', consulted in August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ IFRC, 'Burkina Faso: Hunger Crisis', 5 June 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ *Ibid*.

5.1.2. THE EUTF IN BURKINA FASO

Figure 16. EUTF portfolio in Burkina Faso, June 2022 ^{1,2}



The EUTF has contracted €190.8M in Burkina Faso, focusing mainly on governance and security-related programmes (SO4), which account for 69% of the funding (€132.3M). The recently completed Protection BF and the PEV programme (BR-07³ and BF-08⁴, respectively) address this objective by promoting social cohesion and dialogue, the former focussing on youth education in at-risk zones and the latter working to counter violent extremism in the North. The Justice BF programme (BF-11)⁵ seeks to reinforce the criminal justice system, fight impunity, and improve access to local justice. All the resilience (SO2) programmes – 16% of the budget – in Burkina Faso have closed, although several regional projects remain active on this topic in the country. Another 11% of the EUTF budget was allocated to economic and employment opportunities (SO1), with the TUUMA programme (BF-06)⁶ supporting entrepreneurship and job creation in rural areas of the country. Finally, 4% was spent on improving migration management (SO3 – EU-IOM JI Burkina Faso, BF-04)⁷.

¹ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

² This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

³ Protection des jeunes dans les zones à risque au Burkina Faso à travers l'éducation et le dialogue.


⁴ Rebâtir une cohésion sociale au Nord du Burkina à travers un meilleur suivi de la radicalisation, la promotion du dialogue et la valorisation de l'économie pastoraliste.

⁵ Appui à la justice au Burkina Faso pour renforcer la lutte contre l'impunité au travers d'une justice plus accessible et efficace.

⁶ Appui à la compétence professionnelle, l'entrepreneuriat et l'emploi des jeunes et des femmes dans les régions rurales du Burkina Faso.

⁷ Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Burkina Faso.

Figure 17: Selected EUTF outputs in Burkina Faso, June 2022



Community approach to conflict reduction and strengthening of justice

This year has seen Burkina Faso become the new epicentre of the conflict in the central Sahel, with casualties in 2021 exceeding those in Mali.¹ To date, EUTF-funded programmes have trained over 13,476 people in governance, conflict prevention, and human rights to strengthen institutions and approaches to peacebuilding (indicator 4.2). In previous years, trainings focussed on border management and security, and in 2021, 59% of the people trained were members of national security forces. This semester, the approach taken by EUTF-funded programmes emphasised conflict-prevention and peacebuilding, targeting largely community-level actors. Additionally, trainings on justice and human rights have been introduced in recent semesters.

This semester, 1,476 people were trained in conflict prevention and peacebuilding (indicator 4.2), accounting for 58% of the semester's reported outputs for the country and representing a 42% increase in the number of conflict prevention trainings compared to S2 2021. The trainings mainly adopted a local approach through the training of youth ambassadors (31% of the trainings on conflict prevention this semester), NGOs/CSOS (26%), community representatives (22%), and local civilian institutions (17%). In addition to the presence of Islamist armed groups, inter-communal conflict, such as agro-pastoral conflict, has increasingly become militarised and fuelled by tensions over scarce resources.² Community mediation mechanisms have been effective at resolving conflict while maintaining respect for tradition and local conventions.³ The PDU programme (REG-18) trained 325


¹ Al Jazeera, 'How Burkina Faso became the epicentre of conflict in the Sahel', 11 March 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

² Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 'Natural resources management in the Sahel', 1 September 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

³ Ibid.

community representatives, including religious and community leaders as well as mediators in conflict prevention and management. The programme also worked with 454 youth ambassadors to build skills in inclusive leadership, positive communication and transformation of conflicts. Finally, targeting civilian institutions and CSOs, 645 leaders were trained on conflict prevention and resolution at the community level.

Figure 18: Indicator 4.2, Burkina Faso, June 2022



A local approach was also used in EUTF-funded work on conflict prevention and peacebuilding (indicator 4.3), which reached over 20,955 people this semester through activities related to community dialogue and cross-community groups. The PEV programme (BF-08),¹ which aims to build inter-communal dialogue and prevent radicalisation, reached most of these beneficiaries (19,231, including 33% women), mostly by organising monthly meetings led by community or religious leaders in which 15,364 people participated in S1 2022 (indicator 4.3). They also ran youth programmes on personal development, emphasising inclusiveness and human rights, that reached 2,316 young people, as well as micro-projects in an inter-religious forum that aimed to prevent radicalisation and promote social cohesion, reaching 1,551 youth. Meanwhile, the PDU programme involved 1,609 community members (32% women, 26% youth) in community dialogues, including intra-community dialogues, local level intercommunity dialogues, fora for dialogue with local state authorities, and cross-border meetings. The programme also involved 115 people (18% women) in cross-community groups by organising workshops, consultative frameworks, and popular fora.

¹ *Rebâtir une cohésion sociale au Nord du Burkina à travers un meilleur suivi de la radicalisation, la promotion du dialogue et la valorisation de l'économie pastoraliste.*

In addition to trainings on conflict prevention, 526 officials (21% of total trainings) were trained this semester to strengthen human rights and justice systems, mainly targeting actors in state institutions (indicator 4.2). Rule of law institutions in Burkina Faso are weak, and little progress has been made toward justice for victims of violence or abuse by security forces.¹ The Justice BF programme (BF-11) trained 154 justice officials in total this semester (15% women), including court officials, magistrates, and other legal actors on criminal justice and supporting litigants. This semester, the programme also trained 143 judicial police officers to strengthen communication within the criminal justice system. Finally, 48 non-state actors adjacent to the legal system (22% women), including interpreters and forensic doctors, were trained over the first half of 2022. Security G5 Sahel programme trained 280 members of national security forces in human rights (12% women) during the period and PDU also trained 15 local authorities on human rights, and 61 on good governance.

Providing basic services and a safety net during a period of crisis

In 2022, Burkina Faso was facing a multi-dimensional crisis and approximately one in five Burkinabé people was in need of humanitarian assistance.² Over 6 million people were projected to be food insecure between June and August 2022, including approximately half the population of the Sahel region, nearly a third of the population of the Centre-North region, and around a quarter of people in the North and East regions.³ In S1 2022, EUTF-funded programmes provided 84,455 people with improved access to basic services (indicator 2.9), the highest number assisted since 2019.

This semester, 55,290 people benefitted from a cash or social transfer, which provides a safety net for meeting basic needs and improving nutrition and food security. Cash transfers accounted for nearly two thirds of beneficiaries of indicator 2.9 in S1 2022, and represented a 68% increase compared to S2 2021. They were focussed mainly on the Sahel (30%), Centre-North (22%) and North (18%) regions.⁴ In North, for example, agricultural production dropped by 50 percent on average due to instability and climate conditions, which was likely to result in additional food and nutritional needs well ahead of the 2022 lean season (July–September).⁵ To shield households from these negative impacts, PDU (REG-18)⁶ gave regular cash transfers to households, reaching over 37,866 people in S1 2022, of whom 23% were refugees or asylum seekers, 4% IDPs, and 4% members of host communities. The CRIALCES programme (REG-24)⁷ provided cash transfers or coupons to 15,423 people; 54% of beneficiaries were children 6 to 23 months old and 46% pregnant or lactating women (including 3% internally displaced women).

In Burkina Faso's Sahel region, PDU sought to address a lack of access to water and sanitation, particularly for displaced persons. In January, 160,000 people were newly displaced in Burkina Faso, the second-largest monthly increase in three years. The rising number of displaced people strains host communities, with water resources stretched, schools unable to absorb children, and healthcare systems underequipped.⁸ In the north of the country, the conflict has prevented state technical teams from maintaining water installations, which are often destroyed or decay over time. Amidst periods of drought, water has become a strategic resource, and armed groups frequently control water points, and decide who in the community is granted access. Having fled the control of these groups, IDPs are more often excluded from accessing these water points and may also have less access to community or state services.⁹

¹ Human Rights Watch, 'Burkina Faso: Events of 2021', Accessed October 2021, Retrieved [here](#).

² Refugees International, 'After the Coup: Burkina Faso's Humanitarian and Displacement Crisis', 21 April 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

³ *Cadre Harmonisé* and Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, 'Food security Data in West and Central Africa', consulted in August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Note that 30% of data was not specified at the regional level.

⁵ FAO, 'Burkina Faso Humanitarian Response Plan 2022', 8 April 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ *Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel*.


⁷ *Réponse à la crise alimentaire au centre Sahel : support nutritionnel et relèvement*.

⁸ VOA, 'Burkina Faso's Displaced Numbers Swell Amid Jihadi Violence', 8 May 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Benjamin Traore and Tierowe Germain Dabire, 'The right to water for internally displaced persons in the Sahel region,' International Review of the Red Cross (2021), 103 (918), 959–980, retrieved [here](#).

This semester, PDU improved access to drinking water for 2,000 IDPs in the Sahel region through the construction and servicing of standpipes to dispense water in the towns of Dori and Djibo. The programme also distributed urgently needed tanks of drinking water to 2,001 IDPs at displacement sites in in Sebba, Seytenga, and Gorom-Gorom. Finally, the programme constructed latrines in a health centre in the Seno district, benefitting 122 people.

Figure 19: Indicator 2.9, Burkina Faso, June 2022



EUTF-funded programmes also contributed to education and healthcare through the Protection BF (BF-07)¹ and PDU programmes. Protection BF constructed two public professional training centres for Franco-Arab speaking students in Dibo and Nouma, which in S1 2022 served 120 people. Additionally, by training health care service providers, PDU extended improved health care services to 26,923 people.

Continuing urgent assistance for people on the move


Burkina Faso remains an important country of transit for people on the move due to its central location between coastal and landlocked Sahelian countries. Movements through flow monitoring points in Burkina Faso saw an overall drop of 10% between April and June, likely due to attacks by

¹ Protection des jeunes dans les zones à risque au Burkina Faso à travers l'éducation et le dialogue.

armed groups in Seytenga and an attack on police in Faramana.¹ Despite the overall decrease, a 17% increase was observed in the flow of people through the Faramana flow monitoring point, in Hauts-Bassins.²

The Protection WA programme (REG-13)³ assisted 11,301 migrants in transit this semester (50% women), accounting for nearly half of all migrants in transit assisted by the EUTF in Burkina Faso since the Trust Fund's inception (indicator 3.2). The programme provided urgent assistance in key areas of the Centre-North, Hauts-Bassins, Centre, Centre-East, Cascades, and Sahel regions, which contain important transit points with Mali, Niger, and Côte d'Ivoire. In particular, the number of beneficiaries rose up by 40% in Comoe, Cascades, by 39% in Houet (Hauts-Bassins), and by 36% in Centre-Est, compared to last semester. The provided assistance included cash transfers and basic services (3,559 beneficiaries), urgent medical assistance (4,728), food security assistance (2,238), legal assistance (148), and temporary lodging (135), as well as other types of material or mixed assistance (6,356).⁴

Figure 20: Indicator 3.2, Burkina Faso, June 2022



Psychosocial support was provided to 3,239 migrants to help them deal with the trauma of violence, exploitation, or abuse faced on their journey. The Migration Centre found that 30% of migrants surveyed in Burkina Faso perceived at least one dangerous location on their journey, most often mentioning risk of robbery, physical violence, and bribery or extortion.⁵ Protection West Africa also conducted awareness raising to alert migrants to these risks, and to diffuse information at passage points and bus stops on how to access protection services. These campaigns reached 21,395 people on the move during S1 2022, or 41% of all people reached by sensitisation campaigns in Burkina Faso. The programme also conducted awareness raising activities with 27,528 members of host communities.

¹ IOM, « Burkina Faso – Rapport sur le suivi des flux de populations 47 », Accessed October 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

² *Ibid.*

³ *Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest.*

⁴ Some beneficiaries received multiple types of assistance, so the sum of each assistance provided exceeds the total of unique beneficiaries.

⁵ MMC, 'Quarterly Mixed Migration Update West Africa, Quarter 2, 2022', 20 July 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

5.1.3. BURKINA FASO AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 3: EUTF common output indicators for Burkina Faso, June 2022

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	S1 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	2,277	2,414	6,151	475	972	2,137	14,427	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	55	200	1,855	20	611	405	3,146	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	4,475	12,644	4,640	1,737	2,522	685	26,703	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) and/or skills development	956	5,747	4,195	3,932	7,710	3,289	25,829	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed, expanded or improved	3	14	19	8	11	1	55	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	0	33	18	0	0	0	51	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	522	1,445	386	266	592	407	3,618	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	98,553	58,101	4,405	1,128	6,642	37,112	205,941	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	282,181	100,124	26,270	71,469	70,247	141,265	691,557	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	150,574	217,432	173,568	65,420	126,835	74,832	808,661	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	23	71	4	17	24	0	139	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable management practices have been introduced	1,402	1,003	625	317	145	383	3,874	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience-building practices and basic rights	341,434	524,022	234,888	99,742	137,385	190,852	1,528,322	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers benefiting from capacity building to strengthen service delivery	7,354	11,919	11,016	1,378	2,061	2,187	35,915	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	333,002	383,674	73,485	21,076	43,910	84,455	939,602	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected and/or assisted	190	442	328	2,304	10,085	11,301	24,650	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	9,018	27,040	13,248	4,719	16,075	48,923	119,023	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	1,635	1,260	4,275	52	12	0	7,234	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	1,586	821	666	273	235	0	3,581	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	1,282	224	239	145	391	170	2,451	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	30	125	1,020	144	1,319	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	2	23	16	6	0	0	47	
3.11 Number of awareness-raising events on migration	20	68	0	5	10	7	110	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	3	0	1	4	12	0	20	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	924	9	1,210	0	10,944	1,182	14,269	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	994	1,667	1,436	2,146	4,699	2,534	13,476	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention and human rights activities	3,283	83,035	2,069,885	146,258	52,600	244,783	2,599,843	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed and/or directly supported	7	138	123	64	191	82	605	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed and regularly gathering	91	430	380	106	302	193	1,502	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up, implemented and/or strengthened	70	184	615	1,005	236	10	2,120	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	13	45	4	19	5	24	110	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	10	1	4	10	5	0	30	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	302,840	0	0	0	302,840	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	8,509	0	0	0	8,509	

5.2. CHAD

5.2.1. CHAD IN S1 2022

Figure 21: Chad – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2022



Chad's political transition made little progress in S1 2022. After signing an amnesty with opposing political and military groups on 29 November 2021, peace talks with armed rebel groups, initially planned to take place in January, started in Qatar on 13 March but had yet to conclude at the time of writing.¹ One of the main groups pulled out of the negotiations in April,² and all others threatened to follow suit in June, accusing the governmental delegation of 'intimidations' and 'provocations'.³ At the same time, a demonstration against French interference in local politics organised by *Wakit Tama*, a coalition of opposition leaders and civil society groups, led to the destruction of seven Total Energies gas stations in Ndjamena and the sentencing of six opposition leaders to a one-year suspension for 'disturbing public order'.^{4,5}

Despite economic growth, food insecurity increased in S1 2022. Following a two-year recession, real GDP growth for 2022 was forecast at 2.8%.⁶ The period, however, saw a decline in agro-pastoral productivity: in the Sahelian zone, a scarcity of pasture was caused by poor spatial and temporal distribution of rainfall in 2021, while in the Sudanian zone, pastoral overloading caused a decline in biomass which negatively impacted the weight of animals.⁷ The revised 2022 cereal balance sheet showed a net deficit of 308,960 tons to meet the population's needs.⁸ Besides, annual food price inflation reached 12.9% in June.⁹ This situation led the government to declare a food emergency,¹⁰ with 3.8 million people projected to be food insecure during the 2022 lean season (a 31% increase compared to the 2021 lean season).¹¹

¹ Africa News, 'Chad junta postpones post-coup forum to May', January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² The *Conseil de commandement militaire pour le salut de la République* (CCMSR), active in the North of Chad.

³ Jeune Afrique 'Tchad : les rebelles menacent de se retirer des négociations de Doha', June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Africa News, 'Chad arrests opposition leaders over anti-France protest', May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Africa News, 'Opposition leaders in Chad sentenced for disturbing public order', June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ World Bank, 'Global Economic Prospects', June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ OCHA, 'Tchad : Rapport de situation', July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Institut National de la Statistique, des Études Économiques et Démographiques, 'Bulletin mensuel de l'Indice National des Prix à la Consommation au Tchad – Juin 2022', July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


¹⁰ Africa News, 'Chad declares food emergency, calls for help from local and foreign partners', June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ Cadre Harmonisé and Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, 'Food security Data in West and Central Africa', consulted in August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

Chad is still facing an influx of refugees from its neighbouring countries. As of 31 July 2022, there were 580,055 refugees in the country (a 4% increase from December 2021),¹ and 381,289 IDPs (a 6% decrease compared to December 2021). Insecurity in neighbouring countries appeared to be the main driver for the increase in the number of refugees, with 18,929 additional people of concern from Sudan, 6,640 from Cameroon and 1,827 from the Central African Republic from December 2021 to June 2022.²

5.2.2. THE EUTF IN CHAD

Figure 22: EUTF portfolio in Chad, June 2022^{3,4}



The EUTF's total contracted budget in Chad amounts to €113.9M, of which some 5% have yet to be spent. With the completion of PRODECO (TD-06)⁵ in April 2022, four programmes have now ended in Chad, accounting for 59% of the EUTF's total budget in the country. The remaining active programmes mostly focus on resilience (SO2), which accounts for €37.3M or 78% of the budget of programmes still being implemented. Indeed, the DIZA (TD-07)⁶ and PRCPT (TD-02)⁷ programmes mostly aim to enhance local development and the resilience of fragile communities, but also to expand access to basic services such as clean water, medical care, education or legal assistance. The remaining active programme, *Bab-al-amal* (TD-03)⁸, with a budget of €10.3M, focuses on TVET, youth qualifications and professional insertion in Chad's largest cities (SO1).

¹ UNHCR, Operational Data Portal, accessed July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² UNHCR, 'Tchad : Personnes relevant de la compétence du HCR', December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁴ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.


⁵ *Appui au déminage, à la protection sociale et au développement des personnes vulnérables.*

⁶ *Programme de développement inclusif dans les zones d'accueil.*

⁷ *Projet de Renforcement de la Résilience et de la Cohabitation Pacifique au Tchad.*

⁸ *Projet de soutien à l'insertion socio-professionnelle des jeunes tchadiens en situation de vulnérabilité.*

Figure 23: Selected EUTF outputs in Chad, June 2022



Support the Chadian economy through assistance to MSMEs and IGAs

After two years of recession that severely impacted vulnerable populations, the business landscape in Chad remained fragile in 2022. As of June 2022, formal economic opportunities in Chad were very limited, and working conditions were poor.¹ The formal registration of private companies was not up to date, and restricted access to funding as well as corruption hindered private investment and initiatives. In addition, Chad's economy was severely hit by the COVID-19 crisis, with almost two out of three firms closing at least once between April 2020 and April 2021, further exacerbating the above-mentioned challenges.²

In this context, EUTF-funded programmes supported small structures such as MSMEs or IGAs, particularly in rural areas. They focused on agriculture and village savings and loan associations (VSLAs) and adopted a countrywide approach to reach vulnerable people from all regions, including border areas where many displaced persons live.

In total, EUTF-funded projects have supported 251 micro, small, and medium enterprises, including 65 in S1 2022, a 35% increase compared to what was achieved by December 2021. During the semester, four programmes contributed to this result, almost all of them through support to the organisation of cooperatives and livelihood groups. The PDU programme (REG-18)³ contributed the highest figures this semester, with 30 VSLAs groups created. The goal of this activity is to increase the capacity of women and youth, participating households and communities to cope with, adapt to and recover from successive shocks while supporting social and economic development. The RESILAC


¹ World Bank, 'Chad Economic Update - April 2022', April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² African Development Bank, 'African Economic Outlook 2022', May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.

programme (REG-05)¹, similarly, supported 18 established VSLAs through support for agricultural installation and micro-entrepreneurship. The DIZA programme, which aims to create economic opportunities and jobs to give people the means to achieve economic self-sufficiency, supported 16 existing agricultural structures this semester through technical training (cooperative management, development of operating accounts or business plans, storage techniques, etc). Finally, one small enterprise was supported by IPDEV2 (REG-11)² through seed funding and technical assistance.

Figure 24: EUTF indicator 1.2, in Chad, June 2022



Although VSLA members received training in income generating activities this semester (900, indicator 1.3), they did constitute a small part of the IGAs that were supported during the period. A total of 10,323 beneficiaries were supported with IGAs in the first half of 2022 (indicator 1.3), an increase of 28% compared to the results from S1 2021. Most of these IGAs were supported through training (9,107 or 88% of the S1 2022 output) provided by three programmes : PRCPT (4,691), DIZA (4,176) and RESILAC (240). PDU supported 900 people in starting IGAs through the creation and strengthening of VSLAs. Finally, 316 people received material support for their agricultural IGA from RESILAC (313) and DIZA (3). This semester, more than half (57%, 5,905) of those supported to develop an IGA were women, partly due to PDU RECOSOC's (REG-18-08) and DIZA Est's (TD-07-01) focus on the inclusion of women in IGAs.

Strengthening the delivery of basic services in Chad


Access to basic services with regard to drinking water, sanitation and hygiene measures, reproductive health and agriculture, remains a challenge in Chad. Only 11% of the Chadian

¹ Redressement économique et social inclusif du Lac Tchad.

² Soutenir les entrepreneurs et les petites PME en Afrique de l'Ouest.

population had access to electricity in 2020, a number dropping to 2% in rural areas.¹ Similarly, 38% of the rural population had access to at least basic drinking water services in 2020,² and 4% to basic sanitation services,³ causing 14,842 yearly deaths from diarrhoea, the third leading cause of death in Chad.⁴ In the Lake Chad region and the East, protracted crises, insecurity and forced displacements continued to undermine access to basic services, as displacement-affected communities usually have even lower rates of access to basic services after they move.⁵

Figure 25: EUTF indicator 2.2, in Chad, June 2022



In S1 2022, EUTF-funded projects delivered a total of 51,511 basic services, almost five times what was delivered in S2 2021 (indicator 2.2). This represents 59% of all basic services provided in Chad by EUTF-funded programmes. Some of these basic services were designed to provide immediate relief to vulnerable populations. Thus, the PRODECO programme continued to support households identified as 'very poor' with temporary social safety nets that enabled them to meet their primary needs. 22,296 people received these monthly allowances this semester, 56% of whom were women. In addition, the PDU RECOSOC project started a new activity this semester that paid 300 women for learning in a cash-for-learning scheme. PRODECO and RESILAC also provided immediate health assistance to 21 people this semester.

Beyond temporary relief, some EUTF programmes also provide services designed to improve the livelihoods of Chadians more permanently. Notably, and despite efforts by the government, the birth registration rate in Chad remains very low (74% of children under five years of age are not

¹ World Bank, 'Access to electricity (% of the population) – Chad', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

² World Bank, 'People using at least basic drinking water services, rural (% of rural population) – Chad', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

³ World Bank, 'People using at least basic sanitation services, rural (% of rural population) – Chad', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ World health rankings, 'Chad – Diarrhoeal diseases', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ OCHA, 'Chad: Rapport de situation', July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

registered, leaving more than 4 million children under five years of age without legal existence), especially among displaced people. In this context, the DIZA Transversal Support project aims to reduce the risk of statelessness for IDPs and returnees by issuing birth certificates and identity cards. This semester, it delivered 24,050 birth certificates to 16,949 refugees and 7,101 IDPs, bringing the total number of certificates delivered to 46,094 (indicator 2.2). In addition, this semester, the programme trained 59 private sector actors on issues related to the law of asylum and the socio-economic inclusion of refugees and returnees in Chad (indicator 2.8) and 294 members of the national authorities were sensitised on this same issue (Indicator 3.7). At the same time, the PDU EPEVA project facilitated access to latrines for 4,844 people this semester (indicator 2.2) and trained 10 artisans in latrine maintenance to ensure their sustainability (indicator 2.8).

5.2.3. CHAD AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 4: EUTF common output indicators for Chad, June 2022

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	S1 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	2,081	2,307	2,218	970	243	97	7,917	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	32	74	70	10	65	251	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	5,268	16,963	9,109	8,062	13,837	10,323	63,562	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) and/or skills development	230	2,488	2,481	1,620	2,188	1,104	10,111	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed, expanded or improved	3	24	11	11	5	8	62	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	26	56	19	20	25	16	162	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	139	264	298	254	53	16	1,024	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	660	2,567	17,824	2,280	11,982	51,511	86,824	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	18,546	10,477	8,684	3,496	6,587	1,832	49,622	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	34,999	18,610	93,082	37,269	16,989	4,624	205,573	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	8	40	9	3	0	0	60	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable management practices have been introduced	70	225	1,496	14	6,977	0	8,781	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience-building practices and basic rights	21,672	30,707	183,797	5,250	6,092	949	248,467	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers benefiting from capacity building to strengthen service delivery	57	1,622	430	142	144	206	2,600	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	35,160	221,000	14,206	5,830	44,365	41,464	362,025	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected and/or assisted	0	43	300	123	335	0	801	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	0	605	1,468	289	15,332	0	17,694	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	9	119	360	61	248	0	797	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	10	1,228	2,959	1,207	828	133	6,365	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	86	446	23	0	294	850	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	0	16	23	4	8	0	51	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	0	0	16	0	0	0	16	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	216	709	26	104	249	1,304	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	667	1,205	3,118	1,232	1,673	3,782	11,677	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention and human rights activities	60,527	233,942	69,314	8,266	10,206	18,170	400,425	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed and/or directly supported	1	1	5	0	4	0	11	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed and regularly gathering	17	206	131	83	144	12	594	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools setup, implemented and/or strengthened	5	12	157	11	132	0	317	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	10	19	9	2	0	1	41	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	8	0	4	0	1	0	13	

5.3. CÔTE D'IVOIRE

5.3.1. CÔTE D'IVOIRE IN S1 2022

Figure 26: Côte d'Ivoire – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2022



Political tensions in Côte d'Ivoire continued to ease in the first half of 2022, despite remaining apprehensions around the legacy of past political violence. In June, the election of the new President of the National Assembly, who received votes from the two main opposition parties, was an encouraging sign towards political reconciliation.¹ However, in April, recently returned former President Laurent Gbagbo organised a political rally in the town of Douékoué, which had seen hundreds of civilians killed during the 2011 post-election violence. In reaction, political adversaries accused him of conjuring up dangerous political sentiments.²

Côte d'Ivoire continued experiencing relative stability compared to neighbouring countries, as Ivoirian refugees returned home. The cessation of refugee status for Ivoirians officially took place on 30 June 2022, and over 15,000 Ivoirians refugees were repatriated from January to June.³ Violence in the northern regions abated in 2022, with no attack or plot reported since the discovery of an unexploded IED in early February.⁴ Meanwhile, attacks from violent extremists in Burkina Faso caused sudden migration flows into the northeast of the country, with 4,042 new Burkinabé refugees registered in Côte d'Ivoire between May and June 2022.⁵

Côte d'Ivoire's economy showed strong growth, but inflation was a threat to vulnerable households. Growth in Côte d'Ivoire was 7% in 2021 and was projected to remain high in 2022 at 5.7%.⁶ However, annual inflation reached 5.4%, and 9.8% on prices of food products, in June.⁷ Inflation in the price of food items affects poor households the most, as they spend a larger share of their income on food.⁸ The government has implemented a series of measures to mitigate the effects of inflation,

¹ Africa News, 'Ivory Coast: Adama Bictogo elected President of the National Assembly', June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Jeune Afrique, 'Côte d'Ivoire : Laurent Gbagbo à Douékoué, où « les Ivoiriens sont devenus fous »', April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ UNHCR, 'Côte d'Ivoire - Operational Update - June 2022', July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Jeune Afrique, 'Côte d'Ivoire : la menace terroriste fragilise les relations intercommunautaires', May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ UNHCR, 'Côte d'Ivoire - Operational Update - June 2022', July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ World Bank, 'Global Economic Prospects', June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


⁷ Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances de Côte d'Ivoire, 'Annexe - Note mensuelle de conjoncture économique – Juillet 2022', July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ African Development Bank, 'African Economic Outlook 2022', May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

such as subsidies, duty waivers, and price controls on staple foods, totalling over €318M in fiscal expansion.¹

5.3.2. THE EUTF IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Figure 27: EUTF portfolio in Côte d'Ivoire, June 2022^{2,3}



The EUTF has contracted €29M to two national programmes in Côte d'Ivoire. Both programmes started their implementation phase in 2021, while several regional programmes have implemented activities in the country since 2018. A €24M budget support programme was signed in June 2021 to support the government's effort to provide financial support to businesses impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic (PSRE COVID, CI-03, SO1).⁴ An additional €5M were contracted to CIVIPOL to support the 2019 national strategy on civil registration in the country (*Etat Civil*, CI-02, SO3).⁵

Figure 28: Selected EUTF outputs in Côte d'Ivoire, June 2022



Supporting civil registration and identification system reforms

Côte d'Ivoire's current civil registration and identification system is inadequate to serve the country's needs. In 2016, only 72% of births were registered, with wide regional, rural-urban, and economic disparities. For instance, the birth registration rate was as low as 60% in rural areas and 48% for households in the lowest economic well-being quintile.⁶ These limitations contribute to long-standing issues of widespread statelessness, as the rules and processes determining the deliverance of civil status documents – and all the civic and economic rights attached to them – have been politically sensitive for decades.⁷

¹ Jeune Afrique, 'Côte d'Ivoire : « Protéger le pouvoir d'achat tout en maintenant l'activité », la priorité d'Adama Coulibaly', June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

³ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁴ Programme de soutien et de relance à l'économie dans le contexte de la crise du COVID-19 en Côte d'Ivoire.


⁵ Appui à la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale de l'état civil et de l'identification en Côte d'Ivoire.

⁶ Ministère du Plan et du Développement, 'Enquête par grappes à indicateurs multiples - Côte d'Ivoire 2016', 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Ousmane Dembélé, 'Côte d'Ivoire : la fracture communautaire', 2003. Retrieved [here](#).

The country's authorities have made progress towards addressing the issue of statelessness in recent years, lowering the number of stateless and at-risk people from 1.6 million in 2019 to 931,166 people in June 2022.¹ In 2020, Côte d'Ivoire became the first African country to adopt a 'Statelessness Determination Procedure', formally establishing procedures to recognise stateless people and better protect their rights through the issuance of identity documents. These documents are a pre-condition to accessing many public services, such as education, health, formal employment, and legal asset ownership.²

Figure 29: EUTF indicator 2.8, in Côte d'Ivoire, June 2022³



The *Etat Civil* CI programme (CI-02) is supporting the implementation of Côte d'Ivoire's civil registration and identification strategy, a key component of the fight against statelessness with broad governance benefits. Addressing the current gaps in the civil registration system can facilitate the production of public statistics, the planning and delivery of public services, fiscal revenue collection, migration management, and the formalisation of informal businesses.⁴

¹ UNHCR, 'Côte d'Ivoire - Operational Update - June 2022', July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² UNHCR, 'Côte d'Ivoire adopts Africa's first legal process to identify and protect stateless people', September 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

³ The map does not show data for 36 national-level civil servants trained by the *Etat Civil* programme. Non-disaggregated data accounts for 13% of all people trained in the delivery of services in Côte d'Ivoire.

⁴ CIVIPOL, 'Description de l'action, Appui à la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale de l'état civil et de l'identification de Côte d'Ivoire', December 2020.

In S1 2022, *Etat Civil CI* organised a pilot experimentation of a new system to register all births and deaths. The programmed trained 240 health service providers (69% women) in registering births and deaths according to the new system (indicator 2.8), over five times the total previously achieved for this indicator in Côte d'Ivoire. In parallel, 166 civil servants (34% women) were trained on the same topic (indicator 4.2), 86% of whom worked in local government institutions in 15 renovated civil status centres in pilot locations.¹ To facilitate these trainings, *Etat Civil CI* produced two 'how to' guides on civil servants and health workers' respective roles in the registration of births and deaths in the new system (indicator 5.2).

The pilot took place in Abidjan and seven regions,² five of which are border regions. Pilot locations were selected by building on the experience of a previous pilot undertaken by the Ivorian authorities and supported by UNICEF in Bas-Sassandra district in 2016-2017.³ The chosen locations covered a wide range of local conditions, as two of the border regions are in the districts with the highest prevalence of population at risk of statelessness (Zanzan and Savanes), while others are in districts with lower-than-average prevalence, such as Comoé or Lagunes.⁴

Improving protection for migrant children and youth

Available data on human trafficking in Côte d'Ivoire point to children as the main victims, with forced labour in cocoa farms as the most common form of exploitation.⁵ All 172 cases of human trafficking registered by UNODC in Côte d'Ivoire since 2018 concerned children, with 95% being exploited in forced labour,⁶ although these statistics are likely biased by a greater focus of authorities on child trafficking compared to other types of victims.⁷ In recent years, human trafficking has become increasingly associated with irregular migration, and trafficking networks operate along the main migration routes.⁸ In one recent case, law enforcement sentenced 5 traffickers and identified 68 child victims, mostly from Burkina Faso, exploited as forced labour in cocoa farms.⁹

EUTF-funded programmes tackle this issue through several approaches, including protection of rescued victims and sensitisation campaigns for professionals and at-risk children and youth. In S1 2022, Protection West Africa (REG-13)¹⁰ offered protection (indicator 3.2) to 608 migrant children and young people (33% girls), a 16% increase over the previous total. Meanwhile, TEH (REG-12)¹¹ delivered basic social services (indicator 2.2) to five minors (60% girls). In addition, Protection West Africa raised awareness for 8,113 professionals and migrant children/youth (48% female) through the design, production and diffusion of brochures and flyers (indicator 3.3). The brochure distributed to professionals contained information on existing routes and profiles of migrant children/youth, while the flyers distributed to the migrant children/youth presented protection services available to them.

This semester, efforts were also made to build the capacity of actors in the sector, with a total of 328 actors trained, or 16% of the semester's output for the entire SLC window (indicator 3.7). Protection West Africa trained 303 key actors (35% women) involved in child protection on case management and/or psychosocial support for migrant children and young people (indicator 3.7). The training workshop attendees presented diverse professional profiles, including social workers, national, municipal, and regional employees, as well as employees from security forces and civil society activists. TEH (REG-12) trained 25 members of national security forces on human trafficking (indicator 3.7).

¹ CIVIPOL, 'Réhabilitation de 15 centres d'état civil en Côte d'Ivoire', March 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Gbêké, Gontougo, Mé, Poro, Tonkpi, San-Pédro, and Sud-Comoé.

³ CIVIPOL, 'Description de l'action, Appui à la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale de l'état civil et de l'identification de Côte d'Ivoire', December 2020.

⁴ UNHCR, 'Cartographie des personnes à risque d'apatridie en Côte d'Ivoire', January 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ OFPRA, 'Côte d'Ivoire, Les victimes de la traite des êtres humains à des fins d'exploitation par le travail', March 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ UNODC, 'Detected victims of trafficking, by forms of exploitation, 2018 (or more recent)' Database, July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Altai Consulting, 'Anti-trafficking initiatives in the Gulf of Guinea, June 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Ibid.


⁹ US Department of State, 'Trafficking in persons report', 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest.

¹¹ Appui à la Lutte contre la Traite des Personnes dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée.

Protection West Africa also finalised a study on the profiles of migrant children and youth and a mapping of actors involved and available protection services before sharing it with stakeholders (indicator 5.3). This mapping exercise is particularly relevant in Côte d'Ivoire as migration management and human trafficking are cross-cutting issues without clear leading institutions in the country, with up to 9 distinct ministries having purview over the matter.¹

Figure 30: EUTF indicator 3.7, in Côte d'Ivoire, June 2022



5.3.3. CÔTE D'IVOIRE AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 5: EUTF common output indicators for Côte d'Ivoire, June 2022


EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	S1 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	0	71	155	2,220	468	2,914	
1.2 Number of IM SMEs created or supported	0	0	9	1	181	13	204	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) and/or skills development	0	0	0	432	592	0	1,024	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	0	0	0	1	2	0	3	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	0	0	0	38	0	10	48	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers benefiting from capacity building to strengthen service delivery	0	0	0	0	36	240	276	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected and/or assisted	4	3	2,344	828	546	608	4,333	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	12,400	41,852	9,881	1,035	1,980	8,175	75,323	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	5	11	307	0	4	0	327	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	3,752	2,030	912	1,000	559	0	8,253	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	1,626	1,151	1,263	994	631	1	5,666	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	0	0	1	0	1	2	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	132	605	58	328	1,123	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	64	55	35	1	0	155	
3.11 Number of awareness-raising events on migration	10	343	108	0	0	0	461	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	0	0	0	0	15	0	15	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	0	0	0	17	0	17	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	0	0	10	686	54	166	916	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed and/or directly supported	0	1	3	0	1	1	6	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed and regularly gathering	0	0	0	1	5	77	83	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools setup, implemented and/or strengthened	0	0	1	2	1	2	6	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	0	1	0	2	1	4	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	

¹ Altai Consulting, 'État des lieux de la gouvernance des migrations en Côte d'Ivoire', December 2021.

5.4. GHANA

5.4.1. GHANA IN S1 2022

Figure 31: Ghana – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2022



This semester, Ghana struggled to tackle rising inflation and its public debt. Ghana's deficit is over 80% of its GDP, and the Ghanaian Cedi had weakened by 18% against the dollar as of April.¹ The country was ranked second globally in terms of sovereign debt vulnerability and risk of default.² In March the government announced a 30% reduction in the salaries of public employees, and on 29 March, the controversial electronic transaction levy ('e-levy' tax) on electric payments was approved in order to reduce the government's deficit.³ These policies had a negative impact on the ongoing inflation crisis in the country. Ghana's inflation was at an 18-year high in June 2022, having accelerated for 12 successive months. Food prices in June were 30% higher compared to the prior year, and inflation was expected to worsen due to the 1.5% e-levy tax which came in force in May.⁴

Protests fuelled by frustration over the high cost of living in Ghana mounted in 2022. In late June, protests over price increases from the 'Arise Ghana' movement led to clashes with the police, leaving 12 policemen injured and 29 protesters arrested.⁵ These protests represented a continuation of frustrations among Ghana's youth over inequality and government corruption, as seen in protests by the #fixthecountry movement, which began in 2021.⁶ Many Ghanaians felt that the government's efforts to avoid currency and debt crises were being born by everyday people who were hard hit by rising prices.⁷

Ghana is a country of negative net migration and is not a major transit or destination country in the region. However, Ghana and other coastal countries in West Africa may begin to see increased migration as an effect of the ongoing Sahel conflict. In particular, Ghana may see increased arrivals at

¹ Yara Rizk, 'Face à la crise, le Ghana est-il vraiment prêt à tout?', Jeune Afrique, 1 April 2022, Retrieved [here](#). Akshay Chinchalkar, 'History Shows Ghana's Cedi May Weaken Further From Record Low', Bloomberg, 21 April 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

² Sydney Maki, 'Historic Cascade of Defaults Is Coming for Emerging Markets', Bloomberg, 7 July 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

³ Yara Rizk, 'Face à la crise, le Ghana est-il vraiment prêt à tout?', Jeune Afrique, 1 April 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Ekow Dontoh, 'Inflation Rate at 18-Year High as Food Costs Surge in Ghana', Bloomberg, 8 June 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Africa News, 'Tear gas mar "Arise Ghana" protest: 12 Policemen injured, 29 protesters arrested', 29 June 2022, Retrieved [here](#).


⁶ Anakwa Dwamena, 'The Secret to Getting What You Need in Ghana', Foreign Policy, 11 June 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Christian Akorlie, 'UPDATE 1-Ghanaians return to the streets to protest economic woes', Reuters, 29 June 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

its northern border with Burkina Faso where violence, instability and displacement have been on an increasing trend.¹

5.4.2. THE EUTF IN GHANA


Figure 32: EUTF Portfolio in Ghana, June 2022



The EUTF has contracted €24.6M to projects in Ghana. Employment-related projects (SO1) account for 80% of this funding, and the remaining 20% deal with migration management (SO3). All national projects were contracted at the end of 2019 as part of two programmes: the GrEEEn programme (GH-02), which focusses on supporting the creation of green employment and enterprise opportunities, and the Border Security programme (GH-01) which aims to strengthen local and national capacity for migration and border management. As of June 2022, programmes in Ghana were nearly two-thirds through their implementation period.

¹ ICMPD, 'Migration Outlook 2022 West Africa', Accessed September 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

Figure 33: Selected EUTF outputs, Ghana, June 2022




Boosting jobs through training and support to MSMEs

The GrEEen programme (GH-02)¹ was the only contributor to job creation in Ghana this semester, creating or supporting 1,806 jobs (indicator 1.1), which accounts for nearly half of the jobs supported by EUTF-funded programmes in Ghana to date. GrEEen aims to support economic opportunities in regions of departure, transit and return to Ghana, creating local ecosystems that facilitate the development of MSMEs and IGAs with a particular focus on green sectors. Most jobs created in Ghana during S1 2022 (82%) were held by youth, and 62% by women.

Most of these jobs (94%) were permanent or long-term, regular wage employment stemming from support to MSMEs and TVET by GrEEen. In 80% of cases, these jobs involved skilled labour, and just over half of the jobs were in the WASH sector (53%), followed by agriculture (43%) and energy (4%). Following incubation, acceleration, coaching, and mentoring provided to MSMEs, beneficiary businesses were able to employ 883 people in S1 2022. A total of 778 MSMEs have been supported by the GrEEen programme since it began in 2020 (indicator 1.2). This has generated 999 jobs since the programme's inception (indicator 1.1).

¹ Boosting Green Employment and Enterprise opportunities in Ghana.

Figure 34: Indicator 1.1, Ghana, June 2022



Another 806 jobs came from entrepreneurship and employability trainings. This package TVET support by GrEEn provides coaching and mentoring services to individuals in the Ashanti and Western regions with vocational and entrepreneurship skills, and has reached 4,216 beneficiaries so far. Overall, a total of 995 jobs have been created due to GrEEn’s TVET support, and the programme has trained a total of 61,272 individuals since it began.

Finally, 117 jobs were boosted through support for access to financial services for individuals and MSMEs. This brings the total number of jobs created through support for access to financial services to 1,879. In the Ashanti and Western regions of Ghana, the GrEEn UNCDF project has helped 55,055 people access a mix of loans, savings, remittance products, financial literacy, and crowdfunding, which has helped beneficiaries save cumulatively \$164,000 and take out \$499,000 in loans.¹

An innovative approach to border management

Strengthening Border Security (GH-01)² has continued its support to the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), having trained a total of 951 GIS officers and managers in ethics and accountability, operational procedures, emergency response, gender mainstreaming, French, and border management-related subjects (indicator 4.2). This semester, trainings continued, reaching 101 GIS officers. The mounting instability in Burkina Faso has increased the importance of preparedness and border management in the event of increased population movements, and the programme conducted a simulation exercise in 2021 at Baga, on the border with Burkina Faso.

This semester, the programme begun work on a Demand Driven Facility, which uses an integrated border management approach to fund bottom-up border management initiatives. These initiatives employ a wholistic approach to border management that is led by civil society and directly involves local communities. This semester, the programme conducted an awareness raising

¹ UNCDF, ‘How is GrEEn making finance work in Ghana?’, March 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Strengthening Border Security in Ghana

campaign with regional stakeholders as well as two community sensitisation campaigns (indicator 3.11). The programme also began providing direct assistance to returnees, including psychosocial support and livelihood and skills acquisition activities (indicator 3.5 and 3.5 bis).

5.4.3. GHANA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 6: EUTF common output indicators for Ghana, June 2022

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	S1 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	0	2	1,040	1,092	1,806	3,940	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	0	5	351	345	176	877	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	0	0	79	2,368	4,011	57,985	64,443	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) and/or skills development	0	5	679	1,418	10,883	48,613	61,598	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	0	0	0	10	0	0	10	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	0	0	0	0	10	0	10	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	0	0	0	90,156	0	90,156	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	0	0	0	0	3	2	5	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected and/or assisted	0	0	5	0	7	0	12	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	3,164	25,290	826,213	2,067	342	60	857,136	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	0	0	5	0	17	0	22	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	831	305	758	24	160	11	2,089	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	314	281	483	176	433	26	1,713	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	200	20	509	133	862	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	5	88	64	54	10	4	225	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	29	57	204	6	0	3	299	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	0	31	0	0	0	31	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	140	40	49	374	431	101	1,135	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed and regularly gathering	0	0	19	6	196	136	357	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools setup, implemented and/or strengthened	0	0	3	2	33	11	49	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	0	13	2	2	37	54	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	1	0	0	1	2	0	4	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	32,000	0	0	0	32,000	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	7,000	182,763	0	0	189,763	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	10	10	0	0	20	

5.5. GUINEA

5.5.1. GUINEA IN S1 2022

Figure 35: Guinea – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2022



Discontent with Guinea's military government grew during the first semester of 2022. Following a coup in September 2021 that ousted President Alpha Condé, Guinea's junta formed an 80-member National Transition Council (CNT) on 22 January 2022 to perform parliamentary functions until an eventual transition to civilian rule.¹ The military government, led by Mamady Doumbouya, put forth a proposed three-year transition timeline, but the CNT had yet to set a date for elections at the time of writing.² The government also announced a ban on political protests after revealing the plan, a move that drew criticism from civil society and human rights groups.³ The National Front for the Defence of the Constitution, a coalition of political parties and civil society, condemned the junta and called for peaceful protests, which were later cancelled by the government.⁴ Though the coup was initially welcomed by many Guineans, frustrations have mounted against the government's unwillingness to manage a quick transition to democratic rule. In early June, a rise in the price of fuel sparked demonstrations, and a young man was shot during clashes between protesters and the police.⁵

Despite the tense political situation in Guinea, economic growth was projected to stay strong at 4.3% in 2022, driven by the mining sector and infrastructure investments.⁶ However, like other countries in the region, Guinea contended with increasing fuel and food prices. In response to inflationary pressures, the government signed an agreement with the Guinean chamber of commerce to reduce customs duties and set price ceilings for key food items.⁷

Guinea remained a country of departure and transit for migrants in the region, with most of those on the move in Guinea as of May 2022 being nationals of Guinea itself, Senegal, Mali, and The Gambia.⁸ Frontex reported that Guinea was among the top five countries of origin for illegal border crossings into Europe coming from the Atlantic Route in the first half of 2022.⁹

¹ Saliou Samb, 'Guinea junta establishes council to lead transition to elections', 23 January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² BBC, 'Guinea to move to civilian rule in three years', 1 May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Bloomberg, 'Guinea Junta Bans Protests After Announcing Transition Timeline', 14 May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Reuters, 'Guinea's coup leader proposes 3-year transition back to civilian rule', 3 May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ France 24, '*Jeune tué par balle en Guinée*', 6 June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ World Bank, 'Global Economic Prospects', June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


⁷ IMF, 'IMF Staff Concludes Visit to Guinea', 9 June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ IOM, '*Matrice de suivi des déplacements*', May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ FRONTEX, 'Migratory Map', July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

5.5.2. THE EUTF IN GUINEA

Figure 36: EUTF portfolio in Guinea, June 2022^{1,2}



The EUTF has committed €73M in Guinea. The INTEGRA programme (GN-01)³ represents most of this funding with €60M. It aims to create jobs, provide TVET, especially to youth, and support entrepreneurship and small businesses (SO1). Through the recently completed €8M RESIGUI programme (GN-04),⁴ the EUTF also strove to build the population's resilience in the face of food insecurity (SO2). Finally, the €5M *Etat Civil* programme (GN-05)⁵ seeks to strengthen and digitise civil registry processes, while building national actors' capacities on civil registration and identification (SO4).

¹ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.


² This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

³ Programme d'appui à l'intégration socio-économique des jeunes en République de Guinée.

⁴ Améliorer la résilience des populations vulnérables de Guinée.

⁵ Projet pilote d'amélioration des performances de l'état civil guinéen par le recours à la digitalisation.

Figure 37: Selected EUTF outputs in Guinea, June 2022



Creating job opportunities and helping Guinean youth build skills

Job creation is a major challenge in Guinea, where 62% of the population is under 25 years old.¹ Guinea's economy is dominated by two sectors: the capital-intensive mining sector represents more than 15% of GDP but only 6% of jobs;^{2,3} and the low-productivity agricultural sector employs over half of the active population but accounts for less than a quarter of GDP.⁴ Given Guinea's low adult literacy rates (54% for men and 28% for women), vocational and on-the-job training are likely to play a significant role in building Guinean youths' skills.⁵

This semester, 1,579 direct jobs were created by EUTF-funded activities in Guinea, 92% of which benefitted youths and 48% women (indicator 1.1). This was the highest number reported in a semester for this indicator in Guinea, increasing the total number of jobs ever created or supported by 63%, and accounting for 10% of all jobs created in the SLC region this semester. Equal distribution of support across genders contributes to the inclusion of young women in the labour market, as 15% of women are not in education, employment, or training (NEET), compared to 9% of young men.⁶

The INTEGRA programme created all 1,579 jobs this semester, through three types of activities: vocational training, support to MSMEs, and public works. 1,211 jobs were created through

¹ UNDESA. 'World Population Prospects 2022, Online Edition' consulted in October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Institut National de la Statistique, 'Annuaire statistique 2020', June 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

³ International Monetary Fund, 'Guinea: 2021 Article IV Consultation', July 2021. Retrieved [here](#).


⁴ Direction Générale du Trésor, 'Guinée, Situation économique et financière', consulted in October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Institut National de la Statistique, 'Annuaire statistique 2020', June 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ International Labour Organization, 'ILO Modelled Estimates and Projections (ILOEST), Nov. 2021', accessed in September 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

successful TVET support, notably through collaboration with the *Terre des Hommes* foundation and the Guinean Ministry of TVET.¹ INTEGRA offers certifying programmes for 24 in-demand trades,² half of which could not previously be learned in Guinea, thus contributing to the diversification of skills among the Guinean labour force. Supporting MSMEs led to the creation of 55 jobs, mainly through the provision of access to start-up capital, bringing the total of long-term jobs created in S1 2022 to 1,266, or 80% of the semester's total. Finally, INTEGRA contributed to addressing Guinea's infrastructure deficit by building 15 public infrastructures with labour-intensive construction techniques. These public works employed daily labourers for 72,037 man-hours this semester (59% women), or 20% of the semester's total jobs created.

Figure 38: EUTF indicator 1.1, in Guinea, June 2022³



Since INTEGRA creates jobs mainly through successful TVET interventions, skill-building efforts this semester are likely to generate job creation in the near future, with 1,905 (53% women when gender was specified) people having benefitted from TVET (indicator 1.4) this semester. In addition to consulting private sector actors to design TVET modules, INTEGRA also helped beneficiaries acquire demanded skills through dual education programmes combining TVET and internships (40% of TVET beneficiaries in S1 2022).

Fighting food insecurity and malnutrition through cash transfers and sensitisation campaigns

Extreme poverty and food insecurity are widespread in Guinea. The former concerned about 35% of the population in 2022, mostly in the inland rural provinces,⁴ while 36% of the population consumed insufficient food, and 30% of children under five suffered from chronic malnutrition as of June 2022.⁵

¹ Ministère de l'Enseignement Technique et de la Formation Professionnelle.

² In-demand trades were identified through consultations with private sector actors and include the following: masonry, paving, tiling, carpentry-cabinetwork, boiler making, plumbing, ironwork, glazing, upholstery, brickwork, market gardening and pineapple farming, potato farming, poultry farming, beekeeping, dairy products manufacturing, fishing, driving, mechanics, waste management, catering, pastry, bakery, dyeing, and sewing.

³ The map does not show data for 267 jobs created by the INTEGRA programme, for which no precise location was available. Non-disaggregated data accounts for 7% of all jobs created in Guinea.

⁴ World Data Lab, 'World Poverty Clock', accessed in October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ World Food Programme, 'HungerMap', accessed 30 June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

in the SLC region at 29%.¹ Women represented 55% of beneficiaries, reflecting the essential role played by mothers in infant and child nutrition.

5.5.3. GUINEA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 7: EUTF common output indicators for Guinea, June 2022


EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	S1 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	55	1,363	426	654	1,579	4,077	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	444	1,058	333	110	485	2,430	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	0	1,246	1,278	0	10	0	2,534	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) and/or skills development	0	2,026	4,551	7,168	9,311	1,905	24,961	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed, expanded or improved	0	3	2	1	0	3	9	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	1	0	0	85	43	0	129	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	0	0	0	0	1,323	3,607	4,930	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	0	0	17,996	0	0	17,996	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable management practices have been introduced	0	0	0	479	348	0	827	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience-building practices and basic rights	0	0	8,787	14,643	221	4,296	27,947	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers benefiting from capacity building to strengthen service delivery	0	74	0	382	1,397	110	1,963	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	0	6,975	65,920	42,615	29,265	144,775	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected and/or assisted	1	3	36	130	2,185	3,513	5,868	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	21,155	21,161	5,967	1,837	7,904	11,504	69,528	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	1	5	11	4	5	0	26	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	9,414	3,973	3,201	1,426	1,719	0	19,733	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	2,874	1,881	1,729	2,565	3,696	364	13,109	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	174	0	1	0	0	175	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	1,047	375	161	84	1,667	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	672	107	91	31	19	14	934	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	0	0	0	0	8	8	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed and/or directly supported	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed and regularly gathering	0	8	1	2	1	59	71	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up, implemented and/or strengthened	0	8	1	4	2	1	16	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	15	1	0	12	9	37	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	0	36	0	1	0	0	37	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	23,015	2,106	0	0	25,121	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	4,035	1,053	0	0	5,088	

¹ UNICEF/WHO/World Bank, 'Joint Child Malnutrition Estimates Database', May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

5.6. MALI

5.6.1. MALI IN S1 2022

Figure 40: Mali – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2022



The first half of 2022 remained marked by tensions between the Malian junta in power and sub-regional institutions, despite some progress made toward a return to civilian rule at the end of the semester. On 9 January, a day after the junta presented a new proposal to continue ruling the country for up to five more years, ECOWAS adopted sanctions against Mali, including closure of borders and suspension of trade.¹ After several months of negotiations, on 6 June, the junta agreed to return power to civilians within two years.² On 10 June, the Transitional President created a commission to draft a new Constitution, and on 17 June, the National Transitional Council adopted a new draft electoral law, which was promulgated on 24 June.^{3,4} These developments led to the lifting of ECOWAS economic sanctions on 3 July.⁵

During the first half of the year, French forces from Operation Barkhane continued their gradual withdrawal in a tense political context between the two countries. Anti-French, and, more generally, anti-European sentiments were particularly noticeable during demonstrations against ECOWAS sanctions, where thousands of demonstrators took to the streets to exalt Malian sovereignty, give the army a standing ovation, and demand the disengagement of France. The name of Russian President Vladimir Putin, was also chanted.⁶ At the political level, the escalation of tensions led Malian authorities to expel the French ambassador on 31 January.⁷ During the semester, French and European soldiers of the Barkhane and Takouba forces, respectively, withdrew completely from Malian territory, with their military bases quickly filled by Russian mercenary forces.⁸

In the context of withdrawal of international forces, the security situation remained complex and worrisome during the year's first half. An April 2022 opinion survey indicated that 84% of

¹ France 24, 'La Cédéao adopte des sanctions "très dures" contre la junte au pouvoir au Mali', 9 January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² France 24, 'Mali : la junte se donne deux ans pour rendre le pouvoir aux civils', 7 June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Ibid.

⁴ The new electoral law establishes the Independent Electoral Management Authority (AIGE) and sets out the rules for the referendum, the election of the President of the Republic and the election of councillors for the local authorities.

⁵ TV5 Monde, 'La CEDEAO lève les sanctions économiques au Mali et donne son accord pour deux ans de transition au Burkina Faso', 3 July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ France 24, 'Au Mali, des milliers de manifestants protestent contre les sanctions de la Cédéao', 14 January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ France 24, 'Mali : la junte décide d'expulser l'ambassadeur de France', 31 January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


⁸ Le Monde, 'Au Mali, des forces russes en uniforme repérées à Gao, après le retrait de l'armée française', 17 August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

respondents believed that the level of insecurity had decreased in their region during the past three months.¹ At the same time, however, in the first half of 2022, 636 violent events resulting in 2,666 deaths were recorded, an increase of 34% and 181%, respectively, compared to the first half of 2021.² Notably, during the first six months of the year, MINUSMA recorded 1,279 cases of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law, of which 442 were attributed to the Malian defence and security forces, against 123 in the last semester of 2021.^{3,4}

Insecurity was compounded by the effects of climate change and the inability of people in conflict-affected areas to carry out their socioeconomic activities properly, all of which strongly aggravated the vulnerability of Malians. In June 2022, it was estimated that 7.5 million people needed humanitarian assistance in the country, a 27% increase from 2021. The multiplication of armed clashes caused new displacements in the centre and northeast of the country. The latest displacements occurred in the Ménaka region, where approximately 9,000 new households (54,000 people) were displaced in June.⁵ In total, as of July 31, 2022, there were 396,904 IDPs in Mali, a 7% increase from June 2021.⁶ As of June 2022, the number of schools closed due to insecurity was also the highest ever recorded in the country, with 1,766 schools closed, leaving 519,000 children out of school.⁷

5.6.2. THE EUTF IN MALI

Figure 41: EUTF portfolio in Mali, June 2022^{8,9}



The EUTF has contracted €276.4M in Mali, primarily to programmes working on security, governance and conflict prevention (SO4, 47%) as well as resilience (SO2, 33%). The Support Program for the Transition in the Republic of Mali or PST (PST, ML-14), whose objective is to support initiatives in favour of a return of the state in fragile areas (centre and north of Mali), now constitutes over a third of the SO4 budget (37%). As of June 2022, projects contracted under the PST represented

¹ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 'Mali-Mètre: Enquête d'opinion', May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event data project dashboard', 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ MINUSMA, 'Note trimestrielle des tendances des violations et atteintes aux droits de l'homme au Mali: 1er janvier - 31 mars', May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ MINUSMA, 'Note trimestrielle des tendances des violations et atteintes aux droits de l'homme au Mali: 1er avril - 30 juin', August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ OCHA, 'Mali: Rapport de situation', 24 August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ UNHCR, 'Mali: All population Snapshot', September 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


⁷ Cluster Education, 'Situation des Ecoles, Mali', March 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁹ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

€48.1M. Its main projects are PARSEC II (ML-14-13, €16M),¹ which mainly aims to build and equip camps for internal security forces, and PAREM (ML-14-01, €15M),² which aims to strengthen the capacities of the election management body through material and technical support. In Mali, many programmes are reaching the end of their implementation period, and it is estimated that 80% of the EUTF budget has been spent.

Figure 42: Situation in Mali and EUTF outputs – as of June 2022



Increasing the food and nutrition security of vulnerable people

EUTF-funded programmes aim to improve the nutritional situation of the population and to reduce food insecurity in Mali, where the food sector remains precarious. In S1 2022, food insecurity in Mali reached its highest level since 2014, with more than 1.8 million people estimated to be acutely insecure and in need of emergency food assistance during the lean season, compared to 1.3 million in 2021.³ In addition, two million children under the age of five were estimated to be affected by malnutrition.⁴ In this context, the regional programmes PDU (REG-18)⁵ and CRIALCES (REG-24)⁶ aimed to improve the living conditions and resilience of vulnerable populations, especially in terms of

¹ Programme d'Appui au Renforcement de la Sécurité Phase 2.

² Projet d'appui aux réformes et aux élections au Mali (2021-2023).

³ OCHA, August 2022, op.cit.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.

⁶ Réponse à la crise alimentaire au centre Sahel : support nutritionnel et relèvement.


nutrition and food security. In S1 2022, 28,409 people received food security assistance (indicator 2.4), and 5,314 people received nutrition assistance (indicator 2.3) in Mali.

This semester, EUTF-funded programmes participated in the fight against malnutrition by 1) training community actors and local service providers in the detection of malnutrition, 2) sensitising women who received cash transfers on the subject, and 3) diagnosing and treating children. The end of the KEY programme (ML-01) in S1 2021 coincided with the start of PDU activities in the country, allowing EUTF-funded malnutrition services to continue. In S1 2022, PDU trained 45 people in the provision of nutrition-related services, including 20 women members of nutrition support groups, and 25 service providers (including 15 women) (indicator 2.8). In addition, this semester, 15,516 people were sensitised by resilience campaigns on nutrition-related topics by PDU (indicator 2.7). Notably, 3,747 women benefitted from face-to-face awareness raising on infant and young child feeding by the above-mentioned nutrition support groups. The remaining 11,769 beneficiaries received training on measuring arm circumference to detect malnutrition (4,729), cooking demonstrations (3,763), or direct counselling on infant and young child feeding (3,277). Participation in some of these sensitisation activities was a condition for receiving cash transfers for the purchase of food and non-food items from PDU, which reached 7,290 people with these transfers in 21 2022 (indicator 2.9). The CRIALCES programme also distributed cash transfers to 77,564 beneficiaries this semester, enabling 57,660 pregnant and lactating women and 19,904 children under two years of age to access nutritious food available on the market. In total, as of June 2022, 336,836 Malians have benefitted from nutrition and food security cash transfers through EUTF-funded activities. These cash transfers are particularly important in a context where economic sanctions coupled with global inflation have caused food prices to rise sharply (by 20-70% compared to 5-year averages), further deteriorating Malian households' food access.¹ All these activities helped 5,314 people to benefit from nutritional assistance in the first half of 2022, through detection (4,784) or treatment of malnutrition (530 infants under five) (indicator 2.3).

In the first half of 2022, EUTF-funded programmes also enhanced food security in Mali by supporting farmers and agro-pastoralists. As of June 2022, a total of 215,165 people had received food security-related assistance in Mali, including 28,409 in S1 2022 (indicator 2.4). CRIALCES reached most of the S1 2022 beneficiaries (88%). The programme, which started in July 2020 and is implemented by WFP, aims to improve the food security of people in the most vulnerable situations in areas of the central Sahel. This semester, most of the beneficiaries of food security support received training in farming practices (25,096 or 88%). This activity is particularly relevant in Mali, where agriculture is primarily rainfed and characterised by low productivity, low technology, and high labour intensity. 24,905 farmers benefitted from CRIALCES's training on management and food transformation while 191 agro-pastoralist women benefitted from PDU training on the production of vegetable crops. The rest of the beneficiaries were farmers and pastoralists benefitting from livestock distribution (respectively 468 and 2,808, totalling 3,276) or pastoralist women assisted to develop dairy farms (37). These efforts were complemented by CRIALCES sensitisation activities on food security which reached 256,547 people this semester (indicator 2.7).

¹ Few's net, 'Mali - Food Security Outlook Update', April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

Figure 43: EUTF indicator 2.3, in Mali, June 2022



Supporting the provision of basic services in Mali

The weak presence of the Malian state in growing parts of the central and northern regions is resulting in limited access to basic social services for the population and is creating pressure on the few services still available to communities.¹ The resurgence of insecurity and banditry, as well as the low level of implementation of the Algiers Peace Agreement, explain in large part the slow return of state administration and, by extension, of basic social services.² EUTF-funded programmes in the country have supported improved access to basic services for populations through construction of infrastructures, distribution of cash/social services, and training of service providers. They have also delivered services including providing access to housing and civil registration documents. As of June 2022, 53,077 social services have been delivered (indicator 2.2), and 2,607,294 people have benefitted from improved access to basic social benefits (indicator 2.9).

This semester, all 34,420 basic services directly provided by EUTF-funded programs were related to legal assistance. This represents an 89% increase compared to the number of legal services provided until December 2021. Almost all these services (99.9%) were delivered by the PAECSSIS programme (ML-08),³ which aims to consolidate the civil registration system in Mali. A study from the now-finished KEY programme established that only 65% of its adult beneficiaries - and only 25% of children - had national identification documentation. One of the main causes for the lack of registration of Malians was the absence of coverage of state services in remote or rural areas. Despite difficulties related to the political and security situation, PAECSSIS provided birth certificates to 34,379 individuals this semester through mobile courts. Another cause for the lack of civil registration is that

¹ OCHA, 'L'accès aux services sociaux de base', Août 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.


³ Programme d'appui au fonctionnement de l'état civil au Mali : appui à la mise en place d'un système d'information sécurisé.

emphasising and harmonising dialogue efforts to negotiate local ceasefires, and by establishing local peace committees headed by a regional committee.¹

In S1 2022, 122,299 people participated in conflict prevention/peacebuilding activities funded by the EUTF (indicator 4.3). This represents 87% of those reached by such activities since the beginning of EUTF-funded activities in the country. This significant increase was driven by the implementation of the PDU PROGRESS project's (REG-18-09) mass media awareness campaign, which reached 112,047 people this semester. The programme aims to increase access to information and combat rumours, misinformation, and stereotypes that play a negative role in the evolution of conflict dynamics. It uses short and accurate messages that can target beneficiaries who are usually difficult to reach: most of the beneficiaries of the PDU mass media campaign were located in the regions of Mopti (91,492) and Gao (20,555), which are the epicentres of the conflict. Including other PDU activities, 112,187 people were reached by awareness-raising campaigns on conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the first half of the year.

In addition to awareness-raising campaigns, EUTF-funded programmes have conducted conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities, and community and intra-community dialogues, notably through the establishment of peace groups. This semester, 9,194 people participated in the various conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities organized by PDU and 190 people participated in its community dialogues (indicator 4.3). To carry out these activities, PDU trained 2,942 community representatives and staff from local civilian institutions in governance and conflict prevention, including 322 this semester (indicator 4.2). Finally, ADEL reached 728 people this semester through activities aimed at building their conflict prevention and management capacities.

Figure 45: EUTF indicator 4.3, activities on conflict prevention/peacebuilding, in Mali, June 2022



Protecting transit migrants

Mali sees mixed migration flows, as a point of both origin and transit. The complex nature of mixed migration raises the question of how to best provide protection and assistance to migrants, returnees


¹ Ibid.

and people on the move. Children especially face heightened risks of violence, abuse, trafficking and various forms of exploitation along the journey and when separated from their families.¹

This semester, 8,057 migrants in transit were protected and/or assisted by EUTF-funded activities, bringing the total of migrants in transit assisted in Mali to 37,049. All were supported by the Protection West Africa programme (REG-13)² which aims to improve the protection of the most vulnerable migrants on West African migration routes by ensuring their access to basic and protection services. The programme is able to reach migrants in areas with constrained access through a network of protection and basic services providers in all the regions it covers. Thus, this semester, 71% of beneficiaries were in Tombouctou and 15% in Kayes, which are key transit points on the main migration routes to Algeria. The programme offered different types of assistance: non-food items (10,679), medical treatment and psycho-social support (4,129), temporary housing and subsistence support (2,421), as well as legal assistance (959).³ Responding to the needs of vulnerable groups was also a priority: in S1 2022, Protection West Africa reached 1,651 women and 323 children.

In addition, during its implementation, the EU-IOM Joint Initiative has established 16 migrant resource centres in Mali, some of which are dedicated to the reception and protection of non-Malian migrants in transit (indicator 2.1 bis).

Figure 46: EUTF indicator 3.2, migrants in transit beneficiaries, in Mali, June 2022



¹ IOM, 'Profil migratoire de l'OIM : le Mali reste un pays d'émigration et de transit', 13 April 2010. Retrieved [here](#).

² Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest.

³ Individuals can receive more than one support, hence why numbers of services do not add up to number of beneficiaries.

5.6.3. MALI AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 8: EUTF common output indicators for Mali, June 2022

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	S1 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	2,198	1,307	681	2,248	1,092	7,525	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	950	1,664	718	288	287	2	3,909	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	18,499	30,552	20,574	17,437	38,540	250	125,852	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) and/or skills development	3,689	5,511	5,998	2,136	7,093	1,012	25,439	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed, expanded or improved	7	58	19	30	10	0	124	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	248	241	120	174	565	94	1,442	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	3,813	2,344	1,290	6,600	4,610	34,420	53,077	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	108,815	190,481	63,346	9,086	9,665	5,314	386,707	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	38,880	69,426	56,314	7,240	14,896	28,409	215,165	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	10	2	0	0	0	0	12	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable management practices have been introduced	5,133	4,736	4,152	1,155	16,370	13	31,560	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience-building practices and basic rights	31,343	176,408	314,206	320,460	231,618	567,850	1,641,885	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers benefiting from capacity building to strengthen service delivery	633	5,124	364	186	587	45	6,939	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	1,749,378	284,844	233,291	80,658	95,486	163,638	2,607,294	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	0	0	21	9	0	15	45	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected and/or assisted	6,088	3,021	1,692	1,129	17,062	8,057	37,049	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	0	91,476	42,729	18,764	199,938	64,304	417,211	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	1,885	981	349	210	111	0	3,536	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	9,521	6,209	2,308	1,819	1,060	0	20,917	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	2,047	4,381	3,127	2,307	1,452	22	13,336	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	3	19	18	23	0	0	63	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	25	0	281	414	833	66	1,619	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	2	14	6	3	6	0	31	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	0	0	31	17	16	4	68	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	3	2	3	0	2	1	12	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	837	6	1,318	410	4,367	2,688	9,626	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	610	1,930	1,074	1,236	2,674	1,940	9,464	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention and human rights activities	265	1,342	1,987	8,181	8,161	122,644	142,580	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed and/or directly supported	37	381	134	5	287	81	925	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed and regularly gathering	12	26	53	122	188	91	492	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up, implemented and/or strengthened	17	16	808	20	405	45	1,311	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	34	26	15	12	9	2	98	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	8	0	8	2	1	2	21	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	102,641	0	0	0	102,641	

5.7. MAURITANIA

5.7.1. MAURITANIA IN S1 2022

Figure 47: Mauritania – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2022



Despite favourable economic growth, Mauritania remained vulnerable to shocks that impacted food insecurity. In 2022, Mauritania's economy was projected to grow by 4.5% thanks to a thriving extractive sector.¹ However, household incomes were hit by the economic impacts of COVID-19 and rising inflation, which reduced purchasing power.² Meanwhile, shortfalls of cereal and livestock production from 2021 kept an upward pressure on food prices.³ Between June and August 2022, a projected 1.5 million people in Mauritania were expected to experience crisis or emergency levels of food insecurity, which represented an increase of 72% compared to the same period in 2021.

In addition to economic pressures, climate change had a negative impact on livelihoods and food security in Mauritania. The Ministry of Environment reported that 85% of the country was impacted by desertification, and that rural fires destroyed approximately 100,000 hectares of agricultural land annually.⁴ The majority of Mauritania's population relies on traditional agriculture and is heavily dependent on rainy seasons.⁵ For example, the region of Guidimaka now sees barely one quarter of the rainfall it did in the 1990s, and farmers struggle to irrigate crops.⁶ After a deficit for the 2021/2022 agricultural season, the June to September 2022 season was expected to see above average rainfall, which was expected to relieve pressure on local production.⁷

With continued insecurity in Mali, Mauritania has seen an uptick in the number of Malian refugees arriving since the end of 2021. Near Mauritania's border, Malians fled increased violence on the part of armed groups, the Malian army, and by some recent accounts, alleged Russian mercenaries of the Wagner Group.⁸ 7,000 new arrivals were recorded in March and April alone.⁹ Most Malian refugees live in M'bera camp in the Hodh el Chargui region, which hosted 89% of the 86,842

¹ US International Trade Administration, 'Mauritania – Country Commercial Guide', 15 August 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

² Famine Early Warning Systems Network, 'L'inflation impacte négativement l'accessibilité des ménages à une alimentation suffisante', August 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

³ FAO, 'Crop Prospects and Food Situation', July 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ AA, 'Mauritania: Desertification affects about 85 percent of the country's soil', 17 March 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ ACAPS, 'Food Security', 24 August 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Africa News, 'Climate change is causing an increase in desertification', 19 June 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Famine Early Warning Systems Network, op. cited.


⁸ Nick Roll, 'Russia's Wagner group in Mali spurs refugee spike in Mauritania', 28 June 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ UNHCR, 'Data Portal Mauritania', Accessed September 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

refugees in the country as of May 2022.¹ Malian refugees have lived in Mauritania since 2012, and have over time begun settling in villages near M'bera, often working in agriculture or fishing near Lake Mahmouda.² Return in the near future is unlikely, given the insecurity in S1 2022.³

5.7.2. THE EUTF IN MAURITANIA

Figure 48: EUTF portfolio in Mauritania, June 2022^{4,5}



The EUTF contracted €81.5M to projects in Mauritania. The largest proportion of this funding (36%) was for security and governance, through the completed CORIM programme's (MR-06)⁶ support to government deradicalisation efforts, and through the Nexus SRD programme's (MR-08)⁷ support to Mauritanian institutions on governance for the security-resilience-development nexus. Another 33% of the budget was contracted to programmes focusing on economic and employment opportunities (SO1). Notably, the SAFIRE, Promopêche, and Promopêche AECID programmes (MR-07, MR-04, MR-05)⁸ aimed to support job access and creation as well as technical training focusing on high-potential sectors such as fishing and construction. Finally, programmes for migration management (SO3) and strengthening resilience of communities (SO2) comprised 19% and 12% of EUTF funding, respectively. The most recent programme contracted in Mauritania is the POC MR (MR-09-01),⁹ which aims to prevent irregular migration and facilitate improved migration management. Most programmes in Mauritania are nearing the end of implementation in 2022 or 2023.

¹ UNHCR, 'Data Portal Mauritania', Accessed September 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

² ACAPS, 'Malian Refugees', 22 June 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁵ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁶ *Résilience pour la cohésion sociale et culturelle en République Islamique de Mauritanie*


⁷ *L'UE pour le nexus sécurité-résilience-développement en Mauritanie*

⁸ *Programme de renforcement de la résilience des communautés urbaines et rurales vulnérables en Mauritanie ;*

Promotion de l'emploi et amélioration des conditions de vie des pêcheurs artisanaux côtiers, jeunes et femmes aux alentours des espaces naturels protégés du secteur nord de Mauritanie ; Création d'emplois décents et consolidation de l'emploi existant pour les jeunes et potentiels migrants dans le secteur de la pêche artisanale.

⁹ Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint pour la Mauritanie

Figure 49: Selected EUTF outputs in Mauritania, June 2022¹



Technical trainings in key sectors to boost employability

In Mauritania, the labour market is characterized by the dominance of the informal sector and a mismatch between the training on offer and the skills required.² There is a gap a gap between job requirements and the skills gained in technical and vocation training.³ Boosting education and vocational training, particularly among youth and women, is critical to ensure that vulnerable groups have the skills necessary for employment in productive sectors.⁴

This semester, TVET and professional or skills development trainings in Mauritania benefitted 1,049 people, 62% of whom were women and 33% youth (indicator 1.4). 48% of the trainings targeted employability and skills in various sectors, with emphasis on ensuring the professional insertion of young people and women. For example, the SAFIRE programme (MR-07⁵) trained 51 young women and 16 young men in sectors, mainly relating to the green economy (indicator 1.4). SAFIRE also trained 46 young women in artisanal skills and provided professional trainings including professional guidance and soft skills for 27 women and 14 men (46% of participants were youth), as well as entrepreneurship training to 6 members of Savings and Internal Lending Communities. Another 50 youth were trained

¹ Used in the graph: multidimensional poverty encompasses the various deprivations experienced by poor people in their daily lives – such as poor health, lack of education, inadequate living standards, disempowerment, poor quality of work, the threat of violence, and living in areas that are environmentally hazardous, among others ([source](#)).

² ILO, 'State of Skills: Mauritania', Accessed October 2022, Retrieved [here](#).


³ ILO, 'State of Skills: Mauritania', Accessed October 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ World Bank, 'Report on the Economic Situation in Mauritania: Leveraging the private sector to drive economic transformation and job creation', 14 June 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Programme de renforcement de la résilience des communautés urbaines et rurales vulnérables en Mauritanie.

with professional placement or apprenticeships in artisanal skills, transport and logistics, construction, and other rural employment sectors. Promopêche GIZ/ILO also provided professional trainings to 351 people, 53% of whom were women.

Figure 50: EUTF indicator 1.4, in Mauritania, June 2022



Trainings also targeted the agriculture and fishing sectors (41%). With its rich coastline, Mauritania's fishing sector accounts for 25% of exports and provides approximately 220,000 jobs.¹ Fishing has also been a close sector of cooperation between Mauritania and the EU: A sustainable fisheries partnership agreement signed in November 2021 provides support to sustainable fishing governance and assists local communities in exchange for the right to fish in Mauritanian waters.² The Promopêche AECID programme (MR-05)³ aims to support jobs among coastal communities that rely on the artisanal fishing sector while promoting environmentally sustainable fishing practices. This semester, the programme trained 278 people, 89% of whom were women, in cross-cutting professional skills. Meanwhile, SAFIRE provided TVET and skills development related to agriculture for 47 women and 107 men this semester.

¹ Agence de Promotion des Investissements en Mauritanie, 'Fisheries', Accessed October 2022, Retrieved [here](#).

² European Commission, 'Sustainable fisheries partnership agreement with Mauritania', Accessed October 2022, Retrieved [here](#).


³ Promotion de l'emploi et amélioration des conditions de vie des pêcheurs artisanaux côtiers, jeunes et femmes aux alentours des espaces naturels protégés du secteur nord de Mauritanie

Finally, the remainder of trainings targeted the construction sector, which accounted for 11% of TVET and skills development beneficiaries this semester. The PECOBAT programme (MR-01)¹ trained 25 young men, and Promopêche GIZ/ILO (MR-04)² trained 73 young people on the job at construction sites (8 women). In addition to providing TVET and skills trainings, PECOBAT trained 28 employees (36% women) of the National Agency for the Promotion of Youth Employment and the Centre for Professional Trainings to support their capacity to offer professional trainings.

Strengthening governance through the provision of equipment

With its proximity to the Canary Islands, Mauritania is a major point of departure for migrants attempting to take the Atlantic Route to Europe. 800 people died or went missing *en route* to the Canary Islands during the first semester of 2022.³ The Nexus SRD programme (MR-08)⁴ implemented by IOM and FIIAPP aims to strengthen the coordination and operational capabilities of the Mauritanian forces dealing with maritime surveillance, namely the Mauritanian coast guards, the *gendarmerie nationale*, and first responders to disembarkations of migrants and refugees, especially those in charge of providing first aid and humanitarian assistance to rescued or intercepted persons.

Figure 51: EUTF indicator 4.1 bis, in Mauritania, June 2022



To this aim, the programme provided 3,016 units of technical equipment to improve capacity for surveillance, intervention, and rescue operations. This included 1,026 units of surveillance and intervention equipment to strengthen the response capacity of the national *gendarmerie* in Rosso on the Senegal River, as well as 149 units of surveillance equipment for the coast guard and *gendarmerie* and 8 units of technical equipment for the coast guard's research centre in Nouadhibou. Another 726 units of maritime response and rescue equipment and 1,124 units of nautical safety equipment were provided to the *gendarmerie nationale* and Mauritanian coast guard.

The EUTF also aims to strengthen national security forces through the GAR-SI programme (REG-04),⁵ which provided 130 units of technical equipment to GAR-SI units, along with 3 vehicles, and 12 units of other structural equipment such as generators.

¹ Amélioration de l'employabilité des jeunes et des capacités des PME par le développement du sous-secteur du BTP.
² Création d'emplois décents et consolidation de l'emploi existant pour les jeunes et potentiels migrants dans le secteur de la pêche artisanale.
³ Caminando Fronteras, 'Monitoring the Right to Life: January-June 2022', Retrieved [here](#).
⁴ L'UE pour le nexus sécurité-résilience-développement en Mauritanie.
⁵ GAR-SI SAHEL : Groupes d'Action Rapides – Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel.

5.7.3. MAURITANIA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 9: EUTF common output indicators for Mauritania, June 2022

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	S1 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	46	325	1,888	629	449	388	3,724	
1.2 Number of SMEs created or supported	0	18	465	532	52	183	1,251	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	5,160	7,678	4,205	2,337	3,553	781	23,714	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (VET) and/or skills development	533	1,747	3,562	2,268	1,922	1,049	11,080	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed, expanded or improved	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	4	11	47	9	4	1	76	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	404	204	334	92	88	0	1,122	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	3,098	40,332	587	0	0	44,017	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	0	5,422	13,367	5,116	272	207	24,385	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable management practices have been introduced	8	12	14	0	0	32	66	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience-building practices and basic rights	0	87,260	298,839	4,207	2,293	4,093	396,691	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers benefiting from capacity building to strengthen service delivery	0	170	14	122	81	1	388	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	0	2,100	0	0	0	2,100	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected and/or assisted	213	1,380	2,627	1,092	2,291	632	8,235	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	6,558	14,138	1,524	0	0	0	22,220	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	906	2,525	373	198	285	0	4,287	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	9	20	11	15	6	0	61	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	9	7	7	13	2	0	38	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	15	76	44	0	12	0	147	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	65	773	50	0	822	0	1,710	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	3	0	3	0	0	6	
3.11 Number of awareness-raising events on migration	13	30	10	0	0	0	53	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	2	2	0	0	0	0	4	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	31	0	1,628	52	7,124	3,352	12,187	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	223	339	976	647	583	127	2,895	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention and human rights activities	15,250	511	64,761	9,781	2,579	160	93,042	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed and/or directly supported	39	10	17	15	23	1	105	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed and regularly gathering	0	26	122	8	19	2	177	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up, implemented and/or strengthened	13	6	269	4	118	6	416	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	5	32	32	2	6	3	80	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	9	0	1	1	0	1	12	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	35,207	4,889	5,152	5,554	50,802	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	6,662	2,921	1,786	2,795	14,164	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	95	10	0	1	106	

5.8. NIGER

5.8.1. NIGER IN S1 2022

Figure 52: Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2022



Although decreasing compared to its 2021 peak, violence in Niger continued during S1 2022, with 196 violent incidents and 559 reported fatalities.¹ This violence – concentrated in the regions bordering Mali, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria – is having dire effects on children’s education among other things. 759 primary and 34 secondary schools remained closed due to security reasons as of May 2022, with over 86% of the closed schools situated in the Tillabéri region.² The UN Secretary General visited the region on 3 May, promising to request support for the Nigerien army from the international community.³

Against this backdrop, Niger’s National Assembly voted in April in favour of the redeployment in the country of the French Barkhane and European Takouba forces leaving Mali.⁴ 250 French soldiers will be supporting Nigerien armed forces on the border with Mali, which is less than the 2,400 French soldiers that left Mali from February to August.⁵ In May, the Nigerien Ministry of Interior stated that the investigation into the deaths of three civilians in a clash between a Barkhane convoy and demonstrators could ‘not identify the exact course of events that led to the death and injury of demonstrators’, and that compensation would be paid equally by France and Niger.⁶

Meanwhile, humanitarian needs are increasing in the country as conflict, climate, and inflation affect food security. Around three million people were facing a crisis or emergency food security situation from March to May, almost double the amount for the same period in 2021.⁷ In addition, violence in neighbouring countries brought new waves of refugees as the country has kept its borders open. From January to June, Niger received 24,107 new refugees from Nigeria, 21,666 from Mali, and

¹ ACLED, ‘Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project dashboard’, consulted in September 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² UNICEF, ‘Niger Humanitarian Situation Report June 2022’, August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Libération, ‘Au Niger, le secrétaire général de l’ONU à la rencontre «des populations martyrisées»’, May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Financial Afrik, ‘Niger : l’Assemblée approuve le redéploiement des forces Barkhane et Takouba sur le territoire national’, April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ CNEWS, ‘Opération Barkhane : l’armée française a définitivement quitté le Mali’, August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


⁶ Africa News, ‘Niger: Probe fails to name killer of protesters at anti-French army march’, May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ UNICEF, ‘Niger Humanitarian Situation Report June 2022’, August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

4,102 from Burkina Faso. The total number of persons of concern in Niger as of June was 595,074 persons, with 291,629 refugees and asylum seekers and 264,257 IDPs.¹

5.8.2. THE EUTF IN NIGER

Figure 53: EUTF portfolio in Niger, June 2022^{2,3}



The EUTF contracted €299.7M in Niger, 43% of which went to security, governance and conflict-prevention related programmes (SO4), followed by employment (SO1 – 30%), migration-related projects (SO3 – 18%) and resilience (SO2 – 9%). Governance-related programmes included the AJUSEN programme (NE-06), with €107.5M, €90.0M of which consists in budget support to the Nigerien Government. The EUTF also supported the creation of employment opportunities, particularly in transit areas. PAIERA (NE-08)⁴ and its second phase *Stabilisation Agadez* (NE-12)⁵ aimed to provide socio-economic opportunities to populations affected by irregular migration in Agadez. *Emploi Niger* (NE-11)⁶ and *ProEmploi* (NE-13)⁷ created jobs and economic opportunities in departure and transit areas, including Tillabéry, while *Pôles Ruraux* (NE-03)⁸ supported agricultural chains in Tahoua and Agadez, and A-FIP (NE-04)⁹ developed training and professional insertion in Agadez. In Niger, strengthening migration governance and assistance to return were also priorities supported by the IOM JI Niger SURENI (NE-07,¹⁰ migration governance and return), EU-IOM JI Niger MRRM (NE-01,¹¹ response and resources for migrants) and *ProGEM* (NE-02,¹² sustainable management of migration

¹ UNHCR, 'Niger Operational Update June 2022', August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

³ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁴ *Plan d'actions à impact économique rapide à Agadez*.

⁵ *Stabilisation et renforcement socio-économique des populations affectées par la migration irrégulière dans les zones de transit au Niger*.

⁶ *Création d'emplois et d'opportunités économiques à travers une gestion durable de l'environnement dans les zones de transit et départ au Niger*.

⁷ *Promotion de l'emploi pour le renforcement de la résilience économique des communautés dans la région de Tillabéry*.

⁸ *Projet d'appui aux filières agricoles dans les régions de Tahoua et Agadez*.

⁹ *Appuyer la formation et l'insertion professionnelle des jeunes filles et garçons des régions d'Agadez et Zinder en vue de contribuer au développement socioéconomique de ces deux régions*.


¹⁰ *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour durable au Niger*.

¹¹ *Mécanisme de Réponse et de Ressources pour les Migrants*.

¹² *Renforcement de la gestion durable des conséquences des flux migratoires*.

flows). Lastly, resilience programmes such as *Shimodu* (NE-10),¹ *Kallo Tchidaniwo* (NE-09) and *Résilience ASP* (NE-14,² newly contracted) strengthened resilience for host and displaced populations across the country. It is estimated that 79% of the EUTF contracted budget in Niger has been spent as of June 2022 and that 21% are yet to be spent by 2025.

Figure 54: Selected EUTF outputs in Niger, June 2022



Improving food security in Niger through land rehabilitation and protection and agricultural trainings

In Niger, agriculture represents 40% of GDP and over 80% of the population lives in rural areas. However, around 80% of the land is in the Sahara Desert, with little arable land. Global warming further exacerbates food insecurity and compromises economic growth.³ The *Cadre Harmonisé* for Niger projected that 3.6 million people were expected to be in emergency or crisis situation of food insecurity in June-August 2022, compared to 2.3 million in June-August 2021.⁴ This significant increase was partly due to the security context in the region but also to a poor rainy season in 2021 and the repercussions of the conflict in Ukraine which has led to a price increase in fertilisers.⁵

Against this backdrop, EUTF-funded programmes aimed to strengthen food security in Niger through land rehabilitation and income generating activities. As of June 2022, 162,569 hectares of land have been rehabilitated in Niger (indicator 2.6), including 55,025 in S1 2022, or 34% of the total since 2018.

¹ *Projet intégré d'appui à la résilience des populations vulnérables réfugiées, déplacées, retournées et hôtes de la région de Diffa, Niger.*

² *Renforcement de la résilience institutionnelle et communautaire dans la région Diffa, Bassin du Lac Tchad, Niger.*

³ UNOPS, 'L'agriculture, moteur du développement au Niger', consulted in November 2022. Retrieved here.

⁴ *Cadre Harmonisé* and Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, 'Food security Data in West and Central Africa', consulted in August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


⁵ ONU Info, 'Sahel : une grave insécurité alimentaire menace 12 millions de personnes', June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

The EUTF strategy for land rehabilitation to tackle food insecurity is two-pronged. Recently, in S1 2022, programmes worked to preserve pastoral land, protecting animal husbandry. At the same time, over the longer course of EUTF-funded activities, initiatives focused on rehabilitating productive land for agriculture.

During S1 2022, most of the land (48,206 hectares, or 88%) was rehabilitated or restored for pastoral use through the *Emploi Niger* programme (NE-11)¹, specifically its AICS-led component. Agriculture and animal husbandry contribute highly to food security and employ large segments of the active population. In the regions of Agadez and Tahoua alone, 80% of the workforce works in agriculture or animal husbandry. Yet, over the last few years, exploitation of underground resources led to a reduction in pastoral spaces, threatening livelihoods and food security. In S1 2022, the project installed firewalls over 200kms of transhumance corridors, thereby protecting land from the risk of fire.

In parallel, EUTF-funded programmes rehabilitated productive land for agriculture. Niger is the country with the highest birth rate in the world, and responding to the food needs of the population is a significant challenge, especially given the recurrent droughts and limited access to water.² The *Pôles Ruraux* programme (NE-03)³ rehabilitates land to support food security, in alignment with the national strategy 'les Nigériens nourrissent les Nigériens'.⁴ Since 2018, 109,492 hectares of land have benefitted from sustainable management practices through the programme (amounting to 67% of all land rehabilitated in Niger), including 2,939 in S1 2022. As a result, in Niger, 239,165 people received food security assistance (indicator 2.4) thanks to land rehabilitation through the programme.

Figure 55: EUTF indicator 2.6, in Niger, June 2022



Creating income generating activities (IGAs) in agriculture also contributes to improving food security in Niger, where EUTF-funded programmes support small farmers and pastoralists to reinforce their resilience to shocks and strengthen agricultural production. As of June 2022, 20,558 individuals were supported to develop IGAs (indicator 1.3) related to agriculture, including 8,879 in S1 2022, the highest value ever reached for any semester since the beginning of EUTF-funded activities. During the

¹ *Création d'emplois et d'opportunités économiques à travers une gestion durable de l'environnement dans les zones de transit et départ au Niger.*

² UNOPS, 'l'agriculture, moteur du développement au Niger', consulted in November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ *Projet d'appui aux filières agricoles dans les régions de Tahoua et Agadez.*

⁴ In English: Nigeriens feed Nigeriens.

semester, over 98% of beneficiaries were supported through two main programmes: *Emploi Niger* (NE-11) and PDU (REG-18).¹ *Emploi Niger* trained 1,572 people (including 535 women) in production and transformation techniques through its AICS component and 3,558 people on agricultural entrepreneurial skills through its Enabel component. Further, the ACH-implemented segment of the PDU programme supported 3,354 beneficiaries (including 1,643 women) on the development of IGAs in agriculture. The project supports activities related to agro-pastoral sectors (such as horticulture, transformation of agricultural products, etc.) and opportunities for professional training. To anchor the sustainability of the activities, every IGA beneficiary follows technical trainings on basic business skills and receives a launch kit for their activity.

Creating jobs for immediate needs and for the long run

Development indicators in Niger are amongst the lowest in the world (the country is ranked 189 out of 191 on the Human Development Index) and economic opportunities are limited. EUTF-funded interventions in the country support or create jobs through varied interventions, supporting both short-term employment with immediate revenues and longer-term, more skilled employment.

As of June 2022, 29,379 jobs have been created or supported in Niger, with 6,246 jobs created over the first half of the year, a 27% increase compared to December 2021 (indicator 1.1). During the semester, two programmes accounted for 89% of all jobs created or supported: *Emploi Niger* (NE-11, 3,126 jobs) and *Pôles Ruraux* (NE-03 2,455 jobs). The strategy of these EUTF-funded programmes rested on two main pillars in S1 2022: on one hand, the creation of permanent formal jobs (largely through MSMEs and in valued agricultural chains); on the other hand, short-term labour-intensive cash-for-work occupation.

While cash-for-work labour-intensive activities may not have long-term impact in terms of employment,² they prevent households from falling further into poverty, especially in periods of drought, by providing immediate revenue.³ As of June 2022, 16,774 jobs have been created or supported through labour-intensive work (57% of all jobs created or supported), including 1,285 in S1 2022. The largest contributor over the first half of the year to labour-intensive work (casual, daily labour as well as short-term employment) is *Pôles Ruraux*, which aims to develop infrastructure for the sustainable development of arable land in the regions of Tahoua and Agadez. The programme created 710 jobs in casual, daily labour and 1,459 short-term jobs for infrastructure-building activities. *Emploi Niger*, through its AICS-implemented component, also created full time equivalent jobs (261) in days of work in S1 2022 through the construction of houses (172 jobs) and land rehabilitations (89 jobs). Other contributors to cash-for-work jobs in Niger in S1 2022 included *ProEmploi* (NE-13,⁴ 73 jobs) and RESILAC (NE-05,⁵ 242 jobs).

Permanent, long-term wage employment is associated with higher income and development returns. 52% of all the jobs (3,272) created or supported in Niger in S1 2022 consisted in permanent or long-term wage employment. The largest contributor was the *Emploi Niger* programme through its Enabel component. The intervention aims to create or support jobs through multiple channels, including longer term / permanent employment through (i) technical trainings on identified agricultural chains; (ii) advisory support for entrepreneurship development (such as elaboration of business plans, help in identifying market niches, etc.); and (iii) micro-credit or digital credit to MSMEs for their development. The intervention is active in the region of Zinder, the most populated area in the country. The project created or supported 2,770 permanent jobs in this region in S1 2022 (84% of all the permanent jobs created/supported in Niger since the beginning of EUTF-funded activities), including 1,330 for women,

¹ Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.

² It is important to emphasise 'on their own': development programmes in other countries have shown that cash-for-work activities coupled with savings initiatives and/or professional training may have longer development impact.


³ World Bank, 'Support to Jobs for Youth in Niger a Retrospective Evaluation of Jobs', 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Promotion de l'emploi pour le renforcement de la résilience économique des communautés dans la région de Tillabéry.

⁵ Redressement économique et social inclusif du Lac Tchad.

through support provided to MSMEs in agricultural chains. Other contributors to permanent employment in Niger in S1 2022 included *Pôles ruraux* (56 jobs) and *ProEmploi* (320).

Figure 56: EUTF indicator 1.1, in Niger, June 2022



Outcome analysis 1: ProGEM project (NE-02-01)¹ in Niger^{2,3}

ProGEM		Budget: €31.95M EUTF €15.50M BMZ	Main targets
	<i>Renforcement de la gestion durable des conséquences des flux migratoires au Niger</i>	 IP: GIZ	 Municipalities and regional governments
	From September 2016 to October 2021	 Objective: Strengthen capacity of local authorities along main migration routes to better manage migration flows and their consequences	 Migrant and host community households

ProGEM aimed to improve the capacity of local authorities in Niger to respond to the complex challenges posed by migrations flows through three specific objectives: i) to promote dialogue and mutual learning between national, regional, and local actors by building on local level successes; ii) to strengthen capacity and expertise of local actors on analysis of migration flows and policy response through the creation and support of local and regional observatories; iii) to financially and technically support the implementation of development measures prioritised by local authorities.

The final evaluation report found that the project achieved measurable improvements in outcomes, notably relating to its second and third specific objectives.

Reinforced local capacity through migration observatories

The project created and supported 16 migration observatories (3 regional, 13 local). These observatories are meant to analyse local migration flows and their impact, build expertise of members on the topic, recommend concrete development measures, and advocate and mobilise resources for the implementation of these measures.

In a July 2021 survey of a representative sample of elected officials of partner municipalities and regions (313 people), 95% of respondents confirmed that analyses and recommendations made by the observatories were useful to decision-making and that they influenced policy prioritisation. Furthermore, all respondents could cite at least one concrete example of the observatories' positive contribution, with 85% of respondents able to provide more than three examples. The regional observatories have begun advising municipalities not targeted by the project to set-up similar observatories, and some development partners (Danish Red Cross, UN Women, UNICEF, etc.) have shown interest in the observatories and have partially integrated them in their activities.

Accompanying capacity-building measures within local institutions also produced measurable results. In 2017, the project created an index reflecting capacity along several dimensions: technical, organisational, institutional, resource-mobilisation, planning and programming. The average score of partner municipalities and regions went from 17/100 in 2017 to 52/100 by the end of the project.

Best practices

- **Inclusive and participatory approach** – Composed of local elected representatives, civil servants from local and devolved national governments, civil society actors and traditional leaders, migration observatories were designed to include all relevant stakeholders. As a result, 96% percent of the central government civil servants working in devolved units surveyed found the observatories useful, even as they gave municipal and regional institutions stronger roles in decision-making. In addition, the observatories used participatory methodologies for their analyses, such as focus group discussions, field

¹ *Renforcement de la gestion durable des conséquences des flux migratoires au Niger*

² GIZ, 'Rapport final de l'Action « Renforcement de la gestion durable des conséquences des flux migratoires au Niger » (ProGEM)', February 2022.

³ EU, 'ProGEM results-oriented monitoring (ROM) report', December 2018.

observation, and community forums. Observatories also shared their work with 519 civil society actors throughout the project, as well as with new elected officials in early 2021.

Challenges

- **Gender-inclusivity** – While ProGEM ensured that each observatory would contain women, they are mostly civil society representatives, as most elected officials and civil servants at the local and regional levels are men. Training on ‘migration and gender’ were provided to observatory members and other stakeholders, but it is notable that only 88% of women respondents in the survey found observatories useful, compared with 96% of men.
- **Knowledge management** – Targeted municipalities and other observatory members currently lack the capacity to leverage digital tools for archiving and reproduction purposes, particularly in rural areas with limited electricity access and basic knowledge of digital tools. So far, the knowledge and expertise accumulated through the observatories’ work is concentrated within individual members of the observatories and partner local governments.

Improved access to basic social services and promotion of local economy

Based on prioritisation made by partner local governments advised by observatories, ProGEM funded and technically supported the building of 125 individual infrastructures, 49 of which were in the WASH sector, 33 in health, and 20 in education and TVET. These employment intensive public works created 6,000 temporary jobs, and improved access to basic services for 500,000 people.

The project surveyed migrant and host community households in the vicinity of these new infrastructures in 2019, 2020, and 2021. Most respondents confirmed that their living conditions had improved following the activities, and the proportion increased from 70% in 2019 (219 people) to 100% in 2021 (148 people). In particular, 75% of respondents found improvement in their access to health services and 64% for access to drinking water in the latest survey.

Best practices

- **Local and sustainable management** – For each new infrastructure, training and coaching sessions on maintenance, management, and promotion were provided to the relevant municipal services, tailored to the specific type of infrastructure (health centre, water pump, etc). Training took place before construction was finished, so that sufficient time was dedicated to discussions regarding commissioning and managing the infrastructures. Technical assistance was also provided during the first months of operation.
- **Inclusivity** – A ‘gender tool’ was used by observatories to analyse the gender implications of potential measures, and many realised infrastructures directly benefitted women (maternity wards and centres) or were designed in a gender-sensitive manner (public lighting, separated bathrooms). Access ramps for people in wheelchairs were also systematically implemented.

Challenges

- **Tension between local ownership and legal requirements** – Partner local governments expressed critiques regarding the speed and stringency of procedures, and the lack of control that they have over the construction process. However, strict adherence to protocols is necessary for the project to be in conformity with EU and German laws.

5.8.3. NIGER AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 10: EUTF common output indicators for Niger, June 2022

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	S1 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	4,831	4,574	8,324	2,494	2,909	6,246	29,379	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	91	127	668	436	518	212	2,052	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	5,940	5,332	8,623	4,843	8,146	12,341	45,226	
1.4 Number of people benefitting from professional training (TVET) and/or skills development	6,110	7,875	3,767	2,283	3,857	3,677	27,568	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed, expanded or improved	0	212	72	11	21	20	336	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	26	29	21	10	3	24	113	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	62	852	749	469	472	406	3,010	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	1,020	6,340	5,254	2,366	4,720	427	20,127	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	184	3,455	14,687	20,926	17,013	56,266	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	70,386	123,818	125,031	57,047	42,222	15,286	433,790	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable management practices have been introduced	4,680	82,858	13,467	1,897	4,642	55,025	162,569	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience-building practices and basic rights	0	3,669	196,270	47,451	332,624	120,752	700,766	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers benefitting from capacity building to strengthen service delivery	651	1,426	1,382	3,015	1,020	831	8,325	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	144,191	266,542	211,714	79,192	202,409	85,451	989,499	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected and/or assisted	54,592	7,335	8,585	4,367	12,329	9,832	97,040	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	263,488	199,745	8,806	24,775	35,097	46,564	578,475	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	24,718	14,165	9,014	3,275	3,422	322	54,916	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefitting from post-arrival assistance	1	0	1	81	96	0	179	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefitting from reintegration assistance	30	134	1,200	773	51	362	2,550	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	45	14	10	5	0	0	74	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	639	756	291	204	23	81	1,994	
3.8 Number of people of concern benefitting from evacuation and resettlement assistance or other durable solutions for evacuees	2,915	1,395	583	98	367	18	5,376	
3.10 Number of people benefitting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	6	4	4	2	0	16	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	9,233	2,996	22	0	0	0	12,251	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	10	0	0	14	0	0	24	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	489	1,082	1,433	10,025	378	5,440	18,847	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	1,607	1,784	781	1,216	1,278	800	7,467	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention and human rights activities	395,666	80,233	49,526	115,281	71,884	114,867	827,456	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed and/or directly supported	7	40	16	11	13	15	102	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed and regularly gathering	46	40	88	46	91	5	316	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up, implemented and/or strengthened	48	58	451	17	158	6	738	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	29	18	14	3	20	25	109	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	8	7	5	3	4	0	27	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	3,713	1,632	64	0	5,409	
6.2 Number of people directly benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	867	625	3,288	0	4,780	
6.3 Number of entities benefitting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	20	0	0	0	20	

5.9. NIGERIA

5.9.1. NIGERIA IN S1 2022

Figure 57: Nigeria – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2022



Insecurity intensified, diversified, and spread in the whole of Nigeria during the first half of 2022.

During the period, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) further expanded its operational base to areas outside of the northeast, with attacks notably reported in states where the group had never been present (Kogi and Ondo states).¹ Violence by communal and ethnic militias persisted in northwestern and central Nigeria.² So far, governmental measures like airstrikes, movement restrictions, and cutting communication networks, have failed to curb bandits' violence.³ New governmental strategies against banditry this semester included formally designating these groups as 'terrorists' under the Terrorism Prevention Act and issuing licenses to citizens to 'obtain guns to defend themselves' in Zamfara state.^{4,5} During the period, activity by Ansaru, a breakaway Boko Haram faction, resurged in the northwest. Violence also spiked in Nigeria's southeast where an Igbo separatist movement continued to grow. In total, 1,662 attacks resulting in 5,961 deaths were recorded in S1 2022 in Nigeria, representing respectively a 16% and 27% increase from S2 2021.⁶

Given the continued insecurity, the number of IDPs and refugees from Nigeria further increased in S1 2022.

Overall civilian targeting increased by 45% throughout the first six months of 2022 compared to the same period last year, with more than 2,300 reported civilian fatalities. Communal and ethnic militias were responsible for nearly half of these incidents.⁷ As of June 2022, there were 3.2 million internally displaced people in Nigeria, 70% of whom were in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (BAY)

¹ ACLED, 'Nigeria: Mid-Year Update', July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event data project dashboard', 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ The Conversation, 'Nigeria's banditry: why 5 government strategies have failed', 22 April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Al Jazeera, 'Nigeria labels bandit gangs 'terrorists' in bid to stem violence', 6 January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Al Jazeera, 'Analysis: Nigerian state's call to arms could spur state of anarchy', 29 June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ ACLED, 2022, *op. cited*.

⁷ *Ibid.*


states.¹ The number of Nigerian refugees in the three neighbouring countries of Niger, Chad and Cameroon reached 343,438 (compared to 327,313 at the end of 2021).²

In this context, the humanitarian needs of vulnerable populations have further increased over the first half of 2022. As of June 2022, an estimated 8.3 million people (out of 13 million inhabitants) needed humanitarian assistance in the BAY states.³ Food insecurity and malnutrition also worsened, especially in the BAY states, where over 40% of households had inadequate food consumption at the start of the lean season – a 33% increase compared to last year.⁴ IDPs and returnees show significantly higher levels of deprivation.⁵

Ongoing instability across Nigeria has also affected the conduct of local, federal, and state elections. As of June 2022, eight months before the presidential elections, most of Nigeria's local federal and regional part primary elections have been held.⁶ This semester, Nigeria saw a surge in voter registrations and a wave of civic engagement among young Nigerians.⁷ Yet, election-related political disorder has already occurred during the first half of 2022, particularly in the southern states.⁸ As campaigning for national elections ramps up, large rallies could heighten the existing security challenges and exacerbate partisan and factional tensions.⁹

5.9.2. THE EUTF IN NIGERIA

Figure 58: EUTF portfolio in Nigeria, June 2022^{10,11}



The EUTF has contracted €125.9M in Nigeria, mostly to security, governance and conflict-prevention (SO4, 56%) and resilience (SO2, 31%) programmes. Notably, €49.8M (40% of the total budget) was allocated in 2020 to SO4 to support UNDP's implementation of the One UN Response

¹ UNHCR, 'Nigeria: All population Snapshot', September 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² UNHCR, Operational data portal, accessed August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ OCHA, 'Nigeria Situation Report for Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States No.21', 6 July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ WFP, 'North East Nigeria mVAM Bulletin – Lean Season Food Security Outlook, 9 June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Wikipedia, '2022 Nigerian election', accessed 28 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ United State Institute of Peace, 'Amid Nigeria's Turmoil, an Election Could Alter its Democracy', 28 July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Al Jazeera, 'Nigeria: Ruling party, top opposition hold presidential primaries', 27 May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


⁹ ACLED, 'Nigeria Election Violence Tracker', 25 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

¹¹ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

Plan (NG-09).¹ The MCN programme (NG-03)², also contributing to SO4, brings the EUTF budget in this area to €70.8M. Strengthening the resilience of communities and the most vulnerable (SO2) accounts for €39.6M of the EUTF budget in Nigeria. All the programmes that contributed to address the crisis in the BAY states (SO2), namely RRR (NG-07),³ LRRD NG (NG-01),⁴ ISING (NG-02)⁵ and PSS (NG-06)⁶ are now completed. Additionally, 12% of the Nigerian contracted EUTF budget is allocated to the EU-IOM Joint Initiative (NG-04),⁷ which contributes to migration management (SO3). Most ongoing projects are approaching the final stages of implementation, and it is estimated that 11% of the EUTF budget in Nigeria is yet to be spent.

Figure 59: Selected EUTF outputs in Nigeria, June 2022



Enhancing reconciliation and stability in conflict-affected communities

The security situation in the northeastern BAY states remained volatile in the first half of 2022 as incidents and attacks continued. Although Boko Haram and ISWAP have suffered setbacks over the last year, they continued to carry out indiscriminate attacks in BAY states at the same rate as before.⁸ In the first half of 2022, 250 events resulting in 1,336 fatalities were recorded across the three states, numbers almost identical to those reported in the second half of 2021 (respectively 245 and

¹ EU Support to the United Nations 'One UN Response Plan to COVID-19 in Nigeria'.

² Enhancing state and community level conflict management capability in northeastern Nigeria.

³ EU Support to Response, Recovery and Resilience in Borno State.

⁴ Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development and promoting the stability and safety of communities in displacement in northeastern Nigeria.

⁵ Investing in the Safety and Integrity of Nigerian Girls.

⁶ Strengthening Psychosocial Support, Mental Health, Reintegration and Protection Services for children in Borno, including children associated with Boko Haram.


⁷ Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants in Nigeria.

⁸ UN News, 'Nigeria: crisis in northeast will worsen without urgent help, says OCHA', 21 June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

1,337).¹ Continued insecurity over the past decade weakened community-based governance institutions like local government councils, local courts and religious institutions.

In this context, the MCN programme aims to enhance state and community-level conflict management capabilities in the BAY states through a community-based approach. In the first half of 2022, 14,221 people took part in dialogue and mediation activities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding (indicator 4.3), bringing the total of beneficiaries to 161,725. This semester, most beneficiaries were in Yobe (65%) and Borno (26%) which are at the epicentre of the Nigerian conflict. Since LRRD, PSS, and RESILAC (REG-05)² concluded their activities, MCN was the sole contributor to this indicator in Nigeria in S1 2022. Over the period, the programme reported facing challenges in implementation related to rising kidnapping for ransom threats and the beginning of political mobilisation for the 2023 elections, compounded by the effects of a broader economic and financial crisis. Those were mitigated by relocating some of the activities and by seeking more engagements with non-governmental actors for the delivery of results.

Figure 60: EUTF indicator 4.3, in Nigeria, June 2022



In S1 2022, the bulk of MCN conflict prevention activities were community dialogues (11,945 participants, 84%) and civil mediation activities (2,276 participants, 16%) held by various actors that were also trained during the period. Recent research in Nigeria has shown that traditional institutions can be of great benefit to the judiciary in complementing their efforts at resolving civil conflicts before they degenerate into violent conflicts.³ In S1 2022, the programme trained 491 traditional leaders and community representatives (indicator 4.2) which held dispute resolution activities for 9,541 people (indicator 4.3). Cases handled and resolved were captured in record-keeping centres and used for trend analysis and decision-making. This semester, the programme also facilitated the preparation of a code of conduct for the traditional rulers (indicator 4.6). The programme also trained 193 members of CSOs which held 39 dialogue sessions for 1,665 people, leading to 66 actions, seven issues resolved, and five agreements signed. One of the main focuses of the dialogues in the period was the acceptance of ex-combatants and returnees from areas formerly occupied by violent extremist organisations. Another 338 people were engaged through youth groups. The remaining 2,276


¹ ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event data project dashboard', 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Redressement économique et social inclusif du Lac Tchad.

³ Daily Trust, 'Traditional Leaders And Quest For Peace, Security In The Middle Belt', 3 May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

participants were involved in civil mediation activities through various platforms such as Community Peace and Safety Partnerships (CPSP) at local councils. According to the programme, there are encouraging signs that the various CPSPs established during the projects will continue after the end of the programme with support from a wide range of local government and community stakeholders.

Figure 61: EUTF indicator 4.2, in Nigeria, June 2022



Providing a comprehensive response to the Covid-19 pandemic crisis


Despite a decrease in infections and associated deaths, Nigeria and its partners continue their fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, and its social and economic effects. As of June 2022, Nigeria recorded a total of 257,290 cases resulting in 3,144 deaths, including 15,777 and 114 respectively in S1 2022.¹ The Federal Government of Nigeria is implementing various interventions defined by the National COVID-19 Multi-Sectoral Pandemic Response Plan to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. The United Nations aims to complement these efforts through the One-UN Response plan.

During the period, the One-UN Response Plan programme supported, distributed, and conducted mass COVID testing. The programme strengthened COVID-19 testing capacity in Nigeria notably through the distribution of 4,694,005 testing equipment and supplies to national and state laboratories, including 75 in the first half of 2022 (indicator 6.1). The programme extended the testing

¹ WHO Coronavirus Dashboard. Accessed October 2022 [here](#).

capacities of a total of 183 laboratories, including 33 in S1 2022 (indicator 6.3). Such support included both setting up new laboratories and expanding existing laboratories. As result, as of June 2022, a total of 4,227,022 COVID-19 tests have been conducted through the programme, including 3,302,927 (78% of the total) in S1 2022 (indicator 6.2). Besides, during the period, 156 health centres and hospitals were supported (indicator 6.3), and 430 people were trained either in case management (261) or COVID-19 prevention (169) (indicator 2.8).

Figure 62: EUTF indicator 6.2, in Nigeria, June 2022



In 2022, as contamination decreases, the programme has shifted from the distribution of personal protective equipment (PPEs) to building the capacity to produce them. In total, from S1 2020 to S1 2021, the UN’s global procurement and support systems allowed for rapid and extensive procurement of medical supplies, including 7,878,940 PPE items (indicator 6.1). Noting the need to expand the capacity of local MSMEs/manufacturers to produce high-quality personal protective equipment to supplement imported healthcare products and meet the high demand for these products in Nigeria, the programme supported a total of 13,030 MSMEs, including 3,884 in S1 2022 (indicator 1.2). Support to some MSMEs was delayed as beneficiaries had to travel to Abuja since sessions could not be held in some locations due to insecurity. In addition, the programme notes its difficulty in scaling up its support as most of the reinforced MSMEs, being non-tech savvy, only communicate by phone and not by email.

Concurrently, the programme continued improving health-related knowledge in the Nigerian population through the provision of strategic information on COVID-19 and health promotion. In the first half of 2022, 8,007,881 people were estimated to have been reached with messages on COVID-19 and other essential risk communication and community engagement messaging, bringing the total beneficiaries to 47,952,267 (indicator 2.7). This was achieved through the project’s support of six integrated communication strategies and almost 320 public awareness campaigns on preventive measures and recovery interventions. The engagement was done through door-to-door- and motorized campaigns, TV and radio communication, social media and other digital platforms, community health fairs and other community engagement activities. The programme however noted that despite widely scaled-up public awareness about COVID-19 transmission risk, poor adherence to public health measures, including mass gatherings with the potential of spreading COVID-19 continues to be a challenge in Nigeria.

5.9.3. NIGERIA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 11: EUTF common output indicators for Nigeria, June 2022

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	S1 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	4,575	104	0	0	0	0	4,679	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	257	27	37	1,325	8,009	3,884	13,539	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	17,101	5,621	5,025	255	1,253	0	29,255	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) and/or skills development	774	1,022	286	18	2,144	0	4,244	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed, expanded or improved	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	12	0	0	1	0	0	13	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	431	24	535	200	0	0	1,190	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	186,085	315,828	66,595	5,295	1,286	27,822	602,911	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	0	10,000	0	0	0	10,000	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	170,961	200,430	246,044	158,373	5,057	0	780,865	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable management practices have been introduced	0	600	740	0	230	0	1,570	
2.7 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers benefiting from capacity building to strengthen service delivery practices and basic rights	114,224	9,388	32,036,292	6,988,029	1,454,954	8,036,326	48,639,213	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers benefiting from capacity building to strengthen service delivery	5,624	1,774	34,598	21,741	1,485	430	65,652	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	136,160	17,965	94,653	203,954	9,789	31,038	493,558	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected and/or assisted	0	0	9	0	1	0	10	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	1,265	11,020	53,904	3,930	1,800	0	71,919	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	7	3	7	0	1	0	18	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	12,460	5,324	1,310	1,018	979	0	21,091	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	5,699	4,447	1,529	1,113	1,021	109	13,918	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	0	3	0	1	0	4	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	45	1,343	105	28	1,521	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	41	71	12	0	0	124	
3.11 Number of awareness-raising events on migration	10	65	126	152	0	0	353	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	4	17	3	0	0	0	24	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	0	60	0	0	0	60	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	9,093	3,279	2,585	944	820	973	17,694	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention and human rights activities	24,587	18,259	62,283	18,677	23,698	14,221	161,725	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed and/or directly supported	9	2	8	11	6	18	53	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed and regularly gathering	33	1	22	0	1	0	57	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up, implemented and/or strengthened	16	12	4	2	1	3	38	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	28	9	6	1	1	0	45	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	10,769,181	2,013,032	20,311	444	12,802,968	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	425,784	392,864	532,040	3,304,627	4,655,315	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	615	222	150	189	1,176	

5.10. SENEGAL

5.10.1. SENEGAL IN S1 2022

Figure 63: Senegal - Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2022



After reinstating the function of prime minister in December 2021, Senegal spent the first half of the year without a head of government. Several reasons were reportedly given for the delay, such as Senegal's victory in the Africa Cup of Nations in January, the organisation of the inauguration ceremony of the new Senegalese stadium, or a decision to wait for the outcome of the July legislative elections before putting a new team in place.¹

In local mayoral elections in January, Senegalese largely voted for the opposition party, Yewwi Askan Wi (YAW). While some inconsistencies were flagged during the process – such as the unavailability of electoral material in some polling stations or missing electoral lists – local media have commended the rollout of the poll after two postponements.² The coalition in power, *Benno Bokk Yaakaar*,³ suffered a defeat in Dakar, whilst the opposition party YAW won an important number of seats in the country's major cities. YAW was founded by Khalifa Sall and Ousmane Sonko, and some have argued that this victory could be a leverage from Khalifa Sall to come back 'intelligently to the political scene', after he was deemed ineligible to run for the 2024 presidential elections.⁴

Legislative elections planned in July 2022 were preceded by some tension and protests against the constitutional council's decision to reject YAW's electoral list. The elections will lead to the renewal of the five-year term of the current 165 deputies in the national assembly, currently dominated by the presidential coalition.^{5,6}

Elections are happening against a backdrop of heightening inflation, including on food prices. According to the national statistical agency, the price of imported goods saw an important increase year-on-year at the end of 2021, with an average inflation rate of 22.8% on products like rice, wheat,

¹ RFI, 'Le Sénégal attend toujours son Premier ministre', March 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Courrier International, 'Claque. "Débâcle" aux élections locales sénégalaises : premier test raté pour Macky Sall', January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ In English: 'United in hope'

⁴ Courrier International, 2022. op. cited.

⁵ France 24, 'Sénégal : tensions entre le gouvernement et l'opposition à l'approche des élections législatives', June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Since the time of writing of this report, legislative elections have taken place and, for the first time in Senegal recent history, no coalition has won the absolute majority. *Benno Bokk Yaakaar* saw its representation drop from 125 seats to 82.

corn and onions.¹ Since early March 2022, the conflict in Ukraine and its impact on international price of oil has further contributed to inflationary pressures across the world, including in Senegal. As a result, the State announced measures to help control the price of essential foodstuffs and launched a cash transfer program of 43.4B FCFA (€66M) in March 2022 to provide resilience support to over 540,000 vulnerable households. The funds used to finance the operation were from a World Bank project which includes other donors such as Germany and the United Kingdom. Continued increase in the price of food products and deployment of social protection programmes, including subsidies, are expected to put pressure on public revenues.²

Departures of migrants from Senegal have continued during the first semester of 2022. In June, at least fourteen migrants died in a dugout fire on a boat in Kafountine, in Casamance. The boat was carrying 140 individuals from Guinea, Nigeria, The Gambia and Senegal, and was headed to the Canary Islands. In total, 762 irregular border crossings by Senegalese nationals into Europe were reported in S1 2022, including 637 to the Canary Islands.^{3,4} In February 2022, the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, proposed a status agreement between Senegal and Frontex⁵ that would allow the deployment of European teams on the ground and distribution of technical equipment to contribute to the fight against smuggling of migrants. If agreed by the Senegalese government, this would mark the first Frontex deployment in a country outside Europe or that does not directly border the European Union. Thus far, the proposal has received a green light for technical discussions from the Senegalese Ministry of Interior.^{6,7}

¹ Jeune Afrique, 'Sénégal – Huile, riz, sucre : 76 millions d'euros de subventions contre l'inflation', February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Africanews, 'Le Sénégal distribue des aides aux ménages modestes face à l'inflation', May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Frontex, 'Detections of illegal border-crossings statistics download', consulted in July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ It may be worth noting that in S1 2022, 2,459 irregular border crossings from "unidentified sub-Saharan nationals" to the Canary Islands were reported. Given the geographical location of Senegal as a coastal country, and the profile of migrants usually identified, it is very likely that Senegalese nationals may be represented in the 2,459 unidentified sub-Saharan nationals, in addition to the 637 already identified during that period.


⁵ Frontex is the European coast guard agency.

⁶ Le Figaro, 'L'Union européenne veut déployer son agence de protection des frontières au Sénégal', February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Reliefweb, 'Plans to send Frontex guards to Senegal illegitimate attempt to stop migrants, asylum seekers', February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

5.10.2. THE EUTF IN SENEGAL

Figure 64: EUTF portfolio in Senegal, June 2022^{1,2}



The EUTF has contracted €165.4M in Senegal, 56% of which goes to employment-related projects (SO1), followed by security, governance and conflict-prevention (SO4 – 22%) and migration-related projects (SO3 – 17%). The EUTF aims to create economic opportunities and jobs with the DES (SN-04),³ PASPED (SN-09),⁴ PACERSEN (SN-05)⁵ and PARERBA (SN-08)⁶ programmes. The EUTF also aims to assist returning migrants and support their sustainable reintegration with the *Migration Senegal* programme (SN-06).⁷ In Senegal, preventing irregular migration, smuggling of migrants and human trafficking are also priorities supported by the *Nekkal* and POC SN programmes (SN-07⁸ and SN-10,⁹ respectively), which pertain to SO4. It is estimated that most of the EUTF contracted budget in Senegal (87%) has been spent as of June 2022 and that 13% are yet to be spent by 2024.

¹ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

² This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

³ *Développer l'emploi au Sénégal : renforcement de la compétitivité des entreprises et de l'employabilité dans les zones de départ.*

⁴ *Programme de contraste à la migration illégale à travers l'appui au Secteur Privé et à la création d'emplois au Sénégal.*

⁵ *Projet d'Appui à la réduction de la migration à travers la Création d'Emplois Ruraux au Sénégal.*


⁶ *Projet d'Appui à la Réduction de l'Émigration rurale et à la Réintégration dans le Bassin Arachidier par le développement d'une économie rurale sur base des périmètres irrigués.*

⁷ *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations, retour et réintégration durable au Sénégal et accompagnement des investissements de la diaspora sénégalaise.*

⁸ *Programme d'appui au renforcement du système d'information de l'état civil et à la consolidation d'un fichier d'état national d'identité biométrique au Sénégal.*

⁹ *Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint (POC) de lutte contre l'émigration irrégulière, la traite et le trafic de migrants au Sénégal.*

Figure 65: Selected EUTF outputs in Senegal, June 2022



Strengthening the management and delivery of civil status in Senegal

In Senegal, the national system of civil status is currently unable to provide universal civil status in a sustainable manner. Only 77% of births of children currently under the age of five were registered onto the civil status registry, and the repartition of civil status centres (*centres d'état civil*) is unequal across the country. Yet, civil status records are necessary for the development of well-tailored population and public policies, and, as such, are linked to development outcomes.¹

The programme *Nekkal* (SN-07)² aims to improve the civil status information system and consolidate a secure national biometric identity file in the country. Most notably, the programme supported the development of a civil status national strategy (indicator 4.6) in S1 2022, the *Stratégie nationale de l'État civil* (SNEC). *Nekkal* supported the different phases of the strategy, from the launch workshop, the policy-making process until the validation of the SNEC chaired by the Minister and the ambassador of the European Union Delegation in Senegal.

In addition, in order to strengthen the management and delivery of civil status, the programme provided 138 pieces of equipment (indicator 4.1 bis) in S1 2022, amounting to 60% of all governance-linked items delivered across Senegal by EUTF-funded activities during that period. National institutions supported included the Civil Affairs and Seals Directorate (DACS),³ the Department of legal and consular affairs


¹ Enabel, 'Annexe I de la Convention de contribution de l'Union européenne : Description de l'Action', consulted in October 2022.

² Programme d'appui au renforcement du système d'information de l'état civil et à la consolidation d'un fichier national d'identité biométrique au Sénégal

³ In French, the *Direction des Affaires civiles et du Sceau*

(DAJC),¹ and the Department of Civil Status (DEC).² As such, five cars were provided in S1 2022 (one to the DACS and four to the DEC), and 31 motorcycles to centres of civil status in order to facilitate interactions with other public services. In addition, 25 items of IT equipment were delivered to the DACS (compared to 21 in S2 2021), and 55 IT items were delivered to DEC (compared to 53 in S2 2021) to strengthen their capacities to monitor and deliver civil status documentation.

Figure 66: EUTF indicator 4.1 bis, in Senegal, June 2022



Supporting Senegalese authorities to dismantle irregular migration networks

Senegal is a country of transit and departure for irregular migration, and the fight against irregular migration and smuggling of migrants is a growing priority for the Senegalese State. In S1 2022, the number of irregular borders crossings (IBCs) to Europe from Senegalese nationals tripled compared to S2 2021 (263 IBCs).^{3,4}

To strengthen the capacity of government and security actors in the fight against criminal networks linked to the smuggling of migrants, the EUTF finances the implementation of the POC SN programme (SN-10).⁵ The POC SN supports national institutions and national security forces, training them on security and border management. In S1 2022, the programme trained 432 staff on governance, conflict prevention and human rights (indicator 4.2) – a 109% increase compared to results

¹ In French, the *Direction des Affaires juridiques et consulaires*

² In French, the *Direction de l'État civil*

³ Frontex, 'migratory map', consulted in October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ In addition, there were 2,459 IBCs from "unspecified sub-Saharan nationals" in S1 2022 through the Western African Route, leading Western Africa to the Canary Islands. In view of Senegalese position as a coastal country, it is highly likely that most many sub-Saharan nationals, including Senegal, departed from Senegalese coasts.

⁵ Partenariat opérationnel conjoint de lutte contre l'immigration irrégulière et le trafic de migrants et de la traite des êtres humains au Sénégal.

achieved in S2 2021 –, including 315 in Q2, bringing the total to 1,235. Staff was trained on border management (114), including at border posts (36) and at Senegalese main airports (56); and on security (318), including on the detection of documentary fraud. In addition, through the programme, the director of the *Division nationale de lutte contre le trafic de migrants et pratiques assimilées* (DNLT)¹ attended the conference on migration and organised smuggling networks in the context of the French Presidency of the European Union. Lastly, the DNLT, with the support of POC SN, was able to extradite a migrant smuggler from Senegal based in Spain in March 2022, marking the first example of European-Senegalese judicial cooperation.

Providing professional training and skills development to fill the skills gap

In Senegal, the professional training sector holds great potential but is under-exploited. Despite high demand and better wages for technical and vocational training (TVET), enrolment and the diversity of specialisations offered are limited.² This skills gap represents a major constraint to raising productivity and transitioning towards a more competitive economy. As such, to achieve its growth goal, the government and its partners work to improve the qualifications of young populations.

EUTF-funded activities in Senegal work to provide TVET and/or skills development (indicator 1.4) with the objective to facilitate economic insertion of trainees in today's labour market. In S1 2022, 5,704 people were trained, which amounts to 22% of the total of people trained and represents a sevenfold increase compared to results achieved in S2 2021. Close to 63% beneficiaries (3,656) were trained through the component implemented by LuxDev of the *Développer l'Emploi au Sénégal* programme (DES-04-02),³ using a competency-based approach, meaning that, ultimately, the trainee will have acquired skills and knowledge in order to perform work activities to a specified standard by the end of their training.⁴ The delivery of training services through EUTF-funded programmes is territorial, with only 3% of trainings delivered in Dakar, which hosts most public TVET and skills development institutions. Combined, the regions of Kolda, Kedougou, Sedhiou, Tambacounda and Ziguinchor hosted 73% of TVET and/or skills development specified trainings.⁵

In addition, most skills' acquisition is done informally. While informal skills acquisition may produce semi-skilled and skilled craftspersons, it has three main drawbacks: it tends to (i) be based on old technology; (ii) rely on imitation and repetition and thus limited thinking skills; and thus (iii) induce neglect the role of implementation of rigorous procedures.⁶ EUTF-funded activities deliver professional training through nationally accredited institutions in the country, thereby providing a framework and a level of formality to the curricula. Of all specified trainings provided in the country since the beginning of implementation, 28% were through nationally accredited institutions.⁷

¹ In English, *national division for the fight against smuggling of migrants and related practices*

² World Bank, 'Project Information Document, Skills for jobs and competitiveness', consulted in October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ *Développer l'emploi au Sénégal : renforcement de la compétitivité des entreprises et de l'employabilité dans les zones de départ*.


⁴ ILO, 'competency-based training', published in 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ This ratio is based on calculations for which the location of the training was provided, and therefore excludes data for which location was 'unspecified'.

⁶ World Bank, *op. cited*.

⁷ It is worth noting that this is the highest ratio of jobs for which support was specified, with 56% being unspecified, 5% leading to no certification, and 10% being conducted in non-accredited institutions.

Figure 67: EUTF indicator 1.4, in Senegal, June 2022



EUTF-funded programmes deliver other types of training on entrepreneurship to develop income generating activities (IGAs). In S1 2022, 1,391 IGAs were created (indicator 1.3) through entrepreneurship training compared to 17 in S2 2021 via the PARERBA programme (SN-08).¹ PARERBA provides training to men and women in rural areas – in the groundnut basin² – to provide them with the skills to create or develop micro-enterprises in agriculture, in collaboration with the *Agence Nationale pour la promotion de l'emploi des jeunes* (ANPEJ)³ and the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF). Beneficiaries receive pre-creation (financial literacy, business plan,...) and post-creation (coaching) support.

¹ *Projet d'Appui à la Réduction de l'Emigration rurale et à la Réintégration dans le Bassin Arachidier par le développement d'une économie rurale sur base des périmètres irrigués.*

² The groundnut basin covers the western and central parts of the country, corresponding to the regions of Louga, Thiès, Diourbel, Kaolack and Fatick.

³ In English, the National Agency for the Promotion of Youth Employment.

5.10.3. SENEGAL AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 12: EUTF common output indicators for Senegal, June 2022

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	S1 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	553	2,900	9,181	5,290	2,308	2,511	22,743	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	1,688	1,146	4,278	890	244	643	8,889	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	6,207	7,106	2,788	203	19	1,391	17,715	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (VET) and/or skills development	9,757	7,043	2,583	463	773	5,704	26,324	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	6	11	7	0	0	0	25	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	3	56	13	27	10	11	120	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	5,378	2,781	304	0	0	0	8,463	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	67,575	327,702	168,358	0	0	0	563,635	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	23,153	21,280	19,857	18,448	4,913	4,059	91,710	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	0	40	0	0	0	0	40	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable management practices have been introduced	23	667	432	318	207	0	1,648	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience-building practices and basic rights	42,939	180,400	357,769	74,884	25,651	824	682,468	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers benefiting from capacity building to strengthen service delivery	194	1,997	102	6	22	3	2,324	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	2,400	10,737	15,933	24,189	11,392	35,808	100,459	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	19	36	15	44	71	94	279	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected and/or assisted	0	8	731	744	734	1,153	3,370	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	103,918	506,419	142,382	695,242	438,517	665,373	2,551,851	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	10	7	119	30	50	0	216	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	2,937	970	508	511	345	0	5,271	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	268	2,112	16,941	1,867	450	22	21,660	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	8	0	1	1	0	10	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	368	131	172	345	1,016	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	36	50	41	7	0	134	
3.11 Number of awareness-raising events on migration	221	73	548	121	10	14	987	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	0	0	0	0	2	2	4	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	34	0	702	155	123	230	1,244	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	150	50	141	455	207	432	1,435	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed and/or directly supported	9	28	10	8	45	1	101	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed and regularly gathering	0	44	9	6	21	34	114	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up, implemented and/or strengthened	8	9	3	2	3	8	33	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	14	5	16	2	31	15	83	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	84,525	0	0	0	84,525	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	251,687	0	0	0	251,687	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	93	0	0	0	93	

5.11. THE GAMBIA

5.11.1. THE GAMBIA IN S1 2022

Figure 68: The Gambia - Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2022



In April 2022, Gambians went to the polls to vote for a new national assembly, consolidating the country's democratic transition. The party of President Adama Barrow won the elections with 19 seats but fell short of the absolute majority in the 58-seat chamber. According to local media, turnout was low, although the electoral commission did not provide an official national Figure:¹

At the end of May, the Government announced its decision to prosecute exiled former President Yahya Jammeh for crimes committed under his 20-year rule, offering new hope to victims for justice and closure.² Jammeh has been accused of murder, torture and rape, among other crimes.³ The announcement came as a response to the recommendations made by the Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission in November 2021.

In the first half of 2022, The Gambia continued to face global inflation and economic hardships. After two years of economic slowdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic, President Barrow pledged earlier this year to accelerate growth and focus on economic development over his five-year term.⁴ However, the current global hike in fuel and food prices is set to have an impact on the Gambian economy, with growth rate projections being revised downwards from 6.8 percent in 2022 to 4.8 percent.⁵

During the first semester of 2022, more than 6,000 people fled their homes in The Gambia and Senegal following clashes between Senegalese soldiers and separatists near the Gambian border.⁶ The fighting pushed near 700 people in Casamance, a Senegal region bordering The Gambia, to cross over and seek refuge in The Gambia, while an additional 5,600 people were displaced within

¹ RFI, 'Gambian president's party falls short of majority in legislative vote', April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² World Politics Review, 'Gambia's Plans to Prosecute Jammeh Are Sparking New Hopes for Justice', June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Al Jazeera, 'Gambian government says it will prosecute exiled ex-ruler Jammeh', May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Reuters, 'Gambian President Barrow vows economic progress at start of second term', January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


⁵ The Voice Gambia, 'Regional Economic Outlook For Sub-Saharan Africa Launched', June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ In Casamance, a region in southern Senegal bordering The Gambia, a low-level conflict has been taking place since the 80s' opposing the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance, an independentist group, and Senegalese forces.

The Gambia after stray bullets landed on the Gambian territory during clash between Senegalese military and armed rebels. ^{1,2}

5.11.2. THE EUTF IN THE GAMBIA

Figure 69: EUTF portfolio in The Gambia, June 2022^{3,4}



The EUTF has contracted €37.4M to projects in The Gambia, of which employment-related projects (SO1) account for 90%, while one project focuses on migration management (SO3 – 10%). Through the YEP (GM-01)⁵ and MIITG (GM-03)⁶ programmes, the EUTF aims to create economic opportunities and jobs, particularly for the youth and people in rural areas. The EU-IOM Joint Initiative in The Gambia (GM-02)⁷ provides post-arrival support and reintegration assistance to returning migrants and raises awareness on the risks of irregular migration.⁸ Projects in The Gambia are nearing the later phases of implementation, and it is estimated that 7% of EUTF contracted budget in the country is yet to be spent.

¹ Al Jazeera, 'Over 6,000 displaced in Gambia, Senegal after Casamance mission', March 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² West Africa Democracy Radio, 'Casamance: Senegalese Army reacts after stray bullets landed on Gambian territory', October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁴ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.


⁵ Youth Employment Project.

⁶ Building a future – Make it in The Gambia.

⁷ Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants in the Gambia.

⁸ European Commission. 'EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, The Gambia'. Retrieved [here](#).

Figure 70: Selected EUTF outputs in The Gambia, June 2022



Assisting and protecting migrants, building capacity in migration management and raising awareness to prevent irregular migration

The Gambia is one of the continent's poorest nations. According to the latest national survey conducted in 2015, almost half of the Gambian population (960,000 individuals) are under the national poverty line. Poverty is expected to increase in the second half of the year as a result of floods in July and August 2022.¹ At least 47,104 people were directly affected by the downpours.²

Poverty and lack of economic opportunities are push factors that make The Gambia a country with one of the highest rates of irregular migration to Europe. Between 2009 and 2022, 47,796 Gambian migrants entered Europe through irregular channels, the fifth highest figure in the SLC region, despite being by far the least populated country in the region.³ In S1 2022, 383 irregular border crossings (IBCs) to Europe from Gambian nationals were registered, slightly lower than in S2 2021 (408).⁴ As comparison, for Senegal and Mali, countries with respectively eight times and ten times the population of The Gambia, IBCs for the same period of time were at 762 and 820.

In S1 2022, EUTF-funded programmes address migration-related questions through a multidimensional approach. Programmes supported the return and reintegration of Gambian migrants in neighbouring countries, for instance. Transit migrants in The Gambia benefitted from assistance and protection, and Gambian staff working on migration from capacity-building. Lastly, awareness-raising campaigns are conducted to inform on the risks of irregular migration but also on existing opportunities in The Gambia.

Stranded Gambian migrants may benefit from EUTF-funded support to return voluntarily to The Gambia and to socially and economically reintegrate in the country. Such support has mostly been provided by the EU-IOM JI. As of June 2022, 5,840 Gambian returnees had received post arrival assistance from the programme in the form of cash for immediate needs (indicator 3.5). Further, EUTF-

¹ World Bank, 'Poverty & Equity brief, The Gambia', October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Reliefweb, 'Gambia: floods – Jul 2022', July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ The first being Nigeria, followed by Guinea, Mali and Côte d'Ivoire.

⁴ Frontex, 'Detections of illegal border-crossings statistics download', consulted in July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

funded programmes also support returnees in their physical and emotional wellbeing, through medical and psychosocial reintegration assistance, and provide economic support to re-establish their livelihoods. As of June 2022, 4,620 returnees benefitted from such reintegration assistance, including 66 in S1 2022, most of which through the EU-IOM JI (4,390, 95%), the remaining being supported by YEP (230). The observed decrease in support is largely due the EU-IOM JI programme coming to an end, although both the IOM and the EU continue to support returnees through other non-EUTF-funded projects.

In addition to being a country of departure, The Gambia is also one of the main channels for irregular transit migration for nationals from the sub-region.¹ As of June 2022, EUTF-funded activities provided support to 1,542 migrants in transit in The Gambia (indicator 3.2), including 744 in S1 2022. During the first half of the year, support was exclusively provided through the Protection West Africa programme (REG-13).² The programme is managed by the Red Cross and Save the Children, with the latter providing package support to children under the age of 18 (201 of S1 2022 beneficiaries). Meanwhile, the Spanish Red Cross provides multi-dimensional support to adult migrants: this semester, a total of 574 migrants have received psycho-social support, 557 have received hygiene items and clothes, 432 have benefitted from family tracing, and 319 have received temporary accommodation from the project.³ This semester, 29% of individual beneficiaries were women.

EUTF-funded activities help build the capacity of Gambian staff on migration management, thereby anchoring the sustainability of such practices. As of June 2022, 1,237 individuals were trained on migration management and protection (indicator 3.7), including 343 in S1 2022 – a 38% increase compared to December 2021. During S1 2022, Protection West Africa trained 240 community volunteers and 103 key actors in child protection by the Protection West Africa programme.

Finally, EUTF support to migration in The Gambia relies on campaigns to raise awareness on the risks of irregular migration but also on existing opportunities in the country. As of June 2022, 603,954 potential migrants were reached by information campaigns on migration (indicator 3.3, amounting to a quarter of the total Gambian population), including 122,637 in S1 2022, a 35% increase compared to what was achieved in S2 2021. In S1 2022 – and across the years –, the largest contributor to awareness-raising campaigns in The Gambia was the YEP programme (GM-01), with 98,647 beneficiaries reached. YEP uses social media to reach young people in The Gambia, sharing opportunities, success stories and key results and messages. As of the end of Q1 2022, the project had respectively 12,239 and 8,725 followers on Facebook and Twitter.⁴ Other strategies for awareness-raising in the Gambia target women specifically, in view of the role that parents play in sponsoring youths' departure.⁵ The Make it in The Gambia programme (MIITG, GM-03),⁶ through its IMVF component, targets women and conducts awareness-raising on migration and available opportunities in the vegetable gardens supported by the project. Finally, Protection West Africa conducted awareness-raising campaigns within local communities and at centres for information sharing (such as bus stations and border crossing points); and spread information tools on existing protection services and the means to reduce migration-linked risks for children and youth on the road. In total, the programme reached 21,200 beneficiaries in S1 2022.

¹ Maastricht University, 'Gambia migration profile', October 2017. Retrieved [here](#).; Migration Policy Institute, 'The Gambia: Migration in Africa's "Smiling Coast"', August 2013. Retrieved [here](#).

² *Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest*.


³ While the data is in the form of 'package support', qualitative data shared detailed the type of support provided, but was reflected only once in the form of package support so as to avoid double counting.

⁴ Youth Empowerment Project, 'Progress report – Q1 2022 Update', consulted in October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Tekki Fii, 'promoting agribusiness – strengthening social social, interim narrative report', consulted in October 2022. Internal report.

⁶ Building a future – Make it in The Gambia










Figure 71: EUTF indicator 3.7, in The Gambia, June 2022



Supporting MSMEs development in The Gambia

In The Gambia, the labour market is characterised by a predominantly large informal sector. The workforce tends to be employed in low-wage, low-productivity sectors, keeping residents in poverty lest the structure of the economy is changed.

EUTF-funded programmes in The Gambia support the development of the local economy. As of June 2022, 4,821 MSMEs were supported or created in The Gambia, including 554 in S1 2022 (indicator 1.2). MSME support was done through two main programmes: MIITG and YEP. By the end of implementation, the GIZ component of MIITG contributed to the creation or development of 2,666 MSMEs. The project's strategy rested upon the offering of diversified packages for business development support, benefitting a range of actors. Packages include (i) the promotion of market linkages targeting young agropreneurs (615) and other beneficiaries (152); (ii) grant schemes with other MIITG partners; (iii) start-up kits (863) to new entrepreneurs, TVET graduates and apprentices; (iv) support to community farms; and (v) business advisory services to established businesses (300). Further, the YEP programme aims to create opportunities for the youth through the creation of MSMEs. In S1 2022, the programme supported or created 496 MSMEs through the demonstration of improved business practices (1,151 MSMEs) and improvement in quality and food safety (182), the largest number since the beginning of its activities and the equivalent of 90% of all MSMEs supported during the semester.

MIITG GIZ		Main target groups	
 Make it in the Gambia – GIZ  IP: GIZ  Budget: €7.3M	 From January 2019 to November 2021  Objective: contribute to socio-economic development and to nurture positive prospects for local populations and returning migrants in The Gambia.	 Youth and young adults  Women  Returnees  TVET and skills	
<p><i>The Gambia is a small economy relying heavily on agriculture, tourism and remittances from the Gambian diaspora, and, as such, is highly vulnerable to external shocks. The private sector is small and faces significant obstacles, mainly linked to a shortage of entrepreneurial skills and structural gaps in the business environment. Young people, who represent the largest segment of the population (about 64%), face higher levels of unemployment (over 40%). Despite being the smallest country in mainland Africa, The Gambia has one of the highest rates of irregular migration. Poverty and lack of socio-economic opportunities are the main factors driving outward migration, both regular and irregular.</i></p> <p>Training beneficiaries for insertion in the labour market</p> <p>The project targeted youth not in employment, education or training to improve their skills and provide them with socio-economic opportunities. At the end of the project, 87% of 2,979 trainees (2,591) were able to find a job, exceeding the target of 50% of 2,600 trainees (1,300). The project faced some challenges but was able to find practical solutions that constitute best practices that can be used for ongoing and future engagement in The Gambia.</p> <p><i>Challenges</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Selection of training beneficiaries – the project had to train make trade-offs in terms of numbers versus impact as they were targeting youths with no skills, very limited capital and low formal education, to enter the labour market or become self-employed in an economically fragile context, with a relatively short timeframe. • Weak institution / implementation capacities and policy gaps – developing ownership amongst the Government’s partner institutions and ensuring their participation was a challenge, as most institutions lacked policies and planning frameworks and only participated in short-term or ad-hoc missions through resource persons or expert. • Gaps amongst established training providers – in the TVET sector, an overwhelming majority of trainers did not have prior pedagogical training and centres had mostly theoretical curricula (as opposed to a practical component), poor facilities and insufficient equipment. • Urban vs. rural disparity – considerable scarcity of training and business opportunities in rural regions (West Coast Region, Lower River Region and Upper River Region) where the project intervenes represented a significant challenge in targeting and training beneficiaries. <p><i>Solutions and best practices</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hybrid approach to training to maximize scale and relevance to the job market –The project adopted a holistic approach, combining trainings in hard skills and soft skills to ensure highest possible level of employability but also linked the beneficiaries directly to the labour market, provided grants or start-up kits, placed them in an industry and ensured close follow-up of their economic integration • Enhancing the participation of government stakeholders – to help navigate institutional gaps, the project succeeded in drawing the attention of Gambian authorities to the 			

challenges, in particular with regards to sustainability, and organized a retreat with stakeholders to discuss how to ensure long-term ownership of institutions. The gaps

- **Participatory approach to build capacity at training centres** – through regular networking of the partners, the establishment of a participatory and intensive M&E approach and the sharing of common constraints and best practices, the project was able to enhance commitment from training centres and improve delivery systems.
- **Scaling up facilities in rural areas** – to ensure that trainings could be conducted in rural areas despite considerable disparities, the project invested in (i) opening and/or rehabilitating five skills training centres; (ii) setting up and equipping training facilities; and (iii) bringing high-profile technical experts from Greater Banjul Area for peer coaching sessions.

5.11.3. THE GAMBIA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 13: EUTF common output indicators for The Gambia, June 2022

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	S1 2021	S2 2021	S1 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	370	1,681	1,514	1,976	3,827	166	9,535	
1.2 Number of SMEs created or supported	335	306	1,633	959	1,034	554	4,821	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	1,770	2,956	3,114	2,065	1,540	291	11,736	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) and/or skills development	767	2,877	955	625	1,812	411	7,447	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed, expanded or improved	0	5	8	4	26	0	43	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	0	0	7	4	5	1	17	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable management practices have been introduced	0	21	42	52	9	0	124	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience-building practices and basic rights	0	0	241,939	5,450	80,100	98,647	426,136	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers benefiting from capacity building to strengthen service delivery	0	42	257	51	22	5	376	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	688	2,400	760	861	0	4,709	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected and/or assisted	0	2	32	184	580	744	1,542	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	8,775	74,560	97,530	209,574	90,878	122,637	603,954	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	3	5	1	1	23	0	33	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	3,817	1,070	327	176	450	0	5,840	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	2,139	1,217	575	170	453	66	4,620	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	710	153	31	343	1,237	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	10	5	0	0	0	15	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	65	215	292	75	85	56	788	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed and/or directly supported	4	1	1	0	1	0	7	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed and regularly gathering	4	4	3	0	0	0	11	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up, implemented and/or strengthened	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	1	7	2	3	1	14	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	112,796	80,114	20,000	0	212,910	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	40,744	1,548	1,242	0	43,534	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	402	738	0	0	1,140	


CONCLUSIONS

The situation in the SLC region continued to deteriorate in the first half of 2022 as the insecurity that has been affecting the Liptako-Gourma area and the Lake Chad Basin for a decade intensified and expanded to other regions. Displacement figures further increased, and the two areas hosted almost 1.5 million refugees and asylum seekers, and 7.6 million IDPs at the end of the semester. Mass displacement, combined with the effects of climate change and endemic poverty resulted in a rising number of people in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, reaching 34.6 million by June 2022.

THE EUTF PORTFOLIO IN S1 2022

The EUTF contracted portfolio in the SLC window grew by 2% in the first half of 2022 in number of projects and 2% in funding, from 213 operational contracts worth €2.02B at the end of 2021 to 218 contracts worth €2.06B in June 2022. The Trust Fund reached its peak in spending during the first half of 2020, but a significant amount of budget remains to be implemented.

Figure 72: Spending of EUTF SLC funds¹



Eight additional projects were contracted in the first half of 2022.² Seven projects were contracted to support governance, peace and security (four in Niger, three in Mali); and another contract was signed to support the efforts of the security forces to combat irregular migration in Mauritania.

The EUTF also mitigated the impact of the pandemic on SLC countries by reorienting some of its funding towards the COVID-19 response. In total, 61 projects redirected funds, accounting for €123.8M towards a COVID-19 response; 51 projects had implemented COVID-related activities at the end of June 2022.³

THE MLS

This report is the outcome of the tenth round of data collection conducted by the MLS team for the EUTF's SLC window.

Data collection for the S1 2022 report lasted from the end of August to the beginning of October 2022. In addition to the standard data collection requests, IPs were asked to update their COVID-19 budget and response data when relevant. A number of IPs also provided the MLS team with more qualitative information on programme implementation, which provided further qualitative details and explanations to the data collected.

This report includes data for 197 projects, a number that has been gradually increasing from 71 projects in the first report for 2018, to 129 at the end of 2019, to 166 at the end of 2020, to 194 at the end of 2021.

¹ Estimates based on known contracts' budget, start and end dates. Only contracted and operational projects are included.

² Portfolio data for the S1 2021 report was valid as of July 2022.

³ The 61 projects with funds allocated to the COVID-19 response and 51 projects with COVID-19-response outputs are not necessarily the same projects, as some projects have reported COVID-19-response outputs but not reallocated funds and some projects with funds allocated to the COVID-19 response have not yet generated COVID-19-related outputs that are relevant to the EUTF indicators.

S1 2022 KEY ACHIEVEMENTS

Substantial outputs were reported against all Strategic Objectives in S1 2022.

- **Economy and employment:** The EUTF supported the creation of 16,546 jobs in the SLC region in S1 2022, for a total of 122,378 jobs created or supported since the beginning of activities (indicator 1.1). During the semester, 84,047 people benefitted from assistance to income generating activities in S1 2022 (indicator 1.3), and 66,765 people benefitted from TVET and/or skills development (indicator 1.4). Additionally, 6,625 MSMEs were created or supported in S1 2022 (indicator 1.2). Finally, 32 business and productive infrastructures were built or rehabilitated over the course of the semester (indicator 1.5).
- **Resilience:** EUTF-funded programmes supplied 127,418 people with food security-related assistance (indicator 2.4) and 165,424 with nutrition assistance (indicator 2.3) in S1 2022. EUTF-funded programmes also supported the delivery of 154,961 basic social services (indicator 2.2), and improved access to basic services for 471,110 people (indicator 2.9). Furthermore, 1,125 social infrastructures were built or rehabilitated (indicator 2.1 bis), and 4,156 people were trained in the provision of services (indicator 2.8) during the first half of 2022. Finally, 9,024,588 people were sensitised by resilience campaigns in the semester (indicator 2.7)
- **Migration:** EUTF-funded programmes provided assistance or protection to 35,840 migrants in transit, refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs in S1 2022 (indicator 3.2). To improve migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination, programmes also provided capacity building or operational support to 1 institution (indicator 3.6) and 2,035 staff (indicator 3.7) in S1 2022. Campaigns on the risks of irregular migration reached 967,676 migrants and potential migrants over the course of the semester (indicator 3.3). EUTF-funded activities supported 11 returnees with post-arrival assistance (indicator 3.5) and 1,340 with reintegration assistance (indicator 3.5 bis) in S1 2022.
- **Governance, security and conflict prevention:** EUTF-funded programmes supported the drafting of 903 laws, plans and policy documents aimed at improving governance and policymaking efforts in S1 2022 (indicator 4.6). Furthermore, 514,963 individuals participated in peacebuilding activities centred around social cohesion and conflict resolution in the first half of 2022 (indicator 4.3). EUTF-funded programmes also delivered conflict prevention and security-related training to 11,581 staff members and key actors involved in social cohesion and peace dynamics over the course of the semester (indicator 4.2). Finally, 3 infrastructures were built (indicator 4.1) and 13,149 units of equipment (indicator 4.1 bis) were provided to support governance and security in S1 2022.
- **COVID-19 response:** To mitigate the impact of the pandemic in the SLC region, 5,998 COVID-19 supplies were provided with EUTF funding in S1 2022 reaching a total of 13,619,216 since the beginning of the pandemic (indicator 6.1). Additionally, 3,307,422 individual beneficiaries and 190 entities benefitted from specific COVID-19 response activities in S1 2022, for a total of 5,172,840 and 2,555 respectively (indicators 6.2 and 6.3).

6. INDEX

6.1. TABLES

Table 1: Projects newly added to the MLS for the S1 2022 report, June 2022	11
Table 2: EUTF common output indicators for all SLC projects, June 2022	19
Table 3: EUTF common output indicators for Burkina Faso, June 2022	46
Table 4: EUTF common output indicators for Chad, June 2022.....	52
Table 5: EUTF common output indicators for Côte d'Ivoire, June 2022	57
Table 6: EUTF common output indicators for Ghana, June 2022	62
Table 7: EUTF common output indicators for Guinea, June 2022.....	68
Table 8: EUTF common output indicators for Mali, June 2022.....	77
Table 9: EUTF common output indicators for Mauritania, June 2022	83
Table 10: EUTF common output indicators for Niger, June 2022.....	92
Table 11: EUTF common output indicators for Nigeria, June 2022.....	99
Table 12: EUTF common output indicators for Senegal, June 2022	107
Table 13: EUTF common output indicators for The Gambia, June 2022	114

6.2. FIGURES

Figure 1: Contracted budget breakdown by country and Strategic Objective, June 2022	5
Figure 2: Projects and budget covered by the current S1 2022 MLS report, June 2022.....	11
Figure 3: Evolution of projects and budgets covered by the MLS in SLC, June 2022,	12
Figure 4: EUTF SLC contracted projects by budget and implementation status, June 2022	13
Figure 5: Budget distribution by country and implementing partner, June 2022.....	14
Figure 6: Contracted budget breakdown by Strategic Objectives, June 2022.....	15
Figure 7: Budget allocated to the COVID-19 response in the SLC, June 2022.....	16
Figure 8: Main achievements of EUTF-funded programmes in S1 2022, June 2022.....	18
Figure 9: Strategic Objective 1 dashboard, SLC, June 2022.....	20
Figure 10: Strategic Objective 2 dashboard, SLC, June 2022.....	24
Figure 11: Food insecure people in 2020 and projected to be food insecure in S1 2022	27
Figure 12: Beneficiaries of EUTF-provided food security assistance (2.4), by semester	27
Figure 13: Strategic Objective 3 dashboard, SLC, June 2022.....	29
Figure 14: Strategic Objective 4 dashboard, SLC, June 2022.....	33
Figure 15: Burkina Faso – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2022.....	38
Figure 16: EUTF portfolio in Burkina Faso, June 2022	40
Figure 17: Selected EUTF outputs in Burkina Faso, June 2022.....	41
Figure 18: Indicator 4.2, Burkina Faso, June 2022	42
Figure 19: Indicator 2.9, Burkina Faso, June 2022	44
Figure 20: Indicator 3.2, Burkina Faso, June 2022	45
Figure 21: Chad – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2022.....	47
Figure 22: EUTF portfolio in Chad, June 2022.....	48
Figure 23: Selected EUTF outputs in Chad, June 2022	49
Figure 24: EUTF indicator 1.2, in Chad, June 2022	50

Figure 25: EUTF indicator 2.2, in Chad, June 2022	51
Figure 26: Côte d'Ivoire – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2022	53
Figure 27: EUTF portfolio in Côte d'Ivoire, June 2022	54
Figure 28: Selected EUTF outputs in Côte d'Ivoire, June 2022.....	54
Figure 29: EUTF indicator 2.8, in Côte d'Ivoire, June 2022	55
Figure 30: EUTF indicator 3.7, in Côte d'Ivoire, June 2022	57
Figure 31: Ghana – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2022	58
Figure 32: EUTF Portfolio in Ghana, June 2022	59
Figure 33: Selected EUTF outputs, Ghana, June 2022	60
Figure 34: Indicator 1.1, Ghana, June 2022	61
Figure 35: Guinea – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2022.....	63
Figure 36: EUTF portfolio in Guinea, June 2022.....	64
Figure 37: Selected EUTF outputs in Guinea, June 2022	65
Figure 38: EUTF indicator 1.1, in Guinea, June 2022	66
Figure 39: EUTF indicator 2.9, in Guinea, June 2022	67
Figure 40: Mali – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2022.....	69
Figure 41: EUTF portfolio in Mali, June 2022.....	70
Figure 42: Situation in Mali and EUTF outputs – as of June 2022	71
Figure 43: EUTF indicator 2.3, in Mali, June 2022	73
Figure 44: EUTF indicator 2.9, support through infrastructures building, in Mali, June 2022.....	74
Figure 45: EUTF indicator 4.3, activities on conflict prevention/peacebuilding, in Mali, June 2022	75
Figure 46: EUTF indicator 3.2, migrants in transit beneficiaries, in Mali, June 2022.....	76
Figure 47: Mauritania – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2022	78
Figure 48: EUTF portfolio in Mauritania, June 2022.....	79
Figure 49: Selected EUTF outputs in Mauritania, June 2022	80
Figure 50: EUTF indicator 1.4, in Mauritania, June 2022	81
Figure 51: EUTF indicator 4.1 bis, in Mauritania, June 2022.....	82
Figure 52: Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2022	84
Figure 53: EUTF portfolio in Niger, June 2022.....	85
Figure 54: Selected EUTF outputs in Niger, June 2022	86
Figure 55: EUTF indicator 2.6, in Niger, June 2022	87
Figure 56: EUTF indicator 1.1, in Niger, June 2022	89
Figure 57: Nigeria – Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2022.....	93
Figure 58: EUTF portfolio in Nigeria, June 2022.....	94
Figure 59: Selected EUTF outputs in Nigeria, June 2022	95
Figure 60: EUTF indicator 4.3, in Nigeria, June 2022.....	96
Figure 61: EUTF indicator 4.2, in Nigeria, June 2022.....	97
Figure 62: EUTF indicator 6.2, in Nigeria, June 2022.....	98
Figure 63: Senegal - Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2022.....	100
Figure 64: EUTF portfolio in Senegal, June 2022.....	102
Figure 65: Selected EUTF outputs in Senegal, June 2022.....	103
Figure 66: EUTF indicator 4.1 bis, in Senegal, June 2022	104
Figure 67: EUTF indicator 1.4, in Senegal, June 2022	106
Figure 68: The Gambia - Key facts and figures dashboard, June 2022	108
Figure 69: EUTF portfolio in The Gambia, June 2022.....	109

Figure 70: Selected EUTF outputs in The Gambia, June 2022	110
Figure 71: EUTF indicator 3.7, in The Gambia, June 2022	112
Figure 72: Spending of EUTF SLC funds	115

6.3. OUTCOME ANALYSES

Outcome analysis 1: ProGEM project (NE-02-01) in Niger	90
Outcome analysis 2: MIITG GIZ project (GM-03-01) in The Gambia	113