



EUTF Monitoring and Learning System SLC

YEARLY 2022 REPORT
COVERING UNTIL 31 DECEMBER 2022

Altai Consulting for the European Union – June 2023



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
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the eleventh report prepared by the Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) for the Sahel and Lake Chad window, covering all outputs achieved through funding from the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced people in Africa (EUTF) in the Sahel and Lake Chad (SLC) region, from the start of activities until the end of December 2022, with a specific focus on outputs generated in 2022.

This report includes outputs from programmes implemented in Burkina Faso, Benin, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, The Gambia and Togo.¹

As of December 2022, the EUTF for Africa has committed² €5.0B (billion), including €2.2B to 114 decisions in the SLC window. A total of 214 operational projects have been contracted in the SLC region, including 106 completed projects, 103 projects in implementation and 5 projects in inception. 99 of the projects currently in implementation have data or other qualitative information to report and 4 are either too early in their implementation phase to be able to report outputs or their activities have not yet generated outputs that are relevant to the EUTF indicators. The current report includes data on 205 projects (equivalent in funding to €2.0B), comprising 106 completed projects, as well as 99 projects in their implementation phase with data to report.

Figure 1: Contracted budget breakdown by country and Strategic Objective, December 2022³



Strategic Objective 1: Greater economic and employment opportunities

Many countries in West and Central Africa struggled with rising food and energy prices in 2022, caused by the war in Ukraine and global supply chain disruptions. Inflation in the region averaged 16.8% and GDP growth slowed down to 3.6%.⁴ Informal and unstable employment is one of the main reasons for workers' low resilience towards economic shocks in the SLC region. In 2022, EUTF-funded programmes created or supported 31,219 jobs, 51% of them skilled and 47% permanent – the highest annual shares achieved so far (indicator 1.1). Throughout the year, many SLC countries tightened monetary policy to fight inflation, negatively affecting access to financial services, which can be key to harnessing economic opportunities. In this context, EUTF interventions promoting income generating activities (IGAs) improved access to finance for 101,704 people in 2022, a sharp increase compared to previous years (indicator 1.3). Scaling up access to finance, especially in Ghana, was instrumental in reaching 161,397 people with IGAs in 2022, more than in any previous year.

¹ Outputs in Benin, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Togo are collected through regional programmes.

² This refers to funds allocated following decisions by the Operational Committees.

³ Share of budget for projects contracted and relevant to the MLS.

⁴ AfDB, 'Africa's Macroeconomic Performance and Outlook', January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

Strategic Objective 2: Strengthening resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable including refugees and other displaced people

Food security in the SLC region deteriorated in 2022 as a result of rising commodity prices, accelerated conflict, and harmful rainfall patterns. At the end of the year, 31.4 million people were food insecure, 6.4 million people more than in 2021.¹ In 2022, the EUTF provided 406,318 beneficiaries with food security-related assistance (indicator 2.4) and 414,300 with nutrition assistance (indicator 2.3). While nutrition assistance increased compared to 2021, the number of people reached with food security-related assistance diminished compared to the previous year, as important projects in this field have come to a close. EUTF-funded programmes also delivered basic services to 372,286 people, compared to 50,990 in 2021 (indicator 2.2). Services focused mostly on legal assistance, in particular through civil registration judgements and birth certificates for IDPs and refugees / asylum seekers. Other services related to health, social protection, and education.

Strategic Objective 3: Improved migration management in countries of origin, transit, and destination

The SLC region continues to be a non-negligible origin and transit area for migrants intending to reach Europe through the Central Mediterranean or Atlantic Routes. More importantly, internal and intra-regional migration continued to be on the rise in 2022, triggered by conflict (Liptako-Gourma area, Lake Chad Basin) and natural disasters (floods). At the end of 2022, there were 380,241 additional IDPs, 56,298 additional refugees and 18,466 additional asylum seekers compared to the previous year, raising the totals to 7,749,903 1,561,832 and 70,595, respectively.^{2,3} In 2022, EUTF-funded programmes assisted 55,909 migrants in transit with cash transfers and humanitarian assistance (indicator 3.2) in the region. Other programmes trained 4,454 people on issues at the crossroads between migration management and protection (indicator 3.7). As most activities which facilitated return and reintegration have closed down, support for voluntary returns (indicator 3.4), post-arrival assistance (indicator 3.5), and reintegration assistance (indicator 3.5 bis) all strongly decreased in 2022.

Strategic Objective 4: Improved governance, security and conflict prevention

In 2022, the SLC region witnessed two military coups in Burkina Faso and an extension of the transition periods in Guinea and Chad, while a new transition calendar was adopted in Mali. At the same time, violence in the region kept increasing and reached its highest level in over a decade.⁴ Most importantly, conflicts in Nigeria, Mali and Burkina Faso spread and/or intensified during the year. EUTF-funded programmes supported national and local security forces with equipment and training in order to help them respond to increasingly complex threats. In 2022, security forces received 18,230 pieces of equipment (indicator 4.1 bis), in particular in Niger, Chad, Mauritania, Mali, and Burkina Faso. In addition, 20,285 staff members from government forces, internal security forces and non-state actors were trained on security, border management, CVE, conflict prevention, protection of civilian populations and human rights (indicator 4.2). Finally, 853,477 people participated in conflict prevention and human rights activities (indicator 4.3), 93% of them in Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali.

¹ *Cadre Harmonisé* and IPC estimations for West and Central Africa, January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² UNHCR, 'West and Central Africa – Persons of concern'. 31 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ UNHCR, 'West and Central Africa – Persons of concern'. 31 December 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project database', consulted in March 2023. Retrieved [here](#) (compilation with older ACLED datasets).

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND

The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced people in Africa (EUTF for Africa or EUTF) was launched in November 2015. It is composed of three geographical 'windows': 'North Africa' (NoA), 'Horn of Africa' (HoA) and 'Sahel and Lake Chad' (SLC), which includes 12 'main' countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and The Gambia. Neighbouring countries are also eligible for regional programmes. This report includes outputs from programmes implemented in 16 countries: the 12 mentioned above as well as Benin, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Togo.¹

This is the eleventh report prepared by the Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) for the EUTF SLC window, covering all the outputs achieved with EUTF funding in the SLC region, from the start of activities until the end of December 2022, with a specific focus on outputs generated in 2022. Previous reports can be found [here](#).

In response to the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, the European Union (EU) decided to reorient funds in the EUTF SLC portfolio, and some implementing partners (IPs) adjusted their activities. Three new COVID-19 specific indicators were added to the EUTF common indicators to better capture the outputs generated through these initiatives in MLS reporting.

1.2. THE EUTF SLC WINDOW IN 2022

As of end of December 2022, the EUTF had committed (i.e., allocated funds following decisions by the EUTF Operational Committees) €5.0B (billion euros). The SLC window is the first in size in terms of funding, with €2.2B committed across 114 decisions. There are 214 operational contracts and of interest to the MLS.² Of these, 106 projects worth €899M (million) are completed, 103 projects worth €1.1B, are being implemented, and 5 projects (€60M) are in inception. Out of the 103 projects currently implementing, 99 have data to report.³ This report presents data from 205 projects, including 106 completed projects, covering a total contracted amount of €2.0B. As such, it covers eight projects and €24M more funding than the previous MLS report, for the first semester of 2022. Funding and implementation continue to follow the EUTF's four Strategic Objectives⁴ (SOs) and the strategic priorities set by the EUTF Strategic Board and ratified in September 2019 i.e., i) returns and reintegration; ii) refugee management; iii) completing progress on the securitisation of documents and civil registry; iv) anti-trafficking measures; v) essential stabilisation efforts; and vi) migration dialogue.

¹ Outputs in Benin, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau and Togo are collected through regional programmes and are presented in the overview of results section (4.2) of this report.

² Projects are considered operational when they deliver outputs to beneficiaries. Administrative projects and non-operational projects (such as projects contracted under the Research and Evidence Facility and the Technical and Cooperation Facility, feasibility studies, audits, etc.) are not included in the analysis.

³ Four projects are either too early in their implementation phase to be able to report outputs or their activities did not yet generate outputs that are relevant to the EUTF indicators.

⁴ The four Strategic Objectives (SO) of the EUTF are: SO1 'Greater economic and employment opportunities'; SO2 'Strengthening resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable including refugees and other displaced people', SO3 'Improved migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination' and SO4 'Improved governance and conflict prevention and reduction of forced displacement and irregular migration'.

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1. MLS METHODOLOGY

2.1.1. OUTPUT MONITORING

The Monitoring and Learning System (MLS) team works with each implementing partner (IP) to develop a reporting system that allows the MLS to collect the most detailed and granular level of data common to all IPs. To that end, the MLS has developed a reporting template that it uses with most IPs, although the reporting template is tailored to each project through a drafting and feedback process with respective IPs. Given the complexity and diversity of the EUTF portfolio, and the fact that IPs and M&E systems have different resources, limitations and capacities, the MLS tries to offer as much flexibility as possible with regard to the quantity, disaggregation and format of data collected from IPs.

The MLS then aggregates the collected data using a standardised methodology (and later disaggregates it again along various lines of analysis for reporting). This approach allows the MLS to help IPs map their own activities and outputs against the list of EUTF common output indicators and to have access to a finer level of disaggregation (e.g., by gender, beneficiary type, location, etc.). It also gives the MLS significant flexibility in changing the way data is analysed or presented as needed.

Based on the information received, the MLS team completes output indicator mappings for each project, collects the relevant data from each IP, checks the data for quality and enters it into the MLS database for aggregation, further quality checking and analysis.

During the S1 2020 reporting period, the EUTF revised its common output indicators and their respective methodologies. The resulting revisions have been formalised through a set of methodological notes, which can be found in the annexes to the S1 2020 report. For more information about this process, please see the S1 2020 report.

2.1.2. OUTCOME ANALYSIS

In addition to output monitoring, the EUTF MLS started to include project- and programme-level outcome analysis in S2 2020 in the form of focus boxes for certain completed projects. As explained in previous reports as well as in this [MLS methodological note](#), aggregating outcome data for the EUTF portfolio is not possible in the way that it is for output data, because there are no common and standardised EUTF outcome indicators. This means that no methodologically harmonised outcome data has been collected by EUTF projects, without which comprehensive and meaningful outcome analysis is impossible. Therefore, it was agreed that the MLS would not undertake a comprehensive quantitative aggregation of outcome indicators across projects.

However, as part of the MLS's broader efforts to assess potential large-scale changes effected by the EUTF in its areas of implementation, in March 2022, the team conducted a review of all outcome indicators reported on by projects which had completed before July 2021,¹ to assess whether partial aggregation could be feasible in some cases, and if limited conclusions could be drawn about the potential outcomes of the EUTF portfolio beyond specific projects and programmes.

A total of 56 projects that ended before S2 2021 in the SLC window were assessed as part of this exercise.² Out of these 56, 35 projects had shared a final evaluation report with the MLS team. The

¹ According to EUTF directives, projects are required to deliver their final report no later than six months after the end of their project, hence the choice of this deadline for the inclusion of projects in the study. It should be noted, however, that the lack of a final report after this deadline may be due to a number of factors, including the possibility that reports were not made available to the MLS team.

² See footnote 1.

remaining 21 projects were either not relevant for a final evaluation, pending a final evaluation because they had recently ended, were part of a programme which was still ongoing, or did not make the documents available to the MLS team. Collectively, these projects reported on 514 outcome and impact indicators, of which 370 were categorised by the MLS to be 'true' outcomes indicators.¹ Among those, 313 indicators were assessed by the team to be SMART.² Combining results in initial SLC and HoA analysis, 33 common outcome indicator categories were identified. Twenty of these were relevant to outcomes mapped under SLC projects.

However, while categories allow to group indicators in batches of similar expected outcomes, the way indicators are measured or defined often prevents aggregation. Even in cases where outcome indicators are exactly equivalent, aggregated values cannot be weighted or calculated without knowing the relevant population or sample size. Furthermore, limitations in the quality and availability of project indicator descriptions and data negatively affect their aggregation potential. In many cases, indicators measured at baseline were not measured again at endline (or vice versa), or the endline evaluation collected data for a similar but incomparable indicator to the one used at baseline.

As such, it is only possible to aggregate a limited number of indicators across EUTF projects, and even in these cases methodological limitations and caveats must be considered. These aggregable indicators were then analysed in the SO sections of the 2021 annual report, and these analyses will be continually revised in future annual reports (as a critical mass of additional completed projects are required before the aggregated data can be significantly updated). Project-specific outcome analyses continue to be included as focus boxes in their respective country sections.

2.2. CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS IN THE 2022 REPORT

During the implementation of the methodological changes, some projects were unable to provide the additional disaggregation requested. In these cases, data was included under the 'unspecified' category in the MLS analyses. Others lacked data for the newly created indicators. Significant cases of this include:

- Due to the methodological changes to the common output indicators performed in S1 2020, not all previously gathered GIZ data could be transferred to the changed system. Therefore, the GIZ data included in this report is not complete and numbers may differ from earlier reports.³
- For completed projects where IPs could no longer be contacted, the MLS team has applied only those methodological changes that were feasible without consultation, taking as reference project documents such as final evaluations.

Data for S2 2022 was received from all projects for which it was expected, except for the following:⁴

- In Mali, the project Diaspora AFD (ML-05-01) was not able to provide data for S2 2022 (up to its closure in September 2022).
- In Nigeria, the project One UN Response Plan (NG-09-01) did not provide complete data for S2 2022 due to ongoing methodological clarifications.
- The regional project ARCHIPELAGO (REG-15-01) did not provide the entire data for S2 2022 due to the fact that they were focusing on a more extensive and time-consuming data collection exercise at the end of the project.

¹ See footnote 2.

² Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, and Time-bound.

³ However, historical data for all projects was retroactively adapted to the methodological changes, whenever possible, and therefore data provided within the same report is comparable, even across reporting periods.

⁴ We estimate missing data for projects that have not been able to report on conducted activities would have contributed to less than 8% of the 6,000 data points collected for S2 2021. Missing data for this semester will as much as possible be gathered for the next report.

Finally, it is important to note that as projects are closing, they compile their total outputs and oftentimes do a complete revision of their data. They sometimes ask the MLS to correct past data over the whole lifetime of the project. The full list of corrections impacting data reported in past MLS reports is provided in Annex 6. This semester, large corrections were introduced by:

- The EU-IOM Joint Initiative, for all its programmes;
- PDU RECOSA (REG-18), with still minor corrections to come in the next report;
- GrEEen UNCDF (GH-02-01), for specific activities (A.3.1 and A.3.2);


The data review exercise is ongoing for RESILAC and TEH *Golfe de Guinée* and their corrections will be included in the next report.

3. PORTFOLIO OVERVIEW

3.1. BUDGET AND NUMBER OF CONTRACTS BY STATUS

As of December 2022, the EUTF for Africa had committed €5.0B, including €2.2B across 114 decisions in the Sahel and Lake Chad window, of which a total of €2.1B had been contracted to 214 operational projects.¹ The 214 contracted operational projects include 5 projects in their inception phase, 4 projects in their early implementation phase, with no data to report to the MLS yet, 99 projects in their implementation phase and with data to report and 106 completed projects. The current report includes data on 205 projects (equivalent in funding to €2.0B), comprising 106 completed projects as well as 99 projects in their implementation phase and with data to report.

Figure 2: Projects and budget covered by the yearly 2022 MLS report, December 2022



Since the publication of the previous report, the following projects have been added to the MLS database and to this report:

Table 1: Projects newly added to the MLS for the yearly 2022 report, December 2022


Country	Programme Name	EUTF ID	Project Name	Lead IP	EUTF Budget
Regional	<i>Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-REG-18-14	<i>Interconsortia Niger - Save the Children</i>	Save the Children	€ 1,400,000
Mali	<i>Programme de soutien à la transition en République du Mali</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-ML-14-02	<i>Projet d'appui à l'observation citoyenne du cycle électoral de la transition 2020-2022 au Mali</i>	ECES	€ 3,500,000
Mauritania	<i>Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint pour la Mauritanie</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-MR-09-01	<i>Création d'un partenariat opérationnel conjoint pour appuyer la lutte contre le trafic illicite de migrants et la gestion de l'immigration irrégulière en Mauritanie</i>	FIIAPP	€ 4,500,000
Niger	<i>Contrat relatif à la Reconstruction de l'État au Niger en complément du SBC II en préparation / Appui à la Justice, Sécurité et à la Gestion des Frontières au Niger</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-NE-06-08	<i>Programme d'appui à la stabilisation de la situation des populations retournées dans leurs villages d'origines dans la région de Diffa</i>	Garkua	€ 4,037,805
Niger	<i>Contrat relatif à la Reconstruction de l'État au Niger en complément du SBC II en préparation / Appui à la Justice, Sécurité et à la Gestion des Frontières au Niger</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-NE-06-09	<i>Renforcement du Dispositif de Promotion et Protection des Droits Humains (RDPPDH) au Niger</i>	CNDH	€ 1,000,000
Niger	<i>Stabilisation et renforcement socio-économique des populations affectées par la</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-NE-12-02	<i>Projet de stabilisation et du renforcement socio-économique dans les régions d'Agadez et de Zinder</i>	KARKARA	€ 1,749,000

¹ The 218 projects include only 'operational' projects: 111 projects worth approximately €62M and considered 'non-operational' are excluded from the overall analysis. They are mostly evaluations and audits, air services, mappings and plans, reports, communications and events.

	<i>migration irrégulière dans les zones de transit au Niger</i>				
Niger	<i>Résilience agro-sylvo pastorale, Ouest Niger</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-NE-14-01	<i>Résilience agro-sylvo-pastorale, Ouest Niger</i>	ENABEL	€ 4,860,000
Niger	<i>Résilience agro-sylvo pastorale, Ouest Niger</i>	T05-EUTF-SAH-NE-14-02	<i>Sécurisation et résilience du Parc W Niger et périphérie</i>	APN	€ 2,070,000

The graph below represents the evolution in the number of EUTF contracted operational projects as well as the number of projects included in the MLS reports, together with the corresponding funding amounts. Between July and December 2022, the eight projects listed above were newly included in the MLS database. This represents an increase of €24M in funding covered by the MLS SLC reports.

Figure 3: Evolution of projects and budgets covered by the MLS in SLC, December 2022^{1,2}




The below graph shows the 214 contracted operational projects by budget, lifespan, and status of implementation. The graph uses shortened programme names for the sake of clarity. Budgets refer solely to the EUTF contribution. The length of the bars represents the lifespan of the project and the height/width the EUTF budget per project. The colour of the bars indicates the status of the project. Dates of completion are considered as of January 2023.

¹ In 2020, the MLS shifted from a quarterly to a biannual reporting schedule, initially to accommodate methodological changes process, and later to make room for other complementary work streams that aim to support the EUTF and the EU in the medium-to long-term future.

² Between the first semester of 2022 and end of 2022, four projects initially considered as operational were re-classified as not relevant for the MLS after discussion with the EU delegation – hence the decrease in number of signed, operational contracts from 218 to 214. No data has been collected for these projects.


Figure 4: EUTF SLC contracted projects by budget and implementation status, December 2022



3.2. BUDGET DISTRIBUTION BY COUNTRY, IMPLEMENTING PARTNER AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

As of December 2022, regional projects collectively represented the largest amount of contracted EUTF funding. A total of €602.0M (or 29% of the total) were contracted to 55 projects at the regional level. At the country level, Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso have the largest portfolios, with respective budgets of €294.4M (14%), €288.6M (14%), and €190.8M (9%).

Figure 5: Budget distribution by country and implementing partner, December 2022^{1,2}



The EUTF SLC budget for operational contracted projects remains largely managed by member state agencies (€893.8M, or 43% of the budget), as well as United Nations (UN) agencies, funds, and programmes (€442.1M, or 22%). Projects managed by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) represent 19% of the total budget, amounting to €395.8M. Recipient countries' governments directly receive 12% (or €239.8M) of the budget, mostly in the form of budget support actions, followed by international organisations and the private sector to a lesser extent, with 3% and 1% of the budget, respectively €69.2M and €24.9M.³

With regards to Strategic Objectives (SO), security and governance activities (SO4) receive the largest share of budget at 34% (€692.8M). SO4 is the main priority in Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Mali, Niger, and Mauritania, where it accounts for 69%, 56%, 49%, 42%, and 36% of the budget, respectively. Projects

¹ The map shows the distribution of the combined SLC budget (€2.06B) for the 218 operational projects, per country.

² 'New' refers to projects newly added to the MLS for the S2 2021 report.

³ For many contracts, parts of the budgets are subcontracted by IPs (including member state agencies and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes) at least in part to NGOs and CSOs.


in Mali, followed by regional projects and projects in Burkina Faso receive the largest amount of funding for SO4, with respectively €141.3M, €135.6M, and €132.4M dedicated to these activities.

Resilience building (SO2) represents 26% of the EUTF funds in the SLC window (€534.3M) and is particularly significant in Chad and Cameroon as well as among regional projects (where it accounts for 73%, 50% and 36% of the budget, respectively). Regional projects dedicated to SO2 represent €215.1M, followed by Mali (€90M), Chad (€83.6M) and Nigeria (€39.6M).

Economic and employment opportunities (SO1) are supported by 23% (or €473M) of the EUTF SLC budget. These types of activities are particularly important in West African coastal countries such as The Gambia (90% of the total funds for this country), Côte d'Ivoire (83%), Guinea (82%), Ghana (80%) and Senegal (56%). In absolute numbers, the countries with the largest amount of funding dedicated to SO1 are Senegal with €92.2M and Niger with €88.9M.

Migration management (SO3) represents another 18% (€366.3M) of total EUTF funding in SLC. SO3 is funded primarily through regional programmes, which represent €210.3M. National country programmes dedicated to SO3 are prevalent in Niger (€53.9M) and Senegal (€27.9M).

Figure 6: Contracted budget breakdown by Strategic Objectives, December 2022¹



¹ Share of budget for projects contracted and relevant to the MLS.

4. SITUATION AND RESULTS OVERVIEW

4.1. THE SAHEL AND LAKE CHAD REGION IN 2022

The Sahel and Lake Chad region was marked by political turmoil and violence in 2022. Al Qaeda and Islamic West Africa Province (ISWAP) militants intensified their actions, notably in Burkina Faso and Mali. With bases in the far south of Mali and Burkina Faso, armed groups ramped up their attacks in coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea (Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, Togo), which had so far been spared by the Sahel conflict.^{1,2} In November 2022, the international community met at the International Conference on the Accra Initiative to specifically discuss a roadmap towards a preventative and coordinated response to challenges facing the coastal and Sahelian states.³ The Initiative aims to prevent the spillover of terrorism from the Sahel and to address transnational organised crime within the common border areas of member states.

Several countries witnessed significant political and economic events with far-reaching consequences for the stability of the region. Burkina Faso experienced a turbulent year with two regime changes occurring due to military coups d'état, first in January and then again in September.⁴ This took place against a backdrop of worsening security crisis in Burkina Faso and Mali. Ghana, a key player in the region, faced an increasingly challenging economic situation marked by high inflation and a default on its debt obligations.⁵ Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, was marked by election-related violent events in December, just two months prior to the highly anticipated general elections of February 2023. The rising tensions and escalating violence raised concerns over their potential impact on Nigeria's stability.⁶

Climate change interacted with regional political and security tensions and contributed to creating complex humanitarian emergencies. In 2022, the rainy season started early and was above average, leading to flooding in Mali, Cameroon, Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Benin.⁷ The floods killed more than 800 people, destroyed homes and shelters, and damaged hundreds of hectares of farmland.⁸ In addition to triggering short-term disasters, climate change is affecting the routes and flows of transhumance and the patterns of seasonal work in agriculture, mining and fishing. These changes are inducing people to migrate, thus increasing competition for resources in new areas and sparking community-level tensions.⁹

The worsening political and security situation in the Sahel belt continued to have a direct impact on displacement and migration figures. Forced displacement reached new heights in the Sahel and Lake Chad region in 2022. UNHCR reported 7,749,903 internally displaced persons, 1,561,832 refugees and 70,595 asylum seekers across the region.¹⁰ Moreover, migration flows to Europe remained significant in 2022, with 136,158 arrivals on three main migration routes: the Atlantic Route, the Central Mediterranean Route, and the Western Mediterranean Route.¹¹

¹ *Institut Montaigne*, 'Gulf of Guinea: Can the Sahel Trap Be Avoided?', 01 February 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² Council on Foreign Relations, 'Preventing Conflict in Coastal West Africa', 25 August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ UNOWAS, 'International Conference of the Accra Initiative', 23 November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ ISS, 'Security priorities for Burkina Faso's new transition', October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Al-Jazeera, 'How Ghana, Africa's rising star, ended up in economic turmoil', 31 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ ACLED, 'Nigeria Election Violence Tracker', 25 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ World Weather Attribution, 'Climate change exacerbated heavy rainfall leading to large scale flooding in highly vulnerable communities in West Africa', 16 November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Carbon Brief, 'West Africa's deadly rainfall in 2022 made '80 times more likely' by climate change', 16 November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ ICMPD, 'Migration Outlook 2022: West Africa', 24 January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ UNHCR, 'West and Central Africa – Persons of concern', 31 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


¹¹ Frontex, 'Monitoring and Risk Analysis'. Retrieved [here](#).

4.2. THE EUTF RESPONSE – OVERVIEW OF RESULTS

This section offers an analysis of the results of the EUTF’s response to date against its four Strategic Objectives: economy and employment; resilience (food security and access to basic services); migration management; and governance and conflict prevention.

4.2.1. OVERVIEW OF EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Figure 7: Main achievements of EUTF-funded programmes in 2022, December 2022



The table below shows the aggregated values reported by SLC projects for the 38 EUTF common output indicators as of 31 December 2022.


Table 2: EUTF common output indicators for all SLC projects, December 2022¹

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	S1 2022	S2 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	17,333	24,769	32,020	31,719	17,879	13,340	137,059	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	4,234	4,555	10,705	16,554	6,997	5,760	48,805	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	74,906	98,273	75,162	118,741	89,613	71,784	528,478	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	32,254	44,477	30,772	68,193	65,329	47,962	288,988	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	18	326	159	144	32	34	713	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	70	131	65	72	40	78	456	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	1,573	3,432	2,313	3,292	1,123	286	12,018	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	403,805	459,856	127,182	50,990	154,921	217,365	1,414,119	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	560,237	737,215	341,586	223,880	183,617	230,683	2,277,218	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	522,319	698,582	738,453	559,521	128,454	277,864	2,925,194	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	182	218	17	45	0	15	477	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	11,413	93,177	21,734	33,446	55,453	2,548	217,771	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	666,654	1,335,913	34,124,609	9,849,843	9,040,310	7,416,062	62,433,391	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	15,129	33,292	52,542	33,982	4,831	4,390	144,167	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	2,423,091	1,340,869	728,670	1,020,324	475,305	388,674	6,376,932	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	19	36	36	127	112	40	370	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	61,089	12,320	16,692	64,449	35,840	20,069	210,459	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	443,515	1,022,823	1,253,965	1,784,391	967,442	12,884,182	18,356,319	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	29,194	19,165	14,823	8,012	96	97	71,387	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	47,490	22,168	10,744	12,678	11	0	93,091	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	17,971	18,099	31,008	22,023	1,358	224	90,683	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	64	328	76	47	1	1	517	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	729	1,615	3,623	8,228	2,111	2,343	18,650	
3.8 Number of people of concern benefiting from evacuation and resettlement...	2,915	1,395	583	465	18	0	5,376	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	11	326	305	210	13	18	883	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	10,340	4,122	1,820	560	85	222	17,149	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	22	22	23	49	3	10	129	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	2,315	1,313	7,099	34,193	13,249	5,784	63,953	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	13,686	10,698	10,655	22,150	12,001	8,285	77,474	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	544,936	433,900	2,652,720	475,844	516,584	336,894	4,960,879	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	133	728	362	882	919	425	3,448	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	213	791	857	1,203	694	420	4,178	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	188	311	2,376	2,168	94	2,399	7,536	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	158	199	152	573	225	370	1,677	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	47	44	24	39	5	14	173	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	11,465,917	2,147,301	5,998	846	13,620,062	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	745,288	1,120,130	3,307,422	246,807	5,419,647	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	1,234	1,130	190	5	2,560	

¹ Trendlines represent quarterly non-cumulated outputs across time.

4.2.2. GREATER ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES

Figure 8: Strategic Objective 1 dashboard, SLC, December 2022¹



Inflation in West Africa is estimated to have increased to 16.8% in 2022, driven by the war in Ukraine and sustained global supply chain disruptions.² Reduced food and energy exports from

¹ Budget figures are related to projects which are contracted, relevant to the MLS, and providing data.

² AfDB, 'Africa's Macroeconomic Performance and Outlook', January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

Russia and the Ukraine caused a global price surge, affecting most those households which spend a large share of their income on these commodities. To ease inflation, many countries in West and Central Africa tightened their monetary policies, leading to decelerated economic activity.¹ In 2022, growth in West Africa is estimated to have slowed to 3.6% from 4.4% in 2021.² While the monetary policy response will likely ease inflation in 2023, macroeconomic instability is likely to remain significant amid rising debt and debt-servicing burdens.³ Ghana, for instance, having spent 54% of its revenue on interest payments in the first half of 2022⁴, announced at the end of the year a suspension of parts of its foreign debt service.⁵

While higher food prices threatened food security⁶, increased energy prices put pressure on economic activities and social service delivery, affecting business operations and social institutions like schools and health facilities. Relatedly, post COVID-19 job recovery slowed down: compared to pre-pandemic levels, there remains a 2.1% gap in hours worked in Africa, corresponding to 8.3 million fewer full-time equivalent jobs.⁷ These challenges add themselves to already existing economic barriers linked to sustained conflict, climate change, and skills mismatches.

Africa's largest economy, Nigeria, is a case in point, having suffered in 2022 from heightened inflation, sustained conflict, widespread floodings and inefficient oil production. The increase in global oil prices did not benefit Nigerian oil earnings because of low outputs related to inadequate maintenance, funding shortfalls and security risks⁸. The oil sector shrank by 19.2% in 2022.⁹ Moreover, inflation reached a 21-year high and averaged 18.8%.¹⁰ Additionally, widespread floods, likely impacted by climate change¹¹, affected 3.2 million people across the country¹². These developments hence contributed to the 11.8 million additional Nigerians estimated to be living below the national poverty line by 2024, compared to 2019.¹³

The EUTF has contracted €473M¹⁴ (23% of the total EUTF SLC budget) to enhance economic and employment opportunities (SO1) in the region. The Trust Fund primarily targets inclusive job creation focusing on the most vulnerable, both through the job market and by supporting people to develop income generating activities. In addition, it aims to strengthen micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) through improved governance, access to funding, enterprise development, as well as by building, renovating, and expanding business infrastructure. Finally, its programmes support professional training (TVET) and skills development. 12 projects focusing on SO1 completed in 2022. 23 out of 50 SO1 projects were ongoing in January 2023, accounting for 57% of the SO1 overall contracted budget.

Long-term employment opportunities in an informal environment

Macroeconomic instability linked to inflation and indebtedness curbed post COVID-19 recovery in Africa. While the gap in hours worked in Africa relative to pre COVID-19 levels narrowed from 15.7% (in Q2 2020) to 2.1% (in Q3 2022), changes in 2022 were marginal (from 2.6% in Q1 to 2.1% in Q3).¹⁵ This deceleration in employment recovery correlates with the slower growth achieved in 2022. Importantly, informal workers had suffered particularly from the COVID-19-induced recession. In

¹ United Nations, 'World Economic Situation and Prospects', January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² AfDB, 'Africa's Macroeconomic Performance and Outlook', January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ United Nations, 'World Economic Situation and Prospects', January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ World Bank, 'Ghana Macro Poverty Outlook', 4 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Al-Jazeera, 'How Ghana, Africa's rising star, ended up in economic turmoil', 31 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Food security developments will be discussed in detail under SO2.

⁷ ILO, 'Monitor on the world of work. Tenth edition', 31 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ World Bank, 'Nigeria Macro Poverty Outlook', 4 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ World Bank, 'Nigeria Macro Poverty Outlook', 4 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ World Weather Attribution, 'Climate change exacerbated heavy rainfall leading to large scale flooding in highly vulnerable communities in West Africa', 16 November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹² OCHA, 'Nigeria Situation Report', 19 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹³ World Bank, 'Nigeria Macro Poverty Outlook', 4 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁴ Reduction by 41.000 of budget for NE-12-02 (compared to figure in S1 2022).

¹⁵ ILO, 'Monitor on the world of work. Tenth edition', 31 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

general, informal workers tend to be excluded from safety nets, have lower incomes and limited buffers, and are less frequently reached by government support programmes.¹ As a consequence, efforts for post COVID-19 recovery in Africa focused on recognising the specific challenges as well as economic contributions of the informal sector. Most importantly, in 2022 recovery policies aimed to create an enabling environment to transition to formality.²

The prevalence of informal employment in West Africa increased the region's vulnerability to the economic turbulences of 2022. West Africa has the highest share of informal employment among all African regions, amounting to 92% of total employment. For youth (98%) and women (95%), the numbers are even higher. Even with tertiary education, the chances for formal employment are only 51% in West Africa. The highest share of informal workers is in the agricultural sector (98%), followed by the industrial (92%) and the service sectors (85%).³ Although recent research found that informal employment does not contract in times of recession, informal workers are nonetheless strongly affected by economic turbulences.⁴ Most likely, the informal labour market absorbs lower output through reduced working hours and lower wages. These coping mechanisms can be used much more extensively on the unregulated informal labour market.⁵

In 2022, EUTF-funded programmes created or supported more permanent regular wage jobs than in any previous year, namely 14,772 (indicator 1.1). This represents 47% of all employment supported or created in 2022, compared to 38% in 2021 and 18% in 2020. 60% of those benefitting from the permanent and regular jobs were young people. As with other jobs created or supported, most of these regular wage jobs were in the agricultural/fishery/livestock sector (34%), followed by the services sector (11%). Geographically, most permanent and regular jobs were created or supported in Niger (28%) and Ghana (24%). The *Emploi Niger* programme (NE-11)⁶, for instance, aims to strengthen local employment and sustainable economic development, and to establish an ecosystem favouring enterprise development in the Region of Zinder. Its holistic approach to job creation includes agricultural trainings, technical counselling, strengthening of agricultural cooperatives, sensitising for entrepreneurship, and supporting access to financial services so that beneficiaries are able to invest in key agricultural inputs. Since its start, *Emploi Niger* has created or supported 6,654 jobs, 51% of which were permanent / regular employment.

51% of the jobs created or supported in 2022 were skilled jobs, the highest percentage recorded so far by the EUTF. In absolute terms, 15,774 of the jobs supported in 2022 were skilled, as opposed to 5,908 unskilled⁷. For example, the ADEL programme (ML-12)⁸ in Mali focused on local economic development in the Tombouctou and Gao regions by supporting technical training and economic integration measures. After three years of implementation, the programme came to a close in November 2022. During its implementation, ADEL helped establish 12 offices for professional orientation and integration within existing structures in the two regions. The offices served as entry points to orient job seekers towards qualifying and self-employment measures. The job seekers were placed in trainings followed by internships in their targeted profession based on individual counselling to identify suitable professional projects. Over the project period, young people were trained in 19 professions, such as solar panel installation, plumbing, or tailoring. People seeking self-employment were accompanied by a mentor. Overall, ADEL created or supported 3,378 jobs, all of them skilled.

In 2022, 29 EUTF programmes created or supported 31,219 jobs in 12 countries of the SLC region, leading the total number of jobs created or supported since 2018 increases to 137,059. Both in

¹ World Bank, 'The Long Shadow of Informality. Challenges and Policies', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

² AU, ILO, UNDP, 'Concept Note : Informal Economy in Africa : Which Way Forward? Making policy responsive, inclusive and sustainable', May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ ILO, 'Women and Men in the Informal Economy: A Statistical Picture', 2018. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ World Bank, 'The Long Shadow of Informality. Challenges and Policies', 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ *Création d'emplois et d'opportunités économiques à travers une gestion durable de l'environnement dans les zones de transit et départ au Niger*.

⁷ For 9,537 jobs created or supported in 2022, it was not specified whether they were skilled or unskilled.

⁸ *Appui au Développement Économique Local et à la prévention des conflits dans les régions de Tombouctou et Gao*.

2022 and overall, most jobs were supported in Niger (39% in 2022 and 26% overall). Contrary to the general trend, however, Ghana recorded the second highest number of supported jobs in 2022 (14%). The results achieved by GrEEn GH (GH-02)¹ were for the most part responsible for this result. In addition, most jobs created / supported in 2022 came from strengthening MSMEs, livelihood groups, or Village Savings and Loan Associations (VSLAs – 34%). TVET and skills development support (25%) and cash-for-work (16%) were also important contributions to supporting employment.

Supporting access to finance in financially turbulent times

Inflation and economic slowdown hampered both supply and demand of financial services for MSMEs, entrepreneurs and households. On the supply side, central banks in West Africa reacted to increasing inflation by tightening monetary policy, albeit to different degrees. For instance, the Central Bank of West African States raised policy interest rates by merely 75 basis points in 2022², whereas the Bank of Ghana increased policy rates by 1350 basis points in the same timeframe, reaching 28% at the end of 2022³. Consequently, commercial banks imposed higher interest rates to customers by tightening their credit standards⁴. On the demand side, household budgets and company balances came under pressure due to increased food and energy prices. As a result, parts of investments and loan repayments were postponed. It is remarkable that regardless of the difficult macroeconomic environment, 92% of West African banks expect to expand their activities according to the European Investment Bank's 2022 Banking in Africa survey.⁵ One explanation could be that the negative effects bear predominantly on microfinance institutions, which serve more vulnerable households and enterprises. Indeed, preliminary data suggests that the loan portfolios of microfinance institutions in sub-Saharan Africa are deteriorating.⁶

These issues magnify long-term challenges to financial inclusion, most importantly a lack of collaterals, poor credit history, and insufficient financial education. In a 2019 survey among SMEs in 19 francophone African countries, 32% of respondents who saw their loan application rejected reported that they had provided insufficient collateral. For 26% of the rejected applications, the reason was that the bank doubted the company's ability to repay or generate profits. In 24% of the cases, the business plan was deemed unreliable or the application form was not completed correctly.⁷ The latter figure points to the role of financial education in extending access to finance. Recent research underlines that building financial abilities is a key strategy to increasing financial inclusion.⁸

In 2022, the EUTF addressed financial inclusion by supporting access to finance for 101,704 people (indicator 1.3). Improving access to finance was the largest contributor to indicator 1.3 (income-generating activities), its contribution having increased sharply in 2022 compared to previous years. While access to finance only accounted for 9% of people reached with income generating activities in 2021, i.e. 10,870 people, the number went up to 63% in 2022. The GrEEn GH, the PDU (REG-18)⁹, *Pôles Ruraux* (NE-03)¹⁰, SAFIRE (MR-07)¹¹, and TUUMA (BF-06)¹² programmes all contributed to this increase. Most notably, GrEEn GH reported nine times more people assisted with financial services between 2021 and 2022. This is the result of a wide-ranging upscaling of financial services in the target regions, accompanied by broad sensitisation campaigns. Services provided

¹ Boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in Ghana.

² World Bank, 'Mali Macro Poverty Outlook', 5 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ World Bank, 'Ghana Macro Poverty Outlook', 5 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ EIB, 'Finance in Africa: Navigating the financial landscape in turbulent times', 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ International Trade Centre, 'Promoting SME competitiveness in Francophone Africa', 14 November 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Ansar, S. et al., 'The Importance of Financial Education for the Effective Use of Formal Financial Services', March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ *Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel*.

¹⁰ *Projet d'appui aux filières agricoles dans les régions de Tahoua et Agadez*.

¹¹ *Programme de renforcement de la résilience des communautés urbaines et rurales vulnérables en Mauritanie*.

¹² *Appui à la compétence professionnelle, l'entrepreneuriat et l'emploi des jeunes et des femmes dans les régions rurales du Burkina Faso*.

include smart bank accounts, mobile wallets, as well as integrated payments and bookkeeping platform for entrepreneurs.

In addition to supporting access to finance, EUTF-funded programmes also provided financial training to 64,637 people in 2022 (indicator 1.4). This represents 57% of all people reached with TVET or skills development activities in 2022 in SLC, up from 11% in 2021. 54% of them were men and 44% women.¹ The CRIALCES (REG-24)², GrEEn GH, IPDEV2 (REG-11)³, and *Pôles Ruraux* programmes contributed to these achievements. The quantitatively most significant results were achieved in Ghana, accounting for 98% of all financial trainings. The country suffered particularly from financial turmoil in 2022, recording an estimated annual inflation rate of 31.5%.⁴ Based on research on financial literacy gaps among the target population in the Ashanti and Western Regions, GrEEn GH worked with financial and other intermediaries to scale up financial education. The intermediaries include conventional banks (e.g. Fidelity Bank Ghana) and digital service providers (e.g. Viamo) who delivered financial literacy skills both face-to-face and online. The latter included digital training modules, a chatbot solution, and an interactive voice response system. In addition to financial education, TVET and skills development activities in 2022 also included technical trainings, dual education, and entrepreneurship trainings.

¹ 2% unspecified.


² *Réponse à la crise alimentaire au centre Sahel : support nutritionnel et relèvement.*

³ *Soutenir les entrepreneurs et les petites PME en Afrique de l'Ouest.*

⁴ World Bank, 'Ghana Macro Poverty Outlook', 5 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

4.2.3. STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE OF COMMUNITIES

Figure 9: Strategic Objective 2 dashboard, SLC, December 2022



the SLC region as a whole has suffered from several compounding issues, resulting in a **further deterioration of food security in 2022**. Food insecurity has been increasing year after year in the region, both in absolute and relative terms. The number of people from the region at IPC phases 3 to 5¹ during the September to December season increased from 10.7 million in 2019 (3.9% of the population) to 31.4 million in 2022 (8% of the population). In 2022, this number increased by 6.4 million people.

Figure 10: Number of people at stages 3 to 5 of IPC, December 2022





Figure 11: Evolution of the number of people at stages 3-5 of IPC², 2018-2022



The most affected countries in the region in 2022 were Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and to a lesser extent, Senegal, Ghana, Togo and The Gambia. Most countries faced an important increase in commodities' prices, largely due to the global disruptions in the supply chain resulting from the conflict in Ukraine. Inflation not only affected the price of food commodities, but also of energy and fertilizers, which resulted in increased costs for domestic food production. At more local levels, this was compounded by weather (floods or insufficient rainfall) and political events leading to further population displacements. In the summer of 2022, Nigeria experienced the worst floods since 2012, which displaced 1.4 million people³ and damaged more than 676,000 hectares of farmland before the harvest season. In mid-October, it was estimated that 19 million people were food insecure and 14.7 million children were at risk of malnutrition in Nigeria⁴. Burkina Faso faced the worst food crisis in a decade due to a reduction in staple agricultural produce yields, increased costs for imported key products and increasing internal displacement (1.88 million people displaced in December 2022)⁵.

Intensifying conflict and violence kept increasing the number of forcibly displaced persons (see SO 3 section below) in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and north-western Nigeria, **and hampering the delivery of basic services**. As of September 2022, 11,000 schools were closed in the Sahel region due to conflict.⁶ As of December, more than 600 health facilities were affected by insecurity in Burkina Faso, 211 of which were entirely closed.⁷

As a result, in December 2022, 36.7 million people were in urgent need of humanitarian assistance across the Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad Basin regions.⁸ As conflict and violence intensified in both regions, humanitarian assistance continued to face high access constraints, reinforcing the vulnerability of local populations.⁹

¹ The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), a multi-stakeholder initiative for improving food security and nutrition analysis, classifies acute food insecurity (AFI) into five stages: (1) Minimal/None, (2) Stressed, (3) Crisis, (4) Emergency, (5) Catastrophe/Famine. Phases 3 to 5 thus represent crisis level of worse.

² *Cadre Harmonisé* and IPC estimations for West and Central Africa, January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ UNOCHA, 'Nigeria Situation Report', 19 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Nigeria, 'UN / Nigeria humanitarian situation', 13 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ UNHCR Operational Data Portal, 'IDPs in Burkina Faso', December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ UNICEF, '11,000 schools closed in the Sahel region due to conflict', September 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ UNICEF, 'Burkina Faso situation report', January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Aggregated UNOCHA data from January 2023. Retrieved [here](#), [here](#), [here](#), [here](#) and [here](#).

⁹ ACAPS, 'Humanitarian Access Overview', July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

The EUTF has contracted €534.3M (26% of the total EUTF SLC budget) to strengthen the resilience of communities (SO2). EUTF resilience programmes broadly adopt a Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) approach to better anticipate, prepare for and respond to crises related to insecurity, mass displacements and other shocks. In 2022, 13 SO2 programmes¹ (65 contracts) were active. The PDU programme (REG-18)², launched in 2019, represents 40% of the budget of on-going programming for SO2. Ten projects, representing 28% of the SO2 budget, were completed in 2022, and another twelve are expected to complete in 2023 (25% of SO2 budget).

Provision of civil registration, legal assistance and other basic social services

EUTF-funded programmes have increased support to basic service delivery in the SLC window in 2022. During the year, 372,286 basic services have been delivered (indicator 2.2), compared to 50,990 in 2021. The largest focus in 2022 was on legal assistance, in particular civil registration, through PAECISIS (ML-08)³, which delivered 169,363 civil registration judgements in Mali, and DIZA (TD-07)⁴, which provided birth certificates to 24,050 IDP and asylum-seeker children in Chad. Security G5 Sahel (REG-23)⁵ provided legal assistance to 53,547 beneficiaries (63% female) in Mali through civil society organisations (CSOs), and the PDU provided legal counselling or documentation through local legal advice services to 7,381 beneficiaries in Burkina Faso.

Beyond legal assistance, the One UN Response Plan (NG-09)⁶ continued providing essential health and social protection services to 40,000 beneficiaries in Nigeria. Protection Burkina Faso (BF-07)⁷ provided school textbooks and pedagogical tools to 25,400 post-primary school pupils in Burkina Faso. The PDU provided water and sanitation services to 12,104 beneficiaries in Burkina Faso and 9,671 in Chad.

To support basic service delivery, 1,409 social infrastructures were built, repaired or supported (indicator 2.1 bis). PDU projects constructed or rehabilitated 568 social infrastructures in Burkina Faso (425 infrastructures), Niger (102 infrastructures), Chad and Mali. The PDU focused mostly on water and sanitation infrastructures such as latrines and boreholes, and to a lesser extent on food security-related infrastructures such as food storage, and health centres which it assisted with equipment and inputs. RESILAC (REG-05)⁸ supported 279 functional literacy centres in Niger and Chad, and restored 148 infrastructures, including flood protection systems in Cameroon.

Thanks to these and other efforts, **892,237 people have gained improved access to basic social services and transfers (indicator 2.9) in 2022.** 571,433 beneficiaries have received cash or food transfers, at least 59% of them with an objective of nutrition and/or food security (333,344). CRIALCES (REG-24)⁹ distributed cash and coupons to purchase nutritional food for 275,363 children and pregnant women in Mali (163,163 beneficiaries), Niger (79,810) and Burkina Faso (32,390). The PDU provided cash transfers to 216,289 beneficiaries as a means of social protection (86%) or nutrition or food security (14%) to vulnerable people, IDPs, refugees and host populations in Burkina Faso (161,338 beneficiaries), Niger (95,742), Chad (68,508), Mali (32,913) and Mauritania (125).

In addition to social transfers, 117,369 people benefitted from improved health services in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Senegal, 102,900 benefitted from improved water and sanitation services in Chad,

¹ In the SLC window, programmes, or decisions, are classified as belonging to a unique SO, in the action document describing the decision.

² Programme d'urgence pour la réhabilitation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.

³ Programme d'appui au fonctionnement de l'état civil au Mali: appui à la mise en place d'un système d'information sécurisé.

⁴ Programme de développement inclusif dans les zones d'accueil.

⁵ Appui aux forces de sécurité des pays membres du G5 Sahel pour la lutte contre l'impunité et le renforcement de leurs liens avec les populations.

⁶ EU Support to the United Nations 'One UN Response Plan to COVID-19 in Nigeria'.

⁷ Protection des jeunes dans les zones à risque au Burkina Faso à travers l'éducation et le dialogue.

⁸ RESILAC – Redressement Economique Social et Inclusif du Lac Tchad – Cameroun, Niger, Nigeria, Tchad.

⁹ Réponse à la crise alimentaire au centre Sahel : support nutritionnel et relèvement.

Niger, Burkina Faso and Senegal, and 1,571 benefitted from supported education services in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.

Supporting nutrition and food security in a food crisis context

In the increasingly severe food security situation, EUTF programmes continued to bring food security and nutrition assistance to SLC populations in 2022. While some of the largest EUTF-financed programmes with a significant focus on food security have completed in 2020 or 2021, **the EUTF still provided 406,318 beneficiaries with food security assistance (indicator 2.4) and 414,300 with nutrition assistance (indicator 2.3) in 2022.**

The PDU has worked with 267,771 beneficiaries in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania on malnutrition screening - either to directly screen children (200,989) or to train mothers on how to screen their children for malnutrition. The programme introduced the Baby WASH approach, supporting nutrition outcomes with water, sanitation and hygiene, to 60,198 beneficiaries in Burkina Faso and Niger, and provided dietary training to 30,802 beneficiaries in the same countries. On the food security aspect, in addition to distribution of cash and vouchers (see previous section), the PDU assisted 166,671 beneficiaries with farming inputs and tools, training on agricultural practices, livestock and agricultural land rehabilitation.

The CRIALCES programme assisted 228,861 farmers with agricultural extension and equipment to improve food production and the processing of nutritional foods in Burkina Faso (63%), Mali (37%) and Niger.

In addition, 58,001 hectares of agricultural land were rehabilitated in 2022 (indicator 2.6). *Emploi Niger (NE-11)*¹ rehabilitated 48,627 hectares in Zinder, Agadez and Tahoua (Niger) with flood protection, band spreading and rural roads. RESILAC rehabilitated 3,613 sites through cash-for-work rehabilitation of community assets in Niger. *Pôles Ruraux (NE-03)*² continued its rehabilitation programme in Niger, reporting 2,939 hectares in 2022, through recovery of degraded land, seeding and fight against invasive species. Also in Niger (Dosso, Tillabéri and Tahoua), *Résilience ASP (NE-14)*³ rehabilitated 2,385 hectares of pasture.


¹ *Création d'emplois et d'opportunités économiques à travers une gestion durable de l'environnement dans les zones de transit et départ au Niger.*

² *Projet d'appui aux filières agricoles dans les régions de Tahoua et Agadez.*

³ *Résilience agro-sylvo pastorale, Ouest Niger.*

4.2.4. IMPROVED MIGRATION MANAGEMENT

Figure 12: Strategic Objective 3 dashboard, SLC, December 2022¹



¹ Budget figures are related to projects which are contracted and relevant to the MLS.

The Sahel and Lake Chad region has developed into one of the world's fastest growing displacement crises. Forced displacement reached new heights in 2022, with 7,749,903 internally displaced persons and 1,561,832 refugees recorded in the region,¹ or 380,241 additional IDPs and 56,298 additional refugees compared to December 2021.² Displacement is driven by conflict and violence, with a concentration of displacements in the border areas between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger and in the northwest of Nigeria. Climate change has also triggered short-term migration events, such as the catastrophic floods that swept several West African countries in 2022.³

Migration in West Africa is characterised by intra-regional migration.⁴ Almost 95% of West African migrants move around countries in the region.⁵ This migration is legal and border crossings are enabled by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Free Movement Protocol. The main migration routes run through the Sahel region, on an east-west axis going from Chad to Senegal and crossing Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali, among others.

Europe remains an important destination for West African migrants who attempt to get there via three main migration routes. These are the Atlantic Route, linking Senegal, Mauritania and Morocco with the Canary Islands, the Central Mediterranean Route, linking Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria with Italy and Malta, and the Western Mediterranean route, linking Morocco and Algeria with Spain. The Atlantic Route has surged in recent years and become the second most active route between Africa and Europe, after the Central Mediterranean Route.⁶ In 2022, 15,682 arrivals were reported in the Canary Islands.⁷ Migrants travelling to the Canary Islands do so in inadequate and overcrowded boats and, in 2022, the NGO Caminando Fronteras documented 61 shipwrecks and the disappearance of 1,784 people in 2022.^{8,9}

The EUTF has contracted €366.3M (18% of the EUTF SLC budget) to improve migration management in countries of origin, transit, and destination (SO3) across 22 countries in Africa, including 13 countries in West Africa. With 20% of the SLC's SO3 budget, the EU-IOM Joint Initiative (EU-IOM JI)¹⁰ aims to support the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants in the Sahel and produces data on migration factors, flows and trends to inform evidence-based policymaking and programming. The Protection West Africa (REG-13)¹¹ and *TEH Golfe de Guinée* (REG-12)¹² programmes aim to protect children, young migrants, and vulnerable people along the Atlantic Route (Gambia-Senegal-Mauritania) and Central Mediterranean Route, with special attention to people at risk of trafficking. The EUTF also finances activities to strengthen the operational management of migration (including border management), through programmes such as ProGEM (NE-02)¹³ in Niger, AFIA (MR-

¹ UNHCR, 'West and Central Africa – Persons of concern'. 31 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ ICMPD, 'Migration Outlook 2022: West Africa', 24 January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ ICMPD, 'Migration Outlook 2022: West Africa', 24 January 2022. Retrieved [here](#). The report cites IOM data in 2021 with 90% of the 7.4% million migrations living in West Africa coming from countries in the region.

⁵ EU-IOM Joint Initiatives for Migrant Protection and Reintegration, 'Sahel and Lake Chad'. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, 'North-West Passage', December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ *Gobierno de España*, 'Inmigración irregular 2022', Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ *Caminando Fronteras*, 'Monitoring the Right to Life', 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ According to IOM, 45 shipwrecks were recorded in 2022 with 543 people dying or disappearing. As stated by IOM, however, these figures are probably underestimated, as data remains limited. (IOM, 'Irregular Migration Towards Europe: Western Africa – Atlantic Route', January 2023. Retrieved here).

¹⁰ Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Chad.

¹¹ *Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest*.

¹² *Appui à la Lutte contre la Traite des Personnes dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée*.

¹³ *Renforcement de la gestion durable des conséquences des flux migratoires*.

02)¹ in Mauritania, Border Security in Ghana (GH-01)² and the *Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint* (POC) in Mali (ML-13)³, Mauritania (MR-09)⁴ and Senegal (SN-10)⁵.

Protecting migrants in transit

Migrants along the main routes in West Africa and the Sahel are often exposed to precarious living conditions along risky journeys. The most vulnerable of them lack economic resources and support networks to meet basic needs in terms of food, water, health, and shelter.. In 2022, EUTF-funded programmes continued to implement activities along migration routes to minimise these risks and enable migrants to continue their journey safely. The programmes reached 55,909 migrants in transit in 2022 (indicator 3.2): beneficiaries received cash transfers/vouchers (23,061 migrants) and humanitarian assistance (32,848 migrants).

EUTF-funded programmes tailored their interventions to meet the specific needs of beneficiaries. Acknowledging that many migrants have faced high levels of hardship, the Protection West Africa programme delivered interventions to help migrants overcome trauma experienced before and/or during migration, and reached 7,889 people in 2022. This assistance was delivered in regions along main migration routes, including the Centre-Est and Centre Nord regions in Burkina Faso, Kayes, Ségou and Tombouctou in Mali, and Agadez and Niamey in Niger.

7,918 children and young migrants were assisted through one-stop-shops, which are spaces where asylum seekers, refugees and migrants can access protection-related services. Staff at one-stop-shops notably identify children and youth in need of assistance and refer them to government institutions and service providers offering specialised services. These can include emergency food and health assistance, legal support but also access to safe spaces, host families and family reunification.

The Nexus SRD (MR-08) programme worked with CSOs to ensure the durability and sustainability of its actions in Mauritania. The programme delivered its activities through IOM and national CSOs which it helped upskill to ensure that migrants transiting through the country continue to find assistance once the programme is completed.

EUTF-funded programmes trained 4,454 people on issues at the crossroads between migration management and protection (indicator 3.7). The Protection West Africa and *TEH Golfe de Guinée* programmes were the main contributors to this indicator in 2022, training 2,158 and 1,439 people on human trafficking and migrant smuggling (36%) and protection and gender-based violence (48%), respectively, as well as other topics such as the European context, refugee law and the socio-economic inclusion of refugees and returnees. Trainees were community members/volunteers, local civilian institutions, local security forces, national security forces, NGOs/CSOs and service providers. These activities took place in the 13 countries where EUTF programmes operate in the SLC region.

Supporting the reintegration of returned migrants

The reintegration of returned migrants is a slow and complex process. Migrants face the challenge of adapting to their environment whilst in transit and at their destination, but also when they return to their communities of origin. Many factors affect the reintegration process, including their experiences of migration, the length of time spent abroad, whether the person was forced to return or did so voluntarily, whether they kept in touch with their community or origin, etc. It can also be challenging for returnees to find job opportunities that match the trainings and skills acquired abroad.

¹ *Renforcement des capacités pour une meilleure gestion de la migration afin de protéger l'enfance migrante contre l'exploitation et la traite.*

² *Strengthening Border Security in Ghana.*

³ *Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint, de lutte contre l'immigration irrégulière, le trafic de migrants et la traite des êtres humains en République du Mali.*

⁴ *Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint pour la Mauritanie.*

⁵ *Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint de lutte contre l'immigration irrégulière, la traite et le trafic de migrants au Sénégal.*

Since its launch, the EUTF has funded ten programmes that have supported returnees in the SLC region: the EU-IOM JI, Migration SN and Migration ML, Refugees' resilience, Stabilisation Agadez, Border Security GH, *Développer l'emploi au Sénégal*, DIZA, PACERCEN, *TEH Golfe de Guinée* and YEP. Collectively, these programmes have supported the voluntary return of 71,387 people (indicator 3.4), delivered post-arrival assistance to 93,091 people (indicator 3.5) and reintegration assistance to 90,683 people (indicator 3.5 bis). The EU-IOM JI has been a major contributor to these results, supporting 74% of voluntary returns, 72% of beneficiaries receiving post-arrival assistance, and 54% of beneficiaries receiving reintegration assistance.


In 2022, most EUTF activities to facilitate returns and provide post-arrival assistance had completed, with only the Stabilisation Agadez programme continuing to facilitate returns. It supported the return of 193 people who had attempted to cross the border into Algeria and had been expelled. Their transport was organised from Agadez to their villages of origin in Niger. Regarding post-arrival assistance, 11 returning migrants received psychosocial assistance in Ghana (Border Security GH). In comparison, in 2021, 8,012 returns were supported and 12,678 people received post-arrival assistance.

The only part of the EU-IOM JI activities that was still ongoing in 2022 was the reintegration assistance, which was provided to 1,240 persons across ten countries in the region (indicator 3.5 bis). Reintegration assistance is based on a long-term approach and can include psychosocial support (PSS), job counselling and orientation, TVET and skills development and support to set up an IGA, depending on individual situations.

Economic reintegration is one of the key issues in reintegration. In response to this challenge, in 2022, the DIZA programme assisted 133 people with activities to include returnees into the peanut and karite value chains in Chad; the YEP project delivered skills training and supported IGA activities for 86 returned migrants in The Gambia; and the Border GH project trained ten returned young men in Ghana. At the regional level, the EU-IOM JI held a regional workshop in November 2022 on the integrated approach to reintegration with representatives from 12 countries. The objective of the workshop was to strengthen the link between reintegration programming and national employment, job creation and microenterprise development.

4.2.5. IMPROVING GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

Figure 13: Strategic Objective 4 dashboard, SLC, December 2022¹



¹ Budget figures are related to projects which are contracted, relevant to the MLS, and providing data.

In 2022, democratic backsliding in the region continued. Following coups in Mali, Chad, and Guinea in 2021, Burkina Faso saw two military-led regime changes in one year. Elected President Roch Kaboré was deposed in January by Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba, who was in turn overthrown on 29 September by Captain Ibrahim Traoré, capitalising on discontent with France's military and the deteriorating security situation.¹ Meanwhile, the juntas in Guinea and Chad extended the timelines initially set forth for the transition to civilian rule and violently repressed protests resulting in deaths among demonstrators, with a death toll of over 100 people for the October protests in Chad.^{2,3} In Mali, the announcement of a five-year transition plan in January was met with increased sanctions from ECOWAS, but in June, the adoption of a new transition timetable planning for elections in February 2024 led to the lifting of country-wide ECOWAS sanctions on trade and access to capital markets.^{4,5}

Relations between states in the region were tense throughout the year and created fractures in economic and security cooperation, fuelled by military takeovers and geopolitical realignments. The most prominent crisis involved Mali and Côte d'Ivoire, as 49 Ivoirian soldiers flown in to provide backup security to MINUSMA German contingent were arrested at Bamako airport on 12 July and remained detained until January 2023.⁶ In May, Mali withdrew from the G5 Sahel joint military force while in November, Côte d'Ivoire withdrew from MINUSMA along Germany and the UK, three months after French troops completed their departure from Mali.^{7,8,9} While Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea remain indefinitely suspended from ECOWAS, the bloc's leaders announced the creation of a regional peacekeeping force.¹⁰

2022 was the most violent and deadliest year on record for the countries of the SLC window, driven by the profound and continuing security crises in Nigeria, Mali, and Burkina Faso. Fatalities recorded in the ACLED database in Mali (4,867) and Burkina Faso (4,266) were the highest ever recorded, more than doubling (144% and 119%, respectively) compared to the average for 2020-2021. In Nigeria, recorded fatalities (10,763) were roughly equal to those of 2021 (10,890), which had itself been a record year.¹¹ Conflict-fuelled humanitarian crises in the Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad Basin reached new heights in 2022, with over 2.9 million refugees and IDPs in the former and 3 million in the latter.^{12,13} The impact on women and children is dire, with over 11,000 thousand schools closed as of September 2022, and recent research from the Tillabéri region in Niger for example highlighting how insecurity increased the prevalence of various forms of pre-existing gender-based violence.^{14,15}

The Al-Qaeda-affiliated *Jama'at Nusrat Al Islam Wal Muslimin (JNIM)* was the most active jihadist organisation in the Liptako-Gourma. JNIM carried out three times more attacks and more fatalities than the Islamic State Sahel Province¹⁶ (IS Sahel), its main rival in the region.¹⁷ Following the partial relocation of French and European military operations from Mali to Niger, IS Sahel decreased

¹ ISS, 'Security priorities for Burkina Faso's new transition', October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Jeune Afrique, 'Guinée : Mamadi Doumbouya lance son dialogue « inclusif », les principaux partis boycottent', November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Africa News, 'Deadly Chad protests: death toll now estimated at 128', February 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ United Nations Security Council, 'Economic Sanctions on Mali Tightened as West African Leaders Reject Proposed Timetable for Presidential Election, Special Representative Tells Security Council', January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ VOA, 'ECOWAS Lifts Sanctions Against Mali', July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Al Jazeera, 'Ivory Coast troops return home after months of captivity in Mali', January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Al Jazeera, 'Mali government pulls military out of regional G5 Sahel force', May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Security Council Report, 'West Africa and the Sahel - January 2023 Monthly Forecast', December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Al Jazeera, 'Last French troops leave Mali, ending nine-year deployment', August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ Al Jazeera, 'Mali government pulls military out of regional G5 Sahel force', May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ Security Council Report, 'West Africa and the Sahel - January 2023 Monthly Forecast', December 2022. Retrieved www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2023-01/west-africa-and-the-sahel-9.php [here](#).

¹² Al Jazeera, 'Last French troops leave Mali, ending nine-

year deployment', August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹³ [s://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2023/1/18/climate-fueled-violence-and-displacement-in-the-lake-chad-basin-focus-on-chad-and-cameroon](https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2023/1/18/climate-fueled-violence-and-displacement-in-the-lake-chad-basin-focus-on-chad-and-cameroon) [here](#).

¹⁴ UNICEF, '11,100 schools closed in the Sahel region due to conflict', September 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁵ ISS, 'In Niger's Tillabéri, insecurity takes a toll on women and girls', February 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁶ Previously known as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) - Greater Sahara faction.

¹⁷ ACLED, 'The Sahel: Geopolitical Transition at the Center of an Ever-Worsening Crisis', February 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

operations in Niger.¹ This allowed the group to focus resources in the Gao and Ménaka regions of Mali, causing over a thousand deaths among security forces, civilians, militiamen, and fighters from the JNIM in a six-months campaign between March and August 2022.²

In 2022, political violence in Nigeria became more widespread and involved a broad range of actors. In addition to Boko Haram's offshoots, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), *Jama'atu Ahlussunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad* (JAS), and Al-Qaeda-affiliated Ansaru, violent incidents were also caused by bandit groups, cult militias, Igbo separatist, security forces and communal militias.³ Communal militias were the biggest threat to Nigerian civilians in 2022, accounting for 57% of reported civilian fatalities in the country. Violence against civilians was also less geographically concentrated, increasing most in previously less-affected regions in the South-East and North-East.⁴

In Mali, state armed forces supported by the Wagner group were the deadliest actor for the first time since the beginning of the conflict.⁵ Fatalities from counter-insurgency operations by the Malian military were not limited to enemy combatants, as Malian military personnel reportedly killed more civilians in 2022 than in all previous years combined.⁶

The EUTF has contracted €692.8M to 66 SO4-priority projects in the SLC region, or 33.5% of the EUTF SLC budget.⁷ EUTF funding on SO4 is mainly contracted at the regional level (20%) and in the countries most affected by the on-going security crises, namely Mali (20%), Burkina Faso (19%), Niger (18%), and Nigeria (10%).

Supporting security forces to face growing threats from non-state armed groups

Across the SLC region, non-state armed groups operate with increasing scope and sophistication. Contagion from the Sahel to the Gulf of Guinea has already solidified in Benin, as the northern part of the country saw 28 organized political violence events from either JNIM or IS Sahel between 1 November 2021 and 14 September 2022.⁸ In Nigeria, recent developments point to growing synergy between previously independent actors, such as a kidnapping of train passengers in March which saw JAS and bandits working together, and Ansaru and ISWAP collaborating on the jailbreak of Boko Haram-affiliated prisoners in July.⁹ Recent research also documented ISWAP's use of ICTs for propaganda, surveillance and communication, as well as preparations to start using drones for the delivery of improvised explosive devices.¹⁰

EUTF-funded programmes are supporting national and local security forces with equipment and training to help them respond to these increasingly complex threats. In 2022, security forces received 18,238 pieces of equipment (96% of all the governance equipment provided with EUTF funding, indicator 4.1 bis), mainly in Niger (31%) and Chad (27%), Mauritania (19%) and Mali (15%). Meanwhile, 3,551 members of security forces (91% national, 9% local) were trained (indicator 4.2), mostly in Burkina Faso (45%) and Niger (23%).

The GAR-SI programme (REG-04)¹¹ was the largest provider of equipment, strengthening rural police units which can also support military operations across the Sahel.¹² In 2022, the programme trained 476 personnel (indicator 4.2) and delivered 8,291 pieces of equipment (indicator 4.1 bis). GAR-SI completed its activities in Burkina Faso and Mali in June. The second main contributor

¹ ACLED, 'Sahel: Mid-Year Update', July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² ACLED, 'The Sahel: Geopolitical Transition at the Center of an Ever-Worsening Crisis', February 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ ACLED, 'Nigeria: Historic Elections Threatened by Insecurity', February 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ ACLED, 'The Sahel: Geopolitical Transition at the Center of an Ever-Worsening Crisis', February 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ This report includes 58 projects worth €621M.

⁸ ACLED, 'Jihad Takes Root in Northern Benin', September 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ ISS, 'Tackling Lake Chad's growing crime and terror threat', October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


¹⁰ ISS, 'ISWAP's use of tech could prolong Lake Chad Basin violence', April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ *Groupes d'Action Rapides – Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel*.

¹² Equipment provision covered Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger while personnel were trained in the same countries excluding Mali.

to indicator 4.1 bis was the EP-GNN programme (NE-16),¹ which provided 4,925 pieces of equipment to a multipurpose squadron of the Niger National Guard. Both projects fully equipped the supported units, – excluding weaponry and ammunition – supplying them with vehicles, protective equipment, as well as logistical (furniture, generators, cookers, etc.) and ICT equipment (communication, sensing, and electronic warfare).

Figure 14: EUTF indicator 4.1 bis, December 2022



Meanwhile, the Security G5 Sahel programme (REG-23)² was the largest provider of training to security forces in 2022, providing training to 1,751 personnel in the region. The programme aims to address the self-reinforcing feedback loop whereby adhesion to non-state armed groups is fuelled by local populations’ grievances towards security forces. To address this concern, Security G5 Sahel trained 1,467 personnel (11% female) on human rights (indicator 4.2) in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Teaching materials were tailored to local contexts and situations, and covered topics such as the protection of vulnerable populations, the use of force and firearms, and the rights and duties of security forces.³ In addition, 284 male members of security forces were trained on conflict resolution tools and practices in unstable environments in Burkina Faso and Niger.

¹ Soutien à la création d'un escadron polyvalent de la Garde Nationale du Niger.

² Appui aux forces de sécurité des pays membres du G5 Sahel pour la lutte contre l'impunité et le renforcement de leurs liens avec les populations.


³ IDDH, 'Rapport Narratif Intermédiaire', February 2021.

5. ANALYSIS BY COUNTRY

5.1. BURKINA FASO

5.1.1. BURKINA FASO IN 2022

Figure 15. Burkina Faso – Key facts and figures, December 2022



In Burkina Faso, 2022 was marked by political instability and deepening insecurity. The country saw two regime changes during the year, as the military staged two coups d'état, first in January and then in September. On 24 January, Lieutenant Colonel Paul-Henri Damiba deposed civilian President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré. Eight months later, on 30 September, Captain Ibrahim Traoré led a coup to overthrow Damiba.¹ This series of coups d'état led by different factions of the military evidences the division of the Burkinabe armed forces which undermines the country's ability to fight violent extremism.²

Burkina Faso has suffered from attacks from armed groups, some of them affiliated to Al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, since the early 2010s. The intensity of the conflicts has increased since 2019, with daily attacks on civilians and the armed forces, and the destruction of infrastructure. In 2022, there were 4,238 violent incidents, including fighting (48%), violence against civilians (28%), and explosions/remote violence (23%).³ The six border regions in the North and the East of the country are the most directly affected by the security crisis. However, the impact of the crisis is spilling over to other regions as armed groups expanded their operations to 10 of Burkina Faso's 13 regions.⁴

The conflict has sparked an unprecedented humanitarian crisis. By December 2022, 1,882,593 people were internally displaced in Burkina Faso (a 19% increase compared to December 2021).⁵ The UN's Humanitarian Response Plan called for \$805M to respond to the most urgent needs of 3.5 million people. In 2022, 57.5% of this appeal was unmet⁶, leaving large numbers of people unassisted.

¹ ISS, 'Security priorities for Burkina Faso's new transition', October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project dashboard', consulted in March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ International Crisis Group, 'Premier bilan pour le pouvoir de transition au Burkina Faso', September 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ UNHCR Operational Data Portal, 'IDPs in Burkina Faso', December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


⁶ OCHA, 'Burkina Faso Plan de Réponse Humanitaire 2022', 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

Burkina Faso is facing the worst food crisis in a decade. The *Cadre Harmonisé* (the early warning mechanism for food security in West Africa) estimated in November 2022 that 2.6 million people were reported to be in food crisis (IPC Phase 3 or more)¹, with one province in food emergency (IPC Phase 4)², just one level down from famine, and evidenced by excess mortality.³

Availability of food has become a nationwide issue. The yields of the 2021/2022 agricultural season were insufficient, with a reported 10% reduction compared to the previous year for staple foods.⁴ Imports of key products (wheat, oil, fertilisers and milk powder) were hampered by atypically high price levels sparked by the worldwide impact of Russia-Ukraine conflict on the food supply chain. These elements are compounded by the fact that demand for staple foods in the country is higher than average: IDPs are not able to rely on their own production, and households in host communities exhaust their reserves more rapidly than normal.

5.1.2. THE EUTF IN BURKINA FASO

Figure 16: EUTF portfolio in Burkina Faso, December 2022^{5,6}



The EUTF has contracted €190.8M in Burkina Faso. 69% of the budget is dedicated to governance and conflict prevention projects (SO4), and the remaining 31% of funds are directed to resilience projects (SO2; 16%), employment-related projects (SO1; 11%) and migration management-related

¹ OCHA, 'Burkina Faso: Aperçu de la situation humanitaire', November 2022. Retrieved [here](#). IPC Phase 3 means that 'food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihoods assets or through crisis-coping mechanisms'.

² *Cadre Harmonisé*, 'Cadre Harmonisé d'identification des zones à risque et des populations en insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle', March 2022. Retrieved [here](#). These were projected numbers for June to August 2022.

³ OCHA, 'Burkina Faso: Aperçu de la situation humanitaire', November 2022. Retrieved [here](#). IPC Phase 4 means that households either have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality or are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.


⁴ *Cadre Harmonisé*, *op. cit.*

⁵ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁶ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

projects (SO3; 4%). Three programmes, *Stabilisation Séno* (BF-02¹), *Emploi Burkina Faso* (BF-05²) and TUUMA (BF-06³), supported entrepreneurship and job creation. Resilience BF (BF-01⁴) addressed food insecurity and access to basic services and the EU-IOM JI Burkina Faso (BF-04)⁵ addressed migration management. Five programmes fell under the governance and security umbrella. These programmes focused on promoting social cohesion and dialogue (BF-07 Protection⁶ and BF-08 PEV⁷); strengthening the justice system (BF-11 Justice BF⁸); promoting security (BF-09 PUS⁹); and improving border management (BF-03 ProGEF¹⁰). By December 2022, 96% of the budget had been spent. The remaining 4% relate to justice, prevention against violent extremism, migration management and employment-related projects that are due to end in 2023 and 2024.

Figure 17: Selected EUTF outputs in Burkina Faso, December 2022



The changing political and security context has impacted the ability of programmes to implement their

¹ *Insertion et Stabilisation Socio - Économique des Jeunes et Femmes dans la Province du Séno.*

² *Programme d'appui à l'Emploi dans les zones frontalières et périphériques.*

³ *Appui à la compétence professionnelle, l'entreprenariat et l'emploi des jeunes et des femmes dans les régions rurales du Burkina Faso.*

⁴ *Programme "LRRD" de renforcement de la résilience des communautés vulnérables à l'insécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle dans les zones frontalières septentrionales au Burkina Faso.*

⁵ *Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Burkina Faso.*

⁶ *Protection des jeunes dans les zones à risque au Burkina Faso à travers l'éducation et le dialogue.*

⁷ *Rebâtir une cohésion sociale au Nord du Burkina à travers un meilleur suivi de la radicalisation, la promotion du dialogue et la valorisation de l'économie pastoraliste.*

⁸ *Appui à la justice au Burkina Faso pour renforcer la lutte contre l'impunité au travers d'une justice plus accessible et efficace.*

⁹ *Appui budgétaire pour la mise en œuvre du Programme d'Urgence Sahel du Burkina Faso.*

¹⁰ *Programme d'appui à la gestion intégrée des frontières au Burkina Faso.*

activities as planned. PEV, TUUMA and Justice BF had to postpone activities, suspend their work in some of the regions badly affected by violence or redirect activities. The security context has also led organisations to limit field trips and adjust the management and monitoring of projects, opting for remote modalities. In addition, programmes had to rebuild working relationships with new focal points within the government and local authorities, and discuss project activities with them, before proceeding with implementation.

Prevention of violent extremism at the national and local level

The conflict is affecting nearly all of Burkina Faso's regions and armed groups are known to instrumentalise local conflicts and tensions to their advantage.¹ Research shows that domestic socio-political and economic dynamics, especially state-periphery tensions and community-level conflicts, are liable to create breeding ground for the spread of violent extremism.

In response to this risk, the EUTF is funding programmes aiming to prevent violent extremism in strategic regions of the country through the promotion of community dialogue. In 2022, programmes reached 372,575 people (indicator 4.3) in various regions, including Boucle du Mouhoun, Centre, Est, Hauts Bassins, Nord, and Sahel.

Programmes reached 324,281 people through awareness raising activities on conflict prevention, human rights and natural resource management and. Mass sensitisation campaigns targeted their audience at the national level via radio and TV. At the community level, programmes rolled out village assemblies and campaigns in schools.

In addition, some activities were designed to facilitate inter- and intra-community dialogue. In 2022, 44,457 people participated in a variety of activities that encouraged community-level dialogue. These included fora that created dialogue opportunities between communities and political leaders or religious leaders; microprojects (art, music, theatre, sport, cultural initiatives, etc.) led by youth to support peaceful cohabitation and debating sessions, among others.

Lastly, the Security G5 Sahel programme worked with security forces to strengthen their ability to engage in dialogues in conflict-affected areas. The programme posits that security forces can play a significant role in facilitating non-violent conflict resolution with a better understanding of the context and knowledge of conflict mediation. In 2022, the programme organised dialogues in insecure areas and reached 181 people. Security G5 Sahel also organised nine lessons learning sessions with national authorities to learn from their experiences.

Food and nutrition assistance as a humanitarian prerogative

Food access has become critical in insecure areas, as armed groups have intensified efforts to isolate local populations. By cutting the roads, they have restricted farmers' access to fields and made the flow of foods from production areas in the south of the country to the north increasingly difficult.² For instance, over 374,000 people, most of them IDPs³, were at risk of starvation in the besieged city of Djibo, in northern Burkina Faso. In September 2022, a convoy of 200 trucks was organised by the Burkinabe army to transport food assistance to the city but did not reach its destination as it was attacked by violent extremists.⁴ As a result, humanitarian operations had to continue via helicopter.

¹ FDFA/DCAF, 'Improving our understanding of the role of defence and security forces (DSF) in the prevention of violent extremism (PVE) in West Africa - Comparative study relating to the review and analysis of political, legislative, and operational frameworks, as well as practical experiences (2020-2022)', 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² FEWS NET, 'Le blocus sécuritaire accélère l'érosion des avoirs et expose les ménages pauvres à l'urgence (Phase 4 de l'IPC)', June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


³ ACAPS, 'Humanitarian overview of Djibo town surrounded by armed groups', October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Africa News, 'Burkina Faso: Recounting the attack on a convoy in Gaskindé days before a second coup', October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

EUTF-funded projects are implementing interventions to mitigate the food crisis. In 2022, the CRIALCES and PDU programmes targeted regions badly affected by the conflict and provided food security assistance to 242,776 people in the Centre Nord, Est, Nord, and Sahel regions (indicator 2.4). The programmes supported the early recovery of the agriculture sector by distributing agriculture inputs and delivering training people on agricultural practices (69% of beneficiaries), rehabilitating land (5% of beneficiaries), distributing and vaccinating livestock (3% of beneficiaries) and improving access to water (1% of beneficiaries). In addition, 52,925 vulnerable people received food vouchers (22% of beneficiaries), marking a 73% increase compared to 2021. Beneficiaries were from both IDP and host community households.

In addition to delivering food security interventions, the PDU delivered nutrition assistance to people affected by the conflict, reaching 274,914 people in 2022 (indicator 2.3). The programme implemented large-scale malnutrition screenings, reaching 204,568 individuals, primarily children under the age of five (74% of beneficiaries). At-risk individuals were referred to malnutrition treatment centres or directly treated. For instance, 205 malnourished children under five years old received treatment. The programme also targeted children to encourage psychomotor stimulation and reached 3,912 children.

Figure 18: EUTF indicator 2.4, in Burkina Faso, December 2022



Creating employment opportunities for vulnerable households

Burkina Faso is one of the poorest countries in Africa, ranking 184 out of 191 countries on the Human Development Index for 2021/2022.¹ The country is experiencing significant population growth (2.7% per year) with an estimated total population of 22 million.² Over the past ten years, Burkina Faso has experienced fairly stable economic growth,³ with the exception of 2020 when GDP growth plateaued at 1.9% due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite steady growth, the country struggles to create enough jobs to absorb the influx of young people (people aged 15-35 whose unemployment rate reaches 82%) into the labour market.⁴

EUTF-funded programmes have supported the employment sector in Burkina Faso. In 2022, five programmes (IPDEV2, PDU, Protection BF, *Radio Jeunesse Sahel* and TUUMA) created or supported 3,971 jobs (indicator 1.1). This is more than twice the number of jobs that had been supported or created in 2021 (i.e., 1,447 jobs). In 2022, most jobs were supported by strengthening MSMEs, livelihood groups or VSLAs (41%), successful IGA support (31%) and recruitment to staff facilities (17%). Consequently, 26% of these jobs were self-employed and 30% of them were permanent regular wage employment. 43% of beneficiaries were women and 39% were men. However, they benefitted from different interventions as women were more represented in permanent wage employment (28% of women vs. 13% of men) and self-employment (40% of women vs. 23% of men), whereas men were represented more in short-term opportunities (65% of men vs. 32% of women).⁵

5.1.3. BURKINA FASO AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 3: EUTF common output indicators for Burkina Faso, December 2022

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	S1 2022	S2 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	2,277	2,414	6,151	1,447	2,135	1,836	16,261	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	55	200	1,855	631	405	67	3,213	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	4,475	12,644	4,640	4,259	685	4,362	31,065	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	956	5,747	4,195	11,642	3,289	1,801	27,630	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	3	14	19	18	1	1	56	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	0	33	18	0	0	0	51	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	522	1,445	386	858	405	190	3,806	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	98,553	58,101	4,405	7,770	37,072	7,709	213,610	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	282,181	100,124	26,270	141,717	141,265	133,649	825,206	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	150,574	217,432	173,568	192,255	74,832	167,944	976,605	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	23	71	4	41	0	1	140	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	1,402	1,003	625	462	383	0	3,874	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	341,434	524,022	234,888	237,126	190,852	227,078	1,755,400	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	7,354	11,919	11,016	3,439	2,187	1,686	37,601	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	333,002	383,674	65,694	62,732	88,641	105,207	1,038,950	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	190	442	328	12,389	11,301	5,446	30,096	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	9,018	27,400	13,248	20,794	48,923	14,889	133,912	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	1,635	1,260	4,275	64	0	0	7,234	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	1,586	821	666	508	0	0	3,581	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	1,244	258	242	535	162	9	2,450	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	30	1,145	144	64	1,383	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	2	23	16	6	0	0	47	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	20	68	0	15	7	0	110	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	3	0	1	16	0	8	28	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	924	9	1,210	10,944	1,182	30	14,299	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	994	1,667	1,436	6,845	2,534	2,043	15,519	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	3,283	83,035	2,069,885	198,931	244,883	127,692	2,727,709	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	7	138	123	255	82	4	609	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	91	430	380	334	93	26	1,354	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	70	184	615	1,241	10	448	2,568	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	13	45	4	24	24	2	112	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	10	1	4	15	0	0	30	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	302,840	0	0	0	302,840	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	8,509	0	0	0	8,509	

¹ UNDP, 'Human Development Report 2021/2022: Uncertain Times, Unsettled Lives: Shaping our Future in a Transforming World', September 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² World Bank, 'Burkina Faso', 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Growth has oscillated between 4% and 8% since 2010.

⁴ IFAD, 'Burkina Faso. Programme d'options stratégiques pour le pays : 2019-2024', April 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ For all sex disaggregation, the remaining percentage is unspecified.

5.2. CHAD

5.2.1. CHAD IN 2022

Figure 19: Chad – Key facts and figures, December 2022



In 2022, President Mahamat Déby’s transitional government extended the transition period and imposed its interests during a National Dialogue, leading to large-scale protests and a government crackdown in October. After Mahamat Idriss Déby, son of Idriss Déby, had taken power in 2021, the year 2022 was supposed to bring a transition to civilian rule and return to constitutional order. In August 2022, the transitional government and several rebel groups signed a peace agreement in Doha. However, important armed groups (FACT¹, CCSMR²) refused to sign the accord.³ The main rebel groups, opposition parties and CSOs also boycotted the subsequent “Sovereign Inclusive National Dialogue”, which remained dominated by the government’s agenda. A resolution adopted at the end of the National Dialogue in early October extended the transition period by two years, dissolved the military council, and retained Mahamat Déby as transitional president. Most importantly, the resolution affirmed that Déby, like other junta members, could run in the elections set to take place in 2024, thus disregarding one of civil society and opposition groups’ main demands. On 20 October, a country-wide march protested the extension of the Déby regime. In a violent crackdown, at least 50 people were killed, 300 wounded, and 600 arrested⁴, according to government figures.⁵ In December, 342 people of those arrested were sentenced to one to three years in prison for their role in the protests.⁶ Meanwhile, *Les Transformateurs*’ opposition party leader, Succès Masra, fled the country to Cameroon, after security forces had looted his party headquarters and arrested dozens of his fellow party members.⁷

¹ *Front pour l’alternance et la concorde au Tchad*.

² *Conseil de commandement militaire pour le salut de la République*.

³ Africa Center for Strategic Studies, “Transition” Orchestrated by Chad’s Military Goes Awry, 15 November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Opposition parties and CSOs said that 100 to 200 people were killed (Foreign Policy, ‘Chad’s Coup Leader Stops Democracy in Its Tracks’, 6 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#); Africa Center for Strategic Studies, op. cit.)

⁵ International Crisis Group, ‘Chad’s Transition: Easing Tensions Online’, 13 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


⁶ Foreign Policy, ‘Chad’s Coup Leader Stops Democracy in Its Tracks’, 6 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#). Human Rights Watch stated that 401 people were put on trial in early December, while 150 to 200 were still facing trials (Human Rights Watch, ‘Chad: Justice Needed for October Crackdown’, 23 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#)).

⁷ Africa Center for Strategic Studies, op. cit.

Widespread floods in the second half of 2022 affected 1.3 million people¹ and undermined food security, which was already under pressure due to climate change, conflict, and rising food prices. 2.1 million people were believed to be food insecure during the 2022 lean season², up from 1.8 million in 2021³. It is estimated that the floods – the worst in 30 years⁴ – pushed 292,585 additional people into food insecurity.⁵ They destroyed 80,000 homes, killed 20,000 livestock and damaged over 350,000 hectares of agricultural land.⁶ In October, the transitional government declared a state of emergency after it had already declared a food and nutrition emergency in June.⁷ Indeed, the floods occurred in a difficult food security environment: between 2015 and 2021, climate change has exacerbated desertification, accelerated the degradation of the productive potential of soil, and increased competition for access to resources.⁸ These developments had direct effects on a large portion of the population, as about 80% are active in the agriculture and livestock sectors.⁹ Furthermore, inflation of food prices averaged 12.2% in 2022, driven by diminished domestic output and the global food and energy price surge due to the war in Ukraine.¹⁰ Finally, conflict in the Lake Chad Basin and in neighbouring countries impeded economic activities, in addition to triggering internal displacements and refugee movements into Chad.

5.2.2. THE EUTF IN CHAD

Figure 20: EUTF portfolio in Chad, December 2022^{11,12}



The EUTF's total contracted budget in Chad amounts to €113.9M, of which about 97% have already been spent as of 31 December 2022. 73% of the budget accounts for programmes focusing on resilience (SO2). During 2022, four programmes were implementing activities. One of them came to a

¹ OCHA, 'Flooding Situation in N'Djamena', 20 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² WFP, 'Chad Country Brief', 27 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ WFP, 'Chad Country Brief', 4 January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ WFP, 'Chad: Annual Country Report 2022', 31 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ IMF, 'First and Second Reviews under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement, Requests for Waivers of Nonobservance of Performance Criteria and Modification of Performance Criteria', 12 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ OCHA, 'Flooding Situation in N'Djamena', 20 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ UNICEF, 'Chad: Humanitarian Situation Report No. 4', 31 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Notably, Chad ranks last in the 2020 Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative Index, measuring climate change vulnerability and readiness (Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative, 'ND-GAIN Country Index', 2020. Retrieved [here](#)).

⁹ World Bank, 'The Republic of Chad: Boosting Shared Prosperity in a Landlocked Country Beset by Fragility and Conflict. Systematic Country Diagnostic', 20 March 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


¹⁰ World Bank, 'Chad Macro Poverty Outlook', 5 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

¹² This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

close during the year (PRODECO, TD-06¹) so that three are continuing into 2023 and expected to come to an end in 2023 and 2024 (PRCPT, TD-02², *Bab-al-amal*, TD-03³ and DIZA, TD-07⁴). Among the four active programmes during 2022, three focused on resilience (SO2), accounting for 85% of the budget, and one on economic and employment opportunities (SO1), accounting for 15% of the budget.

Figure 21: Selected EUTF outputs in Chad, December 2022



Social and legal services for refugees, IDPs, and host communities

In 2022, the DIZA programme intensified its efforts towards the effective implementation of the Chadian asylum law. The latter was passed in December 2020 with DIZA support and created for the first time a legal framework for asylum procedures in Chad, an important step towards securing the legal status of refugees and providing them with economic opportunities.⁵ The adoption of the asylum law was a crucial stepping stone to achieve DIZA's objective of improving the living conditions of refugees, returnees as well as host communities in the eastern and southern parts of the country. These areas face an important influx of refugees and returnees, due to conflicts in Sudan and the Central African Republic. In 2022, the number of refugees in Chad increased by 7% to 597,728, representing the largest group⁶ of refugees in a West or Central African country. 68% of refugees in Chad have fled from Sudan and 21% from the Central African Republic as of December 2022. In addition, at the last assessment in November 2019, 101,551 Chadians had returned. Finally, as a result of ongoing conflict

¹ Appui au déminage, à la protection sociale et au développement des personnes vulnérables.

² Projet de Renforcement de la Résilience et de la Cohabitation Pacifique au Tchad.

³ Projet de soutien à l'insertion socio-professionnelle des jeunes tchadiens en situation de vulnérabilité.

⁴ Programme de développement inclusif dans les zones d'accueil.


⁵ UNHCR, 'Le HCR se félicite de l'adoption de la nouvelle loi sur l'asile au Tchad', 24 December 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ WFP, 'Chad: Annual Country Report 2022', 31 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

in the Lake Chad Basin, there were 381,289 IDPs in the western Lac region in December 2022, a 6% decrease compared to 2021.¹

In 2022, EUTF-funded programmes delivered 56,637 basic services in Chad, more than the total achieved in all the previous years (indicator 2.2, total of 91,950 since the beginning). Most significantly, DIZA provided 24,050 legal services to refugees (70%) and IDPs (30%) in the form of birth certificates. The documents reduce the risk of becoming stateless, allow for a greater degree of free movement, and give access to formal economic opportunities. For instance, refugees with documentation have better access to banks and microfinance institutions in order to invest in economic activities. The PRODECO programme also made an important contribution to this indicator, providing support to victims of mines and social protection to vulnerable groups. Notably, the programme has supported during its implementation period local committees in 16 villages to develop action plans for the financing and developing of community projects (e.g., health centres, communitarian mills, storage spaces, or veterinarian pharmacies). Furthermore, the programme provided monthly allowances to households previously identified as ‘very poor’.

Figure 22: EUTF indicator 2.2, in Chad, December 2022



Working towards a skilled labour force

Chad’s labour market is largely dominated by low-skilled activities, with 92% of the active population either self-employed or employed by households. Conversely, only 3% of the employed population works in managerial positions or as employers, and only 1.7% are skilled workers.² The prevalence of unskilled employment is even stronger for women and in rural areas: 97% of the rural


¹ UNHCR, ‘Tchad: Statistiques des personnes relevant de la compétence du HCR’, December 2021. Retrieved [here](#); UNHCR, ‘Tchad: Personnes relevant de la compétence du HCR’, December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² World Bank, ‘The Republic of Chad: Boosting Shared Prosperity in a Landlocked Country Beset by Fragility and Conflict. Systematic Country Diagnostic’, 20 March 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

population and of active women are self-employed, family helpers, or apprentices.¹ According to ILO estimates, only 1% of the employed population are female salaried workers, compared to 19% in sub-Saharan Africa.² The Chadian *Plan National de Développement 2017-2021* identified technical training as an important pillar to strengthen human capital and improve quality of life.³ School fees as well as transportation, material and living costs are a major barrier to TVET for Chadians, according to a 2016 report from the Ministry of Education: in 2011, 56% of those receiving technical training came from the 14% richest families.⁴

In 2022, EUTF-funded activities supported 3,568 people in Chad to benefit from TVET and skills development, bringing the total number of beneficiaries since 2018 to 12,575 (indicator 1.4). 99% of the 2022 results were achieved through the activities of three programmes: DIZA, *Bab-al-amal* and the regional ARCHIPELAGO (REG-15)⁵. 39% of beneficiaries were women and 60% men. In addition, 99% of the vocational training happened in nationally accredited institutions so that the acquired skills can be officially recognised. DIZA reached 1,360 returnees among its 3,568 beneficiaries, all of them in southern Chad. *Bab-al-amal*, which aims to support the socio-economic integration of young vulnerable Chadians, technically and financially supported training centres to allow for increased, better, and affordable trainings. In addition to supporting skills development for 552 Chadians in 2022, the programme also helped establish public private partnership committees in N'Djamena and in three regions to better align curricula with private sector needs.

Figure 23: EUTF indicator 1.4, in Chad, December 2022



¹ Ibid.

² World Bank, 'Chad Gender Landscape', 1 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ *Ministère de l'Économie et de la Planification du Développement*, 'Plan National de Développement 2017-2021', August 2021. Retrieved [here](#). The *Plan National de Développement 2022-2026* was still in the making at the time of writing.

⁴ *Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale*, 'Tchad : Rapport d'état sur le système éducatif national', 2016. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ ARCHIPELAGO: an African-European TVET initiative.

Additionally, 17,511 people were assisted with income generating activities in 2022, 58% of whom were women (indicator 1.3). The largest contributor to this result was the PRCPT programme. PRCPT aims to augment resilience and improve economic opportunities to promote cross-border stability in Chad. Since its beginning, the programme has supported 56 local development plans (indicator 2.1) and assisted 23,054 people to develop income generating activities (indicator 1.3), emanating from the development plans. 95% of the beneficiaries were returnees, a group that is targeted by the programme. By supporting the implementation of the development plans, PRCPT also built or rehabilitated 225 social infrastructures (indicator 2.1 bis), which benefitted 270,510 people (indicator 2.9). Furthermore, 2,488 staff from local authorities and basic service providers were trained since the beginning of the programme (indicator 2.8).

Outcome analysis 1: *DIZA Appui transversal* project (TD-07-03)¹ in Chad

<p>DIZA Appui Transversal</p> <p> Programme for inclusive development in hosting areas (DIZA) - Cross-cutting</p> <p> From April 2019 to April 2022</p>		<p> Budget: €1M EUTF</p> <p> IP: UNHCR</p> <p> Objective: Strengthen advocacy strategies leading to the adoption of the asylum law, its dissemination, and its implementation</p>	<p>Main targets</p> <p> Refugees</p> <p> Host communities</p>
<p><i>During the political crises in Sudan/Darfur and the Central African Republic from the 2000s onwards, a large number of refugees fled to the eastern and southern parts of Chad. As of December 2022, Chad hosted 597,728 refugees, representing about 3.5% of its population, including 405,896 Sudanese and 126,908 people from CAR. 84% of refugees and asylum seekers lived in camps, mostly in the east and south, as well as in urban areas. 54% of refugees and asylum seekers were children, 86% of them at education age.²</i></p> <p>Advocating for the adoption, dissemination, and implementation of a national asylum law</p> <p>The <i>DIZA Appui Transversal</i> project aimed to improve the situation of refugees in Chad by advocating for the adoption, dissemination, and implementation of a Chadian asylum law. The project was part of the larger DIZA programme and addressed cross-cutting issues in the context of the programme's efforts to foster inclusive development in hosting areas. By advocating for the asylum law, the project wanted to improve refugees' access to documentation, boost their employment opportunities, provide them with better access to land, and reduce the cases of statelessness. Nine years after the beginning of the process, the law was finally adopted on 31 December 2022. The lack of an implementation decree, however, still delays its implementation.</p> <p>During the three years of implementation, the project sensitised 504 staff members of national authorities on aspects related to the law and the socio-economic integration of refugees and returnees. Furthermore, the project trained administrative authorities, security actors, religious leaders, refugee leaders and traditional leaders of affected communities. Finally, it helped deliver 46,094 birth certificates to IDPs (43%), refugees (41%), and returnees (16%).</p> <p>The adoption of a modern asylum law which is aligned with international norms and standards is a crucial pillar in building a sustainable, reliable and enforceable support system for refugees. For the law to become effective, however, further steps are needed: in particular, to complement the normative framework, strengthen implementation capacities, and ensure adequate and long-term funding.</p>			

¹ Programme de développement inclusif dans les zones d'accueil – Appui transversal.

² UNHCR, 'Tchad: Personnes relevant de la compétence du HCR', December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

5.2.3. CHAD AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 4: EUTF common output indicators for Chad, December 2022

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	S1 2022	S2 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	2,081	2,307	2,218	1,213	97	698	8,615	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	32	74	80	65	81	332	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	5,268	16,963	9,109	21,899	10,323	7,188	70,750	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	230	2,488	2,481	3,808	1,104	2,464	12,575	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	3	24	11	16	8	11	73	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	26	56	19	45	16	27	189	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	139	264	298	307	16	40	1,064	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	660	2,567	17,824	14,262	51,511	5,126	91,950	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	18,546	10,477	8,684	10,083	1,832	4,024	53,646	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	34,999	18,610	93,082	54,258	4,624	942	206,515	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	8	40	9	3	0	0	60	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	70	225	1,496	6,991	0	0	8,781	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	21,672	30,707	183,797	11,342	949	4,838	253,305	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	57	1,622	430	286	206	735	3,335	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	35,160	221,000	14,206	50,195	41,464	39,535	401,560	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	0	43	300	458	0	0	801	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	0	605	1,468	15,621	0	0	17,694	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	9	119	360	309	0	0	797	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	10	1,228	2,958	2,035	133	0	6,364	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	86	446	23	294	0	850	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	0	16	23	12	0	0	51	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	0	0	16	0	0	0	16	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	216	709	130	249	4,937	6,241	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	667	1,205	3,118	2,905	3,782	837	12,514	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	60,527	233,942	69,314	18,472	18,170	14,162	414,587	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	1	1	5	4	0	0	11	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	17	206	131	227	12	231	825	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	5	12	157	143	0	150	467	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	10	19	9	2	1	0	41	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	8	0	4	1	0	0	13	

5.3. CÔTE D'IVOIRE

5.3.1. CÔTE D'IVOIRE IN 2022

Figure 24: Côte d'Ivoire – Key facts and figures, December 2022



In 2022, reconciliation among the political elite in Côte d'Ivoire continued, albeit interrupted by renewed discord in the second half of the year. Reconciliation has been a long process in Côte d'Ivoire, especially following the violence experienced by the country in 2010-2011 following presidential elections. On 30 June 2022, UNHCR declared the official cessation of refugee status for Ivoirians.¹ A meeting on 14 July between the country's main political figures, President Alassane Ouattara, Laurent Gbagbo, and Henri Konan Bédié, intended to seal the reconciliation process. The president also invited both opposition leaders to take part in the country's independence celebration on 7 August.² However, Laurent Gbagbo, who had received the presidential pardon on the previous day,³ did not join the ceremony, arguing that promises made to release military officials who had been incarcerated following the civil war had not been fulfilled by Ouattara.⁴

Regionally, tensions with Mali were high throughout 2022 following the arrest of 49 Ivorian military personnel flown in to provide backup security to the German contingent of MINUSMA at Bamako airport on 12 July. The government of Mali labelled the arrested soldiers "mercenaries" and, in August, charged them with undermining state security.⁵ Despite mediation efforts by Togo which led to the return of three female soldiers in September,⁶ the continued standoff contributed to Côte d'Ivoire announcing its withdrawal from MINUSMA⁷ in November.⁸ Negotiations between the two countries bore fruits in December with the signature of a memorandum leading to the pardon and release of the 46 remaining military personnel on 7 January 2023, shortly after they had been sentenced to 20 years in prison.⁹

¹ VOA, 'UNHCR Ends Ivory Coast "Refugee" Status', 21 June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Jeune Afrique, 'Côte d'Ivoire : pourquoi les relations entre Laurent Gbagbo et Alassane Ouattara se sont (à nouveau) dégradées', August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Jeune Afrique, 'Côte d'Ivoire : Laurent Gbagbo gracié par Alassane Ouattara', August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Jeune Afrique, 'Côte d'Ivoire : pourquoi les relations entre Laurent Gbagbo et Alassane Ouattara se sont (à nouveau) dégradées', August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Africa News, 'Ivorian troops arrested in Mali charged with undermining state security', August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Africa News, 'Togo announces release of three Ivorian soldiers detained in Mali', September 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ MINUSMA is the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali.


⁸ Jeune Afrique, 'Mali : pourquoi la Côte d'Ivoire retire ses troupes de la Minusma', November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Al Jazeera, 'Ivory Coast troops return home after months of captivity in Mali', January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

Ivoirian authorities launched an economic integration plan in the northern regions of the country to combat recruitment of youths by militant groups. The plan was announced in January 2022 by the Prime Minister in the department of Téhini, which has experienced several attacks by the Katiba Macina militia¹ since June 2020.² The plan aims to reach 65,613 youths by 2024, with 16,875 already enrolled in September 2022, and has an overall budget of €50.8M.³ While there has been no reported attack since January, 4,085 refugees were in the department in December 2022, almost all of them from neighbouring Burkina Faso, having fled violence and its economic consequences.⁴

5.3.2. THE EUTF IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE

Figure 25: EUTF portfolio in Côte d'Ivoire, December 2022^{5,6}



The EUTF has contracted €28.9M to two national programmes in the Côte d'Ivoire, both of which started implementing activities in 2021. PSRE is a €24M budget support programme to help fund the state's efforts to assist small businesses to recover after the COVID-19 pandemic and related economic crisis (PSRE COVID, CI-03, SO1).⁷ The EUTF also supports the national strategy on civil registration through the €4.9M *Etat Civil* project (*Etat Civil*, CI-02, SO3).⁸

Regional programmes have been implementing activities in the country as well. Two regional programmes were funded to support small enterprises and professional training: ARCHIPELAGO (REG-15)⁹ and IPDEV2 (REG-11).¹⁰ Since 2019, two regional programmes to protect migrants and victims of trafficking have been active in Côte d'Ivoire as well: Protection West Africa (REG-13)¹¹ and TEH *Golfe de Guinée* (REG-12).¹² Finally, starting in 2022 and as a response to the risk of Sahelian conflict spreading south to Côte d'Ivoire, the PEV (BF-08)¹³ programme has been organising dialogues

¹ The Macina Liberation Front, also known as Katiba Macina, is an Islamist group affiliated to Ansar Dine, that has been operating in Mali since 2015.

² Africa News, 'Ivoirian PM announces social plan for young people', January 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Jeune Afrique, 'Côte d'Ivoire : la stratégie antiterroriste dans le Nord à l'heure des comptes' November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ UNHCR, 'Côte d'Ivoire Northern Refugee Situation Report', December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁶ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁷ *Programme de soutien et de relance à l'économie dans le contexte de la crise du COVID-19 en Côte d'Ivoire*.

⁸ *Appui à la mise en œuvre de la stratégie nationale de l'état civil et de l'identification en Côte d'Ivoire*.

⁹ ARCHIPELAGO: an African-European TVET initiative.

¹⁰ *Soutenir les entrepreneurs et les petites PME en Afrique de l'Ouest*.

¹¹ *Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest*.

¹² *Appui à la Lutte contre la Traite des Personnes dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée*.

¹³ *Rebâtir une cohésion sociale au Nord du Burkina à travers un meilleur suivi de la radicalisation, la promotion du dialogue et la valorisation de l'économie pastoraliste*.

between pastoral communities and authorities, to support the establishment of cooperation channels between both groups.

Figure 26: Selected EUTF outputs in Côte d'Ivoire, December 2022




Protecting vulnerable migrants and victims of trafficking

Côte d'Ivoire is a transit, destination and origin country for migrants in the Gulf of Guinea. Projects funded by the EUTF have aimed to protect vulnerable people and victims of trafficking along the migratory route. In 2022 in Côte d'Ivoire, 1,630 migrants were protected or assisted (indicator 3.2) and 85,575 were reached by information campaigns on migration (indicator 3.3). This represents increases of 44% and 127%, respectively, compared to the total reached at the end of 2021.

All of the migrants protected in 2022 were children, and all were reached by Protection West Africa (REG-13, indicator 3.2). The programme has set up one stop shops and mobile units which are tasked with identifying vulnerable young migrants and referring them to service providers (see section on SO3). Out of the 1,630 children who received protection services in 2022, 48% were girls. Between July and September, one stop shops provided assistance to over twice as many young migrants as in any other quarter of the year (626 people). This can be related to the end of year holidays: ahead of the season, more young people attempt to find employment opportunities, thus migrating to make money for the holidays.

Figure 27: EUTF indicator 3.2, in Côte d'Ivoire, December 2022



The TEH Golfe de Guinée regional programme also provided services to 125 victims of trafficking (77% women) in 2022 (indicator 2.2). In Côte d'Ivoire, most victims of trafficking are children and in 2022, identified cases of child trafficking mostly concerned forced labour and sexual exploitation.¹ In 2022, 55% of the victims of trafficking assisted by TEH were children.

To further protect vulnerable migrants and victims of trafficking, EUTF-funded programmes have also organised sensitisation campaigns, which reached 85,575 people in 2022 (indicator

¹ US Department of State, 'Trafficking in persons report', 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

3.3), of which 96% (or 82,513 people) by Protection West Africa. The programme organised awareness campaigns on the services available to young unaccompanied migrants. 94% of those reached in 2022 were reported in the second half of the year, after the programme hired a contractor to conduct mass campaigns. Another 3,062 people were reached by TEH with campaigns on migration risks, and 43 people were trained on the use of the newly created national referral system for victims of trafficking (indicator 3.7).

Finally, EUTF-funded programmes also trained 580 institutional staff on migration management in 2022 (indicator 3.7) in order to build institutional capacity. This included 517 child protection actors who were trained by Protection West Africa on available protection services and referral procedures. TEH trained the remaining 63 members of national security forces to support their activities to prevent human trafficking.

5.3.3. CÔTE D'IVOIRE AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 5: EUTF common output indicators for Côte d'Ivoire, December 2022

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	S1 2022	S2 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	0	71	2,375	466	256	3,168	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	0	9	182	13	50	254	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	0	0	0	1,024	0	462	1,486	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	0	0	0	3	0	0	3	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	0	0	0	38	10	115	163	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	0	0	0	36	240	0	276	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	4	3	2,344	1,374	608	1,022	5,355	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	12,400	41,852	9,881	3,015	8,175	77,400	152,723	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	5	11	307	4	0	0	327	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	3,752	2,030	912	1,559	0	0	8,253	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	1,625	1,149	1,263	1,624	0	19	5,680	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	0	0	1	1	1	3	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	132	663	328	295	1,418	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	64	55	36	0	0	155	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	10	343	108	0	0	1	462	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	0	0	0	15	0	0	15	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	0	0	17	0	0	17	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	0	0	10	740	166	724	1,640	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	0	0	0	2	37	72	111	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	0	1	3	1	1	3	9	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	0	0	4	40	2	46	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	0	0	1	3	2	2	8	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	0	1	2	1	0	4	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	

5.4. GHANA

5.4.1. GHANA IN 2022

Figure 28: Ghana – Key facts and figures, December 2022



In 2022, Ghana suspended parts of its foreign debt service amid spiralling inflation and currency depreciation. Sources of the economic turmoil experienced in 2022 can be traced back to the years before the outbreak of COVID-19, when Ghana increased public expenditures while implementing tax cuts.¹ Consequently, public debt rose during the pandemic, leading to credit rating downgrades and investors pulling out.² Currency depreciation and inflation accelerated as the war in Ukraine caused soaring commodity prices.³ Ultimately, the Ghanaian cedi had depreciated by 40% against the U.S. dollar and inflation had reached 54% by December 2022.⁴ After the country lost access to international capital markets⁵, the Ghanaian Finance Minister announced in December that Ghana suspended parts of their foreign debt payments. Interest payments had amounted to 54% of revenues in the first half of 2022.⁶ Also in December, the Ghanaian government reached a staff level agreement with the IMF on a three-year programme of \$3 billion, which is supposed to stabilise public finance sustainability through fiscal reforms, while at the same time protecting vulnerable population groups with strengthened social safety nets.⁷

Poverty reduction slows down as vulnerable households suffer from increased costs of living. Currency depreciation and high inflation put pressure on household budgets. Poor households, which already spend more than half of their budget on food, are particularly affected by higher expenditures for nutrition, fuels and fertiliser. Consequently, it is expected that poverty will decrease by only 0.2% between 2022 and 2024, compared to a 1.3% decrease between 2020 and 2022.⁸ These developments have fuelled protests in Ghana with large gatherings in June and November, including clashes with security forces.⁹

¹ Al-Jazeera, 'How Ghana, Africa's rising star, ended up in economic turmoil', 31 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² IMF, 'Frequently Asked Questions on Ghana', 13 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ World Bank, 'Ghana Macro Poverty Outlook', 5 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ World Bank, 'Ghana Macro Poverty Outlook', 5 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ IMF, 'Frequently Asked Questions on Ghana', 13 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ World Bank, 'Ghana Macro Poverty Outlook', 4 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ IMF, 'IMF Reaches Staff-Level Agreement on a \$3 billion, three years Extended Credit Facility with Ghana', 12 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ World Bank, 'Ghana Macro Poverty Outlook', 5 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


⁹ Africa News, 'Tear gas mar "Arise Ghana" protest: 12 Policemen injured, 29 protesters arrested', 29 June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

Reuters, 'Ghanaian protesters demand president step down over economic crisis', 7 November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

Meanwhile, amid rising levels of violence in Burkina Faso, Burkinabe refugees started to move into northern Ghana. In July, 1,000 Burkinabe crossed the border into the Upper East Region in Ghana following violent attacks in Burkina Faso. Another influx of Burkinabe refugees was registered in December into the Ghanaian Upper West Region. As of December 2022, 1,118 Burkinabe refugees were registered, although registration was still underway at that time.¹ Most of the new arrivals were hosted in villages, but some also built makeshift shelters near the border.²

5.4.2. THE EUTF IN GHANA

Figure 29: EUTF Portfolio in Ghana, December 2022^{3,4}



The EUTF has contracted two programmes amounting to €24.6M in Ghana. The GrEEn programme (GH-02)⁵ focuses on supporting the creation of green employment and enterprise opportunities (SO1). It accounts for 80% of the funding, implemented by two projects (GrEEn SNV and GrEEn UNCDF). The other programme works on migration management (SO3) and aims to strengthen local and national capacity for migration and border management (Border Security, GH-01)⁶. Both programmes were contracted at the end of 2019 and are expected to come to a close in the last quarter of 2023.

¹ UNHCR, 'Ghana Fact Sheet', 29 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#). As of February 2023, the number of Burkinabe refugees in northern Ghana was estimated at 4,000 to 6,000 people (UNHCR, 'Ghana Fact Sheet', 9 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#)).

² UNHCR, 'UNHCR Ghana and Partners gear themselves up to support Burkinabe asylum seekers as UNHCR declares level one emergency', 16 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


³ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁴ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁵ Boosting green employment and enterprise opportunities in Ghana.

⁶ Strengthening Border Security in Ghana.

Figure 30: Selected EUTF outputs, Ghana, December 2022



Boosting economic opportunities in a struggling agriculture sector

High prices for inputs have contributed to a much slower growth in the agriculture sector, compared to previous years (0.4% in 2022 as opposed to 7.3% and 8.4% in 2020 and 2021, respectively)¹. In a survey, 73% of respondents reported costs of fertilisers as a major challenge encountered by farming households during the 2022 planting season.² The sector is also particularly vulnerable to climate change, being exposed to more intense and more frequent extreme weather events³, and Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) is the largest greenhouse gas emitter in Ghana.⁴ The government's Coordinated Programme of Economic and Social Development Policies 2017-2024 focuses on productivity, product development, as well as storage, transport and processing capacities to modernise agricultural production in the country. It associates low fertiliser consumption with an ineffective credit market, rendering yield enhancing inputs unaffordable for many Ghanaian farmers.⁵ GrEEen focuses on agriculture and other sectors to create economic opportunities in regions of departure, transit and return to Ghana.

In 2022, 784 agriculture, fishery and livestock production or processing MSMEs were created or supported (indicator 1.2), in addition to 367 MSMEs in other sectors. Besides GrEEen UNCDF, the regional ARCHIPELAGO programme significantly contributed to these results by supporting

¹ World Bank, 'Ghana Macro Poverty Outlook', 5 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² *Cadre Harmonisé* and Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, 'Ghana: Results of the Current (October to December 2022) and Projected (June to August 2023) Acute Food Security and Nutrition Analysis', 14 November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ World Bank, 'Ghana Country Climate and Development Report', October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


⁴ World Bank, 'Ghana Climate Change Law and Development', November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Republic of Ghana, 'The Coordinated Programme of Economic and Social Development Policies (2017-2024)', 20 October 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

partnerships between African and European organisations, which have the capacity to engage the private sector. For instance, the Kwadoso Agricultural College in Kumasi and the Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands jointly developed a practice oriented towards training programme implicating the private sector of Kumasi, thereby strengthening agricultural entrepreneurs and MSMEs.

Additionally, agriculture represented 41% of jobs created or supported in Ghana in 2022, followed by the service sector with 30% (indicator 1.1). This corresponds to 1,845 jobs in agriculture and 1,337 jobs in services, out of 4,463 jobs overall. 71% of people benefitting from job support in agriculture were young people and 58% women. GrEEn created or supported 3,590 jobs overall and all of the jobs in agriculture, largely through GrEEn SNV’s systematic Opportunities for Youth Employment (OYE) approach. OYE addresses push, pull and match factors of employment, implementing activities ranging from market scans to job placement and business incubation. All jobs created or supported with the OYE approach were long term regular wage employment.

Figure 31: EUTF indicator 1.1, in Ghana, December 2022




100,801 people were also assisted to develop income generating activities in 2022 (indicator 1.3), largely through GrEEn UNCDF’s support in accessing financial services. This represents 62% of contributions to indicator 1.3 in 2022 across all EUTF countries in the Sahel and Lake Chad window. Access to finance was also supported by building financial literacy: GrEEn UNCDF reached 63,216 individuals (45% female, 54% male), helping them to understand and use financial services, including crowdfunding opportunities (indicator 1.4). Via different intermediaries, including banks, digital service providers, and humanitarian organisations, the project helped develop a broad range of digital literacy offers. Besides face-to-face and online education, the project also supported a chatbot solution and an interactive voice response system to provide financial counselling.

Improving border management by strengthening state and civil society actors

The Border Security programme worked with both national security and civil society actors to facilitate collaboration on border management. Notably, it supported the organisation of a two-day roundtable discussion on preventing and countering violent extremism between the Ministry of National Security, the Ghana Boundary Commission, and CSOs (indicator 5.1). A similar forum for exchange between government and civil society actors is planned for the coming years. Improving this state-society dialogue is a key component of the programme's objective to promote a comprehensive and sustainable approach to migration management. In 2022, the project strengthened border control capacities by providing five motorbikes and 65 forensic devices to check travel documents to different units of the Ghana Immigration Service (indicator 4.1 bis). At the same time, it supported several civil society initiatives to develop innovative approaches to migration issues. For instance, the Ghana Integrity Initiative, a local chapter of Transparency International, was supported in 2022 to implement information campaigns which reached 160,000 people with community radio discussions on the free movement of people and goods, as well as on the threats of violent extremism (indicator 2.7).

Figure 32: EUTF indicator 4.1 bis, in Ghana, December 2022



5.4.3. GHANA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 6: EUTF common output indicators for Ghana, December 2022

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	S1 2022	S2 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	0	2	2,132	1,806	2,657	6,597	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	0	5	696	176	975	1,852	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	0	0	79	10,622	60,552	40,249	111,502	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	0	5	679	8,533	46,901	26,515	82,633	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	0	0	0	10	0	0	10	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	0	0	0	10	0	0	10	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	0	0	0	0	0	67	67	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	0	0	0	0	160,000	160,000	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	0	0	90,156	0	0	90,156	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	0	0	0	3	2	0	5	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	0	0	5	7	0	0	12	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	3,164	25,290	826,213	2,409	60	0	857,136	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	0	0	5	17	0	0	22	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	831	305	758	184	11	0	2,089	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	177	268	444	596	53	0	1,538	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	200	529	133	321	1,183	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	5	88	64	64	4	0	225	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	29	57	204	6	3	0	299	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	0	31	0	0	70	101	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	140	40	49	805	101	26	1,161	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	0	0	0	29	35	35	99	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	0	19	173	101	8	301	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	0	0	3	35	11	2	51	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	0	13	4	37	3	57	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	1	0	0	3	0	1	5	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	32,000	0	0	0	32,000	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	7,000	182,763	0	0	189,763	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	10	10	0	0	20	

5.5. GUINEA

5.5.1. GUINEA IN S1 2022

Figure 33: Guinea – Key facts and figures dashboard, December 2022



Guinea's internal politics became increasingly conflictual throughout 2022. The military government banned protests in May and arrested three prominent members of the FNDC¹ on 5 July, triggering violent clashes between demonstrators and the police.^{2,3} On 9 August, the authorities announced the dissolution of the FNDC, following protests against the "authoritarian handling of the transition" which on 28-29 July had seen five demonstrators killed.⁴ A similar sequence of events unfolded in October, when the police killing of three protesters were followed by arrests of FNDC leaders.⁵ In this context, opposition organisations have repeatedly rejected "inclusive dialogue" initiatives by the authorities until political and civil liberties are restored.⁶

The junta's relations with ECOWAS were tumultuous but showed improvement at the tail end of the year. On 20 July, President Umaro Sissoco Embalo of Guinea-Bissau led a an official ECOWAS visit to Guinea. On 28 July, Embalo announced an agreement had been reached to restore civilian rule in two years rather than three, but this was immediately contradicted by Guinean authorities.⁷ Tensions with the regional bloc escalated in September as ECOWAS announced "gradual sanctions" on individuals linked to the junta,⁸ but an agreement was announced one month later by ECOWAS, once again referring to a 24-month transition.⁹ The Guinean interim President Mamady Doumbouya, however, set January 2023 as the starting date of the transition period, or 16 months after the coup. On

¹ The 'Front National pour la Défense de la Constitution' is an alliance of political parties, labour unions and civil society organisations formed during protests against Alpha Condé's attempt to amend the constitution and remain in power.

² Bloomberg, 'Guinea Junta Bans Protests After Announcing Transition Timeline', 14 May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Africa News, 'Guinea: 17 police injured after violent protests', 7 July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ TV5 Monde, 'Guinée : le Front national de la défense de la Constitution dissout par le gouvernement', 9 August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Africa News, 'Guinea: Politicians prosecuted after banned anti-government demonstration', 25 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Jeune Afrique, 'Guinée : Mamadi Doumbouya lance son dialogue « inclusif », les principaux partis boycottent', November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Jeune Afrique, 'Guinée : pourquoi Mamadi Doumbouya a démenti l'accord avec la CEDEAO', August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Africa News, 'West African leaders impose sanctions on Guinea junta', 23 September 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Africa News, 'Guinea junta agrees to leave power after two years – ECOWAS', 22 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

4 December, ECOWAS leaders declared that the transition period “must start immediately, and not at a later date”.^{1,2}

While the junta’s economic priorities seem aligned with international lenders’ diagnostics, food affordability is a growing concern. Both the IMF and the World Bank highlighted in their latest publications the need to increase development gains from the mining sector, which in 2021 accounted for 21% of GDP but only brought in 2% of GDP in government revenues.^{3,4} In 2022, Guinean authorities instructed foreign bauxite mining companies to submit proposals for domestic processing and negotiated greater infrastructure investment and state ownership with the consortium exploiting the largest iron deposit in the world at Simandou mine (Nzérékoré Region).^{5,6} Food insecurity has become a pressing issue in recent years due to climate events and the rise in food and agricultural input prices, with the number of food insecure people increasing sevenfold from 2019 to 2021.^{7,8} In spite of countervailing measures such as reduced custom duties and price ceilings on selected commodities, the situation worsened in 2022,⁹ as annual food inflation reached 15.7% and the number of food insecure people increased by 15%.^{10,11} In response, the IMF Executive Board approved a disbursement of \$71M under the Food Shock Window of the Rapid Credit Facility in December, in order to help the country address the food security crisis.¹²

5.5.2. THE EUTF IN GUINEA

The EUTF has committed €73M in Guinea. The INTEGRA programme (GN-01)¹³ represents most of this funding with €60M, with which it aims to create jobs, provide TVET, especially to youth, and support entrepreneurship and small businesses (SO1). The €8M RESIGUI programme (GN-04)¹⁴, which completed in 2022, strove to build the population’s resilience in the face of food insecurity (SO2). Finally, the €5M *Etat Civil* programme (GN-05)¹⁵ seeks to strengthen and digitise civil registry processes while building national actors’ civil registration and identification capacities (SO4).

¹ Jeune Afrique, ‘Guinée : Mamadi Doumbouya lance son dialogue « inclusif », les principaux partis boycottent’, November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² ECOWAS Commission, ‘Sixty-second Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government’, 4 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ World Bank, ‘Macro Poverty Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa’, April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ IMF, ‘Staff Report for the 2022 Article IV Consultation and request for disbursement under the Rapid Credit Facility’, 8 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Jeune Afrique, ‘Simandou : Rio Tinto et WCS dans une impasse face au mur Doumbouya’, July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Africa News, ‘Guinea: Foreign Mining companies ordered to process bauxite on site’, October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Cadre Harmonisé, ‘Résultats de l’analyse de l’insécurité alimentaire aiguë courante en octobre-décembre 2019’, November 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Cadre Harmonisé, ‘Résultats de l’analyse de l’insécurité alimentaire aiguë courante en octobre-décembre 2021’, November 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ IMF, ‘IMF Staff Concludes Visit to Guinea’, 9 June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹⁰ Institut National de la Statistique, ‘Indice harmonisé des prix à la consommation’, December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ Cadre Harmonisé, ‘Résultats de l’analyse de l’insécurité alimentaire aiguë courante en octobre-décembre 2022’, November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹² IMF, ‘IMF Executive Board Approves US\$71 Million in Emergency Financing Support and Concludes 2022 Article IV Consultation with Guinea’, 22 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹³ Programme d’appui à l’intégration socio-économique des jeunes en République de Guinée.

¹⁴ Améliorer la résilience des populations vulnérables de Guinée.

¹⁵ Projet pilote d’amélioration des performances de l’état civil guinéen par le recours à la digitalisation.

Figure 34: EUTF portfolio in Guinea, December 2022^{1,2}





Figure 35: Selected EUTF outputs in Guinea, December 2022



¹ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

² This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

Assisting migrants and building capacity to sustainably address mixed migrations challenges

There are substantial mixed migration flows in Guinea, mainly in the form of departures and transit from economic migrants. In addition to substantial internal migration from rural areas to the capital and mining regions, Guineans migrate primarily to other West African countries, and to a lesser degree to Europe and the MENA region.¹ Data on IOM-supported voluntary and humanitarian returns over the last six years indicate that Guinean returnees are 95% male, and the youngest of any Western and Central African country with an average age of 24 years old.² The UN estimated in 2020 that over 550,000 Guinean nationals lived abroad (4% of the country's population), while 121,000 foreign nationals lived within the country.³ Guinea hosts few refugees, notably since former Ivoirian refugees have been repatriated, with only 2,204 refugees and 266 asylum seekers as of December 2022.⁴

Available data on mixed migrations in Guinea indicate that they have been increasing in recent years. In 2022, Guinea was the second most represented Sub-Saharan nationality (behind Côte d'Ivoire) in illegal border crossings into the EU by sea with 5,983 cases. After dropping from their peak in 2016, illegal border crossings of Guinean nationals have doubled each year since 2019, when the country ranked in the seventh place with 656 cases.⁵ Guinea was also the main country of origin for IOM-supported⁶ voluntary and humanitarian returns to the West and Central Africa (WCA) region⁷ during the 2021-June 2022 period with 9,142 returns (23% of the total, mostly from the WCA region), up from second place in 2019-2020.⁸ Population movements along Guinea's land border increased throughout the latter half of 2022, with 71,976 crossings reported by IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) during the latest three-month period available (September-November), the highest number recorded⁹ of any 3-months period and a 69% increase compared to April-June.¹⁰

In 2022, Protection West Africa (REG-13) assisted 5,027 (28% female) youth and migrant children (indicator 3.2), tripling the number of beneficiaries for this indicator in Guinea. Both Guinean and foreign child migrants are particularly vulnerable to trafficking within and through Guinea, where the most reported forms of exploitation are forced begging and forced labour in mining and agriculture.¹¹ The programme targets youth and migrant children in transit through one stop shops and mobile teams along migration routes and refers them to reinforced protection services, including shelters, foster families, and psychosocial support.¹²

In addition, EUTF-funded programmes strengthened local capacity to sustainably address the enduring phenomenon of mixed migrations. In total, 612 individuals were trained on migration management and protection (indicator 3.7) this year by *TEH Golfe de Guinée* (REG-12) and Protection West Africa (REG-13) in Guinea. The former trained 289 members of national security forces (14% female) involved in the penal response to trafficking (including 12 trainers), as well as 59 employees of local judicial institutions (2 female) and 16 call centre operators (9 female), trained to receive calls from trafficking victims and refer them to protection services. Protection West Africa offered on-the-job training to 143 key child protection actors (32% female) who had been previously identified through a

¹ IOM, 'Migration en Guinée – Profil migratoire national 2020'. 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

² IOM Regional Office for West and Central Africa, 'Assistance to Voluntary and Humanitarian Return 2017-June 2022', October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ UNDESA, 'International Migration 2020 Highlights', January 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ UNHCR, 'West and Central Africa – Persons of concern as of December 2022', January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Frontex, 'Detections of illegal border-crossings statistics download', consulted in April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Including 2,325 supported by the EU-IOM Joint Initiative.

⁷ IOM's WCA region covers all countries of SLC region, plus the Congo, the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

⁸ IOM Regional Office for West and Central Africa, 'Assistance to Voluntary and Humanitarian Return 2017-June 2022', October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ Data collection first began in October 2021.


¹⁰ IOM DTM, 'Guinée – Rapport sur le suivi des flux de population #1-#14', December 2021-January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

¹¹ US Department of State, 'Trafficking in persons report', 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

¹² Save the Children, 'Document of Action T05-SAH-REG-13-02'.

mapping of existing services. Training topics included case management, safeguarding as well as children’s rights, wellbeing, life skills and beneficiary participation.¹

Figure 36: EUTF indicator 3.7, in Guinea, December 2022



Leveraging digital technologies to improve the civil registration system

Guinea’s civil registration system is currently not able to serve the needs of its people. Beyond the fulfilment of a human right enshrined in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 7), an adequate civil registration system has profound implications for national security, economic development, and public service delivery.² In 2018, only 51% of children under five years old had a birth certificate and only 62% had their birth registered at all. These rates diverged significantly across regions and income levels, with only 28% of children under five years old having a birth certificate in the Boké region, and only 34% for children in the lowest economic well-being quintile.³ Coverage of other life events appears even more limited, with only 2.1% of deaths registered in Guinea in 2018.⁴

Civil registration has seen measurable progress in recent years with ongoing support from international partners, although gaps remain. In 2012, the rate of children under five years old for which birth was registered was 58%, while only 42% had a birth certificate and 16% did not.⁵ Part of the progress was driven by an EU-funded (€1.4M) project implemented by UNICEF⁶ at the central level and in 66 municipalities of the N’Zérékoré region from 2016 to 2019. This project achieved notable results, with birth registration rates in the target region rising from 26% to 54% over the implementation period.⁷ In addition, Guinea is part of the World Bank’s WURI⁸ programme which started operations in 2019 and aims to reinforce access to identification for adults through the deliverance of a unique identity number.⁹

The *Etat Civil* GN programme (GN-05) is supporting Guinean authorities to leverage digitalisation to durably transform the civil registration system. The support combines legal and

¹ Ibid.

² Haishan Fu and Steve MacFeely (World Bank Blogs), ‘Civil registrations and vital statistics: it’s not just important, it’s a matter of life and death’, consulted on 4 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ *Ministère du Plan et du Développement Économique*, ‘Enquête Démographique et de Santé 2018’, 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ United Nations Statistics Division, ‘Vital statistics metadata – Guinea 2020’, Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ *Ministère du Plan et du Développement Économique*, op. cit.

⁶ *Projet d’appui à la modernisation du système d’état civil en Guinée*. More information available [here](#).

⁷ ENABEL, ‘Description de l’action, Projet pilote d’amélioration du système d’état civil guinéen par l’effet catalyseur de la digitalisation’, July 2020.

⁸ West Africa Unique Identification for Regional Integration and Inclusion.

⁹ ENABEL, op. cit.

operational support for central government institutions as well as the design, planning, implementation and testing of a pilot system in target areas of Conakry, Kindia and Mamou Regions.¹

In 2022, Etat Civil GN concluded the set-up of the pilot civil registration system (indicator 5.2). In preparation for its rollout, the programme conducted research, trained local civil servants and fully equipped offices in targeted local civil registration centres and tribunals to allow them to use the new system. In total, seven preparatory research papers were drafted and disseminated (indicator 5.3) and eight offices were equipped (indicator 4.1 bis), the first contribution to this indicator in Guinea. Meanwhile, 116 service providers were trained on the use of the system (indicator 2.8), of which 42 were women.

In Q4 2022, civil servants began digitising existing birth certificates in four municipalities of the Conakry region. In Kaloum, Tatam, Matoto, and Ratoma, employees of the *MATD*² together with archivists uploaded 23,315 birth certificates to the new database, easing users' access and control as well as improving security over personal information (indicator 2.9). Beforehand, paper copies of birth certificates were often stored in inadequate conditions, hampering people's access to civil status services.³

5.5.3. GUINEA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 7: EUTF common output indicators for Guinea, December 2022

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	S1 2022	S2 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	55	1,363	1,080	1,724	91	4,313	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	444	1,058	443	905	2	2,852	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	0	1,246	1,278	10	0	0	2,534	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	0	2,026	4,551	16,479	2,155	1,258	26,469	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	0	3	2	1	3	1	10	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	1	0	0	128	0	2	131	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	0	0	0	1,323	3,607	251	5,181	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	0	0	17,996	0	0	17,996	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	0	0	0	827	0	0	827	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	0	8,787	14,864	4,296	2,312	30,259	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	0	74	0	1,779	110	6	1,969	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	0	6,975	108,535	29,265	21,315	166,090	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	1	3	36	2,315	3,513	1,514	7,382	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	21,155	21,161	5,967	9,741	11,504	7,519	77,047	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	1	5	11	9	0	0	26	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	9,414	3,973	3,201	3,145	0	0	19,733	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	2,898	1,908	1,809	6,770	386	116	13,887	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	174	0	1	0	0	175	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	1,047	536	84	528	2,195	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	672	107	91	50	14	14	948	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	0	0	0	8	0	8	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	0	0	0	2	0	1	3	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	8	1	3	59	14	85	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	0	8	1	6	1	2	18	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	15	1	12	9	3	40	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	0	36	0	1	0	0	37	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	23,015	2,106	0	0	25,121	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	4,035	1,053	0	0	5,088	

¹ Ibid.


² *Ministère de l'Administration du Territoire et de la Décentralisation*, Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization

³ Open ENABEL, 'Projet pilote d'amélioration du système d'état civil guinéen par l'effet catalyseur de la digitalisation', consulted on 4 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

5.6. MALI

5.6.1. MALI IN 2022

Figure 37: Mali – Key facts and figures, December 2022



After the Malian government adopted a new transition calendar in June and ECOWAS sanctions were lifted in July, there was some progress in the various political processes in the second half of 2022.¹ ECOWAS had imposed trade and financial sanctions in January in response to the junta's failure to adhere to the transition calendar. After adopting a new timeline, which foresees a transition to civilian rule until the end of March 2024, ECOWAS lifted the sanctions, allowing cross-border trade and giving Mali access to regional capital markets.² In the remainder of the year, some progress to implement the transition was achieved: the Electoral Law was adopted and the Independent Authority for Election Management was operationalised to prepare the local, parliamentary and presidential elections in 2023 and 2024. Furthermore, a new constitution was elaborated and planned to be submitted to a referendum in March 2023.³

Nonetheless, the political process remains at risk considering the country's worsening security situation and strained diplomatic relations. In 2022, 1,378 events of violence were reported, causing 4,862 fatalities, a 31% and 155% increase, respectively, compared to 2021.⁴ At the same time, troop-contributing countries support for MINUSMA diminished as several countries announced the progressive withdrawal of their troops.⁵ Regional diplomatic relations worsened in July when Mali detained 46 Ivorian soldiers who could only return home in January 2023.⁶ Briefly after this arrest, Mali expelled MINUSMA's spokesman, allegedly because of his statements about the detainment.⁷ The end of the French Barkhane mission in 2022 also occurred in a context of growing diplomatic tensions between France and Mali, fuelled by the increasing involvement of Russia's Wagner Group in Mali.⁸

In an increasingly insecure environment, 8.8 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance in January 2023.⁹ Following attacks of extremists, self-defence and other violent groups,

¹ United Nations Security Council, 'Situation in Mali. Report of the Secretary-General', 6 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² United Nations Security Council, 'Situation in Mali. Report of the Secretary-General', 3 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ United Nations Security Council, 'Situation in Mali. Report of the Secretary-General', 6 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project dashboard', consulted in 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ ICG, 'MINUSMA at a Crossroads', 1 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Al Jazeera, 'Ivory Coast troops return home after months of captivity in Mali', 8 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Deutsche Welle, 'Mali expels UN peacekeeping mission spokesman', 20 July 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


⁸ Center for Strategic & International Studies, 'The End of Operation Barkhane and the Future of Counterterrorism in Mali', 2 March 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ OCHA, 'Plan de Réponse Humanitaire: Mali', January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

the number of IDPs increased by 18% from 350,110 in January 2022 to 412,387 a year later. Relatedly, the number of Malian refugees in asylum countries increased in the same timeframe by 24%, from 158,958 to 197,737.¹ These humanitarian challenges come at a time of continued shrinking space for civil society actors: after the French government decided to suspend bilateral development assistance in the country, Mali announced to ban activities of NGOs which are technically or financially supported by France. 294 NGOs are reported to be affected by this decision.² More generally, authorities also announced that financial sources of NGOs operating in Mali must be validated on an annual basis for Malian organisations, and on a monthly basis for foreign organisations.³

5.6.2. THE EUTF IN MALI

Figure 38: EUTF portfolio in Mali, December 2022^{4,5}



The EUTF has contracted €288.6M in Mali, primarily to programmes working on security, governance and conflict prevention (SO4, 49%) as well as resilience (SO2, 31%). Other programmes focus on economic and employment opportunities (SO1, 14%) and migration management (SO3, 6%). Seven projects have come to an end in 2022 and nine are continuing into 2023. The most recently contracted project is PROJES II (ML-14-14)⁶, which is part of the overall Support Programme for the Transition in the Republic of Mali (PST-ML, ML-14). The programme had to considerably adjust its timeline following the changes in the government's transition calendar. Two of its projects, PST-PAREM (ML-14-01)⁷ and *PST-Observation citoyenne* (ML-14-02)⁸, are supporting the electoral processes, a key component of the transition in Mali.

The political and security situation in Mali made implementation in 2022 challenging for many programmes. The major difficulties encountered stemmed from the complicated security situation, especially in the central and northern parts of the country, restrictions imposed as a result of the ECOWAS sanctions in the first half of 2022, as well as the deteriorating diplomatic relations between the Malian government and European countries. Activities in northern parts of the countries oftentimes had to be delayed or reoriented because the security situation did not allow regular operations, for

¹ UNHCR, 'Mali Factsheet', January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² RFI, 'Mali: les autorités renforcent le contrôle des ONG', 16 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ RFI, 'Mali: les ONG inquiètes des nouveaux dispositifs de contrôle', 19 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁵ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.


⁶ *Programme Jeunesse et Stabilisation II*.

⁷ *Projet d'appui aux réformes et aux élections au Mali (2021-2023)*.

⁸ *Projet d'appui à l'observation citoyenne du cycle électoral de la transition 2020-2022 au Mali*.

instance concerning sensitisation campaigns of the PAECSIS programme. Deploying experts into certain parts of the country was severely limited. Furthermore, the sanctions impeded certain administrative procedures in delivering material or contracting partners. The Diaspora ML programme (ML-05)¹ reported for instance that the sanctions had delayed the creation of a local investment fund, destined to channel diaspora resources into structuring projects in agricultural value chains. Finally, the deteriorating diplomatic relations also affected the relationships between the implementing organisations and some of their Malian partner agencies, leading to interruptions of cooperation. At the time of writing, activities of the G5 Security FSI project (REG-23-03)² in Mali were still suspended.

Figure 39: Situation in Mali and EUTF outputs – as of December 2022



Humanitarian assistance amid multiple crises

Deteriorating security in Mali negatively impacted the humanitarian situation of the population. Between January 2022 and January 2023, the number of people in need increased by 17% from 7.5 to 8.8 million.³ Regarding food security, a good rainfall season was expected to lead to an average to good harvest in 2022/2023. Nonetheless, the harvest in certain areas was projected to be considerably diminished due to insecurity and floodings. The northern and central regions are most affected by food insecurity. Between October and December, 152,260 people were in a situation of food crisis in the

¹ *Projet d'appui aux investissements de la diaspora malienne dans les régions d'origine.*


² *Appui aux capacités de dialogue et d'actions concertées des Forces de sécurité intérieure dans les environnements de conflictualité et d'insécurité au Burkina Faso, Mali et Niger.*

³ OCHA, 'Plan de Réponse Humanitaire: Mali', January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

central region of Mopti and 137,429 people in a situation of crisis or worse in the north-eastern region of Gao, representing the highest numbers registered across all Malian regions.¹

In 2022, EUTF-funded programmes provided 89,750 people with food-security related assistance (indicator 2.4), the highest annual number achieved in Mali so far. Most beneficiaries were reached in the Tombouctou (28% of beneficiaries) and Mopti regions (25%), followed by Gao (15%).² The large majority of those supported were farmers (95%), in addition to pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. The PDU (REG-18)³ and CRIALCES (REG-24)⁴ programmes provided all of the support in 2022 for this indicator. CRIALCES conducted trainings on issues like techniques of market gardening or management of cooperatives. The trainings were complemented by provision of equipment, including wheelbarrows, shovels, and ploughs. In addition, in 2022, 271,186 people benefitted from improved access to basic social services, of which 63% pertained to nutrition and food security (indicator 2.9). Other improved access to services concerned health care, social protection, and education. Cash transfers provided by the PDU and CRIALCES were instrumental in achieving these results, accounting for 71% of all beneficiaries reported for this indicator. Services were also improved by constructing infrastructure (28%). For instance, the DIASPORA Mali programme helped construct schools, health centres and maternity units with contributions of the Malian diaspora.

Figure 40: EUTF indicator 2.4, in Mali, December 2022



Moreover, EUTF-funded programmes built capacities of 1,920 staff members from basic service providers (indicator 2.8), all of them in the area of nutrition and food security. Most service providers were trained in Mopti (68%), followed by Ségou (13%). 70% of them were community or

¹ Cadre Harmonisé and Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, 'Mali: Résultats de l'analyse de la situation de l'insécurité alimentaire aigue actuelle et projeté', 12 November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² For 28% of the assistance provided, the location was not specified.

³ Programme d'urgence pour la stabilisation des espaces frontaliers du G5 Sahel.

⁴ Réponse à la crise alimentaire au centre Sahel : support nutritionnel et relèvement.

volunteer service providers, underlining the importance of non-state actors in providing basic social services. The ban on French-backed NGOs could thus have important repercussions on providing the required assistance to vulnerable population groups.

Bottom-up and top-down conflict mitigation

The number of fatalities in violent events increased from 1,909 in 2021 to 4,862 in 2022, with the highest numbers recorded in Mopti (1,935) and Gao (1,159). In Mopti, the number of fatalities increased by 118% and in Gao by 201% compared to 2021.¹ In Gao and neighbouring Ménaka, the main drivers of insecurity were active fighting among extremist groups affiliated with Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), as well as their intimidation of communities in order to consolidate influence.² In Mopti, the main danger for civilians emanated from improvised explosive devices, which caused high numbers of deaths and injured.³ In August, the government adopted a stabilisation strategy for central Mali, recognising the complex security situation in the tri-border area between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.⁴ The strategy aims to coordinate all initiatives in central Mali to work towards stability, prosperity and community reconciliation.⁵ Among the EUTF programmes in Mali, the PDU has a regional focus on Mopti, PARSEC (ML-06)⁶ on Mopti and Gao, and ADEL on Gao and Tombouctou.

In 2022, the PDU PROGRESS⁷ project reached 112,047 people in Mopti and Gao with conflict prevention and human rights messages through mass media campaigns (indicator 4.3). Messages to counter stereotypes and prejudices as well as to fight rumours and false information were largely spread through radio stations and replicated in social media. Furthermore, 30,676 people – 27% women and 73% men – participated in conflict prevention and human rights activities thanks to the ADEL (ML-12)⁸, PDU, and PST-ML programmes. For example, the *PST-ML Observation Citoyenne* project, which aims to support citizen observation of the electoral cycle during the transition in Mali, helped establish a group of civil society actors to observe the transition process. The group analysed and provided information on important political and security events during the transition process. State representatives were associated to the group in order to strengthen civil society-state coordination and to immediately inform the respective authorities about emerging problems. The group was reoriented to provide analyses beyond the electoral cycle itself as the elections were delayed.

At the same time, EUTF-funded programmes strengthened Malian security forces by providing 2,726 items of equipment, including bulletproof vests, helmets, tents, and phones (indicator 4.1 bis). The equipment was provided by the PARSEC, GAR-SI (REG-04)⁹, and POC Mali (ML-13)¹⁰ programmes. Other types of equipment provided include 27 vehicles and an engine-generator. The following security actors benefitted from the equipment: the *Groupe d'Action Rapide de Surveillance et Intervention* (GAR-SI)¹¹, the customs service, the *Garde Nationale*¹², the *Gendarmerie Nationale*¹³, the *Brigade de Répression du Trafic de Migrants et la Traite des Êtres Humains*¹⁴, and the Police of Koro. Most of these actors operate on a national scale, but some are more regionally focused. Most significantly, PARSEC specifically targets the Mopti region, in the centre of the country. Mopti has a

¹ ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project dashboard', consulted in March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² United Nations Security Council, 'Situation in Mali. Report of the Secretary-General', 3 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ United Nations Security Council, 'Situation in Mali. Report of the Secretary-General', 6 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ United Nations, 'Progress towards Peace in Mali is Unfolding, Security Council Told, Despite Tough Security, Humanitarian and Human Rights Challenges', 18 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ RFI, 'Mali : en quoi consiste la stratégie nationale de stabilisation du Centre?', 31 August 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ *Programme d'Appui au Renforcement de la Sécurité dans les régions de Mopti et de Gao et à la gestion des zones frontalières.*

⁷ PROGRESS (programme de résilience et de cohésion sociale au Sahel) - fuseau central.

⁸ *Appui au Développement Économique Local et à la prévention des conflits dans les régions de Tombouctou et Gao.*

⁹ *Groupes d'Action Rapides – Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel.*

¹⁰ *Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint de lutte contre l'immigration irrégulière, le trafic de migrants et la traite des êtres humains en République du Mali.*

¹¹ Rapid Action Surveillance and Intervention Group.


¹² National Guard.

¹³ National Gendarmerie.

¹⁴ Brigade to Fight Against Migrant Smuggling and Trafficking of Human Beings.

strategic location in accessing the strongholds of extremist groups in the northern parts of Mali. In addition, it is an important transit point for irregular migration and illegal traffic, including of weapons and drugs.¹ Importantly, extremist groups attempt to capitalise on intercommunal conflicts in central Mali to expand their influence and secure new recruits.² PARSEC also built a camp for the Bandiagara mobile battalion and rehabilitated Koro's custom service secondary office (indicator 4.1), both located in the Mopti region. These infrastructures were supported with a six-digit amount.

Figure 41: EUTF indicator 4.1 bis, in Mali, December 2022



Assistance to migrants, refugees and IDPs

In addition to internal displacement, three main migration flows crossed the Malian borders in 2022: from/to Burkina Faso, from/to Algeria, and from/to Mauritania. Between October and December 2022, the flows between Burkina Faso and Mali were the largest in terms of numbers (79% of all cross-border flows), followed by those between Algeria and Mali (11%) and with Mauritania (9%).³ Migrants travelling along the Malian-Burkinabe axis most of the time either searched for seasonal economic opportunities, for instance at gold panning sites in Kayes, Koulikoro or Sikasso, or they returned from Algeria or Europe. Similarly, migrants travelling from/to Mauritania or Algeria often searched for economic opportunities in these countries or were travelling further north along the Western or Central Mediterranean Routes. Incoming migrants from Mauritania or Algeria were most of the time returning from these countries. Between October and December 2022, 128,000 migratory movements overall were observed at six flow monitoring points, 51% incoming and 49% outgoing.⁴

In 2022, the Protection West Africa programme (REG-13)⁵ assisted 17,299 migrants (22% women, 78% men) (indicator 3.2). This represents 37% of all migrants, refugees or IDPs protected in Mali since 2018 with EUTF support. Protection West Africa contributes to the protection of vulnerable migrants along the migratory routes in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. In 2022, it reached 80% of its

¹ Expertise France, 'Description de l'action, Programme d'Appui au Renforcement de la Sécurité dans les régions de Mopti et de Gao et à la gestion des zones frontalières (PARSEC Mopti-Gao)', August 2017.

² United Nations Security Council, 'Situation in Mali. Report of the Secretary-General', 6 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


³ IOM, 'Mali: Rapport sur le suivi des flux de population', 24 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Appui à la protection des migrants les plus vulnérables en Afrique de l'Ouest.

beneficiaries in Mali in Tombouctou, followed by Kayes and Ségou (both 9%). Most migrants received non-food items like hygiene products or clothes (77%). Others were assisted with psycho-social (14%) or package support (8%).¹ The 2022 beneficiaries also included 829 minors who received cash transfers.

Figure 42: EUTF indicator 3.2 bis, in Mali, December 2022



Consolidating the civil registry system

Towards the end of 2022, the PAECSIS programme (ML-08)² came to an end. PAECSIS developed a sustainable civil registry system to continuously register vital events (births, marriages, deaths). To do so, the programme targeted different actors and levels, adjusting policies and strategies, building the system, developing the capacities of the Malian administration (including at the local level) and conducting sensitisation campaigns to foster demand for civil registration. The programme achieved a significant share of its results in the fifth and last year of implementation.

Over the entire implementation period, 180,573 judgements to register vital events were rendered (indicator 2.2). 94% of these results were achieved in 2022. In order to provide access to the civil registration system across the entire country, relevant actors were trained by PAECSIS in at least seven regions in Mali (indicator 4.2). Out of 3,607 people trained over the entire project period, 49% were from relevant non-state actors – mostly people who are in a position to declare deaths or

¹ The deviation from 100% is due to rounding of percentages.

² Programme d'appui au fonctionnement de l'état civil au Mali: appui à la mise en place d'un système d'information sécurisé.

births in medical facilities and can provide information on the importance of civil registration – 36% were from local civilian institutions and 13% were justice officials. 65% of the people trained on civil registration were men and 30% women.

Outcome analysis 2: ADEL project (ML-12-01)¹ in Mali^{2,3}

ADEL		Main targets	
 <p><i>Appui au Développement Economique Local et à la prévention des conflits dans les régions de Tombouctou et Gao</i></p>	 <p>Budget: €13M EUTF</p>	 <p>Local authorities</p>	 <p>Users of social services</p>
 <p>From December 2019 to November 2022</p>	 <p>IP: LuxDev</p>	 <p>Local associations and cooperatives</p>	 <p>Youth (15-40) in Tombouctou</p>
<p><i>Gao and Tombouctou are amongst the regions most affected by violence in Mali. Radical groups and criminal gangs have threatened socio-economic development in both regions since conflict broke out in 2012. As a consequence of ongoing violence, there were 61,435 IDPs in Gao and 52,153 IDPs in Tombouctou as of January 2023.⁴ Poverty rates in 2019/2020 stood at 40% and 13% respectively.⁵ In this volatile environment, the project aimed at contributing to the stabilisation of the two regions and the resilience of the communities and local authorities by strengthening the legitimacy of local administrations, establishing constructive state society relations, and meeting social demands.</i></p> <p>Improved performance of associations/cooperatives and local authorities</p> <p>The project has achieved this objective by strengthening the skills of elected representatives and local actors to enable them to exercise their roles and responsibilities more effectively, and by supporting them in the transparent management of local affairs based on a culture of accountability. The project has also strengthened the capacity of associations/cooperatives to carry out their activities safely and increase their agricultural output. To measure effects of the activities on the outcome level, the project used two composite indicators on a scale from 1 to 100, referring to the performance of associations/cooperatives and of local authorities, respectively. The composite indicator on associations/cooperatives focused on governance and financial sustainability aspects, such as increase in members' contribution compared to the previous year, participation rate in the last general assembly, and the annual net benefit of economic projects financed by the association/cooperative. The composite indicator on local authorities included aspects related to governance and access to basic social services, for instance by taking into account the taxes that were collected, the share of the budget that was executed, and the population's access to water, education and health. The final project evaluation found that performance of the associations/cooperatives improved by 28% and that of local authorities by 44%.</p> <p>Best practices</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participative planning – the project applied a bottom-up planning process, whereby needs and priorities were defined on the communal level by Committees of Orientation, Coordination and Monitoring of Development Actions⁶. Higher-level authorities then 			

¹ Appui au Développement Économique Local et à la prévention des conflits dans les régions de Tombouctou et Gao.

² PARTICIP GmbH, 'Rapport d'évaluation finale. MLI/804 : Appui au développement économique local et à la prévention des conflits dans les régions de Gao et Tombouctou (ADEL)', 31 October 2022.

³ LuxDev, EU, 'Rapport Annuel Suivi-Evaluation. Période couverte: 1er Janvier au 31 décembre 2020', January 2021.

⁴ UNHCR, 'Mali: Statistiques des Personnes relevant du HCR', January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ World Bank, 'Mali: Systematic Country Diagnostic', 19 September 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ Comités d'orientation, de coordination et de suivi des actions de développement.

validated these priorities. This participative process increased local ownership of the project activities.

- **Long-term engagement** – Building upon LuxDev’s engagement in both regions since 2016, the project illustrates that significant effects are more likely when target groups and partners have the chance to build mutual trust, the more so in insecure contexts. Besides being more effective, long-term partnerships also tend to be more efficient as building up project structures and relationships consumes time and resources.

Challenges

- **Sustainability in a volatile environment** – Sustainability of the project was assessed to be limited, amongst others because of a weak rate of return of some economic projects supported by the programme, lack of competitiveness of some products, and an inadequate supply side of the labour market. Addressing such structural factors, in particular in environments characterised by conflict, requires higher-level interventions and can only be achieved through incremental change.

5.6.3. MALI AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 8: EUTF common output indicators for Mali, December 2022

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	S1 2022	S2 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	0	2,198	1,307	2,927	1,091	140	7,663	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	950	1,664	718	575	2	34	3,943	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	18,499	30,552	20,574	55,977	3,214	3,015	131,831	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	3,689	5,511	5,998	9,229	1,090	556	26,073	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	7	58	19	40	0	0	124	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	248	241	120	739	94	5	1,447	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	3,813	2,344	1,290	11,210	34,420	188,416	241,493	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	108,815	190,481	63,346	17,883	19,735	11,033	411,293	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	38,880	69,426	56,314	22,136	29,445	60,305	276,506	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	10	2	0	0	0	0	12	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	5,133	4,736	4,152	17,526	13	0	31,560	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	31,343	176,408	314,206	544,666	583,572	1,434,244	3,084,439	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	633	5,124	364	773	700	1,220	8,814	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	1,749,378	284,844	233,291	176,144	163,638	107,548	2,714,842	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	0	0	21	9	15	0	45	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	6,088	3,021	1,692	18,191	8,057	9,242	46,291	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	0	91,476	42,729	218,702	64,304	8,257	425,468	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	1,885	981	349	321	0	0	3,536	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	9,521	6,209	2,308	2,879	0	0	20,917	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	2,046	4,364	3,111	3,723	19	1	13,264	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	3	19	18	23	0	0	63	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	25	0	281	1,247	66	188	1,807	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	2	14	6	9	0	0	31	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	0	0	31	33	4	1	69	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	3	2	3	2	1	1	13	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	837	6	1,318	4,777	2,688	38	9,664	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	610	1,930	1,074	3,985	2,230	2,048	11,877	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	265	1,342	1,987	16,367	123,670	19,053	162,684	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	37	381	134	292	87	296	1,227	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	12	26	53	285	91	57	524	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	17	16	808	426	45	962	2,274	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	34	26	15	396	77	321	869	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	8	0	8	3	2	0	21	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	102,641	0	0	0	102,641	

5.7. MAURITANIA

5.7.1. MAURITANIA IN 2022

Figure 43: Mauritania – Key facts and figures, December 2022



In 2022, heightened food prices contributed to food vulnerability in Mauritania. 97% of the wheat that is consumed in Mauritania is imported. Therefore, the country suffered particularly from the collapse of wheat and fertilizer exports from Ukraine and Russia. While in 2021 Mauritania had imported 35% of its wheat from Ukraine and Russia combined, that number fell to only 4% (from Ukraine) in 2022.¹ The result was a 70% increase in wheat prices between October 2021 and November 2022.² Towards the end of 2022, general inflation stabilised at 11% following a tightened monetary policy. Despite good rainfall during the 2021/2022 rainy season, it is estimated that 878,921 people faced severe food insecurity in 2022, more than double the previous year.³

A country of origin, transit and destination, Mauritania saw a continued influx of Malian refugees and remained a significant point of transit and departure in 2022. Notably, the number of Malian refugees and asylum-seekers surpassed 100,000 in 2022. The great majority of refugees stayed in the south-eastern region of Hodh el Chargui. As of December 2022, the M'bera camp next to the Malian border hosted 82,816 Malian refugees⁴, a 22% increase from 67,803 a year before. In addition, 5,570 Mauritians returned from Mali in 2022.⁵ Meanwhile, Mauritania remains one of the main points of departure for irregular migration on the Atlantic Route.

¹ IMF, 'Islamic Republic of Mauritania: Staff report for the 2022 Article IV Consultation and Requests for 42-Month Arrangements under the Extended Credit Facility and the Extended Fund Facility', 20 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² *Cadre Harmonisé* and Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, 'Mauritanie: Résultats de l'analyse de la situation de l'insécurité alimentaire aiguë actuelle', 12 November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


³ IMF, op. cit.

⁴ UNHCR, 'Mauritania Map: Situation on Refugees and Asylum-seekers', 16 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ UNICEF, 'Mauritania: Humanitarian Action for Children', 5 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

5.7.2. THE EUTF IN MAURITANIA

Figure 44: EUTF portfolio in Mauritania, December 2022^{1,2}



The EUTF contracted €81.5M to projects in Mauritania. 36% was spent on security and governance (SO4), through the completed CORIM programme's (MR-06)³ support to deradicalisation efforts, and through the Nexus SRD programme's (MR-08)⁴ support to Mauritanian institutions on the security-resilience-development nexus. Another 33% of the budget was contracted to programmes focusing on economic and employment opportunities (SO1). Notably, the Promopêche GIZ/ILO, Promopêche AECID, and SAFIRE programmes (MR-04, MR-05, MR-07)⁵ aim to support job creation and access as well as technical training focusing on high-potential sectors such as fishing and construction. Finally, programmes on migration management (SO3) and strengthening resilience (SO2) comprise 19% and 12% of EUTF funding, respectively. Until the end of 2022, three programmes have been completed; four more will come to an end in 2023 and only two are planned to continue into 2024.

¹ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.


² This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

³ Résilience pour la cohésion sociale et culturelle en République Islamique de Mauritanie.

⁴ L'UE pour le nexus sécurité-résilience-développement en Mauritanie.

⁵ Création d'emplois décents et consolidation de l'emploi existant pour les jeunes et potentiels migrants dans le secteur de la pêche artisanale; Promotion de l'emploi et amélioration des conditions de vie des pêcheurs artisanaux côtiers, jeunes et femmes aux alentours des espaces naturels protégés du secteur nord de Mauritanie; Programme de renforcement de la résilience des communautés urbaines et rurales vulnérables en Mauritanie.

Figure 45: Selected EUTF outputs in Mauritania, December 2022¹



Creating and supporting MSMEs – within and beyond Nouakchott

While MSMEs represent 96% of formal enterprises in Mauritania, they account for only 42% of formal employment. Conversely, the 4% large companies provide 58% of employment and 43% of revenues. Enterprises tend to be concentrated in the tertiary sector, mainly in the area of commerce and other services. Notably, 90% of the formal and active enterprises are located in Nouakchott. Furthermore, amongst the 26,000 companies created since 2015, 67% are individual enterprises and 90% are led by men.²


In 2022, EUTF-funded programmes supported or created 520 MSMEs in Mauritania (indicator 1.2). 480 of the 520 enterprises were strengthened and 36 were newly created. SAFIRE provided comprehensive support throughout the different steps of the business creation process to the 36 new enterprises, such as developing a business plan, conducting a feasibility study, coaching and training, networking, as well as providing material and financial resources. The programme's objective is to strengthen the resilience of urban and rural vulnerable communities by promoting the economic and social integration of young people and women. Most of the new enterprises worked in agriculture, fishery and livestock production or processing and were located in the southern region of Gorgol. Since 2018, 320 MSMEs have been created and 1,194 MSMEs supported with EUTF funding in Mauritania.

¹ Used in the graph: multidimensional poverty encompasses the various deprivations experienced by poor people in their daily lives – such as poor health, lack of education, inadequate living standards, disempowerment, poor quality of work, the threat of violence, and living in areas that are environmentally hazardous, among others (source).

² AfDB, 'Mauritanie : Note de Diagnostic Pays 2023', February 2023, Retrieved [here](#).

75% of the 520 MSMEs supported or created were in Nouakchott and 25% in other regions. This illustrates that EUTF programmes put a focus on companies outside of Nouakchott, as the latter only account for 10% of enterprises across the country. The 25% of companies in other regions were in the south-eastern Hodh el Gharbi (17%), as well as in the south central Gorgol (6%) and Guidimaka (2%). 220 of 520 MSMEs (42%) received different kinds of assistance, including training, financing and others. 179 enterprises (34%) were strengthened with management, governance, enterprise development and training, and access to finance was provided to 121 MSMEs (23%)¹. Finally, the main sectors of activity of the MSMEs were construction for 137 (26%) of the 520 MSMEs and agriculture, fishery and livestock production or processing for 28 (5%).²

Figure 46: EUTF indicator 1.2, in Mauritania, December 2022



Gender distinctions on TVET and skills development

Women in Mauritania have less access to the labour market, face wage inequality, and have a significantly lower estimated earned income, as per the World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Report 2021. The report also states that only 15% of firms in Mauritania are majority-owned by women.³ Several EUTF-funded programmes in Mauritania contribute to economic integration by promoting TVET and skills development, including PECOBAT (MR-01)⁴, Promopêche AECID, Promopêche GIZ/ILO, and SAFIRE. These programmes aim to particularly target girls and women, to overcome discriminatory practices on socio-economic participation. The Promopêche programmes focus on fish processing and distribution to reach women, while SAFIRE and PECOBAT aim to develop occupations which are better accessible for women, including entrepreneurship and self-employment opportunities.

In 2022, 45% of 2,978 people benefitting from EUTF-funded TVET and skills development were women (indicator 1.4). Women represented the majority of those trained on handicraft (100%), textile (100%), and agriculture practices (52%), and were less represented among those trained in construction (15%), services (10%), and transportation and logistics (3%). In absolute numbers,

¹ The deviation from 100% is due to rounding of percentages.


² The rest of the enterprises were working in other or unspecified sectors.

³ WEF, 'Global Gender Gap Report 2021', March 2021, Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Amélioration de l'employabilité des jeunes et des capacités des PME par le développement du sous-secteur du BTP.

trainings in agriculture, fishery and livestock production or processing contributed most to the 45% of women reached with TVET and skills development in 2022: 590 women benefitted from trainings in agriculture, compared to 66 in textile and 56 in handicraft. The 2022 results are consistent with previous distributions of men and women across different kinds of trainings: women trained in agriculture alone account for 16% of people reached with TVET and skills development in Mauritania since 2018. These numbers underline the importance of targeting specific sectors and occupations when seeking to reach women. Beyond that, focusing on entrepreneurship and self-employment can also be an important strategy for women's integration in the labour market. Women accounted for 77% of self-employment supported in 2022, compared to 61% of women reached with employment support overall (indicator 1.1). Relatedly, more women than men participated in entrepreneurship trainings in 2022 (53%, indicator 1.4). The same is true for the timeframe from 2018 to 2022 (66%). Finally, women had better access to short-term trainings of less than seven days (84%) and internships (75%) in 2022, whereas men benefitted more from medium- and long-term trainings (seven days to a year, 64%) and dual education (80%).

Figure 47: EUTF indicator 1.4, in Mauritania, December 2022



Equipment of security actors both at sea and on shore

As the Atlantic Route has become more popular again since 2020, Nouakchott's and Nouadhibou's importance as transit and departure points have increased. Against this background, smuggling of migrants has become an important issue in Mauritania. While it is estimated that most migrants arrive in Nouadhibou on their own, they are likely to pay intermediaries to continue

towards North Africa or Europe.¹ To address migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings, two laws passed in 2020 aim to create a more effective framework to punish related crimes and protect the victims. The laws also created an entity charged with fighting migrant smuggling and trafficking of human beings.² The Nexus SRD and the regional GAR-SI (REG-04)³ programmes support these efforts, amongst others, by strengthening maritime security in Mauritania, faced with various offshore threats (human trafficking, irregular migration, illegal fishing, drowning, pollution), and by supporting the *Groupe d'Action Rapide, Surveillance et Intervention* of Mauritania, modelled after a rapid response unit of the Spanish *Guardia Civil*.

Nexus SRD and GAR-SI provided national security actors with a total of 3,709 items of equipment in 2022 (indicator 4.1 bis), including 3,510 items of technical equipment, 176 items of IT equipment, and 3 vehicles.⁴ The main beneficiaries of the IT, surveillance and rescue equipment provided by Nexus SRD in 2022 were the *Gendarmerie nationale* and the *Garde Côtes Mauritanienes*. 56% of the 3,564 items provided by the programme were delivered to security actors in the commune of Nouadhibou in the north of Mauritania. The city is one of the main points of departure for migrants from West Africa seeking to reach the Canary Islands.⁵ 29% of the items, including two boats, were provided in the commune of Rosso in the south. Rosso is located next to the border with Senegal, which runs along the Senegal river. The equipment serves to improve surveillance and interventions of the *Gendarmerie nationale* on the river. GAR-SI, furthermore, provided in 2022 130 items of individual technical equipment and 3 vehicles to the *Groupe d'Action Rapide, Surveillance et Intervention* of Mauritania, intervening on a national scale.

5.7.3. MAURITANIA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 9: EUTF common output indicators for Mauritania, December 2022

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	S1 2022	S2 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	46	325	1,888	1,078	388	481	4,205	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	0	18	468	595	188	332	1,601	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	5,160	7,678	4,205	5,890	783	2,685	26,401	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	533	1,747	3,562	4,202	1,051	1,927	13,022	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	4	11	47	13	1	1	77	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	404	204	334	180	0	0	1,122	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	3,098	40,332	587	3,772	0	47,789	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	0	5,422	13,367	5,388	207	72	24,457	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	8	12	14	0	32	0	66	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	87,260	298,839	6,500	4,093	7,188	403,879	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	0	170	14	203	21	31	439	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	0	2,100	0	0	125	2,225	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	213	1,380	2,627	3,383	632	0	8,235	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	6,558	14,138	1,524	0	0	0	22,220	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	906	2,525	373	483	0	0	4,287	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	9	20	11	21	0	0	61	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	9	7	7	15	0	0	38	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	15	76	44	12	0	0	147	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	65	773	50	822	0	0	1,710	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	3	0	3	0	0	6	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	13	30	10	0	0	0	53	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	2	2	0	0	0	1	5	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	31	0	1,628	7,176	3,352	357	12,544	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	223	339	976	1,230	175	401	3,344	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	15,250	511	64,751	9,990	565	295	91,362	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	39	10	17	38	9	4	117	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	26	122	27	2	8	185	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	13	6	269	122	6	305	721	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	5	32	32	8	3	2	82	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	9	0	1	1	1	2	14	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	35,207	10,041	5,554	0	50,802	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	6,662	4,707	2,795	0	14,164	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	95	10	1	0	106	

¹ IOM, 'Migration à Nouadhibou: Focus sur le trafic, la traite et l'exploitation des migrants', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

³ *Groupes d'Action Rapides – Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel*.


⁴ 20 additional items of equipment were unspecified.

⁵ IOM, 'Irregular Migration Towards Europe: Western Africa – Atlantic Route', January 2023, Retrieved [here](#).

5.8. NIGER

5.8.1. NIGER IN 2022

Figure 48: Niger – Key facts and figures, December 2022



Although the anticipated food crisis for 2022 in Niger was met with an adequate response, the level of food insecurity remains concerning. In March 2022, it was estimated that Niger would face an unprecedented food crisis during the 2022 lean season, resulting from conflict, drought, and high food prices. The *Cadre Harmonisé* predicted that 4.4 million people, or 18% of the population, would experience acute food insecurity, a 91% increase from 2021.¹ Although the anticipated crisis could be attenuated through widespread assistance, the level of food insecurity in Niger remains high:² between September and December, 2,044,334 people were food insecure. Although this represents a 21% decrease from 2021, it is a 66% increase compared to 2020.³ In 2023, an estimated 2.9 million people will face food insecurity during the lean season.⁴

In addition to climate shocks, the humanitarian crisis is strongly driven by insecurity. Conflicts in the Liptako-Gourma region as well as the Lake Chad area pose important security and humanitarian challenges. Although the number of fatalities decreased by 34% between 2021 and 2022 (988 fatalities), 71% more violent events like battles, violence against civilians, explosions and riots were recorded in 2022 (576 events).⁵ The regions of Tillabéri, bordering Mali, Burkina Faso, and Benin, and Diffa, bordering Chad and Nigeria, are most affected by violence and, as a result, displacements and refugee flows. Importantly, Niger more and more stands out as the principal ally of international security forces in the Sahel. In December, the EU decided to establish a Common Security and Defence Policy military partnership mission in Niger (€27.3M, 3 years).⁶ The military engagement comes after the end

¹ WFP, 'Niger: Annual Country Report 2022', 31 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² OCHA, 'Niger: Sécurité alimentaire – Une réponse rapide et à l'échelle à la crise alimentaire de 2021/22 a permis d'éviter un crise majeure', 30 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ *Cadre Harmonisé* and IPC estimations for West and Central Africa, January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ OCHA, 'Niger: Sécurité alimentaire – Une réponse rapide et à l'échelle à la crise alimentaire de 2021/22 a permis d'éviter un crise majeure', 30 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project dashboard', consulted in March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


⁶ Council of the EU Press release, 'Niger: EU establishes a military partnership mission to support the country in its fight against terrorism', 12 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

of the French Barkhane mission and amid anti-French protests in Mali, Burkina Faso and, to a lesser extent, Niger.¹

As a result of conflict, the number of internal displacements and refugees in Niger kept rising. At the end of 2022, the country hosted 376,809 IDPs and 302,044 refugees and asylum seekers. Compared to 2021, the number of IDPs has increased by 43% and the number of refugees and asylum seekers by 13%.² 69% of refugees were from Nigeria, 21% from Mali, and 5% from Burkina Faso. Accordingly, the Diffa (Nigerian refugees) and Tillabéri (Malian and Burkinabe refugees) were most affected. As of January 2023, 56% of refugees and 59% of IDPs were children.³

5.8.2. THE EUTF IN NIGER

Figure 49: EUTF portfolio in Niger, December 2022^{4,5}



The EUTF contracted €294.4M in Niger, 60% for projects that have already ended. Among the budget of completed projects, 53% was allocated to governance and security projects (SO4), while this represents only 25% of the budget of ongoing projects. This can be explained by the end of most of the projects funded under the AJUSEN programme (NE-06), including the €85M budget support to assist the government in reinforcing justice, security and migration institutions and infrastructures.

Among ongoing programmes, 47% of the budget is allocated to the creation of economic opportunities (SO1, €55.8M), while this sector represents only 19% of the budget of completed projects. The portfolio of the EUTF in Niger was rebalanced mid-fund towards employment (SO1) through the funding of the *Emploi Niger* programme (NE-11, €29.6M),⁶ which started implementation in

¹ Le Monde, 'Au Niger, des centaines de personnes manifestent contre la présence militaire française', 19 September 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² UNHCR, 'Niger Operational Data Portal', consulted in May 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ UNHCR, 'Niger Operational Update', December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


⁴ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁵ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁶ *Création d'emplois et d'opportunités économiques à travers une gestion durable de l'environnement dans les zones de transit et départ au Niger*.

the end of 2018, the *Stabilisation Agadez* programme (NE-12, €7.3M),¹ which started in 2019, and the ProEMPLOI programme (NE-13, €7.9M),² which shared its first results in 2022. Finally, €18.9M of EUTF funding are allocated to two ongoing resilience programmes (SO2, 16% of funding for ongoing projects) and €15.0M to one migration-related programme (SO3, 13% of funding for ongoing projects).

Figure 50: Selected EUTF outputs in Niger, December 2022



Reinforcing nutritious habits and malnutrition prevention and treatment

In Niger, almost 10% of the population is expected to face hunger in the first half of 2023.³ This is mainly due to 80% of the population depending on agriculture for their livelihood and, as such, being especially vulnerable to climatic shocks. High numbers of displaced people and the increase in the cost of food are further compounding the vulnerability of the population.⁴ In 2022, 44,995 people were provided with nutritional services in Niger, all of them by different projects within the PDU programme (indicator 2.3). This represents a 26% increase from results reached in 2021.

Most beneficiaries of nutritional assistance in 2022 were in the agropastoral regions of Tahoua and Tillabéri. In the two regions, the number of children at risk of malnutrition has increased in the last years, as a result of conflict, displacement and the collapse of state services.⁵ In 2022, in order to

¹ *Stabilisation et renforcement socio-économique des populations affectées par la migration irrégulière dans les zones de transit au Niger.*

² *Promotion de l'emploi pour le renforcement de la résilience économique des communautés dans la région de Tillabéri.*


³ Save the Children 'Warning over child malnutrition in Niger this year as climate crisis, conflict take a toll', January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ Save the Children 'Warning over child malnutrition in Niger this year as climate crisis, conflict take a toll', January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ OCHA, Government of Niger, "Joint launch of the Government's food insecurity and nutritional response plan and the 2023 humanitarian response Plan", March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

reduce malnutrition, projects have implemented activities that recognise the link between malnutrition and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and supported an integrated community response to malnutrition.

Figure 51: EUTF indicator 2.3, in Niger, December 2022



The BabyWASH approach, implemented and advocated for by Action against Hunger, recognises the impact of poor WASH practices on stunting in children, and links WASH and nutrition interventions for small children (until 1,000 days old). Inadequate WASH practices can increase the risks of repeated diarrhoea episodes, soil transmitted infections, malaria or acute respiratory infections in children. These can in turn lead to increased risks of under- or malnutrition. In addition, WASH conditions impact social and economic situations: time and money constraints on caregivers (for instance as a result of time spent to fetch water, cost for the treatment of diseases) may impact the quality of care provided to children.¹

¹ Action against hunger, “Baby Wash and the 1,000 days”, July 2017. Retrieved [here](#).

In 2022, the increase in beneficiaries from nutrition assistance is mostly due to the beginning of activities related to the BabyWASH approach in the first half of the year. In 2022, 14,703 households in Tahoua and Tillabéri benefitted from activities related to the BabyWASH approach: they received sanitation kits, trainings on hygiene and hand washing stations. In addition, over the course of the year, 64,291 women were reached by campaigns on hygiene and nutrition practices (indicator 2.7).

The entire community is often involved in interventions looking to treat and prevent malnutrition. For instance, in 2022, in the districts of Ayérou and Téra (Tillabéri), in addition to 8,390 children screened for malnutrition, families, communities, and authorities were involved in malnutrition prevention interventions. Over the year, 132 community outreach workers were trained on detecting malnutrition (indicator 2.8) and 8,771 community members in Ayérou and Téra were sensitised to the early signs of malnutrition, to nutrition practices for children and attended cooking demonstrations (indicator 2.7). In Niger, in 2022, 44,910 people were sensitised to nutrition-related practices and 1,275 service providers were trained on screening, preventing and treating malnutrition (indicator 2.8).

Continue to support a whole-of-society approach to peacebuilding and security


As Niger continues to grapple with violent conflict, from militants both inside and outside of its borders, increased numbers of security forces are being deployed.¹ Reported abuses committed on civilians² have led to tensed relationships with the population. For people in remote areas where state services are sparse, interactions with police and security forces might be the first interaction they have with state representatives. If these interactions are tense and violent, they can create feelings of marginalisation and reinforce a distrust of the state.

In 2022, EUTF-funded projects have supported the training of 1,894 staff from security forces, community members and local authorities on governance, conflict prevention and human rights (indicator 4.2). 828 people trained in 2022 were members of security forces, bringing the total number of security forces trained in Niger since the beginning of the EUTF to 3,923.

¹ Jeune Afrique, "Terrorisme : le Niger vote pour le déploiement de nouvelles forces étrangères", April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² BBC News, "Niger mass graves: army accused of executing over 70 civilians", September 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

Figure 52: EUTF indicator 4.2, in Niger, December 2022



In 2022, 59% of members of security forces trained in Niger were trained on human rights and justice. This includes 342 members of the national police and the National Guard of Niger, both units that are in close contact with the population, trained by the regional programme G5 Security Sahel (REG-23)¹ on their obligations and duties concerning human rights and international humanitarian law. An additional 143 local security forces stationed in and around the W Park, where insurgents have reportedly established bases,² were trained on justice by the ASP programme (NE-14).³

EUTF-funded programmes have also continued to support and reinforce specific units within the Nigerien army. In 2022, four such units that have been created by EUTF-funded programmes were supported through training or equipment. First, 84 members of the *ECI Terrorisme* (NE-15),⁴ a unit created to support the state's efforts to counter and prevent terrorism were trained. Another 37 people from the *ECI* (NE-05),⁵ a similar unit focusing on preventing smuggling and irregular migration, were trained on security. Finally, 28 members of the *GAR-SI* (REG-04)⁶ unit were trained. These units, and the *EP-GNN* (NE-16)⁷, a newly created unit within the National Guard of Niger, received 5,536 pieces of equipment in 2022 (indicator 4.1 bis). This accounts for 29% of all pieces of equipment delivered during the course of the year in the region.

Finally, EUTF-funded programmes have supported communities to build conflict mediation and resolution mechanisms. Over the year, 414 members of land commission and peace committees were trained to mediate land conflicts and conflicts between farmers and herders by the *Emploi Niger*

¹ Appui aux forces de sécurité des pays membres du G5 Sahel pour la lutte contre l'impunité et le renforcement de leurs liens avec les populations.

² ICG, "Containing Militancy in West Africa's Park W", January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Résilience agro-sylvo-pastorale.

⁴ Création d'une Équipe Conjointe d'Investigation (ECI) pour la lutte contre les réseaux criminels liés au terrorisme.

⁵ Création d'une Équipe Conjointe d'Investigation (ECI) pour la lutte contre les réseaux criminels liés à l'immigration irrégulière, la traite des êtres humains et le trafic des migrants.

⁶ GAR-SI SAHEL (Groupes d'Action Rapides – Surveillance et Intervention au Sahel).

⁷ Soutien à la création d'un escadron polyvalents de la Garde Nationale du Niger

and ASP programmes. Another 236 community representatives were trained to mediate conflict by the PDU programme.

5.8.3. NIGER AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 10: EUTF common output indicators for Niger, December 2022

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	S1 2022	S2 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	4,831	4,574	8,324	5,411	7,401	4,642	35,184	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	91	127	399	732	159	527	2,035	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	5,940	5,332	8,623	12,989	12,374	10,024	55,282	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	6,110	7,875	3,767	6,139	3,677	1,668	29,236	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	0	212	72	32	20	2	338	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	26	29	21	13	24	18	131	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	62	852	749	941	406	19	3,030	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	1,020	6,340	5,254	7,086	427	547	20,674	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	184	3,455	35,614	17,013	27,982	84,248	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	70,386	123,818	125,031	98,019	15,286	48,421	480,961	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	0	0	0	1	0	14	15	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	4,680	82,858	13,467	6,540	55,025	2,547	165,117	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	3,669	196,270	380,075	120,752	162,396	863,162	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	651	1,426	1,382	4,035	831	444	8,769	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	144,191	266,542	211,714	281,618	85,451	91,226	1,080,742	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	54,592	7,335	8,585	16,696	9,832	2,314	99,354	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	263,488	199,745	8,806	59,872	46,564	89,768	668,243	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	24,718	14,165	9,014	6,697	96	97	54,787	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	1	0	1	177	0	0	179	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	30	134	1,192	822	344	0	2,522	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	45	14	10	5	0	0	74	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	639	756	291	227	150	141	2,204	
3.8 Number of people of concern benefiting from evacuation and resettlement...	2,915	1,395	583	465	18	0	5,376	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	6	4	6	0	0	16	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	9,233	2,996	22	0	0	0	12,251	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	10	0	0	14	0	0	24	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	489	1,082	1,433	10,871	5,540	188	19,603	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	1,607	1,784	781	2,535	881	1,013	8,602	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	395,666	80,233	47,147	186,344	114,712	164,637	988,738	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	7	40	16	24	17	64	168	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	46	40	88	102	6	30	312	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	48	58	451	175	6	506	1,244	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	29	18	14	24	35	19	139	
5.4 Number of regional cooperation initiatives created, launched or supported	8	7	5	7	0	10	37	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	3,713	1,696	0	0	5,409	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	867	3,913	0	0	4,780	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	20	0	0	0	20	

5.9. NIGERIA

5.9.1. NIGERIA IN 2022

Figure 53: Nigeria – Key facts and figures, December 2022



During the second half of 2022, 3.2 million people in Nigeria were affected by the worst floods in more than a decade. 1.4 million people had to flee their homes and 569,000 hectares of farmland were destroyed or damaged ahead of the October harvest season. At least 612 people lost their lives and 2,700 were injured. As a result of the floods, water sources were contaminated, leading to a cholera outbreak in the northeast with more than 14,000 cases.¹ Research has shown that climate change made the floods more likely and more intense.² As a consequence of climate change, it is expected that temperatures in Nigeria will increase between 1.1 and 2.5°C by 2060, the sea level will rise by 0.4 and 1.0 meter by 2100, and extreme precipitation events will become more frequent.³

17 million people in Nigeria were in a situation of food insecurity in the fourth quarter of 2022, largely driven by heightened inflation and further exacerbated by the floods.⁴ This represents a 32% increase compared to the fourth quarter in 2021, when 12.9 million people were food insecure.⁵ Inflation caused by the war in Ukraine and global supply chain disruptions rose to 19% in 2022.⁶ At the same time, the country did not benefit from increased global oil prices due to its diminished oil output, which resulted from funding shortfalls, inadequate maintenance, and insecurity.⁷ Consequently, the oil sector shrank by 19.2% in 2022. Overall, growth decelerated from 3.6% in 2021 to 3.3% in 2022 (agriculture from 2.1% to 1.9%).⁸

In December 2022, there were 3.2 million IDPs in the country: 2.2 million in the northeast and 1 million in the northwest and north-central regions.⁹ IDPs mainly fled from violence caused by Islamists, communal and ethnic militias, and separatists. Between January and December 2022, 10,749

¹ UNOCHA, 'Nigeria Situation Report', 19 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² World Weather Attribution, 'Climate change exacerbated heavy rainfall leading to large scale flooding in highly vulnerable communities in West Africa', 16 November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ USAID, 'Climate Risk Profile Nigeria', February 2019. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ *Cadre Harmonisé* and Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, 'Nigeria: Results of the Analysis of Current Period (October to December, 2022) and Projected Period (June to August 2023)', 11 November 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ *Cadre Harmonisé* and Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, 'Nigeria: Results of the Analysis of Current (Oct to Dec, 2021) and Projected (Jun to Aug 2022)', 5 November 2021. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ World Bank, 'Nigeria Macro Poverty Outlook', 5 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ World Bank, 'Nigeria Macro Poverty Outlook', 4 October 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


⁸ World Bank, 'Nigeria Macro Poverty Outlook', 5 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁹ UNHCR, 'Nigeria: All Population Snapshot', 13 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

people were killed (1% less than in 2021)¹ and 5,434 kidnapped (11% less than in 2021)². Importantly, a recent ICG report³ points to the increased vulnerability of IDPs in Borno state as a result of the authorities' closure of IDP camps to accelerate return and resettlement. Since 2021, state authorities have shut down nine camps in and around Maiduguri in Borno state, with only one remaining open. In August, state governor Babagana Zulum announced further camp closures in Borno's secondary towns for early 2023. As of January 2023, 150,000 IDPs had to relocate, often losing access to humanitarian assistance, especially because international NGOs' capacity to provide support has been constrained either by state authorities⁴ or because of the security situation at the IDP relocation sites, often closer to areas controlled by extremists.

5.9.2. THE EUTF IN NIGERIA

Figure 54: EUTF portfolio in Nigeria, December 2022^{5,6}



The EUTF has contracted €125.9M in Nigeria, mostly to security, governance and conflict-prevention (SO4, 56%) and resilience (SO2, 31%) programmes. SO4 represents €70.8M, through two programmes. €49.8M (40% of the total budget) has been allocated to the One UN Response Plan (NG-09)⁷ under SO4 to support the UN response to COVID-19 in Nigeria. The MCN programme (NG-03)⁸ contributes to SO4 with a budget of €21M. SO2 represents €39.6M, through four programmes, all of which aimed to address the crisis in the BAY states and were completed at the end of 2021.⁹ Additionally, 12% of the contracted EUTF budget is allocated to the EU-IOM Joint Initiative (NG-04)¹⁰, which contributes to migration management (SO3). Two of the three ongoing programmes will come to

¹ ACLED, 'Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project dashboard', consulted in March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² Council on Foreign Relations, 'Nigeria Security Tracker', dataset downloaded in April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ ICG, 'Rethinking Resettlement and Return in Nigeria's North East', 16 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ According to the ICG report, state authorities "made it a rule that [relocated] IDPs [in Borno] are ineligible for continued assistance from international NGOs", as they "want IDPs to stop relying on humanitarian aid and to develop sustainable livelihoods" (ICG, 'Rethinking Resettlement and Return in Nigeria's North East', 16 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#)).

⁵ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁶ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

⁷ EU Support to the United Nations 'One UN Response Plan to COVID-19 in Nigeria'.


⁸ Enhancing state and community level conflict management capability in North Eastern Nigeria.

⁹ Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development and promoting the stability and safety of communities in displacement in North East Nigeria (NG-01); Investing in the Safety and Integrity of Nigerian Girls (NG-02); Strengthening Psychosocial Support, Mental Health, Reintegration and Protection Services for children in Borno, including children associated with Boko Haram (NG-06); EU Support to Response, Recovery and Resilience in Borno State (NG-07).

¹⁰ Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants in Nigeria.

an end in the first quarter of 2023 (MCN and IOM Joint Initiative) and the remaining one will close at the end of 2023 (One UN Response Plan).

Figure 55: Selected EUTF outputs in Nigeria, December 2022



Working towards conflict resolution and peacebuilding in a volatile environment

The Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) and the Jama’u Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS) remained a paramount security threat in Nigeria’s northeast in 2022. Between January and December, though lower, 523 violent events resulted in 2,957 fatalities in the BAY states, representing 27% of fatalities recorded on the entire territory of Nigeria. Compared to 2021, the number of fatalities in the BAY states has fallen by 386, representing a 12% decrease.¹ In 2022, Borno state experienced by far the largest number of fatalities resulting from violent events (Borno: 2,852 fatalities; Yobe: 65; Adamawa: 44).² Continued insecurity over the past decade has weakened community-based governance, institutions like local government councils, local courts and traditional institutions.

Against this backdrop, the MCN programme aimed to enhance state and community level conflict management capabilities in northeast Nigeria. To achieve this objective, the programme has strengthened conflict management actors, promoted reconciliation and stability, addressed sexual and gender-based violence, and supported the reintegration and empowerment of young men and women. Research and policy dialogue initiatives have accompanied the activities on the ground. The six-year programme will come to an end in January 2023.

2022 was marked by a consolidation of MCN’s activities visible in the finalisation of 18 new policies, MoUs, protocols and agreements, increasing their overall number to 26 (indicator 4.6). The policies strengthen traditional justice systems as well as Community Peace and Safety

¹ ACLED, ‘Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project dashboard’, consulted in March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² Ibid.

Partnerships. The latter are platforms of cooperation which deal with security early warning and response systems, implicating local governments as well as security, civil society, and traditional actors. Over the programme cycle, MCN has helped establish 32 such partnerships (indicator 5.1) which have held 899 meetings leading to the resolution or mitigation of 535 security or safety concerns in the BAY states.

In 2022, MCN trained 1,843 individuals in conflict prevention, peacebuilding, human rights and protection, especially on sexual and gender-based violence (indicator 4.2). They included community (35%) and civil society representatives (32%), local security forces (10%), traditional leaders (10%), members of the national security forces (7%), and of local civilian institutions (6%). Most were trained in Borno state (68%), followed by Adamawa (18%) and Yobe (14%). Overall, the programme has trained 11,291 individuals since its start. Moreover, in 2022, 24,909 people participated in conflict prevention and human rights activities (indicator 4.3), most of them in Yobe (57%), followed by Borno (29%) and Adamawa (14%). The total number of people participating in conflict prevention and human rights activities has therefore risen to 126,292, including 424 people with disabilities.

Figure 56: EUTF indicator 4.2, in Nigeria, December 2022





Figure 57: EUTF indicator 4.3, in Nigeria, December 2022



Strengthening supply and demand of COVID-19 and other health services

The EU Support to the United Nations ‘One UN Response Plan to COVID-19 in Nigeria’ programme supports the Nigerian government’s implementation of the National COVID-19 Multi-Sectoral Pandemic Response Plan. In 2022, Nigeria registered 24,937 COVID-19 cases and 125 deaths. ILO, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNIDO, UN Women and WHO all contribute to the programme. Having started its activities in May 2020, it is to end in December 2023.

On the demand side, the programme reached over 13 million people with sensitisation campaigns (indicator 2.7) and strengthened 34 communication strategies (indicator 4.6) in 2022. The programme sought to reach the most people possible, including in remote areas, by using various types of communication outlets such as mass media, community groups, religious and traditional leaders, as well as social media. Messages focused essentially on COVID-19 prevention measures, symptoms and vaccination, but also provided information on GBV and HIV. Since the programme’s beginning, 53,307,908 people are estimated to have been reached with health-related information. In addition, in 2022, the programme supported for the first time the establishment of rumour and misinformation tracking systems in two states (indicator 5.2). The systems are hosted by the national COVID-19 Crisis Communication Centre which is supported by the programme and which aims to track and address rumours and misinformation. The Centre also carries out community polls to better understand reasons for vaccination hesitancy.

On the supply side, 192 health facilities were supported (indicator 6.3) and 517 health and social workers trained (indicator 2.8). The health facilities include, amongst others, teaching hospitals, speciality hospitals and laboratories (indicator 6.3). For instance, 105 COVID-19 healthcare facilities were equipped with triage and treatment capacity. The 517 health and social workers were trained in case management, providing sexual and reproductive health/GBV services, and/or implementing COVID-19 prevention measures (indicator 2.8). In addition, 6,273 MSMEs were supported with capacity building to scale up local production of personal protective equipment, such as hand sanitisers, face masks and gloves (indicator 1.2). Overall, 40,000 people benefitted from health services related to GBV, HIV, TB, or sexual and reproductive health in 2022, accounting for 79% of all basic social services delivered by the programme so far (indicator 2.2).

5.9.3. NIGERIA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 11: EUTF common output indicators for Nigeria, December 2022

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	S1 2022	S2 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	4,575	104	0	0	0	0	4,679	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	257	27	37	9,334	3,884	2,389	15,928	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	17,101	5,621	5,025	1,508	0	1,208	30,463	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	774	1,022	286	2,162	0	0	4,244	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	0	0	0	3	0	0	3	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	12	0	0	1	0	1	14	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	431	24	535	200	0	1	1,191	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	186,085	315,828	66,595	6,581	27,822	15,110	618,021	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	0	0	10,000	0	0	0	10,000	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	170,961	200,430	246,044	163,430	0	0	780,865	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	0	600	740	230	0	0	1,570	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	114,224	9,388	32,036,292	8,442,983	8,036,326	5,387,039	54,026,252	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	5,624	1,774	34,598	23,225	430	86	65,738	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	136,160	17,965	94,653	213,742	31,038	14,338	507,895	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	0	0	9	1	0	0	10	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	1,265	11,020	53,904	5,730	0	6,042	77,961	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	7	3	7	1	0	0	18	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	12,460	5,324	1,310	1,997	0	0	21,091	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	5,700	4,442	1,522	2,058	95	7	13,824	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	0	3	1	0	0	4	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	45	1,448	28	230	1,751	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	41	71	12	0	0	124	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	10	65	126	152	0	83	436	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	4	17	3	0	0	0	24	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	0	0	60	0	0	0	60	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	9,093	3,279	2,585	1,764	973	917	18,612	
4.3 Number of people participating in conflict prevention...	24,587	18,259	62,283	42,376	14,221	10,689	172,414	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	9	2	8	17	18	35	88	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	33	1	22	1	0	0	57	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	16	12	4	3	3	0	38	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	28	9	6	2	0	1	46	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	10,769,181	2,033,343	444	846	12,803,814	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	425,784	924,904	3,304,627	246,807	4,902,122	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	615	372	189	5	1,181	

5.10. SENEGAL

5.10.1. SENEGAL IN 2022

Figure 58: Senegal – Key facts and figures, December 2022



In 2022, two nationwide elections provided early signals for the upcoming 2024 political contest, as President Macky Sall approaches the end of his second term. Political leaders participated in local elections in January and in parliamentary elections in July¹. On both occasions, results evidenced a division of power between the two main coalitions, the ruling party's *Benno Bokk Yaakar* (BBY) and the opposition's *Yewwi Askan Wi* (YAW). Political leaders are due to face each other again in the Presidential elections in February 2024. In anticipation of these elections, Senegal is going through a period of political tension and uncertainty.

The local and parliamentary elections took place in the aftermath of violent demonstrations that swept the country in 2021, sparked by inflation and economic hardship. The COVID-19 pandemic and the outset of the Ukraine crisis have had a direct impact on energy and agriculture prices and contributed to raising inflation to 9.6% in 2022.² President Macky Sall announced several measures to regulate the price of staple goods including oil, rice³ and rent in order to mitigate the impact of inflation on the poorest households.⁴

The recent discovery of oil, gold and phosphates is predicted to boost the Senegalese economy. The country has invested heavily in extractive industries and production is projected to begin in 2023. The World Bank estimated Senegal's growth rate at 4.8% in 2022, driven by the agriculture sector, mining and, to a lesser extent, the recovery of the services sector.⁵ Growth is predicted to reach 9.9% in 2024.⁶

The numbers of migrants taking the Atlantic Route remained high in 2022, with 15,682 arrivals reported in the Canary Islands. Despite high numbers, this represents a 30% drop compared to

¹ Jeune Afrique, 'Législatives au Sénégal : à qui profitera le bras de fer entre Ousmane Sonko et Macky Sall ?', 24 June 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² World Bank, Macro Poverty Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa: Senegal, April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Jeune Afrique, 'Sénégal – Huile, riz, sucre : 76 millions d'euros de subventions contre l'inflation', 25 February 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ World Bank, 'Rapport sur la Situation Économique au Sénégal', September 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ World Bank, 'Rapport sur la Situation Économique au Sénégal', September 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


⁶ World Bank, Macro Poverty Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa: Senegal, April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

2021.¹ The journey along the Atlantic Route is often divided in several trips along the West African coast, to reach departure points in Morocco, Western Sahara, Mauritania and northern Senegal. In 2022, IOM reported the departure of at least 36 ships from Senegal and the embarkation of 2,464 people in the January-October period.² This route is dangerous, and at least 1 in 20 migrants who attempt the crossing go missing or are reported dead.³

In the south of the country, the separatist Movement of Democratic Forces in Casamance (MFDC) and the Senegalese government clashed in March 2022, and triggered population displacements. The Gambia's National Disaster Management Agency reported the arrival of 3,800 Senegalese people, the internal displacement of over 6,200 Gambians, and pressure on 8,500 people from host communities in The Gambia.⁴

5.10.2. THE EUTF IN SENEGAL

Figure 59: EUTF portfolio in Senegal, December 2022^{5,6}



The EUTF has contracted €165.4M in Senegal. 56% of the funds have been allocated to employment-related projects (SO1), followed by governance and conflict-prevention (SO4 – 22%) and migration-related projects (SO3 – 17%). EUTF-funded programmes focus on objectives ranging from creating

¹ Gobierno de España, 'Inmigración Irregular', 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² IOM, 'Sénégal : État des lieux des départs', 2022. Retrieved [here](#). (Aggregation of data from reports covering 2022).

³ INFOMIGRANTS, Canary Islands, 'More migrants risk deadly Atlantic route', 04 May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ IOM, 'The Gambia Red Cross Society Distribute Non-Food Items to Communities Affected by Casamance Conflict', 11 May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).


⁵ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁶ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.

employment opportunities (DES¹, PASPED², PACERSEN³, and PARERBA⁴), to modernising civil registry services (*Etat Civil SN*⁵), and supporting better migration management (Migration SN⁶, POC⁷).

In December 2022, 86% of the EUTF-contracted budget in Senegal had been spent, with 14% of the budget left to be spent in the 2023-2025 period. DES and PARERBA completed their activities in 2022. PASPED, POC and one project within the Migration programme will be implementing final activities in 2023. One project under the Migration and the *Etat Civil SN* programmes each will continue to implement activities into 2024 and 2025.

Figure 60: Selected EUTF outputs in Senegal, December 2022



Supporting the government’s agenda to formalise the economy

In Senegal, a high rate of informal employment (85%⁸) leaves a significant portion of the population out of the legal protection system. Informal workers do not have access to pensions, medical insurance, paid sick or annual leave. This issue disproportionately affects women and is more

¹ SN-04: Développer l’emploi au Sénégal : renforcement de la compétitivité des entreprises et de l’employabilité dans les zones de départ.

² SN-09: Programme de contraste à la migration illégale à travers l’appui au Secteur Privé et à la création d’emplois au Sénégal.

³ SN-05: Projet d’Appui à la réduction de la migration à travers la Création d’Emplois Ruraux au Sénégal.

⁴ SN-08: Projet d’Appui à la Réduction de l’Émigration rurale et à la Réintégration dans le Bassin Arachidier par le développement d’une économie rurale sur base des périmètres irrigués.

⁵ SN-07: Programme d’appui au renforcement du système d’information de l’état civil et à la consolidation d’un fichier d’état national d’identité biométrique au Sénégal.

⁶ SN-06: Renforcement de la gestion et de la gouvernance des migrations et le retour et la réintégration durable au Sénégal et accompagnement des investissements de la diaspora sénégalaise.


⁷ SN-10: Partenariat Opérationnel Conjoint (POC) de lutte contre l’émigration irrégulière, la traite et le trafic de migrants au Sénégal.

⁸ ILO, ‘Diagnostic de l’Économie Informelle au Sénégal’, 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

prevalent in rural areas. To address this, in May 2022, the Senegalese government introduced the Integrated National Strategy for the Formalization of the Informal Economy (SNIFEI) and the Operational Action Plan for the Transformation of the Informal Sector (PAOTSI).¹ These policies aim to promote the formalisation of the economy, notably by simplifying legal procedures for micro and small enterprises, and by nurturing entrepreneurship.

The EUTF has made contributions to the formalisation of the economy in Senegal, particularly in rural areas and with a focus on gender inclusivity. With this objective in mind, five EUTF-funded programmes have supported the creation of MSMEs. DES notably worked with the Senegalese *Bureau de mise à niveau* (BMN) and the *Agence pour le Développement et l'Encadrement des PME* (ADEPME) to assist and counsel small firms across the country.² They have also supported the creation of formal jobs through the development of IGAs and entrepreneurship trainings.

Figure 61: EUTF indicator 1.1, in Senegal, December 2022



All the programmes have focused part of their activities outside of Dakar to encourage rural development. In 2022, a total of 3,317 jobs were created or supported (indicator 1.1), 91% of which were located outside of Dakar. The jobs went to both men (49%) and women (44%).³ In addition, EUTF-funded programmes contributed to the creation or development of 901 MSMEs (indicator 1.2), including 70% outside of Dakar. Lastly, the EUTF supported the professional development of individuals by

¹ ILO, 'Diagnostic de l'Économie Informelle au Sénégal', 2020. Retrieved [here](#).

² The *Bureau de Mise à Niveau* (Levelling-up Office) is the Senegalese government body responsible for implementing levelling-up policies and programmes for Senegalese companies. The mission of the ADEPME is to assist and support small and medium-sized enterprises and micro-businesses and strengthen their competitiveness.

³ The remaining 1% is not specified.

delivering TVET and skills development to 12,795 individuals (indicator 1.4) and income generating activities to 1,391 individuals (indicator 1.3).


Setting up building blocks to for the improved implementation of policies

The Government of Senegal developed the *Plan Sénégal Émergent* (PSE) aimed at transforming Senegal into an emerging economy by 2035. The PSE focuses on structural reforms, the development of key sectors such as agriculture, industry, and services, the fostering of a favourable business environment, and investment in human capital.¹

The successful execution of the *Plan Sénégal Émergent* relies *inter alia* on the availability of accurate population data. However, there is a large gap in population data in Senegal; it is estimated that 24% of children do not have birth certificates nor any form of official civil status.² This hinders their access to social protection and state services. The EUTF has played an important role to support the modernisation of the civil registry system. Its *Etat Civil* programme works with the government at the legislative level to modernise the system, notably with the creation of one civil registry spanning across services, including health, education, passport, consular services, and statistics. In 2022, *Etat Civil* initiated a wide communications campaign promoting child registration, reaching 30,904 people (indicator 2.7).

The *Plan Sénégal Émergent* also outlines security, stability and governance as major aspects of the country's development. The effective management of borders ensures the country's safety, facilitates trade, and contributes to the protection of human rights. The EUTF-funded POC supports Senegal's efforts towards this objective, as it helps the government fight criminal networks linked to irregular migration. The programme intervenes on several fronts, strengthening inter-ministerial and inter-regional cooperation to fight irregular migration, and supporting border management operations. The programme is phasing out and, in 2022, it delivered trainings to 690 individuals on security (78%) and border management (22%) (indicator 4.2).

Figure 62: EUTF indicator 4.2, in Senegal, December 2022



¹ Gouvernement du Sénégal, 'Plan Sénégal Émergent', May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Conférence Africaine sur la Population, *Enregistrement des naissances à l'État-civil au Sénégal, 2019*. Retrieved [here](#).

PASPED



Programme to contrast illegal migration through support to the private sector and job creation in Senegal



Objective: Reduce irregular migration and encourage the return of migrants through the creation of jobs in migration-prone areas



From **February 2019** to **January 2023**



IP: AICS



Budget: €14.3M

Supporting the resilience of vulnerable communities in the face of global shocks

The COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine have significantly impacted Senegal's poverty reduction trajectory. Prior to this, Senegal had seen poverty decrease from 71% in 2011 to 37.4% in 2018¹ But it is expected to remain stable at around 36% in 2022.² The latest household survey (2018-2019) revealed that the vulnerability rate, which is defined as the probability of falling into poverty due to a shock, stood at 54% in 2019,³ while in rural areas, the rate approached 80%, more than 2.5 times higher than in urban areas.

PASPED took into account the global context and adapted its activities to support the most vulnerable households in Senegal. The programme was originally designed to support MSMEs through grants and technical support. Over 2020-2021, during the acute phase of the COVID-19 crisis, the programme adapted its approach and earmarked 20% of its budget to social and humanitarian initiatives. Its objective was to promote a development model in which the private sector is not only attentive to its own profit but also integrates social and environmental dimensions in a responsible manner.

As PASPED reached its conclusion, data on the project's social impact has become available. During the life of the project, MSMEs supported by PASPED produced an additional:

- 1,162 tonnes of food (including cereals, meat, fish, sugar, eggs, and milk) that were donated to 53,995 people from vulnerable households;
- 26 tonnes of infant flour for children at risk of malnutrition that were distributed through the National Council for the Development of Malnutrition;
- that were distributed to vulnerable farmers and families.

Further solidarity measures also included the construction of wells, rehabilitation or construction of productive infrastructures, completion of health centres and distribution of school supplies.

¹ The poverty rate here is measured against the Lower Middle Income Class Poverty Line. World Bank, 'Poverty Headcount Ratio at \$3.65 a day (2017 PPP)', 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² World Bank, Poverty & Equity Brief. West Africa & Central: Senegal, April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ World Bank, Poverty & Equity Brief. West Africa & Central: Senegal, April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

5.10.3. SENEGAL AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS


Table 12: EUTF common output indicators for Senegal, December 2022

EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	S1 2022	S2 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	553	2,900	9,181	7,599	2,510	807	23,549	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	1,688	1,146	4,278	1,134	643	258	9,147	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	6,207	7,106	2,788	223	1,391	0	17,715	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	9,757	7,043	2,583	1,236	5,704	7,091	33,415	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	0	0	0	0	0	19	19	
2.1 Number of local development plans directly supported	6	11	7	0	0	32	57	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	3	56	13	37	11	6	126	
2.2 Number of basic social services delivered	5,378	2,781	304	0	0	0	8,463	
2.3 Number of people receiving nutrition assistance	67,575	327,702	168,358	0	0	53,995	617,630	
2.4 Number of people receiving food security-related assistance	23,153	21,280	19,857	23,361	4,059	0	91,710	
2.5 Number of institutions that adopt local disaster risk reduction strategies	0	40	0	0	0	0	40	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	23	667	432	525	0	0	1,648	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	42,939	180,400	357,769	100,535	824	30,080	712,548	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	194	1,997	102	28	3	134	2,458	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	2,400	10,737	15,933	35,581	35,808	9,380	109,839	
3.1 Number of projects and initiatives supported by diaspora members	19	36	15	115	94	6	285	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	0	8	731	1,478	1,153	354	3,724	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	103,918	506,419	142,382	1,133,758	665,373	12,492,037	15,043,888	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	10	7	119	80	0	0	216	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	2,937	970	508	856	0	0	5,271	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	268	2,110	16,940	2,316	22	0	21,656	
3.6 Number of institutions strengthened on migration management	0	8	0	2	0	0	10	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	368	303	345	102	1,118	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	36	50	48	0	0	134	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	221	73	548	131	14	14	1,001	
4.1 Number of infrastructures supported to strengthen governance	0	0	0	2	2	0	4	
4.1 bis Number of equipment provided to strengthen governance	34	0	702	278	230	95	1,339	
4.2 Number of staff trained on governance, conflict prevention and human rights	150	50	141	662	432	258	1,693	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	9	28	10	53	1	17	118	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	0	44	9	27	34	15	129	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	8	9	3	5	8	19	52	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	14	5	16	33	15	12	95	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	84,525	0	0	0	84,525	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	251,687	0	0	0	251,687	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	93	0	0	0	93	

5.11. THE GAMBIA

5.11.1. THE GAMBIA IN 2022

Figure 63: The Gambia - Key facts and figures, December 2022



The end of Yahya Jammeh's regime in 2016 triggered a political transition in The Gambia. In 2022, the country consolidated its new political regime. President Adama Barrow was inaugurated on 19 January 2022, following his re-election in December 2021. In April, the country held legislative elections. The president's party won a narrow victory, securing 19 out of the 53 contested seats¹ (with a 51% participation rate²). On 20 December 2022, President Barrow's government issued a statement announcing that it had foiled a coup attempt.³

As part of its transition to democracy, The Gambia set up a Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commission to investigate the human rights violations that had occurred between 1994 and 2017, under former President Jammeh's rule. The Commission issued 265 recommendations to support transitional justice, which the government of The Gambia translated into a roadmap in 2022. The government is notably considering the prosecution of former President Jammeh and reviewing the eligibility of key figures of the former regime to hold public office.⁴

The Gambian economy continued its recovery in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. The economy recovered in 2021 and economic growth continued in 2022, reaching 4.3%.⁵ This recovery has been driven by improved agricultural production, increased government consumption, high infrastructure spending, and a rebound in the tourism industry.⁶

The performance of the tourism industry – which contributes up to 20% of the country's GDP⁷ – has a significant impact on The Gambia's economic wellbeing. In 2022, the number of visitors to The Gambia increased by 81%, reaching 185,728 people, compared to 2021, yet representing 79% of 2019 arrivals.⁸

¹ Al Jazeera, 'Gambian president's party narrowly wins legislative polls', 10 April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² The Point, 'IEC announces final Legislative Election results', 11 April 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

³ Al Jazeera, 'Four soldiers arrested after alleged coup attempt in The Gambia', 21 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ The New Humanitarian, 'The Gambia's slow path to justice and reconciliation', 15 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ World Bank, 'The Gambia Macro Poverty Outlook', 5 April 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁶ World Bank, 'The World Bank in The Gambia' 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ UNDP, 'The Gambia 2019-2021 Report', 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁸ Own calculations. Gambia Bureau of Statistics, 'Tourist Arrivals', 2023. Retrieved [here](#).


in 2022, the World Bank launched a \$68M programme to support the diversification of the tourism sector and support the economic development of the country.¹

Remittances play a vital part in The Gambian economy. In 2022, the Central Bank of The Gambia registered the inflow of \$712M in remittance transfers, which represented 60% of the country's GDP.² The value of reported remittances is much higher than before the COVID-19 pandemic (\$277M in 2018),³ yet this increase is partially accounted for by the formalisation of remittance flows, as the COVID-19 travel bans forced the redirection of informal transfers towards the banking sector. These inflows of funds provide direct economic benefits to Gambians, notably to the up to 37% of households that rely on them for day to day consumption.⁴

The Gambia continues to be a country of emigration, with over 10% of its population living overseas.⁵ In 2022, the country also experienced internal migrations flows: The Gambia's National Disaster Management Agency reported the arrival of 3,800 Senegalese refugees and the internal displacement of over 6,200 Gambians following clashes between the separatist Movement of Democratic Forces in Casamance (MFDC) and the Government of Senegal.⁶

5.11.2. THE EUTF IN THE GAMBIA

Figure 64: EUTF portfolio in The Gambia, December 2022^{7,8}



The EUTF has dedicated €37.4M to programmes in The Gambia. 90% of these funds went to programmes aimed at creating employment opportunities (SO1), through YEP (GM-01)⁹ and MIITG (GM-03)¹⁰. The remaining 10% went to the EU-IOM Joint Initiative in The Gambia (GM-02)¹¹ which addressed migration issues (SO3), with a focus on migration management, providing post-arrival support and reintegration assistance to returning migrants, and raising awareness on the risks of

¹ Bloomberg, 'Tourism Revenue Jump Helps Gambia Offset 8,918% Surge in Imports', 10 March 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

² AllAfrica, 'Gambia: Diaspora remittance in 2022 Stands at US\$ €12 Million', 16 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

³ AllAfrica, 'Gambia: Diaspora Remittance in 2022 Stands At U.S.\$712 Million', 16 January 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

⁴ RemitSCOPE, 'The Gambia: Country diagnostic', 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁵ Idem

⁶ IOM, 'The Gambia Red Cross Society Distribute Non-Food Items to Communities Affected by Casamance Conflict', 11 May 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

⁷ Calculations for the spending chart assume that projects evenly distribute budget spending across years of implementation.

⁸ This data only refers to nationally contracted programmes and excludes regional level programmes implemented in the country.


⁹ Youth Employment Project.

¹⁰ Building a future – Make it in The Gambia.

¹¹ Strengthening the management and governance of migration and the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants in the Gambia.

irregular migration. All projects in The Gambia will finalise their activities in the first quarter of 2023, except for one MIITG project, which will close in late 2023.

Figure 65: Selected EUTF outputs in The Gambia, December 2022



Supporting upskilling in the agriculture sector

Formal employment opportunities are scarce in The Gambia, and the entering the informal economy is the norm for those who cannot be absorbed by the formal sector. In particular, the agriculture sector – which is marked by informality – employs 70% of the population. It is characterised by subsistence and rainfed farming, low productivity, and high exposure to weather shocks. As a result, despite its high share of labour, the sector only contributes 25% of the country’s GDP.¹


EUTF programmes in The Gambia aimed to create positive prospects for local youth in key sectors of the economy. As such, YEP focused its interventions in the agriculture, horticulture, and the textiles and garment industry. The programme supports skills upgrading through technical and vocational training programmes, promotes entrepreneurship, and improves MSMEs’ productive capacities on specific value chains. MIITG’s programming focused, first, on creating revenue generation in regions prone to migration and, second, on supporting the economic reintegration of returning migrants. The programme reinforced value chains in horticulture, poultry and small ruminant production.

In 2022, 1,102 jobs (indicator 1.1) were supported by MIITG and YEP (54% and 46%, respectively). At least 49% of the supported jobs were in the agriculture, fishery and livestock sectors. In addition, 1,601 people received TVET and on-the-job learning opportunities (indicator 1.4) – 93% of them were delivered by YEP and 7% by MIITG; and 3,345 people received trainings on entrepreneurship and income-generating activities (indicator 1.3) – 90% of them were delivered by MIITG and 10% by YEP. 90% of IGA trainings were in the agriculture, fishery and livestock production and processing sectors. Both programmes aimed to increase the inclusivity of their action by ensuring extensive geographical

¹ AFDB, ‘Gambia: Country Food and Agriculture Delivery Compact’, 20 February 2023. Retrieved [here](#).

coverage: they worked in the capital Banjul, but also in Central River, Lower River, North Bank, Upper River and Western Regions.

Figure 66: EUTF indicator 1.3, in The Gambia, December 2022



The programmes also attempted to change youths’ mindsets towards agriculture by emphasising the sector’s potential for profitability. For instance, YEP’s nuts and agro-processing roadmap focuses on fostering diversification and empowering youth through value addition so that they can better take advantage of available trade opportunities. The programme also launched a packaging hub in December 2022 to help MSMEs meet food safety standards and facilitate the exportation of “Made in The Gambia” products.¹

Multifaceted migration support

Gambian nationals feature regularly in data recording illegal crossings into Europe. Since the beginning of Frontex data in 2009, 48,771 Gambian nationals have illegally crossed European borders, thus making The Gambia 20th out of 155 countries of origin overall. Their numbers fluctuate, as low as 140 crossings (2010) and as high as 12,927 (2016). In 2022, 1,336 Gambians were reported as having entered Europe illegally (26th country of origin), with 79% of irregular border crossings registered along the Central Mediterranean Route, 13% on the Atlantic Route and 7% on the Eastern Mediterranean Route.² All these migration routes are deadly, and migrants often rely on smugglers to arrange different parts of their trip.

The EUTF implemented activities to address different facets of migration in The Gambia (SO3), notably to increase awareness on the risks related to irregular migration and communicate about viable alternatives to irregular migration. In 2022, MIITG, Protection West Africa and YEP collectively reached 310,431 people in The Gambia through communications campaigns (indicator 3.3). They used a variety of strategies developed to reach as many target communities as possible: billboards on alternatives to migration; face-to-face campaigns on the risks of irregular migration in schools and at strategic locations such as bus stations and border areas; radio messaging etc. They reached potential migrants in Banjul, Central River, Lower River, Upper River, and Western Regions.

The Gambia is a transit country for migrants along the Atlantic Route, colloquially known as the “backway”. Protection West Africa assisted 921 persons in transit, including 378 children (indicator 3.2), through one stop shops, which are spaces where people at risk are handled by social workers who

¹ YEP, ‘Youth Empowerment Project launches packaging hub’, 15 December 2022. Retrieved [here](#).

² Frontex, ‘Monitoring and Risk Analysis’. Retrieved [here](#).

ensure that they receive comprehensive and tailored support (psychological first aid, food, clothing, legal and judicial assistance, etc).

The EUTF also helped returning migrants restart their lives in their countries of origin. YEP for example designed and rolled out interventions to support returnees' economic reintegration in The Gambia. In 2022, it delivered business skills trainings to 57 returning youth and supported 29 returnee entrepreneurs. The EU-OIM JI also supported 18 returning migrants with reintegration assistance (indicator 3.5 bis).

Outcome analysis 4: MIITG Tekki Fii project (GM-03-03) in The Gambia

MIITG		 Objective: Strengthen capacity of local authorities along main migration routes to better manage migration flows and their consequences
 <i>Building a Future: Make It In The Gambia – Tekki Fii.</i>	 From January 2019 to December 2022	
 IP: IMVF	 Budget: €5.0M	

IMVF implemented a project within the programme Building a Future: Make It in The Gambia – Tekki Fii, which seeks to foster stability to contribute to better migration management in The Gambia, by addressing the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement, and irregular migration. IMVF's project specifically contributed to socio-economic development and to nurturing positive prospects for local populations and returning migrants in the Central River, North Bank, Lower River, and Upper River regions.

On the one hand, the project aimed to boost economic development by improving TVET and entrepreneurial skills and support agro-enterprise creation and growth. On the other hand, it aimed to improve the attractiveness of rural areas with a focus on returnees, whilst communicating about the dangers of irregular migration through community radios, awareness raising events, and interventions in schools. By the end of the project, 604 jobs and 340 MSMEs had been created or supported; 6,370 people had been assisted to develop IGAs, and 398 people had participated in TVET and skills development. In addition, 14,302 potential migrants had been reached by information campaigns on migration. The final evaluation of the project found positive results towards the two outcomes of the project.

Outcome 1: Sustainable market-oriented agribusiness value chains are emerging and/or reinforced in rural Gambia through training.

Grantees who participated in the evaluation mentioned that they had gained technical knowledge and skills. Of the 435 beneficiaries who participated in the evaluation survey, 94.3% self-reported an increase in the volume of their production. The average of increase in production among the participants, according to the self-reported data, was 75.6%. When asked to what extent their participation in the project contributed to these changes in the volume of their production, 66.2% of them answered that the project contributed a lot.

Of the 143 people who self-reported having participated in market linkage activities in the evaluation survey, 81.8% indicated an increase in their income generation. The average of increase in income generation among participants, according to the self-reported data, was 175%. 65.1% of the beneficiaries agreed that the project contributed a great deal to the increase in their income-generating capacity.

Outcome 2: Social cohesion has been strengthened by the activities of local organisations and the implementation of social/recreational facilities.

Interventions brought together community actors to problematise and engage in dialogue, discuss the risks of irregular migration and share information about economic development opportunities for young people. 96.2% of youth who participated in the evaluation perceived that their opinions were listened, and their interests addressed. Moreover, 92.7% of people who participated in the evaluation said that they had an increased perception of opportunities in the regions of The Gambia.

The final evaluation provided insights into the drivers of success and obstacles encountered during implementation.

Drivers of success

- The provision of seed capital, the acquisition of knowledge and the development of skills laid solid foundations that were able to help sustain income-generating activities.
- The coaching and monitoring of grantees, schools, and vegetable gardens are key factors that contributed to the success of the agribusiness component.

Challenges

- There were delays in the completion of rehabilitation activities and there were communication issues with youth centres and multipurpose halls which hampered the contribution of the project to strengthening their capacity.
- Although the project sought to incorporate a value chain approach, it gave greater weight to actions aimed at strengthening and influencing behaviour in the production component and, to a lesser extent, in the processing and commercialisation of products.

5.11.3. THE GAMBIA AND THE EUTF COMMON OUTPUT INDICATORS

Table 13: EUTF common output indicators for The Gambia, December 2022


EUTF Indicator	2016-2018	2019	2020	2021	S1 2022	S2 2022	Total	Trend
1.1 Number of direct jobs created or supported	370	1,681	1,514	5,804	205	897	10,471	
1.2 Number of MSMEs created or supported	335	306	1,633	1,985	554	144	4,957	
1.3 Number of people assisted to develop income-generating activities	1,770	2,956	3,114	3,612	291	3,054	14,797	
1.4 Number of people benefiting from professional training (TVET) ...	767	2,877	955	2,437	358	1,243	8,637	
1.5 Number of industrial parks and/or business infrastructure constructed...	0	5	8	30	0	0	43	
2.1 bis Number of social infrastructure built or rehabilitated	0	0	7	9	1	22	39	
2.6 Hectares of agricultural and pastoral ecosystems where sustainable...	0	21	42	61	0	0	124	
2.7 Number of people reached by sensitisation campaigns on resilience...	0	0	241,939	85,550	98,647	783	426,919	
2.8 Number of staff from local authorities and basic service providers trained...	0	42	257	73	5	48	424	
2.9 Number of people having access to improved basic services	0	688	2,400	1,621	0	0	4,709	
3.2 Number of migrants in transit, refugees/asylum seekers and IDPs protected...	0	2	32	764	744	177	1,719	
3.3 Number of potential migrants, reached by information campaigns on migration	8,775	74,560	97,530	299,828	122,403	188,028	791,124	
3.4 Number of voluntary returns supported	3	5	1	24	0	0	33	
3.5 Number of returning migrants benefiting from post-arrival assistance	3,817	1,070	327	626	0	0	5,840	
3.5 bis Number of returning migrants benefiting from reintegration assistance	2,131	1,225	568	523	55	49	4,551	
3.7 Number of individuals trained on migration management	0	0	710	184	343	382	1,619	
3.10 Number of people benefiting from legal migration and mobility programmes	0	10	5	0	0	0	15	
3.11 Number of awareness raising events on migration	65	215	292	151	43	105	871	
4.6 Number of strategies, laws, policies and plans developed...	4	1	1	1	0	0	7	
5.1 Number of multi-stakeholder groups and learning mechanisms formed...	4	4	3	0	0	0	11	
5.2 Number of planning, monitoring and/or learning tools set up...	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	
5.3 Number of field studies, surveys and other research conducted	0	1	7	5	1	0	14	
6.1 Number of pandemic-related supplies provided	0	0	112,796	100,114	0	0	212,910	
6.2 Number of people directly benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	40,744	2,790	0	0	43,534	
6.3 Number of entities benefiting from COVID-19 activities	0	0	402	738	0	0	1,140	

CONCLUSIONS

In 2022, the SLC region struggled with economic turmoil (inflation), intensified conflict (Liptako-Gourma area and Lake Chad Basin), and extreme weather events (floods), causing intertwined security, political and humanitarian challenges. The multiple crises pushed an additional 6.4 million people into food insecurity, augmenting the total of food insecure people to 31.4 million. Relatedly, displacement figures also grew: at the end of the year, SLC countries hosted 7.7 million IDPs and 1.6 million refugees, both representing a 5% increase compared to 2021.

THE EUTF PORTFOLIO IN 2022

The EUTF contracted portfolio in the SLC window grew by 2.4% in 2022 in number of projects and by 2.3% in funding, from 209 operational contracts worth €2.02B at the end of 2021 to 214 contracts worth €2.07B in December 2022. Of the five additional projects contracted in 2022, four projects aim to support governance, peace and security (three in Mali, one in Niger) and another means to support the efforts of the security forces to combat irregular migration in Mauritania. The Trust Fund reached its peak in spending during the first half of 2020, and 11% of the budget remains to be implemented.



The EUTF also continued to make efforts to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on SLC countries by reorienting some of its funding towards the COVID-19 response. Since the beginning of the pandemic, 61 projects have redirected funds, accounting for €124M towards a COVID-19 response; 51 projects had implemented COVID-related activities at the end of December 2022.²

THE MLS

This report is the outcome of the 11th round of data collection conducted by the MLS team for the EUTF's SLC window.

Data collection for the S2 2022 report lasted from the beginning of February 2023 to the beginning of March 2023. Many IPs also provided the MLS team with qualitative information on programme implementation, which supported the analysis and contextualisation of collected data.

This report includes data from 205 projects, a number that has been gradually increasing: 71 projects had been included in the first report in 2018, 129 in the 2019 annual report, 166 in the 2020 annual report, and 194 in the 2021 annual report.

2022 KEY ACHIEVEMENTS

Substantial results were reported against all Strategic Objectives in 2022.

¹ Estimates based on known contracts' budget, start and end dates. Only contracted and operational projects are included.

² The 61 projects with funds allocated to the COVID-19 response and 51 projects with COVID-19-response outputs are not necessarily the same projects, as some projects have reported COVID-19-response outputs but not reallocated funds and some projects with funds allocated to the COVID-19 response have not yet generated COVID-19-related outputs that are relevant to the EUTF indicators. Furthermore, some COVID-19 outputs may not be registered by the MLS.

- **Economy and employment:** The EUTF supported the creation of 31,219 jobs in the SLC region in 2022, for a total of 137,059 jobs created or supported since the beginning of activities (indicator 1.1). During the year, 161,397 people benefitted from assistance to income generating activities (indicator 1.3), and 113,292 people benefitted from TVET and/or skills development (indicator 1.4). Additionally, 12,757 MSMEs were created or supported in 2022 (indicator 1.2). Finally, 66 business and productive infrastructures were built or rehabilitated over the course of the year (indicator 1.5).
- **Resilience:** EUTF-funded programmes supplied 406,318 people with food security-related assistance (indicator 2.4) and 414,300 people with nutrition assistance (indicator 2.3) in 2022. EUTF-funded programmes also supported the delivery of 372,286 basic social services (indicator 2.2), and improved access to basic services for 863,978 people (indicator 2.9) during the year. Furthermore, 1,409 social infrastructures were built or rehabilitated (indicator 2.1 bis), and 9,221 people were trained in the provision of services (indicator 2.8). Finally, 16,456,372 people were reached by resilience campaigns in 2022 (indicator 2.7).
- **Migration:** EUTF-funded programmes provided assistance or protection to 55,909 migrants in transit, refugees, asylum seekers and IDPs in 2022 (indicator 3.2). To improve migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination, programmes also provided capacity building or operational support to 4,454 staff (indicator 3.7) and 2 institutions (indicator 3.6) in 2022. Campaigns on the risks of irregular migration reached 13,851,624 migrants and potential migrants over the course of the year (indicator 3.3). EUTF-funded activities supported 11 returnees with post-arrival assistance (indicator 3.5) and 1,582 with reintegration assistance (indicator 3.5 bis) in 2022.
- **Governance, security and conflict prevention:** EUTF-funded programmes supported the drafting of 1,343 laws, plans and policy documents aimed at improving governance and policymaking efforts in 2022 (indicator 4.6). Furthermore, 853,477 individuals participated in peacebuilding activities centred around social cohesion and conflict resolution in 2022 (indicator 4.3). EUTF-funded programmes also delivered conflict prevention and security-related training to 20,285 staff members and key actors involved in social cohesion and peace dynamics over the course of the year (indicator 4.2). Finally, 13 infrastructures were supported (indicator 4.1) and 19,033 items of equipment (indicator 4.1 bis) were provided to support governance and security in 2022.
- **COVID-19 response:** To mitigate the impact of the pandemic in the SLC region, 6,844 COVID-19 supplies were provided with EUTF funding in 2022 reaching a total of 13,620,062 since the beginning of the pandemic (indicator 6.1). Additionally, 3,554,229 individual beneficiaries and 195 entities benefitted from specific COVID-19 response activities in 2022, for a total of 5,419,647 and 2,560, respectively (indicators 6.2 and 6.3).

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