



CONFLICT PREVENTION, PEACE, AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE YOUTH

Lessons learned from a consortium approach to stability and conflict prevention in Kenya

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Cover picture: Former students from the partner Vocational Training Centres of the EU-GIZ project in Mtwapa Demonstration Centre in Malindi (Kilifi County) and Mazeras Replication Centre (Kwale County), supported by GIZ with a representative of their implementing partner CAP YEI (Capacity-building Manager).

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EUTF MONITORING AND LEARNING SYSTEM (MLS)

The EU Trust Fund (EUTF) Horn of Africa (HoA) Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) was initiated in July 2017 and is being implemented by Altai Consulting. The overall objective of the MLS is to strengthen the EUTF interventions in the HoA region through the creation of a monitoring and learning system, which should provide an evidence-based approach for programming and implementing interventions.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AKF	Aga Khan Foundation
CAP YEI	CAP Youth Empowerment Institute Kenya
CSO	Civil society organisation
CVE	Countering violent extremism
EU	European Union
EUTF	European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTF for Africa)
FGD	Focus group discussion
GIZ	<i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</i>
HoA	Horn of Africa
IP	Implementing partner
KES	Kenyan Shilling
KII	Key informant interview
KRCS	Kenya Red Cross Society
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MLS	Monitoring and Learning System
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
RCT	Randomised controlled trial
REF	Research and Evidence Facility
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute
SAIDC	Slovak Agency for International Development Cooperation
VE	Violent extremism
VTC	Vocational training centre

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTF for Africa, hereafter EUTF), inter alia, funds three projects that aim to contribute to reducing conflict and increasing economic opportunities for youth in marginalised areas of Kenya. The three projects are grouped under one programme – *Conflict Prevention, Peace, and Economic Opportunities for the Youth*¹ – and activities include the following:

- The **Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)** provides, through its implementing partner, CAP Youth Empowerment Institute (CAP YEI), both direct training to vulnerable youth and capacity building to selected vocational training centres (VTCs).
- The **Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)** has set up a mentorship programme for youth at risk of engaging in violent extremism (VE), gives training to law enforcement officers, and conducts communications and research activities related to VE.
- The **Kenya Red Cross Society (KRCS)** provides youth groups with training and equipment for their business projects, funds the tuition fees of youth willing to engage in vocational training, organises peace forums, and conducts research on drivers of conflict. KRCS specifically targets youth previously involved with gangs or abusing drugs.

Separately, the European Union (EU) – not the EUTF – is funding a fourth project implemented by the **Aga Khan Foundation (AKF)**, titled *Improving Social and Economic Opportunities for the Youth in Northern Kenya*, which targets the same age group and deals with the same thematic and geographical areas as the organisations listed above.

The four organisations and the EU management expressed the wish to reinforce and operationalise synergies between the projects to increase their effectiveness and sustainability, and the EUTF Horn of Africa Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) team proposed to investigate pathways by which to do so. In addition, it was suggested that a case study would present an opportunity to begin thinking about the links between skills development and livelihoods support on the one side, and conflict prevention on the other. The case study started with a review of project documents and relevant literature, followed by two weeks of fieldwork in Mombasa, Kilifi and Lamu County, where 21 key informant interviews (KIIs) and 11 focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted.

FGDs conducted during the fieldwork suggest that the development of skills and the support of livelihoods can impact conflict prevention in many ways; however, analysing the nature of this relationship will require further research and additional monitoring and evaluation (M&E) tools to build on these initial findings. FGDs highlighted that the projects may have impacted beneficiaries' attitudes towards conflict notably through increasing the earnings of youth, keeping them busy and making them socialise. However, the projects' M&E mechanisms do not allow for a formal quantitative evaluation of the impact of the programme on conflict, violence and extremism,² though RUSI, and to a lesser extent GIZ, track changes in attitudes and perceptions towards violence among their beneficiaries. Additionally, the reviewed literature, which deals with projects similar to the ones investigated during the case study, does not find a definitive causal link between developing skills and livelihoods on one side and conflict prevention on the other.

The case study also found that because of the way the current projects were designed, the consortium structure of the programme cannot be fully taken advantage of. It could, however,

¹ Under the same programme, the Slovak Agency for International Development Cooperation (SAIDC) is funding another project that is targeting youth and non-youth alike and was therefore not looked at in this case study.

² In the case of GIZ, the Delegation Agreement with the EU was not designed with this specific impact in mind, which has therefore not been measured.

be a source of important synergies for future conflict prevention programmes. The current programme was designed in such a way that opportunities for increasing synergies between the current projects are now very limited: projects were designed to target different geographical areas to avoid overlap, have different strategic goals,³ and are already at an advanced stage with most if not all of current and future beneficiaries recruited.⁴ However, given that the consortium structure puts together organisations with diverse and complementary expertise and know-how, it could deliver net benefits for future programming. Compared to a situation where projects are implemented independently from one another, the consortium approach can generate two sources of synergies:

- Firstly, though additional research is needed, existing literature suggests that for stabilisation interventions to have an impact on individuals at risk of engaging in conflict because of several drivers (e.g. poverty, radicalisation by peers, harassment by the police), as many individual drivers as possible should be addressed by the intervention. The consortium approach could allow to do just that, since each organisation in the consortium has solid experience providing answers to one or several specific driver(s).
- Secondly, if a beneficiary can potentially access all consortium activities, it is more likely that s/he will take part in the most relevant activity or activities to him/her. This will allow targeting the most important driver(s) of conflict for this individual (for example, somebody most at risk of radicalisation will presumably benefit most from being mentored). A strategic combination and phasing of activities proposed by the different organisations may also maximise the benefits for participants, with individuals taking part in the most relevant activities for them at different points in time (for example, mentoring followed by vocational training).

For future programmes, these two types of synergies can be operationalised if all beneficiaries are a priori eligible for all programme activities, and if each organisation focuses on the activities for which it has a comparative advantage. This strategy requires some common initial targeting criteria – alongside specific ones for each activity. Common initial criteria, in turn, imply that all organisations share the same strategic goal. This would unlock additional synergies (in regards to communications, for example), as organisations would then share the same definition of success. If the common strategic goal of future programming is determined to be conflict prevention, for example, a future consortium could conduct a common conflict analysis and an at least partially common mobilisation and recruitment process, wherein persons⁵ at risk of engaging in violent behaviours would be selected for the most suitable activity/ies (mentorship and/or vocational training, etc.). Each activity would then be implemented by the most relevant organisation, based on their expertise. Finally, a properly resourced formal impact evaluation building on existing expertise in this field could contribute to furthering the research on the links between skills/livelihoods development and conflict prevention.

³ GIZ will measure its impact through the increase in livelihoods opportunities in targeted areas. KRCS adds to this a measure of the reduction in violent incidents. RUSI's impact focuses on reduced radicalisation, recruitment and support to violent extremist groups.

⁴ An exception to the lack of possible synergies within the current programme is the proposition, taken up by consortium members following the fieldwork for the case study, to connect RUSI beneficiaries with the support that KRCS provides to livelihoods groups in Mombasa.

⁵ Depending on the findings of the conflict analysis, future programming could lift age restrictions for some activities.

2. BACKGROUND AND PROJECTS OVERVIEW

2.1. OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED BY EACH CONSORTIUM PARTNER

The programme *Conflict Prevention, Peace, and Economic Opportunities for the Youth*, funded by the EUTF, aims at addressing the root causes of conflict in areas of Kenya that present a high risk of violent conflict and forced displacement (the coastal and north-eastern regions as well as Nairobi, for one project). The programme therefore contributes to the EUTF Horn of Africa window strategic priority to ‘increase stability in peripheral areas’⁶, and to the EUTF strategic objectives 1 (SO1) ‘create greater economic and employment opportunities, especially for young people and women’; and 4 (SO4) ‘improved governance and conflict prevention’. The programme is comprised of four projects:

- Three projects targeted at the youth, implemented by GIZ, KRCS and RUSI. The projects started in the Fall of 2016 and have an overall budget of €12 million. Due to the fact that all of the projects target youth in coastal and/or north-eastern counties, the three organisations were gathered in a consortium which, inter alia, organises regular coordination meetings in Nairobi.
- One project implemented by the Slovak Agency for International Development Cooperation (SAIDC) in coastal counties, but as it does not target youth in particular, is not a part of the consortium.

Separately, the EU (but not the EUTF) is funding a project implemented by AKF targeted at youth in some coastal and north-eastern counties and in the same thematic areas as the KRCS and GIZ projects (skills and livelihoods development); hence, this project was integrated within the consortium.

The following section gives an overview of the activities conducted by the four consortium partners.

2.1.1. AKF

AKF strengthens the technical and institutional capacity of a network of civil society organisations (CSOs) to deliver socio-economic programming for youth groups in Lamu, Garissa and Mandera; builds the capacity of VTCs in the three counties to deliver value-based education and market-led skills for vulnerable youth; and provides equipment to workshops willing to take in apprentices. The youth groups supported (mainly through training and the provision of equipment) include agribusiness clusters, village savings and loan associations, as well as groups engaged in small non-agribusiness. Contrary to KRCS (see section 2.1.3 below), AKF does not target youth impacted by or involved in conflict, and most often the youth groups already existed before they started being assisted by the (AKF-supported) CSOs. The project also aims to improve understanding between youth and other stakeholders and to build youth advocacy capacity; to this end, AKF organises forums between youth and government officers, radio talk shows and events in schools.

⁶ Minutes of the third board meeting of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF for Africa), Brussels, 30 June 2017.

2.1.2. GIZ

GIZ provides labour market-oriented and demand-driven vocational training to vulnerable youth, and capacity building to VTCs, through its implementing partner CAP YEI. Three types of VTCs are supported by GIZ (see Focus Box 1).

Focus Box 1: Types of VTCs Supported by GIZ

GIZ supports VTCs which are divided into three categories:

- **‘Demonstration centres’**, which are run entirely by GIZ’s implementing partner, CAP YEI, and which will close or be used for new activities once the project ends. In demonstration centres, both vulnerable youths and staff from other VTCs are trained by CAP YEI staff. Demonstration centres serve as a platform to showcase best practices related to labour market-oriented and demand-driven vocational training.
- **‘Replication centres’**, which are public VTCs under the mandate of the county governments. They provide classrooms to CAP YEI staff to conduct their labour market-oriented and demand-driven training. The governmental teachers of the host centres are invited to observe and participate in all activities implemented by CAP YEI (e.g. mobilisation, integration of life skills, engagement with private sector etc.).
- **‘Partner VTCs’**, where no training is directly provided to youth by CAP YEI. The staff of partner VTCs are provided with capacity building in the demonstration centres to encourage them to adopt labour market-oriented and demand-driven vocational training.

There are in total 27 partner VTCs, 6 replication and 4 demonstration centres (see list in Annex 6.1).⁷

CAP YEI first commissions in-depth market assessments, called ‘market scans’, which assess job markets in the areas of intervention (including employers’ profiles and specific recruitment needs), as well as youth profiles and aspirations. The market scans are updated every year and are used to tailor the vocational training courses to employers’ and labour market needs.

The registration fees of students taught by CAP YEI staff in demonstration and replication centres are subsidised (around KES 2,000, or approximately €17, for three months), and students also receive a start-up kit for their chosen economic activity upon graduation. For eight hours every day, the students first go through one to two weeks of life skills training, followed by three months of technical courses and five weeks of internship for practical training and industry exposure, which the project staff help them to find. During classroom training, students also take part in further modules on work readiness skills, entrepreneurial skills and engagement with the private sector through guest lectures or field visits. After completion of 14 training batches, an average of 73% of beneficiaries have been successfully placed in employment.

2.1.3. KRCS

KRCS forms youth groups and provides them with training and equipment for their business projects. KRCS aims to train 43 groups of 15 to 20 youth on group dynamics and business plan development, followed by a three-day technical training. Groups are then given equipment to start

⁷ Additionally, two ‘models’ were set up for specific areas where training facilities are not easily accessible or not available and/or where economic opportunities are lacking:

- Youth living in remote areas of Lamu, Tana River and Taita Taveta, and who would normally not be able to come for training at the VTCs, can study in a VTC in Mtwapa with the goal that they then engage in economic activities in the Mtwapa area (‘portable’ model);
- Due to limited access to training combined with the tense security situation in Mandera County, eligible youth from this county can study in Thika (close to Nairobi) before going back to Mandera to start economic activities there (‘residential’ model).

their business, which can be worth up to KES 500,000 (or approximately €4,300) per group – but they do not receive any cash assistance.

KRCS also funds the tuition and exam fees as well as start-up kits⁸ of other youth willing to engage in vocational training. It focuses on this support to vocational training in north-eastern areas, while activities in coastal counties are instead aimed at supporting youth groups (as there are already many vocational training initiatives along the coast).

In both cases, the project targets youth previously involved in violent activities (including gangs) or drug abuse, or who have a family member previously engaged, injured or killed in a violent activity or conflict (see beneficiaries' targeting criteria for all organisations in Annex 6.2).

KRCS also organises a series of police-community dialogues and trains government officials on 'accountability to communities'.

2.1.4. RUSI

In Mombasa (and in Nairobi), RUSI has set up a mentorship programme for youth at risk of engaging in violent extremism. They are connected to 'mentors' and fellow 'mentees' with whom they have regular informal discussions, aiming in particular at shifting their focus towards constructive attitudes to life. Mentors are members of the mentees' community, aged 20 to 34 years old, who are recruited in particular because of their ethics, 'humanist values', good deeds in the community and because they can show that they made positive life choices. In some cases, mentors will be former mentees who 'graduated' from the mentorship programme. Each mentor organises group meetings with his/her five mentees every two weeks, and they share experiences around a topic of their choice. Mentors also meet regularly with their mentees on a one-on-one basis. They are regularly trained by RUSI on specific topics (building common understanding on mentorship and VE, life skills, etc.).

In addition to the mentorship programme, RUSI provides CVE-related (countering violent extremism) training to law enforcement officers, produces research on the drivers of conflict in partnership with national researchers, and is engaged in preventive communications activities aiming in particular at strengthening the voice of the youth in Kenya media.

2.2. OBJECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE CASE STUDY

This case study was initiated following a request from the EU delegation in Nairobi and the consortium partners to identify practical steps to enhance the synergies between the four partners, to gather insights regarding the link between skills development and conflict prevention, and to begin a process of reflection on how to measure the impact of the projects.

However, during the case study it appeared that, while the consortium approach seemed very relevant for conflict prevention programming, the way the current programme was designed and the level of advancement of the project did not allow for maximising the synergies arising from this consortium approach. Therefore, the MLS team decided to focus on the identification of practical steps to enhance synergies within potential *future* programming in similar geographical and thematic areas.⁹


The following activities were conducted throughout the case study:

⁸ Basic equipment that a VTC graduate may need as s/he starts a new business.

⁹ The MLS team also extended the initial scope of work by investigating the link between livelihoods support and conflict prevention (and not only skills development and conflict prevention), so as to be able to include all projects within the case study.

- **Project documents were reviewed, as was the available literature** investigating the link between skills/livelihoods development and conflict prevention;
- **KIIs and FGDs were organised in Mombasa, Kilifi and Lamu counties** with project staff from each of the implementing partners, project beneficiaries as well as government officials involved in issues related to youth and security (see map in Figure 1 below). Fieldwork lasted two weeks, and 21 KIIs and 11 FGDs were organised in total. During the fieldwork, additional documents were also provided by project staff.

Figure 1: Counties Where Activities of the Four Projects are Implemented and Locations of FGDs



3. PREVENTING CONFLICT THROUGH SKILLS AND LIVELIHOODS DEVELOPMENT

A key hypothesis underlying the theory of change in the *Conflict Prevention, Peace, and Economic Opportunities for the Youth* programme is that there is a positive link between vocational training and livelihoods support on one side and peace on the other.¹⁰ The first part of the case study investigates this link,¹¹ both based on the existing literature and on interviews conducted with project staff and beneficiaries. Findings can be considered relevant for the first specific objective of the programme (*‘to enhance understanding of sources of conflict and exclusion’*), and could also be useful for other EUTF-funded projects that would base their theory of change on the hypothesis that there is a positive link between skills/livelihoods development and conflict prevention.

3.1. LINK BETWEEN PROJECT ACTIVITIES AND CONFLICT PREVENTION AS SUGGESTED BY THE LITERATURE

The literature identifies two main channels through which skills and livelihoods development projects can impact conflict prevention: an indirect impact by creating employment/livelihoods (3.1.1), and a direct impact through simply participation in the project (3.1.2).



3.1.1. INDIRECT IMPACT THROUGH IMPROVED EMPLOYMENT AND LIVELIHOODS

The first possible impact identified by the literature is indirect. Skills and livelihoods development projects improve employment or livelihoods outcomes, which in turn contribute to conflict prevention through two main theoretical channels: opportunity costs and reduced grievances. The former infers that if project beneficiaries earn more money, they will be less likely to engage in violent activities that would involve giving up on their salary; the latter hypothesises that if violence is fuelled by resentment against the government or by perceived injustices between different population groups, giving opportunities to the aggrieved group may decrease these grievances and therefore their motivation to resort to violence.

However, the empirical relevance of these hypotheses remains mostly untested. The description of the *Conflict Prevention, Peace, and Economic Opportunities for the Youth* programme

¹⁰ ‘If young people are given inclusive access to better vocational educational opportunities which lead to decent jobs and livelihoods for target groups, then grievances will decline, and better economic opportunities will be created. This will contribute to reduced vulnerability, enhanced economic stability and positive peace.’ (‘Fiche action’ for the programme).

¹¹ The case study will not investigate the ‘opposite’ link—how conflict can effect employment and vocational training opportunities. Issues relevant to this latter link were, however, noted during the field research: in Mbwajumlawi (Lamu County) for example, KRCS beneficiaries mentioned that they could not access the VTC on the island because it is located in a village with which Mbwajumlawi residents have a long-term feud. Other FGD participants mentioned that, because of such inter-village feuds, they had to make a costly detour to go to Lamu Town –where most market opportunities are located – or that some fishermen were sometimes unable to fish in common fishing grounds.

cites Overseas Development Institute (ODI 2013) and Walton (2010) to support the hypothesised link between employment and peace.¹² But the ODI paper (a literature review) finds only one study exploring the link between employment and social cohesion – a study it describes as ‘*of limited technical robustness*’.¹³ The review concludes that ‘*there is very limited empirical evidence directly illuminating the impact of employment creation on stability*’. Similarly, Walton (2010) also concludes that ‘*both the theoretical and empirical cases for using youth employment programmes as a stand-alone tool for reducing violent conflict are extremely weak. Donor interventions have been poorly evaluated and evidence of success is usually limited to demonstrating increases in employment levels, with little effort made to assess the impact on conflict*’.^{14,15}

The most solid study investigating the link between employment and conflict encountered in this case study’s literature review is an impact evaluation conducted in Afghanistan by Mercy Corps. It finds that, while vocational training increased employment, improved employment did not have any impact on the willingness to use violence for political or other reasons.¹⁶ Other studies with weaker methodologies¹⁷ come to mixed conclusions. In research conducted in 2011 in Kenya, Mercy Corps finds that being willing to or having already engaged in violence for a political cause was negatively correlated with the ability to satisfy basic needs, but that there was no significant link with unemployment.¹⁸ In Somaliland and Puntland, Mercy Corps (2013) finds that employment status does not correlate with a propensity towards political violence.¹⁹

Employment and improved earnings could play a less important role in the case of violent extremism compared to other types of conflict. Rink and Sharma (2011) find that, among Kenyans, being employed is not correlated with higher disagreements with extremist statements.²⁰ Botha (2014) notes that only 4% of the Kenyan al-Shabaab members she interviewed said they joined the group for economic reasons, against 87% for religious reasons and 6% for a mix of religious and economic reasons.²¹

3.1.2. IMPACT THROUGH PROGRAMME PARTICIPATION

Even without necessarily improving employment outcomes, participation in skills or livelihoods development projects could by itself contribute to conflict prevention. Providing training or livelihoods opportunities may be effective in reducing grievances against the government; participants could be provided an opportunity to socialise with people from groups they do not

¹² ‘*It is widely assumed that access to jobs improves social cohesion (WB, 2013; ODI, 2013; Walton, 2010).*’ (Fiche action).

¹³ ODI, ‘What is the Evidence on the Impact of Employment Creation on Stability and Poverty Reduction in Fragile States: A Systematic Review’, 2013.

¹⁴ Oliver Walton, ‘Youth, Armed Violence and Job Creation Programmes: A Rapid Mapping Study’, 2010.

¹⁵ One can also cite Brück et al. (2016), which finds that about 30% of employment programmes in fragile and conflict-affected states have peace-building stated as a main-line goal, but the authors do ‘*not find any evaluation that specifically assessed the impact of employment on peacebuilding*’. They conclude: ‘*we remain uncommitted on the nature of the empirical relationship between employment interventions and peacebuilding.*’ (Tilman Brück et al., ‘Jobs Aid Peace: A Review of the Theory and Practice of the Impact of Employment Programmes on Peace in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries’, 2016).

¹⁶ Mercy Corps, ‘Does Youth Employment Bring Stability: Evidence From an Impact Evaluation of Vocational Training in Afghanistan’, January 2015.

¹⁷ Such studies use panel data instead of (quasi-) experiments, which means that even though some variables are ‘controlled for’, findings can only be interpreted as correlations.

¹⁸ Mercy Corps, ‘Understanding Political Violence Among Youth: Evidence from Kenya on the Links Between Youth Economic Independence, Social Integration, and Stability’, June 2011.

¹⁹ Mercy Corps, ‘Examining the Links Between Youth Economic Opportunity, Civic Engagement, and Conflict: Evidence from Mercy Corps’ Somali Youth Leaders Initiative’, January 2013.

²⁰ Rink, Anselm; Sharma, Kunaal, ‘The Determinants of Religious Radicalisation: Evidence from Kenya’, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2016.

²¹ Anneli Botha, ‘Radicalisation in Kenya: Recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council’, ISS Paper 265, September 2014. One should, however, note that such questions typically lead to biased answers, as former al-Shabaab militants will probably not readily admit that they were attracted by monetary rewards as opposed to the religious reasons advertised by the organisation.

typically spend time or *a priori* get along with; and trainings could provide skills that participants could utilise in solving conflicts peacefully.²²

However, most studies investigating the impact of such projects on conflict prevention find no significant effect. An impact evaluation conducted by Blattman et al. (2013) finds that a project that provided cash grants to groups of Ugandan youth, with half of the funds dedicated to training, had had no effect on aggression and disputes four years after the project.²³ Another impact evaluation by Blattman and Annan (2014) finds that after providing agricultural training and capital to Liberian ex-fighters, the men were less engaged with mercenary recruiters during a neighbouring war, but there was no evidence that the programme affected non-monetary violence or socio-political integration.²⁴ A review of nine studies of job placements/vocational training programmes specifically aimed at preventing youth crime and delinquency in the United States concludes that only two studies found short-term positive impacts – including one that presented self-selection issues.²⁵ Of the remaining seven studies, six found no impact and one study found that the project actually led to increased criminal behaviour.²⁶

The literature suggests that providing education or training may in fact be counterproductive if it does not directly lead to effective employment. Two quantitative research papers support this idea:²⁷ Bhatia and Ghanem (2017) find that having a relatively high level of education (secondary or tertiary) has a *positive* impact on support for extremism when a person is unemployed or underemployed,²⁸ while Brockhoff et al. (2012) find that '*countries with higher levels of education will experience (ceteris paribus) higher levels of terrorism when country-specific (socioeconomic, political, institutional, demographic etc.) circumstances are poor*'.²⁹

3.2. LINK BETWEEN PROJECT ACTIVITIES AND CONFLICT PREVENTION AS SUGGESTED BY THE FIELDWORK

Discussions with project staff and beneficiaries led to the identification of several channels through which skills development and livelihoods support can impact conflict prevention. FGDs with beneficiaries highlighted changes in their involvement in conflict and violence since their participation in the projects. For example, some KRCS beneficiaries reported less drug use and subsequently a reduced involvement in crime, while GIZ current or former students reported quitting gang involvement and/or drugs since entering the vocational training programme. Though the qualitative methods used for the case study are not appropriate to generalise these findings and attribute them to the projects (and this is, in any case, not the objective of the case study), they

²² See, for example: Clayton L. Thyne, 'ABC's, 123's, and the Golden Rule: The Pacifying Effect of Education on Civil War, 1980–1999', 2006.

²³ Christopher Blattman, Nathan Fiala & Sebastian Martinez, 'The Economic and Social Returns to Cash Transfers: Evidence from a Ugandan Aid Programme', 2013.

²⁴ Christopher Blattman & Jeannie Annan, 'Can Employment Reduce Lawlessness and Rebellion? A Field Experiment with High-risk Men in a Fragile State', 2014.

²⁵ If youth self-select into a programme, it is unlikely that the difference in outcomes between them and youth who chose not to join the programme is fully due to the programme, as external factors probably influence both self-selection and outcomes (e.g. motivation, etc.).

²⁶ World Health Organisation, 'Preventing Violence by Developing Life Skills in Children and Adolescents', 2009.

²⁷ See also Mercy Corps, 'Youth and Consequences: Unemployment, Injustice and Violence', 2015: '*Supply-side vocational training projects, not linked to meaningful employment in the marketplace, risk raising expectations that cannot be satisfied. And where programmes fail to target the most marginalised—as many do—or have been manipulated by local elites, they may aggravate perceptions of unfairness.*'

²⁸ Kartika Bhatia and Hafez Ghanem, 'How Do Education and Unemployment Affect Support for Violent Extremism? Evidence from Eight Arab Countries', 2017.

²⁹ Sarah Brockhoff, Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierrieks, 'Great Expectations and Hard Times – The (Nontrivial) Impact of Education on Domestic Terrorism', 2012.

highlight potential channels through which skills and livelihoods development could influence conflict prevention. It is, however, important to keep in mind that most of the channels highlighted below rely on explanations for violence provided by the youths themselves, who may tend to overemphasise socio-economic justifications.³⁰

With this in mind, almost all the interviewed beneficiaries and key informants mentioned that the programme was useful because it addresses key channels through which *youth unemployment* impacts violence: lack of money (3.2.1), idleness (3.2.2) and grievances (3.2.3).

3.2.1. INCREASED ECONOMIC OUTCOMES

Project activities could effect violence driven by monetary incentives by reducing extreme poverty among beneficiaries, thus limiting the incentives to engage in illegal activities as a means of survival.

It remains to be seen whether the projects will reduce poverty sufficiently to make criminality less attractive; a key informant suggested that *'giving a few chickens will not allow*

[the youth] to earn enough; criminality will remain more lucrative'.³¹ Based on information gathered from the FGDs, GIZ beneficiaries who find a job following the programme are estimated to earn KES 8,000 (€70) on average per month in their first job out of the vocational training programme, or the minimum wage in Kenya.³² Similarly, according to their business plans (and thus a likely upper limit), KRCS youth group beneficiaries were planning to earn KES 10,000 (€86) per person per month. This is unlikely to be sufficient to compensate for the revenues lost by giving up on criminal activities – but it may be enough to cover basic needs, and thus decreasing incentives to steal to survive. In addition, criminality entails important non-monetary costs, such as the risk of being arrested or killed by the police, which should also be considered.

'Unemployed people still need to care for their families and so they will rob neighbours.'

(KRCS beneficiary in Mbwajumlawi)

'I engaged in illegal activities in order to sustain myself.'

(RUSI mentee in Kisauni)

In line with the literature, focus group participants and key informants diverged as to whether increased economic opportunities could decrease violent extremism. Some believed that it would not change anything: *'Even if you have more money, that will not change. What matters is the mindset'*;³³ *'The mind controls everything. You can't be convinced not to kill children, women, with money'*.³⁴ Others underlined that poverty is one of the issues (among many others) that the extremists use to attract youth by making them hope for a better life: *'If you don't have a job and someone offers you money, you can be manipulated'*;³⁵ *'When the recruiters come, they promise you money; they tell you that you can get money to get married'*;³⁶ *'Here there is not one issue, there are many: they will use whatever you are going through to recruit you.'*³⁷

3.2.2. KEEPING YOUTH BUSY

Keeping youth busy through employment creation could contribute to conflict prevention: indeed, almost all focus groups and key informants mentioned idleness as

'An idle mind is the devil's workshop.'

(Three separate key informants and FGD participants)

³⁰ Discussions with RUSI programme manager.

³¹ KII with Mr. Kyalo, County Executive Committee Member for Youth, Gender and Sports.

³² FGD with 11 former CAP YEI students in Likoni Holy Ghost VTC.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ RUSI Kisauni mentee.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ RUSI Majengo mentee, who had been radicalised by al-Shabaab before he joined the mentorship programme.

³⁷ FGD with RUSI mentors in Kisauni.

a factor for violence. According to them, idleness often leads to drug use which in turn fuels violence, both because of the need to get significant amounts of money to sustain the addiction, and because of the way drug use affects judgement. Keeping youth busy through employment creation is likely to be a particularly important conflict prevention channel for GIZ beneficiaries, 73% of whom are placed in sustainable jobs following the vocational training programme.

The sole act of participating in the programme may reduce idleness. For example, GIZ beneficiaries sit in their classroom from 8am to 5pm every day and are encouraged to take part in common activities during the weekend. A former beneficiary mentioned that all students in his class had stopped using drugs because, *'if you are working, your time is occupied, so you reduce your desire for drugs, and over time the desire disappears'*. Another former student noted that, of the five youth from his neighbourhood who took part in the vocational training programme, three had been using drugs, and they had all stopped during the programme *'because they are busy'*.³⁸ All FGD participants who were asked if they were busier now or before they started the project indicated that they were busier after they started the project.

3.2.3. REDUCED GRIEVANCES

Creating employment and better livelihoods among beneficiaries may also reduce some participants' grievances. Youth mentioned the fact that they felt ignored by the government and harassed by the police. In the case of the coastal counties, informants mentioned that some youth perceived that non-coastal Kenyans were *'stealing their jobs'*.³⁹

Nevertheless, none of the beneficiaries mentioned that their view of the government had changed following participation in the projects, likely because they perceive the services provided as coming from the implementing partners and not the government. In the case of vocational training in particular, a reflection could be initiated on the need to highlight and communicate the efforts made by the government to support the participants in the projects,⁴⁰ for example by advertising better the fact that the government subsidises registration fees for some KRCS beneficiaries.⁴¹

RUSI beneficiaries did underline the benefits of the discussions they had had with police officers within the context of the project,⁴² though almost all FGD participants (including from KRCS and GIZ) mentioned that the police was still, in their view, part of the problem, as they harass, arrest and even kill youth.⁴³ In this regard, RUSI and KRCS could advertise more extensively the part of their programming targeted at law enforcement officers to make sure that the youth understand that the organisations do not consider the youth to be solely the problem, as there are efforts to address the action of law enforcement officers also.⁴⁴

3.2.4. SOCIALISATION

³⁸ FGD with 11 former CAP YEI students in Likoni Holy Ghost VTC.

³⁹ KRCS staff in Lamu suggested, for example, that *'since outsiders are believed to steal their jobs, for the youth it is normal to steal money from the outsiders'*.

⁴⁰ The RUSI project manager expressed caution and asked for a reflection on whether contributing to a positive view of the government should be the consortium's role, and what the implications of doing so could be.

⁴¹ KRCS beneficiaries in Kisauni mentioned that they recently applied to a separate, government-led programme that covers tuition fees for vocational training and that knowing about this opportunity improved their view of the government.

⁴² FGD with RUSI mentees in Majengo.

⁴³ For example, during the fieldwork for this case study, a former gang leader who had defected and become a KRCS beneficiary was shot by the police under unclear circumstances.

⁴⁴ For example, a RUSI mentee in Kisauni said that RUSI was not doing anything to address the issue of police harassment, while RUSI is providing training to law enforcement officers precisely about such issues.

All the projects' activities focus on placing the youth in group settings. In doing so, they serve to decrease conflict both by making youth meet and socialise with people from groups they may initially be in conflict with (3.2.4.1) and by creating a sense of belonging among beneficiaries, which could discourage them from joining violent groups (3.2.4.2). Additionally, several activities connect youth with 'role models' who can act as catalysts for positive change (3.2.4.3).

'The group is like family.'
(KRCS beneficiary in Kisauni)

'I used to fear being killed when I visited Kisauni, not anymore.' (RUSI mentee in Majengo)

3.2.4.1. Socialisation with different types of people

Through their participation in the programme, beneficiaries are exposed to people they would usually not spend time with. GIZ beneficiaries gathered in a classroom come from various backgrounds; both Christians and Muslims engage in vocational training, for example, and *'they see that all communities face the same issues'*, which, according to one key informant, brings them closer to the other community.⁴⁵ Some organisations also organise 'exposure visits': for example, AKF took youth groups from Lamu to show them successful groups in Mpeketoni and even Garissa. KRCS beneficiaries are gathered during youth forums. RUSI organises common biweekly meetings between mentors and mentees from communities that traditionally do not get along (Majengo and Kisauni): *'At the beginning the two groups of mentees did not get along, they would sit on opposite sides of the room; there is a history of confrontations between the areas. But they even became friends now. Also, sometimes we have common activities, like we go to the beach together.'*⁴⁶

3.2.4.2. Sense of belonging

Because beneficiaries are either in youth groups, vocational training classes or regularly meeting other mentees, all projects can contribute to creating a sense of belonging, which, in turn, may decrease the comparative attractiveness of joining violent groups, be it violent extremist groups or gangs.⁴⁷ Beneficiaries from KRCS, AKF and RUSI all described their livelihoods/class/mentee group as 'family'.⁴⁸ Though some youth may have lost friends when leaving gangs or violent extremist groups, almost all those who were asked about friends said that they had more now than before.⁴⁹ KRCS beneficiaries even contribute towards a "social fund" that can be used in the event of the death of a family member, for example.

3.2.4.3. Role models

Some projects do not only encourage socialisation through peers, but also through role models who can act as catalysts for change. This is the case for RUSI mentors,⁵⁰ but also potentially for successful business people that GIZ beneficiaries can work for during their internships or employment. Both approaches are interesting: RUSI selects people from the mentees' community and within the same age range, assuming that identification will encourage a positive influence by the

⁴⁵ KII with Likoni Holy Ghost VTC director.

⁴⁶ RUSI Majengo mentee.

⁴⁷ See, for example: James Khalil and Martine Zeuthen, 'Countering Violent Extremism and Risk Reduction: A Guide to Programme Design and Evaluation', 2016, and Daryl Harris, Russell Turner, Ian Garrett and Sally Atkinson, 'Understanding the Psychology of Gang Violence: Implications for Designing Effective Violence Interventions', 2011.

⁴⁸ KRCS group in Kisauni, AKF agribusiness group in Shella, RUSI mentees in Kisauni.

⁴⁹ However, two out of five students from the GIZ-supported Mtwapa VTC mentioned that they now have less friends, because before they used to have all their gang member friends, and *'now only two or three, as three months [the duration of the vocational training in the VTC] is too short to make friends'*.

⁵⁰ As mentioned above, the selection criteria for RUSI mentors include: their ethics, 'humanist values', and good deeds in the community.

mentor on the mentee; while GIZ attempts to place youth in employed positions with successful people from different backgrounds, assuming that positive changes will be maximised if the youth spend time outside their original environment. In both cases, beneficiaries linked to employment opportunities (in the case of GIZ) or graduating from the mentorship programme (in the case of RUSI) act as role models for their peers as well.

3.2.5. DIRECT AND INDIRECT CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TRAINING

GIZ, KRCS and RUSI all organise conflict management training for their beneficiaries, though in varying formats. GIZ conflict management trainings are oriented towards conflicts that could arise in the workplace. RUSI organises informal discussions between mentors and mentees around conflict management. KRCS youth group leaders benefit from a two-day conflict management training. Several FGD participants in Mbwajumlawi said that since they had received the conflict management training they would not be afraid to intervene between two people to stop them from fighting.

'In the past, if a conflict started I would let it happen; now I don't hesitate to intervene. I make them sit and I judge based on what they say';

'Before, if somebody talked badly to me, I would attack him. Now I assess the situation first.'

(Current and former GIZ students)

All projects also aim at providing indirect conflict management skills through the strengthening of life skills, such as an increased sense of control, responsibility and self-esteem, stress management training, etc. The focus on life skills constitutes a particularly important part of RUSI's mentorship programme, and the biweekly meetings often discuss aspects of life skills.

3.3. EVALUATING THE EFFECT OF THE PROGRAMME ON STABILITY AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

3.3.1. CURRENT M&E TOOLS OVERVIEW

The M&E systems of the *Conflict Prevention, Peace and Economic Opportunities for the Youth* programme do not include a formal impact evaluation component. Although RUSI suggested the inclusion of such an evaluation in their inception report, the proposition was not taken up by the EU because of the associated costs.

To compensate for the lack of resources required for a more formal mechanism, RUSI put in place surveys intending to capture the perceptions and attitudes of beneficiaries towards violent extremism when they enter the mentorship programme and after 'graduation'.

GIZ, following a similar logic, is conducting post-placement surveys that track attitudes among beneficiaries six months after graduation, but without a parallel survey conducted before youth start vocational training, and only for internal purposes. It would be useful to see whether there could be further harmonisation between the behavioural assessments of RUSI and GIZ, as initially suggested by RUSI in their inception report. GIZ will also conduct a study on the impact of skills development for vulnerable youth in marginalised areas for conflict prevention, based on the example of this project. This exercise could also be conducted partly in collaboration with RUSI (and KRCS).

The M&E tools developed by KRCS do not allow the organisation to assess the effect of its project on conflict prevention. The baseline survey captures the percentage of respondents who feel safe and who witnessed criminal activities, as will the endline survey; however, these surveys are conducted among a representative sample of youth in the areas of intervention (eight counties).

Beneficiaries themselves will not be surveyed quantitatively. This is of significance because we can expect the KRCS project to be only one of the many factors impacting criminality in the eight counties of intervention (see breadth of the area in Figure 2).⁵¹

3.3.2. PROPOSITIONS FOR EVALUATION

3.3.2.1. Measuring a common effect

As suggested by RUSI and in place for its beneficiaries, a repeated measures design – capturing changes over time among project participants – could be implemented among all future youth beneficiaries entering each project.⁵² Youth would be asked a series of questions measuring their attitudes towards violence, perceptions of a number of issues (e.g. of extremist groups, of the police, etc.), and personal perspectives (e.g. positive outlook on life, structure of personal networks), when: 1. they are recruited, 2. upon ‘graduating’ from the project, and, possibly 3. some months after graduating (to measure the sustainability of the effects). Such surveys would, in addition to providing an indication of the programme’s effects, contribute quantitatively to understanding whether skills/livelihoods development have an effect on conflict prevention. Since no budget was planned for a common survey, additional resources would have to be identified for this purpose. If implemented, surveys should start early in 2019, given that the process of recruitment of beneficiaries is already at a late stage.⁵³

3.3.2.2. Suggestions for the evaluations of each consortium member

Even if the consortium does not move forward with the suggested repeated measures design, the case study identified a number of questions that could be investigated during the evaluations conducted by each consortium member:

- What assumptions did the project design rely on? In particular, does every link in the projects’ theory of change have a solid evidence base?
- How were the areas of intervention selected? In particular, how was the choice made to intervene in remote areas as opposed to cities?
- Were beneficiaries’ selection criteria adapted to the expected impact of each project? Including, more specifically: is there a possible discrepancy between the profile of youth most likely to engage in violent behaviour and their ability to fully benefit from this type of project (requiring patience and motivation)? As a consequence, were the most ‘sensitive’ beneficiaries enrolled by the project, or did the programme miss them?
- Was the setup of each activity appropriate, in particular in regards to the number of youth engaged in each group activity? Was the staffing dedicated to the projects appropriate, particularly to ensure systematic follow-up? What steps were undertaken to ensure the sustainability of the project, in particular to make sure that youth do not revert to violent behaviours?
- Is the M&E setup appropriate to measure each project’s intended outcomes and impacts?

⁵¹ KRCS’s mid-term review will capture changes in behaviour towards conflicts, but only qualitatively.

⁵² This could include or not AKF, since they do not share the conflict prevention perspective with the other projects.

⁵³ KRCS has recruited all the members of its supported youth groups except in Mombasa. However, some youth groups could be considered to be at a sufficiently early stage in the project for their first interview to be considered a ‘baseline’.

4. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE CONSORTIUM APPROACH

The programme was not designed to favour cooperation (4.1) but significant synergies could arise from the consortium approach if designed differently in the future (4.2).

4.1. THERE IS LIMITED POTENTIAL TO INCREASE COLLABORATION WITHIN THE CURRENT PROGRAMME


Firstly, the programme was designed in such a way that all four organisations are not present in the same coastal/north-eastern counties, and even when they are in the same county, they may still implement activities too far away from each other to fully benefit from synergies on the ground (see Figure 2 below).⁵⁴ Importantly, this limited overlap between the organisations was designed on purpose, to avoid potential duplication of activities.⁵⁵

Secondly, each project and logical framework was designed and approved with a different main strategic goal in mind: GIZ will measure its impact through the increase in livelihoods opportunities in targeted areas; KRCS adds to this a measurement of the reduction in violent incidents; RUSI's impact focuses on reduced radicalisation, recruitment and support to violent extremist groups.

The difference in intended impacts results in differences in the beneficiary selection criteria (cf. annex 6.2): all consortium members target vulnerable youth but KRCS's written criteria also include youth previously engaged in violent activities or drug abuse, while RUSI specifically targets youth likely to engage in violent extremism. This means that there are few common best practices to be identified around beneficiaries' mobilisation and selection, except maybe in regards to gender parity (see Focus Box 2 below).

A further challenge today is the level of advancement of the projects: as of September 2018, GIZ's demonstration and replication centres are full and have waiting lists of about six to nine months, and the programme will end in September 2019. RUSI reached its target number of mentees, KRCS can only recruit a few additional beneficiaries for livelihoods groups in Mombasa, and AKF already

Figure 2: Locations of programme activities



⁵⁴ Information used for the map was collected in June 2018.

⁵⁵ For example, it was initially decided that GIZ activities would not take place in Mombasa and Lamu because the other organisations were already active there.

formed all its livelihoods groups.

Focus Box 2: Best Practices for Mobilisation and Gender Parity

Since projects target different types of youth, the organisations have adopted practices that are adapted to the specific target: GIZ organises large recruitment drives in poor areas, using local leaders' support to reach as many vulnerable youth as possible; AKF, which aims at empowering CSOs, uses their network to identify relevant youth; KRCS, which aims at recruiting former addicts and gang members, approaches gang leaders, methadone clinics and rehabilitation centres; and RUSI, which targets youth with less overt characteristics (such as having extremist beliefs), works through referrals from a network of local stakeholders, which include parents and teachers.

Gender parity in mobilisation could be a potential exception to the lack of replicable best practices: it was reported that in some areas, KRCS did not achieve its targets in terms of female beneficiaries because of the stigma surrounding gang membership and drug abuse by girls. RUSI's approach seems to solve this concern by not informing beneficiaries of the criteria used for their selection, so female beneficiaries do not know that they are selected because they are thought to be likely to join violent extremist groups and are thus more likely to participate in the project.

This means that perspectives for improving the effectiveness and sustainability of current programming through synergies are limited, with potential exceptions, as follows.

- **In specific cases, beneficiaries could take part in the activities implemented by another organisation.** The suggestion to connect RUSI beneficiaries in Mombasa with KRCS to see whether they would be eligible to receive its support (training and equipment) was made during the fieldwork of the case study and taken up by the partners.⁵⁶ Following up on the laudable initiative by GIZ to provide a one-day life skills training to RUSI mentors, RUSI and KRCS beneficiaries who are supported to attend VTCs could be encouraged to apply to GIZ-supported 'partner' VTCs.⁵⁷

- **Overall coordination could be strengthened.** As suggested by field staff, the consortium meetings in Nairobi could be complemented by similar meetings at the county level, such as a quarterly meeting, and a very simple factual quarterly newsletter. There is also some scope for improving collaboration in the VTCs that are assisted by both GIZ and AKF.⁵⁸

- **When still feasible, consortium partners should build on each others' strengths.** Given RUSI's CVE expertise, for example, it was suggested that a few 'strong' mentors be trained to lead discussions around CVE-related topics (for example, the drivers of VE) in GIZ-supported VTCs. Consortium partners could also learn from RUSI's conflict expertise

Picture 1: The 'Youth for Good Van' in the KRCS parking lot



⁵⁶ This would be particularly relevant as several RUSI FGD participants expressed the need to be supported economically in addition to the psychosocial support they receive. RUSI FGD participants (mentees in Kisauni) mentioned that 'we come here and talk about issues but the issues don't change, like the lack of employment opportunities. Psychologically, the mentorship helps a lot, but not economically'. On the other hand, several mentees mentioned that, solely by discussing entrepreneurship during the biweekly meetings, they felt empowered to start or develop their own business. RUSI staff also regularly presents them with opportunities and several RUSI mentees have, for example, received scholarships to engage in vocational training.

⁵⁷ Since all GIZ 'demonstration' and 'replication' VTCs have already recruited their next two to three batches of future students (equivalent to six to nine months of waiting time), KRCS and RUSI beneficiaries interested in vocational training should focus on the 'partner' VTCs – although, if they are considered very vulnerable, they could in some cases move up the waiting list for the 'demonstration' or 'replication' centres.

⁵⁸ In Lamu, GIZ and AKF, both provide capacity building to Kizingitini and Mukoe VTCs, and they could think about ways to train the instructors from these centres together instead of separately, as is done currently.

for their research projects.⁵⁹ AKF could advise other organisations on how to access government loans, as it provides trainings to its own beneficiaries on how to obtain such loans. GIZ ‘market scans’, if used by the other organisations (when relevant to their areas), could help them advise youth on the type of vocational training or apprenticeships they should engage in.⁶⁰ Finally, other organisations could take advantage of KRCS’s large network of volunteers and of its capacity for mobilisation – for example, GIZ and AKF should follow up on KRCS’s offer to use their ‘Youth for Good Van’ if they conduct further awareness events.⁶¹

The examples above illustrate the limited possibilities for increasing collaboration within the current consortium, but also highlight that this consortium allows for the gathering together of diverse know-how and expertise from the different organisations. Future and potentially more ambitious programmes could take advantage of this, as detailed in the next section.

4.2. THE CONSORTIUM APPROACH IS, HOWEVER, PROMISING FOR FUTURE PROGRAMMING⁶²

Cooperation between organisations does not always deliver net benefits due to coordination costs,⁶³ but in the case of conflict-oriented programming, two main possible synergies justify the consortium approach:

1. Though additional research is needed,⁶⁴ existing literature suggests that for stabilisation interventions to be effective for individuals at risk of engaging in conflict because of several drivers, as many of them as possible should be addressed by the intervention⁶⁵ – and each organisation in the consortium has strong experience in providing an answer to one or several specific driver(s) (see Figure 3 below).

⁵⁹ In particular, it is suggested that KRCS follow up on RUSI’s offer to advise them on the research they are planning to conduct on drivers of conflict.

⁶⁰ GIZ, KRCS and AKF all conduct ‘market scans’ (i.e. assessments of the job market in the areas of intervention) but GIZ’s scans are considerably more detailed than the ones conducted by KRCS and AKF and are updated every year. Unfortunately, field staff from KRCS and AKF mentioned they never used these market scans.

⁶¹ The van is equipped with Wi-Fi and attracts youth who come in the van to discuss issues of importance to them (see picture).


⁶² This section mostly leaves out AKF, whose primary objective is not to reduce conflict.

⁶³ Tilman Brück et al., ‘Jobs Aid Peace’, 2016.

⁶⁴ The literature quoted is mostly not based on quantitative findings and would benefit from additional investigation. With the programme *Conflict Prevention, Peace and Economic Opportunities for the Youth* for example, it could have been interesting to investigate the added value of having several organisations operating in the same area, for example by comparing areas where only one organisation is present to areas where several organisations are active – which was suggested by RUSI.

⁶⁵ ‘*Studies in the United States and elsewhere suggest that the accumulation of risk is more influential than the impact of any particular risk factor by itself.*’ (World Bank, ‘Interpersonal Violence Prevention’, 2010); ‘*Because violence is a multifaceted problem with biological, psychological, social and environmental roots, it needs to be confronted on several different levels at once*’ (WHO, ‘Violence – A Global Public Health Problem’); ‘*To break cycles of violence, efforts should be holistic. Market-driven jobs training should be paired with psychosocial support, protection, intercommunity peace building and governance reform.*’ (Mercy Corps, ‘Youth and Consequences: Unemployment, Injustice and Violence’, 2015). In the specific case of violent extremism, research also indicates the need to complement traditional VE prevention activities (dialogues, etc.) with activities addressing the underlying causes of grievances; see: Search for Common Ground, ‘Transforming Violent Extremism: A Peacebuilder Guide’: ‘*Individuals commonly join violent extremist movements out of feelings of frustration, marginalisation, and a legitimate dearth of opportunities to address very real and pressing problems in their communities. Working to change their tactics without discussing their underlying grievances can lead partners and stakeholders to feel ignored or manipulated. Initiatives which promote tolerance, for example, without tackling the root causes of inequality, can end up backfiring on our credibility.*’ This was also suggested by RUSI mentors who said that in order to limit risks of relapse, RUSI’s psychological support should be complemented with an economical/financial support.

Figure 3: Main Target Impact of the Implementing Partners' Activities on Likely Conflict Drivers⁶⁶



2. If all beneficiaries can *a priori* access all consortium activities, it is more likely that they will take part in the most adapted activity/ies for each of them. This will allow targeting the most important driver(s) of violence for each individual and minimise the likelihood of he/she dropping out. For example, if the individual is most at risk of radicalisation, conflict prevention would be maximised if he/she could be mentored by RUSI. This approach differs from the current situation where, overall, each individual is recruited by only one organisation and is either eligible for the activities proposed by this organisation or ineligible (even though he or she would potentially benefit from the activities of another organisation). A proper combination and phasing of activities proposed by the different organisations may also maximise the benefits for participants, with individuals potentially taking part in the most relevant activities for them at different points in time. For example, for a specific individual initially at risk of engaging in VE, mentoring could be followed by vocational training.

These two types of synergies can be operationalised if all beneficiaries are *a priori* eligible to all consortium activities and each organisation focuses on the activities for which it has a comparative advantage. A common initial pool of beneficiaries does not mean that all beneficiaries will benefit from all activities, as there will be additional criteria specific to each activity; however, it does mean that there should be some common targeting criteria among organisations, which itself involves having a common strategic goal. A common strategic goal will also make overall coordination easier since organisations will share the same definition of success. It will unlock additional synergies in regards to communications and visibility, for example, as currently the organisations do not have a unified message to send across (e.g. GIZ advertises the benefits of vocational training, while RUSI spreads awareness on CVE issues), as well as in regards to monitoring and evaluation.

The steps outlined below show what future programming could look like if the common strategic goal were to be 'conflict prevention'.

Design phase

- **Select a limited number of areas of interventions and conduct a conflict analysis** focused on these areas. Initially plan for all consortium organisations to be present in each area – this involves a redesign of respective responsibilities compared to the current programme, so that each activity is provided by only one organisation or in a coordinated manner by several organisations.⁶⁷ Then, based on the conflict analysis, it may be concluded that the presence of some organisations (or of some of their activities) is not necessary in all areas – for example, the area may not present any

⁶⁶ The figure does not include AKF, whose project does not directly target conflict. The drivers of conflict influence each other (for example, unemployment can contribute to drug abuse and, conversely radicalisation can be driven by unemployment and poverty, etc.), meaning that the GIZ project, for example, may not target drug abuse directly, but it may do so indirectly through its impact on employment.

⁶⁷ Currently there are some overlaps between some of the activities provided by GIZ and AKF (VTC capacity building), by KRCS and AKF (support to livelihoods groups) and to a lesser extent by RUSI and KRCS (training of law enforcement officers).

risk of VE but show a high occurrence of police harassment, in which case RUSI may be active in this area only through its law enforcement training component.

- **Based on the conflict analysis, draft a common theory of change.** Logical frameworks should at least include common impact indicators (but output and outcome indicators will be different).
- **Based on the conflict analysis, draft criteria for persons at risk of engaging in conflict,** including for persons at risk of engaging specifically in VE. Depending on the findings of the conflict analysis, criteria may or may not include the requirement that beneficiaries are ‘youth’ (aged 18 to 35).⁶⁸ The set of criteria should be as precise as possible so as not to simply refer to ‘vulnerable’ or ‘poor’ persons – again, if the common impact goal is decided to be conflict prevention.⁶⁹
- **Conduct a mapping of the CSOs present in the target areas and decide whether part of the activities could be implemented by one or several CSOs,** as done currently by AKF (support to livelihoods groups, visibility, etc.), to build capacity and ensure sustainability.
- **Explore the possibility of including scholarships in the programme for school drop-outs.** For people who dropped out of primary or secondary school and would like to resume their education (including minors not eligible to this consortium’s current activities), the most efficient first step to engage in legal livelihoods may be a second chance at obtaining their high school certificate rather than directly engaging in vocational training or livelihoods groups.⁷⁰
- **Allocate a budget for cooperation.** This can be limited to one staff for coordination if the contracts describe precisely where and how cooperation is expected to take place.

Implementation phase

- **Allocate sufficient time for recruitment and mobilisation,** as the impact of the programme on conflict prevention will be highly dependent on finding the persons most likely to engage in violent activities. It is suggested to organise separate recruitment/mobilisation for persons at risk of engaging in violent extremism on one side and for persons at risk of engaging in other types of violent activities on the other side, if the consortium set-up remains the same as the current one. This is because the criteria used to determine whether youth were likely to engage in violent extremism rely on knowledge of VE drivers that – in the current consortium – only RUSI possesses.
- **Organise interviews** during which questions regarding attitudes towards violence, perception of a number of issues (e.g. perceptions of extremist groups, of the police), and personal perspectives (e.g. positive outlook on life, structure of personal networks) are asked. Answers to such questions, and to other questions (see Figure 4 below) would then be used by organisations to determine which activity the person is most likely to benefit from: attending a VTC, starting an apprenticeship, going back to school, being part of a livelihoods group, or any of these in combination with the mentorship


⁶⁸ KRCS beneficiaries indicated that gangs typically include minors, and according to Botha (2014), 23% of al-Shabaab respondents joined the group between the ages of 10 and 19.

⁶⁹ In the case of VE, see for example Khalil and Zeuthen (2014): ‘Amongst practitioners there is some resistance to the idea of identifying such “vulnerable” individuals as this is suggestive of stereotyping at a time when it is increasingly recognised that terrorist profiles either do not exist or may never be identified. However, we believe that this is misguided as the objective should not be to precisely identify individual “types”, but more modestly to narrow targeting efforts on a probabilistic basis.’ Such probabilities should be based on the conflicts analysis conducted previously and would allow to increase returns on investments. See, for example, USAID, ‘Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism’, 2009: ‘The fact that it is not possible to generalise about the profile of populations susceptible to VE across countries, regions and time periods does not mean that it is impossible to detect such a profile for a particular country at a given historical juncture. That does not mean that a clear-cut profile will always emerge from the evidence, but when it does, it is important to take note. From a programmatic perspective, and faced with limited resources, it is critical to target the communities, populations, settings, or institutions that appear to be producing a disproportionate percentage of extremists.’

⁷⁰ KRCS provided some youth with scholarships to resume schooling with their own budget after having realised that this would be what would benefit them most.

programme.⁷¹ For example, potential beneficiaries who already have their own business and the skills to develop it are likely to benefit more from being supported as part of a livelihoods group than from attending a VTC.⁷²

Figure 4: Example of a Process Assigning Potential Beneficiaries to the Most Relevant Activities⁷³



As mentioned before, activities can also be delivered one after the other, if deemed relevant for a specific individual.⁷⁴

- **Each type of activity should preferably be provided separately by the consortium organisation with the most relevant experience (or comparative advantage)**, but some activities could be conducted jointly by two or more organisations if their actions are complementary. For example, common visibility activities could be conducted using each organisation’s resources (which would be facilitated by the common strategic objective shared by all organisations).

M&E

An impact evaluation could include either of the following:

- **A randomised controlled trial**, where eligible persons are randomly selected into programme activities (‘treatment’ group) or not (‘control’ group). As the selection into treatment and control group may by itself create tensions, the process could be phased in, as

⁷¹ As mentioned in **Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.**, FGDs with RUSI mentees highlighted that the returns on the mentorship programme would be greater if combined with employment and livelihoods activities.

⁷² In the words of a Kisauni mentee: ‘If [the project officer] comes with an opportunity for learning how to drive, I am not interested. What I want is to grow my shoe business.’

⁷³ The first step will be to assess whether the potential beneficiary is most at risk of joining VE groups or gangs/other violent activities—if RUSI interviews a person in the latter case, they would refer him/her to the other consortium organisations for an additional interview; and if the other consortium organisations interview a person seemingly more likely to engage in VE they would refer him/her to RUSI for an additional interview.

⁷⁴ This would involve streamlining the activities compared to the way that they are implemented today so that there is strictly no overlap between the different components.

suggested by the RUSI project manager: youth in the 'control' group would eventually enter the programme after, for example, one or two years.⁷⁵

- **A difference-in-difference** methodology (which was proposed by RUSI in their inception report) where trends in/perception of conflict and radicalisation would be compared between intervention areas and 'control' areas where no programme activity is implemented. A phase-in approach would also be possible for this option.

In both cases, and as suggested by RUSI, more than two groups could be set up. This would allow to compare not only areas/individuals benefiting from programme activities with those not benefiting from programme activities, but also areas/individuals benefiting from the activities of *only one organisation* with areas/individuals benefiting from the activities of *several organisations*. This would serve as a direct test of the magnitude of the synergies associated with the consortium approach.

5. CONCLUSION

The EUTF-funded programme *Conflict Prevention, Peace, and Economic Opportunities for the Youth* presents an innovative consortium structure comprising of organisations with diverse and complementary expertise and know-how. This structure should allow it to effectively address the different types of violence in coastal and north-eastern Kenya (VE, gangs) and their drivers (economic, psychological, police harassment, etc.). However, the current programme was not designed to maximise synergies between the organisations: they are often not present in the same areas and do not share the same strategic goal. As a result, each driver is addressed separately in non-overlapping communities, preventing drivers to be tackled comprehensively *at the individual level*. Therefore, synergies are mostly limited to experience-sharing during the consortium meetings and some common visibility projects. In this context and given coordination costs, even though each organisation may well achieve (or, particularly in the case of GIZ, exceed) its individual objectives, it is not clear whether the consortium approach will deliver net benefits to the current programme compared to a situation where the three projects would be implemented separately.


Nevertheless, the consortium approach offers promising prospects for future conflict prevention programming. In order to operationalise synergies, future programmes should have a well-formulated and focused overall objective, a common initial pool of beneficiaries and a well-defined separation of tasks between each organisation, based on their comparative advantages. Future programming should take into account both the lessons from the ongoing projects and the learning generated by other similar projects to adjust the approach and resources mobilised to the expected impact. Finally, it should also include a combination of real time M&E mechanisms with rapid feedback loops all along the project cycle to adjust programming as needed, and a more formal impact evaluation, planned ahead and properly resourced, building on existing expertise in this field.

⁷⁵ Though this could create expectations in the 'control' group, making the results less reliable.

6. ANNEXES

6.1. LIST OF GIZ-SUPPORTED VTCs

'Demonstration' and 'replication' VTCs, as well as the residential and portable models (in orange), have waiting lists of around six to nine months. Beneficiaries from other organisations should be encouraged to apply to 'partner' VTCs (in green).



6.2. BENEFICIARY SELECTION CRITERIA

6.2.1. AKF

Youth groups supported by AKF should be registered with the social services and have a constitution; 100% of the leadership and 70% of the membership of the group must be aged 18 to 35. In Lamu, AKF strives to minimise duplication of efforts with KRCS; as such they try to select youth not actively involved in crime/violence – but it is not a formal criterion.

6.2.2. GIZ

Youth (18–35 years old) are selected based on their:

- literacy;
- neediness, mainly based on demographic data collected during the enrolment process (e.g. number of dependent family members);
- and willingness, as assessed during an interview.

Additionally, the youth have to not be in education, employment or training.

According to GIZ, the following criteria are also applied:

- Vulnerable background, includes 'at-risk' criteria such as (at least TWO of the following):
 - some links or association with criminals;
 - orphan and/or coming from a broken family;
 - school drop-out;
 - new convert to Islam;

- socially withdrawn or from a needy or humble background.
- Additionally, CAP YEI is considering the joint selection criteria of the consortium for identifying 'hard cases', who fulfil at least TWO of the following criteria:
 - Known in the community to have previously been associated with violent criminals or gang members;
 - known in the community to hold radical or extremist views and tendencies;
 - known in the community to affiliate himself/herself with holders of extremist views and tendencies – as mentoring cannot happen with a youth who is already engaged in terrorist activities;
 - socially withdrawn or from a needy or humble background.

6.2.3. KRCS

Youth (18–35 years old) have to be either:

- recovery addicts or;
- previously engaged in violent activity or conflict (including communal/clan/terror-related) or in a gang or;
- having a family member previously engaged in, injured by or killed in a violent activity or conflict.

6.2.4. RUSI

Youth (18–35 years old) with **at least two of the following**:

- a person whose close peer/relative has been recruited into a violent extremist group engaged in violent extremism activities;
- known in the community to previously have been associated with violent criminals or gang members;
- known in the community to hold radical or extremist views and tendencies;
- known in the community to affiliate himself/herself with holders of extremist views and tendencies – as mentoring cannot happen with a youth who is already engaged in terrorist activities;
- a person who is socially withdrawn or from a needy or humble background.

OR At least two of the following:

- some links or association with criminals;
- orphan and/or from a broken family;
- school drop-out;
- new convert to Islam;
- socially withdrawn or from a needy or humble background.