REGIONAL SYNTHESIS REPORT

EUROPEAN UNION EMERGENCY TRUST FUND FOR AFRICA
THIRD-PARTY MONITORING AND LEARNING (TPML) MECHANISM
FOR SAHEL AND LAKE CHAD

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. EUTF'S THIRD-PARTY MONITORING AND LEARNING (TPML) MECHANISM FOR THE SLC REGION

The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa ([EUTF for Africa](), **hereafter EUTF**[1]), created by European and African partners at the [Valletta Summit on Migration]() in November 2015, aims to foster stability and improve migration management. It is managed by the European Commission with support from the European Union Delegations (EUD) in-country. The EUTF for Africa supports interventions in three regions: Sahel and Lake Chad (SLC); Horn of Africa; and North Africa. The SLC region is the largest both in terms of financial engagement and the number of funded projects/programmes. It includes 13 countries: Burkina Faso; Cameroon; Chad; Côte d'Ivoire; The Gambia; Ghana; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Mali; Mauritania; Niger; Nigeria; and Senegal. As per the end of April 2021, approved programmes amounted to EUR 2.15 billion, of which EUR 2.10 billion were contracted. Various national and local authorities, international organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and civil society organisations (CSOs) directly or indirectly benefited from EUTF, implementing, overseeing, or supporting interventions in the field.

In July 2019, EUTF created a third-party monitoring and learning mechanism (TPML) for the actions it funds in the SLC region under its Strategic Objective 3 (migration management) and covering the following three programming areas:

- return and reintegration assistance to migrants stranded along the central Mediterranean route;

- migration governance, with actions aiming to improve migration management by partner countries and strengthen national institutions and capacities; and

- migration related awareness-raising (AR) campaigns aiming to reduce irregular migration flows.

The overall objective of TPML was to provide a longitudinal analysis of the related projects' relevance, outcomes, and lessons learnt at country and regional levels, and to provide a periodic feedback to EUTF and its implementing partners (IPs) aimed at informing their future strategic and programming decisions. EUTF mandated [Altai Consulting]() to establish and manage the TPML mechanism until April 2021. The present document is the final TPML synthesis report. It is accompanied by 12 country reports detailing country-specific findings and recommendations.

1.2. TPML SCOPE AND APPROACH

TPML adopted an iterative process, organised in three cycles of data collection and analysis, each accompanied by feedback to EUTF, the EUD and IPs. The methodology was overall similar across all countries, although not all countries were covered the same number of times or in the same way – and Chad was not included in the scope of TPML due to the lack of relevant projects. For Cycle 1, EUTF prioritised reintegration-related actions in eight countries of high return. The scope of work was then expanded to all three programming areas and 12 countries (the 13 SLC countries minus Chad). Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, Cycle 2 was discontinued after four country visits, while stakeholder interviews were conducted remotely for four of the 12 countries in Cycle 3. (See Table 1 and Figure 1, as well as Annex 2 for further details on the organisation of the work.)

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[1] The list of acronyms is provided in Annex 1.

Table 1: The three TPML cycles

	Cycle 1	Cycle 2	Cycle 3
Timeframe	July–Dec. 2019	Jan.–June 2020	July 2020–Feb. 2021
Programming areas	▪ Return and reintegration	▪ Return and reintegration ▪ Governance ▪ Awareness-raising	▪ Return and reintegration ▪ Governance ▪ Awareness-raising
Geographic scope	8 countries	4 countries	12 countries

Figure 1: Countries covered by TPML across the three data collection and analysis cycles

TPML relied and built on the data and knowledge readily available from key informants, documents, and monitoring, evaluation and learning systems of the EU, IPs, and their partners. These data sources were complemented with a review of contextual documents, interviews of external experts, direct field observations and beneficiary surveys. The evidence base is summarised in Figure 2 and described in further detail in Annex 2.

Figure 2: Evidence base for TPML

Review of 895 documents and datasets	Interviews with 635 key stakeholders	Survey with 5 881 beneficiaries	Direct field observations
✓ Country background, migration policies, standard operating procedures, studies and scientific articles ✓ Programme implementation and coordination-related documentation ✓ Progress reports, monitoring, evaluation and learning data, etc.	✓ EU delegations ✓ IPs and their field partners ✓ National authorities and agencies ✓ Other relevant projects, experts and civil society representatives not funded by the EUTF	✓ 3 634 interviews with returnees targeted by reintegration assistance ✓ Focus group discussions with 50 returnees ✓ 2 119 beneficiaries of awareness-raising campaigns ✓ 78 community leaders in areas of high return	✓ Arrivals and registration of returnees at airport, and transit/reception centres ✓ General counselling and job orientation sessions, job fairs and vocational trainings, cash-for-work activities ✓ Individual, collective and community-based projects ✓ Awareness-raising activities

The main findings from the three cycles of data collection and analysis are summarised in this report. It describes similarities and differences in approaches and results across IPs and countries and identifies advantages and disadvantages/risks of various approaches, progress, and challenges, as well as internal and external factors that may influence success. Finally, it showcases good or promising programming practices introduced by IPs in certain countries. After a brief description and analysis of EUTF's project portfolio (Chapter 2), the report assesses return and reintegration programming in practice (Chapter 3) as well as its results in terms of outcomes and impacts (Chapter 4). Migration governance (Chapter 5) and AR campaigns (Chapter 6) are considered thereafter. Lessons learnt and recommendations are included at the end of each chapter.

1.3. REGIONAL MIGRATION CONTEXT

The SLC region is often described as a region of mobility. With the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), regular and circular migration flows, and labour migration in particular, have contributed to the development of the region. However, the current demographic pressure combined with insufficient economic development, weak governance, complex social dynamics, and environmental and security deterioration have increased the scale of irregular migration and forced displacement within the region and towards North Africa and Europe, particularly since 2000[i].

While irregular migration of Western African nationals to the EU via the Central Mediterranean Route continuously increased in the years leading up to 2016, since then, it has decreased significantly. Irregular arrivals from the 13 SLC countries to Europe rose by 167% from 43 000 in 2014 to 115 000 in 2016, then steadily decreased to 5 000 in 2020, as reported by Frontex. In total, Frontex reports 136 000 irregular arrivals from these countries between January 2017 and December 2020, mostly from Guinea (21%), Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, and Mali (16% each)[ii]. The decrease after 2016 can largely be attributed to the bilateral agreements negotiated by the EU, notably with Morocco and Libya, as well as other measures aiming to strengthen border controls and reduce irregular migration from Africa.

These initiatives led to a **considerable and largely unforeseen increase in the number of migrants stranded in North Africa and returning to their country-of-origin**, either with assistance from the International Organization for Migration (IOM), state actors, and NGOs, or without assistance. IOM estimates that the number of migrants who returned to the 12 TPML countries between 1 April 2017 and 31 March 2021 and became eligible for post-arrival support totalled 89 160[iii]. A high number of irregular migrants from sub-Saharan Africa are still stranded in Libya with Europe as their intended destination. IOM displacement flow monitoring points account for 38 000 movements headed from West and Central Africa to Italy or Spain during the first three months of 2020 alone[iv]. They have limited access to employment, protection or basic social services and are exposed to growing violence and abuse by local armed groups. Since 2017–2018, a shift has been observed from the Central Mediterranean migration route (with Italy as the first arrival country in Europe) towards the Western Mediterranean route (Spain). Migration flows towards North Africa and Europe dropped in March 2020 due to COVID-19 related travel restrictions but had already returned to pre-crisis levels by mid-2020.

The great majority of migrants and returnees are young males (18–35 years of age). Their socioeconomic background, including education and geographic origin, is heterogenous (see Chapter 4). Many have experienced situations of extreme risks or trauma along migration routes and/or while crossing the Mediterranean. While the absolute number of deaths in the Mediterranean has been decreasing since 2016, the level of risk has remained high, especially along the Central Mediterranean route[v].

Supporting the reintegration of returnees into their home countries and communities is a shared commitment made in 2006 by European and West, Central and North African governments as well as the European Commission and ECOWAS as part of the Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development (Rabat Process). The commitment was renewed at the 2015 Valletta Summit on Migration: Its action plan committed participants to 'launch projects in countries of origin to support the reintegration of returnees into their communities, aiming at capacity building for authorities and CSOs

involved in the return and reintegration processes in their field of competence, in particular by integrating the returning migrants in the local community, labour market and social system'. In December 2018, reintegration gained greater prominence, beyond the regional level, with the adoption by the United Nations (UN) Member States of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration ('Global Compact'). The Global Compact calls on governments to cooperate 'in facilitating safe and dignified return (…), as well as sustainable reintegration'.

2. EUTF's PORTFOLIO IN THE SLC REGION

2.1. MAPPING OF EUTF-FUNDED PROJECTS COVERED BY TPML

The TPML covered 48 country-level actions across the 12 TPML countries, representing a modest part in the entire EUTF portfolio in the SLC region. These 48 reintegration, migration governance, and AR related actions make up less than 20% of EUTF-funded actions in the region and 24% in terms of contracted amount (EUR 500 million of 2.1 billion). They are managed by a variety of organisations: bilateral cooperation agencies, UN agencies and international NGOs, alone or as part of a consortium.

These actions vary significantly in size, scope, and timeframe. Their budgets range from EUR 1 million to over 180 million. EUTF's engagement was the highest in Niger and Senegal both in terms of funding and the number of actions. Half of the country-level actions are implemented in more than one country (25 cross-country or regional programmes). Nineteen have more than one component: 28 include a reintegration component, 32 include a migration governance component, and 21 include an AR component. Actions with a reintegration component range from employment and economic development projects that include some returnees among their target beneficiaries[vi] to actions focused exclusively on the reintegration of returnees. Some migration governance interventions aim to establish institutional frameworks needed to support the return and reintegration of migrants while others address broader or different migration issues, such as migration stakeholder coordination, the protection of vulnerable migrants along migration routes, migrant smuggling and human trafficking, border management, the capacity-building of national and local authorities, South-South cooperation, and the involvement of the diaspora. Awareness-raising actions deal with the risks associated with irregular migration, the free movement of populations within the ECOWAS area, communication about legal alternatives to irregular migration, the protection of children on the move, and the prevention of human trafficking. Some include institutional-level interventions in addition to their operational activities. Only two actions focus solely on AR. Half of the actions included in the TPML started in late 2016/early 2017 and the other half started in late 2018/early 2019. Some have experienced delays in the inception or implementation phase, and all have been affected by the COVID-19 crisis. The 48 actions therefore have varying progress levels. A few ended in late 2020/early 2021. For these reasons, the TPML has not studied each action with the same depth. See Annex 4 for more information on each action.

2.2. EU-IOM JOINT INITIATIVE

The largest programme in the EUTF portfolio, and thus the main focus of TPML, is the regional EU-IOM Joint Initiative (JI) for Migrant Protection and Reintegration, which has been implemented since 2017 in all 12 TPML countries. Through the JI, IOM provides protection assistance to migrants who are stranded along the Central Mediterranean migration route, and return and reintegration assistance to those who decide to voluntarily return to their country[vii].

The JI includes standard components and approaches across all countries, with some country-specific adaptations or activities. Under the JI, IOM intervenes in the three programming areas of interest for TPML (three-fold strategy). It provides return and reintegration assistance to migrants in transit or stranded in North Africa and along migration routes, aims to strengthen the governance of migration with a focus on return and reintegration, and works to raise awareness among the general population on migration issues. Its return and reintegration assistance is guided by the IOM Framework for Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR), the IOM Integrated Approach to Reintegration, and the JI Framework Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for AVRR. In-country, JI activities focus on the main areas of return.

The JI[2] provides an opportunity to test and implement IOM's new integrated approach to reintegration. This approach identifies three dimensions for sustainable reintegration: economic self-sufficiency; social stability; and psychosocial well-being (see details in Annex 5). The various activities of IOM and its partners aim to support the achievement of these three objectives. In addition to working at the individual level, the JI intervenes at the community, subnational, and national levels to support an enabling environment conducive to the programme objectives, although success also depends on contextual and structural conditions that fall outside the control and scope of the JI. This approach is more time- and resource-intensive than IOM's previous approach to reintegration, which focused more on individual returnees and economic support, and provided a more standard package to all.

A set of overarching programming principles listed in Box 1 guides the design and implementation of the JI[viii].

<div align="center">Box 1: The Joint Initiative's reintegration programming principles</div>

1. Comprehensive assistance: Reintegration depends on economic, social, and psychosocial factors. Reintegration assistance can therefore include support in all of these areas.

2. Flexible, needs-based and individually tailored assistance: All eligible migrants receive some reintegration assistance; however, the type, level and value of assistance provided depends on several factors and individual needs, and are therefore not the same for all beneficiaries.

3. Individual assistance complemented with community and structural support: While addressing individual needs, the reintegration approach aims to foster the participation of communities and address their needs, and to strengthen the enabling environment.

4. Participation and ownership of national counterparts: Engaging with national governments and agencies fosters national leadership and long-term continuity/sustainability.

5. Partnerships and synergies with a range of other actors: Collaborating with development partners, including the EU, national governments, UN agencies, international and local NGOs, and the private sector, facilitates the mobilisation of more resources and expertise while also maximising complementarities and results.

2.3. PORTFOLIO RELEVANCE AND COHERENCE

In terms of geographic targeting, EUTF-funded actions related to return and reintegration, migration governance and AR cover the main countries of origin of irregular migrants and return in the region. The countries with the largest irregular migration and return flows (Guinea, Mali, Nigeria, and Niger) tend to benefit from proportionally more funding, but there are suboptimal budget allocations among countries. For example, Senegal represents 15% of EUTF funding in the three TPML thematic areas but only 7% of irregular migration and return flows between January 2016 and December 2020. Within the JI, countries that received the highest budget did not always end up being those facing the most pressing needs[ix]. This imbalance was reduced following the regional top-up disbursed by EUTF in 2018, which IOM allocated among countries based on their caseload. Some key informants regretted that Benin, Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were excluded from the EUTF funding and, consequently, from the JI[3]. Moreover, the scope of the JI is limited to migrants stranded in North Africa and along the Mediterranean routes, i.e. those likely to have Europe as a desired destination, excluding migrants in/returning from other African countries, such as Angola, Congo and the Democratic Republic of the

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[2] Also referred to as 'IOM' in this report as a means of simplification. IOM implement part of the JI together with other partners, including national governments and agencies and, of course, has other funding sources and activities in addition to the JI.

[3] Returnees from these countries were still assisted through IOM offices in transit countries. Based on IOM data, an estimated 7 000 migrants (excluding COVID-induced returns) were assisted in their return from host and transit countries covered by the JI in the SLC region (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger) to Benin, Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Togo, among others, as of the end of July 2020. 2 100 had completed their reintegration assistance process.

Congo, and the Gulf States, which also have protection and reintegration needs. This contributes to the perception, among some African government officials, of EUTF as a political instrument.

The EUTF portfolio covered by TPML appears relevant. Yet, the potential for synergies among actions funded by EUTF and with those funded by other actors has not been fully realised. EUTF funds a wide range of actions responding to migration issues in the region. These EUTF-funded actions cover priority programming areas for the EU and its Member States as well as some of the priorities of partner governments in the SLC region. The diversity of actions, IPs and programming contexts makes it possible to test and compare approaches, create complementarities, and promote cross-learning. While potential linkages and complementarities with other actors exist, these have not fully materialised mainly due to the size of the project portfolio, different implementation periods, and insufficient communication platforms and learning workshops organised by the EU at the regional and country levels (see Sections 3.6 and 3.9 further below).

The pertinence and internal coherence of in-country portfolios vary. Awareness-raising, migrant protection and anti-trafficking actions are funded in the countries with the highest emigration figures and those situated along the main migration routes: Burkina Faso; Côte d'Ivoire; The Gambia; Guinea; Mali; Mauritania; Niger; Nigeria; and Senegal. However, synergies and complementarities among these initiatives and with others related to migration governance, reintegration and youth employment were not ensured in-country. For example, in seven of the 12 countries, EUTF did not fund youth employment programmes which could have provided opportunities for returnees and potential migrants (especially in countries, such as Guinea-Bissau, where such opportunities are scarce), or could have reinforced reintegration and AR initiatives, and increased political interest and buy-in. Where such projects were funded by EUTF (or the EU), they were not designed with this purpose in mind from the onset. They started at different times and were often implemented in different geographic areas or weakly coordinated (see Chapters 3, 5 and 6). EUTF is also constrained by its status as an intergovernmental instrument and the way it operates as a funding window, resulting in strategies that are not clearly defined and country-level portfolios that depend on the strategic and ad hoc priorities of the EU and its Member States as well as on the projects proposed by bilateral and multilateral cooperation agencies in each country. They do not derive from a pre-defined, specific EUTF (or partner government) country strategy, and therefore often lack coherence, synergies and complementarities across countries.

The JI provided a relevant and much-needed response to the migration context and the induced humanitarian emergency. It mitigated and responded to the logistical, financial, and political challenges that made it difficult for governments in the region to address the migration crisis. Without the JI, many migrants would have remained stranded along migration routes, without any resources and victim of, or at risk of, detention, violence, and abuse. All government and programme stakeholders recognise the relevance of combining the immediate AVRR response with longer-term considerations: supporting the sustainable reintegration of returnees, involving governments; strengthening their AVRR and migration management capacities; and preventing future migration crises through AR campaigns in the main areas of departure. IOM's mandate as the UN migration agency, its experience in both humanitarian and development fields and its regional presence made it the right organisation to manage this large-scale, multi-level programme, including in the time of COVID-19.

The JI as a regionally coordinated approach appears to be an appropriate arrangement. It provided a unique opportunity to test and roll out IOM's threefold strategy and integrated approach to reintegration on a large scale, within an ambitious timeframe. It gave to the intervention – and to the organisation – a higher profile, attracted political attention, and benefited from crucial management support from IOM regional and headquarters (HQ) offices as well as from donors. It made it possible for some small countries to benefit from increased funding and support. It allowed for increased cross-country harmonisation, joint activities, economies of scale and efficiency gains. The harmonised strategies, guidance, and tools enable a higher quality programming and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) across countries. Lastly, the regional approach provided opportunities for comparative studies and cross-learning among countries and organisational levels (country, regional and HQ), which can be converted into institutional knowledge and strategy improvements. These are valuable advantages as reintegration, migration governance and AR are relatively recent programming fields, with few

internationally agreed standards, research evidence or documented best practices, especially in West Africa.

IOM's holistic approach to reintegration appears to be overall well-designed and relevant, despite implementation challenges. Most interviewed stakeholders and beneficiaries agree that it is well aligned with the needs of the target groups: migrants; communities; and governments. The comprehensive and tailored support is adapted to the various profiles and needs of returnees. Yet, its implementation faced several challenges, as outlined below.

▪ It took time for all staff and stakeholders to agree on the approach, establish effective processes and partnerships, and develop the necessary expertise.

▪ Cross-country learning and efficiency gains have not yet fully materialised because of the unexpected caseload, the need to prioritise implementation, and the additional workload created by the inception phase and the internal operational processes.

▪ The number of returns also meant that IOM had limited time to conduct extensive pre-implementation studies to inform country-level programming – for reintegration as well as for institutional support and AR activities.

▪ Sustainable (economic) reintegration is not an easy endeavour, especially in the West African context and with few connections with other development actors and programmes. The JI is primarily a humanitarian intervention, but it also needs to address structural issues that require more predictable and longer-term funding.

▪ The specific support offered to returnees was sometimes perceived as associated with risks of singling them out, creating parallel systems, and favouring them over non-migrants facing similar economic and employment issues[4]. Key informants from the governments, the EU and IOM also highlighted the potential effect of inadvertently incentivising young people to (re)migrate (or abuse the system) in order to benefit from JI reintegration assistance.

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[4] Especially in countries and areas where (large-scale) youth employment programmes were not funded by the EU or implemented by the government and its other development partners.

3. RETURN AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMMING IN PRACTICE

3.1. OVERVIEW OF THE RETURN AND REINTEGRATION PROCESS

Figure 3 below illustrates the main forms and steps of the return and reintegration assistance, which are examined in the next sections of this chapter. As mentioned above (Box 1), not all returnees receive the same type of support or go through each of these steps. Moreover, some activities can be implemented concurrently. For example, social and psychosocial support and M&E often take place while other activities are ongoing.

Figure 3: Overview of the return and reintegration process

Protection and return assistance	Immediate support upon return	Social and psychosocial support	Job counselling and orientation	Vocational training	Inclusion in the job market (e.g. microproject)	M&E and learning

Because IOM leads return and reintegration programming in the SLC region and thus intervenes at all stages of the process while other IPs intervene at a later stage (once returnees have returned to their respective countries) and only provide economic assistance to returnees among other target groups – mainly through vocational training and/or support for entrepreneurship projects – the following sections focus on IOM.

3.2. RETURN ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION OF MIGRANTS IN TRANSIT

After some challenges due to the inception of the JI and the high caseload of returnees in 2017– 2018, the return and post-arrival assistance process managed by IOM is now well-established and fully involves relevant national actors. IOM has a long-standing experience managing this process and few changes have been introduced as part of the JI to streamline it. The framework regional SOPs and the country-adapted ones describe the AVRR principles and its successive steps in detail, improving coordination between countries and facilitating a common understanding and buy-in by all involved parties (see Section 5.1). After the initial counselling and vulnerability assessment of migrants in transit countries, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Libya, and to a lesser extent Mauritania and Morocco, those unable or unwilling to pursue their migration journey enrol in the JI's return and reintegration process. The search and rescue operations and the consular missions organised by IOM in Niger and North Africa were key to facilitate voluntary returns. Once the necessary travel and identification documents are obtained, IOM arranges the pre-departure and travel, which includes all administrative, material, medical and logistical support until returnees reach their respective countries. The local IOM staff, in collaboration with the national authorities and, in some countries, CSOs, take over at the airport or bus station. They conduct a second registration and vulnerability screening and provide food and non-food items, short-term accommodation in a transit/reception centre when needed and available, and initial information on the reintegration process. Returnees also receive around EUR 100 as pocket money to cover their immediate basic needs and onward transportation until their final destination. This immediate post-arrival assistance typically spans a few hours to a couple of days.

Coordination challenges remain but have lessened due to the lower number of returns after the first year of the JI, the adoption of national SOPs, the collaborative relationships between stakeholders, and the opening of transit/reception centres in transit and return countries. The challenge most frequently cited by stakeholders interviewed across countries is that arrival information is often received at the last minute, resulting in limited time to prepare and mobilise. Numerous actors and communication flows are involved: between IOM missions in departure, transit, and arrival countries, and between them, governments, civil society partners and EUDs. Key informants report that it took time – two to five years depending on the country – to establish the migrant resource, transit and

reception centres[5] and to agree on specific SOPs for their management and for the protection and referral of vulnerable migrants (unaccompanied children, victims of trafficking, individuals in need of medical assistance, etc.). The delay was often caused by the unavailability of an appropriate facility and disagreements around stakeholders' respective contributions for the infrastructure construction/rehabilitation and management during and after the JI implementation period. At the regional level, IOM signed a memorandum of understanding with UNICEF and a technical partnership with Save the Children to ease the inter-agency collaboration in-country, in addition to country-level agreements. Once in place, these arrangements were instrumental in facilitating the process for all stakeholders, including the migrants.

The COVID-19 pandemic significantly impacted the flow and condition of migrants in West Africa. IOM responded to this unprecedented situation, capitalising on the processes, capacities and experience gained through the JI. An estimated 50 000 transit migrants were stranded because of border closures and in-country mobility restrictions as of June 2020[x]. IOM transit centres had to accommodate many more migrants and for a longer period than planned, which often exacerbated migrants' physical and mental health[xi]. An earmarked COVID-19 fund was created and EUTF demonstrated flexibility and reactivity by allowing IOM to (re)direct more than EUR 16 million towards response-related activities. IOM rented additional temporary shelters, provided necessary information, protective equipment and care to migrants, enforced quarantine requirements, and negotiated the opening of humanitarian corridors for AVRR to resume. Operations in transit centres were adapted to provide adequate care and support to stranded migrants (adoption of COVID-19 SOPs, strengthened mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS), additional recreational activities, etc.). These measures benefited over 44 500 migrants and community members in 2020[xii].

Overall, the JI supported the safe return of more than 74 000 migrants in the SLC region between April 2017 and March 2021 – more than three times the initial programme target – with high government and beneficiary satisfaction. Nonetheless, feedback from governments and beneficiaries revealed one critical issue: Some migrants received insufficient information about the reality of reintegration support when making their decision to return. Nearly all government officials interviewed expressed general satisfaction with the return process and noted improved collaboration with IOM over time. 80% of JI-assisted returnees surveyed by Altai Consulting confirm having received adequate assistance and information pre-departure to make a well-informed return decision. The remainder stated that IOM's communication was not comprehensive, transparent/clear, and specific enough as to the (lack of) timeliness of reintegration support, as well as its form (cash vs. in-kind), amount, available options, and pre-conditions for success[6] (Figure 4). This information gap was reported by a relatively higher proportion of migrants returning from Morocco and Algeria but was also reported by migrants returning from Niger and Libya. It can be explained, in part, by the operational context. When asked about it, IOM Niger stated that the information provided to migrants about the reintegration assistance was kept intentionally general for three main reasons: the need to avoid making economic support the main motivation of AVRR; the fear of creating expectations that IOM may not be able to meet; and the differences in JI reintegration services across countries and profiles of beneficiaries, which complexify communications and may create frustrations among migrants with different needs and of different nationalities who share information during their stay in transit centres. The high number of returnees gathered in the information sessions and word-of-mouth among them are additional obstacles. This communication gap partly explains the challenges faced by IOM and its partners in managing returnees' expectations later in the reintegration process. According to IOM, returnees are now given more complete oral, written, and video information to explain the composition of the reintegration assistance and the conditions and process for obtaining it. While returnees continue

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[5] In the main transit countries (Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali) as well as in some countries of return, such as Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau.

[6] Pre-conditions to be met by returnees to receive support and succeed, such as being reachable by phone even when based in a remote area; having a plan for the future and demonstrating motivation and sustained engagement despite challenges; providing identification documents, authorisations for setting up a business, quotes and invoices; and bearing part of the costs associated with the reintegration process (e.g. transportation to the IOM office and training location, accommodation costs where relevant, some phone communications and paperwork, etc.).

to raise the issue in qualitative interviews, quantitative survey data indicates that it has gradually decreased (Figure 5)[xiii].

Figure 4: Information returnees felt they lacked to make a well-informed decision about their return

Category	Value
The timing/timeliness of the start of the…	252
The length of the reintegration process	225
The difficulties associated with the…	209
The form of the assistance (cash/in-kind)	203
The amount of assistance	156
The level of alignment with individual priority…	114
Other	65
Do not know	58
Do not wish to answer	1

Figure 5: Returnees feeling they had enough information to make a well-informed decision about their return

Year	No	Yes
2016 and before	63	52
2017	146	422
2018	165	608
2019	91	409
2020	17	173

The harmonisation and continuation of West African migrants' protection and return assistance is not ensured at this time. National capacities and long-term funding are still lacking to ensure uninterrupted support to stranded and vulnerable migrants. Although national teams have been recruited and gained experience through the JI, IOM staff continue to play a significant role in building their capacities, supervising them, coordinating all actors, and directly managing part of the assistance process (e.g. migrants' counselling and registration, logistics and financial matters, including pocket money). Government staff, social workers, CSOs and three EUTF IPs (Save the Children, Red Cross/Caritas and Terre des Hommes) intervene in certain areas and could assume some responsibilities in select countries after the end of the JI. However, none have the mandate and transnational capabilities of IOM, or the funding of the JI. Moreover, the evolving context and shifting roles will require a periodic revision of the SOPs and referral mechanisms, as well as continuous capacity-building (see Chapter 5).

3.3. SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE AND STABILISATION

IOM aims to help returnees reintegrate within their communities and families and stabilise their social and psychological situation before or while benefiting from economic reintegration support. This is a relevant feature of IOM's new integrated approach to reintegration. Under the JI, it benefits vulnerable migrants the most, including some returning from Europe. Such assistance starts immediately upon return and can span several months. It is based on the prior assessment of returnees' vulnerability and needs and may involve medical and psychological care, family mediation, food

and non-food items, and financial aid for housing and the schooling of children. According to IOM, 6 900 returnees had received a form of social assistance under the JI as of the end of July 2020, i.e. 15% of the total caseload (see Annex 6). In addition, in Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, and Senegal, IOM provided a one-off cash amount to help returnees and their families cope with the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic; IOM Cameroon and Guinea also started providing such assistance in the last quarter of 2020[7]. The DFID-funded Safety, Support and Solutions II complemented JI activities with a focus on protecting the most vulnerable, notably victims of trafficking or children on the move.

The JI also provided immediate assistance to 235 voluntary and forced returnees from Europe (as of July 2020). This is only 7% of all concerned migrants from Europe who were voluntarily returned by IOM (2 876) or other organisations (67) or who were forcibly returned (295)[8]. Around half of the migrants assisted by the JI to return from Europe were Nigerians. The GIZ (German Corporation for International Cooperation) started referring them to IOM Nigeria in 2020. Approximately 200 of them have effectively received social and psychosocial assistance from the JI to complement the skills development support provided by the German cooperation agency[xiv]. Although IOM is not involved in the return process of forced returnees, the inward referral mechanism established between the EU and IOM allows the JI to provide reintegration assistance, if requested by the country-of-origin's national authorities[xv]. As The Gambia is the pilot country for the inward referral mechanism, most of this assistance was provided there: As of July 2020, the JI provided post-arrival reception assistance to 116 of the 215 forced returnees, the majority of whom had arrived prior to the start of the COVID-19 crisis[9, xvi].

Returnees' social reinsertion does not appear to be as challenging as often described by interviewed stakeholders and in literature. Nonetheless, over half of returnees experience psychosocial issues of varying severity. These issues are more often due to failed migration attempts and the current context of return to the family than to a traumatic migration experience. Nearly all TPML survey respondents feel 'at home', 'free' and 'safe' in their respective countries and communities. Slightly more than half (53%) report having received some form of help (mainly food, money, housing, and emotional support) from their relatives[xvii]. 25% experienced tensions with their family upon return, and 15% experienced the same with their community or friends; in one-third of those cases, tensions or conflicts were "significant"[xviii]. As time passes, these percentages tend to fall back to pre-migration levels (Figure 6). Community leaders confirmed that challenges with social reinsertion are relatively rare overall (Box 2). By contrast, 58% of surveyed returnees indicated struggling with negative thoughts, anxiety, or depression upon their return (Figure 7).

Figure 6: Existence of tensions with the family

Figure 7: Prevalence of psychological distress (negative thoughts, anxiety, depression)

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
[7] This support helped returnees in dire need of cash keep their businesses afloat, cope with loss of income and rising prices of basic goods, and mitigate the risks of delays on purchases of equipment needed for their micro-businesses.

[8] Most voluntary returns supported by IOM from Europe benefit from immediate assistance upon return and reintegration services through bilateral EU Member State funding.

[9] The crisis coincided with the official validation in March 2020 of the SOPs for 'Complementary Reintegration Assistance for Migrants Returning Involuntarily from European Union Member States, Norway, and Switzerland to The Gambia'.

Social, psychological, and even economic stabilisation issues appear to be intertwined. Questioned about the causes of their psychosocial distress, only 12% of returnees cited a trauma due to the migration journey, detention or abuse[xix]. Meanwhile, 73% described feelings of failure, wasted time and being misunderstood, and/or the psychological effect of the loss of social status and shame due to the inability to support their families financially and meet related expectations. Such situations can result in returnees being isolated or self-isolating from their families[xx]. One returnee from Dakar, Senegal shared: 'I am disrespected in my own house because I am now 30 and still unable to provide for the family or at least financially support my mother.' Nearly half of returnees experiencing negative thoughts or feelings frequently felt that these made their social reinsertion more difficult, and three-quarters cited a stable job and decent income as their priority needs and as vital to improve their thoughts and feelings.

Based on the TPML quantitative survey and qualitative interviews with returnees, the situation may be context-dependent. For example, failures tend to be less accepted and family tensions more widespread in families and geographic areas where irregular migration is more common across generations (and the migration success rate potentially greater), where the cost of living and the family's dependency on remittances are higher, and where migrants put themselves and their families into debt to fund the migration journey. For instance, the prevalence of family tensions tends to be significantly higher than average among TPML survey respondents living in high departure areas, such as the Centre-Est province (Burkina Faso), Douala (Cameroon), Abidjan (Côte d'Ivoire) and Edo State (Nigeria), as well as in urban areas (31% vs. 19% in rural areas).

Box 2: Community leaders' perspectives on returnees' social reinsertion and on migration

Community leaders interviewed by Altai Consulting revealed differing experiences and views, depending on the individual country, community, and personal context. Although many cited cases of returnees in conflict with their families (and friends), they are believed to be uncommon because, as one interviewee described: 'In our culture here, family is very important. Your family is your family. In some cases, the migration attempt is a family project. If it ends up being successful, it is for the benefit of the entire family. When unsuccessful, they bear the misfortune together.' Another community leader explained that cases of conflict between returnees and their families often occur when families are not informed of the migration decision and have to bear the cost of the failed migration attempt.

Community leaders stated being generally supportive of migrants and returnees and expressed a positive opinion of migration. As one stated: 'It is in the human nature to seek a better life elsewhere when local opportunities are few.' Migrants can significantly and sustainably improve the lives of their families and communities through remittances. Nonetheless, most community leaders interviewed were aware of the dangers associated with irregular migration and emphasised the socioeconomic cost of migration for areas of departure; it can jeopardise the local agriculture, which represents a significant driver of the economy in rural areas. Thus, migrants are often well received and supported when they return. Some community leaders advise young people to try to build a life at home, if possible, while stressing that 'people all want to stay and live here; they migrate simply because they are in a precarious situation and do not have much alternative and hope'.

Nevertheless, most community leaders confirmed cases of returnees who are marginalised by their families or marginalising themselves because of the feeling of failure and dishonour – for both returnees and their families. An interviewee stated that 'people would not exclude a returnee because he is a returnee. But a migrant who failed will belong to those people with a lower social status'. Several community leaders noted that, for some returnees, it took several months or years to cope with their psychosocial distress and shame, to return to their community and reintegrate within their social networks.

The EUTF budget and funding conditions as well as limited national capacities constrained the JI's capacity to provide adequate and more continuous social and psychosocial assistance to vulnerable returnees. In several countries, the budget for social and psychosocial services was determined based on a percentage of returnees estimated to require this type of support and an

indicative unit cost per beneficiary. Feedback from IOM indicates that this budget proved insufficient, given the number of vulnerable returnees and the severity of some cases requiring expensive medical care, for example[xxi]. Moreover, as per EU procedures, even when the budget is available, disbursements committed by IOM cannot extend beyond the duration of the JI contract, which was relatively short and extended often at the last minute. This rule also applies to health, housing, and education, which for some particularly ill and vulnerable returnees would require prolonged financial aid. The fact that IOM's core funding is limited makes the organisation dependent on EU or other external funding. Yet, IOM representatives at the regional and country levels stressed that few other donors were in the position to complement EUTF funding and, in some countries, there are also few public institutions and ongoing NGO projects to which returnees could be referred for additional support and to ensure a minimal level of continuity after the end of the JI.

The proportion of returnees who received any form of psychosocial counselling or support under the JI increased from 8% to 22% between early 2019 and mid-2020[xxii]. Around half of the needs remain unmet. The increased importance given to psychosocial support starting in 2019 is a key achievement of the JI. According to IOM, as of the end of July 2020, 10 330 returnees had received some form of MHPSS (as outlined in Annex 6)[10]. Over half of them benefited from more than one session[xxiii]. Yet, of the 350 returnees who cited MHPSS as one of their priority needs at the time of their return, only 38% received such support, based on Altai Consulting's returnee survey. An increase of 35 percentage points in MHPSS coverage would be needed to support all migrants expressing struggles with psychological difficulties at the time of their return. When asked directly about it, 47% of returnees who had not received MHPSS at the time of the TPML survey wished they had[11].

In Nigeria, all returnees are eligible and invited to a 90-minute (collective) psycho-education session, which is integrated into a business skills training offered to all returnees and delivered by public institutions and NGOs trained by IOM. This approach allowed for a timely, basic MHPSS despite the high caseload. In Ghana and Guinea-Bissau, IOM took advantage of the modest caseload to offer at least one psychosocial support session (an individual or group session) to each returnee identified as vulnerable. These countries had the highest MHPSS coverage rate, based on Altai Consulting's survey (respectively 32% and 57%). A lower-than-average coverage was recorded in The Gambia, Mali, and Niger.

The still sub-optimal coverage of psychosocial support is primarily due to the persisting difficulty of identifying needs and the weak national capacity to respond to them. Capacity constraints affect the accessibility, quality, and continuity of care. The screening implemented by protection teams in both transit and reception countries helps identify vulnerabilities and tailor assistance accordingly. IOM case workers and field partners involved in the subsequent counselling and reintegration activities have also been trained to identify vulnerabilities and orient available support to those most in need. However, an internal mid-term evaluation of the JI and key informant interviews conducted in 2020 recommended adapting/expanding the vulnerability definition and criteria, and reviewing screening tools accordingly. Using the dedicated tools and recognising signs of distress require technical know-how, cultural awareness, and emotional responsiveness. These conditions are not always met, as evidenced by direct observation of a group counselling and orientation session in Burkina Faso and a role game organised by IOM Mali with case managers. Another example is that, among the 1 488 returnees who attended the psycho-education group sessions facilitated by IOM Nigeria field partners between August 2019 and January 2020, only seven vulnerable cases were identified as needing psychiatric care and referred to the IOM MHPSS team for individual follow-up support[xxiv]. Other challenges include returnees' limited mental health awareness and ability to identify

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[10] The TPML analysis shows that not all IOM country offices share the same definition of what 'psychological' or 'psychosocial support' entails and that the figures they report are not always consistent across countries and time. IOM-reported figures are therefore to be considered as broad estimates. This is also why, in this report, countries are not compared based on the number of returnees having received such support. IOM reports that a regional guidance was sent to country offices in February 2021 to align practices in this regard. In general, MHPSS as implemented by IOM refers to prevention, educational, protection, recreational and counselling activities in non-specialised settings, as opposed to longer-term psychological and psychiatric interventions relying on existing specialised structures, which goes beyond the timeline and capacity of the JI.

[11] This figure is less than the percentage of returnees declaring psychological issues at the time of their return. This is because MHPSS issues and needs decrease as time passes after the return.

and express their own needs for support, the stigma associated with receiving such support, and the evolving nature of their psychological condition[12]. MHPSS needs may arise at a later stage, e.g. while awaiting reintegration support and when expected benefits do not materialise[xxv]. With respect to service provision, an IOM mapping of national psychosocial services in eight countries[13], and interviews with IOM staff in the other SLC countries revealed that few countries have a MHPSS policy in place, and most national institutions and capacities are weak and concentrated in the capitals, which are not necessarily the main areas of return.

In the last two years, some IPs including IOM have improved psychosocial support capacities and activities. This was the result of learning-by-doing and successive improvements more than a strategic effort planned from the start. For example, the Luxembourg Development Cooperation Agency (LuxDev) added a MHPSS component to the ECLOSIO project during its implementation in Senegal after realising that the lack of such assistance was an obstacle to most returnees' economic reintegration. IOM recruited dedicated staff in the Dakar coordination unit and country missions, including psychologists or psychiatrists when possible. IOM Dakar developed a manual on communication and psychosocial reintegration counselling[xxvi], and country-level staff and protection and reintegration partners were trained to identify signs of distress and refer cases to IOM specialists throughout the reintegration process, i.e. not only during returnees' journey through transit and reception centres. Priority was given to transit countries – Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso – but other country missions launched similar initiatives in Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Nigeria (with EUTF and/or DFID funding). In Burkina Faso, Cameroon, The Gambia, Mali, and Niger, IOM set up referral mechanisms to local structures and/or NGOs, such as the Red Cross/Caritas consortium, offering mental health support to vulnerable migrants. In Senegal, in 2019, 1 500 returnees attended a five-day personal development workshop including MHPSS group sessions facilitated by a network of 60 community facilitators previously trained in collaboration with a psychiatrist from the Ministry of Health. Country offices also partnered with hospitals to refer the most serious cases. During the COVID-19 crisis, which affected the psychosocial well-being of an estimated 60% of returnees, IOM provided support to more people while adapting its work modalities by conducting counselling sessions over the phone[xxvii].

IOM is becoming increasingly aware of the need to decentralise psychosocial support and involve families and communities while strengthening national MHPSS systems. In Guinea, IOM supported the creation of OGLMI (Organisation guinéenne de lutte contre la migration irrégulière), a returnee association against irregular migration which organises discussion groups and peer support, in addition to IOM's direct MHPSS focused on severe cases. Both IOM and OGLMI consider this collaboration a success because it expanded the geographic reach and coverage of MHPSS as well as its appropriateness, as former returnees are well positioned to understand their peers and communicate with them in a personal and culturally sensitive manner. In Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia and Nigeria, IOM also facilitated peer-support mechanisms, sought to involve returnees' support networks and, in parallel, took actions to strengthen national MHPSS capacities and systems in 2020 (Box 3).

Box 3: IOM's MHPSS capacity and system-strengthening initiatives in The Gambia and Nigeria

In 2020, IOM Nigeria collaborated with the Federal Ministry of Health to roll out the World Health Organization (WHO) Mental Health Gap Action Plan. Together, they organised two pilot trainings (four days each) for 42 primary healthcare workers based in the main areas of return, outside the largest cities. The trainings, which covered MHPSS in general and the specific needs of returnees in particular, are expected to facilitate the referral of returnees during and beyond the duration of the JI and to strengthen the Nigerian mental health support system, thus potentially benefiting many other Nigerians. In addition, IOM's experience with mobile clinics for internally displaced people in the Northeast region is envisaged to be extended to returnees in the southern part of the country.

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[12] While a high percentage of surveyed returnees (58%) declare facing MHPSS issues at the time of their return to their country, only 10% cited that this was a priority need for them at that time. This gap shows that many returnees may not be fully aware of their need at that time and/or do not prioritise such support.

[13] In Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Ghana, Niger and Nigeria with EUTF funding, and in Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, and Senegal with other funding.

In The Gambia, IOM developed a national mental health framework for returnees and a national training curriculum (not EUTF-funded), which it implemented in partnership with the WHO, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the International Trade Centre (ITC). Ad hoc community-based MHPSS activities were implemented following a shipwreck off the coast of Mauritania, causing the deaths of dozens of Gambians and the return of survivors. To ensure the continuity of this support and strengthen community support mechanisms, IOM trained over 100 health workers, youth counsellors and community members to become local MHPSS ambassadors and change agents. At the end of the training, they were able to identify basic signs of mental illness and provide psychological first aid and basic counselling.

When received, the psychosocial support was appreciated and useful. 85% of surveyed beneficiaries noted that the psychosocial support they received helped them feel better, without distinction among IPs providing such support. Two-thirds of the respondents also noted that reintegration assistance more generally helped improve their psychological well-being notably by improving their overall living conditions (as outlined further in Chapter 4).

3.4. START OF THE JOINT INITIATIVE ECONOMIC REINTEGRATION ASSISTANCE

Over half of the returnees whose return was organised by the JI did not benefit from reintegration assistance or dropped out at an early stage. Among those who started the process, only 59% had completed it as of July 2020. This is mainly due to IOM losing contact with returnees and to the significant delay in the provision of economic support, especially in the first two years of implementation. According to IOM, 49 000 returnees (52% of the total caseload) did not start the JI reintegration process at all or quit (Figure 8)[xxviii]. The deactivation rate is particularly high in Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, and Mali (high caseload countries) as well as in Senegal (due to the late start of reintegration activities). In Niger, the apparent deactivation rate is due to many returnees being assisted through other funding sources[14]. Combining the deactivation rate and the completion rate among the active caseload (having at least started the reintegration process) gives a result of 29% of all returnees having completed the reintegration process under the JI. The completion rate within the active caseload is highest in The Gambia (92%), Guinea (78%) and Cameroon (74%) and lowest in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Senegal, all in the range of 41–44%.

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[14] The AVRR of Nigerien returnees has been covered by a variety of projects (IOM Libya, MRRM II, SURENI, and the JI regional top-up). The gap between the total number of returns to Niger (around 8 500 in July 2020) and the active caseload (785 among whom 240 had completed their reintegration in July 2020) can be explained by the fact that around 1 000 were reintegrated through IOM Libya funding before May 2019 and a few hundred under other bilateral funding. It should also be noted that thousands of Nigeriens who returned from Libya through charter flights organised by the Government of Niger (funded by IOM) were not eligible for reintegration assistance under the JI.

Figure 8: Progress of the JI's reintegration assistance as of 31 July 2020 (source: IOM)

Reintegration process completed
Reintegration process on going
Deactivated caseload

* Part of the caseload in Niger was covered through other funding.

Contact loss with returnees is mostly due to wrong or outdated contact numbers, limited connectivity in the regions, and a lack of response or follow-up from some IOM case managers[xxix]. Key factors contributing to the delay include the high caseload, operational challenges of the JI inception phase (recruiting project teams, establishing procedures and partnerships), and the many steps and associated conditions of the economic assistance process.

The delay in the provision of the JI economic assistance created a backlog of returnees awaiting support and frustration among them, as most migrants return with immediate financial needs[xxx]. For 73% of migrants who received return assistance from the JI through the end of 2018, it took over six months to receive economic support (based on Altai Consulting's beneficiary survey). Clearing such a backlog despite the decreasing number of returns since 2018 has proven challenging for IOM. The pocket money received upon arrival in the country is generally too modest for returnees to cope until they find a source of income or receive economic reintegration support; it lasted a mere three days or less for half of surveyed returnees. The amount was determined by IOM and the government in each country based on budgetary considerations and the perceived risk that a high amount could enable returnees to remigrate or provide an incentive to abuse the system through successive trips to neighbouring countries[xxxi].

IOM took steps to reduce contact losses with returnees, expedite the provision of economic support, and help beneficiaries cope with the situation in the meantime, as outlined below.

- In Burkina Faso, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Nigeria, IOM now provides a *mobile phone and a SIM card to all returnees* to keep contact with them more easily. In The Gambia, IOM requests three phone numbers from returnees upon arrival in the country, and *uses Facebook and returnee WhatsApp groups* for those who cannot be reached through calls. IOM Guinea-Bissau broadcasts messages on the *radio* and organises *search and identification visits in communities of high return*. IOM Nigeria places a minimum of six calls at different times of the day and over a period of several weeks and sometimes mobilises returnees' local networks before deactivating cases.

- The *opening of sub-offices* in a few countries helped bring IOM's staff and assistance closer and more accessible to the beneficiaries.

- IOM Mali asks returnees to sign a *commitment document* ('contrat d'adhésion') to inform them of their obligations – including keeping contact with IOM – during the reintegration process, and to keep them engaged and motivated.

- In Burkina Faso, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Nigeria, IOM has offered *cash-for-work* opportunities to returnees, which allowed them to start temporary activities and receive a modest but much needed income, while also enabling IOM to maintain contact with them for a certain period of time (Box 4).

- In Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal, IOM and the respective governments *raised the pocket money amount* to EUR 250 and EUR 145, respectively.

- In most countries, IOM *recruited additional staff, multiplied partnerships, and streamlined processes* to reduce returnees' wait time.

As a result, the backlog of returnees reduced, and the timeliness of support improved over time. Altai Consulting survey data indicate that 43% of JI beneficiaries who returned to their country through the end of 2018 were invited to their first job counselling and orientation session more than six months after their return, compared to 18% for those who returned more recently. For the reception of the material support itself (e.g. in-kind assistance to establish an income-generating activity), the percentage decreased from 73% in 2017–2018 to 58% in 2019. The average wait time remains significantly higher than IOM's standards but, according to IOM, by July 2020, 41 000 returnees (nearly 90% of assisted returnees) had at least started receiving some form of economic assistance (Figure 9)[xxxii].

Figure 9: Status of economic reintegration assistance of JI returnees as of 31 July 2020

* Part of the caseload in Niger was covered through other funding.

Box 4: Cash-for-work in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Nigeria

In all four countries, IOM offered cash-for-work to returnees as a temporary income-generating activity before the economic assistance became available. Cash-for-work activities typically consist of cleaning public spaces or participating in similar sanitation- and environment-related work in areas of high return. Such activities improve the living conditions in the local community while giving a social role to returnees. Both returnees and other young people from the host community can participate. This helps returnees create bonds among themselves and expand their social networks in the community. Some returnees share their migration experience informally or in sessions facilitated by IOM, which help them cope with the psychological distress or sensitise others about the risks of migrating irregularly. Overall, IOM reports very positive beneficiary feedback[xxxiii].

In Guinea, beneficiaries worked five days per week on the project. For each day worked, on average, EUR 4.5 was paid in cash and EUR 2.5 was transferred to an individual bank account created for

each participant. This amount set aside could either be used immediately or saved by returnees as a personal contribution to a future economic reintegration project.

The main challenges identified by IOM were: clearly communicating objectives and rules (e.g. type of work, duration, payment amount and modalities) to beneficiaries in order to manage their expectations; ensuring regular and secured payments; mitigating the risk of unintended inclusion or fraud; and involving local authorities and community members to avoid frustration. The financial and logistical cost of organising such activities and the potential liability in case of accidents led IOM to discontinue cash-for-work programmes in Burkina Faso and Guinea.

For most of 2020, the COVID-19 crisis and related governmental restrictions heavily impacted the delivery of assistance to beneficiaries. IOM and other IPs deployed rapid and relevant adaptation strategies to ensure business continuity. Most offices were closed, and many IP support activities slowed or were interrupted for several months – at a time when they were most needed and efforts to reduce implementation delays and backlogs were starting to succeed – not only for the JI. A response plan was discussed within each project and, for the JI, at the regional level and with EUDs and EUTF. The main COVID-19 impacts and adaptation measures are listed in Annex 7. The most significant shift in the JI reintegration approach was the provision of a cash grant for returnees to implement their reintegration plan. Such assistance has been provided in Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea, and was instrumental to accelerate assistance delivery (outlined further in Section 3.8).

3.5. JOB COUNSELLING AND ORIENTATION

Job counselling and orientation is critical to the success of returnees' economic reintegration. IOM and most other IPs offer various types of economic support, or one type of support in various fields/lines of business. The job counselling and orientation phase aims to inform returnees of the range of options available, help them decide what best fits their needs, and adapt the economic support accordingly. IPs, including IOM, generally organise a first session in groups, which can take the form of a series of presentations on available reintegration support options and local opportunities, or be included as part of a longer business skills training as in Nigeria. This first group session can be followed by additional one-on-one in-person or phone discussions based on demand. This phase ends when returnees have a reintegration plan, or a business plan in the case of entrepreneurship projects. The business plan template allows for the type of job or microbusiness chosen to be indicated, assesses its feasibility and potential profitability, and sets out the corresponding training and/or financial support to be provided by the IP based on availability and budgets. Failure to identify these key elements adequately would jeopardise returnees' reintegration.

Yet, in most countries and for most IPs, the job counselling and orientation is not systematic and the process tends to be rushed. It does not take the context sufficiently into account and is not always tailored to individual skills, aspirations, and needs. Returnees' individual situations, aspirations and needs are diverse. Their desires and requests are not always well considered, clearly articulated, or realistic. In most cases, substantial guidance and support is needed to help them develop and assess the feasibility of their plans. Stakeholder reports, a review of selected reintegration plans and direct observations conducted by Altai Consulting in several countries revealed gaps in the analyses of returnees' backgrounds and plans, and sessions with them tend to be short and more top-down or guided than intended.

▪ Among all returnees surveyed by Altai Consulting, one in three (and half of non-JI beneficiaries) has not benefited from a job counselling and orientation session.

▪ In the three countries where group and individual counselling and job orientation sessions facilitated by IOM case managers, consultants or partners were observed, the sessions lasted between 30 minutes and two hours. No follow-up session was explicitly offered. One or more additional meetings could be organised, either in-person or by phone, upon request.

▪ Regarding the JI specifically, until 2019, economic support options offered or communicated to returnees were too limited. One in four survey respondents felt they were not offered enough

options suiting their prior experience, interests and needs. In many countries, returnees were advised, by default, to establish an entrepreneurship project although 'not everyone is an entrepreneur' or has the skills to succeed as one[xxxiv].

▪ A significant number of beneficiaries reported that IOM directed them to collective and community-based projects while this was not their choice (explained further in Section 3.8)[15]. Some IOM country offices also refused to support microbusinesses in retail, livestock farming and other lines of business as they were considered riskier in terms of profitability or misuse of the start-up equipment. The in-kind contribution was deemed easier to re-sell, and the cash likely to be used for other, unintended purposes including remigration[xxxv]. A 2004 study conducted in Mali found that these two sectors – retail and livestock farming – had the highest success rate at the time[xxxvi].

▪ Based on Altai Consulting's surveys, some JI beneficiaries were not informed of available technical and vocational education and training (TVET), and 60% of beneficiaries of IOM and other IPs were not informed of opportunities offered by other ongoing EUTF or non-EUTF projects.

▪ Business plans are typically developed by IPs' reintegration assistants, consultants, or partners, with uneven participation of, and ownership by, beneficiaries. Returnees' families/relatives and former returnees, whose experiences and advice could benefit beneficiaries, are rarely involved in the process[16].

▪ Reintegration plans are not always informed by an analysis of the returnee's context. A rapid profiling is carried out upon their arrival in the country: They are asked about their qualifications, work experience and aspirations. The IOM Reintegration Handbook and Reintegration Counselling guide recommend assessing the returnees' family and social context and their support network as important influencing factors[xxxvii]. Community diagnoses were only mentioned by IOM Guinea-Bissau. The analysis of the business plan feasibility, when carried out, pays insufficient attention to the socioeconomic context, while operational risks are poorly anticipated and factored. Feasibility studies are rarely conducted, except for large-scale projects[17].

▪ Most IPs sought to analyse the broader market and identify local economic or job opportunities[xxxviii]. Yet, studies were sometimes completed too late to inform IP programming and returnee orientation. Stakeholders interviewed felt that these studies should have been conducted before project implementation, and better coordinated or at least shared between IPs. Few IPs state having used studies published by other organisations, such as the World Bank, African Development Bank, ILO, EU or other institutions, even in countries where such publications are numerous (e.g. in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Nigeria and Senegal). The risk is that decisions are made based on each IP's individual experience and expertise instead of drawing on a broader collective of expertise, experience and lessons learned.

The implementation of the JI principle of a context-adapted, individually tailored assistance is challenged by the following constraints:

▪ a lack of time and resources available in the project formulation and inception phase;

▪ priority given to implementation, especially by IOM in the high caseload;

▪ sometimes unclear or unrealistic aspirations of beneficiaries;

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[15] For example, the IOM information brochure distributed to returnees in Nigeria reads: 'IOM strongly encourages you to subscribe to collective or community projects.' This tendency is created/reinforced by the JI's guidelines, Framework SOPs, and the IOM Reintegration Counselling guide published in 2019. The latter states: 'While collective and community-based reintegration assistance may be difficult to promote in the context of individual reintegration counselling, you should highlight some of the advantages of this type of assistance (larger project, availability of more resources and support from peers, breadth of skills and experience which can be useful to the project, better chances of acceptance from the community, etc.). Collective and community-based activities can also be encouraged by describing the selection criteria reintegration plans will have to pass through: if a project is presented by a group of returned migrants, if it involves the community or addresses its needs, it is far more likely to be selected and funded than individual projects.'

[16] IOM Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire have experimented and involved, in some cases, former returnees in the process of counselling new returnees or mentoring them.

[17] This was the case with IOM Nigeria, which funds two large-scale community-based projects: a pineapple juice factory and a cassava processing unit, both involving private sector operators. Extensive feasibility studies were commissioned.

- the template and process for developing business plans, ill-adapted to those returnees who are illiterate, have an inadequate perception of risks, and/or have no prior experience in the field of their chosen business;

- limited budget per capita and the impatience of returnees to receive economic assistance, which reduces opportunities for an in-depth counselling and orientation; and

- a lack of in-house professional expertise in job counselling and orientation, weak involvement of national employment and entrepreneurship support agencies (except by IOM in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Côte d'Ivoire, YEP (Youth Empowerment Project) in the Gambia, and the EJOM (L'emploi des Jeunes crée des Opportunités, ici au Mali) project in Mali where the national employment agency for youth is one of the three IP consortium members), and the limited institutional capacity of these agencies.

Matching the supply of economic reintegration opportunities with the returnees' demand is challenging. The study conducted in 2004 among Malian returnees found that reintegration projects and microbusinesses were more successful and sustainable when the idea/decision of the project was the returnee's own, without influence from the funding agency or returnees' relatives. At the same time, it stressed the importance of adapting the project to the local socioeconomic context[xxxix]. It is not easy to maximise the chances of effective reintegration by letting returnees make their own decisions and also preventing them from engaging in sectors that have limited prospects for success. Ensuring a people-centred, needs-based, individually tailored, and successful assistance requires providing clear, comprehensive information about economic reintegration opportunities and risks, facilitating connections with experts and other returnees working in relevant sectors, and letting returnees make informed decisions. This involves exceptional research, and interpersonal and networking skills.

IPs have experimented and improved over time through a more demand-sensitive approach to job orientation and a more diversified range of economic reintegration pathways. In 2019, several IOM missions and other IPs started multiplying economic support options made available to returnees with the view to better match individual situations and plans. This includes the EJOM project in Mali and the INTEGRA programme in Guinea, among others. As for IOM, country offices allowed returnees not assessed as vulnerable to also benefit from individual support. Whenever possible, they contracted (more) TVET centres, NGOs and CSOs working in various sectors/lines of business. In some countries, such as Mali, these partners were asked to organise more frequent TVET sessions and enrol more returnees. In Guinea, IOM offered scholarships for master's degrees in Morocco and France via e-learning, which was relevant as the percentage of Guinean returnees with secondary and higher education is well above the regional average. In Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal, IOM explored options for direct job placements through partnerships with private companies and TVET institutions. However, few job placements were secured due to the weak formal sector and the lack of interest of employers – even more so in the context of COVID-19; in Nigeria, returnees themselves demonstrated little interest. In Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea, IOM and its partners organised job fairs to connect returnees with other NGOs and potential employers but found the initiative costly compared to the number of successful recruitments. Yet, it put returnees at the centre of the decisions that affect their reintegration and life and gave them a more active role and sense of responsibility. IOM also tried to establish formal referral mechanisms with other organisations and projects.

3.6. PARTNERSHIPS AND REFERRALS FOR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

The JI programming principle of external partnerships and referrals, combined with the quota of returnees set by EUTF for most other projects, proved relevant but insufficient to foster effective collaboration and synergies between EUTF-funded IPs, and between them and other organisations and national institutions. Effective referrals remain a work in progress. The quotas and follow-up requests from EUTF and EUDs created an incentive for IPs to coordinate and establish referral mechanisms. Referrals are a shared interest: They lend to more opportunities for returnees, less case management responsibilities for IPs, increased coherence of actions, and less reliance on EUTF funding for the reintegration of future migrants. Although IPs were encouraged to establish referrals with other (non-EUTF) funded organisations/projects and with national institutions, however,

such referrals remain modest and involve EUTF IPs more than national institutions or other organisations (Figure 10).

Figure 10: Referrals between IOM and other projects or agencies

Such modest referrals and, in particular, limited referrals with other funded organisations/projects and national institutions can be attributed to three main causes, outlined below and explained further in Annex 8.

▪ There are *limited TVET, entrepreneurship and youth employment projects that are well adapted* to the profiles, locations and aspirations of returnees and aligned with the JI implementation timeframe (as many projects commenced recently), and *relevant national programmes/agencies* have *limited technical and financial capacity*.

▪ *Mutual knowledge and coordination between reintegration and employment initiatives is generally weak*, even within the EUTF, EU and Member States project portfolio, development projects tend to work in silos, and inter-agency coordination is perceived as entailing high transaction costs.

▪ *IOM's policy related to the protection of returnees' personal data* is interpreted differently at the various levels of the organisation, its implementation is cumbersome (e.g. approval procedures for data-sharing agreements signed by IOM with non-UN organisations are long, and the later in the reintegration process that these agreements are signed, the more difficult it is – and the longer it takes – to obtain returnees' consent to share their personal data), and not all possibilities offered by the policy have been implemented (e.g. prior consent has not been collected from returnees before or directly upon their return) or could be operationalised as intended in any of the countries of concern during the period under review[18].

Options exist to overcome the above-listed obstacles to referrals and make them easier going forward. IPs in some countries have already put them in place. In addition to the above-mentioned job fairs, which can be considered an informal approach to referrals, initiatives that could be replicated or adapted elsewhere include:

▪ monthly meetings organised by the EUD with all relevant IPs in The Gambia and Guinea, during which referral opportunities are discussed;

▪ the reintegration support and referral guide developed by IOM Guinea and made available to case managers and partners involved in returnees' job counselling and orientation, whereby information

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[18] IOM reports having introduced in October 2020 a data-sharing agreement form to be piloted by all country missions in the SLC region, which enables IOM to obtain returnees' consent earlier in the process. The feedback from four country missions that started using this form is overall positive: two indicated that this approach has facilitated referrals "a lot", one that it has facilitated them "a little", and one that it did not help (but no further information was provided as to why).

and contact details in the document were identified through an extensive mapping of institutions and projects to which returnees can be referred for support services beyond EUTF-funded ones;

- the online outward referral platform, IOM Migrant Assistant Portal (IMAP), which was piloted in The Gambia in 2019–2020, which lists services and opportunities relevant to the needs of returnees, facilitates the sharing of returnee information between IOM and other organisations (once a data-sharing agreement is signed between them), and enables returnee case management and monitoring once referred; and

- Mali's double returnee registration process coupled with its two databases (of the National Directorate for Social Development and IOM) have helped avoid issues with IOM's data protection policy that have arisen in other countries.

Challenges with referrals led to an internalisation of tasks by IOM and a reliance on services that the organisation can manage directly[xl]. The diversification of economic reintegration options remains primarily achieved through direct partnerships. Most returnees continue to be directed to entrepreneurship projects managed by IOM, and to NGOs and national or private TVET centres contracted by IOM, which does not allow them to work independently from IOM, financially and technically. This tendency was also documented in past evaluations of IOM AVRR programmes[xli]. Where referral mechanisms exist, they are project-bound and IP-managed and, thus, not steered by relevant national authorities and not fostering returnee ownership[19]. This approach hinders several aspects of programming, as outlined below.

- IOM's absorption capacity and the quality of case management: In many countries, IOM directly manages a multiplicity of (often short-term) partnerships, individual returnee trajectories, and scattered, small-scale reintegration projects, for which the existing IOM staffing and stringent procedures are not well suited. This approach may compromise the quality of case management.

- Programme efficiency: Internalising work and/or relying on direct implementation partnerships entails significant management costs.

- Opportunities for returnees: Returnees' freedom of choice, engagement and ownership of their entrepreneurship projects become more limited[20].

- Overall coherence, coordination and good governance of migration and employment initiatives: Creating synergies and complementarities between the two types of programmes becomes difficult (see Annex 9, where the contribution of job creation and youth employment programmes to the EUTF migration agenda is detailed).

- National ownership and leadership: These are obstructed by the overall weak role of government agencies in the referral system and in the management of returnees' economic reintegration process more broadly.

- Prospects for sustainability: Dependency on often relatively short-term and unpredictable IPs and EU funding stifles the insertion of future returnees into employment programmes/the labour market.

3.7. TECHNICAL AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION

TVET is offered by most IPs, and increasingly by IOM, as a type of support that has a longer-lasting impact on returnees' trajectories than other forms of economic assistance. TVET is sometimes combined with an entrepreneurship training, and typically followed with assistance in finding work or starting a business. As of November 2020, IOM reports that 41% of the JI beneficiaries of economic support benefited from TVET. IOM Ghana and Nigeria have engaged comparatively less in this area, while Mali and Burkina Faso have engaged the most. The average percentage is essentially the same for other IPs' beneficiaries. Across JI countries and other IPs, increasing diversified TVET options have been offered to returnees either through service contracts with public and private TVET

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[19] They typically work through lists of voluntary returnees sent by IOM to other IPs.

[20] On the other hand, joining another programme involves opportunity costs for returnees.

centres (e.g. for IOM Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, and Mali), through referrals between EUTF IPs (mostly in The Gambia, fewer in Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Senegal) or to other organisations (Guinea-Bissau and Senegal). 85% of TVET beneficiaries report having been offered various options, and roughly the same proportion were able to pursue the option they chose. Diversifying TVET options may have contributed to the decrease in wait times. For instance, among JI beneficiaries, 56% of TVET participants who had returned before the end of 2018 had to wait over six months before their first training session, compared to 32% for those who returned more recently.

Across the region and IPs, feedback provided by TVET beneficiaries is positive overall (Figure 11). There is no significant difference among countries and IPs or in relation to training duration and the respondent's level of education.

Figure 11: Satisfaction and feedback of TVET beneficiaries

Overall satisfaction

- Very dissatisfied: 30
- Dissatisfied: 134
- Neutral: 79
- Satisfied: 754
- Very satisfied: 228

Understanding of the training contents

- Nothing: 22
- A few: 121
- Most: 525
- Everything: 552

Training sufficient to work in the field

- Do not wish to answer
- Completely insufficient: 72
- Rather insufficient: 147
- Rather sufficient: 670
- (Very sufficient): 400

Both beneficiaries and programme stakeholders reported three main challenges: accessibility of TVET opportunities; quality of TVET opportunities; and insertion of trainees into the labour market.

1. *Information, and financial and geographic accessibility.* IPs tend to report low demand for TVET while Altai Consulting's survey results indicate otherwise: 70% of respondents who did not benefit from TVET said they would have appreciated this support (Figure 12a and b). They report not having been offered the opportunity or not having been well informed about it. This may be due to the cost of TVET, hence the limited number of places. Other obstacles include: the wait time before the next available TVET session; the location of TVET institutions, often concentrated in the capital city[xlii]; and the full-time requirement of some trainings, making it difficult to maintain a parallel activity[21]. Lastly, evidence suggests that returnees' interest in TVET increases once they have received some material support or started an income-generating activity and are more motivated and available to attend[xliii]. When returnees see economic needs as their main priority, TVET is not appealing as it delays economic gains. Adequately timing and sequencing this type of support is key.

2. *Quality and duration*: All IPs report facing challenges finding training centres with qualified trainers, modern teaching methods, and adequate equipment. They typically work with accredited centres and make sure there is an adequate mix between theory and practice. One issue raised in interviews with IPs, TVET centres and TVET participants is that almost all trainees obtain the

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[21] The per diems, offered by most IPs, are insufficient to cover all returnees' living expenses and the needs of their families/children, if any.

training certificate regardless of their learning and skills, even when these are assessed. The certificate therefore does not serve as a motivating factor and may lose its value in the eyes of potential employers. Moreover, budget constraints mean that trainings are often short. The main beneficiary feedback is that TVET needs to be less rushed. Duration ranges from a few days to one year depending on the IP and the type of job/skills. However, the training lasted less than four weeks for 90% of surveyed beneficiaries, and five days or less for one-third; in this case, it is closer to a general introduction/orientation than to an actual TVET. Furthermore, in March 2020, the COVID-19 crisis interrupted most TVET, although some continued in smaller groups.

3. *Bridges with the labour market*: Around 60% of TVET beneficiaries surveyed by Altai Consulting declared that the training had proven helpful in securing a job and that they were working in the field/trade in which they had been trained[22] (Figures 12c and d). Although some training participants may have taken on other job opportunities and be able to apply the knowledge and skills they acquired to these jobs, the lack of a stronger correlation between TVET training and related employment diminishes the cost-effectiveness of TVET and reveals room for improvement in the job counselling and orientation phase and in beneficiary integration into employment. Internships, apprenticeships, and job placement opportunities are limited without connections, which may be the reason most TVET beneficiaries elect to set up their own businesses.

Figure 12: Demand for TVET and insertion of trainees into the labour market

b. Interest in TVET among non-beneficiaries

a. TVET beneficiaries among TPML survey respondents[xliv]

c. Trainees working in the field they were trained

d. Helpfulness of the training in securing a job in the field

IPs' good practices:

- In Mali, the EJOM project conducted a mapping and assessment of all training centres in its intervention areas to select the best and most accessible ones, and periodically updated the training courses based on demand from beneficiaries, the needs of the local economy, and the success rate of past beneficiaries' entrepreneurship projects.

- In Guinea-Bissau, IOM recruited mobile trainers to assemble returnees located in the same areas and deliver the training on-site, making it more geographically accessible and reducing costs for both IOM and beneficiaries.

- In a few countries, TVET centres have adapted to returnees' time constraints by offering part-time or intermittent TVET sessions.

- In Côte d'Ivoire and Mali, IOM informed TVET trainers about returnees' backgrounds and vulnerabilities and trained them on how to take these specificities into account in their teaching and communication approach. This helped limit cases of conflict and drop-out during training.

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[22] The duration of the training does not seem to influence this percentage.

- As part of the YEP project in The Gambia, ITC and the Gambian Government developed national Youth and Trade Roadmaps which identified sectors and trades that have the highest potential to generate decent jobs and are aligned with youth aspirations. One of the roadmaps is dedicated to TVET and included an assessment of the vocational training and apprenticeship system and of its policy and regulatory frameworks.

- Some IPs and TVET centres provide extra support to trainees towards the end of the training, helping them look for job opportunities, develop CVs, prepare for interviews, etc. IOM Mali recruited dedicated personnel to research the job market and facilitate direct job placements.

- Some IPs contracted TVET centres that already had partnerships in place with potential employers: IOM Côte d'Ivoire contracted the French transnational company Bolloré Logistics and the training centre SITM (Société Ivoirienne de Technologies Modernes); in Burkina Faso, IOM contracted Québec Afrique while the Chamber of Commerce and Industry managing the ARCHIPELAGO project liaised with its members from the private sector to pre-identify apprenticeship opportunities; in Guinea, the INTEGRA programme works with ASCAD (l'Agence du Service Civique D'Action pour le Développement), a TVET centre that stands out due to the high employment rate of its trainees (explained further in Box 5).

<div align="center">Box 5: TVET through ASCAD in Guinea</div>

ASCAD is a Guinean civil-military training institution created in 2011 under the authority of the President's Secretariat. Its mandate is to deliver to young people military and vocational training for a variety of educational and career paths. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), one of the INTEGRA consortium members, collaborates with ASCAD to train 1 000 young people and help them obtain employment.

The financial agreement between ASCAD and the Guinean State requires that at least 70% of trainees sign a stable work contract within six months of the completion of the training. This performance-based contract arrangement acts as a strong incentive for ASCAD to develop its market knowledge and maximise TVET effectiveness.

ASCAD opens new training courses and orients candidates based on periodic national and local job market assessments. Training duration ranges from six to 14 months. It is organised in three phases: civic education and life skills training, with an emphasis on the military discipline and work ethics; technical and vocational training (30% theory and 70% practice); and mandatory internship or apprenticeship. For this last phase, ASCAD nurtures relationships and formal partnerships with a wide range of small, medium, and large companies. A dedicated Studies, Monitoring and Evaluation team was established and maintains a trainee database to monitor trainee employment status every six months over a period of three years and notify the trainees when new job opportunities arise.

ASCAD gained employers' trust because of its focus on soft skills (first training phase): communication; self-management; etiquette; respect for hierarchy; punctuality and reliability; discipline; and other soft skills which employers find rare among young Guineans (an issue that was highlighted in other SLC countries as well)[xlv]. ASCAD also attracted donors' attention and support because of its excellent track record: It obtained numerous accreditations and reports a 76.5% employment rate overall since 2012.

3.8. ENTREPRENEURSHIP PROJECTS/MICROBUSINESSES

3.8.1. SUPPORT TO MICROBUSINESSES

Support to set up a microbusiness is the most common type of economic support provided by IPs and can take various forms. Returnees who opt for self-employment and request support to set up a microbusiness can receive in-kind support (start-up equipment) and/or monetary assistance directly after the review and approval of their business (or reintegration) plan, or after an entrepreneurship training or TVET. Some are placed directly into an existing project, without prior

training or support. The form and amount of support depends on the IP, the type of microbusiness, the budget available and the specific need/request of the beneficiary. 86% of JI beneficiaries received at least one type of project start-up support as of December 2020[xlvi]. The percentage is lower among beneficiaries of other IPs, for which this type of support is either not offered or less systematic.

This type of economic support can have positive results and is generally appreciated. Nearly three in four microbusinesses were still operational and generating income at the time of Altai Consulting's survey, and two-thirds of respondents were satisfied or very satisfied with their projects. The viability and profitability of the projects and beneficiary satisfaction were higher when the in-kind (or monetary) support was combined with an entrepreneurship or technical training. However, 43% of Altai Consulting's survey respondents reported having a parallel activity (in addition to the one supported by IPs) and, in 57% of cases, the other activity was more profitable than the IP-supported one.

Photos of projects and beneficiaries (© Altai Consulting, with the authorisation of the people photographed)

| Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso | Dakar, Senegal |

Key challenges and limitations in IP support provided by IPs to micro-businesses are outlined below.

▪ **Microbusinesses are not always aligned with the beneficiaries' first choice, professional aspirations, and skills**. Nearly one in four Altai Consulting's survey respondents stated that their microbusiness was not aligned with their initial desires and plans. Moreover, entrepreneurship projects require skills specific to entrepreneurship, life/soft skills, communications skills, etc., which are different from technical skills and for which training is not systematically offered.

▪ **The project start-up support often comes late**. For two-thirds of beneficiaries, it took more than six months after return to receive start-up support. All countries and IPs have faced this challenge. In the JI, the average wait time was longest in Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon, and Nigeria, and shorter in Niger and The Gambia. Timeliness has moderately improved over time: While 73% of returnees had to wait over six months to receive such support in 2017, 59% of beneficiaries had to wait that long in 2019. The reasons for this delay, cited by programme implementers, include the preference for formalising microbusinesses, IPs' lengthy supply and logistics procedures[23], and the time and cost beneficiaries take to gather necessary documentation (e.g. identification documents, quotes, and receipts/bills). The relevance of these approaches/procedures is questionable considering the humanitarian imperative of providing timely support to returnees, the small size of their entrepreneurship projects, and the West African context where more than 90% of the economy is informal, the civil registration and administrative system is weak, and paperwork can be cumbersome and costly[24].

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[23] This can also be attributed to the limited use of efficient options (e.g. long-term agreements with suppliers and buying in bulk and stock-piling), an issue that was also highlighted in the JI mid-term evaluation of reintegration activities in the Sahel, 2020.

[24] Studies conducted by the World Bank show that formalising micro- and small businesses too soon can cause their failure. See: World Bank Group Support for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), 2019, and Support for microenterprises: Lessons from Sub-Saharan Africa, 1999.

- **The start-up equipment is often too modest to set the entrepreneurship projects up for success**. **Some beneficiaries questioned the adequacy and quality of the start-up equipment provided by IPs**. The subsidy typically values as much as EUR 1 000 per beneficiary and varies across IPs and projects based on the beneficiary's vulnerability and needs[25]. Most IPs provide it as a one-off, in-kind grant. Some projects, such as INTEGRA in Guinea and EJOM in Mali, provide it in instalments, the second, complementary grant being disbursed after a follow-up period; this helps ensure the first grant was adequately used and incentivises beneficiaries to start small instead of investing everything at once. The small initial funding is the most frequent issue mentioned by beneficiaries as well as programme and government stakeholders: The subsidy reportedly is 'too modest to start certain types of businesses, especially those requiring upfront investment in capital, equipment and supplies' or even 'insufficient to sustainably reintegrate anyone'. By comparison, returnees from Europe receive a higher grant from EU Member States and other non-EUTF funded organisations, such as the French OFII (Office Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration), the French-Malian Cellule Technique de Codéveloppement, IOM with Swiss funding in Nigeria, and GIZ. Studies show that one of the main success factors of reintegration projects is the amount of the initial capital investment or financial subsidy[xlvii]. However, the limited initial funding can be attributed to EUTF budget limitations and, with regard to the JI, the higher-than-expected number of returnees to assist, and the risk of creating a push factor for irregular (re-)migration.

- **Follow-up support provided by IPs tends to be patchy** and limited to a few weeks after microbusinesses' installation, due to the geographic dispersion of returnees as well as IP budget and staffing constraints.

- **The preliminary analysis of the context, market potential and profitability of projects tends to be weak** (outlined further in Section 3.5).

- **Project sustainability is an issue**. The functionality rate decreases sharply over time: The percentage of projects operational at the time of Altai Consulting's survey is 95% among recent projects (those in their first year of existence), 59% among projects in existence between one and two years, and 37% for projects older than two years (Figure 13)[xlviii]. Discontinuation of income-generating activities is not necessarily a sign of failure of reintegration (assistance) if project beneficiaries have gained funds, experience, and a better understanding of the market, and have reinvested them in a new project; based on survey data presented in Chapter 4, it is likely to be the case for some of them.

Figure 13: Functionality of IP-supported projects over time (Cycle 3 survey only)

Project success and sustainability are influenced by three key factors:

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[25] For example, large farming projects set up by EJOM in Mali as well as Enabel and PACERSEN in Senegal provide a much higher financial (and technical) support for the capital investment.

- *Contextual* (returnees' geographic/living environment and support network, as well as the broader socioeconomic context, such as the COVID-19 crisis [outlined further in Sections 4.3 and 4.4] and the SARS protests in Nigeria in late 2020);

- *Individual* (beneficiaries' motivation, ownership, skills, and financial resources); and

- *Operational* (the way IPs counsel, orient, motivate, train, support and follow up with returnees, and how risks are identified and managed along the way).

There is a modest but noticeable difference between microbusinesses supported by IOM and other IPs. On average, based on Altai Consulting's survey, beneficiaries of other IPs experience shorter wait times, benefit from projects and support that correspond better to their aspirations, receive more support and training overall, and their projects' functionality and profitability rates are slightly higher, as is the beneficiary satisfaction. Besides the diverse nature of the entrepreneurship projects they support and the quality of the support provided, other factors may explain these differences: Other IPs do not face the same caseload as IOM; their beneficiary returnees came back and resettled a longer time ago; and the returnees need to proactively apply and meet several criteria to benefit from IP support[26].

Under the JI, three types of microbusinesses can be supported: individual; collective; and community-based. The number and type of project participants is what differentiates them (Figure 14).

Figure 14: Types of JI-sponsored microbusinesses

3.8.2. COLLECTIVE AND COMMUNITY-BASED PROJECTS

Initially, the JI favoured group (community-based and collective) projects, while individual project support was primarily for returnees identified as vulnerable. This is because of the intended advantages of group projects in terms of efficiency, sustainability and social benefits: More returnees can be reintegrated at once, speeding up the caseload absorption; the pooling of the financial support budgeted for individual beneficiaries allows for higher upfront capital investment; this and the pooling of returnees' respective time/capacities and skills can enable more solid, viable projects and therefore increase socioeconomic benefits for the community, which in turn help address the root causes of irregular migration. An additional advantage of community-based projects, promoted in IOM's integrated approach to reintegration and in the JI Framework SOPs for return and reintegration, is that they can foster social cohesion and local development while not appearing to reward migrants and exclude those who stayed[xlix].

IOM's actual engagement in this approach has been uneven across countries and, in the implementation phase, group projects face several challenges. Although the evolution to more group support has taken place to an extent, IOM's initial intentions for this have not yet been achieved. Focusing on community-based reintegration, IOM reports 104 such projects in place (for which IOM's

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[26] The survey sample size is also smaller for non-IOM beneficiaries.

support was completed) and 97 were being set up as of 31 July 2020, against 44 and 13 respectively two years earlier. These projects involve an estimated 1 800 returnees and 2 400 host community members. IOM Côte d'Ivoire accounts for more than half of these totals, while Senegal and Niger are still preparing a few projects, and Mali and Mauritania have not initiated any[j]. Other IPs support community-based projects: The Italian and Spanish international cooperation agencies AICS and AECID as part of the PACERSEN programme in Senegal (community farming); the Belgian international cooperation agency ENABEL with the PARERBA project in Senegal (farms with irrigation systems) and INTEGRA in Guinea (infrastructure projects); and the Dutch cooperation agency SNV and its partners as part of the EJOM programme in Mali (horticultural farms).

While opinions on collective and community projects vary across countries, IPs and other stakeholders, all report challenges: delays in the preparation and implementation phases; higher upfront financial investment; generally low interest among returnees, who tend to prefer individual support and, in some cases, felt 'forced by IOM to enrol in group projects'; an uneven level of engagement among project participants, and tensions and trust issues; and sometimes insufficient income to generate enough revenue for all, or the project takes too long to yield benefits. As a result, some groups have split or discontinued the project. (See Annex 10 for a more detailed analysis of the main advantages and limitations/risks of community-based projects.)

Evidence on the relative performance of the three types of projects is emerging from IOM and Altai Consulting's surveys. **Overall, individual projects seem to perform better than group projects and, among the latter, collective projects tend to perform better than community-based projects across all considered indicators – beneficiary satisfaction, financial performance, and sustainability** – according to Altai Consulting's surveys (Table 2, based on the self-reports of the beneficiaries)[27].

Table 2: Comparison of IOM-supported project performance by type of projects

	Individual	Collective	Community	All projects
Projects still ongoing at the time of the survey	78%	64%	70%	74%
Projects with tensions or conflict between participants	-	28%	43%	-
At least 2 participants left the project since it started	-	26%	52%	-
Projects generating some revenue	74%	71%	55%	72%
Satisfaction of project beneficiaries	70%	65%	38%	66%
Participants' satisfaction with their financial situations	45%	38%	32%	42%
Participants' ability to cover at least most of their personal needs	58%	52%	41%	55%
Ability to cover at least most of personal needs now vs. after return	+36pp (+171%)	+36pp (+225%)	+22pp (+116%)	+25pp (+125%)
Participants making more money than before reintegration support	57%	45%	26%	52%
Participants reporting a positive impact of reintegration support on their financial situations	61%	52%	36%	56%

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[27] Result may be overestimated due to selection bias. For most country surveys, IOM provided the initial list of project beneficiaries to be interviewed, and enumerators may have prioritised projects that were still ongoing.

The implementation of group projects may have lacked the necessary time and expertise in the preparation and follow-up phase. All parameters considered, all types of projects have advantages and risks/limitations and should continue to be included in the reintegration toolbox. Firstly, this is because their results greatly vary by country and IP and are context-dependent[28]. Secondly, in the data presented above, the sample size is smaller for community-based projects than for the individual and collective ones because fewer were already operational at the time of the surveys. Moreover, community-based projects in operation might show a lower level of income and beneficiary satisfaction and a higher frequency of tension and attrition than collective projects because they tend to be less advanced/mature and include more participants. This points to the fact that their (cost-) effectiveness could be further improved by mobilising the necessary local expertise and facilitation skills, and by more systematically factoring in the risk factors that are in the control of IOM/IPs and their partners. Lastly, the overall relevance of each approach cannot be judged solely based on their operational and economic performance. In the past two years, IOM has reflected on and recognised the challenges of both collective and community-based projects, but programme managers and the 2020 JI mid-term evaluation have recommended to 'handle *collective* microbusiness assistance with caution'[li]. This preference for community over collective projects is due to the non-economic benefits of community projects. Taking them into consideration, the advantages of the community approach for host communities and IPs may outweigh its risks and limitations. At the beneficiary level, however, income generation is the most important criterion.

As a result of the challenges faced with the various types of microbusinesses in the field, IOM's approach evolved in the past one-to-two years, and other IPs have also taken various promising initiatives, including those outlined below.

- In addition to the above-mentioned *commitment document* to be signed by IOM group project participants in Mali (also introduced by IOM field partners in Côte d'Ivoire), some IPs request that beneficiaries set basic operational and management rules for their projects in writing, which helps establish a common understanding among beneficiaries and gives them a sense of responsibility.

- *Reduced group project size*. IOM Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau halved the average number of community-based project participants between 2017–2018 and 2019–2020[lii]. In Guinea-Bissau, community members cannot join an ongoing project unless they bring additional capital, revenue, or skills.

- IPs provide *more up-front information* on the sustainability/profitability and risks associated with group projects, and an *entrepreneurship, life skills and/or conflict management training is more frequently offered* (e.g. in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria, and Guinea-Bissau).

- In several countries, IOM *increased the level of local support and follow-up* to group projects, either through grassroots organisations with significant experience in local development projects (e.g. NGOs CADEL in Niger and PAARDIC in Cameroon), returnee associations (e.g. Alert Migration in Burkina Faso), village development committees (in The Gambia), and/or local multi-stakeholders committees (in Guinea and, for community-based projects, in Nigeria). In The Gambia, 30% of project revenue is to be paid back to the village development committees to support development of the communities, which stimulates community members/leaders' involvement in the project[liii].

- In several countries, IOM and other IPs sought to increase the level of financial support to entrepreneurship projects by *using or promoting various financing instruments* supplementing the EUTF-funded initial subsidy, such as mini-grants and mini-loans (YEP in The Gambia), village savings and loans associations (IOM in Senegal), or by facilitating access to credit through local banks or microfinance institutions (INTEGRA in Guinea and IOM in Nigeria under non-EUTF

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[28] The nature of projects and IP support varies significantly across IPs and countries, as well as their implementation contexts. The highest all-project functionality rate is found in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger and the lowest in Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau. The satisfaction rate (with any project type) is the highest in Niger and Burkina Faso, and the lowest in Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon. Regarding collective and community-based projects, tensions or conflicts among participants are least frequent in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Niger, and The Gambia and most frequent in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Nigeria, while attrition is the lowest in Mali, Burkina, and Cameroon and the highest in Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea.

funding, as outlined in Box 6)[29]. Microfinance institutions are reportedly more reluctant to provide loans to returnees than to other population groups, but pilots have been successful in Nigeria and a few other countries[liv]. In a recent publication, IOM described the approach as relevant for certain entrepreneurship projects, especially if other, cheaper sources of funding are not available. This extra funding is recommended for the most promising and/or mature entrepreneurship initiatives rather than towards capital investment for any project[lv].

▪ In several countries, IOM and other IPs are promoting a *value chain approach*, supporting mutually benefiting projects upstream and downstream of the value chain, e.g. in the production, processing, packing and distribution of agricultural products (IOM Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau, other IPs in The Gambia and Senegal, and the ARCHIPELAGO project in several countries).

▪ *Individual support offered to non-vulnerable returnees*. Some IOM country offices (e.g. Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Nigeria), also reported paying more attention to returnees' desires instead of systematically encouraging collective and community-based projects. Based on IOM monitoring data and Altai Consulting's survey, the share of individual project beneficiaries increased from 59% among returnees returned in 2017 or earlier to 72% among returnees returned in 2019. As of mid-2020, around 65% of returnees who had received microbusiness start-up support since the start of the JI are (or were) involved in an individual project, 25% in a collective project and 10% in a community-based project.

▪ *Provision of part of the economic reintegration assistance in the form of cash* in Côte d'Ivoire first, then Cameroon and Guinea (see below).

Box 6: Using financing instruments to increase the level of support to entrepreneurship projects

A Village Savings and Loan Association (VSLA) is a group of people who usually know each other well and meet regularly to save together and take small loans from those savings. The activities of the group run in cycles of one year, after which the accumulated savings and the loan profits are distributed back to the members. The purpose of a VSLA is to provide simple savings and loan facilities in a community that does not have easy access to formal financial services[lvi]. The only documented example of its application as part of a reintegration project is described by IOM in its fourth JI biannual reintegration report. In the Guiré Yéro Bocar village in Senegal, returnees and community members set up a VSLA to sustain the IOM-sponsored local grain mill. As the project and the VSLA further develop, beneficiaries will be in the position to contribute to the development of the local community and gain access to other financing schemes (microcredit and revolving funds).

IOM has experience with microcredit in other regions (Asia and the Middle East). In the SLC region in 2017, the Nigeria office partnered with a local microfinance institution that had a social purpose and experience with disadvantaged groups. Qualifying microbusinesses receive an initial training and a small initial loan of approximately EUR 320. If repaid on time, they become eligible for higher amounts. To date, the average end-of-year reimbursement rate has been around 70%[lvii].

3.8.3. THE USE OF CASH IN THE REINTEGRATION ASSISTANCE

Cash-based reintegration assistance was introduced by IOM in three countries to overcome the operational challenges posed by the COVID-19 crisis. It initiated a paradigm shift in the no-cash reintegration approach of the JI. Until early 2020, and still in some JI countries, IOM staff and the EU explain(ed) their preference for in-kind support by the risk of returnees using cash for their short-term needs and for purposes other than income generation and long-term economic self-sufficiency –

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[29] A village savings and loan association was created by the (IOM-sponsored) community project participants in the Guiré Yéro Bocar village in Senegal. Access to microcredit is facilitated by the following IPs: The Gambia: GIZ as part of the Make it in the Gambia project and ITC as part of the YEP project; Guinea: ENABEL, United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) and ITC as part of INTEGRA; Niger: UNCDF with the ENABEL/SNV/AICS consortium; Senegal, LuxDev/Eclosio as part of the DEFI project; Nigeria: IOM with Swiss funding.

including to repay a debt incurred to finance their migration, to remigrate, or for other, social purposes[30]. In the three concerned countries (Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea)[lviii], IOM and the EUD agreed on the use of cash as a temporary arrangement, to start or resume reintegration assistance to returnees who had not yet completed the process. Operational arrangements were agreed between IOM and EUTF in a regional SOP, and subsequently adapted in each country (the operational modalities for which are outlined further in Box 7)[31]. Cash support is advantageous in many ways: It is efficient and can be quickly released to IPs; it can be used flexibly by returnees for multiple purposes at once and is, therefore, more relevant to their needs, which are diverse and evolve over time; it empowers beneficiaries and gives them a greater sense of responsibility[32]. (Annex 11 lists the arguments for and against the use of cash in reintegration support.) Ongoing initiatives require significant evaluation and learning efforts to determine the most effective implementation modalities and risk mitigation measures and make future strategy decisions more evidence based.

Box 7: Modalities of the cash-based reintegration assistance provided by IOM in Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea

IOM Côte d'Ivoire was the first office to offer cash support to migrants returned after 1 January 2020 and whose reintegration processes had not started or who had not yet received the economic (in-kind) support. It was meant as a replacement for it, hence subtracted from the total reintegration assistance amount budgeted, until normal operations could resume. IOM Cameroon and Guinea followed thereafter.

Amounts and delivery modalities of the monetary support differ across the three countries. For instance, beneficiaries received around EUR 915 in Côte d'Ivoire, EUR 1 220 in Cameroon, and EUR 1 300 in Guinea. In most cases, the amount is transferred to a bank account, or provided through cheques or mobile transfers (Guinea). Beneficiaries are required to provide an identification document, confirm their contact information, and sign a code of conduct.

In Cameroon, the cash assistance is given in two instalments. The second instalment is disbursed upon verification of the adequate use of the first one; whenever possible, returnees are requested to provide photos of the goods purchased and/or the invoices, or at least a post-distribution monitoring form. In Cameroon, EUR 230 of the total amount is unconditional, meaning it can be used without proof of utilisation.

Monitoring is carried out by phone in two stages: immediately after the transfer and three weeks later. 1 200 interviews were conducted between February 2020 and January 2021. 85% of beneficiary respondents stated that the cash assistance had met their needs and around 89% preferred the flexibility and autonomy provided by cash in comparison with in-kind support, according to IOM. Field visits are planned to take place when the situation allows[lix].

3.9. REINTEGRATION MONITORING, EVALUATION, LEARNING AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT

Many of the EUTF IPs in the SLC region have experimented new approaches and have worked with returnees for the first time. As for IOM, the integrated approach to reintegration was also implemented for the first time, and in a challenging regional, high caseload context. There is therefore both an opportunity and a need to establish robust M&E and learning capacities and systems in order to measure results, identify bottlenecks and improve programming outcomes along the way.

Dedicated M&E staff capacity exist in most IPs, although they often report being stretched, particularly in the JI. The IOM regional and HQ offices played an important supporting role. The

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[30] For other IPs, the risk of misuse of cash exists but is perceived as lower because they target mostly non-returnees and select their beneficiaries based on several criteria, including motivation for starting up a business.

[31] This approach is to be distinguished from the one-off humanitarian cash grant provided to returnees with the COVID-19 response fund in Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, and Senegal, as mentioned in Section 3.3.

[32] In that sense, the use of cash is in line with the JI principle of a people-centred, need-based, tailored, and flexible approach.

main challenge cited by M&E officers is the heavy donor monitoring and reporting requirements. JI staff stress that IOM's own internal processes add to these external obligations, creating a burden that has come, at times, at the expense of other duties such as field monitoring and formative evaluations. At the same time, the M&E training, guidance, tools, and technical assistance received from the IOM regional and HQ offices were strongly appreciated, especially after the regional support team was strengthened, two years into the JI implementation.

Several IPs strengthened their databases, monitoring and learning systems over time, including IOM. Beneficiary registration processes are generally well-defined, and databases are in place. However, Excel beneficiary databases and monitoring tools, used my most IPs, are subject to recording and typing errors and create data reliability and integrity issues, identified in all countries and for all projects. Weaknesses in registration and personal data verification systems also exposed IPs to a risk of false inclusion and fraud or system abuse[33]. Such cases were reported by IP staff and their field partners in several countries, and directly observed by TPML in Burkina Faso and Mali[34]. Keeping beneficiaries' information up to date is also challenging as they tend to change plans, location, contact information, etc. without informing IPs.

In 2020, some IPs introduced more robust data management platforms, such as INTEGRA in Guinea and IOM regionally. The JI transitioned from internal Excel databases to a global, online system, the Migrant Management Operational System Application (MiMOSA), which assigns a unique identifier number to each returnee, and the regional coordination unit started working with country offices to clean historical data. In this process, the number of JI beneficiaries were revised down from 59 500 (as reported in January 2020) to 46 000 as of July 2020[35]. MiMOSA went through successive improvements to strengthen data and knowledge management, and country staff were trained to use the system although further support is needed. The definitions used to calculate the number of beneficiaries presents another M&E challenge in the JI, as they differ across countries and time. For example, at the beginning of the JI, returnees were registered by IOM and received basic information and pocket money upon arrival were considered to have started the reintegration process; today, the process is considered to have started when a reintegration (or business) plan has been drafted through reintegration counselling, or at least one type of reintegration support has been provided before completion of the counselling process. Similarly, to date, not all countries count the number of MHPSS beneficiaries the same way. This makes it impossible to aggregate results accurately and compare them across countries and time[36].

Logical frameworks and associated M&E indicators exist for all projects, but few are underpinned by an explicit theory of change. Monitoring efforts and stakeholder attention also tend to focus on the achievement of quantitative targets rather than the quality of processes and the sustainability of results. Two projects provided a full-fledged theory of change: INTEGRA in Guinea and EJOM in Mali. By setting out the pathways to results, a theory of change helps conceptualise the programme logic, factor key assumptions and operational risks in the programme design, and maximise outcomes. In terms of M&E indicators, IOM mainly reported on the number of beneficiaries, meetings, actors involved, and referral mechanisms, and other IPs mainly reported on

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[33] False/indue inclusion happens when people receive support although they are not eligible for it.

[34] A large-scale case of fraud was uncovered by IOM in Mali early 2019, involving inhabitants from Sierra Leone and Liberia travelling to Mali with the aim to benefit from IOM's reintegration assistance. The numbers were high enough to be detected by IOM data and monitoring staff. IOM interrupted its activities and verified eligibility for these individuals. In another example, one returnee reported during an interview with the Altai Consulting TPML team having already benefited from reintegration assistance and completed a vocational training; he was then found applying again as a new returnee and starting the entire process over again. In Mali, several returnees who had benefited from the EJOM project had lied about their age in order to circumvent the age limit of eligibility. Reports also have been made of returnees giving fake names or different phone numbers to benefit twice. More robust personal identification methods are not yet in practice. IOM reports that it conducts name and photo verifications and that returnees are requested to provide their travel documents or form of ID (laissez-passer or identity card) to confirm identity. A preliminary, internal assessment conducted by IOM concluded that the risks associated with collecting and using biometric data (privacy, data security, etc.) do not outweigh the risk of improper use of the programme, and IOM therefore is not considering using biometric data as part of its AVRR programmes at this stage.

[35] This sharp decrease (-13 500 beneficiaries) is also due to deactivated cases being removed from the beneficiary figures.

[36] A regional guidance on recording of activities in MiMOSA was sent to country offices in February 2021, and is expected to help harmonise results monitoring and reporting practices.

the number of people trained and jobs created. Strategic indicators were missing, e.g. on the timeliness of reintegration support, coverage of social and psychosocial support, beneficiary drop-out rate, number of returnees actually referred to other IPs and national programmes, and the strengthening of national employment agencies. Outcome level indicators (e.g. quality and stability of employment, sustainability of microbusinesses, and beneficiary income, when such indicators were foreseen in the logical framework) were not informed on an ongoing basis and, with a few exceptions, were not calculated at baseline. Beneficiary surveys were launched late, sometimes at mid-course, often even towards the end of the implementation period[37]. IOM conducted monitoring surveys on the sustainability of returnee reintegration, the results of which were first reported in 2020 (detailed below).

Regionally/globally harmonised survey tools were rolled out across all JI countries and have generated useful data and learning on reintegration effectiveness, although these provide an incomplete measure of success. Building stakeholder ownership is still an ongoing endeavour. JI surveys include one monitoring and satisfaction survey on returns, an equivalent survey on reintegration, and a reintegration sustainability survey, all conducted by IOM staff[38]. The sustainability survey assesses medium-term outcomes regarding the three reintegration dimensions of economic self-sufficiency, social stability, and psychosocial well-being which in turn should impact migrant decision-making to migrate. It then uses a scoring system to determine whether the reintegration could be deemed sustainable. The tools have been complemented with more specific, context-adapted questions by a few country offices and partly revised in early 2020 to capture the context and impact of the COVID-19 pandemic including, in the concerned countries, questions on the cash assistance. By mid-2020, around 10 000 beneficiaries had been surveyed across SLC countries[39]. (Altai Consulting's survey results are compared with those published by IOM in the next chapter.)

The main limitations of these surveys are methodological and operational. First, the reliability of data is affected by the fact that surveys are administered by phone, and not independently from IOM, which creates selection and reporting bias[40]. The design of the survey does not fully capture the diversity of programming contexts and approaches at country and beneficiary levels. This makes it difficult to compare the situation of returnees having received different reintegration support and to compare across countries. Regarding reintegration sustainability, the survey questions and scoring system include several external conditions related to the beneficiaries' living environments rather than to parameters that can be directly influenced by, attributable to, and useful for IOM's programming. Inversely, the survey does not adequately capture important aspects of effectiveness, such as beneficiary income/revenue and the viability/sustainability of reintegration projects, especially of microbusinesses sponsored by the JI, which could have been instrumental to guide corrective measures and boost reintegration effectiveness. Lastly, the surveys provide insufficient opportunities for returnee consultation and feedback, and they are not used by IOM as a reporting and accountability mechanism to beneficiaries and governments, thus hindering IOM's responsiveness with respect to the accountability to affected populations agenda. Government and field partners feel limited ownership and leadership[lx]. They regret not being involved in the survey design, implementation, and data analysis process, and wish results were more regularly presented to them so that their collaboration would be more effective, IOM would be more accountable for the results, and the programme would be more impactful overall. (Annex 12 provides further analysis of IOM's surveys.)

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[37] Concerning baseline surveys, notable exceptions were the YEP and Tekki Fii programmes in The Gambia and the LuxDev/DEFI project in Senegal. Mid-term or endline surveys were conducted by YEP and Tekki Fii in The Gambia, INTEGRA in Guinea, EJOM in Mali, and DEFI in Senegal. Most, if not all, were conducted by phone.

[38] JI surveys are intended to be conducted in a successive and periodic manner: the return survey (one month after return); the reintegration monitoring and satisfaction survey (six to 12 months after return); and the reintegration sustainability survey, 12–18 months after return. In practice, this timeline was rarely complied with due to delays in the provision of reintegration assistance and other operational and capacity constraints.

[39] Including around 2 800 reintegration sustainability surveys.

[40] This risk was highlighted by country staff and in IOM's fourth JI biannual reintegration report on satisfaction data that appeared unrealistically high in some countries. See also Chapter 4 comparing IOM survey data with Altai Consulting's data. The IOM Post-return Support and Monitoring Framework, published in 2014, states that 'in order to make the monitoring more accurate, it is advisable that an independent body carries out the spot checks, rather than the agencies responsible for the implementation'.

In addition to the periodic field visits and the above-mentioned context studies and beneficiary surveys, most if not all IPs engaged in reviews and evaluations that created new internal and sectoral knowledge. The similarities of activities undertaken and of the challenges faced by the various IPs in and across countries provide unique opportunities for cross-learning. Despite heavy workloads, staffing constraints, and the priority given to output delivery, regular internal meetings have been organised by IPs with their field partners, and sometimes with other EUTF IPs and/or cross-country (e.g. by EJOM in Mali, INTEGRA in Guinea, YEP and Tekki Fii in The Gambia, ARCHIPELAGO in nine countries, the JI in all 12 countries). IOM's '[Knowledge management hub](#)' and its '[Return and reintegration platform](#)', among other resources, offer useful data/reports, training opportunities, and a virtual community of practice. The EU could have facilitated more cross-learning among IPs and countries. Mid-term reviews and/or evaluations and EU-managed results-oriented monitoring (ROM) missions have been completed for at least seven IPs, including for the JI[41]. These initiatives offered external feedback and recommendations to IPs and an opportunity to document good practices, discuss common topics/issues and lessons learnt, and adjust approaches. Yet, according to most IPs, the greatest knowledge was gained through 'learning-by-doing'.

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[41] ROM were initiated by the EU in Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Senegal. Mid-term and/or evaluations were conducted in 2020 for YEP and Tekki Fii in The Gambia, EJOM in Mali, the LuxDev projects in Senegal (DEFI) and Niger (A-FIP), and the JI (and possibly more). The JI is planning a final evaluation towards the end of 2021 with a mix of internal staff and external consultants. In the Horn of Africa region, IOM launched a reintegration impact evaluation which will prove informative, although it was commissioned two years into programme implementation in that region and launched during the COVID-19 crisis.

4. EFFECTIVENESS OF SUPPORT, SUCCESS OF REINTEGRATION, AND PERSPECTIVES

4.1. SURVEY METHODOLOGY AND RESPONDENTS

The findings of TPML on the effectiveness and outcomes of reintegration assistance are mainly based on the beneficiary surveys conducted by Altai Consulting one to three times in each country over the course of TPML (except Mauritania, where no survey took place). In total, 3 634 returnees were interviewed at different stages of their reintegration process, including some who did not receive assistance, in order to compare their situations and understand how these evolve over time. Altai Consulting also organised focus group discussions with 50 returnees and qualitative interviews with 78 community leaders in communities of high return. The main limitations of the returnee survey are: lower statistical representativeness in high caseload countries (e.g. Guinea, Mali and Nigeria); weak randomisation and selection bias due to the constraints faced in selecting and reaching survey participants; risk of response bias; and lack of comparison between the situation of returnees and that of the general population. (More information on the TPML returnee surveys is provided in Annex 3.)

At the regional level, the sociodemographic characteristics and migration experience of the returnees interviewed by Altai Consulting are similar to the overall caseload of returnees assisted by the JI[lxi]. This similarity makes TPML survey results more likely to be representative of the situation of all returnees and allows for comparison with IOM survey results. 89% of the TPML survey respondents are men. 75% are 18–35 years old (median age: 30 years). Their geographic origin and education level are mixed: Respondents are relatively evenly distributed across rural areas/small towns/cities (27/43/30% respectively) and across no/primary/secondary/university education (17/39/37/7% respectively). Almost all respondents indicated that their main reason for migrating was economic. 63% cited Europe as their intended destination with the most common destination countries being Italy (27% of all respondents) and Spain (14%). North Africa was the second region of intended destination (27%), with Libya being the first destination country in this region (21%, i.e. the second most targeted country after Italy). In most cases, the journey ended either in Libya (52%) or Algeria (21%). The number of returnees interviewed in each SLC country ranges from 272 in Ghana to 487 in Niger. 88% were past, current, or future beneficiaries of the JI, and 12% were beneficiaries of other IPs.

Based on IOM's definition, reintegration assistance can be considered effective and the reintegration itself sustainable 'when returnees have reached levels of economic self-sufficiency, social stability within their communities, and psychosocial well-being that allow them to cope with possible (re)migration drivers'[lxii]. The analytical framework used by TPML to study the effectiveness and outcomes of reintegration assistance and to develop the survey methodology and tools derives from this definition. Several dimensions and indicators are assessed in each of these analytical areas. The analysis below focuses on beneficiaries' satisfaction, economic situation and willingness to remigrate. (Their social reinsertion and psychological well-being are discussed earlier in Section 3.3.) Data are disaggregated by IP, country, and other variables where relevant and feasible. The differences between IP programme design and implementation, and the related obstacles and challenges analysed in Chapter 3, may explain some of the results presented below. Additional interpretation and influencing factors are proposed when possible.

4.2. BENEFICIARY SATISFACTION AND FEEDBACK

63% of reintegration beneficiaries report being satisfied or very satisfied with the support they received, and one in four report being dissatisfied or very dissatisfied, with high variations across countries (Figure 15; the satisfaction rate may be boosted by selection and reporting bias[lxiii]). Satisfied and very satisfied beneficiaries were considerably more prevalent in Niger (95%), and lowest in Côte d'Ivoire (30%), based on Altai Consulting's survey.

Figure 15: Beneficiary satisfaction with overall reintegration assistance

There is no significant difference by year of return and between beneficiaries of IOM and other IPs overall. The overall beneficiary satisfaction reported by IOM (80%) is considerably higher than Altai Consulting's (63%) and the country ranking is slightly different (with Mali, Niger, and Senegal first, and Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire last)[lxiv].

The proportion of satisfied returnees is higher than the proportion reporting a positive impact of the assistance received on their employment and economic situation (explained further below). Some beneficiaries who did not report any economic impact still declared being satisfied overall. This suggests that returnees recognise and are grateful for the support and appreciate its non-quantifiable benefits in terms of self-confidence (the primary positive impact reported by 82% of beneficiaries) and professional skills[42]. Returnees may also have modest expectations of what reintegration support can achieve economically, although implementers observed significant variation in this expectation by person and country, depending on the socioeconomic and cultural context, education level, personal ambitions, and social obligations/pressures, among other factors.

The most frequent criticisms and suggestions cited by returnees relate to the need for:

- more complete and accurate information on the reality of the (economic) reintegration support (what to expect) before the beneficiaries take the decision to return (outlined further in Section 3.2), and for improved communication with them throughout the assistance process[43];
- more timely reintegration support and quicker delivery of it;
- increased amount of assistance, with a higher percentage distributed in cash;
- more individual, individually tailored, and flexible assistance, with more economic support options; and
- follow-up support provided for a longer period of time.

87% of 2019 survey respondents felt optimistic or very optimistic about the future (relatively even across countries). However, this was only loosely linked with the reintegration support received: Even beneficiaries who were not satisfied with the reintegration support they received and/or who were in a precarious financial situation and dissatisfied with their overall condition responded positively overall. The main reasons for their optimism can be attributed to their self-confidence and religious beliefs.

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[42] Beneficiaries did not report any negative impacts.

[43] Returnees wished IOM would return their calls and communicate better in general. Many survey respondents were also unsure when they would start receiving support or for how long they would continue to receive it.

4.3. EMPLOYMENT STATUS

After having received economic reintegration support[44], 38% of surveyed returnees across all survey countries report having a full-time job while 17% report being without work. 45% have one or several part-time or intermittent job(s), 5% are in training, and 60% are self-employed. Their employment status returns to pre-migration levels or is slightly better than before migrating: 30% of returnees report being employed full-time before migrating (eight percentage points less than after receiving economic reintegration assistance), while there is no difference in unemployment (Figure 16).

Figure 16: Employment status of survey respondents before migrating and after return, with and without economic reintegration assistance

Returnees' employment situation after receiving economic support is relatively better in Cameroon. The Gambia, Niger, and Nigeria, and worse in Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire (Figure 17). There is no significant difference between IOM and other IPs' beneficiaries or by educational level.

Figure 17: Respondents' employment status after economic support, by country

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
[44] TVET and/or start-up support for an income-generating activity (e.g. micro-business).

Overall, the economic assistance provided to returnees helped improve their employment status, although the existence and scale of this varies across countries. Returnees who have received economic assistance (TVET and/or entrepreneurship project start-up support) at the time of Altai Consulting's survey are less likely to be out of work than those who have not (yet) received such assistance (17% versus 34%), and also more likely to report having a full-time job (38% versus 25%). These figures suggest that the economic reintegration assistance may result in a 50% decrease in unemployment and 52% increase in full-time employment[45]. The effect of IPs' economic support on the unemployment rate appears to be stronger in Nigeria, Senegal, and Burkina Faso, weaker in The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, and negative in Côte d'Ivoire. The effect on full-time employment appears strong in Nigeria and Mali, weak in Niger, and negative in The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, and Côte d'Ivoire (Figure 18).

While the reduction in unemployment almost always coincides with an increase in full-time jobs, the effect of IPs' support may be stronger on one indicator than the other (Figure 18). In Nigeria, the survey indicates a strong double effect: Beneficiaries are far less unemployed and have more full-time jobs than non-beneficiaries. In some countries (e.g. Mali and Ghana), the effect of IP support is stronger on the quality of jobs than on the unemployment rate: Beneficiaries have more full-time jobs but are only marginally less unemployed than non-beneficiaries. In these countries, the main effect of IP support may be to help returnees who already had a job gain more stable employment. Inversely, in Guinea, IP support seems to help beneficiaries get out of unemployment more than gain full-time jobs. In The Gambia and Guinea Bissau, unemployment is slightly lower among beneficiaries than non-beneficiaries, but fewer beneficiaries have full-time jobs. In Côte d'Ivoire, returnees' employment situation is worse after receiving IOM's support than before. Such situations may be due to the type and stability/seasonality of jobs and microbusinesses created (varies by sector/line of business), their level of maturity and income, and beneficiaries already having another income-generating activity prior to IP support and choosing to keep both rather than switch to the IP-sponsored one.

Figure 18: Difference in unemployment and full-time employment between returnees with/without economic support regionally and by country

Unemployment is significantly lower among beneficiaries who received a combination of TVET and another type of support to start a microbusiness (Figure 19)[lxv]. There is no difference between

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[45] Assuming returnees who already received economic support and those who have not are comparable on all aspects (background and profile, motivation, context, and support network, etc.).

IOM and other IPs in terms of beneficiaries' initial employment status and the impact of IP support, between urban and rural returnees, or between those with higher and lower educational levels.

Figure 19: Respondents' employment situation at the time of the survey depending on the level/type of economic support received

The impact of reintegration assistance on beneficiaries' employment status is not easy to measure.

- First, the difference in employment status between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries cannot be solely attributed to IP support. Exogenous circumstances contribute, and employment opportunities may arise independently from IP support. Individual and contextual factors can play out both positively and negatively. For instance, 63% of beneficiaries stated that the COVID-19 pandemic negatively impacted their employment situation. This percentage was particularly high in Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal. In 80% of cases, beneficiaries' professional activity slowed or was interrupted before resuming, but it permanently stopped in the remaining 20% of cases. Without the pandemic, a greater impact of reintegration assistance on employment may have manifested. The comparison between the results of the surveys conducted by Altai Consulting before and after the pandemic point to the same: The full-time employment rate among reintegration beneficiaries was six percentage points lower after the pandemic (in surveys conducted in the last quarter of 2020).

- Second, some returnees may have secured jobs independently from the IP support[lxvi].

- Third, reintegration support may not only have an effect on employment; it may improve the quality of returnees' jobs. They may elect to change to better paying jobs or ones that are better aligned with their aspirations and skills. These aspects were not captured by Altai Consulting's survey.

- Fourth, after they have completed the reintegration process and possibly gained more qualifications, beneficiaries may need time to secure a full-time activity given the lack of job opportunities available locally. Indeed, survey results show that returnees who returned to their countries and those who received economic assistance long ago tend to have a better employment situation than those who returned and received assistance more recently (Figure 20). This suggests that the employment situation of returnees generally improves over time.

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Figure 20: Returnees' employment situation at successive stages of their migration and reintegration journey

4.4. ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY

Economic self-sufficiency is key to reintegration. The most common reason for migrating, cited by survey respondents, was economic (pursuit of a higher income) and the most pressing need upon return is also financial. The economic dimension of reintegration is also stressed by programme staff and government partners interviewed by Altai Consulting.[lxvii]

After having received economic assistance, nearly half of surveyed beneficiaries report being able to cover at least 'most of their personal needs' and 42% are satisfied with their economic situation. There are large variations across countries and other beneficiary sub-groups. Niger has the highest percentages, while Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire have the lowest. Beneficiaries living in cities are less able to cover their needs and less satisfied with their economic situation than those in rural areas. Those with higher education are better off than those with primary or no education. IOM beneficiaries are less satisfied with their situation than beneficiaries of other IPs. (See Figures 21–22, and Table 3 below.)

Although the overall economic status of beneficiaries is better than before migrating, it remains precarious. Their ability to cover most or all of their personal needs is 11 percentage points higher than before they left their respective countries (49% versus 38%, as shown in Figure 21). This is not the case in Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire where beneficiaries remain worse off than before migration. At the regional level, half of the surveyed returnees who received economic support and completed the reintegration process still report being unable to cover at least most of their personal needs, and one in five report not even being able to cover their *basic* needs (housing, food, clothes, transportation).

Figure 21: Beneficiaries' self-reported ability to cover their economic needs over time with and without IPs' economic support

Figure 22: Beneficiaries' self-reported ability to cover their economic needs by country after receiving economic support

Table 3: Economic situation of beneficiary sub-groups (after receiving economic support)

	Able to cover at least most of their personal needs	Satisfied with their economic situation
Regional average	49%	42%
Urban areas (city >100 000 inhab.)	36%	33%
Rural areas	58%	56%
Secondary and higher education	51%	49%
Primary and no education	46%	34%
IOM	49%	41%
Other IPs	48%	51%

Altai Consulting asked returnees questions about asset ownership in the first survey conducted in 2019 in the eight Cycle 1 countries. While virtually all surveyed beneficiaries who had completed the reintegration process owned a mobile phone, only 37% owned a means of transportation (bicycle, motorbike or vehicle), and 11% owned a house. 60% owned these assets before leaving the country. Asset ownership remains unchanged before/after receipt of IP support. This suggests that any income gained from reintegration support may be used to cover basic, daily needs and are not enough to cover significantly more than that.

Reintegration assistance positively impacts returnees' economic situation, although not in all countries. Beneficiaries of economic reintegration support are 53% more likely to be able to cover at least most of their personal needs than non-beneficiaries and 120% more likely to be satisfied with their financial situations[46]. From a vulnerability perspective, the proportion of beneficiaries dissatisfied with their financial situations and unable to meet even their basic needs is nearly half that of non-beneficiaries (respectively 37% versus 20%, and 28% versus 13%). This difference points to a beneficial effect of IP support on beneficiaries' economic situation, although other factors contribute positively or negatively. When directly asked, nearly 45% of beneficiaries stated that reintegration assistance improved their economic situation and that they earn more money now as a result of it (Figures 23–25). Looking across all indicators, the economic impact of reintegration support appears stronger in The Gambia, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal, and weaker in Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea-Bissau (Figure 26).

Figure 23: Evolution of beneficiaries' income after receiving IP support versus before among TPML Cycle 3 survey respondents

Figure 24: Perceived impact of IP support on respondents' financial situations among TPML Cycles 2 and 3 survey respondents

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
[46] 49% of beneficiary returnees report being able to cover at least most of their personal needs, versus 32% of non-beneficiaries: a 17-percentage point difference. 42% report being satisfied with their financial situations, versus 19% of non-beneficiaries: a 23-percentage point difference.

Figure 25: Self-reported ability to cover personal needs after receiving economic support, and as a result of it (among returnees surveyed in TPML Cycles 2 and 3)

Figure 26: Perceived impact of IP support on respondents' financial situations by country

Not all returnees benefit equally. Impacts differ depending on the context, background, and programming. On average, IOM beneficiaries report a significantly smaller impact than those of other IPs (for which the sample size is considerably smaller, however). The economic impact of IP support is significantly greater for returnees living in rural areas, for those with a lower educational level (although they tend to be relatively worse off than other returnees – in general, the lower the education level, the higher the impact of IP support) and for those who benefited from both TVET and support to start a microbusiness (as shown in Table 4 and Figure 27). Beneficiaries are also more likely to report improvements in their economic situation, including as a result of the reintegration assistance received, when the type of TVET and entrepreneurship project they benefited from matched their aspirations. This confirms the JI's programming principle of individually tailored reintegration assistance and the need to ensure diversified reintegration pathways.

Table 4: Economic impact of IP support for different beneficiary sub-groups

	Beneficiaries' ability to cover at least most personal needs now vs. non-beneficiaries	Beneficiaries' satisfaction with their financial situations vs. non-beneficiaries	Beneficiaries making more money than before reintegration support	Participants reporting a positive impact of reintegration support on their financial situations
Regional average	+17pp *(+53%)*	+23pp *(120% higher)*	41%	45%
Urban areas (city >100 000 inhab.)	+14pp *(64% higher)*	+17pp *(106% higher)*	36%	36%
Rural areas	**+27pp** *(87% higher)*	**+31pp** *(120% higher)*	51%	54%
Secondary and higher education	+15pp *(49% higher)*	+18pp *(112% higher)*	38%	43%
Primary and no education	**+20pp** *(63% higher)*	**+28pp** *(133% higher)*	44%	47%
IOM	+18pp *(56% higher)*	+22pp *(116% higher)*	40%	44%
Other IPs	+22pp *(88% higher)*	+26pp *(100% higher)*	54%	58%

Figure 27: Effect of combining TVET and microbusiness start-up support on beneficiaries' economic situation

The economic gains from IP support sustain over time, although a moderate decrease is observed after two years (Figure 28 below). This decline may be partly due to the failure of IP-supported microbusinesses (Section 3.8) and other individual and contextual conditions. For instance, two-thirds of survey respondents noted that the COVID-19 crisis affected their income, but those who have more than one parallel income-generating activity were significantly less impacted by the crisis. This highlights the need for reintegration assistance to allow for (and even encourage) beneficiaries to engage in more than one activity to decrease their vulnerability and build their resilience to shocks.

Figure 28: Economic effect of IP support over time

4.5. WILLINGNESS TO REMIGRATE

For the EU, economic support must help returnees reintegrate into their country and improve their overall living conditions without enabling them to remigrate irregularly. Reintegration support should provide an alternative to remigration. For IOM, 'reintegration support aims to help people cope with the drivers of (re)migration. Having achieved 'sustainable reintegration', returnees are able to make further migration decisions a matter of choice, rather than necessity'. IOM emphasises the need to promote the safety, dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of all migrants.

Upon return, 57% of surveyed returnees feel able to stay and live in their countries, a percentage that moderately increases as time passes. At the time of the survey, 63% (+6 percentage points) of returnees who still had not received economic reintegration assistance felt able to remain in their countries. On the contrary, 19% of returnees felt unable to stay and live in their countries upon return, while 10% expressed the same later, before receiving economic support (Figure 29). This indicates that time, social bonds, economic opportunities that arise, etc. influence the reintegration process, independently from external support.

Figure 29: Evolution of returnees' self-reported ability to stay and live in their countries over time, with and without IP economic support

Most returnees state that it is unlikely or very unlikely that they will attempt to migrate irregularly again in the future, whether they received economic reintegration support or not. This is the case for 78% of returnees having not (yet) received economic reintegration support, while 22% consider it an option (likely, very likely or undecided). After receiving economic support, remigrating irregularly is an option for five percentage points fewer returnees (17%) and only 9% consider it likely or very likely[47]. The intention to remigrate continues to diminish (slightly) as time passes after receiving reintegration assistance. The percentage of returnees feeling unable to stay in their countries is the same among reintegration beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries: one in 10 (similar to IOM survey results). When asked directly, 59% of surveyed beneficiaries feel that reintegration assistance reduced at least a little their willingness to remigrate irregularly, although most did not have such (strong) intention initially (Figures 30 and 31). **This indicates a low risk of irregular remigration and a positive but limited impact of reintegration assistance on returnees' willingness to remigrate irregularly**. These figures, as well as reports from national enumerators and direct observations, show that the bias in returnees' response (social desirability bias) is likely small. Yet, there is a selection bias as returnees most likely (willing and able) to remigrate may have already done so before the survey was held.

Figure 30: Evolution of returnee's self-reported intention to remigrate irregularly with and without IP economic support, and over time (among Cycles 2 and 3 survey respondents)

Figure 31: Self-reported impact of IP support on beneficiaries' intention to remigrate irregularly

This regional result masks large disparities across countries and beneficiary groups. The countries where returnees feel more able to stay and less willing to remigrate irregularly are Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Niger, and Nigeria, while returnees feel less able to stay and more willing to remigrate irregularly from Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Cameroon. Reintegration assistance has the strongest self-reported impact on returnees' willingness to remigrate irregularly in Guinea-Bissau, Niger, The Gambia, and Nigeria, and the weakest in Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon (Figure 32). The impact is stronger among beneficiaries living in rural areas (67% versus 49% in urban areas, i.e. rural beneficiaries are 37% more likely to report a positive impact), moderately stronger among beneficiaries with a lower education level, and slightly stronger among beneficiaries of IPs other than IOM (Table 5). While the intention to remigrate irregularly is rare overall and rarer among returnees having received any type of economic support, it is even lower among those who benefited from both TVET and microbusiness support. These beneficiaries of a more complete economic support package are also more likely to report a positive impact of the reintegration assistance on their willingness to remigrate.

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[47] Based on IOM reintegration sustainability surveys, 'less than 2% of beneficiaries reported that they were preparing to re-migrate' (IOM, Ji's fourth biannual report on reintegration in the SLC region, February 2021).

Figure 32: Self-reported impact of IP support on remigration intention, by country

Table 5: Beneficiaries' self-reported ability to stay in the country and likelihood of making a new attempt at migrating irregularly after IP support, and impact of such support on remigration intention, for different population sub-groups

	Feeling unable to stay in the country	Likelihood of remigrating irregularly	Self-reported impact of IP support on intention to remigrate
Regional average	10%	17%	59%
Urban areas (city >100 000 inhab.)	12%	21%	49%
Rural areas	7%	17%	67%
Secondary and higher education	12%	17%	55%
Primary and no education	8%	17%	64%
IOM	10%	17%	58%
Other IPs	8%	20%	67%

Returnees who are economically more reintegrated (able to cover their needs, satisfied with their situation) are also less likely to be willing to remigrate irregularly. According to returnee feedback, not having a (decent) job and/or enough revenue to cover their needs (and those of their family) is the main factor influencing their decision to remigrate. It was also the reason mentioned by nearly 90% of returnees for their migration attempt. When IPs are successful at helping young people improve their economic status, they can have a significant influence on the causes and phenomena of irregular migration and remigration, even though West African migrations are multidimensional, with non-economic factors (social, political, and cultural) also influencing the decision.

The fact that slightly more than one in five recent returnees still considers remigrating irregularly shows that IP reintegration support is not always sufficient to help returnees achieve their goal, voluntary return may not always be a real (or well-informed) choice, and returnees may not have had an immediate alternative to the return assistance offered to them, as is the case for those expelled from Algeria or removed from detention in Libya. The percentage of surveyed returnees

describing their return as 'rather not voluntary' or 'not at all voluntary' is the same as the percentage considering remigrating irregularly (22%). 85% of returnees say their situation in the country-of-transit/destination left them with no other option than to accept IOM's offer and return to their country, and 23% felt they did not have enough information to make a well-informed decision about their return.

The fact that many migrants would have preferred to pursue their migration journey towards their destination than return to their country if this could have been feasible and/or if they had been well informed of the reintegration assistance (form and timing/delays) may partly explain their expectations and dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the IP support. Returnees may compare the support they receive from IPs with what they have lost by failing to migrate, experienced along the way, and imagine they could have gained by completing their migration journey (high opportunity cost).

A majority of returnees report interest in, and intent to, migrate regularly in the future (60% of non-beneficiaries and 54% of reintegration beneficiaries). This interest/intention slightly increases as time passes after receiving support (50% within 18 months versus 56% after). Returnees are generally more likely to consider regular than irregular remigration.

4.6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Vulnerable and stranded migrants will continue to need protection, return and reintegration assistance in North Africa, along the Central and Western Mediterranean migration routes, and in countries of origin. The COVID-19 pandemic brings additional challenges for migrants, and its socioeconomic consequences are likely to impact future migration flows. **Future programmes will need to build on experience gained by all IPs, improve their strategies and programme effectiveness, and create stronger synergies between them**.

In many respects, the JI represented an ambitious paradigm shift in AVRR programming and inspired IOM to expand its scope of work beyond its traditional role. Implementing the integrated approach to reintegration in a high caseload environment proved challenging. Not all of its key programming principles could be fully adopted and implemented. There was a trade-off between building internal capacities and absorbing the caseload, and ensuring holistic, flexible, individualised, and government-owned/led reintegration assistance. Staff members, the organisation and their partners advanced their understanding and approach, as evidenced by the various solutions, good practices and promising approaches implemented in all countries, including those highlighted in this report. Reintegrating returnees sustainably and building an enabling environment should continue to be strategic objectives, while recognising that achieving them requires continuous, long-term, and coordinated investment, and that external assistance is limited in what it can achieve in contexts with high levels of poverty, few economic and social opportunities, poor infrastructure and public services, and institutional and governance weaknesses. Individual factors (e.g. returnee backgrounds, aspirations, motivations, and skills) also play key roles.

The following recommendations are made to inform current or future strategy and programming depending on time and budget considerations. Most, if not all, recommendations require close collaboration with governments in countries-of-origin and with other national and international stakeholders.

Funding

Recommendation to the EU:

- Provide longer-term and more predictable funding. Increase the budget per returnee based on a bottom-up costing approach (the amount required to reintegrate someone sustainably, on average). Increase funding dedicated to other, non-operational activities, such as institutional strengthening, IP human resources, strategic partnerships, and M&E, learning and knowledge management.

- Associate EUDs, EU Member State agencies, other relevant donors, and national authorities more strongly at the country level in the design and preparation of the next AVRR and youth employment programmes/funding to increase alignment and synergies in their respective actions.

- Select/fund migrant reintegration and youth employment initiatives that have strong complementarities among them and with other ongoing initiatives. Address the issue of inter-agency collaboration more intentionally from the onset: Projects should be designed and timed to enable coordination platforms, partnerships, and referrals, the effectiveness of which should be incentivised, facilitated, and monitored by the EU. Larger scale youth employment programmes should be funded in all countries, with returnees' access to them facilitated. Such programmes should have a strong strategic and institutional component and spur more transformational and sustainable change, e.g. by modernising national employment agencies, TVET and youth support centres, and helping bridge the gap with potential employers. The migration and inclusive growth component of the EU Neighbourhood Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) should multiply such funding opportunities.

- Continue current funding and support to the IOM integrated and regionally coordinated approach to AVRR, the relevance of which has been confirmed by the JI, while further reviewing and refining its various dimensions and components.

Overall approach to, and implementation of, reintegration assistance

Recommendation to all IPs:

- Coordinate with the government, the EU and IOM during the programme development phase to ensure that proposed actions aimed at returnees target relevant regions, activities, and the specific needs of returnees.

- Review, adapt and scale up the good practices highlighted in this report.

Recommendations to IOM:

- Continue to better inform migrants, both in countries of departure/transit and return, of the options, modalities, conditions, timing, effectiveness, and limitations of reintegration assistance, and of their rights and obligations, so they know what to expect and can make well-informed decisions. Where possible, prepare returnees for the reintegration process in the country-of-departure/transit in collaboration with the country-of-origin, drawing on IOM's experience in Morocco.

- Split target groups and differentiate/adapt approaches and operational support accordingly, considering that returnees of different countries, in urban and rural areas, and of different educational backgrounds, do not face the same circumstances and needs, and have not equally benefited from reintegration assistance.

- Identify opportunities to delegate more responsibilities to national institutions/agencies, civil society and private sector organisations in the successive stages of the return and reintegration process, to support ownership and sustainability. Depending on respective capacities, some of these actors should gradually play a stronger role screening, counselling, and orienting/referring returnees, providing reintegration support, monitoring and coordinating field operations, and providing ongoing coaching and follow-up support to returnees – with IOM refocusing on migrant protection and on its overall capacity-building, convening/facilitation, normative and quality assurance role. As part of this repositioning effort, IOM should promote, strengthen, and partner with national migrant associations in all countries, for them to assume a stronger role and complement/sustain the support provided by IPs, governments, and their partners. To guide this transition, develop country-level action plans with periodically reviewed modalities, risk mitigation measures, and timelines.

- Invest in strategic, longer-term (as opposed to project-based) partnerships, referral mechanisms, and capacity-building; creating effective processes, capacities and mutually beneficial collaborations takes time. Referrals should be actively sought with other EUTF-funded IPs, as well as other EU programmes, EU Member States, bilateral and multilateral aid organisations and, most importantly, with government agencies and other national actors. Systematically anticipate the transfer of returnees' personal data to foreseeable third parties prior to, or at the time of, their return. Ensure that all returnees can decide, before or immediately after their arrival in the country-of-origin,

whether their personal data can be shared, with whom, and for what purpose. Ensure the corresponding documentation is recorded in MiMOSA and processed swiftly to accelerate referrals.

- Continue to promote/roll out, in parallel, more flexible and informal approaches to referrals: Instead of favouring the approach by which IPs/institutions with previously signed data-sharing agreements individually manage beneficiary data, referrals and trajectories, provide complete, detailed, and up-to-date information to returnees about all available referral options and let them take the initiative. In this approach, returnees have a more active role and a greater sense of responsibility over the decisions affecting their lives, while IOM and its partners are positioned as connectors/brokers between the demand and the supply of local public and private reintegration services. Discuss case management, monitoring and reporting implications of this approach with the EU. Identify ways to stimulate returnees' motivation for, and ownership over, the reintegration process, and to create a greater sense of commitment, responsibility, and accountability vis-à-vis the aid received.

- Reinforce communication with, and accountability to, returnees by maintaining more constant contact with them before and throughout the reintegration process and by establishing effective consultation, feedback and complaints mechanisms via SMS, Facebook, WhatsApp, and platforms similar to the participatory programme monitoring meetings organised by IOM in the Horn of Africa.

- Harness the advantages of the large-scale, regionally coordinated approach by further diversifying and pooling funding sources (including core funding), commissioning pre-implementation studies to inform future strategy and programming adjustments, easing/streamlining procurement, contracting, partnership and (personal) data management processes, establishing more regional partnerships where feasible, and organising more cross-country learning initiatives and events.

Recommendations to national authorities:

- Assume a central role in orienting and referring returnees to relevant programmes/actors (social assistance, MHPSS, training, employment) within existing systems, without singling them out from the general (non-migrant) population.

- Improve budget allocations, political leadership, and institutional engagement in stakeholder coordination as part of and beyond the duration of the JI.

Protection, immediate assistance upon arrival, and social and psychosocial support

Recommendations to IOM and the EU:

- Continue funding search and rescue missions and consular missions in North Africa and transit countries. Identify more sustainable funding arrangements for transit and reception centres in collaboration with host governments, including for their management, emergency assistance to vulnerable migrants, and ongoing staff training.

Recommendations to IOM and other concerned IPs:

- Pursue efforts to increase the coverage and adequacy of social and psychosocial support, improving the ongoing detection of returnees' vulnerabilities and needs, training staff and a broader range of partners on an ongoing basis, establishing or updating sustainable SOPs in all countries as well as long-term partnerships and referral mechanisms, strengthening national institutions and systems, deploying mobile clinics and community-based activities, and increasing the engagement of returnee support networks (families, communities, peers through e.g. returnee and youth associations, and local health and social workers) in capacity-building and support delivery efforts.

Economic support

Recommendations to IOM and to other relevant IPs:

- Systematise approaches that expedite the start and process of economic assistance, such as more pocket money, a first unconditional cash reintegration grant (independently from the COVID-19 context), cash-for-work, and/or a first training session (e.g. life or business skills before returnees' reintegration plan is developed), so that the support is timelier.

- Combine short-term (in-kind or cash) assistance with other forms of support having a longer-lasting impact such as TVET, whenever possible, because it increases the effectiveness of reintegration.

- Critically review the process and tools used in the job counselling, orientation, and business plan development phase. In particular, improve the way returnees' motivations, skills, aspirations, and socioeconomic environments (e.g. support network and the needs of the local job market) are assessed and taken into consideration in their reintegration plans; better identify and communicate the conditions of success, anticipate operational and contextual risks, and improve the viability of returnees' economic reintegration projects; and re-train staff and partners, as needed, including on interpersonal communication/counselling skills. Beneficiaries should feel the choice is their own, fully empowered and responsible for their reintegration, and able to make well-informed decisions.

- Continue broadening economic reintegration options through diverse service contracts, partnerships, and referral mechanisms in which national authorities and employment agencies have a more central role and can contribute to a more tailored, timely, and nationally owned reintegration assistance. This diversification must be based on returnee aspirations and needs, on a regularly updated prospective analysis of local market needs, and a mapping of the resources and support other actors offer in key areas of return. Continue investing in (longer) TVET, offer more scholarships for basic/higher education and job placements, and provide information on regular migration pathways, etc.

- Critically review, with relevant local partners, how collective and community-based projects are presented to returnees, designed, budgeted, implemented, managed, and monitored. They should be approached as small-scale development projects benefiting the local community, including young people and returnees, not projects for returnees that also benefit the community. To increase local ownership and sustainability, returnees and their communities must initiate collective and community-based projects, local authorities and grassroots organisations must play a leadership role, and IOM and its partners should assume an informative, facilitative, and external monitoring role. Community-based projects are more relevant in rural, high departure and return areas.

- Consider combining technical, entrepreneurship and life skills training with entrepreneurship support or job placement more systematically, depending on beneficiaries' pre-existing skills and current needs, as this combination is associated with higher beneficiary satisfaction, increased employment and financial benefits, and lower willingness to remigrate irregularly. Pay more attention to the sequencing of economic support based on returnees' evolving needs. For example, returnees may express greater interest in training after providing for their immediate needs and/or starting their microbusiness, and some may not need the full cash or in-kind support at once.

- Increase the budget and time for coaching and follow-up support after the training (to help beneficiaries find jobs) or microbusiness start-up (to solidify it). Facilitate returnees' networking and peer support, notably in countries where returnees are concentrated in the same geographic areas.

- Review the JI beneficiary selection strategy and its implementation to date. As stressed in IOM's mid-term evaluation of the JI in 2020, the JI aimed to provide basic reintegration assistance to all returnees and to select the most vulnerable and most promising/motivated for additional support. Not everyone can be (economically) reintegrated successfully and sustainably. Under budget constraints, equity concerns in resource allocations should not mean the support offered to returnees most in need, engaged and able to succeed is restricted by that provided to others.

- Consider facilitating returnees' access to extra support, e.g. small additional cash instalments, revolving funds, savings and loan groups, microcredit (individual or group loans), banking services, credit guarantees, and other financial and non-financial services, when pre-conditions are met. This could be relevant for innovative, promising, or mature projects and serious, motivated beneficiaries. Clear information on the modalities, eligibility and selection criteria needs to be communicated from the start, and a fair process ensured at all stages (e.g. through transparent competition with a fixed budget, multi-stakeholder review and decision committee). As such, part of the support would become an 'opportunity for some' rather than a 'right for all', as in other youth employment and

socioeconomic development programmes. It would stimulate returnees' interest and engagement in the process, maximise reintegration outcomes, and improve aid targeting and efficiency.

M&E, learning and knowledge management

Recommendation to the EU:

▪ Request that all IPs develop a theory of change for their programmes that sets paths to results and identifies assumptions, operational risks and mitigation measures based on past field experience.

▪ Revise and harmonise reporting indicators for IPs. Indicators should incentivise risk monitoring, quality implementation processes, outcome measurement and achievement, and sustainability[48]. They should be associated with clear definitions and calculation methods, e.g. for beneficiaries having started, completed and dropped out of the reintegration process, beneficiaries having received MHPSS and economic support, having a work contract/decent employment/still operational microbusiness, and sustainably reintegrated. The EU and EUDs need to focus on the quality of IP indicator monitoring and reporting and timely feedback loops in programming.

▪ Organise/facilitate more joint field visits, programme reviews, and cross-learning between IPs, countries, and EUTF regions/windows.

Recommendations to IOM and to other IPs, as relevant:

▪ Conduct baseline, midline, and endline surveys more systematically (comparing returnees' situation before, shortly after reintegration assistance, and later) to inform programming on an ongoing basis and allow for course correction. Review survey methodology, tools, and data analysis, and focus them on reintegration outcomes and key drivers useful to learning, IP programming, and accountability. Complement phone interviews with field visits, direct observation, and qualitative interviews/focus group discussions independent from IPs and their field partners (where possible). Budget accordingly.

▪ Present survey results systematically to all stakeholders, including beneficiaries, donors, and other IPs to support accountability and learning objectives. Identify ways to document and share (detailed, disaggregated) data, evaluations, tacit knowledge, good practices, and lessons learnt systematically, both internally and externally. As a UN agency with a convening and normative role and lead organisation in the AVRR space, IOM has a specific responsibility in this regard. Given its presence at national, regional and global levels, its experience and wide range of partners and stakeholders, IOM has comparative advantages to become a knowledge broker through increased evidence generation and sharing.

▪ Develop, budget, and implement a (coordinated) research agenda so programming is more evidence-based. Formative/operational research and comparative studies should focus on: utilisation of cash-based reintegration assistance and appropriate delivery modalities and risk mitigation measures; best practices to boost returnees' motivation and their insertion in the labour market; cost-effectiveness of various forms of psychosocial and economic support for different target groups; profitability of different microbusinesses in different geographic areas, and key conditions for success; and returnee support networks and other factors influencing reintegration sustainability. IPs are finalising implementation, and such initiatives need to be planned in advance to inform future programming. Support from regional/HQ offices and high-profile academic institutions is necessary.

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[48] Incentives are measures that encourage people to do something they would not necessarily prioritise due to constraints on time, ability, and willingness, etc. They are often recommended to strengthen programme quality and sustainability as well as monitoring, evaluation and learning as these tend to be neglected in favour of programme implementation and management.

5. STRENGTHENING THE GOVERNANCE OF MIGRATION

5.1. OVERVIEW OF EUTF SUPPORT TO MIGRATION GOVERNANCE IN THE SLC REGION

Migration governance usually refers to 'the combined frameworks of legal norms, laws and regulations, policies and traditions as well as organisational structures (subnational, national, regional and international) and the relevant processes that shape and regulate States' approaches with regard to migration in all its forms, addressing rights and responsibilities and promoting international cooperation'[49]. The TPML exercise studied the extent to which the capacities of states and local stakeholders on migration *management* were built in the area of return and reintegration and to a lesser extent in other migration-related areas. The analysis of EUTF support to migration governance below includes its support to policy frameworks and policy makers and to capacity-building efforts aiming to strengthen the management of migration by governments, local authorities, and civil society actors.

EUTF dedicated at least 60 million EUR to migration governance in the SLC region[50]**. Niger benefits from the most funding** (EUR 22 million), based on a budget analysis of the relevant EUTF-funded projects. This TPML estimate is considered low, as it does not account for the informal capacity-building that occurs through learning-by-doing when state or local actors are engaged in programming, and it excludes the migration-related component of the AJUSEN budget support to the Government of Niger (around EUR 55 million[51]). If the latter were included, the overall amount invested in the region on migration governance would be twice as high and the funding for Niger would be around EUR 80 million. All other countries received less than EUR 10 million, as illustrated below. (The methodology of the portfolio analysis is provided in Annex 13.)

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[49] IOM, Glossary on Migration, Geneva, 2019.

[50] This amount differs from that in the Altai Consulting 'Learning from the EUTF' study due to differing definitions of migration governance. The TPML definition includes elements from migration management not included in the 'Learning from the EUTF' study.

[51] We consider the whole budget support to Niger as contributing to governances defined for the TPML. Identifying the part of the budget support specifically dedicated to migration governance is more challenging; as budget support is fungible, the Nigerien State can use it as desired. However, the disbursement indicators (conditions for further support to be disbursed) can indicate to what this support is intended to contribute. In the case of Niger, it was determined that around 50% of the EUR 90 million budget is intended to contribute towards border management, around 10% to help address SOM and TIP, and around 5% to overall migration governance issues (e.g. adoption of the national migration policy). Therefore, around EUR 45 million was considered as contributing to the governance of border management, EUR 10 million to the governance of the issues of smuggling and trafficking, and EUR five million to general migration governance issues.

Figure 33: Estimated budgets of EUTF SLC projects dedicated to migration governance by country

Amounts dedicated to
migration governance by
country, million EUR

< 1
1 - 3
3 - 6
6 - 10
> 10

The main IPs engaged in migration governance activities were IOM and EU Member State agencies. In addition to the Government of Niger, IOM is the largest recipient of EUTF migration governance-related funding in the SLC region, with EUR 15 million, followed by several EU Member State agencies (GIZ, Expertise France, FIIAPP). Altogether, EU Member State agencies received around EUR 37 million and NGOs received around EUR 7 million.

Figure 34: Approximate amounts dedicated to migration governance by EUTF SLC projects, by main thematic area

The main thematic areas of EUTF migration governance support were border management, countering trafficking in persons (TIP) and smuggling of migrants (SOM), protection of migrants, and assisted voluntary return and reintegration (Figure 34)[52]. Comparatively, support to the governance of diaspora issues and of regular/labour migration, both within the ECOWAS region and towards Europe, remains very limited (EUR 3 million). Moreover, the EUTF did not fund any significant governance initiative to address the internal displacement crises in the SLC region (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Nigeria)[53], while it did so in the Horn of Africa.

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[52] 'General' refers to the support to overall national migration strategies, for example.

[53] However, the EUTF is funding a high number of resilience projects in areas of Nigeria and Burkina Faso most affected by internal displacement, frequently involving local communities in the management of projects. In Burkina Faso, the protection

Figure 35 shows, for each project within the scope of the TPML, the approximate amounts dedicated to migration governance for each thematic area. For example, for protection, the amounts correspond to the activities dedicated either to support frameworks on the protection of migrants, or to build the capacities of government and local actors to manage and provide protection activities.

Figure 35: Mapping of EUTF funding dedicated to migration governance in the SLC region, by main thematic area and main IP[54]

The next section focuses on the governance of return and reintegration, the primary focus of TPML, while the section thereafter focuses on the governance of other migration-related thematic areas.

5.2. STRENGTHENING THE GOVERNANCE OF RETURN AND REINTEGRATION

The intended, medium-term objective to improve the governance of return and reintegration is to enable national ownership and sustainability. This can be achieved through the combination of various means and interventions as visualised in Figure 36.

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component of the JI was amended to cover displacement-affected communities and the capacity-building of national protection actors on gender-based violence.

[54] Only activities over EUR 100 000 are shown. Question marks associated with the Niger AJUSEN budget point to the difficulty to associate specific amounts with thematic areas, due to the fungibility of the budget support provided.

While most IPs have engaged in some of these areas, through the JI, IOM has engaged the most in all three areas and all countries.

5.2.1. POLICY AND INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING

The JI mobilised country-level stakeholders for the return and reintegration of migrants, established a national framework for action, streamlined processes and improved stakeholder coordination. These were key accomplishments of the JI, achieved through national Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for AVRR, which were adapted and technically validated in all 12 countries at the beginning or in the course of the JI. In most countries, stakeholders report that the output (national SOPs) as well as the meetings and local adaptation process brought together institutions that do not typically collaborate, helped develop a common understanding of AVRR, clarified respective roles and responsibilities, and positively impacted the way these institutions operate and cooperate in the field. In addition, the JI established, revitalised or supported coordination committees, technical working groups and/or case management/selection committees in all countries, at national and/or subnational levels. These groups, which typically involve national and local government representatives, NGOs, the EUD, IOM and some of its field partners (e.g. CSOs involved in reintegration assistance), helped contextualise IOM's framework SOPs, discuss strategic topics, review progress, and solve operational issues.

In practice, AVRR SOPs and coordination committees are used primarily for the JI rather than by all return and reintegration actors beyond the JI (at sectoral and strategic levels). Thus, they would need to be updated and broadened to integrate other initiatives and continue being used beyond the scope and funding/duration of the JI. They do not apply to forced returnees, to AVRR organised by EU Member State agencies (e.g. the French OFII and GIZ), or to migrants returning from countries other than EU Member States. Moreover, the SOPs do not specify who should be in charge of the reintegration process, if not IOM; they only refer to 'IOM and its partners', 'national partners', or 'the relevant agency'. The focus of these frameworks on JI activities, their dependency on EUTF funding and isolation from other projects/actors are the main limitations stressed by key informants. This situation – and, more generally, the scope of the EUTF support to AVRR – triggered political discussions in several countries (including Ghana, Guinea Bissau, and Senegal), and sometimes delayed the adoption of the SOPs and the start of the JI. In Ghana, the validation of the SOPs was delayed precisely because it addressed reintegration in a more comprehensive way (beyond the JI), and separate SOPs and/or processes/platforms were established for forced returns, as in The Gambia.

At the political, sectoral and operational levels, there is a coordination deficit among EUTF reintegration and youth employment initiatives and with non-EUTF ones. In most countries, donors, NGOs/CSOs and other agencies promoting job creation and youth employment (for returnees and non-migrants) are not involved in the reintegration coordination platforms nor in the JI technical committees and working groups. In Guinea, two inter-ministerial committees/coordination bodies were

created in parallel for IOM and INTEGRA, with some common members but different ministries chairing them, which changed over time. In Senegal and Mali, EUTF IPs and other EU Member State agencies working on reintegration and youth employment chose different ministries and national agencies as partners. This contributes to silos between respective initiatives and triggers or strengthens any divides and/or conflicts of mandate between national institutions working on the same objectives.

5.2.2. INVOLVEMENT OF NATIONAL ACTORS

The JI achieved its initial objective of 'State and non-state actors [becoming] actively involved in assistance for the reintegration of migrants, AR, and/or the collection of data and [becoming] responsible for some of these services', which is the target impact stated in the JI logical framework. This is now the situation in all SLC countries to some extent, with overall government participation highest in Cameroon and Nigeria[lxviii]. IOM and all other IPs ensure the participation of line ministries, public agencies and sometimes NGOs in project steering committees, review of reintegration or business plans, and more recently and modestly, field monitoring.

Government officials in most countries felt insufficiently involved, or not involved as equal partners, in the programme strategy and design phase. The same observation was made in terms of their role in organising/centralising/steering referral mechanisms. National ministries and agencies generally feel associated by IPs as partners or sub-contractors and empowered, but they do not feel they are on equal footing or enjoy the same access to funding and, therefore, do not feel able to exercise full leadership. In their view, the EU and its IPs, including IOM, remain in control, managing the budget and partnerships, taking strategic decisions, and monitoring and owning the results. Some government stakeholders also expressed feeling left out because they were not party to the strategy definition phase and the contractual arrangement between EUTF and IPs[55].

At the return, arrival and post-arrival assistance stages, IOM works closely with government partners in all 12 countries, in bus stations, airports and/or transit/resource centres, often in teams. These work modalities ensure regular and smooth communication and help build or maintain a relationship of collaboration and trust. Government partners at the technical level expressed satisfaction in almost all JI countries. IOM involved national partners in migrant protection and shelters to a varying extent. IOM directly manages transit and/or reception centres in Niger (so far), jointly with national partners in Burkina Faso (Ouagadougou), Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea, and it collaborates with NGOs or national authorities already managing such centres in Mali, Nigeria, and outside Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso). In Niger, the direct management modality allows for more efficient oversight of the large number of migrants but limits government ownership and the sustainability of activities. In Guinea, financial support to the new migrant reception centre in Conakry (initially funded by EUTF and DFID) was included in the 2020 government budget. This funding arrangement is also being negotiated by the EU and IOM with the Government of Burkina Faso for the new centre under construction in Ouagadougou[56].

The involvement of national authorities in the reintegration process tends to decrease as the process advances. In most countries, the involvement of staff from relevant ministerial departments tends to remain one-off, as part of established local selection or case management committees who review and validate returnees' reintegration plans. National agencies are sometimes involved in job orientation and business skills or vocational training (e.g. the JI in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, and Ghana, EJOM in Mali, and INTEGRA in Guinea). In most countries, some national authorities and/or committee members wish they were associated more closely after the validation of reintegration plans, i.e. throughout the implementation and follow-up support phases and for a longer period of time, together with local authorities and community leaders (Section 3.9 on monitoring)[57]. As for other IPs, government representatives tend to report a lower level of involvement, with the exception of the

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[55] EJOM in Mali is a notable exception – one of the only projects that includes a national institution in the contractual arrangement.

[56] The EUTF is funding another transit centre in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, which will be co-managed with, or even fully managed by, the Government of Burkina Faso.

[57] This is not the case everywhere. In the Nigerian State of Edo, the Government is particularly active on the topic of return and reintegration. In Guinea, national, regional, and local authorities tend to be more involved in the follow-up than in counselling.

Government in The Gambia which reports high engagement in the YEP programme, and of the Mali Youth Employment Agency, which is one of the three consortium members in EJOM.

5.2.3. CAPACITY-BUILDING

The engagement of national authorities directly contributed to building their capacities through learning-by-doing. IPs – particularly IOM – provided line ministries and field partners with formal capacity-building opportunities, although these tended to be one-off and focused on direct project partners rather than continuous actions that encompass broader sector players. The most common training topics among the 12 JI countries were sustainable reintegration, counselling and psychosocial support and social protection for vulnerable migrants/returnees. In some JI countries, capacity-building also took the form of study or consular visits (e.g. Guinea government representative to Mali and Senegal), or secondments (Cameroon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal). By July 2020, the JI had conducted over 100 capacity development activities benefiting over 3 000 stakeholders. Initiatives slowed after March 2020 or were interrupted due to COVID-19[lxix]. Feedback from participants was largely positive. The main criticism referenced the limitations of one-off trainings, particularly because capacity gaps are significant in certain contexts, skills development takes time, and turnover is frequent among trained staff. Government institutions expressed the need for more ongoing and institutionalised capacity-building and mentoring. Further, other NGOs and some Member State agencies (beyond IOM partners) active in the migrant protection and reintegration field would have liked to benefit from IOM's capacity-building efforts. As a UN agency, IOM needs a more sector-wide approach to capacity-building. The JI in Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire provided trainings to healthcare workers and the civil society. In Nigeria, these trainings of primary healthcare staff and CSOs working in areas of high return covered mental health in general, and the specific mental health needs of returnees in particular, ensuring the trainings will ultimately benefit returnees as well as other Nigerians with mental health needs.

In addition, IOM provided equipment to government partners, and built or rehabilitated transit or resource centres in six countries. Such investment makes it possible for the government and IOM to provide better reception and accommodation conditions and better support for more returnees over a longer period of time (although returnees typically only stay for a few days). With respect to housing structures for returnees in their countries of origin, IOM favoured the strategy of using/rehabilitating existing structures and/or encouraging the government to build shelters, sometimes with a financial contribution from the EUTF, ensuring sustainability but leaving housing needs unmet in the short-term (i.e. as temporary housing solutions were not consistently put in place to ensure returnees had shelter before the new facilities became operational).

5.2.4. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES: NATIONAL LEADERSHIP AND OWNERSHIP, AND PROSPECTS FOR SUSTAINABILITY

Through policy and institutional strengthening, learning-by-doing, and capacity-building, EUTF IPs and particularly IOM made significant efforts for governments to play a stronger role in migrants' return and reintegration and to boost national ownership over the process. As highlighted by IOM officials, 'the JI enhanced coordination between countries of origin, transit, and destination; and for the first time, the reintegration process overall is being placed under the authority of the country-of-origin/return rather than driven by European/sending countries'. In most countries, governments feel empowered and more responsible. Although there is still room for improvement, progress made since the start of the JI is considerable.

Constraints could limit the outcome of these efforts. Some constraints are structural/systemic and difficult to address in the current circumstances, while others result from how reintegration programming is funded and delivered and could be overcome through changes in strategies and implementation approaches. The constraints most often cited by government and IP staff are listed below.

▪ **Relatively short timeframe of the EUTF funding cycle** limits IP capacity-building, institutional strengthening, and policy advocacy efforts. All stakeholders recognise that tackling capacity gaps

and political issues requires significant and sustained efforts; as an emergency funding instrument, the EUTF is not well suited for this.

- **Limited partner country budgets**, combined with a **lack of prioritisation of return and reintegration by many governments**. National development plans are focused on socioeconomic development and, in terms of migration specifically, on the potential of migration for development and forced displacement (in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, and Nigeria). In Burkina Faso, there are over one million internally displaced people, compared to around 2 000 returnees since 2017.

- Key informants in some countries reported **limited involvement, capacity-building, buy-in or leadership of local authorities and community leaders overall** (except in community-based projects), although these actors are critical for the success of migrants' reintegration projects. However, other informants highlighted the challenge of engaging subnational and community stakeholders in countries where returnees are spread across multiple and dispersed areas, and the risk of being involved in intricate local political and social dynamics.

In some countries, political and reputational obstacles hinder government leadership and national ownership. First, various stakeholders (not only government officials) felt the EUTF-funded programmes – including socioeconomic and youth employment programmes implemented with a migration lens – were designed in the **interests of European governments' political agendas**. For some partner governments, giving political visibility and support to return and reintegration programmes could raise discontent in local public opinion and the media. In Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Senegal, **sensitivities or disagreements emerged at the political level**, for reasons that were not always related to AVRR programming but affected its smooth inception or implementation. In these countries, migration, returns, and readmission agreements are highly political (and social) topics with broad media exposure. Migrating to Europe is also viewed as an opportunity or a right, as there is not a clear distinction between, or understanding of, voluntary and forced returns[58]. Further, EUTF and the EU more broadly neither funded large-scale socioeconomic and youth employment programmes in all SLC countries nor actively promoted legal migration pathways, as opposed to AVRR programmes. Thus, **doubts were expressed on the relevance of the EU migration policy and funding decisions**. Some government officials felt these were not always mutually beneficial and, as stated above, they felt **bypassed** in the funding decisions and contractual arrangement between EUTF and IPs and throughout the programme cycle, especially the referrals and monitoring phases.

Second, since migrants and returnees do not necessarily come from the poorest areas of their countries or the most disadvantaged households, socioeconomic investments to support them may exacerbate **inequalities** within the countries at the expense of the poorest groups. **Offering specific support to returnees and creating parallel systems may also appear to favour young people who migrated** over those who stayed, potentially generating tensions and frustration among local populations.

Third, some IPs believed that the **unclear delineation of mandates between ministries in some countries, and tangled governance structures** and decision-making processes at the national and/or local level posed political risks[59]. When stakeholders are numerous, new ministries created, respective roles and responsibilities contested, migration policies missing or outdated, and political leadership weak, situations of confusion and frustration can arise.

IOM does not appear to have been in a position to focus sufficiently on a gradual withdrawal and a handover/transition to fuller government leadership over the return and reintegration process, notably due to the time and capacities required. Such a strategy should define the objective alongside the means and timeline to achieve it – for IOM, the government, and all other partners. The strategy contents, timeframe and practical modalities (including risk mitigation measures) depend on the in-country capacity (Figure 37). The basis of a governance framework would need to be established or reinforced where it is weak: IOM would continue to play a direct management and implementation role for some components of the AVRR process while identifying, mobilising and empowering other resource partners (NGOs, migrant associations, local authorities and communities). In countries with

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[58] A few interviewees believed the EU/IOM were involved in forced returns, primarily of migrants returning from Libya and Algeria.

[59] Notably in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea (INTEGRA), Mali, and Niger.

stronger capacity, national institutions can assume a central role in the management and oversight of the return and reintegration process, including of a national referral mechanism, with IOM engaging in a strategic repositioning around policy advocacy, system strengthening, evidence generation and monitoring/quality assurance, leveraging its normative and convening role as the UN migration agency.

Figure 37: What could a medium-term engagement and handover strategy look like?

LEVEL OF NATIONAL CAPACITY:	Significant capacity gaps or emergency context	Medium capacity	Strong capacity
POSSIBLE ENGAGEMENT STRATEGIES:	▪ Conduct policy advocacy ▪ Create the basics of a governance framework: policy; SOPs; institutions; coordination platforms; etc. ▪ Facilitate direct implementation while identifying potential partners and building their capacities ▪ Engage with CSOs, create/support local migrant associations, empower communities, work with other external support agencies (ESAs) through referrals…	▪ Involve/work better with existing national institutions and strengthen them (directly or with other actors/ESAs); facilitate referrals through and to national authorities/agencies ▪ Advocate before the government for budget mobilisation ▪ Re-position on coordination, quality assurance, risk mitigation, follow-up support ▪ Accept some levels of risk on effectiveness and resource utilisation ▪ Improve/update the policies, SOPs, refine approaches, conduct research, build evidence…	

In countries with stronger capacity, the experience of the EUTF-supported Tounesna reintegration platform in Tunisia provides a possible way forward, with a national platform on reintegration designed and led by the governments of partner countries, as detailed in Box 8.

Box 8: The Tounesna platform in Tunisia

In Tunisia, a reintegration platform, Tounesna, was launched with support from the EUTF-funded ProGreS Migration programme. Designed in collaboration with Tunisian authorities, Tounesna is hosted by the Tunisian Diaspora Office (*Office des Tunisiens de l'Etranger*) and managed by Tunisian civil servants (paid by the government). The Diaspora Office handles returnees' initial information and orientation session, referrals to public services, and administrative follow-up, in collaboration with the National Employment Agency and the National Directorate for Social Promotion. After this initial support, external, non-governmental entities (*opérateurs de suivi*) take over the individual case management and provide follow-up support on behalf of Tounesna. Tounesna provides an additional economic (micro-business start-up support) and social assistance package, made available through ProGreS Migration for returnees from four European countries (Belgium, France, Germany, and Switzerland), based on eligibility criteria that are identical for all returnees.

Advantages of this scheme include: a reintegration process owned by the country-of-origin; increased institutional sustainability; easier referrals to public services; and no parallel assistance system specifically for returnees. Migrants returning from countries that do not fund reintegration assistance programmes can also access basic support through Tounesna (referrals to public services available to all Tunisians); thus, EUTF capacity-building support to Tounesna also benefits them.

This reintegration mechanism is needed in the context of the recent increase in Tunisians migrating to Europe. One constraint is Tounesna's absorption capacities, which are currently increasing and continue to require external support. So far, it reintegrated 500 returnees from the four European countries in six years. The support package provided by Tounesna to the returnees from these European countries (EUR 4 000–5 000 in economic assistance and/or EUR 2 500 in social assistance) is higher than that offered by most other countries, which could discourage more EU countries from joining and funding this assistance, and maintain a differentiated treatment based on

country-of-departure. Sustaining and expanding it while maintaining a harmonised, government-led process may prove challenging.

Tounesna could inspire other countries in the SLC region, especially those with strong governance structures (Ghana, Nigeria), as well as future EU and IOM reintegration governance programming.

5.3. GOVERNANCE OF MIGRATION – BEYOND RETURN AND REINTEGRATION

As illustrated in Figures 34–35, beyond return and reintegration, EUTF helped strengthen governance and national and local capacities in other migration-related thematic areas, considered below.

5.3.1. OVERALL SUPPORT TO NATIONAL MIGRATION POLICIES/STRATEGIES

The EUTF, mainly under the JI, supported the revision, adoption or implementation of national migration policies/strategies (and/or associated action plans) in several countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Senegal) where these were lacking. Such policies are key for countries to articulate their visions on migration issues and hold balanced dialogues with EU countries, especially compared to the past when EU countries had clear strategies on migration and most SLC countries did not. The EUTF also enabled implementation of some components of migration policies.

Yet, overall, the level of implementation of national migration policies or strategies is limited because of insufficient prioritisation or ownership by partner countries, insufficient funding and attention on follow-up, and unclear institutional setups. Limited ownership of national migration policies/strategies by partner countries may be due to a lack of alignment between the objectives of external actors (e.g. return and reintegration) and those of partner countries[60]. In addition, national migration policies frequently lack a detailed/realistic action plan, budgets for implementation[61], sufficient capacities and effective follow-up mechanisms. Finally, national migration policies/strategies tend to involve ministries and departments that would usually not work together, and this can be another obstacle to their implementation. For example, in Senegal and Tunisia, EUTF funding initially aimed at supporting the validation and diffusion of the national migration policy/strategy and needed to be re-oriented towards other activities, notably because disagreements between key ministries hindered the final validation of the documents[lxx]. As a result, in SLC countries where national migration policies were adopted in the first half of the last decade[62], little has been implemented aside from EU priorities funded by the donors themselves (e.g. return and reintegration), and specific priorities shared by both the EU and partner countries, such as border management (e.g. in Mauritania)[lxxi].

More pragmatic/targeted support to specific thematic areas of migration governance, as some EUTF IPs are providing[63], **could complement the existing support to overall national migration policies/strategies**. This can be achieved by supporting the development of more specific frameworks for thematic areas on which government ownership is strong and for which an implementation budget could realistically be envisioned (e.g. on diaspora or labour mobility specifically as opposed to all migration issues). This can also be achieved by mainstreaming specific migration concerns into existing sectoral policies, e.g. by integrating migrants' specific needs into the country's existing protection frameworks, or the diaspora's specific needs into the country's investment regulations.

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[60] See for example OECD, 'Sustainable Reintegration of Returning Migrants: A Better Homecoming', OECD Publishing, Paris, 2020: 'The presence of reference to reintegration policy in national strategy documents of origin countries is not necessarily a sign of political ownership or that the country assigns a priority to reintegration. Many of the national strategies in origin countries have been developed with financial support from donor countries and with technical support from international organisations, which guarantees inclusion of reference to reintegration as part of international good practice and as a means to ensure that external support for such measures – in bilateral agreements and in cooperation – aligns with official policy in the origin country.'

[61] Conversely, some budgets may be unrealistic given the fiscal space of the country, e.g. the budget for the Niger national migration policy plans, which is set around EUR 400 million in expenditures.

[62] For example, Mauritania in 2010, Burkina Faso in 2013, Mali in 2014, and Nigeria in 2015.

[63] Example: The JI or the programme 'Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest'.

5.3.2. BORDER MANAGEMENT

With around EUR 50 million identified within the scope of the TPML analysis, EUTF made a significant contribution to strengthen border management, primarily in Niger as well as in Mauritania, with varying degrees of involvement of local stakeholders. In Niger, the AJUSEN budget support contributed to the drafting and implementation of the country's first national border policy and action plan. According to the EUTF mid-term review, 'stakeholders perceive that AJUSEN is making a good policy-level contribution to strengthening control of Niger's huge borders' [lxxii]. At the same time, interviews conducted by Altai Consulting suggest that the strengthening of border management in northern Niger, which insufficiently involved local stakeholders, also contributed to a deterioration of the socioeconomic situation in the north of the country[lxxiii]. In Mauritania, the JI supported the update of the country's national strategy on migration management, which includes a section on border management. IOM also provided operational support to border management, which proved remarkably inclusive: It established 20 village committees on the border with Senegal and Mali, that aim to clarify issues of access to natural resources, trade and livestock flows for the local populations[lxxiv,64]. In Mauritania, the JI also included the setup of a border management coordination group in Selibaby which gathers Mauritanian law enforcement actors (police, military, customs authorities, etc.) as well as other stakeholders (embassies, international agencies, donors)[65]. This coordination group reportedly raised the interest of the G5 Sahel, which engaged in informal discussions with IOM to replicate it in other G5 Sahel countries[lxxv]. IOM's border management support in Mauritania was praised by actors met by Altai Consulting[lxxvi]. Meanwhile, the project '*Sécurité maritime*' implemented by FIIAPP is supporting the Mauritanian State to strengthen the management of its maritime borders, including through the adoption of a legal framework, which is important given the surge in irregular crossings to the Canary Islands.

5.3.3. ADDRESSING SMUGGLING OF MIGRANTS AND TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS

EUTF dedicated around EUR 25 million to strengthen states' capacities to fight against the smuggling of migrants (SOM) and trafficking in persons (TIP)[66], through:

- programmes in Niger: AJUSEN (of which around 10% of disbursement indicators were to address SOM and/or TIP), ECI (Equipe Conjointe d'Investigation: creation of a joint team to investigate cases of SOM and TIP), AGAPAIR (Agadez-Programme à Impact Rapide: support for the adoption and implementation of a reconversion plan for actors involved in smuggling) and the JI (support to the national anti-SOM and TIP agency); and

- the multi-country programme Projet d'appui à la lutte contre la traite des êtres humains dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée (Project supporting the fight against human trafficking in the Gulf of Guinea), which is implemented by Expertise France and focuses on TIP.

EUTF programmes focused on operational support to law enforcement agencies. TIP legislation in most West African countries already meets international standards, however, there are some gaps in the protection of victims (explained further in the next section) and issues of internal trafficking[lxxvii]. Apart from some specific actions[67], EUTF programming generally set out to ensure enforcement of existing legal frameworks.

In some countries, projects had to adapt their support to avoid duplication with other donors to the same agencies. In certain countries, other donors (United States, individual EU Member States) or UN agencies (notably the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC]) are active in the

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[64] Other programmes outside the scope of the TPML were also reported to engage civil society actors and local communities, notably the programme Gestion Intégrée des Espaces Frontaliers au Burkina Faso (ProGEF) which included the socioeconomic development of border communities and enhanced access to basic services, and the ICMPD project 'Strengthening border management in Ghana', which includes a demand-driven facility that helps engage civil society and local communities.

[65] Border management constitutes the component of the 2010 National Strategy on Migration Management which witnessed the greatest level of implementation, mostly attributable to strong interest from national authorities in Mauritania.

[66] While the SOM refers to migrants being willingly (albeit illegally) transported to another country, trafficking denotes that the person is forced, coerced, or abused and does not necessarily involve the crossing of borders.

[67] Example: Save the Children support for inclusion of the specific needs of children in revised anti-TIP legislation in Mauritania.

thematic areas of TIP and to a lesser extent SOM. For example, in Nigeria, there were 19 capacity-building projects benefiting law enforcement agencies working on TIP in 2020[lxxviii]. The multi-country Expertise France project[68] nevertheless identified gaps in the Nigerian response to TIP, which should allow its action to complement that of other actors, at least in Nigeria[69]. The Niger anti-TIP agency also receives significant support from several external partners. Faced with limited collaboration from this anti-TIP agency, the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) adapted its programming by re-allocating the funds initially planned by the AJUSEN programme for institutional support to the agency to other activities[lxxix].

Daily teamwork and on-the-job mentoring are seen as effective in building capacities[lxxx]. Both EU and government partners praised the EUTF-funded joint investigation team (ECI), set up in Niger (2017) and now comprising over 40 members (police officers from Niger, France, and Spain), for its results dismantling several smuggling and trafficking networks[lxxxi]. The ECI team reported collaboration with the anti-TIP agency in Nigeria, and stakeholders stressed the need for better cooperation with other neighbouring countries (Libya, Algeria, and Mali). In Senegal, the joint operational partnership (*Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint*) was designed based on the ECI model.

Also in Niger, EUTF helped local governance structures address the consequences of the 2015 law against migrant smuggling, through support with drafting and operationalising a reconversion plan for actors formerly involved in the smuggling business. The AGAPAIR project reportedly organised a successful political dialogue around the drafting and dissemination of the plan, although the decision to exclude 'higher-level' smugglers from the plan was criticised by local authorities, and significant delays between AGAPAIR and a second phase of the project elicited impatience among beneficiaries. While funding proved insufficient to support every eligible individual's transition away from smuggling activities[70], stakeholders interviewed by Altai Consulting praised the initiative. An evaluation of the project also reported positive feedback from most beneficiaries. Research by the thinktank Clingendael was less positive: It found that the financial compensation provided by AGAPAIR had 'minimal impact'. Interviews conducted by the MLS suggested that amounts per person were too small to ensure sustainability. The Clingendael research also concluded that implementation of the 2015 smuggling ban negatively impacted local governance, with traditional leaders sometimes perceived as complicit with the unpopular migration policies of the central state, and international organisations working in migration programming perceived as taking on a key governance role[lxxxii].

5.3.4. Protection of transit and vulnerable migrants, including victims of trafficking

EUTF directly contributed to improving national capacities to protect vulnerable transit migrants on their way to North Africa and Europe, those on the move within the region, and victims of trafficking. Among EUTF-funded projects within the scope of the TPML, around EUR 15 million were identified as directly contributing to the protection of migrants. The JI enabled IOM to significantly increase its protection assistance activities.

- EUTF helped improve *protection frameworks for transit migrants* in Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, where IOM directly contributed to the drafting and/or adoption of SOPs or national referral mechanisms for vulnerable transit migrants. These positively impacted the way institutions work together and protection and care are provided to migrants in need. They will need to be periodically reviewed and updated in the future.

- National partners were also strongly involved in search and rescue missions conducted with IOM support to rescue migrants stranded in the desert in northern Niger.

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[68] Projet d'appui à la lutte contre la traite des êtres humains dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée, implemented by Expertise France.
[69] Expertise France will support State Task Forces against Human Trafficking in two states which currently receive little to no support from other donors.
[70] Less than 700 reconversion plans (out of an initial list of over 5 000 individuals, which was reportedly exaggerated) were funded under phase 1 of the AGAPAIR initiative; phase 2 is helping fund additional activities.

- Through partners, EUTF is helping *strengthen national capacities to improve the protection of children on the move* (e.g. through Save the Children in Mauritania and Côte d'Ivoire) *and of victims of trafficking* (Expertise France in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, and Nigeria). This is achieved through protection workshops and capacity-building for both government and NGO staff, advocacy efforts to include these target groups in national strategies, and the construction/rehabilitation of shelters.

The capacities – and sometimes the willingness – of partner governments to assist vulnerable migrants nonetheless remain limited. Some EUTF projects have advocated for the inclusion of migrants in protection frameworks initially developed for the general population. Most countries still face a lack of protection shelters, which often only allow for short stays and are in some cases only open to women and girls[lxxxiii]. While anti-TIP agencies are bringing some traffickers to justice[71], support for victims remains mostly short-term and funded by external actors[lxxxiv]. In addition, the understanding of the protection needs of persons on the move by local actors can differ from that of donors (and across countries). For example, Nigerien authorities indicated limited willingness to provide 'unnecessarily exhaustive' protection assistance (e.g. medical assistance and food) to migrants in transit, given that most of their own population is viewed as vulnerable. In the same way, *talibé* children are sometimes perceived not as persons of concern but as taking part in a type of traditional mobility[lxxxv]. Some projects have attempted to overcome these issues by adopting a more inclusive approach to protection, going beyond migration statuses. For example, the Save the Children component of the programme '*Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest'* includes in its target groups vulnerable children travelling outside their countries of birth as well as internally displaced children and internal victims of trafficking. In addition, Save the Children will advocate for the inclusion of their specific needs in the existing or planned National Strategies on Children rather than supporting the development of specific governance frameworks dedicated to children on the move[lxxxvi]. They pursued a similar strategy as part of its AFIA project in Mauritania: Although the Mauritanian National Strategy on Child Protection is awaiting formal adoption, stakeholders involved in protection activities in the country reportedly started using it as a framework, therefore making it 'informally operational'[lxxxvii].

Through regional programmes, EUTF helped strengthen international coordination on the protection of migrants. The regional programme '*Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest'* created a cross-border taskforce that brings together national authorities from four countries and other relevant partners[72,lxxxviii]. The Save the Children component of the programme also plans to advocate for the implementation of protection frameworks at the ECOWAS level. Meanwhile, the multi-country Expertise France project is working towards the harmonisation of legal frameworks on TIP, notably around the protection of victims of trafficking to ensure that no victims are overlooked due to differing interpretations of trafficking between countries of origin and transit, for example.

5.3.5. DIASPORA INVOLVEMENT AND LEGAL/LABOUR MIGRATION

The EUTF's approach to promoting the engagement of diasporas in their countries-of-origin emphasises facilitation of local investment projects, rather than a more structural approach. EUTF's support to this endeavour amounts to around EUR 20 million, mostly spent in Senegal and Mali. Less than EUR 3 million were dedicated to supporting states' capacities to promote this involvement, however, as most projects do not directly contribute to the governance of diaspora issues; they either directly co-fund infrastructure/development projects with diaspora associations in destination countries or support the incubation of innovative projects from diaspora entrepreneurs[73], although this often takes place in coordination with relevant national institutions. This coordination was praised in the AFD project in Mali, although it also delayed the project's implementation. More systemic improvements to the governance of diaspora issues at the national level could be considered in the future, for example overhauling investment codes to promote diaspora investments or strengthening trust between partner

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[71] In Nigeria, in 2020, NAPTIP prosecuted 64 suspects and convicted 27 traffickers, according to the United States Department of State, '2020 Trafficking in Persons Report: Nigeria', 2020.

[72] This taskforce reportedly facilitated information-sharing on the situation of non-Senegalese street children who were victims of police abuse and effectively coordinated their return home.

[73] The JI in Mauritania supported the return of qualified diaspora members, receiving positive feedback from national authorities.

countries and their diasporas. The Expertise France/GIZ South-South cooperation project (*Coopération Sud-Sud)* tackles the issue through small-scale pilot initiatives and the exchange of good practices between three SLC countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, and Senegal) and Morocco, which has recently successfully (re-)built relationships of trust with its diaspora. The project includes, for example, a comparative study of diaspora investment promotion mechanisms in Morocco, Senegal, and Mali.

Several projects directly targeted at the governance of diaspora engagement faced implementation issues. In Nigeria, the JI aimed at the finalisation and adoption of a national diaspora strategy, which is still pending formal adoption. The AECID project on migration governance in Senegal[74] planned to establish offices for the reception, orientation and support to Senegalese from the diaspora (*Bureaux d'Accueil, d'Orientation et de Suivi des sénégalais de l'extérieur* [BAOS]); however, implementation was delayed notably due to disagreements on the role of these BAOS[75,lxxxix].

The EUTF supported few governance actions accompanying the implementation of the free movement protocol or promoting legal migration pathways within the region and beyond it. The only two related actions are the '*Cooperation Sud-Sud*' project, with pilot initiatives and exchanges on volunteering, and AECID's project in Mali[76], which includes workshops for border agents on free movement provisions as well as AR activities on free movement of persons within the ECOWAS space. This can be explained by the existence of another major EU-funded governance programme, 'Support to Free Movement of Persons and Migration in West Africa' (EUR 26 million, 2013–2021), supporting implementation of the free movement protocol in the ECOWAS region.

5.3.6. MIGRATION DATA

The EUTF significantly contributed to the collection of migration-related data in SLC but only a small proportion of it is dedicated to strengthening states' capacities to collect their own data. EUTF supported the collection of migration data with around EUR 15 million, mostly through the collection of flow monitoring data by IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), and to a lesser extent through local migration observatories in Niger.

The participation of national stakeholders in the IOM DTM has been limited overall, except in Mauritania. The DTM flow monitoring component received the bulk of EUTF funding. It collects flow monitoring data at specific flow monitoring points positioned to capture (in particular but not only) flows of migrants heading north. While this initiative was presented to and approved by the governments and local stakeholders in all countries in 2017, it was not designed in collaboration with them and these actors were not directly involved in the subsequent data collection phase. This system proved particularly useful for IOM to generate data and maps showing the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on migration flows across the region, for example. In most countries however, government representatives and other national stakeholders interviewed by Altai Consulting were using the data[77]. IOM took steps to strengthen the capacities of national statistics offices only in few countries, typically through one-off training workshops. Mauritania was an exception[78]: IOM worked with the National Statistics Agency to support State-led border data collection, set up a Transhumance Tracking Tool, which includes an early

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[74] 'Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Sénégal'.

[75] The BAOS also partly targeted returnees; this lack of clear vision on their role likely contributed to the delays.

[76] 'Contribuer au renforcement de la gestion et gouvernance des migrations et assurer la protection, le retour et la réintégration durable des migrants au Mali'.

[77] Various reasons were mentioned. First, they were not fully aware of the data system, of its objectives, and how it could be useful and used. Second, flow monitoring data only provide broad estimates: flow monitoring points do not cover all crossing points, migrants frequently change routes as controls increase, and the location of some flow monitoring points varied over time. Third, the flow monitoring component was not designed to maximise its usefulness to national governments and actors. If the aim was to capture flows of migrants heading to Europe, points should have been concentrated at the external borders of Niger, Mali, and Mauritania only (for efficient use of resources and to avoid double-counting). If it was to monitor protection incidents and refer victims, the survey questions should have been different (better covering these aspects). If it was to identify their region of origin and the reason for their migration in order to better target awareness-raising campaigns, related survey questions should have been more specific.

[78] IOM is also collaborating with the National Statistics Institute in Burkina Faso to revise/develop new survey tools and databases on migrations.

warning system and shares alerts with relevant government institutions, and carried out 'migrants' presence surveys' in Nouadhibou and Nouakchott.

Migration observatories in Niger were praised by stakeholders as a useful tool to ensure ownership in an emergency context, although the extent to which they could rely on a thorough analysis of migration flows is to be confirmed. Migration observatories, in charge of analysing migration flows and proposing local responses to their evolution (often infrastructure for basic social services), were initially trained by the GIZ under the ProGEM (Projet de renforcement de la gestion durable des conséquences des flux migratoires au Niger) initiative but have now acquired more independence. TPML, the EUTF mid-term review and the project's results-oriented monitoring (ROM) report all found that the approach helped strengthen local governance capacities[79,xc]. In addition, at least one other external partner expressed interest in using the migration observatories. However, the extent to which the projects were designed based on an analysis of migration flows would require further assessment; the ROM report highlighted that analyses from the observatories insufficiently relied on quantitative data. It should also be noted that the observatories were not designed to outlast the project.

5.3.7. COORDINATION OF INTERVENTIONS

Overall, EUTF and other donors' migration governance initiatives suffer from limited coordination, which can lead to a lack of synergies as well as duplications and bottlenecks. In particular, efforts to build the capacities of civil society actors to strengthen the protection of migrants are often conducted in a fragmented way, both at the national and regional levels[xci]. Duplicated referral systems and overlaps in support to the main anti-TIP agencies were also reported[xcii]. Few synergies were noted for diaspora-related projects as well[xciii]. The role of coordination should arguably be that of the partner governments, but they often lack the capacity to fulfil this role. In Mauritania, for example, Save the Children was unable to re-activate regional coordination groups on protection because of the inability of State actors to fund them. Key exceptions and good practices include the following:

▪ *active collaboration of IOM with UN agencies and NGOs* for the protection of migrants in Niger, notably with UNICEF for unaccompanied children and COOPI for migrants with PSS needs[xciv];

▪ *strong collaboration between Expertise France and UNODC in Nigeria*, with joint anti-TIP workshops conducted; and

▪ *close collaboration between the AECID in Mali and the 'Coopération Sud-Sud' project,* the latter of which resulted in a revised action plan of the national migration policy, which AECID is supporting, and both projects organised a joint conference.

Promising efforts to harmonise EUTF IP and other donors' efforts under the government's lead include:

▪ the *coordination committee on migration in Niger*, which is comprised of 25 members of State and non-State institutions, and is in charge of coordinating the State's and donors' actions;

▪ the *Human Trafficking Fund in Ghana*[80], which is funded by the Government of Ghana, as well as international partners (e.g. IOM), and to which Expertise France is contributing through the regional project TEH; and

▪ the project of creating a *thematic coordination group on migration in Mali,* initiated by AECID, the EUD and the Ministry for Malians living abroad.

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[79] A local beneficiary was stated in the mid-term review of the EUTF as saying 'it's not [only] that we are consulted, we make all the decisions for the project activities'.

[80] The Human Trafficking Fund was launched by the Government of Ghana and started its operations in 2015. It aims to compensate victims of trafficking financially and to fund any activity related to TIP (e.g. rescue, AR, prevention).

5.4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

EUTF allowed actions to be initiated rapidly in various areas, improving migration governance throughout the SLC region. In many cases, the building blocks have been established, new approaches launched, and/or pilot projects tested. These initiatives need to be pursued and built upon to maximise and sustain results – with a different timing and funding instrument. In the case of the JI, IOM country teams had to balance between the short-term emergency requirement of providing support to migrants, and the longer-term requirement of building national and local capacities, two objectives that require different expertise and timing but often relied on the same staff. The EUTF mid-term review highlighted that other EU funding instruments would have been better suited to support national policy formulation and implementation.

EUTF prioritised initiatives in irregular migration and returns and reintegration, while sometimes neglecting other areas of migration governance and limiting governments' interest. As illustrated in Figure 33, EUTF tended to geographically focus its migration governance support on the main countries of transit and origin of irregular migrants to Europe (e.g. Niger and Mauritania), as opposed to the countries with the greatest gaps in migration governance and/or the greatest needs in areas not related to irregular migration. Further, it is likely that partner countries' ownership and political support were reduced by the fact that migration governance components were inserted within broader programmes viewed as more aligned with EU political priorities (i.e. irregular migration and return and reintegration) than with those of partner governments. The EUTF mid-term review even noted that 'the EUTF's focus on irregular migration, combined with weak migration policy frameworks in partner countries, has undermined attempts to engage in effective dialogue on the larger migration challenges'.

The satisfaction of partner governments with EUTF programming improved over time. As mentioned earlier, both key informants interviewed by Altai Consulting and the mid-term review stressed partner governments' initial lack of implication in the EUTF funding decisions, programme design and implementation, underlining that 'speed of delivery was no excuse'[xcv]. Partner countries felt increasingly involved, however, as governance mechanisms became established, and implementation progressed. Some government representatives acknowledged that the lack of coordination between ministries and of stability within them created additional obstacles to a smooth and efficient implementation of governance programming at political, institutional, and technical levels[xcvi].

Through the development of several major regional/cross-country projects, EUTF contributed to harmonising migration governance frameworks across some SLC countries and to the exchange of best practices. However, coordination and cross-learning between the governance initiatives could have been stronger. The SOPs on AVRR drafted as part of the JI, using common templates, the consular visits organised by IOM in Libya, Mali, and Niger, and good practices documented by some JI countries are examples of cross-country exchanges, learning, and harmonisation. Another example is the '*Coopération Sud-Sud'* project which focuses on exchanging best practices on migration governance between Morocco and three SLC countries, or the multi-country Expertise France project against human trafficking, which includes regional exchanges to harmonise legislation across countries in the Gulf of Guinea[81]. Coordination and knowledge management between IPs were weaker, however, and IPs would have preferred more meetings, reviews and events organised by the EU in each country and regionally.

For future programming, the below strategy adjustments and actions are recommended.

Recommendations to the EU:

- Ensure that migration governance programming is **targeted at the countries with the greatest needs** in the specific thematic area under consideration, as opposed to the countries-of-origin and countries-of-transit with the highest number of irregular migrants.

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[81] Because of Nigeria's relative advancement when it comes to legislation on TIP, relevant frameworks were requested from the Nigeria project manager to be used as models in other countries.

- Consider **separating programmes dedicated to AVRR or irregular migration from those dedicated to other governance aspects**, to maximise partner countries' ownership.

- Conduct **comprehensive gap analyses** for the thematic areas and countries where many projects are already active ahead of programming, coordinate with actors providing similar support to the same migration governance areas and agencies throughout programming, and provide funds to cover the costs of this coordination (regular meetings, etc.).

Recommendations to the EU and IPs:

- **Prioritise supporting the *implementation* of existing frameworks**, notably by supporting the budgetisation of migration concerns by partner countries to ensure sustainability, as well as the *streamlining of migration concerns into sectoral legislation* which is most likely to be applied on the ground and to avoid creating imbalances between migrants and non-migrants, e.g. integrate migrants' specific needs into the country's existing protection frameworks, and integrate economic reintegration schemes into broader youth employment programmes.

- **Engage partner countries earlier and better in funding decisions and programme design** and, more generally, ensure greater alignment of programming with partner countries' priorities to maximise programme ownership, effectiveness, and sustainability. For example, in addition to directly encouraging diaspora entrepreneurship, future EU programming could consider supporting more structural approaches, including promoting legal migration pathways more actively, establishing new mobility schemes towards Europe (while remaining cognisant of risks related to brain drain), and facilitating remittances at a lower cost.

- Reconsider funding flow monitoring points and prioritise supporting the **streamlining of migration modules into the migration data regularly collected** by National Institutes of Statistics and other departments, as well as the collection of data gathered at border posts by national authorities.

On-going research by Altai Consulting on the state of migration governance across EUTF countries (including national capacities, implementation of governance frameworks, and existing support provided to national stakeholders), will provide country-specific recommendations by the end of 2021.

The recommendations listed below are made to the EU and IPs with respect to future programming intended to support the governance of return and reintegration.

- Continue to empower partner governments and support national leadership by associating the relevant authorities/agencies at the national, subnational and community levels **more closely in the design phase as well as in the field monitoring and follow-up phase** ('ownership by doing').

- **Ensure IPs and other actors work in close coordination, and define the precise role of the EU and IOM, alongside national governments, and how to fulfil this role more effectively**. Initiate or support coordination platforms that involve other relevant IPs, projects/donors and national agencies in the country beyond IOM's direct counterparts and project partners. In the most advanced countries**, consider promoting national, government-led reintegration platforms** inspired by the Tunisian reintegration mechanism, Tounesna. Such platforms can help establish synergies, complementarities and referrals notably with job creation and youth employment programmes and encourage cross-learning. Seek greater coordination, cross-learning, and alignment of approaches between return and reintegration from the EU (including ERRIN and Frontex in its new role), EU Member States, SLC partner governments, and other countries to ensure more coherence and sustainability. Clearly define respective mandates, contributions, and accountabilities from the onset.

- **Invest in more strategic, continuous, and long-term capacity-building for partner countries** at the national and sub-national levels.

- A primary objective of future projects should be **long-term governance strengthening**, with indicators related to the **institutional and financial sustainability** of existing/new structures and partnerships. New governance mechanisms, coordination bodies need to be institutionalised and progressively funded by government budgets to survive the end or discontinuity of project funding.

6. AWARENESS-RAISING CAMPAIGNS

6.1. OVERVIEW OF IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS' AWARENESS-RAISING CAMPAIGNS IN THE SLC REGION

In this report, awareness-raising (AR) campaigns refer to the set and range of migration-related information, education and communication activities funded by EUTF across the SLC region, with the aim to improve the knowledge of predefined target groups and to influence their opinions/attitudes and their behaviours or intentions.

The EUTF AR portfolio in SLC countries covered within the scope of TPML is presented in Figure 38. Except for Mali, IOM implemented AR activities in all countries under the EU-IOM JI. IOM reports over 15 200 AR events and activities organised from the beginning of the JI through November 2020[xcvii]. Other projects/IPs conducting AR activities (AECID, Tekki Fii, Save the Children, INTEGRA) are also included in the scope of the TPML exercise. As of May 2020, EUTF-funded migration-related AR activities of most IPs had ended.

Figure 38: EUTF AR portfolio in SLC countries, within the scope of TPML

IPs conducted a range of activities targeting various populations with different objectives:

- *In countries of departure*: inform potential migrants and their families and other influencers of the risks of migrating irregularly and of local employment opportunities and legal migration channels;

- *In countries of transit and return*: foster the social cohesion, acceptance and protection of returnees and migrants in transit among host communities; and

- *In all countries* (since March 2020): sensitise the whole population to the risks of COVID-19 and promote health and safety measures against the virus.

While most AR campaigns shared the same goal, IPs had different perspectives. While IOM, in most countries, aimed to enable migrants and potential migrants to make informed decisions on their migratory journey, sensitising communities of origin and promoting alternatives to irregular migration, in line with its mandate and the JI objectives, some other IPs (e.g. Tekki Fii partners in The Gambia and Senegal, and INTEGRA in Guinea) also used AR activities to advertise their youth employment programmes and enrol participants. Two exceptions are Mauritania, where IPs' AR activities sought to foster social cohesion and protection, due to the presence of numerous transit migrants in the country and few nationals attempting to migrate irregularly, and Niger where IOM targeted transit migrants. Expertise France's AR component against human trafficking was not yet in place at the time of the TPML Cycle 3 country visits.

Figure 39 visualises the various types of AR activities and communication channels used by IPs. Most activities were carried out in-person, through partners in the field. Mass media communications were more limited, and mostly went through national and local radio stations as well as social media.

Figure 39: Typology of main AR activities/communications studied as part of TPML

6.2. EVIDENCE BASE AND TPML AWARENESS-RAISING SURVEY METHODOLOGY

In addition to the document review, key informant interviews and field observations, Altai Consulting surveyed 2 069 AR campaign participants in 10 countries during the TPML Cycles 2 and 3[82]. The surveys took place in February–March 2020 (Cycle 2) and September–December 2020 (Cycle 3). Both surveys targeted beneficiaries from recent in-person AR activities. Among survey respondents, 1 448 had participated in in-person activities and 1 143 had been exposed to mass-media communications[83]. Respondents were sampled across countries, regions, AR activities, and IPs with the view to capture the diversity of AR approaches and experiences. (See Annex 14 for more information on the survey methodology.) Thirty-one community leaders/local resource persons were also interviewed by Altai Consulting.

6.3. DESIGN OF AWARENESS-RAISING CAMPAIGNS

Due to the lack of a clear theory of change and preliminary/formative studies, objectives, target groups, messaging, and communication channels tend to be defined in broad terms. The intended change and the logical pathways to change remained unspecific, and IPs' communication plans not well targeted[xcviii]. They mention the intention to increase beneficiaries' knowledge, sometimes also changing their perceptions about migration, and more rarely how these relate to migration intentions and practices. They do not define the ultimate objective nor how and why it is most likely to be reached. They bring forward an all-encompassing list of target groups, activities, and communication channels[xcix]. The only exception is the Cross-cutting communications strategy, developed for the Tekki Fii campaign in Senegal. Few studies were carried out to inform the design of AR campaigns, for instance on the root causes of irregular migration in various contexts and for different population groups, or on the factors, messages, and communication channels most able to impact them[84]. IPs also rarely questioned the extent to which information and entertainment-based activities can counter the influence of friends, relatives, social media, and the smuggling business in the migration decision, and effectively curb migratory intentions. Assumptions and risks have not been examined. The studies conducted by IPs were mostly surveys on migration-related knowledge, attitudes, and practice (KAP)[c]. They mainly

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[82] The Cycle 3 survey in Mauritania was cancelled due to COVID-19 travel restrictions. No AR survey was conducted in Niger given the marked difference in core target groups (transit migrants, who are very mobile and unlikely to be willing to participate in a survey) and in activities implemented by IOM compared with the rest of the sub-region.

[83] This was made possible by interviewing each respondent on up to one in-person activity and/or one mass media communication. When they benefited from more than one activity of each type, the survey was targeted at the most recent one.

[84] Exceptions are: LuxDev and IOM in Senegal, Save the Children in Mauritania, and IOM in Guinea. The short AECID baseline study described migration causes and trajectories and listed secondary targets/stakeholders for the campaign.

aimed to establish a baseline and, sometimes, measure the results of the campaign at endline. They often came late in the programme cycle and had limited operational use.

Social and cultural norms/dynamics appear under-investigated and insufficiently addressed. Most key programme stakeholders emphasise the economic causes of migration, attributing the decision to migrate to the poverty rate in the country/area and the lack of decent work opportunities for the youth. Yet, the pre-departure employment rate of returnees surveyed by Altai Consulting (69%) is similar to those of young males aged 15–29 years in the general West African population[ci]. Furthermore, in almost all countries, departure areas are geographically well delineated (Figure 40) and do not correspond to the economically poorest regions[85]. Rather, they tend to coincide with specific social dynamics or ethnic groups, revealing other underlying migration drivers (tradition, social norms, peer pressure, presence of smuggling networks, influence of social media, etc.) often insufficiently addressed in community mobilisation and messaging. In such contexts, where push and pull factors of irregular migration are specific to each sub-area, community-led approaches aiming to address these migration drivers, encompass all relevant influencers, build a wide consensus and engagement, and change the social norms at play, are key to success. AR campaigns could benefit from lessons learned from Sanitation and Protection programming in this regard[86].

Figure 40: Areas of origin of IOM AVRR migrants, 2017-2020[cii]

In the absence of a strong theoretical underpinning and evidence base, IPs designed their campaigns empirically, based on lessons from previous experiences and by involving national and local partners and, in some countries, professional communications agencies. In several countries, IOM relied on the IOM X campaign in other regions and on the Waka Well and the Migrants as Messengers campaigns in West Africa. In Ghana, IOM organised focus group discussions with local

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[85] Centre-East in Burkina, Abidjan in Côte d'Ivoire, Accra, Brong Ahafo and Ashanti regions in Ghana, Gabù and Bafatá in Guinea-Bissau, Kayes in Mali, Yaoundé and Douala in Cameroon, and Lagos and Southern States in Nigeria, are not the economically poorest regions in the country; some are among the wealthiest. A notable exception is Senegal, where the poorest regions, Kolda and Tambacounda, match the main areas of departure.

[86] Since early 2010, community-led behaviour change approaches based on the social norms and social networks theories have been successfully implemented and scaled up throughout West Africa by sanitation actors to end open defecation practices, and by UNICEF to end female genital mutilation.

community leaders to pre-test and adapt the messaging used in the 'No Place Like Home' campaign. In Nigeria, IOM's guidelines for community dialogues and scripts for community theatre were designed in collaboration with local authorities and CSOs. In Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal and other countries, IOM AR materials went through a joint validation process with the line Ministry and the EUD. To professionalise their AR campaigns, a few IPs (INTEGRA in Guinea, IOM in Ghana, AECID in Mali, EUD in Senegal for the Tekki Fii campaign) contracted local communications agencies to conduct field surveys, develop communications plans, and design messages and activities[87].

Because of the diversity of prior experience, the variety of country contexts (causes of migration, rural/urban areas of emigration, media landscape, institutional environment, etc.), and the combination of donor projects/funding, the EUTF and JI AR activities appear as a diverse set of local approaches rather than a coherent or harmonised strategy. Some IPs used community-based approaches, broadcasted messages on traditional and social media, involved former migrants, mobilised traditional community leaders and/or national celebrities, leveraged the power of art and entertainment, or conveyed informative messages on the dangers of irregular migration, or gave a more positive tone to the campaign. Although support from the IOM regional coordination unit was made available to country offices during the JI's implementation period and some training and programming ideas were offered, no pre-defined, centralised strategy was established.

This dispersed, empirical, and flexible approach provided opportunities to test and learn-by-doing. Examples of innovation and adaptive programming among IPs are provided below.

▪ The Tekki Fii campaign in Senegal *produced* TV and *web-series* to better reach young people of the urban middle class. These have become popular at the country level.

▪ IOM Guinea-Bissau *discontinued community video projections* after limited engagement of the audience was observed in several villages.

▪ After two years of implementation, IOM Burkina Faso paused all field activities to *critically review the pertinence of certain AR activities (e.g. large, one-off sports events and music concerts)* which reach many people at once but whose benefits, in terms of migration-related knowledge and behaviour change, are doubted.

▪ IOM Mauritania *shifted its messaging towards fostering social cohesion* between transit migrants and local communities when realising that messages on risks associated with irregular migration were not relevant in a country where few people emigrate irregularly.

▪ IPs reoriented their messaging towards COVID-19 prevention.

6.4. TARGETING

Overall, IP intervention areas corresponded with the main transit and departure areas. In some countries, the geographic targeting could have been refined based on a more precise mapping and prospective analysis of migration flows at the subnational level. In Niger, IOM organised AR events at strategic locations along the main migration routes and, in Mauritania, Save the Children concentrated its activities on border and transit wilayas. In the 10 remaining countries, IPs covered the areas of high departure and, often, of return[88]. In Nigeria, IOM focused on the main areas of origin and return of migrants, but missed Lagos, where a significant proportion of migrants come from or transit before leaving the country, until mid-2020. IOM included Korhogo in Côte d'Ivoire, which is not an area of departure, and could have dedicated more resources to Abidjan. In Guinea, IOM and INTEGRA implemented most AR activities in urban and peri-urban areas on the Conakry-Mamou axis, while IOM

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[87] The communications agency, Rarili in Guinea, Now Available Africa in Ghana, Venise Group in Mali, and 20STM and AF Consulting in Senegal. 20STM won the EU Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DevCo) Communication Award in 2019.

[88] Centre-East and South-East provinces for IOM in Burkina Faso; Littoral and Centre regions for IOM in Cameroon; Abidjan for IOM in Côte d'Ivoire; Kanifing and West Coast regions for IOM in The Gambia; six regions prone to outward and return migration for IOM in Ghana; Gabù and Bafatá in Guinea-Bissau; Kayes and Bamako regions for AECID in Mali; Edo, Delta and Ogun States in Nigeria; Tambacounda et Kolda in Senegal.

mappings show that migrants come from all regions relatively evenly; the more remote regions of Nzerekoré and Boké and the rural areas, in particular, were left out. In Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso, most activities were conducted in the central neighbourhoods of the city at the expense of more peripheric ones where target groups are located.

In most countries, IPs faced the challenge of striking the right balance between ensuring a large coverage of target groups within intervention areas and achieving a more strategic, focused, and on-point targeting. Reaching the largest number of people directly or indirectly relevant to the AR campaign in-country through a variety of activities and communication channels ensures that all potential migrants and secondary target groups are covered. It also maximises the number of AR beneficiaries. Yet, not all young people are likely to migrate irregularly, and the profile of potential migrants differs by country. Similarly, not all actors and information sources have an equal and significant influence on the decision to migrate, and the most influential ones differ across countries. Thus, the wide outreach poses a risk of loss of efficiency and renders resources unavailable to achieve sufficient engagement and continuous reinforcement of activities among the most relevant target groups.

At the regional level, 28% of AR beneficiaries surveyed by Altai Consulting reported being likely or very likely to migrate irregularly before the AR activity – with high variations across countries. This suggests that the adequacy of beneficiary targeting has been uneven. The percentage ranges from 12% in Cameroon and 20% in Ghana (suggesting a suboptimal targeting at the individual level), to 40% in Mali and Burkina Faso, and 49% in Guinea (good targeting). The wide outreach approach (as opposed to a well-targeted campaign based on a detailed profiling of target groups) may explain that the targeting at the individual level was suboptimal in some countries and that many of those most likely to migrate were missed. Without a more intentional and fine-tuned targeting strategy, individuals with intentions or concrete plans to migrate may be less likely to participate in an activity the explicit aim of which is to discourage or reorient them.

6.5. IMPLEMENTATION

6.5.1. USING THE RIGHT COMMUNICATION CHANNELS AND INVOLVING RELEVANT INFLUENCERS

A strong emphasis was placed on interpersonal field activities in all countries until the COVID-19 outbreak. Most IPs concentrated the bulk of their resources and efforts on roadshows, film screenings, theatre plays, concerts, sports events, group/community dialogues, workshops, etc. targeting potential migrants, their relatives, and their immediate social networks[89,ciii]. These activities typically involved local NGOs/CSOs and community facilitators intervening in community settings. IOM and other IP staff and partners directly implemented some information and sensitisation activities in migrant information and transit centres. A key advantage of interpersonal, on-the-ground activities is the direct interaction with and feedback from target groups, which cannot be achieved through media activities. This approach allows participants' questions and concerns to be answered and facilitates the IP learning process. Pandemic-related restrictions forced all IPs to interrupt field activities and adapt their strategies to respect social distancing guidelines. Many activities were re-oriented towards COVID-19 prevention, notably in IOM transit centres (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger), and media communications.

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[89] While evidence suggests that young migrants are often influenced or pressured by their families to migrate (Hernandez-Carretero and Carling, 2012), IOM findings (Tjaden, 2020) indicate that this pattern may depend on the country context. The percentage of migrants who felt family pressure to migrate is much higher in Senegal (56%) than Guinea (10%), based on IOM's multi-country study (2021) on migratory debt, and a significant number (22%) of lenders (typically family members) were unaware of the purpose of the debt contracted by migrants, suggesting they were not a part of the decision leading to the contract.

Relevant communication channels and stakeholders (TV, social media, friends and relatives living abroad) were rarely mobilised despite the significant influence they can wield on an individual's decision to migrate. In the literature, friends and relatives who already successfully migrated abroad, and the TV and social media are identified as playing a key role in perceptions of wealth and success abroad, conveying the image of the European dream, and in triggering the decision to migrate[civ]. In Altai Consulting's survey, they are, respectively, the second, third and fourth main sources used by respondents to obtain information on migration (Figure 41)[90]. They could have been better mobilised to complement in-person activities. Their lack of, or limited, engagement may be due to a lack of in-house expertise.

Figure 41: Respondents' preferred sources of information
(number and % total answers)

Regarding social media, studies conducted by Samuel Hall, IOM and EUDs in some SLC countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Nigeria, and Senegal) and a wealth of academic literature pointed to their high utilisation rate among young people including migrants in West Africa, and recommended leveraging them to their full advantage[cv]. While internet access and bandwidth can limit outreach in remote areas, the influence and relatively low cost of such media communications make it a relevant complement to on-the-ground activities (see Annex 15). In terms of social media, Facebook and, to a lesser extent, WhatsApp are considered most reliable by Altai Consulting's survey respondents. Most IOM teams currently use their Facebook page for information and institutional communication purposes and to showcase reintegration success stories, rarely for behaviour change communication.

The strong influence of smugglers and human traffickers has not yet been actively addressed. IOM evokes associated risks in select field-based community activities in Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria. References to smugglers – and the deconstruction of their narratives – is also found in Naa's campaign videos (IOM Ghana's IP). This overall limited engagement may be due to the complexity and political dimension of such interventions. The smuggling and trafficking business remains difficult to map and cannot constitute a priority of campaigns if it is not prioritised by both the national government and EU Member States. However, EUTF funded dedicated actions aiming to dismantle networks by strengthening the capacity of, and cooperation between, the police and the judiciary or making reconversion options available to individuals involved in the business (e.g. Expertise France in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Ghana and Nigeria, and FIIAPP, CIVIPOL and AFD in Niger, see Chapter 5). Such actions could be complemented by dedicated AR activities, especially through mass-media communications advertising alternatives, in collaboration with IOM and other relevant IPs/actors. In Côte d'Ivoire, Expertise France plans to help the government develop an AR strategy and launch a campaign. In Nigeria, it will sensitise border communities and workers on human trafficking (e.g. truck drivers).

In all countries, IPs involved various actors to spread and endorse AR messages.

▪ *Most IPs hired NGOs, CSOs and/or youth associations as IPs.* In Guinea Bissau, IOM collaborated with the National Network of Youth Associations and the National Youth Council and, in The Gambia, both IOM and Tekki Fii partners partnered with the Gambian National Youth Council which

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[90] Respondents could select several answers, which explains why the total number of answers is higher than that of respondents (n=1 737).

also directly operates the Migrant Information Centres (MICs). In Côte d'Ivoire, IOM focused its AR efforts on youth and women's associations. These organisations provided local expertise, mobilised their members and networks to increase outreach, and conferred AR activities a strong local footprint (adaptation of messages delivered to each community's context – language, tone, etc.).

- *Government ministries or agencies* were often associated during the design and/or implementation phase, allowing for strengthened national leadership and ownership. This was the case in Ghana for the 'No Place Like Home' campaign, co-designed with line ministries and implemented in partnership with the Migration Information Bureaus of the Ghana Immigration Service. In Nigeria, IOM relied on the National Agency for Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons and the National Orientation Agency, the government organ that has the largest reach and capacity for public enlightenment and sensitisation campaigns. With its offices and staff in all local government areas, the National Orientation Agency has been able to participate in the design of activities, and select, train, deploy, and supervise community dialogue facilitators in all IOM intervention areas, further anchoring activities in the local context and increasing the campaign's sustainability prospects.

- *Religious authorities and traditional leaders* were involved in community mobilisation and dissemination of messages in a few countries (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania). In Mauritania, Save the Children collaborated with the Ministry of Islamic Affairs to develop a sensitisation guide rooting child protection in Islamic jurisprudence, markedly enhancing the legitimacy of the AR messaging. However, the Altai Consulting and IOM surveys found that religious and traditional authorities are not a significant information source and have limited influence on young people's decision to migrate[cvi].

- *IOM mobilised teachers and student associations in schools and universities* in several countries (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, etc.) to address irregular migration as early as possible, given that migratory intentions are often forged at a young age. This was particularly relevant in Guinea, the country where the average age of migrants is the youngest in the region (24 years old)[cvii] and the proportion of students among them is highest (40%)[cviii].

- *IOM trained journalists and organised journalism competitions* in Mauritania, Ghana, Guinea, and The Gambia, to ensure better, higher quality coverage of migration-related issues in local media.

- I*OM mobilised famous West African singers as goodwill ambassadors* in Côte d'Ivoire (Tikken Jah Fakoly), Guinea (Degg J Force 3, whose video clip 'Falé' has 1.2 million views on YouTube and was broadcasted on numerous national and local radios), Ghana (Kofi Kinaata's song 'Behind The Scenes' describing the reality of most sub-Saharan irregular migrants living in Europe, which has 2.5 million views on YouTube) and Senegal (Positive Black Soul, Coumba Gawlo and Idy Coly Diallo). Altai Consulting's survey in Guinea confirmed that the 'Degg J Force 3' song is not only popular but also touched many people and helped shift perceptions around migration.

Figure 42: Kofi Kinaata's song 'Behind The Scenes' (Ghana)

- *IOM mobilised returnees' associations to promote peer-to-peer sensitisation in at least six JI countries.* In Cameroon, in addition to carrying out in-person activities in the Centre region as an IOM field partner, the migrant association named OEMIT, established in 2017 by former returnees and assisted through the JI, manages a WhatsApp hotline available to activity participants to ask questions about irregular migration and its alternatives. In Guinea, the role of the OGLMI association goes beyond helping IOM reach out to returnees eligible for the JI reintegration assistance and providing them psychosocial support: It is also IOM's main field partner for AR activities funded by EUTF and other donors. In the Gambia, IOM works with the Gambian Returnees for the Backway association, whose initial founders were involved in an IOM-supported collective reintegration project after their return from Libya. They now narrate their ordeals for potential migrants during 'attaya' (tea sessions) and football games.

In recent years, IOM has increasingly engaged returnees and migrant associations in its AR activities in almost all SLC countries, under EUTF, Migrants as Messengers, or other initiatives/funding. An evaluation of the IOM Migrants as Messengers initiative in Senegal, KAP surveys conducted by IOM in Guinea (under another EU-funded AR project, Omega) and interviews with implementers show that this approach has numerous advantages, as outlined below.

- Returnees are often in contact with potential migrants.

- Returnees have a deep understanding of local migration dynamics and drivers and speak to the audience from personal experience, in both a well-informed and emotional manner. They provide a convincing narrative that serves the IOM mission to promote better-informed migration decisions through effective AR campaigns.

- The survey conducted as part of the Omega project in Guinea found that returnees were the most trusted source of information on migration, and the Migrants as Messengers evaluation found that this approach significantly impacted the perception of risks among potential migrants and their intention to migrate[cix].

- Returnees' messages and testimonies are also more credible because they do not have to display the EU and IOM logos, which can cause suspicion and even negatively affect the credibility of the AR messaging on the risks of irregular migration.

- Peer-sensitisation has a positive impact on returnees themselves: Telling their stories can give them a purpose, become a source of revenue, and help them overcome trauma and build resilience. In that sense, peer-sensitisation can be considered a reintegration activity, creating mutually beneficial linkages between AR and reintegration assistance.

IOM mobilised individual JI or former returnees or created/partnered with national and local migrant associations. The latter approach presents the additional advantage of strengthening the civil society and grassroot organisations and promoting national ownership and sustainability.

6.5.2. ROOTING MESSAGES IN THE LOCAL CONTEXT AND COMMUNITY DYNAMICS

IPs have faced several implementation challenges, which limited the effectiveness of AR activities. These difficulties demonstrate that IPs made insufficient use of prior experience and documented best practices in the design and inception phases, and the process of building the necessary AR expertise is still underway. Some of these issues have since been addressed through learning-by-doing and generated lessons that will be useful for future campaigns.

- *While providing information to target groups is necessary to improve their knowledge on migration issues, it is not always sufficient to curb migratory intentions,* especially where target groups are well informed of the risks (and benefits) of migrating irregularly, and related decisions are not necessarily caused by wrong perceptions. Other programming approaches are needed to address the various factors influencing decisions and reach the intended outcomes of AR campaigns.

- *There is a need to plan more intentionally for a change in social norms and community dynamics*, as highlighted above. The community dialogue approach promoted by IOM Nigeria and its partners uses local facilitators and addresses various context-tailored topics. The intergenerational dialogue and sensitisation of mothers initiated by IOM in The Gambia is also a promising initiative.

- *There is a critical difference between community-based and community-led approaches that needs to be better internalised by IPs and utilised to shape the design and implementation of AR field activities*. In community-led approaches, community members themselves are the change agents. They assess and understand the issue at stake *on their own*, analyse its causes and the reasons it is a problem *for them*, and they are in a position to decide on the most relevant actions and how to implement them community-wide, ideally with their own means. In this approach, IPs only play a subtle facilitation role, refraining from informing, lecturing, or suggesting anything to the audience.

- *Change in social norms, perceptions, and intentions/behaviours is more likely to occur with a repeated, continuous exposure of target groups to AR messages and through a combination of activities and communication channels.* Field activities tended to be one-off, with limited reinforcement or follow-up, limiting local appropriation and campaign effectiveness. As mentioned above, this can be attributed to budget constraints under EUTF funding and the desire to cover all migration-prone areas and maximise quantitative targets (number of people and communities reached). Regarding IOM, other funding will provide the opportunity to continue AR activities in several countries (The Gambia, Guinea, Niger, Nigeria). In Niger, IOM developed a comprehensive AR strategy implemented in the field by a permanent network of community facilitators and seven counselling and orientation bureaus along major migration routes and funded by several donors.

- *Because intervention contexts, people's individual situations, and migrants' motives are diverse, relevant and effective, AR campaigns should involve territorialising approaches, segmenting target groups, and tailoring interventions and messages accordingly.* This was not apparent in the IPs' AR strategies, action plans, and media or in-person communications materials, although field partners and staff have strived to ensure some level of local adaptations.

- *Quality AR materials and implementation guidelines and ongoing training and supervision of outreach workers are needed to ensure adequate terminology and adapted messaging, and to improve interpersonal and facilitation skills.* While all IPs reported having trained their partners and field staff, comprehensive and iterative training, and step-by-step implementation manuals were found (or shared with Altai Consulting) in only two countries: Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria (IOM).

- *Using local languages and simple wording ensures that messages are well understood.* In a few countries, field implementers interviewed by Altai Consulting explained that they had to revise and translate AR materials in collaboration with IPs, dub, summarise or change the projected film, and review the script of the theatre play to adapt it to the audience. At the time of the TPML country visits, some interviewees regretted that some activities were still primarily carried out in French.

Figure 43: Logo used by IOM Niger's community facilitators

- *Timing is key to boost attendance.* In several countries, field teams and beneficiaries noted that in-person activities were often organised during the day, and sometimes during the rainy season, when the intended beneficiaries (mostly young men) are busy. The associated risk for IPs is to miss their primary target groups. During the rainy season, logistics are also more difficult for both community members and implementers.

- *Using more neutral logos can facilitate interactions with potential migrants and boost trust in AR messages.* In Cameroon, IOM's partner CSOs used their own logos and branding instead of those of the EU and IOM. IOM Niger's community facilitators also use their own logo (Figure 43), which is useful when targeting transit migrants who are often in irregular situations on the Nigerien territory and thus more likely to distrust government staff/entities and their European and international partners.

- *While negative messaging about irregular migration can and should be complemented with more positive messages on available alternatives (local economic opportunities and legal migration pathways), these alternatives may not always appear credible in people's eyes/experience.* The limits of a deterrent messaging principally centred on the danger of migrating irregularly have already been identified in the literature and some IPs' mid-term project evaluations, such as AECID's in Mali. All IPs reported having increasingly included positive messages. Yet, 96% of Altai Consulting's survey respondents reported that the messages to which they have been exposed focused on the risks of migrating irregularly, and 38% said the messages also included information on available alternatives (Figure 44). Based on qualitative evidence from IOM and TPML surveys and key informant interviews, this could be due to field partners/staff keeping their traditional risks-focused approach, to information on alternatives being more complex and requiring more expertise, and to beneficiaries recalling this theme better than more peripheral ones. Potential migrants may have already experienced the struggle of finding decent jobs, accessing education opportunities, or obtaining visas and, thus, may not find such messages convincing (a case of cognitive dissonance, outlined further below).

Figure 44: Main messages delivered during the activity/communication

Message	Value
The risks of migrating irregularly	2392
Job opportunities available in the country	928
Opportunities for legal or safe migration	578
Social cohesion	52

- *Recreational, artistic and entertainment activities are appealing and well-adapted to local preferences. Their sometimes emotional contents can be powerful. However, the entertainment dimension should not take precedence over the message delivered.* IPs and their partners sought to organise engaging activities, notably by mobilising professional communications agencies and celebrities. In Nigeria, IOM hired a renowned filmmaker. Film screenings and community theatre are popular, especially in rural areas. These AR methods stimulate target groups' interest and boost attendance in places where available recreational activities are often scarce. In Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea-Bissau, however, it was observed that some of these recreational activities (road shows, music concerts, football games, and wall painting) risked attracting people only interested in their entertaining aspect and less likely to be receptive to the migration messages. Moreover, they may leave little opportunity/time for interactions with the audience.

6.5.3. ENABLING TARGETED AUDIENCES TO ACCESS COMPLEMENTARY INFORMATION AND SUPPORT

Most IPs plan for target audiences to be given the opportunity to easily obtain additional information after an AR activity. In practice, however, few surveyed beneficiaries reported having been presented with and taken up such an opportunity. IPs supporting TVET and/or job creation initiatives (especially Tekki Fii partners in Senegal and The Gambia and INTEGRA in Guinea) generally use AR activities to communicate on the opportunities they offer so participants can later apply and enrol in their programmes. Aside from these IPs, others took related steps. As part of the AR activities carried out by AECID's partner CSOs in Mali, information on projects supporting professional training and/or employment creation (e.g. FIER and EJOM initiatives) was disseminated in the areas where such projects operate. However, the project's mid-term evaluation conducted in 2020 found that this information and orientation mechanism is not effective. In The Gambia, Tekki Fii partners and IOM developed the online Youth Services Directory. In Nigeria, IOM field partners provided information on job opportunities and referred interested people to the nearest Migrant Resource Centres which also manage the NELEX employment website. Under EUTF, IOM Guinea developed a guide listing local opportunities and alternatives to migration. In Côte d'Ivoire, one of the IOM community facilitators was also a staff member of the National Youth Employment Agency and acted as a resource person for AR beneficiaries seeking additional information. Under the IOM X project, IOM developed the well-designed Waka Well website providing, in an engaging way, complete and useful information and advice to

potential migrants from Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Guinea, and Nigeria. The extent to which these online resources are known and actually visited/used by young people including potential migrants is unclear. A communications strategy would help make them more visible, and other means are needed to reach those among the target audience who rarely use the internet besides social media.

42% of Altai Consulting's survey respondents report having sought additional information on job opportunities, and 37% on the risks of irregular migration and on regular migration options. Among the 1 460 positive responses to this question, most are cases where additional information was sought from family or friends, neighbours or other community members. Few beneficiaries consulted community/religious leaders or looked up or visited an employment centre or migration resource centre (Figure 45). This points to the influence of the immediate social network and the fact that people rarely rely on official institutions and processes to find information or a job. Survey data also indicate that overall, beneficiaries of interpersonal AR activities more frequently sought additional information than beneficiaries of mass media communications.

Figure 45: Structures/actors respondents reached out to when seeking additional information on job opportunities

Despite a notable effort to communicate more extensively on alternatives to irregular migration, options accessible to low-skilled young people generally remain scarce. The accessibility and involvement of employment agencies and embassies is unequal across countries, making it difficult to accompany potential migrants in their search and, as indicated above, application processes are cumbersome. IPs and their partners have not yet gathered sufficient, reliable knowledge on the categories of businesses and jobs most accessible, profitable, or promising to potential migrants. Legal migration options remain few and eligibility criteria restrictive, even for the most educated.

6.6. COORDINATION

Coordination between IOM and other IPs implementing AR activities has been effective or improved in most countries. A lack of coordination with other relevant actors was observed in all countries.

▪ **Important coordination efforts were undertaken in The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Senegal, and among INTEGRA partners in Guinea**. In The Gambia, Tekki Fii partners (ITC, GIZ, IMVF, ENABEL) and IOM collaborated closely to participate in each other's campaigns, which was enabled by complementary objectives and targets, as well as the small size of the country. IOM took part in the Tekki Fii roadshow, and Tekki Fii programming-related information was conveyed by IOM's CSO partners. In Senegal, the Tekki Fii campaigns mobilise various IPs under the direct leadership of the EUD. In Guinea-Bissau, a migration working group gathering IOM, the EUD, and both EUTF and non-EUTF funded international NGOs and CSOs discusses AR and reintegration issues. In Nigeria, IOM created a similar platform named PACHTIM (Partners in Awareness Creation on Human Trafficking and Irregular Migration) led by a government institution, the National

Agency for Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons. Its members harmonised/co-created their messages, coordinated implementation plans, and initiated a country-wide migration-related AR strategy. Membership is to be extended as only one non-JI partner is active within PACHTIM. Other agencies conducting or funding AR activities or planning to do so in the coming months were not aware of the existence of the platform or of its work towards a national AR strategy.

▪ **Coordination is a work in progress in Ghana and Guinea**. Although the EUD in Ghana initiated a formal collaboration between stakeholders involved in AR activities by bringing them together on an online collaborative platform (referencing geographical areas and target groups), utilisation of the platform has not been as active as intended: While some rely heavily on it, others felt burdened by the addition of another tool. Nonetheless, all reported that the platform chat feature was useful to communicate directly with other actors. In Guinea, despite strong complementarities between IOM's and INTEGRA's AR activities, similar intervention areas, designated AR focal points, and regular meetings, actual synergies and joint activities were few, with a risk of duplicating efforts.

▪ **Little to no coordination has taken place so far among various (EUTF or non-EUTF funded) AR campaigns in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger**, which represents a missed opportunity in terms of cost-effectiveness and cross-learning.

6.7. NATIONAL OWNERSHIP, LEADERSHIP, AND SUSTAINABILITY OF PROGRAMMING

IPs established building blocks for national ownership and sustainability, engaging government ministries/agencies, migrant resource centres, local CSOs, community leaders, and local youth, women and returnee associations, artists, and journalists in design and/or implementation in all countries, to some extent; and training key actors to ensure buy-in and enable them to continue without direct IP support. IOM Côte d'Ivoire put a particular emphasis on sustainability; they worked closely with the line ministry and together co-designed the campaign, set up regional committees against irregular migration, equipped and engaged them throughout the design-to-implementation process, promoted the idea of decentralising the National Youth Employment Agency and of embedding or designating a migration focal point within its local offices, and distributed AR materials to local associations, schools, religious authorities, and other players, for them to continue disseminating messages within their networks and the general population. In Senegal, the line ministry expressed its intention to take up a stronger role and more actively steer future campaigns. Government interest and involvement at the political and technical levels have been weakest in Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, and Niger.

Stronger government leadership and funding and continuous reinforcement in the field are needed. Governments rarely played a strategic, leading role, steering the design and implementation, and obliging IPs and other actors/donors to coordinate their respective initiatives. They commit little – if any – of their own budgets to AR campaigns, besides staff time and some logistics. Among interviewed officials, even those who expressed interest and willingness to continue engaging admitted being unable to assume responsibility once project funding ceases. Yet, shifting youth aspirations and offering credible alternatives requires structural, long-term, coordinated efforts. Policy advocacy, wide-ranging partnerships, and capacity-building need to continue for increased impacts.

As of the end of 2020, few countries had a national AR policy or strategy, which could serve as a reference point for all actors and enhance national ownership and sustainability. In Burkina Faso, one of the five priority axes of the national migration strategy 2014–2025, not fully operationalised, includes AR activities, particularly on the topic of irregular migration. Besides the Nigeria AR strategy in process with EUTF/JI funding, the AECID project in Mali supported the development of a national communication, information, and AR strategy, validated in November 2019 in close collaboration with the EUD and the line Ministry. This important document includes an action plan and budget breakdown for the next three years. In Mauritania, in parallel to its AR campaign on children on the move and child protection, Save the Children supported the revision of the National Child Protection Strategy. Similar steps were not taken or documented in other countries. Interviews with key informants show that addressing irregular migration through AR activities rarely constitutes a government priority. It takes tragic events (e.g. reports on the sale of West African migrants as slaves in Libya, the shipwreck of

Gambian and Senegalese migrants in 2019 off the shores of Mauritania, and more recently near the Canary Islands) to attract public attention and raise the issue of political agendas. In some countries, especially high caseload ones, governments need to navigate between their public opinions, the political pressure from European partners, and their own interests and priorities.

6.8. MONITORING, EVALUATION, AND LEARNING

IPs' M&E indicators and systems have been inadequate to capture the quality and effectiveness of the campaigns. Logical framework and reporting indicators focus on activities and outputs rather than outcomes, impacts, sustainability, and risks[91]. The main indicator used by all IPs is the number of communities and/or people reached. No distinction is made between beneficiaries of in-person sensitisation activities at the community level and the (estimated) number of people exposed to mass media campaigns, leading to an overestimation of the actual campaign outreach and impact. This indicator may have provided a disincentive for repeat visits. The JI added another indicator on the perceived change among key informants of the community perception of migration, which can provide useful information but remains an imprecise measure of success. IOM did not report on this indicator, nor on beneficiary perceptions, knowledge, intentions, or behaviours. This points to the lack of a theory of change, a critical foundation of any development intervention that would have helped better define the campaign's objectives and how to measure them[cx]. As a result, evidence of outcomes and impacts of EUTF-supported AR campaigns are lacking across all countries and IPs. When data are missing, evidence-based programming and course correction become impossible. The learning-by-doing approach mentioned by key informants means that strategy and management decisions were made primarily based on empirical, qualitative, or anecdotal evidence.

Insufficient budget and attention were dedicated to AR M&E and learning, by both IPs and EUTF. There was no separate budget line to ensure sufficient resources would be available for AR M&E. Earmarked allocations were for non-AR specific M&E staff salaries and, for some IPs, for specific evaluations or studies, but with limited resources. Other programme components were prioritised in IPs' M&E efforts over AR; reintegration was prioritised by the JI, while INTEGRA, Tekki Fii, and the LuxDev projects prioritised training and job creation activities, even in evaluations. The only evaluation seeking to verify the relevance and effectiveness of the AR campaign was commissioned by AECID in Mali, the only project exclusively dedicated to AR. This mid-term evaluation was not able to elaborate on the campaign effectiveness and impact 'due to the inappropriate M&E indicators and the resulting lack of data'[cxi]. AECID also commissioned a review of past experiences and good AR practices in Mali – a unique initiative in the region[cxii]. The Tekki Fii, YEP, LuxDev, and JI evaluations did not include an AR component, nor did the regional JI progress reports. EUTF and EUDs did not request more data from IPs, nor did it organise any AR learning events between IPs and countries.

M&E capacities for AR were weak among IPs and their partners. This issue was raised multiple times in interviews with project managers and M&E staff. IOM county staff received some support from the regional M&E team, but this support came late. IPs relying on professional communications agencies were able to tap into their know-how to compensate for the lack of internal expertise. For instance, INTEGRA partners in Guinea tasked the Rarili agency with developing a logical framework and conducting field surveys (delayed due to COVID-19 restrictions). Similarly, the communications agency tracks Tekki Fii results in Senegal, while IOM Ghana's partner agency will be responsible for leading the 'No Place Like Home' campaign's M&E once it is fully rolled out.

Despite these important constraints, IPs – and particularly IOM – have gradually taken steps to strengthen M&E. Field implementers were asked to complete a report template after each community-based activity to convey participants' feedback and draw lessons for future activities. A few participants were also randomly selected to assess the outcome of the activity. A regionally harmonised

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[91] The AECID project in Mali is an example of logical framework indicators focused on activities and outputs rather than outcomes, impacts, sustainability, and risks. Its key monitoring and reporting indicators are the number of people and communities reached but also include the number of AR studies, plans and tools created, the number of training plans adopted, training sessions organised, and people trained, and the number of vehicles and computers given to government partners.

questionnaire was sent to country offices in late 2019, two years into implementation, and a few months before the COVID-19 crisis interrupted most field activities. Thus, little data was collected through this means. Key informants reported the following additional issues and limitations: It was difficult to retain participants after the activity to answer survey questions; data collected immediately after and by the same personnel in charge of implementation were less reliable and, thus, less useful; participants were often not available when recontacted one to two weeks later; illiterate beneficiaries did not understand some survey questions; and government and local authorities were not engaged in the exercise.

In Côte d'Ivoire, community facilitators completed 223 interviews and 90 focus group discussions with community leaders, based on which IOM analysed the results of its AR campaign. Among all 12 JI countries studied by Altai Consulting, this is the only IOM report assessing the outcomes of the AR component to date. In Cameroon, IOM commissioned an external survey among 100 beneficiaries after one year of implementation. Thanks to other, non-EUTF funding, IOM was able to conduct baseline/endline surveys, several studies and evaluations on the effectiveness of specific AR approaches, e.g. involving migrants as agents of change in their communities, organising mobile cinema events, and using social media (Facebook)[cxiii].

While there are advantages to the EUTF and JI AR approach across the region – leaving significant autonomy and flexibility to IPs and IOM country missions and encouraging local experimentations – strong M&E systems and rapid feedback loops are needed for this approach to drive results and generate learning. **This is still a work in progress**. Overall, opportunities were not sufficiently pursued. More formative/operational research and cross-learning activities are needed to address knowledge gaps and inform future campaigns. Current M&E systems and evidence are failing to answer critical questions, such as: Does AR work? What works best? What approaches are the most cost-effective? In 2020, the IOM/JI regional coordination unit took a step forward. It created the online platform, Yenna, a repository of IOM AR resources mainly known by IOM staff but accessible to professionals and the public. It contains an AR toolkit, an online course, technical guidance/tips and communications materials, as well as three research and evaluation reports. IOM reported having secured funding (non-EUTF) to maintain and expand it over the next three years.

6.9. BENEFICIARY PARTICIPATION, SATISFACTION, AND FEEDBACK

All IPs report having largely exceeded their quantitative targets 1.5 to 10-fold, although it is unclear whether this success is due to overperformance, low target setting or imprecise estimates of audience and participation. As mentioned earlier, mass media communications and large music and sports events were instrumental to reach AR targets where reporting indicators did not require counting beneficiaries of interpersonal communications separately. The EUD Senegal and its communications agency reported disaggregated data for the Tekki Fii campaign. As of mid-2019, after over two years of implementation, they estimated the number of beneficiaries of community-based events at 90 000, while viewers of the Tekki Fii TV series ranged from 700 000 to one million households, according to the popular private TV channel which broadcasted it. A poll conducted in late 2018 of 272 young people in three target regions found that half of them had heard of the campaign. In January 2020, the AECID projects reported nearly 100 000 beneficiaries in the field and around the same number through the media, against a total target of 70 000. In June 2020, the YEP social media accounts (Facebook and Twitter) reached 500 000 views, while the Tekki Fii digital campaign reached an estimated 150 000 Gambians. The JI has not reported a consolidated number of AR beneficiaries.

Over 60% of respondents who took part in an in-person AR event also reported having been exposed to mass-media migration-related AR messaging, which confirms the generally effective level of media outreach and shows that respondents have often been exposed to multiple sources of messaging (Figure 46). The main channels used were the TV, radio, and social media. Visibility was uneven: Key informants found the JI campaign particularly visible in a few countries (The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, and Mali), and low-profile in Burkina Faso and Nigeria, likely because they engaged more in community-based activities than in the media. This country categorisation matches Altai Consulting's survey results on exposure to mass media messaging[92].

Figure 46: Proportion of participants in in-person, field, AR activities also exposed to messaging through mass-media

- 576 — Was not exposed to mass-media communication
- 872 — Was exposed to mass-media communication

At the community level, incentives used by IPs to attract participants generally proved effective in boosting attendance. Respondents surveyed by Altai Consulting indicated that the main factor influencing their decision to participate was prior communication from the organisers and encouragement from friends or family members. Field implementers met by Altai Consulting unanimously indicated that it was crucial to engage community and youth leaders to inform and mobilise community members in advance. Other incentives (food, drinks, per diems) are less commonly used and influential.

Nearly all AR beneficiaries (96%) are satisfied or very satisfied with the activity/messaging and found it easy to understand and convincing (satisfaction rate in Figure 47). 96% of participants in community-based activities would also participate again if a similar activity were carried out again. There is no difference among countries or IPs, nor between in-person, field activities and media communications. These figures are consistent with IP survey data[93].

Figure 47: Satisfaction with participation in an in-person AR activity

- 2 — Very dissatisfied
- 24 — Dissatisfied
- 35 — Neutral
- 672 — Satisfied
- 709 — Very satisfied

6.10. EFFECTIVENESS

The following effectiveness analysis relies mainly on Altai Consulting's TPML survey of the beneficiaries of the JI and other IPs' AR campaigns; reference is made to IP survey data when available. Any differences between community-based, in-person activities and mass media communications are highlighted. The diversity of AR activities implemented by each IP and the survey sampling do not allow for statistically representative cross-IP and cross-country comparisons. Findings from other surveys and the broader literature are summarised in Annex 16. However, despite the growing number of AR campaigns on migration, there is still limited empirical evidence on their effectiveness. A recent IOM publication stresses that 'in the absence of reliable evidence, the debate on the potential of this policy tool often relies on largely anecdotal evidence. One common claim is that campaigns are ineffective by design, as they are built on wrong assumptions about how individuals make migration decisions. According to some critics, most migrants may be perfectly aware of the facts but accept the danger due to a lack of alternatives'; hence, campaigns are likely to have limited impact[cxiv]. The findings from the

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[92] None of the in-person, field activity participants in Burkina Faso were exposed to messaging in the media. The percentage is below the regional average in Nigeria (55%). The highest percentages are found in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali (90%), Guinea Bissau (97%), and The Gambia (100%).

[93] For example, the Tekki Fii poll found that 95% of respondents who had been exposed to the campaign found it interesting and visually engaging, and 100% found it original and convincing. In Côte d'Ivoire, community mobilisers all reported a high level of interest and engagement in the community-based events.

TPML survey contribute to building the evidence base. (Annex 14 presents the survey methodology and limitations in more detail, including possible response bias.)

6.10.1. OVERVIEW OF ALTAI CONSULTING SURVEY RESULTS

Participant satisfaction

96% of participants were happy to have participated in the AR activity

97% of participants found the AR messages convincing

Impact on knowledge

95% of participants learned something new by participating in the activity

Impact on opinions & perception

73% considered irregular migration risky **before** participating in the AR activity

56% reported an increased perception of associated risks **after** the AR activity

43% felt that work opportunities were available to them in their country, **before** participating in the AR activity

82% felt that work opportunities were available to them in their country, **after** participating in the AR activity

68% were aware of avenues for legal migration, **before** participating in the AR activity

13% perceived legal migration options as more available to them **after** the AR activity

Impact on behaviour & migration intentions

80% shared with others what they learned during the activity

37% sought additional information **after** the AR activity

44% of participants declared having taken concrete action **after** the AR activity, for instance:

Applying for a visa

Discouraging irregular migration

Starting a business

44% indicated a decreased willingness to migrate irregularly **after** the activity

8% still deemed an attempt at irregular migration likely or very likely **after** the activity

6.10.2. BENEFICIARIES' KNOWLEDGE

Slightly less than two-thirds (64%) of respondents reported not being familiar with the main topic addressed in the activity in which they took part or the communication to which they were exposed. This points to the need for and relevance of information-based AR messaging. There is no significant difference depending on the theme addressed, i.e. the risks of migrating irregularly, local job opportunities, legal migration options, or migrants' and returnees' situation and social cohesion.

Nearly all (95%) respondents reported having gained new knowledge as a result of the IP AR activity/messaging. Survey data does not indicate any difference between in-person activities and mass-media communication, nor depending on the theme or previous level of familiarity with the topic.

6.10.3. OPINIONS AND PERCEPTIONS

Survey respondents report a substantial change in their perception of risks associated with irregular migration, although three out of four were already aware of the risks. While only 25% of respondents perceived the risks to be low or very low prior to being exposed to the AR campaign/activity, 56% reported a higher perception after it (Figures 48 and 49). The number of respondents deeming such risks 'very high' increased by nearly 140%, while those deeming the risks 'very low' decreased by over 60. Those who felt the risks were 'low' or 'very low' drastically dropped from 25% to 6%. Concurrently, for those already aware of the risks, AR reinforced their opinion. This is in line with the findings of the IOM Migrants as Messengers impact evaluation in Senegal, the Waka Well KAP surveys in Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea, and qualitative reports from IOM community mobilisers in Côte d'Ivoire: 'Young people do not think it is dangerous or they are aware of the risk but not that much: they were often surprised to hear what we were explaining to them'[cxv].

Figure 48: Respondents' change of perception regarding the risks of migrating irregularly due to the activity

- Risks deemed higher: 1304
- Perception stayed the same: 863
- Risks deemed lower: 175

Figure 49: Respondents' perceived level of risks associated with irregular migration

Before participating:
- Do not know: 45
- Very high: 778
- High: 969
- Low: 442
- Very low: 154

After participating:
- Very high: 1863
- High: 374
- Low: 57
- Very low: 94

The main risks mentioned by respondents were first related to their physical integrity (illness, accident, injury, violence, detention, etc.) – mentioned by nearly all (98%) – then to the loss of money and personal belongings (69%). A similar trend was observed regarding the risks associated with using the services of a smuggler (55% reported a higher perception of that risk after the activity).

The change in beneficiaries' awareness of alternatives to irregular migration is significantly lower than the change in the perceived risk of migrating irregularly. 77% of respondents said the AR activity/message did not change their perception about the existence/accessibility of alternatives to irregular migration (Figure 50). Yet, before the activity, already 70% felt that they had other options than migrating irregularly (versus 85% after, see Figure 51). This suggests that, first, under 30% of respondents were likely to migrate irregularly prior; second, it is not easy to change the opinion of those who think there is no other option for them; and, third, positive messaging is not necessarily more effective than negative, risk-based messaging. A moderate improvement is still observed among beneficiaries who initially felt there was no alternative to irregular migration: Their proportion halved, from 30% to 14% after being exposed to AR messages.

Figure 50: Respondents' change of perception on the existence of alternatives to irregular migration

- More alternatives: 132
- As many alternatives: 412
- Less alternatives: 32

Figure 51: Respondents' perception of the existence of alternatives to irregular migration

Before participating:
- Do not know: 10
- No: 174
- Yes: 392

After participating:
- Do not know: 4
- No: 81
- Yes: 492

Respondents mentioning obtaining a visa (e.g. to Europe) as the main alternative to irregular migration were slightly more numerous than those mentioning finding a job locally (43% versus 39%). However, the proportion of those thinking that decent job opportunities are available in their country/area almost doubled after the activity (from 43% to 82%, see Figure 52). This shows that informing about and promoting local economic opportunities can be effective. AR activities also led to an increased perception of the existence of legal migration pathways, albeit to a lesser extent.

Figure 52: Respondents' perceived availability of job opportunities in their country

Category	Value 1	Value 2
Yes, available	396	762
Available but only to people who are well connected	481	299
Available but only to people with education	267	150
Available but only in a few sectors	185	172
Available but low paid	93	76
Available but none that matches my skillset/diploma	105	0
Available but I didn't know how to find one	37	57
No, no opportunities available at all	114	24
Other	5	7
Do not know	18	2

Before participating / After participating

6.10.4. INFORMATION-SHARING AND -SEEKING

Both in-person activities and mass-media communications triggered substantial information-sharing. Four out of five respondents reported having shared the information they learnt, with no marked difference between in-person and mass-media AR or dependence on the theme (i.e. risks, alternatives, etc.). Nearly all (90%) shared it within their immediate networks (family/friends), and slightly less (60%) with a neighbour or another community member. This is especially interesting as one IOM study found that participating in an open discussion with peers immediately after the activity tends to reinforce the knowledge or perception gained during the activity[cxvi]. These figures are higher than those found in other (IOM) surveys, however. Waka Well post-activity KAP surveys reported that 30% of AR beneficiaries in Côte d'Ivoire talked or will talk with relatives or friends, and 61% in Guinea. In response to the question, 'if some people tell you they want to migrate irregularly, what would you say to them?', 53% of survey participants responded that they would try to convince them that 'it is better to stay and make it here' and 40% indicated that 'they should carefully prepare their journey and weigh the risks before going'.

As previously mentioned, **over one-third of respondents sought additional information following exposure to an AR message**, slightly more on available job opportunities (42% of respondents) than on other topics (37% on average), and primarily from those relatives/friends with whom they talked (72%). Fewer reached out to official sources such as employment agencies, national/local authorities, migrant resource centres, embassies (13–25% of responses among those having sought more information).

6.10.5. MIGRATION INTENTIONS

Altai Consulting's survey data indicates that IPs' campaigns significantly reduced the intention to migrate irregularly among beneficiaries, although only 28% had considered it in the first place (Figure 53). After exposure to IPs' AR messages, this percentage drops to 8% – a percentage similar to that of returnees having received reintegration assistance (Section 4.5). No notable difference is observed between in-person activities and mass-media AR messaging. When asked directly, 44% of AR beneficiaries said they were less likely to migrate irregularly because of the activity/messaging. This effect was stronger among respondents who participated in more than one (in-person) activity.

Among beneficiary respondents who were likely or very likely to migrate irregularly, 70% changed their mind. Data suggest that AR effectiveness was highest in Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria, Mali, and Burkina Faso, and lowest in Cameroon and Ghana. In Côte d'Ivoire, where IOM documented the results of its beneficiary surveys, IOM's data indicate considerably higher AR

effectiveness than Altai Consulting's data[94]. The literature identifies a range of factors likely to explain the remaining 30% who do not change their plans: Even when the messaging was comprehensive and convincing and young people became more aware of the risks and better informed about safer alternatives, they heard conflicting information (e.g. examples of migrants who have successfully reached their intended destination), had strong hopes, believed in their fate and in themselves (e.g. they are religious or optimistic about the future), did not feel vulnerable or were risk-averse, faced strong family obligations or pressure, or still thought the benefits (personal situation, self-worth, social status, role in the family/ability to support the family, etc.) outweighed the risks.

Another important effect of IPs' campaigns was to amplify the attitude of those who were already not likely to migrate irregularly. Among all respondents, 44% were less likely to migrate irregularly after the AR messaging, while 53% reported no impact (Figure 54). Respondents reporting having gained new knowledge and/or changed perceptions are less likely to envisage migrating irregularly. This suggests that changes in knowledge and perceptions can translate into a change in migratory intentions, but it is not always the case.

Figure 53: Likelihood of respondents making an attempt at *irregular* migration

Figure 54: Evolution of the respondents' likeliness to migrate irregularly after the activity or the communication

The effect of AR campaigns appears much smaller on beneficiaries' intentions to migrate regularly (as opposed to irregularly): There is virtually no change in the proportion of respondents deeming it likely or very likely to engage in this path (30% before versus 29% after exposure to AR messages).

6.11. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ONGOING OR FUTURE AWARENESS-RAISING CAMPAIGNS

Funding, strategy setting, and coherence

Recommendations to the EU and IPs:

- Increase funding amounts and duration, and earmark funding for M&E, learning and operational research.

- Engage actively in policy advocacy for increased government leadership and budget allocation.

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[94] Altai Consulting and IOM surveyed similar activities with a similar sample size. The percentage of beneficiaries reporting that they were considering irregular migration as an option before participating in the AR activity is relatively close: 39% for IOM, and 30% for Altai Consulting. Yet, according to the IOM survey, 92% of them reconsidered their plan after the activity, against 47% according to the Altai Consulting survey. This discrepancy may be due to the above-listed issues of IOM surveys being carried out immediately after the activity (on the spot) and by the community mobilisers themselves (as a lack of independence involves a higher risk of response bias), while Altai Consulting survey data may be affected by a recall bias, although this bias is unlikely to explain the 45-percentage point difference.

- Ensure AR is combined with other initiatives aiming to create new job opportunities and improve youth employment in high departure areas, modernise national employment agencies and the TVET sector, fight human trafficking, and improve legal migration pathways and services.

- Work with other specialised organisations to conduct, update and/or make better use of local, prospective job market and youth employment sector analyses.

Evidence-based programming, M&E, and learning

Recommendations to the EU and IPs:

- Systematise – and budget for – preliminary/formative studies in key areas of departure in each country to ensure that AR approaches derive from a more robust evidence base. There is still a need for a more in-depth understanding of the local migration history/dynamics and its non-economic drivers.

- Ensure that each campaign has a well-developed theory of change explicitly defining objectives and how these will be achieved, and clearly articulating the pathways to results as well as underlying assumptions and conditions for success. This will render any AR strategy more intentional and effective. Building robust theories of change implies critically reviewing common assumptions behind AR campaigns.

- Review M&E and reporting indicators accordingly. They should provide an incentive for enhanced campaign targeting and effectiveness and should focus on outcomes/impacts, sustainability, and risks, rather than on quantitative outputs (e.g. number of beneficiaries). The definition of the indicator related to the number of people/communities reached must be refined, and should distinguish beneficiaries of community-based, in-person activities from those of media communications.

- Develop a research agenda, conduct baseline and endline surveys, comparative evaluations, and operational research more systematically, and budget for them.

- Commission a regional or cross-window evaluation of the EUTF and/or the JI AR portfolio and organise learning events with other relevant, non-EUTF partners. According to the European Commission's working group on information campaigns, between 2014 and 2019, more than 100 migration campaigns were funded by the EU and individual EU Member States, and IOM implemented AR campaigns in numerous countries and regions with other, non-EU funding[cxvii]. Few have been evaluated, documented, and disseminated. This considerable knowledge should be better utilised.

Recommendations to IOM:

- Enrich further the Yenna platform with country-level manuals and resources, and an updated communication for development toolkit for designing and implementing an AR campaign step-by-step. This would help increase and harmonise the quality of future AR campaigns. Make the online platform better known within and outside IOM.

Partnerships, national ownership, and sustainability

Recommendations to IPs:

- Advocate for government-led and locally owned national AR strategies or action plans within migration policies or other policy instruments, based on the theory of change and evidence-based design process mentioned above. They can foster political buy-in/prioritisation and enable more coordinated, harmonised efforts.

- Continue efforts to closely associate national and local authorities, schools/universities, and grassroots organisations, and more forcefully engage with employment agencies, youth and migrant associations and resource centres in the design, implementation, and monitoring of AR campaigns. Systematically develop and pre-test communications materials and messages with them. Work with key influencers to change their migration narrative.

- Continue investing in external and internal capacity-building to maximise the quality, outreach, and sustainability of AR campaigns.

Campaign design, targeting, and messaging

Recommendations to IPs:

- Refine geographic and individual targeting (identifying those most likely to migrate) through an intentional strategy and increased coordination with other actors to cover all relevant areas and all relevant primary and secondary target groups.

- Define and segment target groups more precisely, and territorialise and tailor AR strategies and messaging to the local/community context and profile of potential migrants. Young people in the various countries, in urban and rural areas, and of different age, social and education backgrounds are likely to have different motivations to migrate. Focus on activities, communications channels, and messages that are most likely to be impactful for the different target groups.

- Investigate how community dynamics and social norms influence migration decisions. Based on the findings of such formative studies, design and implement AR approaches that are not only information- and entertainment-based, but more strongly based on behaviour change and social norm theories, and more community-led. Wherever relevant, the community should play the main role in identifying the issue and driving the change.

- Try out new negative and positive messaging. Examples of negative messaging: conveying a more nuanced and realistic picture of how living in destination countries, far from home, looks/feels; and emphasising the opportunity cost of migrating irregularly (what is to be lost). Examples of more positive and rights-based messaging: providing practical advice for safe migration practices and protection measures to be taken along migration routes; and promoting (an enabling environment for) intra-regional mobility.

- Better link AR messages and beneficiaries with available jobs, educational opportunities, TVET and legal migration options. Such information should be clear, comprehensive, localised, up-to-date, and easily accessible by the different target groups, including in rural areas.

Communication channels and implementation

Recommendations to IPs:

- Continue seeking exposure of target groups to multiple, mutually reinforcing activities, communications channels, and messages. Resume placing information kiosks and posters at strategic points on migration routes.

- Leverage the power of mass media communications (TV, SMS, YouTube, etc.), social media (Facebook, WhatsApp, etc.) and local celebrities and influencers to their full advantage. Consider establishing a dedicated regional digital unit working across projects and campaigns and/or external partnerships with specialised, professional communications agencies. Avoid EU, EU Member State, and IOM branding that may be counterproductive.

- Ensure more repeated, long-term exposure of target groups to AR activities/messages. Organise follow-up activities and monitoring visits in intervention communities. Encourage and organise information-sharing.

7. ANNEXES

7.1. LIST OF ACRONYMS

AECID	Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (Spanish agency for international development cooperation)
AFD	Agence Française de Développement
AR	Awareness-Raising
ASCAD	Agence du Service Civique d'Action pour le Développement
AVRR	Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DFID	Department for International Development of the United Kingdom, renamed the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) in 2020
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
ECI	Equipe Conjointe d'Investigation
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ENABEL	Belgian Development Agency
EU	European Union
EUD	European Union Delegation
EUTF	European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTF for Africa)
GIZ	German Corporation for International Cooperation
HQ	Headquarters
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IP	Implementing Partner
ITC	International Trade Centre
JI	Joint Initiative
KAP	Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practice
LuxDev	Luxembourg Development Cooperation Agency
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MHPSS	Mental Health and Psychosocial Support
MiMOSA	Migrant Management Operational System Application
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OFII	Office Français de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration
OGLMI	Organisation Guinéenne de Lutte contre la Migration Irrégulière
ROM	Results-Oriented Monitoring
SLC	Sahel and Lake Chad

SOM	Smuggling of Migrants
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
TIP	Trafficking In Persons
TPML	Third-Party Monitoring and Learning
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
VSLA	Village Savings and Loan Association
WHO	World Health Organization

7.2. TPML ORGANISATION AND EVIDENCE BASE

7.2.1. TEAM ORGANISATION

Altai Consulting's TPML team was comprised of a regional management and oversight team supervising a team of project officers responsible for a set of countries, or for a cross-cutting theme (migration governance systems) or task (survey design and data analysis). A local research team was recruited and trained in each country to carry out the beneficiary surveys.

Altai Consulting's TPML team structure

Altai Partner / **Regional Director**	*Oversight*
Project Director	*Management & regional analysis*
Migration Governance Expert / **Country Lead #1** / **Country Lead # 2** / **Country Lead # 3** / **Country Lead # 4** / **Country Lead # 5** / **Country Lead # 6** / **Data Analyst** / **National Survey Teams**	*Country / implementation teams*

7.2.2. ORGANISATION OF THE WORK

Each TPML cycle was organised the same way across all concerned countries, as shown in the table below.

Organisation of TPML

	Inception	Data collection	Analysis & reporting
Activities	▪ Initial desk review of IPs' programme and M&E and learning documents and of contextual information ▪ Development/adaptation of the methodology and data collection tools ▪ Preparation of country missions	▪ Collection of additional documents ▪ Interviews with country- and field-level stakeholders, including EUDs, IPs, government, and beneficiaries ▪ Field observations	▪ Consolidation, cleaning, triangulation, and analysis of data collected in countries ▪ Drafting and submission of country and regional synthesis reports, integration of comments ▪ Communication of results to EUTF and country stakeholders for feedback and discussion
Where?	Desk-based	Mission in-country	Desk-based
How long?	1–2 months	1–2 months	1–2 months

7.2.3. OVERALL EVIDENCE BASE AND DATA ANALYSIS

The TPML relies and builds on the data and knowledge readily available from key informants, documents, and M&E and learning systems of the EU/EUTF, its IPs, and the IPs' own field partners and contractors in the 12 concerned countries. These data sources were complemented with a review of contextual documents, interviews with external experts, field observations, and beneficiary surveys. More specifically:

▪ *753 documents and datasets* were used: country background documents; migration policies; standard operating procedures (SOPs) related to migrants' protection, return and reintegration; programme documents, awareness-raising (AR) guidance and implementation materials and tools, progress reports, and beneficiary results databases; EU and IP monitoring, review/evaluation and learning data and documents; research and publications of EUTF IPs and other institutions. The main documents used are listed in the endnotes of this report and in individual country reports.

▪ *622 key informants* were interviewed: people in charge at the EUD and IPs in countries, as well as the regional coordination units of cross-country actions, such as the IOM Joint Initiative (JI) team in Dakar, IOM experts in Brussels and Geneva HQ, the GIZ 'Sud-Sud Coopération' project coordination team in Morocco, and the ARCHIPELAGO programme coordination team in France and Belgium; official representatives and technical teams of the EU and partner government/agencies; civil society representatives and private service providers involved in programming at the national or local level; non-EUTF funded reintegration, governance and AR project and study teams (e.g. OFII, GIZ, ICPMD, the French ANPE/Migr'Action project, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, etc); and independent experts. Country-specific key informants are listed in individual country reports (or their function or institution instead of their individual name). Key informants interviewed were informed of the purpose of the TPML and gave their consent to participate.

▪ *Field visits and observations* of project teams, transit centres, returnees' counselling and job orientation sessions, cash-for-work activities, technical and vocational trainings, job fairs, individual, collective and community-based projects, AR activities, etc. Locations of field visits and observations are listed in individual country reports.

▪ *5 881 surveys/interviews with direct and indirect beneficiaries*, including 3 634 quantitative interviews with returnees who had benefited (or not yet benefited) from IP reintegration support, focus group discussions and qualitative interviews with 50 beneficiary returnees, 2 119 beneficiaries of IP AR campaigns, and 78 community leaders and local youth associations in areas of high emigration and return and identified by interviewed returnees and IPs as key informants. The general methodology of the beneficiary surveys on return and reintegration and AR is presented below, while country specificities/details are described in individual country reports. Interviews with community representatives were used to capture their knowledge, opinions and experience related to migration, returns, reintegration and AR in their respective communities, and to complement the information collected from beneficiaries and programme and government stakeholders.

In the data analysis phase, all evidence streams were brought together to assess IP processes, delivery and results. The various data sources and data collection methods were combined to ensure complementarity and triangulation, minimise bias, and maximise the level of evidence coverage and quality. Whenever relevant and possible, disaggregation and analyses were conducted to identify trends over time, variations by country and other parameters, general patterns, and the main influencing factors. Whenever possible, performance/results and trends were quantified, and exceptions underlined. The data analysis process led to the extraction of insightful country examples, which are featured in the body of the report or in textboxes to develop or illustrate a specific point or to highlight a promising approach or good practice that can inspire other IPs and countries.

7.3. RETURNEE SURVEY PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY

7.3.1. SURVEY PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The quantitative returnee survey was used to collect information on each returnee's profile and migration history, return and reintegration experience, satisfaction and feedback on the return and reintegration assistance received, past and current economic, social, and psychosocial situation, and plans for the future, including regarding remigration. It helped assess the quality of the return and reintegration assistance provided by IPs overall, across countries and over time, the contribution of this assistance towards returnees' reintegration, the impact of the COVID-19 crisis, and the role of other exogenous factors – contextual and individual ones.

7.3.2. SURVEY TIMELINE

The timeline of the returnee surveys was aligned with the three TPML cycles. Surveys took place in August–September 2019 for Cycle 1, March 2020 for Cycle 2, and September 2020–January 2021 for Cycle 3. Some countries were surveyed only once, others two or three times, depending on the time/cycle at which they were included in the TPML. Eight countries were considered a priority for Cycle 1 already and therefore surveyed in 2019. Only four country surveys took place in early 2020 before the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated travel restrictions. In Cycle 3, the survey took place in 11 countries. Mauritania is the only country where no survey could take place.

7.3.3. SAMPLE SIZE AND COMPOSITION

A target of 300 interviews total per country was set by EUTF across the three TPML survey cycles, regardless of the number of surveys carried out in the country; when the survey had not taken place in earlier cycles, the full sample was surveyed in Cycle 3. The total number of quantitative interviews ended up being higher than targeted: 3 634. The survey universe is the total number of returnees in the region having benefited from IP support. On this basis, at a 95% confidence level, the margin of error is 2% for regional-level survey results and 6% for country-level results.

The target sample size was broken down by IP, based on the number of EUTF-funded reintegration programmes and beneficiaries in each country, in order to capture and reflect the diversity of experiences and views into the various programme activities. The graphs below show the distribution of returnee interviews by country and IP. Returnees were interviewed at different stages of the reintegration process and the sample included some returnees who did not receive any assistance and some who had received assistance a few years before the survey took place, in order to compare their situation, understand how it evolves over time, and assess the difference that IP support made in their reintegration process.

Distribution of survey respondents by country and IP

7.3.4. SAMPLING PROCESS

General approach – when the beneficiary database was available/provided to Altai Consulting

From each individual IP beneficiary database, a stratified random selection approach was taken with the aim to capture the broadest range of views and experiences while remaining representative of the overall beneficiary population. Of the total population in the database, returnees were first filtered according to the following eligibility criteria:

▪ supported by EUTF-funded IPs in 2017 or more recently, or about/planned to receive such support, and returned to their country less than five years earlier, to ensure a more accurate recall of the return and reintegration process;

▪ citizenship of the survey country (i.e. no foreigner who was repatriated to the country by mistake and therefore could not receive reintegration support in the country);

▪ adults 18 years or older at the time of the survey; and

▪ located in the main provinces of return, and in accessible and safe areas (because of logistical and security constraints).

An analysis of the remaining population eligible for the survey was conducted to determine the key characteristics of this population in terms of geographic location, enrolment status in the programmes (balance between past, present, and future beneficiaries), type of assistance received, gender, age, and vulnerability (e.g. experience with detention or identified by IOM as particularly vulnerable), and to reflect these characteristics in the stratified shortlist of potential survey respondents and in the final sample. Within the shortlist, returnees to be interviewed were randomly selected.

When a complete database of beneficiaries is unavailable

In some countries in Cycle 1 and 2 surveys, and in all countries in Cycle 3, IOM did not provide the full JI beneficiary database but, rather, a list of beneficiaries who were pre-selected by IOM and had provided their consent for the survey and a list of reintegration activities where Altai Consulting's enumerators could go to interview beneficiaries. Whenever necessary, enumerators used the snowball approach to complement these interviews and reach the target sample size: They asked survey respondents for the contact of other beneficiaries eligible for the survey and verified with them and with IOM their returnee and reintegration beneficiary status.

In such cases, the characteristics of survey respondents were tracked and the selection of subsequent respondents was continuously adjusted by survey coordinators to avoid any underrepresentation or oversampling of any of the key characteristics of interest listed above and to address any selection bias.

7.3.5. ETHICS AND DATA PROTECTION

A detailed TPML data management, protection and privacy protocol was developed by Altai Consulting for the purpose of the surveys and signed by all country survey team representatives (summary in the figure below). It was based on the EU's General Data Protection Regulation principles[cxviii] and Altai Consulting's Code of Ethics and Protection of Personal Data policy. Altai Consulting also signed a data protection and transfer agreement with the IOM regional office in Dakar.

Survey respondents were systematically informed of the independent and voluntary nature of the survey and, at both the beginning and the end of the survey, of its anonymity and confidentiality. No compensation was offered by Altai Consulting for participating in the survey. To protect the identity of respondents, the last name of respondents was not recorded during interviews. Survey data was treated confidentially, protected by a password, and not shared with IPs in any form beyond aggregated figures and percentages.

Overview of the TPML survey data management, protection, and privacy protocol

Collection
- Enumerators are trained on the ethical principles listed above.
- The data collected is adequate and relevant to the purpose of the TPML exercise. No excessive data is collected.
- Survey respondents are informed of the purpose and objective of the survey, ensured that their responses would be anonymous, and requested to provide consent before proceeding with the survey.
- No survey respondent's full name is given nor collected by the enumerator.
- Survey respondent's phone numbers are collected upon consent for future contact.
- Survey respondents are informed of their right to retract or correct their answers and are given the enumerators' phone number to be able to do so, should they wish.

Storage
- Survey data is collected through ODK collect on tablets or smartphones protected by passwords.
- Once submitted, survey data is stored in a secured server with restricted access: only Altai TPML staff has access to it.
- When downloaded from the server, the dataset is further anonymised by being split into two datasets, thus separating identifiers and answers. The subsequent datasets are stored separately on Dropbox: only TPML staff within Altai has access to the survey answers, and only the project director and data analyst have access to the identifiers.
- No hard copies of the dataset are made.

Analysis
- Collected data is used for the sole purpose of the TPML project.

Transfer & Dissemination
- Raw survey data will not be transferred to any third parties.
- In reports, analyses and results are presented in an aggregated way. It will not be possible to trace individual answers back.
- Names or identifiers of key informants interviewed are not given in any reports, only a list of institutions met is included in the annexes.
- Reports written within the scope of the TPML exercise and presenting survey results are confidential: Their dissemination is bound to the prior approval of Altai and the EU.

Retention & Destruction
- Survey data will be kept for as long as it serves the TPML exercise purposes.
- Upon request from respondents, their personal data can be deleted.
- The personal data from respondents will be completely deleted two years after collection.

7.3.6. SURVEY LIMITATIONS

The main survey limitations are listed below. It is unclear how they played out and possibly counterbalanced one another.

- *Sample size:* The pre-defined sample size was similar across countries. The statistical power of the surveys (representativeness of results) was therefore lower in high caseload countries, such as Guinea, Mali, and Nigeria.

- *Independence and randomisation:* Survey respondents were not selected by Altai Consulting entirely independently and randomly. As mentioned above, for most reintegration beneficiary surveys, IOM provided Altai Consulting with a list of beneficiaries to be surveyed. When the list was not sufficient to attain the intended sample size, Altai Consulting used the snowball approach. The selection of respondents among other EUTF IPs was independent and randomised.

- *Selection bias:* Altai Consulting could only survey returnees still in-country, reachable and willing to respond. The surveys therefore excluded those who had discontinued contact with IPs or changed their phone numbers without informing IPs (except those reached through the snowball approach), had not provided their consent for the survey, and/or had already remigrated. Moreover, for the purpose of the analysis, the surveys included a pre-defined sub-sample for the beneficiaries of psychosocial, job-counselling, TVET and micro-business start-up support. This may result in an overestimation of all-returnees' social, psychosocial and economic situations and underestimation of their willingness to remigrate.

- *Effect of the COVID-19 crisis (as a confounding factor):* The negative impact of the COVID-19 crisis may have adversely affected the survey results with respect to returnees' economic situations.

- *Response bias:* Survey respondents may have misrepresented their actual situations – positively or negatively – in the hope of receiving further assistance or to conform to what they believed the response expected from them was. As mentioned above, to mitigate this risk, enumerators were given an introductory text to be read to all respondents about the survey objectives and independence, about the confidentiality and anonymity of responses, and the fact that responses would be aggregated and analysed with the responses of all other respondents rather than individually. As part of the survey introduction, returnees were also reassured that the survey was fully voluntary and that they could skip any questions. Enumerators were trained to re-ask questions differently if they had any doubt about the respondent's answer. The survey questionnaire included 'I do not know' and 'I do not wish to answer' response options for all questions.

- *Comparison group:* The definition for reintegration, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), focuses on the absence of differences between returnees and the local population: Reintegration is 'a process that should result in the disappearance of differences in local rights and duties between returnees and their compatriots, and the equal access of returnees to services, productive assets and opportunities'[cxix]. Yet, the budget and time allocated to the surveys made it impossible to include non-returnees among survey respondents and to compare the situation of returnees with that of the general population. As described above, the comparison group is only comprised of returnees who had not benefited from reintegration assistance at the time of the survey.

7.3.7. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

TPML used IOM's own reintegration monitoring and sustainability survey tools as a basis for developing its beneficiary survey questionnaire. Some questions and response options were adjusted based on Altai Consulting's experience with such assessments and to better adapt them to the specific West African context and TPML survey purpose. Modules and questions were also added for a more in-depth analysis of some aspects of reintegration programming (e.g. the delivery and quality of psychosocial

support, job counselling and orientation, TVET and micro-business start-up support, and the feedback of beneficiaries on each type of support) and of reintegration outcomes (e.g. social reinsertion, employment situation, economic self-sufficiency and intention to remigrate at various points in time; specific contribution of reintegration assistance on these dimensions; impact of the COVID-19 crisis).

At each cycle, the survey questionnaire used in all countries was the same to allow for result aggregation and cross-country comparisons. Nevertheless, the survey questionnaire was iteratively improved for Cycle 2 and 3 surveys based on field experience and previous analyses, while maintaining comparability across cycles as much as possible. Some modules and questions were only administered at specific cycles or to specific beneficiary profiles, which explains that results do not always have the same survey universe.

7.3.8. SURVEY IMPLEMENTATION, DATA CLEANING AND ANALYSIS

The surveys were administered by experienced national enumerators in each country. Each survey team was trained for three to four days before each data collection cycle, including in-class practical exercises and field testing. Whenever possible, the same enumerators were mobilised for the three survey cycles. They were supervised and debriefed by a senior national survey coordinator and the Altai Consulting TPML country team. Data cleaning and analysis were performed in two stages, by each Altai Consulting TPML country team first, and then by the TPML data analyst.

7.4. EUTF-FUNDED ACTIONS INCLUDED IN THE TPML ANALYSIS

7.4.1. OVERVIEW

Country	Main IP	Project	EUTF project ID	EUTF funding	Start date	End date	Return and reintegration	Migration governance	Awareness-raising
Regional	IOM	IOM Joint Initiative regional top-up	REG-REG-04-03	€ 188 226 000	01/12/2017	31/05/2022	X	X	X
Burkina Faso / Regional	IOM	EU-IOM Joint Initiative	SAH-BF-04-01	€ 8 300 000	01/09/2017	31/05/2022	X	X	X
Burkina Faso / Regional	ITC	Ethical Fashion Initiative (EFI/Mode Ethique)	SAH-REG-07-01	€ 10 000 000	01/05/2017	01/05/2021	X		X
Burkina Faso / Regional	Croix Rouge / Caritas	Assistance et protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest	SAH-REG-13-01/03	€ 4 000 000	01/01/2020	31/12/2022		X	
Burkina Faso / Regional	CCI, CMA	ARCHIPELAGO	SAH-REG-15-01	€ 1 250 000	01/12/2018	01/12/2022	X		
Cameroon / Regional	IOM	EU-IOM Joint Initiative	SAH-CM-04-01	€ 3 300 000	01/06/2017	31/05/2022	X	X	X
Côte d'Ivoire / Regional	IOM	EU-IOM Joint Initiative	SAH-REG-08-01	€ 2 700 000	03/07/2017	31/05/2022	X	X	X
Côte d'Ivoire / Regional	Expertise France, GIZ	Coopération Sud-Sud en matière de migration	NOA-MA-06-01	€ 1 370 000	15/01/2019	01/12/2021		X	
Côte d'Ivoire / Regional	Expertise France	Lutte contre la traite des êtres humains, renforcement de la chaine pénale	SAH-REG-12-01	€ 4 350 000	11/01/2019	31/12/2022		X	X

| Country	Main IP	Project	EUTF project ID	EUTF funding	Start date	End date	Theme		
							Return and reintegration	Migration governance	Awareness-raising
Ghana / Regional	IOM	EU-IOM Joint Initiative	SAH-REG-08-02	€ 3 000 000	01/05/2017	31/05/2022	X	X	X
Guinea / Regional	IOM	EU-IOM Joint Initiative	SAH-REG-08-04	€ 5 400 000	05/04/2017	31/05/2022	X	X	X
Guinea	GIZ	INTEGRA – GIZ	SAH-GN-01-03	€ 10 000 000	01/01/2019	31/12/2022	X		
Guinea	ITC	INTEGRA – ITC	SAH-GN-01-01	€ 15 000 000	01/03/2019	01/08/2022	X		
Guinea	ENABEL	INTEGRA – ENABEL	SAH-GN-01-02	€ 35 000 000	01/03/2019	17/07/2022	X		
Guinea / Regional	Expertise France, GIZ	Coopération Sud-Sud en matière de migration	NOA-MA-06-01	€ 1 370 000	15/01/2019	01/12/2021		X	
Guinea / Regional	Expertise France	Lutte contre la traite des êtres humains, renforcement de la chaine pénale	SAH-REG-12-01	€ 4 350 000	11/01/2019	31/12/2022		X	X
Guinea-Bissau / Regional	IOM	EU-IOM Joint Initiative	SAH-REG-08-03	€ 2 480 000	01/07/2017	31/05/2022	X	X	X
Mali / Regional	IOM	EU-IOM Joint Initiative	SAH-ML-07-02	€ 11 800 000	17/05/2017	31/05/2022	X	X	
Mali	SNV	L'emploi des Jeunes crée des Opportunités, ici au Mali (EJOM)	SAH-ML-09-01	€ 20 000 000	09/06/2017	08/06/2021	X		
Mali / Regional	Expertise France, GIZ	Coopération Sud-Sud en matière de migration	NOA-MA-06-01	€ 1 370 000	15/01/2019	01/12/2021		X	

Country	Main IP	Project	EUTF project ID	EUTF funding	Start date	End date	Theme		
							Return and reintegration	Migration governance	Awareness-raising
Mali	AFD	Appui aux investissements de la diaspora	SAH-ML-05-01	€ 6 000 000	22/09/2016	22/09/2022		X	
Mali / Regional	Croix Rouge, Caritas	Assistance et protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest	SAH-REG-13-01/03	€ 4 000 000	01/01/2020	31/12/2022		X	
Mali	AECID	Information et sensibilisation sur les risques de la migration irrégulière et promotion de la libre circulation dans la CEDEAO	SAH-ML-07-01	€ 3 200 000	01/02/2018	01/12/2021		X	X
Mauritania / Regional	IOM	EU-IOM Joint Initiative	SAH-MR-03-01	€ 8 000 000	01/06/2017	31/05/2022	X	X	X
Mauritania	Save the Children	AFIA – Protection des enfants en mobilité	SAH-MR-02-01	€ 3 000 000	01/11/2016	31/04/2020		X	X
Niger	IOM	Mécanisme de réponse et de ressources pour les migrants (MRRM) – phase 2	SAH-NE-01-01	€ 7 000 000	04/08/2016	04/08/2019	X	X	
Niger / Regional	IOM	EU-IOM Joint Initiative / Sustainable Return from Niger (SURENI)	SAH-NE-07-01	€ 15 000 000	01/04/2017	31/05/2022	X	X	X
Niger	LuxDev	Appui à la Formation et à l'Insertion Professionnelle des Jeunes des Régions de Zinder et d'Agadez (A-FIP)	SAH-NE-04-01	€ 6 900 000	01/01/2017	14/11/2020	X		
Niger	GIZ	Projet de renforcement de la gestion durable des conséquences des flux migratoires au Niger (ProGEM)	SAH-NE-02-01	€ 6 250 000	01/01/2017	31/10/2021		X	

Country	Main IP	Project	EUTF project ID	EUTF funding	Start date	End date	Theme		
							Return and reintegration	Migration governance	Awareness-raising
Niger	FIIAPP	Equipe Conjointe d'Investigation (ECI) pour la lutte contre les réseaux criminels liés à l'immigration irrégulière, la traite des êtres humains et le trafic des migrants	SAH-NE-05-01	€ 6 000 000	01/01/2017	30/11/2022		X	
Niger	CIVIPOL, AFD	Projet d'Appui à la Justice, Sécurité et à la Gestion des Frontières au Niger (AJUSEN)	SAH-NE-06-02/03	€ 10 000 000	01/01/2017	30/04/2021		X	
Niger / Regional	Croix Rouge, Caritas	Assistance et protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest	SAH-REG-13-01/03	€ 4 000 000	01/01/2020	31/12/2022		X	
Niger	SNV, ENABEL, MAECI	Projet de création d'emplois et d'opportunités économiques à travers une gestion durable de l'environnement dans les zones de transit et départ au Niger	SAH-NE-11-01/03	€ 30 000 000	01/01/2019	31/12/2021	X		
Niger	HACP	Plan d'Actions à Impact Economique Rapide à Agadez (PAIERA)	SAH-NE-08-01	€ 8 000 000	15/03/2017	15/03/2020		X	
Nigeria / Regional	IOM	EU-IOM Joint Initiative	SAH-NG-04-01	€ 15 500 000	13/04/2017	31/05/2022	X	X	X
Nigeria / Regional	Expertise France	Lutte contre la traite des êtres humains, renforcement de la chaine pénale	SAH-REG-12-01	€ 4 350 000	11/01/2019	31/12/2022		X	X
Senegal / Regional	IOM	EU-IOM Joint Initiative	SAH-SN-06-01	€ 7 000 000	13/06/2017	31/05/2022	X	X	X

Country	Main IP	Project	EUTF project ID	EUTF funding	Start date	End date	Theme		
							Return and reintegration	Migration governance	Awareness-raising
Senegal	LuxDev	Développer l'Emploi par la Formation et l'Intégration (DEFI): Formation professionnelle et insertion des jeunes	SAH-SN-04-02	€ 19 000 000	01/09/2016	30/06/2021	X		
Senegal	DUE	Communication 'Réussir au Sénégal' (Tekki Fii)	SAH-SN-04-04	€ 1 000 000	01/01/2017	31/12/2020			X
Senegal	AECID, AICS	Projet d'Appui à la Réduction de la Migration à travers la Création d'Emplois Ruraux au Sénégal (PACERSEN)	SAH-SN-05-01	€ 20 000 000	19/12/2016	19/09/2021	X		
Senegal	AECID	Renforcement de la gouvernance inclusive de la migration au Sénégal en vue d'améliorer la synergie Migration et Développement	SAH-SN-06-03	€ 9 500 000	01/12/2017	01/12/2021		X	
Senegal	ENABEL	Projet d'appui à la réduction de l'émigration rurale et à la réintégration dans le bassin arachidier par le développement d'une économie rurale sur base des périmètres irrigués (PARERBA)	SAH-SN-08-01	€ 14 300 000	01/07/2017	30/06/2022	X		
Senegal / Regional	SEQUA, CMA 29	ARCHIPELAGO	SAH-REG-15-01	€ 1 250 000	01/05/2019	01/12/2022	X		
Senegal / Regional	IOM	IOM JI Regional Office – Migration Governance & Diaspora	SAH-SN-06-04	€ 1 400 000	01/01/2017	31/12/2018		X	
The Gambia	IOM	EU-IOM Joint Initiative	SAH-GM-02-01	€ 3 900 000	14/03/2017	31/05/2022	X	X	X

Country	Main IP	Project	EUTF project ID	EUTF funding	Start date	End date	Theme		
							Return and reintegration	Migration governance	Awareness-raising
The Gambia	ITC	Youth Empowerment Project (YEP)	SAH-GM-01-01	€ 11 000 000	01/05/2017	30/10/2022	X		X
The Gambia	ITC, GIZ	Tekki Fii (Make it in The Gambia)	SAH-GM-03-01/04	€ 23 000 000	01/01/2019	30/11/2021	X		X
The Gambia / Regional	Croix Rouge, Save the Children	Assistance et protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest	SAH-REG-13-01	€ 4 000 000	01/01/2020	31/12/2022		X	

7.4.2. PROJECTS' TIMEFRAME/MATURITY*

* The width of each strip varies depending on the budget of each action.

7.5. IOM's integrated approach to reintegration

According to the IOM Framework for Assisted Return and Reintegration, the factors affecting the reintegration process and subsequently its sustainability are often similar to those that resulted in the decision to migrate in the first place. They can be economic, social and/or psychosocial, and are specific to the individual returnees, the communities to which they return, and the contextual/structural environment.

Considering the complexity of reintegration, achieving sustainability requires the adoption of an integrated approach that addresses the needs of individual returnees as well as the communities in a mutually beneficial way while responding to structural factors at play. Accordingly, reintegration interventions should seek to enable returnees to reach levels of economic self-sufficiency, social stability within their communities, and psychosocial well-being that allow them to cope with (re)migration drivers.

Conceptual model for IOM's integrated approach to reintegration

Source: Framework for Assisted Return and Reintegration, IOM, 2018

7.6. PROGRESS IN THE PROVISION OF REINTEGRATION ASSISTANCE BY IOM AS OF 31 JULY 2020

	Active caseload having at least started the reintegration process	Returnees assisted with economic support	% of total active caseload having at least started the process	Returnees assisted with social support	% of total active caseload having at least started the process	Returnees assisted with psycho-social support	% of total active caseload having at least started the process	Returnees having completed reintegration process	% of total active caseload having at least started the process
Burkina Faso	1 984	1 583	80%	360	18%	1 339	67%	859	43%
Cameroon	2 795	2 515	90%	149	5%	210	8%	2 069	74%
Côte d'Ivoire	3 265	2 760	85%	1 185	36%	1 109	34%	2 226	68%
The Gambia	3 583	3 435	96%	668	19%	653	18%	3 312	92%
Ghana	939	474	50%	112	12%	807	86%	393	42%
Guinea	6 067	5 180	85%	762	13%	1 074	18%	4 707	78%
Guinea-Bissau	694	403	58%	275	40%	316	46%	286	41%
Mali	11 111	10 131	91%	1 983	18%	708	6%	4 803	43%
Mauritania	17	17	100%	6	35%	-	0%	14	82%
Niger	785	415	53%	6	1%	1	0%	240	31%
Nigeria	11 474	10 918	95%	1 078	9%	1 295	11%	6 741	59%
Senegal	3 222	3 123	97%	278	9%	2 815	87%	1 406	44%
Total (12 countries)	**45 936**	**40 954**	**89%**	**6 862**	**15%**	**10 327**	**22%**	**27 056**	**59%**

Source: EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration, Fourth biannual regional reintegration report, IOM, February 2021

7.7. IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON RETURNEE REINTEGRATION AND IMPLEMENTING PARTNER PROGRAMMING

	Impacts of the COVID-19 crisis	Programming adaptations
On IOM and other IPs	*IOM:* ▪ Less or no returns to be organised ▪ More migrants in transit or preparing to return who are stranded in transit centres, and for a long period of time ▪ Increased pressure on staff *IOM and other IPs and their partners in countries-of-origin:* ▪ Offices closed most of the time, staff working from home, some international staff members returned to their home countries ▪ Lower staff availability to communicate with/respond to returnees ▪ Collaboration with partners and suppliers slowed down, in-person meetings were interrupted ▪ Transportation to the field stopped, especially outside the capitals	*IOM:* ▪ Provision by IOM of increased psychosocial support and of COVID-19 related health supplies and AR messaging to migrants stranded in transit centres ▪ Political dialogue and logistical arrangements organised to open humanitarian corridors ▪ Rapid situation and needs survey conducted by IOM by phone in March–April 2020 to 1 169 reintegration beneficiaries in 11 JI countries (at least 100 respondents in each country) ▪ Closure of schools, markets, and partners' offices negatively affected the post-arrival and reintegration assistance provided to returnees in terms of schooling, provision of social and psychosocial support, etc. ▪ MHPSS was conducted mostly by phone ▪ Provision of one-off, humanitarian cash transfers to returnees in five countries ▪ In three countries (during the reporting), provision of part of the reintegration assistance to returnees starting the reintegration process in the form of cash instead of in-kind ▪ Shifting to more individual microbusinesses as opposed to collective and community-based ones *All IPs and their partners:* ▪ Counselling and job orientation were paused, organised in smaller groups, or conducted on a one-on-one basis ▪ Trainings were postponed or interrupted due to the closure of venues ▪ Procurement delays of in-kind assistance due to the closure of offices, businesses, and markets ▪ Delivery of supplies and services to returnees was disrupted by restrictions on movements and gatherings
On migrants and their dependents	▪ Migrants stranded or in transit along migration routes were unable to pursue their journeys or to return to their countries-of-origin, some accommodated in transit centres for an unusually long period of time, with psychosocial consequences ▪ Migrants who already returned were less able to continue their journey back to their communities/final destinations and to find employment opportunities upon their return ▪ For returnees with businesses already in place: the business slowed down or stopped, income decreased, savings (if any) were depleted and/or they reached out to support networks or IPs for help ▪ Operation of collective and community-based projects were disrupted by restrictions on transportation and movements ▪ Increased household expenditure due to rising prices of goods and services	

and interruption of school feeding and other social protection programmes ▪ 85% of the beneficiary returnees surveyed by IOM reported that their financial situations were worse compared to the period before the COVID-19 outbreak	▪ Beneficiary field monitoring was interrupted; monitoring was mostly conducted by phone

Sources: document review and interviews with programme stakeholders. See individual TPML country reports for more details.

7.8. MAIN OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE REFERRALS

1. There have been *few EUTF-funded IPs, employment agencies, government programmes for youth, TVET and employment, and other suitable projects, to which IOM could refer returnees*.

2. When such projects existed, there were practical/operational hurdles such as those outlined below.

   a. *Communication and coordination* between IPs, between departments within EUDs, and with other donors/projects require dedicated time and resources while programmes that are busy with implementation may not always have the time needed.

   b. *Geographic constraints and mismatch between employment programmes and returnees' preferences*: Job creation programmes may not operate in the main regions of return and they tend to focus on rural areas and the agricultural sector while many returnees resettle in urban areas and are interested in other sectors.

   c. *Discrepancies between returnee profiles and IP selection criteria/requirements* (skills/diplomas, identification documents, literacy level, etc.): Returnees do not always meet IP selection criteria.

   d. *Timing issues*: Projects start at different times or progress at a different pace.

   e. *Lack of available information on/mapping of other agencies*: Up-to-date knowledge on the local economic context, job market and existing actors/initiatives for referral opportunities is not consistently available among IPs.

   f. *Short funding cycles*: The JI and many other EUTF projects were conceived as (relatively) short-term interventions. Most projects have been extended, sometimes several times, and often at the last minute. This did not give IPs the *visibility and continuity* needed to dedicate resources, seek referral opportunities, and establish effective mechanisms.

   g. *Limited capacity* of certain potential partners: There is a need to build capacities before initiating referrals.

3. *The way IOM's data protection policy has been interpreted and/or implemented* made it difficult for country missions to share information related to migrants with other organisations for referral purposes. The policy requires that IOM staff i) obtains the consent of migrants when they collect their personal data and informs them of how the data will be used and with whom they will be shared, and ii) signs an 'agreement on the transfer of personal data' with the recipient institution, delineating precisely how this data shall be handled and used. Finding a common ground between IOM and other organisations on the clauses of the agreement was reported as a challenge in several countries. Moreover, some IOM country missions that reported having sought approval from their management or from the regional or HQ offices, especially the Office of Legal Affairs and the Migrant Assistance Division, experienced a slow process and highlighted the bottleneck it created. Lastly, IOM's policy recommends that 'transfer to all foreseeable third parties be anticipated prior to data collection'[cxx], but this does not seem to have been achieved.

4. There is a *lack of a mutual understanding/common vision* on what reaching the quotas would involve in practice, and what effective referral mechanisms would look like, from both the perspective of programme managers and of beneficiaries. The characteristics of, and preconditions for, referrals were not outlined as part of the project design phase: Discussions started at a later stage, notably because IOM and other IP proposals were developed separately (and at different times), or because the quota and referral requirements were not set sufficiently in advance by EUTF or without enough consultation with and buy-in from IPs and EUDs. Yet, developing referral mechanisms involves reconciling organisational and practical constraints and creating new procedures, which takes time.

5. *Lack of a system in place for IOM to monitor returnees* after their referral to other IPs.

6. Most interviewed IPs and EUDs reported that the *returnee quotas were set arbitrarily and are perceived as difficult or impossible to achieve*; as a result, they are not always taken seriously or prioritised by the concerned parties.

7. Risk associated with *EUTF's funding window approach* whereby significant flexibility is given to grantees to design and implement their own intervention strategies results in less opportunity or incentive to programme jointly or coordinate with each other.

7.9. CONTRIBUTION OF JOB CREATION AND YOUTH EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMMES TO THE EUTF MIGRATION AGENDA

In certain countries and contexts, job creation and youth employment programmes can meaningfully contribute to and complement reintegration and other migration related programmes (AR campaigns, labour migration, fight against smuggling and human trafficking, etc.). Socioeconomic and infrastructure projects coupled with large-scale vocational training, job creation and entrepreneurship promotion initiatives address some of the main drivers of irregular migration and therefore may help reduce migration flows in the long-term, if implemented at large scale, in the main areas of current and future emigration, and in a well-coordinated and sustained effort. When they also cover the main areas of return (which sometimes differ from the main emigration areas), they can provide economic reintegration opportunities for returnees and address some of the structural obstacles constraining the viability and sustainability of their reintegration plans. For example, the Kayes region is the main area of irregular migration in Mali and the second area of return. Significant efforts (sensitisation campaigns and reintegration programming) are concentrated there. Job market dynamics and absorption capacity are considered principal causes of irregular migration in this region and in the country as a whole, while the lack of basic infrastructure (roads, electricity, communication networks, etc.) and of a conducive business environment was reported by IP staff and returnees as key bottlenecks for reintegration projects, notably in the agricultural sector and in trade and retail.[cxxi] The EU-IOM JI and other AVRR programmes can provide opportunities for the other EUTF-funded IPs and similar job creation and local development programmes: Many returnees gain specific/new skills and resilience during their migration experience, and returnee reintegration (entrepreneurship) projects can contribute to local employment and socioeconomic development objectives.

However, in several countries such as Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria and Mali, most migrants do not come from the most economically vulnerable areas. In those countries, other, non-economic drivers contribute to migration, and linking employment programmes with migration and reintegration objectives/initiatives may have little benefits and lead to unsuccessful referral mechanisms and to the real target of youth employment initiatives being missed.

EUTF-funded actions are part of a broader development aid ecosystem that offers additional opportunities and positive externalities for reintegration and other migration programmes. Programmes, such as INTEGRA in Guinea, EJOM in Mali and YEP in The Gambia, contribute to the broader objective of transforming the West African economy through the development of a more diversified and productive private sector capable of employing youth. The EU, other multilateral and bilateral donors, and the private sector fund similar types of programmes in all 12 countries, in alignment with and support of national development plans. Guinea and Niger, for example, adopted their new National Economic and Social Development Plan in 2017 and each received donor commitments worth over EUR 20 billion from the World Bank Group, African Development Bank, EU, Islamic Development Bank and others. The international and local private sector is financially involved in various sectors, primarily in energy, infrastructure, and mining.

Creating and strengthening linkages between socioeconomic and employment initiatives, as well as on migration and reintegration programmes, is not only justified from a strategic perspective; it is also a political commitment. Promoting synergies and mutual reinforcement between migration and development is a government objective in many of the national migration policies and strategies in the region. At the regional and global levels, it is also part of the Joint Valletta Action Plan, the Rabat Process, and the Global Compact for Migration. In the short- and long-term, it serves the mutual interests of both countries-of-origin and countries-of-destination.

The EUTF-funded socioeconomic development and youth employment initiatives studied in the SLC countries are not typically designed in a way that maximises their contribution to migration and reintegration objectives. This would require a detailed, localised, and regularly updated analysis of the economic context, of prospects on the job market, and of related government- and donor-supported programmes and private investments. It would also require functional coordination mechanisms beyond those typically established for the specific purpose of individual EUTF-funded

actions and other donor-funded projects, and with a broader membership. More largely, the high level of interconnectivity between the various drivers of migration in West Africa calls for better integration of stability and security issues into development policies, as well as an enhanced dialogue with other donors and the private sector to address more effectively the root causes of migration – which also are key determinants of reintegration.

Furthermore, the duration, scope, scale and geographic targeting of economic development and job creation programmes are not always adequate to spur a transformational change and make a sustainable difference for target groups, including potential migrants and returnees. EUTF funding cycles are short in view of the ambitious programme objectives. In most cases, intervention packages are incomplete. Working with, through or for national vocational training and employment agencies as well as medium or large enterprises is not common practice. The duration of technical and vocational education and training (TVET) and the intensity of post-training follow-up support and mentoring are limited. Financial support is modest and the strategy of leveraging additional funding through collaboration with banks and microfinance institutions is, in most projects, still in its infancy. Engagement in upstream, structural support and capacity-building is often insufficient. Spatial reach is limited. Project timelines and geographic and beneficiary targeting do not coincide well with those of reintegration and other migration programmes.[cxxii]

7.10. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES/RISKS OF COMMUNITY-BASED PROJECTS

The advantages and challenges/risks listed below are based on interviews with programme staff, their field partners, national counterparts, community leaders and beneficiaries in the concerned countries, as well as the IOM mid-term evaluation of the JI reintegration programming in the SLC region 2020, the IOM Reintegration Handbook 2019, and IP progress reports.

Main advantages:

1. Community-based projects allow for larger-scale projects to be implemented: The pooling of resources and economies of scale enabled through community-based (and collective) reintegration projects can lead to better opportunities and more viable microbusinesses.

2. Social control among project participants can contribute to better project governance and sustainability (e.g. group pressure makes it harder for one returnee to sell the in-kind equipment provided by IPs, as several people rely on it). A local committee or authority is sometimes involved in the project identification and preparation phase, in its management (when the project size requires it, such as in the two large community-based projects being set up in Nigeria), which can improve project management and outcomes for all. Social cohesion and control and shared interests can help keep returnees in their communities.

3. Returnees are not singled out from the host community. Host communities and their members also benefit from and own and support the project. Therefore, more people benefit from external, economic support, and the relationships between returnees and host communities is improved. This is a more equitable approach towards those who did not migrate or are not eligible for IP reintegration assistance (due to their age, country-of-emigration, date of return etc.), avoids frustrations, reduces the risk of tension between them, and decreases the risk of stigmatisation of returnees. IOM is not seen as favouring those who migrated irregularly over others, and social cohesion and networks are fostered.

4. IP economic assistance contributes more directly to the development of the whole community of departure/return in a more inclusive manner and responds to local development needs, in line with local and national government priorities.

5. Returnees have the opportunity to share their migration experience with others, which can advance awareness of the risks associated with irregular migration and understanding among community members of returnees' experiences and situations. By sharing their experiences, returnees contribute to preventing irregular migration.

Main challenges and risks:

From the perspective of the returnees:

1. There is a low level of interest in collective and community-based projects compared to individual projects: Not all returnees are willing to team up with others and be dependent on them for their livelihood; returnees tend to prioritise individual economic self-sufficiency goals over collective engagement and benefits.

2. There is an uneven level of involvement. Group dynamics and trust issues may create tensions among project participants.

3. Returnees see the project/assistance as 'theirs' and, consequently, may not involve/treat community members equally.

4. Collective and community-based projects take time to yield benefits, while returnees have immediate needs to meet and few resources readily available.

5. The project may not result in enough revenue to constitute a sufficient income-generating activity for all participants. Overall, community-based (and collective) projects tend to perform less well than individual ones (although more time may be needed to assess their economic and financial performance).

6. Tensions can also arise around the allocation of revenues among participants or when the landowner claims part of the revenues.

7. Several agriculture projects have faced difficult situations (e.g. land tenure issues, logistical hurdles, crop diseases, climate-related events, lower yield and sales than expected, and market price fluctuations).

8. Collective and community-based projects force returnees to stay in the same geographic areas while their interests (personal, family, economic, etc.) and opportunities may require geographic mobility, or may force them to move to another location that is not convenient for them.

From a programme management perspective:

1. There may be challenges finding/grouping returnees located in the same geographic areas who are also willing and able to work together on the same project/sector towards shared financial interests.

2. Community-based projects require a solid group formation process and facilitation skills, available information on (or regularly updated mapping of) existing projects or project opportunities, involvement of the local authorities and community, a reliable feasibility assessment, etc. This involves competencies, time and resources which may not be available, especially in high caseload contexts.

3. Some contexts may not be conducive to community-based projects: Participants need to be relatively stable geographically and have complementary skills, micro-business opportunities need to be available and sufficiently profitable for several beneficiaries, etc.

4. Community-based projects often entail higher investment, management, and transaction costs. The JI budget per beneficiary did not factor these nor include extra funds for non-returnee beneficiaries. Non-returnee beneficiaries are also not part of the JI results indicators to be reported to the EUTF.

5. There is a risk of low sustainability of economic reintegration: attrition of project participants (e.g. if they formed a group just to please the IP, do not get along well, or wish to use the support for other purposes), low economic viability, split groups, and discontinued projects.

For the host community:

1. There may be tension around and favouritism in the selection of community members participating in the project. The selection process and criteria need to be transparently communicated, well in advance, and actively involve local authorities/leaders. The process needs to be public or to involve public deliberations.

2. There can be a reluctance to see returnees coming from outside the community benefiting from a project designed for the local population (as returnee participants are not always locals).

3. There is a risk of tension along ethnic lines.

7.11. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES/RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH CASH ASSISTANCE, AND POSSIBLE MITIGATION MEASURES

In the past decade, cash and vouchers have been increasingly integrated into humanitarian assistance packages and supported by recent research, although debates remain within the humanitarian community regarding the advantage-risk relationship[cxxiii]. In the specific context of reintegration programming, the main advantages of cash are outlined below.

Main advantages

From the perspective of the beneficiaries:

1. Returnees generally prefer cash over in-kind grants.

2. Cash is a more immediate and timely form of aid than in-kind support, which is generally delivered after the TVET, business plan and IP procurement process are complete. This is needed because of the economic situation and social obligations of returnees upon their arrival in their country.

3. Cash can be used by beneficiaries for various purposes; therefore, it is more relevant to the diversity and multiplicity of returnee needs and with more flexibility as their needs and priorities evolve over time.

4. Cash can be used to pursue several income-generating activities concurrently, diversify potential sources of income, mitigate risks of failure, and build resilience to external shocks.

5. Cash empowers returnees, as it increases their autonomy and gives them a greater sense of responsibility.

From a programme management perspective:

1. Cash is better aligned with the JI principles of a people-centred, needs-based, tailored, and flexible approach to reintegration.

2. Cash allows for a quicker release to high numbers of returnees (as there is not a need to go through procurement and logistics processes, etc.) and it is more efficient (reduces management and transaction costs).

3. Cash increases flexibility. It can be used in a temporary, limited and targeted manner until other, longer-term economic reintegration support/activities become available or before their project/business starts yielding benefits. It can also be used as a form of additional support at a later stage, for particularly vulnerable returnees or innovative/promising microbusinesses.

4. Cash limits IP exposure to risks (and complaints from beneficiaries) due to the timeliness and quality of in-kind support reported by both interviewed programme/cash managers and beneficiaries.

5. Cash provides an opportunity to build partnerships with financial institutions (mobile money services, banks, microfinance institutions, etc.) and can be combined easily with other forms of economic/financial assistance. There is an opportunity to use card payment systems and mobile money, which make it easier to track beneficiaries and financial flows and they can be combined with microfinance, banking, and other services.

6. Cash addresses one of the possible reasons for the lack of interest and motivation of some returnees to participate in the reintegration programme.

7. Cash can help redirect monitoring and reporting efforts to the outcome level (i.e. effectiveness and sustainability of reintegration) as opposed to the outputs (i.e. verification of the purchase/delivery/use of the equipment, and number of reintegration beneficiaries)

Main challenges/risks and possible mitigation measures:

1. There is a risk that beneficiary returnees will prioritise their short-term needs, which do not contribute to their longer-term reintegration objectives. This could include a new attempt at migrating irregularly, although other forms of support do not necessarily reduce this risk. Possible approaches and mitigation measures:

    a. Offer cash support among, or combined with other, more sustainable forms of economic support.

    b. Refine profiling and risk assessment during the post-arrival interview, and adapt the form of financial assistance accordingly.

    c. Determine eligibility criteria, amounts, and/or instalments carefully to reduce risks. Consider conditioning the next cash instalment to the appropriate and verified use of the previous instalment.

2. It is more difficult to monitor the adequate utilisation of the support through direct observation.

    a. Conduct phone surveys and field visits post-distribution and at a later stage.

    b. Provide beneficiaries with information, counselling, and advice prior to the delivery of the cash grant and, if possible, have developed a well-thought utilisation plan.

    c. Seek to develop a relationship of accountability and trust between the beneficiaries and the IPs/case manager.

3. There is a risk of corruption/diversion/theft as well as a risk to beneficiary safety, especially if the cash grant is delivered through bank transfers to someone other than the intended, final recipient.

    a. Use mobile money to reduce this risk, where such services exist and are easy for beneficiaries to use them.

7.12. Challenges and limitations of IOM's reintegration monitoring surveys

- *Operational challenges:* Standardised survey questionnaires ensure the quality and comparability of data across countries and over time; yet, this approach limits the possibility to adjust the survey indicators and questions over time and to tailor them to the local context and programming. Contacting returnees by phone proved difficult and time-consuming. As the surveys are subject to IOM's data protection policy and some of the surveys are integrated into IOM's system[95], MiMOSA, its implementation and data entry cannot be easily subcontracted to consultants or external partners. Moreover, IOM reports that finding good local consultants proved challenging. Yet, IOM M&E staff and staff time are limited.

- *Methodology and process:* The survey methodology does not foresee a comparison of migrants' situations at different stages of the process (before migrating, immediately upon return, later before reintegration assistance starts, after the full assistance has been received, and sometime later) or on the basis of the different types and level of assistance they receive. Yet, this type of comparison is necessary to assess the various impacts of reintegration assistance. The reliability of data is affected by surveys being mainly administered by phone, and not independently from IOM, which creates selection and reporting bias[96]. Moreover, data analysis has been primarily conducted at regional and HQ levels, which creates long feedback loops in field programming. Country staff expressed the need for more training so they can use the data and benefit more from the surveys.

- *Data analysis and interpretation:* The design of the reintegration monitoring and sustainability surveys and the data analysis do not fully capture the diversity of programming environments and approaches at the country and beneficiary levels. This makes it difficult to compare the situations of returnees in different contexts (social background and education, migration experience, time since return, geographic location/setting, family situation, etc.), having received different reintegration support (e.g. individual, collective and community-based, and with/without TVET and business skills training), and to compare across profiles and countries[97]. Regarding reintegration sustainability, the survey questions and scoring system measure a number of external conditions and factors that are neither related to what reintegration programming aims to achieve nor to the dimensions of the beneficiaries' living environment that can be directly or indirectly influenced by IOM's programming[98]. These questions are not easy to understand for returnees and generate results that are not useful for programming. Inversely, the survey and data analysis have not, so far, adequately assessed important aspects, such as beneficiaries' income/revenues and the viability/sustainability of reintegration projects, especially of microbusinesses sponsored by the JI[99].

- *Accountability, ownership and dissemination:* The surveys provide insufficient opportunities for returnee consultation and feedback, and are not used by IOM as a reporting and accountability mechanism to beneficiaries and governments, thus hindering IOM's responsiveness with respect to the accountability to affected populations agenda. Government and field partners regret not being

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[95] IOM also uses Kobo for data collection, which can be made accessible to consultants and external partners.

[96] This risk was highlighted by country staff and mentioned in IOM's fourth biannual reintegration report for the JI, in relation to some satisfaction data that appeared unrealistically high in a few countries. See the next chapter comparing IOM survey data with that of Altai Consulting.

[97] The recent integration of the surveys in MiMOSA is a first step in this direction as MiMOSA is designed to record information on beneficiaries' profiles and the reintegration services they received. There are also contextual differences, individual ambitions, cultural differences, socioeconomic contexts, various levels of individual motivation and skills, etc. that influence the effectiveness of IOM's/IPs' support and the success of reintegration. Measuring these critical factors and including them into the analysis would require more in-depth surveys, additional qualitative data collection methods, and field research.

[98] Examples: cost of food items, access to water and sanitation, access to a justice system, perception of law enforcement, perception of the standard of housing, access to education and to identification documents in the community, etc. The same issue is highlighted in Itad's report: Methodological report for the impact evaluation of IOM's reintegration assistance in the Horn of Africa region, 2020.

[99] IOM reports that an adapted version of the reintegration monitoring survey questionnaire used during the COVID-19 pandemic better captured some of these aspects, in particular, whether the microbusiness was still operating at the time of the survey, whether the income was sufficient to support beneficiaries, and whether they were better off compared to before receiving assistance and before the COVID-19 pandemic.

involved in the survey design, implementation, and data analysis process, and wish results were more regularly presented to them so that their collaboration would be more effective, IOM would be more accountable for the results, and the programme would be more impactful overall. Governments feel limited ownership and leadership – a key principle of the JI. Two good practices were identified at the country level. In Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria, aggregated results were presented to government partners. In Nigeria, a multi-stakeholder M&E expert team was established to increase partners' engagement in the process and facilitate the dissemination of results. At the regional level, some results were published as part of the JI biannual reintegration reports. Yet, they remain limited to a few indicators: mainly the beneficiary satisfaction rate and, in one report, aggregated sustainability reintegration scores and intention to remigrate.

7.13. Methodology for the mapping of governance projects

The list of projects considered key potential contributors to strengthen migration governance in the SLC region was established by EUTF and EUDs (see projects included in the scope of TPML in Annex 4). Border management projects were not included in the list for this budget analysis because they were assessed to relate less directly to migration governance. Other projects may have been excluded if they did not include a strong migration governance component or were not advanced enough.

TPML assessed the approximate proportion of the budget for each project dedicated to migration governance and, within this, the main thematic area of focus. For most projects, budgets disaggregated by activity could be used. For example, for typical JI country-level activities, TPML added all budget lines dedicated to the drafting and dissemination of SOPs on reintegration, the support to any coordination group, capacity-building workshops for government and CSO actors on reintegration, the construction/rehabilitation of any transit centre, and any workshop for statistical authorities. These amounts were mapped as contributing to 'migration governance' as a whole and, more precisely, the first three activities were classified as mostly related to 'governance of return and reintegration', the fourth to 'governance/protection', and the last one to 'governance/migration data'. In cases where no disaggregated budgets were available, TPML made realistic estimations based on the qualitative description of project activities in the EUTF Description of Action documents.

Amounts included in the analysis exclude co-funding (non-EUTF funding) as well as informal capacity-building that occurs when learning-by-doing. Such informal capacity-building cannot be quantified consistently across projects nor monetised.

In the case of multi-country projects for which only an overall budget was available, the disaggregation by country was done by assuming that each country had received approximately the same budget. For example, for a regional project active in four countries, each country would be allocated 25% of the funding of the regional project.

7.14. METHODOLOGY OF THE AWARENESS-RAISING BENEFICIARY SURVEY

7.14.1. SURVEY PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The quantitative survey on AR was used to collect information on the profile of beneficiaries of various types of AR activities, their main sources of information in general and in relation to migration in particular, on their experience and feedback on the activities in which they have participated or to which they have been exposed, and on the way their migration-related knowledge, attitudes, behaviours and intentions have evolved as a result of the AR campaign to which they have been exposed. It helped assess the relevance and effectiveness of EUTF-funded AR campaigns.

7.14.2. SURVEY TIMELINE

The surveys took place in TPML Cycles 2 and 3 (February–March 2020 and September–December 2020). The Gambia, Guinea and Nigeria were surveyed twice (i.e. in both cycles) while the other countries were surveyed only once. No survey took place in Mauritania because of the COVID-19 situation in the country at the time that the survey was planned, and in Niger because the main target group of AR activities, transit migrants, did not correspond to the focus of the TPML analysis.

7.14.3. SAMPLE SIZE AND COMPOSITION

EUTF set a target of 200 interviews total per country across Cycles 2 and 3, regardless of the number of surveys carried out in the country: When the survey had not taken place in Cycle 2, the full sample was surveyed in Cycle 3. The total number of quantitative interviews conducted by Altai Consulting amounts to 2 069. The survey universe is the total number of people who participated in or were exposed to IPs' AR activities in the region. This number is reported by a few IPs only, based on broad estimations. It is therefore impossible to estimate the statistical representativeness of survey results.

Whenever possible, the target sample size in each country was broken down by IP based on the number of EUTF-funded reintegration programmes and beneficiaries, in order to capture and reflect the diversity of experience and views in the various AR activities. The graph below shows the distribution of returnee interviews by country, IP, and survey cycle. As part of the Cycle 2 AR survey covering Guinea, Nigeria, and The Gambia, 332 respondents were interviewed[100]. In Cycle 3, 1 737 respondents were interviewed in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal.

Some respondents had been exposed to an AR activity shortly before the survey, while others had been exposed up to 15 months prior it. The latter category of respondents may have faced recall issues for some survey questions, but they were always offered the option to answer 'I don't know/I don't

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[100] Due to methodological adaptations between Cycles 2 and 3, the survey analysis presented in this report mostly or only rely on data collected as part of TPML Cycle 3 (1 737 survey respondents).

remember'. Due to the timing of IP AR activities and of the TPML survey, Altai Consulting was able to assess the sustainability of AR outcomes.

Breakdown of interviews by country, cycle, and IP

7.14.4. SAMPLING PROCESS

In each survey country, IPs provided a list of AR beneficiaries or local resource persons able to guide Altai Consulting's survey teams to beneficiaries. The most recent AR activities were prioritised. People under the age of 18 years were not surveyed. Whenever necessary, enumerators used the snowball approach to complement these interviews and reach the target sample size: they asked survey respondents for the contact information of other beneficiaries eligible for the survey. The IP, respondent's location and type of AR activity surveyed were tracked, and the selection of subsequent

respondents was continuously adjusted by the survey coordinators to avoid underrepresenting or oversampling some beneficiary categories, to the extent possible.

Breakdown of in-person AR activities surveyed by Altai Consulting (Cycle 3)

Activity	IOM	AECID	Tekki-Fii (all)	INTEGRA (all)
Dialogue/tea session/group discussion	315	82	51	
Film screening	366	31	11	
Theatre/sketch	133	173		
Caravan/promotional tour	45		57	
Seminar/workshop/training	40	20	11	21
Music concert	50	22	2	
Sport event	71	2		
Formal speech by a religious leader	64			
Other	32			

Breakdown of interviews conducted by Altai Consulting, by country and region (Cycle 3)

Country	Region	Value
Burkina Faso	Centre	47
	Centre-Est	28
	Centre-Sud	131
Cameroon	Central Cameroon	82
	Far North Cameroon	3
	Littoral Cameroon	129
	North Cameroon	1
	West Cameroon	1
Côte d'Ivoire	Abidjan	122
	Bas-Sassandra	6
	Montagnes	8
	Sassandra-Marahoué	21
	Vallée du Bandama	8
Ghana	Ashanti	52
	Brong-Ahafo	60
	Central	10
	Greater Accra	49
	Western	44
Guinea	Conakry	105
	Kindia	12
	Mamou	20
Guinea Bissau	Gabu	165
	Oio	36
Mali	Bamako	109
	Kayes	25
	Sikasso	78
Nigeria	Delta	30
	Edo	29
	Lagos	23
	Ogun	1
Senegal	Dakar	33
	Kolda	83
	Louga	15
	Saint-Louis	17
	Sédhiou	16
	Tambacounda	38
The Gambia	Banjul	15
	Kanifing	21
	North Bank	13
	Upper River	15
	South Central River	5
	West Coast	31

7.14.5. ETHICS AND DATA PROTECTION

The data management, protection and privacy protocol used for the returnee survey (Annex 3) was also used for the AR survey. Survey respondents were systematically informed of the independent and voluntary nature of the survey and, at both the beginning and the end of the survey, of its anonymity and confidentiality. No compensation was offered by Altai Consulting for participating in the survey. To protect the identity of respondents, the last names of respondents were not recorded during interviews. Survey data was treated confidentially, protected by a password, and not shared with IPs in any other form than aggregated figures and percentages.

7.14.6. SURVEY LIMITATIONS

Main survey limitations are listed below.

▪ *Sample size:* The pre-defined sample size was similar across countries. The statistical power of the surveys (representativeness of results) was therefore lower in countries with more AR beneficiaries.

- *Independence and randomisation:* Survey respondents were not selected by Altai Consulting entirely independently and randomly.

- *Selection bias:* Altai Consulting could only survey returnees reachable/available and willing/interested to take part in the survey.

- *Recall bias:* For some respondents, the AR activity had taken place up to 15 months prior to the survey.

- *Response bias:* Survey respondents may have misrepresented their actual situation and experience – positively or negatively – intentionally or unintentionally, e.g. to conform to what they believed to be the response expected from them. To mitigate this risk, enumerators were given an introductory text to be read to all respondents about the survey objectives and independence, the confidentiality and anonymity of responses, and the fact that responses would be aggregated and analysed with the responses of all other respondents rather than individually. As part of the survey introduction, returnees were also reassured that the survey was fully voluntary and that they could skip any questions. Enumerators were trained to re-ask questions differently if they had any doubt about the respondent's answer. The survey questionnaire included 'I do not know' and 'I do not wish to answer' response options for all questions.

- *Comparison group:* The budget and time allocated to the surveys made it impossible to include non-beneficiaries among survey respondents or to compare the migration-related knowledge, attitudes, behaviours, and intentions of the two groups in order to more reliably assess the effectiveness of the AR campaign itself.

7.14.7. SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

TPML developed its own survey tools and then compared them – and aligned them whenever relevant – with IOM's own AR survey tools. The survey questionnaire included specific modules on mass-media campaigns and in-person, field AR activities.

At each cycle, the questionnaire used in all surveyed countries was the same to allow for result aggregation and cross-country comparisons. Nevertheless, the survey questionnaire was adjusted from Cycle 2 to Cycle 3 based on field experience and previous analyses, while maintaining comparability across cycles, to the extent possible. Some survey modules and questions were only administered at specific cycles or to specific beneficiary profiles, which explains why the sample size may vary.

7.14.8. SURVEY IMPLEMENTATION, DATA CLEANING AND ANALYSIS

The surveys were administered by experienced national enumerators in each country – the same as for the returnee survey. In The Gambia, Guinea, and Nigeria, the same enumerators were mobilised for the two AR survey cycles. Each survey team was trained for three to four days before each data collection cycle, including in-class practical exercises and field testing. They were supervised and debriefed by a senior national survey coordinator and the Altai Consulting TPML country team. Data cleaning and analysis were performed in two stages, by each Altai Consulting TPML country team first, and then by the TPML data analyst.

7.15. IOM STUDY FINDINGS ON ONLINE AWARENESS-RAISING CAMPAIGNS

IOM study results on AR campaigns/posts on Facebook (DFID funding)[cxxiv]

Advantages	Disadvantages
• Reach a large audience at low cost • Easy to measure user engagement based on various metrics (clicks, shares, views, likes, comments and so on) • Can be creative with different headlines, sizes, images, videos and text inducing more traffic to other migration-related web pages and social media pages • Have a large user base • Have a lot of data points to target people for specific demographics, such as sex, age, location, behaviour and education • Easy to set up and run on social media platforms	• Unclear whether the audience represents the target audience • User engagement is not a good indicator of changes in perceptions, attitudes and behaviour, which are common objectives of information campaigns • Difficult to measure changes over time as it is hard to get reactions from the same user twice • Type of intervention is limited to posts featuring short messages, images or videos • In low-income countries, Facebook penetration is low (20–40%), Internet speed is slow and user composition may change over time • Ethical concerns in potentially targeting vulnerable groups and data privacy issues • People could easily become oversaturated by too many campaigns by different stakeholders and lose interest • Costs relative to the impact remain unclear; however, differences in cost compared to offline events are much lower than they first appear • Relative to offline activities, online activities can reach people with posts only at a certain time

7.16. Findings from other awareness-raising surveys and from the broader literature

Migrants seem to initially under- (or over-)estimate the risks (or rewards) of migration. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2019) reported that 66% of female and 54% of male irregular African migrants interviewed in Europe found the journey to be more dangerous than they anticipated[cxxv]. On the other hand, Bah and Batista (2018) report that potential migrants from The Gambia estimate the probability of death on the way towards Europe at around 50% (an overestimation based on all existing estimates)[cxxvi]. According to Dunsch et al. (2019), Senegalese potential migrants under-estimate the number of deaths in the Mediterranean and the average duration of the journey, and slightly under-estimate its cost, while their estimate of potential wages in Europe is close to reality (under the assumption of obtaining a work permit – not waiting for an asylum decision)[cxxvii]. Mbaye (2014) found that potential migrants over-estimate earnings at destination but correctly estimate the costs of irregular migration[cxxviii]. Sanchez et al. (2018) found that 95% of migrants interviewed in Italy stated that their journey was harder than they expected, and that they were particularly surprised to find that they were not allowed to work on arrival[cxxix].

Information campaigns can lead migrants to update their beliefs. An impact evaluation conducted by Dunsch et al. (2019) found that potential migrants who listened to testimonies from other migrants were 25% more risk-aware than potential migrants from the control group[cxxx]. This is in line with IOM conclusions drawn from surveys in Guinea and Senegal, which indicated that despite an already good perception of risks related to irregular migration, AR events could increase risk perceptions by 25% (Senegal) and 10% (Guinea) compared to baseline[cxxxi]. Waka Well post-activity KAP surveys reported that 89% of AR beneficiaries in Côte d'Ivoire would seek more information on migration routes before engaging in the journey, and 58% would do the same in Guinea.

Updated beliefs can lead migrants to change their migration behaviour. While the above-mentioned UNDP study found that only 2% of irregular migrants to Europe say they would have changed their mind about coming to Europe had they known how dangerous the journey was, Shrestha's (2016) impact evaluation concludes that inexperienced Nepalese potential migrants are more likely to migrate if they over- (or under)-estimated the risk of dying (or the expected wage) in their country of intended destination and are provided the actual number[cxxxii]. Regarding irregular migration, two studies indicate that updated beliefs can at least reduce intentions to migrate irregularly: The impact evaluation by Dunsch et al. (2019) found that Senegalese potential migrants who watched testimonies from other migrants were 7% less likely to report intentions to migrate irregularly[cxxxiii]; and Bah and Batista (2018) found that providing Gambian migrants with actual deaths and residence permit probability reduces their declared intention to migrate irregularly[cxxxiv]. This is in line with IOM's conclusions drawn from surveys in Senegal and Guinea, where potential migrants who participated in AR events were less likely to report irregular migration intentions[cxxxv].

In a recent IOM publication (2020), Tjaden lists several questions that remain largely unanswered by the current literature[cxxxvi]. Knowledge gaps include:

▪ What information do potential migrants already have? Is available information lacking or biased?

▪ Do potential migrants want and trust new information? Do migrants remember and internalise information?

▪ Are migrants rational decision-makers who weigh the costs and benefits of migration?

▪ Do migrants themselves make decisions or are families and communities more important factors?

▪ Do migrants change their attitudes, perceptions and intentions as a result of information provided to them?

▪ How do changes in knowledge and perceptions relate to changes in actual (safer) migration intentions and, in turn, in actual behaviour?

- How can changes in actual migration behaviour be measured?

- How sustainable are these changes? It is possible that participants forget or access new and conflicting information?

- How do different angles (e.g. increasing knowledge vs. perceptions vs. practices, including making migration safer), messaging, and AR and behaviour change communication approaches compare in terms of effectiveness (migration-related perceptions, intentions, and practices)?

- How do they compare against and/or interact with alternative interventions, such as job creation, youth employment and livelihood interventions or migration policy changes in terms of effectiveness and cost-effectiveness?

ENDOTES

[i] UNDESA, 'International Migrant Stock: The 2019 Revision', 2020.

[ii] Frontex database on illegal border crossing (rounded figures).

[iii] This is the number of returnees who received post-arrival support and were eligible to reintegration assistance under the EU-IOM Joint Initiative. The figure excludes cases for which the post-arrival assistance in Chad and Niger was funded by IOM offices in North Africa, but includes the cases in these two countries that were funded by IOM sending missions in other countries of the SLC region. Data provided by IOM.

[iv] IOM displacement tracking matrix. 'Movement' rather than 'individuals', because the same people can be counted more than once.

[v] EUTF, 'Terms of reference for the Third-Party Monitoring and Learning mechanism in the SLC region', June 2019.

[vi] Among all EUTF-funded actions that aim to support socioeconomic development, create job opportunities and promote youth employability by funding small businesses, supporting existing entrepreneurs, and developing vocational education, training and counselling for young people, only the ones intending to enrol returnees among their beneficiaries have been included in the TPML analysis.

[vii] As part of the JI, IOM may also provide reintegration assistance to forced returnees from Europe. In those cases, however, IOM only intervenes once returnees have cleared all procedures related to the admission to the country-of-origin and IOM is officially notified of their arrival by the relevant national authority. As per the IOM Framework Standard Operating Procedures for Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration, IOM must not be involved in counselling, pre-departure and return assistance of forced returnees.

[viii] IOM, 'EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration: First biannual reintegration report', February 2019.

[ix] For instance, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal are countries of high emigration and have a similar caseload of returnees but the initial allocation for Côte d'Ivoire was 4.5 times lower. Mali had the same budget as Senegal with a caseload 3.5 times higher. The budget for Guinea was EUR 3 million lower than for Burkina Faso with a caseload three times higher.

[x] In West and Central Africa, IOM's displacement tracking matrix counted 50 000 stranded migrants at international borders and in quarantine and transit centres as of the end of June 2020 (IOM, 'COVID-19 and migration in West and North Africa and across the Mediterranean', 2020.

[xi] See Altai Consulting, TPML country reports for Mali and Niger, 2021.

[xii] IOM's presentation to the EUTF reporting and coordination committee 2020, 19 November 2020.

[xiii] The JI mid-term evaluation in the SLC region conducted by IOM in 2020 also highlights this issue and recommends 'refining messaging to beneficiaries to manage expectations of the reintegration process in coordination missions in host/transit countries'.

[xiv] IOM, 'EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration: Fourth biannual regional reintegration report', February 2021, and interviews with IOM Nigeria and GIZ Nigeria. For more information, please see the TPML Nigeria report.

[xv] IOM reports having sought to build coordination and synergies with the return (and reintegration) programming of individual EU Member States and other organisations, bilaterally and through the European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN) (IOM's presentation to the EUTF reporting and coordination committee 2020, 19 November 2020).

[xvi] IOM, 'EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration: Fourth biannual regional reintegration report', February 2021, and interviews with IOM The Gambia. For more information, please see the TPML Gambia report.

[xvii] Based on TPML Cycle 1 survey only (questions not asked in subsequent returnee surveys).

[xviii] These figures are based on the TPML Cycle 2 and 3 surveys. They may not fully capture the situation because not all (surveyed) returnees return to their families and communities. Yet, a survey carried out by IOM in Guinea found similar figures: 10% of returnee respondents felt stigmatised and 3% rejected by their family or community. IOM, 'Migrer pour réussir : Analyse des trajectoires migratoires de la jeunesse guinéenne à travers l'expérience des migrants de retour', 2019.

[xix] Respondents of the TPML Cycle 1 survey. The question was asked differently in subsequent surveys.

[xx] Qualitative interviews conducted by Altai Consulting with returnees and community leaders, and IOM, 'Etude sous-régionale sur l'endettement des migrants assistés au retour et l'impact sur la réintégration au sein des pays d'origine (Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambie, Guinée, Mali et Sénégal)', 2021.

xxi Interviews with key informants of the IOM Dakar regional office and with programme managers in country offices. IOM, 'Mid-term evaluation of the JI reintegration activities in the Sahel', February 2020. The evaluation indicates an average budget of EUR 1 000 per beneficiary of social assistance.

xxii Based on the EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration's second and fourth biannual regional reintegration reports, November 2019 and February 2021. The TPML surveys give similar figures.

xxiii Based on the TPML Cycle 2 and 3 returnee surveys.

xxiv IOM, 'EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration: Third biannual reintegration report', February 2020.

xxv This was raised in interviews both with IOM and other IP staff and partners, and with returnees themselves.

xxvi IOM, Reintegration counselling: a psychosocial approach, 2019.

xxvii IOM, 'EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration: Fourth biannual regional reintegration report', February 2021. IOM conducted a rapid needs assessment in 11 JI countries in the SLC region between March and May 2020, with a region-wide sample of 1 169 reintegration beneficiaries.

xxviii As of end July 2020. IOM, 'EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration: Fourth biannual regional reintegration report', February 2021.

xxix This issue was stressed in the mid-term evaluation of the JI reintegration programming in the SLC region, 2020.

xxx The TPML surveys provided an opportunity for many returnees to express their frustration, which also resulted in the form of angry posts on IOM Facebook pages and demonstrations in front of IOM offices in several countries.

xxxi IOM, 'Framework Standard Operating Procedures for Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration', 2017

xxxii IOM, 'EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration: Fourth biannual regional reintegration report', February 2021.

xxxiii IOM, EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration's biannual regional reintegration reports; and IOM's mid-term evaluation of the JI reintegration programming in the SLC region', 2020.

xxxiv Quote from several interviews with IOM programme managers and regional staff, and from the IOM mid-term evaluation of the JI reintegration programming in the SLC region, 2020.

xxxv Such cases were reported by returnees in most if not all JI countries and confirmed by project staff and a review of some IOM AVRR brochures intended for returnees. A returnee in Mali said: 'I was interested in setting up a retail shop because this is what my family does and what works in my area, but this is not what IOM wanted me to do so I did not get that chance and had to choose something else.' The IOM mid-term evaluation of the JI reintegration programming in the SLC region, 2020, also recommended that IOM continues directing returnees away from such businesses by underlining the benefits of longer-term vocational activities. It is acknowledged that a 'supply driven approach', if well managed and communicated, can have advantages, for example by orienting returnees to, or providing returnees with, innovative options which they would have not considered otherwise or by enticing them away from plans that are unrealistic or not well thought through, or from business lines and jobs that are known to be unprofitable or unsustainable.

xxxvi Babacar Ndione et Jérôme Lombard, 'Diagnostic des projets de réinsertion économique des migrants de retour: au Mali (Bamako, Kayes)', *Revue européenne des migrations internationales*, vol. 20 - n°1, 2004. In interviews conducted in 2019 and 2020, returnees and EUTF-funded IP staff in Mali and Burkina Faso mentioned the same lines of business as comparatively more profitable.

xxxvii IOM, 'Reintegration Handbook', 2019, and IOM, 'Reintegration Counselling: a psychosocial approach', 2019.

xxxviii In all JI countries, IOM commissioned a study to profile and assess the needs of migrants as well as the local context and opportunities in a few selected communities of departure and return. All country reports list a number of projects and actors that can be contacted for referral purposes. Some country offices reported having used the report to map potential community projects or inform partnerships. Yet, ultimately, few reports included a broader analysis of the local job market and economic opportunities. In Burkina Faso and Niger, IOM commissioned a separate study to fill this gap. Many of the other IPs have commissioned context and market assessments: EJOM in Mali, all INTEGRA consortium members in Guinea, LuxDev in Senegal, YEP in The Gambia, etc.

xxxix Babacar Ndione et Jérôme Lombard, 'Diagnostic des projets de réinsertion économique des migrants de retour: étude de cas au Mali (Bamako, Kayes)', *Revue européenne des migrations internationales*, vol. 20 – n°1, 2004.

xl IOM, 'EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration: First biannual reintegration report', February 2019.

xli For example, in evaluations conducted by Altai Consulting in Iraq in 2010 and in Morocco, Tanzania and Yemen as well as countries of origin of migrants in these countries (Ethiopia, Cameroon, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria) in 2017.

xlii Interviews with IP staff and TVET centres, and ILO, 'Exploring the potential for skills partnerships on migration in West Africa and the Sahel', 2020.

xliii This is one explanation of the discrepancy between reports from IOM and Altai Consulting's returnee survey data and was also highlighted in interviews by some IOM staff.

xliv Among TPML Cycle 2 and 3 survey respondents.

xlv The same finding was highlighted in: World Bank, 'Job Diagnostics Côte d'Ivoire', 2017, and in Côte d'Ivoire, 'Stratégie nationale pour l'insertion et l'emploi des jeunes', 2016–2020.

xlvi Data for IOM is provided by IOM Dakar, based on the project database, MiMOSA, while data for other IPs are based on Altai Consulting's beneficiary survey triangulated through interviews with programme managers.

xlvii Babacar Ndione et Jérôme Lombard, 'Diagnostic des projets de réinsertion économique des migrants de retour: étude de cas au Mali (Bamako, Kayes)', *Revue européenne des migrations internationales*, vol. 20 – n°1, 2004; Itad, 'Methodological report for the impact evaluation of IOM's reintegration assistance in the Horn of Africa region', 2020; McKenzie, D., and Yang, D., 'Evidence on Policies to Increase the Development Impacts of International Migration', *The World Bank Observer*, 30(2): 155–192, 2015; Åkesson, L., 'Making migrants responsible for development: Cape Verdean returnees and northern migration policies', *Africa Spectrum*, 46(1): 61–83, 2011; IASC, 'IASC Framework on Durable Solution for Internally Displaced Persons', 2010; Black, R. and Castaldo, A., 'Return migration and entrepreneurship in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire: The role of capital transfers', *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie*, 100(1): 44–58, 2009.

xlviii As a means of comparison with this analysis for EUTF IPs in the SLC region: In Somalia, IOM reported that 'based on four rounds of surveys in 2019, out of 237 returnees who were assisted with in-kind support to open a microbusiness, 14% reported having "closed" the business, 5% "never started" and 11% "operational but struggling". Due to market/economic factors, as well as beneficiaries' lack of necessary skills to run the microbusiness, high competition in the area, fear of failure, pressure to meet basic needs or family responsibilities by sharing or selling in-kind assets or need to sell assets to cover debt repayment' (ITAD, 'Methodological report for the ongoing reintegration impact evaluation commissioned by IOM in the East Africa region', 2020).

xlix Based on: IOM, 'Framework Standard Operating Procedures for Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration', 2017; IOM, 'Integrated Approach to Reintegration', 2018; IOM, 'EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration: First biannual reintegration report', February 2019; and interviews with key informants in IOM country missions.

l IOM, JI's second and fourth biannual regional reintegration reports, November 2019 and February 2021. Mauritania received less than 40 eligible returnees since 2017, which explains the lack of such projects.

li Based on interviews with IOM staff in the country and regional offices, IOM's mid-term evaluation of the JI reintegration programming in the SLC region, 2020, and the JI's fourth biannual regional reintegration report, February 2021. Government officials also express a preference for community-based projects over collective ones, because of their potential local socioeconomic impacts.

lii Analysis based on the average number of project participants over time as reported by IOM in the successive JI biannual reintegration reports, and on the country case studies included in the JI's fourth biannual regional reintegration report, February 2021.

liii See respective TPML country reports (Altai Consulting, 2021).

liv See the TPML country reports for Guinea and Nigeria, as well as the JI's fourth biannual regional reintegration report', February 2021.

lv IOM, 'The use of microcredit schemes in migrant reintegration context', April 2021.

lvi See: https://www.vsla.net/the-vsla-methodology/.

lvii Interview with IOM Nigeria.

lviii As of December 2020. Other countries, such as Burkina Faso and Guinea, were planning to engage.

lix IOM, EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration, 'Fourth biannual regional reintegration report', February 2021.

lx This issue was also raised in the IOM mid-term evaluation of the JI reintegration programming in the SLC region, 2020.

lxi Profiles of migrants assisted to return to their country-of-origin in West and Central Africa for 2017–2019 and the first semester of 2020, IOM, February 2020 and February 2021.

lxii IOM, 'Glossary on migration', 2019. There is not one approach globally agreed in the migration sector for measuring outcomes and defining success of return and reintegration programmes.

lxiii The satisfaction rate is subject to two main biases. First, IOM beneficiaries were not surveyed at random: IOM pre-selected beneficiaries to be interviewed by Altai Consulting (selection bias). Second, some survey respondents may have been reluctant to express dissatisfaction (or satisfaction) by fear of reducing their chance to receiving future or further support (reporting bias). To minimise reporting bias, the purpose, independence, confidentiality, and anonymity of the survey was explained in both the introduction and conclusion of the survey. Moreover, the survey was administered by national enumerators wearing no logo or indication of IOM or the EU. Both national enumerators and direct directions indicate that the great majority of respondents expressed their mind and feedback very freely, without reservation or constraint.

lxiv The low satisfaction rate in Côte d'Ivoire may be due to high aspirations and expectations (most Ivoirian migrants originate from urban areas where opportunities are greater, dreams more ambitious, and the cost of living higher), delays and communication gaps in the reintegration process, the fact that returnees are directed to collective and community-based projects as opposed to individual ones, and a lower economic performance and viability of these microbusinesses.

[lxv] The literature points out that return migrants reintegrate more easily in their community and find employment when they return with substantial capital, if they are able to plan for their return and have accumulated skills that they can apply after their return (Collyer, 2018). Similarly, Black and Castaldo (2009) highlight that relevant work experience gathered during migration was a key determinant for returnee entrepreneurial activities.

[lxvi] The survey did not ascertain whether beneficiaries are employed *as a result of* the reintegration support received.

[lxvii] This does not mean that other dimensions are not important, but they are not considered as important as the economic dimension.

[lxviii] Altai Consulting, TPML Nigeria and Cameroon reports, 2021.

[lxix] IOM, EU-IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration, 'Fourth biannual reintegration report', (2020).

[lxx] Altai Consulting, TPML Senegal report, and MLS draft case study on ProGreS Migration (Tunisia), 2021

[lxxi] Altai Consulting, TPML country reports, 2021. ADD AUTHOR, YEAR

[lxxii] GDSI, 'EUTF Mid-term evaluation report 2015–2019', October 2020.

[lxxiii] Interviews conducted for the MLS 'Learning Lessons from the EUTF' report.

[lxxiv] Altai Consulting, Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) case study on border management in Mauritania, 2021; Altai Consulting for the European Union, 'Learning Lessons from the EUTF – Phase 2 – Paving the way for future programming on migration, mobility and forced displacement', 2021.

[lxxv] Altai Consulting, MLS case study on border management in Mauritania, 2021.

[lxxvi] Interviews conducted for the TPML Mauritania report.

[lxxvii] Altai Consulting, MLS case study on trafficking in persons in the SLC region, 2021.

[lxxviii] Semprebon, M, 'Fighting Human Trafficking in Nigeria: A Gap Analysis of recent and ongoing projects (2010–2019)', 2020.

[lxxix] Altai Consulting, TPML Niger report, 2021.

[lxxx] Altai Consulting for the European Union, 'Learning Lessons from the EUTF – Phase 2 – Paving the way for future programming on migration, mobility and forced displacement' (2021).

[lxxxi] FIIAPP, 'ECI rapport annuel 2020' (2021) and TPML Niger report.

[lxxxii] Claes, J. and Schmauder, A., 'Economic and governance repercussions of migration policies in Niger's north', 2020.

[lxxxiii] TPML Nigeria report.

[lxxxiv] TPML Nigeria report.

[lxxxv] Altai Consulting for the European Union, 'Learning Lessons from the EUTF – Phase 2 – Paving the way for future programming on migration, mobility and forced displacement' (2021).

[lxxxvi] Description of the action of the project T05-EUTF-SAH-REG-13-02.

[lxxxvii] TPML Mauritania report.

[lxxxviii] Altai Consulting for the European Union, 'Learning Lessons from the EUTF – Phase 2 – Paving the way for future programming on migration, mobility and forced displacement' (2021).

[lxxxix] TPML Senegal report.

[xc] GDSI, 'Mid-term Evaluation of the EUTF 2015–2019', October 2020.

[xci] TPML Côte d'Ivoire report; MLS draft case study on trafficking in persons in SLC region.

[xcii] TPML Nigeria report and MLS draft case study on trafficking in persons in SLC region.

[xciii] TPML Senegal and Mali reports.

[xciv] Key informant interview with IOM and TPML Niger report.

[xcv] Altai Consulting for the European Union, 'Learning Lessons from the EUTF – Phase 2 – Paving the way for future programming on migration, mobility and forced displacement' (2021).

[xcvi] Altai Consulting for the European Union, 'Learning Lessons from the EUTF – Phase 2 – Paving the way for future programming on migration, mobility and forced displacement' (2021).

[xcvii] IOM update on the JI presented to the EUTF coordination and reporting committee, 20 November 2020.

[xcviii] This was also highlighted in the mid-term evaluation of the AECID AR project in Mali, 2020.

[xcix] Examples of such broad communication plans – without a rationale being spelled out or an evidence base for the proposed messages, communication channels and activities – are provided by IOM in the various JI countries, INTEGRA in Guinea, AECID in Mali, and LuxDev/ACEFOP in Senegal. (See individual TPML country reports.)

[c] Only Save the Children in Mauritania used EUTF funding to conduct robust KAP surveys prior to implementation, and in-depth analyses of primary and secondary target groups and of the most used and trusted communication channels. Some IPs commissioned such surveys later in the programme cycle and could have made better use of them to adjust their AR strategy along the way (e.g. AECID in Mali, IOM in Ghana, LuxDev in Senegal, and INTEGRA partners in Guinea), and/or had commissioned surveys in the past, or under different funding (IOM

Guinea under the Omega project funded by the EU under the Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund and by the Belgian cooperation, IOM Nigeria under a GIZ-funded project, and several IOM country offices under the Migrants as Messengers (MaM) initiative and the WAKA Well / IOM X project).

ci ILO, 'Report on employment in Africa (Re-Africa): Tackling the youth employment challenge', 2020, gives a young male employment rate of 65% in West African countries. Pre-departure unemployment rate of migrants surveyed by Altai Consulting appears moderately higher than that of the general youth in the region (16% vs. 10%), as is the percentage of 'not in employment, education, or training' (35% vs. 25%). Differences in figures may, in part, be due to differences in the age (brackets and distribution) of the two groups being compared, in the respective definition of the employment categories, and in the countries included in the West African regional average.

cii Profile of migrants assisted to return in West and Central Africa 2017–2019 and 2020, IOM, 2020 and 2021.

ciii Tjaden, 'Assessing the impact of awareness-raising campaigns on potential migrants – what have we learned so far', 2020; Hernandez-Carretero, M., and Carling, J., 'Beyond "Kamikaze Migrants": Risk Taking in West African Boat Migration to Europe', 2012; IOM, 'Etude sous-régionale sur l'endettement des migrants assistés au retour et l'impact sur la réintégration au sein des pays d'origine – Etude menée en Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Mali, Gambie, Sénégal et Guinée sous la coordination du Bureau Régional de l'OIM à Dakar', 2021.

civ OIM and Institut National de la Statistique, 'La migration irrégulière des jeunes en Guinée' 2019; OIM/Omega, 'Enquête initiale et stratégie de sensibilisation du projet', 2019; Samuel Hall, 'Mapping and Socio-Economic Profiling of Communities of Return in Ghana', 2018, etc.

cv A recent study conducted by the IOM regional office in 2020 (with DFID funding) and focused on Facebook highlighted both the advantages (reaching a large audience at a low cost, user engagement easy to measure based on various metrics, large user base, easy set-up, etc.) and disadvantages (unclear whether the audience corresponds to the target groups, difficult to measure changes in perceptions, attitudes and behaviours, as well as changes over time, challenge of internet penetration in low-income countries, etc.) of using online platforms to convey migration-related information. Other key references include: OIM & Institut National de la Statistique, 'La migration irrégulière des jeunes en Guinée', 2019; EU 2017 and 2018 study on communication channels used by migrants and asylum seekers to obtain information in countries of origin and transit, with particular focus on online and social media; a study of the EUD in Côte d'Ivoire on the use of social media among young people; Merisalo and Jauhiainen, journal article 'Asylum-related migrants' social-media use, mobility decisions, and resilience', *Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies,* 2020; Olayinka Akanle and al., journal article 'The Information Communication Technology, Social Media, International Migration and Migrants' Relations with Kin in Nigeria', Journal of Asian and African Studies, 2020; Dekker and Engbersen, journal article 'How social media transform migrant networks and facilitate migration', 2013.

cvi See Figure 41 presenting Altai Consulting survey results. On IOM surveys, see for example: OIM & Institut National de la Statistique, 'La migration irrégulière des jeunes en Guinée', 2019; and the GIZ-funded, IOM-implemented KAP surveys in Nigeria.

cvii IOM, 'Profile of migrants assisted to return in West and Central Africa 2017-2019 and 2020, 2020 and 2021.

cviii Based on IOM's and Altai Consulting's returnee survey.

cix Potential migrants who watched testimonies from other migrants were 25% more risk-aware than potential migrants from the control group. IOM, 'Migrants as Messengers: The Impact of Peer-to-Peer Communication on Potential Migrants in Senegal - Impact Evaluation Report', 2019.

cx This was also highlighted in the mid-term evaluation of the AECID AR project in Mali, 2020.

cxi External, mid-term projet evaluation, April 2020.

cxii 'Rapport d'étude sur les expériences de lutte contre la migration irrégulière au Mali: état des lieux', October 2019 (conducted by a local consultant).

cxiii Germany funded baseline/endline KAP surveys in several countries under the Waka Well project; Guinea, Belgium funded a baseline and endline KAP survey as part of the Omega project; UK Aid funded a study on mobile film screenings in Guinea (IOM, The impact of mobile cinema events on potential migrants in Guinea, 2019) and a pilot study on the effectiveness of Facebook posts in Guinea, Nigeria, and Senegal, mentioned above (IOM, 'Assessing the effectiveness of online Facebook campaigns targeting potential irregular migrants: A pilot study in three West African countries', 2020); GIZ funded a study on the MigrInfo campaign in Côte d'Ivoire; and UK Aid and the Netherlands funded the impact evaluation of the Migrants as Messengers project in Senegal.

cxiv Tjaden, J., 'Assessing the impact of awareness-raising campaigns on potential migrants – what we have learned so far', in the publication: IOM, Migration in West and North Africa and across the Mediterranean: Trends, risks, development and governance, 2020.

cxv The impact evaluation in Senegal found a substantial increase in beneficiaries' knowledge about/perception of risks. Dunsch, F. et al., 'Migrants as Messengers: The Impact of Peer-to-Peer Communication on Potential Migrants in Senegal – Impact Evaluation Report', 2019. In Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea, the percentage of AR beneficiaries saying they would not encourage anyone to try and migrate irregularly was 82% and 70% respectively. The quote from Côte d'Ivoire is taken from: IOM, 'Analysis of awareness-raising activities in Côte d'Ivoire', June 2020.

cxvi IOM, 'The Impact of Mobile Cinema Events on Potential Migrants in Guinea – Impact Evaluation Report', 2019.

cxvii Tjaden, J., 'Assessing the impact of awareness-raising campaigns on potential migrants – what we have learned so far', 2020.

cxviii See: https://gdpr-info.eu/.

cxix UNHCR, 'Handbook for repatriation and reintegration activities', 2004.

cxx IOM, 'Data Protection Manual', 2010.

cxxi A study conducted in Mali in 2004 among returnes to assess the success and sustainability of their reintegration projects/microbusinesses found that: 'Le bilan des projets est mitigé. À son retour, l'émigré promoteur se convertit difficilement en entrepreneur. Il lui faut compter sur ses propres qualités, sur son réseau professionnel et migratoire, sur sa famille, en plus de s'appuyer sur les institutions locales et nationales. Or, les investissements publics sont trop souvent déficients pour placer dans de bonnes conditions des investisseurs aussi fragiles que les migrants. Pour se lancer et développer un projet économique [et surtout productif], le migrant promoteur, en plus d'être motivé et formé dans cette perspective, a besoin d'infrastructures, de marchés régulés, de capitaux, d'investissements publics lourds. Le contexte devient alors surdéterminant pour le promoteur et dépasse sa seule implication : des projets pérennes demandent des réformes à tous les niveaux et une politique sociale, économique, d'aménagement, encore trop souvent peu mise en oeuvre.' Babacar Ndione et Jérôme Lombard, 'Diagnostic des projets de réinsertion économique des migrants de retour : étude de cas au Mali (Bamako, Kayes)', Revue européenne des migrations internationales, vol. 20 – n°1, 2004.

cxxii See, for example, TPML country reports for Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Senegal.

cxxiii See the following resources, among others: http://www.cashlearning.org/; The World Bank (for the Inter-Agency Standing Committee), Strategic Note: 'Cash Transfers in Humanitarian Contexts', 2016; Doocy, S & Tappis, H, 'Cash-based approaches in humanitarian emergencies: a systematic review', *3ie Systematic Review Report 28*, 2016; and Francesca Bastagli, Jessica Hagen-Zanker and all, 'Cash transfers: what does the evidence say? A rigorous review of impacts and the role of design and implementation features', ODI, July 2016.

cxxiv IOM, 'Assessing the effectiveness of online Facebook campaigns targeting potential irregular migrants', 2020.

cxxv UNDP, 'Voices of Irregular African Migrants to Europe' 2019.

cxxvi Bah, T. and Batista, C., 'Understanding Willingness to Migrate Illegally: Evidence from a Lab in the Field Experiment', 2018.

cxxvii IOM, Dunsch, F. et al., 'Migrants as Messengers: The Impact of Peer-to-Peer Communication on Potential Migrants in Senegal – Impact Evaluation', 2019.

cxxviii Mbaye, L., 'Barcelona or die: understanding illegal migration from Senegal', 2014.

cxxix Sanchez et al., 'A study of the communication channels used by migrants and asylum seekers in Italy, with a particular focus on online and social media', 2018.

cxxx Dunsch, F. et al., 'Migrants as Messengers: The Impact of Peer-to-Peer Communication on Potential Migrants in Senegal – Impact Evaluation Report', 2019.

cxxxi Tjaden, J., 'Assessing the impact of awareness-raising campaigns on potential migrants – what we have learned so far', 2020.

cxxxii Shreshta M., 'Get rich or die tryin': Perceived earnings, perceived mortality rate and the

value of a statistical life of potential work-migrants from Nepal', 2016.

cxxxiii Dunsch, F. et al., 'Migrants as Messengers: The Impact of Peer-to-Peer Communication on Potential Migrants in Senegal – Impact Evaluation Report', 2019.

cxxxiv Bah, T. and Batista, C., 'Understanding Willingness to Migrate Illegally: Evidence from a Lab in the Field Experiment', 2018.

cxxxv Tjaden, J., 'Assessing the impact of awareness-raising campaigns on potential migrants – what we have learned so far', 2020.

cxxxvi Tjaden, J., 'Assessing the impact of awareness-raising campaigns on potential migrants – what we have learned so far', 2020.