



FINAL REPORT NIGERIA

THIRD-PARTY MONITORING AND LEARNING MECHANISM FOR THE EU EMERGENCY TRUST FUND FOR AFRICA

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Cover photo: Community dialogue organised by IOM, December 2020 (Altai Consulting)

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1. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

1.1. The EUTF's third party monitoring and learning (TPML) in the SLC region

The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa ([EUTF for Africa](#)) aims in particular at improving migration management in three regions: Sahel and Lake Chad, the Horn of Africa, and North Africa.

In July 2019, the EUTF established a *Third-Party Monitoring and Learning (TPML)* mechanism for specific actions funded in the Sahel and Lake Chad region under the migration management objective of the EUTF: return and reintegration of returnees in their countries of origin, migration governance, and awareness-raising campaigns on migration. This mechanism was entrusted to [Altai Consulting](#).


The main objectives of the TPML are as follows:

- To feed the reflection on the relevance and results of the EUTF's actions;
- Contribute to the sharing of experiences between implementing partners and between countries;
- Provide regular feedback to relevant actors (European Union, EUTF and implementing partners) to guide strategic and programmatic decision-making.

1.2. Methodology of the TPML in Nigeria

The TPML mechanism was organized into three data collection cycles. The first cycle took place between July and November 2019 and was limited to actions funded by the EUTF to support the return and reintegration of migrants. The second cycle took place in March 2020 and the third in August 2020 through January 2021; both covered all three themes mentioned above (return and reintegration, migration governance, and awareness-raising on migration).

Figure 1: TPML coverage



This report presents aggregated results from all three data collection cycles in Nigeria. The analysis focused on the main implementing partner of the EUTF in Nigeria – the International Organization for Migration (IOM) as part of the EU-IOM Joint Initiative (JI) for Migrant Protection and Reintegration,

¹ All countries in the SLC window except for Chad.

which began work in 2017. The report focuses to a lesser extent on the Nigeria activities of Expertise France's regional project '*Appui à la lutte contre la traite des personnes dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée*', which officially began in 2019, though implementation of activities only started in 2020.

The three cycles allowed for the collection, triangulation and analysis of data from the following sources (see full list in the annex):

- 74 interviews with key actors: relevant staff within the European Union Delegation, IOM, its field partners, Expertise France, Nigerian ministerial departments and agencies, as well as Nigerian researchers and civil society actors;
- 71 documents and datasets relating to the country's migration context and governance frameworks and EUTF-funded activities in Nigeria;
- A sample of 260 migrants benefiting from return and/or reintegration assistance financed by the EUTF, and 213 potential migrants and community members targeted by awareness-raising campaigns. The data from these quantitative interviews carried out by a local research team provide an indication of the situation and experience of EUTF beneficiaries in the country but are not statistically representative of all beneficiaries (see details in the annex);
- Visit to IOM premises and the national Migrant Resource Centres (MRC) in Lagos during cycles 1 and 2, participation in a workshop organized by the MRC, visit of reintegration projects, observation of cash for work.

The various interviews were collected with verbal consent and in accordance with the principles of confidentiality and anonymity. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, all activities for cycle 3, excluding the quantitative beneficiary survey, were conducted remotely.

2. RELEVANCE OF EUTF PROJECTS WITH REGARD TO MIGRATION CONTEXT

2.1. Characteristics of migration and return in Nigeria

Nigeria, a country with one-fifth of the population of the entire African continent, is the location of the most serious displacement crisis in West Africa, but is also a major *destination* for labour migration, as well as the main recipient country for remittances in Africa. 2.6 million Nigerians are internally displaced by conflict, a number that has been steadily rising since 2015ⁱ. The Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast of the country is the biggest displacement driver, but intercommunal clashes also flare regularly across the country. In addition to internal displacement, over 200,000 Nigerians have fled to neighboring countriesⁱⁱ.

Nigeria also has a large diaspora of 1.3 million persons whose relatively high standards of living² contribute to explain that, in 2019, they sent back an estimated 20 billion EUR in remittancesⁱⁱⁱ. This would mean that almost 30% of remittances flowing back to Africa are going to Nigeria^{iv}. At the same time, Nigeria's dynamic economy makes it a major destination for labour migration: 1.2 million migrants live in Nigeria, mostly from neighboring countries.

During the so-called “migration crisis”, Nigeria was the country in Africa with the highest number of identified irregular arrivals in Europe. At the time, Nigeria represented about a third of irregular arrivals from Africa to Europe. Since 2016, those numbers have been reduced by a factor of 100, as shown in Figure 2^v. Irregular arrivals to Europe were mostly unrelated to the ongoing problem of internal displacement in the northeast of the country, as most beneficiaries of IOM return and reintegration programmes are from southern states in Nigeria and have not fled insecurity. A recent OECD study suggests that the country's weak institutions and democratic governance may play a large role in the migrants' decision to leave^{vi}, in addition to perceived differentials in standards of living between Nigeria and European countries. Geographic areas of irregular migration seem to be heavily localized: two states (Edo and Delta, see Figure 3) account for over half of the JI returnees, which can probably be traced back to initial flows between Edo and Italy since the 1980-1990^{vii}.

Figure 3: Monthly numbers of identified irregular migrants from Nigeria arriving in Europe





Figure 2: Main States of origin of JI returnees



² The two main destination countries for the Nigerian diaspora are the United States and the United Kingdom.

Return flows of migrants far exceeded IOM's forecasts and allocated budget, with returns to Nigeria being the most numerous across the 13 countries covered by the JI. By December 2020, the JI had already assisted 17,500 Nigerian returnees, over four times the anticipated target of 3,800 by the end of 2020. Most of them were returning from Libya (86%). 41% were female – the highest proportion in the SLC region – and 10% were children. Returns were temporarily put on hold at the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak, contributing to a strong decline in returns numbers in 2020 (see Figure 4)^{viii}. Meanwhile, forced returns from Europe have oscillated between 3,000 and 5,000 annually over the past ten years^{ix}, while voluntary returns from Europe have been more limited – about 1,300 have been supported by IOM between 2017 and 2020^x.

Figure 4: Number of AVRR and VHR by year



Nigeria is the origin country of most victims of trafficking (VoTs) identified in Europe. Three quarters of Nigerian victims were trafficked for sexual exploitation^{xi}. However, considering the phenomenon of human trafficking in Nigeria as a whole, “*the vast majority of cases are considered to involve domestic trafficking*”^{xii}, and even for international trafficking, victims are mostly transported to “*West and Central African countries*”^{xiii}, not Libya and Europe.

2.2. Relevance of the EUTF projects in the context of Nigeria

The high caseload of migrants stranded in Northern Africa and willing to return to Nigeria made the JI ever more relevant and needed, even though it created a challenge in terms of programme management and implementation. Without the JI, many migrants would have probably remained stranded primarily in Libya, where over 70% experienced abuse and/or detention^{xiv}. Although the JI in Nigeria benefited from a large and experienced IOM team, the number of returns also meant in particular that IOM did not have the time to conduct extensive pre-implementation studies, with the exception of those informing the design of community-based projects. IOM commissioned a socio-economic context and stakeholder mapping study, but the report was finalized in September 2018^{xv}, over a year after programme implementation began, which limited its influence on reintegration strategy and implementation³. Still, some recommendations are reflected in IOM’s action⁴. Similarly, IOM awareness-raising activities did not rely on formalized studies about the decision-making process of Nigerian irregular migrants.

In Nigeria, the EUTF did not fund socio-economic projects complementary to the JI which could have provided further support to returning migrants and an opportunity to better link their economic reintegration with the vocational and youth employment sector⁵.

The migration governance component of the JI adopts an almost 360° approach to migration governance, well beyond return and reintegration, though EUTF support to policies implementation is more limited in coverage. The JI governance component covers many migration-related themes relevant for Nigeria: it supports national policies on migration, diaspora, labour migration and border management. However, beyond support to governance frameworks, EUTF support to implementation is limited to two thematic areas, return and reintegration and internal displacement: apart from the JI, the bulk of the EUTF portfolio in Nigeria is (very relevantly) dedicated

³ The assessment is to be updated in the beginning of 2021, with funds pooled from different IOM projects.

⁴ For example, the recommendation to focus on agribusinesses, on capacity building and involvement of government institutions (on PSS and M&E), and to rely on the family rather than the individual for awareness-raising activities.

⁵ EUTF funding initially planned for the youth employability programme SKYE did not materialize and ended up contributing to the COVID response instead.


to the humanitarian response in the North East and therefore directly contributes to supporting internally displaced persons (IDPs).

The focus of the Expertise France project on internal and intra-regional trafficking in persons (TiP) is a particularly relevant addition to the other projects led by the international community which tend to focus on European-bound TiP: as mentioned above, TiP is a serious issue within Nigeria as well as the wider region. In addition, the regional setup of the programme fits the partly regional dimension of the phenomenon it is addressing. And although many other external actors are active in the thematic area of TiP in Nigeria, the project was precisely designed to fill in the gaps and address aspects not covered by existing programming.

The main characteristics of both projects are presented in the annex 6.4.

3. RETURN AND REINTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS

Figure 5: JI return and reintegration process in Nigeria - overview⁶



3.1. Return and assistance upon arrival before reintegration assistance

The return and arrival process in Nigeria has improved over time, with returnees increasingly satisfied with the unfolding of their return, and a quicker arrival processing time. Over 90% of Nigerian returnees interviewed by Altai Consulting believe that they had all the information they needed to make a well-informed decision about their return. However, like others in this report, results are likely to be biased by the non-randomized selection of respondents⁷. On the other side, over 90% of interviewees also mentioned that they felt they had no other viable alternative than to return to their country. On their end, all government officials expressed satisfaction with the improvement in the arrival process, which includes a sharp decrease in returnees' processing times at the airport – it was reduced from 10 to three hours on average between 2017 and 2020, due to a more efficient process and a smaller caseload.

Over the past few years, IOM and its partners managed to reduce the waiting time between arrival and the provision of the business skills training. Overall, in Nigeria waiting times have been longer than in other countries⁸. Around 70% of returnees who came back in 2017-18 had to wait over three months to be enrolled in the business skills training (N=118), against only about 30% of those who came back more recently, in 2019-2020 (N=47). This decrease in waiting times can be explained partly by the decreasing number of arrivals over time, and partly by the fact that IOM

⁶ Acronyms are available in annex 5


⁷ As detailed in the annex, the sample of migrants interviewed is not representative, and this question in particular is subject to a selection bias: returnees surveyed are the ones who remained in contact with IOM and therefore the ones who are more likely to have had sufficient information from and a positive experience with IOM, compared to returnees who lost or discontinued contact with IOM after their arrival in Nigeria. Another study found that over 40% of returnees were not fully satisfied with the information they received during the pre-departure counselling phase with IOM staff. Source: Digidiki, V., Bhabha, J. /IOM, 'Returning home: the reintegration challenges facing child and youth returnees from Libya to Nigeria' (2019).

⁸ Nigeria is in the "bottom three" of countries in terms of waiting times until counselling occurs.

contracted and trained NGOs and government partners to provide trainings in the main areas of return.

The percentage of migrants who lose contact with IOM after their return remains very high, though lower than in other JI countries with a high caseload –probably partly due to IOM Nigeria efforts to tackle the issue. Since the beginning of the JI, 4,000 returnees, or about a quarter of the caseload, lost contact with IOM after their return. To address this concern, IOM now provides phones and SIM cards to returnees, covers hotel and transportation costs to the business skills training, and even used returnees’ associations to reach out to and mobilise returnees in northern communities with limited access to phone networks. The organization also typically attempts to call returnees up to six times, spread over six months –therefore going beyond the three calls administratively required before the returnee can be ‘de-activated’. Maybe partly as a result of these efforts, IOM data suggests that the ‘de-activation rate’ in Nigeria is actually one of the lowest among JI countries with high caseloads. Some partner NGOs nevertheless suggested that they could play a more active role in reaching out to returnees and accompanying them throughout the reintegration process. However, this would require that IOM share returnees’ personal information with them, which is difficult to organize since many of these local NGOs may not have the capacity to align with IOM data sharing requirements (e.g. drafting of internal policy on protection of personal data and securely managing such data).

Figure 6: Short waiting times until the business skills training, by year of arrival (N=165)



3.2. Support to the most vulnerable: medical and psychosocial support

After arrival, the most vulnerable returnees can receive social support⁹ and/or psycho-social support (PSS)¹⁰, the latter being one focus of IOM’s “integrated approach” to reintegration.

On the “demand” side of PSS, the JI in Nigeria has set up a process allowing for a more systematic identification of PSS needs than in most other JI countries. However, the expression of needs by returnees and the provision of PSS face both practical and cultural hurdles. From the start, IOM Nigeria benefited from a relatively strong PSS team including psychologists and one psychiatrist. Along with the Gambia, Nigeria was a pioneer in terms of screening of PSS needs upon arrival at the airport, with a screening tool administered to assess the severity of needs. All serious cases requiring medical care are referred to a clinic; 90 cases had been referred as of September 2020^{xvi}, though only about two thirds actually attended. The distance to the hospital and stigma associated with receiving PSS both were reported as constraining issues. Meanwhile, “mild” to “moderate” cases receive counselling at the airport, and potentially follow up by phones. The business skills training, to which all returnees are invited, provides a second opportunity for identifying PSS needs and offering support: it includes a 90-minute psychoeducation session which was praised by several stakeholders as a key step for the improvement of returnees’ well-being¹¹. After the business skills training, case managers, who have been trained by IOM to provide

⁹ Social support can consist of shelter, education grants for children, family mediation, medical assistance, etc. In total, 1,078 JI returnees benefited from one type of support as of July 2020. In particular, there were 460 beneficiaries of education grants as of the end of 2020.

¹⁰ 1,295 persons benefited from PSS as of July 2020, or 11% of the “active” caseload (having started reintegration) – which is only half as much as the regional average.

¹¹ Though it does not constitute formal PSS given the fact that up to 100 returnees can attend the session at once. Beyond this group session, individual support appears to be limited: according to the 3rd bi-annual reintegration report, between August

psychological first aid, can then refer returnees for additional support, but follow-up after the delivery of equipment appears not to be systematic. This can be an issue as PSS issues emerge and evolve over time, requiring more follow up discussions with returnees to be identified and responded to. In total, as of July 2020, excluding the collective psychoeducation session delivered during the business skills training¹², 11% of the “active” caseload (having started reintegration) received individual follow-up PSS in Nigeria. Among returnees surveyed by Altai Consulting who reported not having benefited from PSS, over a third wished they had benefited from it. Returnees who did receive PSS however, all said it helped or “somewhat” helped them to get better (N=41), and over half declare having benefited from more than one session. Nevertheless, most suggestions for improvements related to the need for additional follow-up sessions.

On the “supply” side, IOM Nigeria has made commendable efforts to build up existing and new PSS capacities in the country in order to improve the coverage, quality and continuity of care even beyond the JI. The JI provided psychological first aid trainings to about 70 staff from key NGOs and government institutions involved in the reintegration process. It also organised two pilot trainings of primary healthcare workers. These four-day trainings covering mental health in general, and the specific mental health needs of returnees in particular, were initially targeted at 42 healthcare workers based outside the largest cities. This is key because of the current discrepancy between the location of many migrants and that of most mental health services, which tend to be only available in the largest cities. Should it be deemed successful and scaled up, such a scheme would allow IOM to establish a referral mechanism for returnees even in hard-to-reach areas, while contributing to the mental health of non-returnee Nigerians as well. Another interesting pilot initiative by IOM Nigeria consists in training “mentor” returnees to provide peer-to-peer PSS support¹³, a promising approach¹⁴ as shown by a recent study^{xvii}.

Because of budgetary constraints, access to social assistance is limited, often to VoTs. Under the national action, additional resources (beyond economic support) for the most vulnerable were only budgeted for 10% of the initial caseload¹⁵. As a result, medical needs in particular remain at least partly unanswered: about half of returnees interviewed by TPML declare having been unaware of the availability of medical assistance and would have liked to benefit from it – but the JI can only cover medical expenses associated with the migration journey, and costly treatments can be hard to cover within the budget limitations. Drug abuse remains out of the scope of the PSS provided by the JI, though IOM will advocate for the inclusion of returnees in the upcoming DFID-supported national alcohol policy. A number of survey respondents also mentioned housing or shelter as one of their greatest needs, both at the time they returned and at the time of the survey. In these conditions, the fact that IOM relies on other stakeholders’ shelters helps to ensure sustainability but also means that shelter needs remain at least partly unfulfilled, especially as most existing shelters are reserved for VoTs¹⁶. This was especially the case during the height of the COVID-19 epidemic, with many NGO-led shelters unable to comply with sanitation rules and having to close – though they received some assistance from IOM to re-open, and the construction of new shelters should improve the situation in

2019 and January 2020, only seven returnees were identified as psycho-socially vulnerable by IOM staff during the business skills training and benefited from subsequent individual counselling by IOM MHPSS staff.

¹² From which over 10,000 returnees have benefited.

¹³ As of the end of 2020, 14 mentors benefited from a two-weeks training.

¹⁴ The study however suggested that the effects of mentoring differ depending on the context, with no positive effects in some countries.

¹⁵ Meanwhile, the regional (top-up) component of the JI considers an average amount per returnee (so costs can to some extent vary depending on the needs).

¹⁶ Combined capacities of shelters managed by NAPTIP and the NGOs “Web of Hearts” and SEYP amount to less than 450 beds for the country, with stays limited to six weeks.

the future¹⁷. In addition, through a partnership with a UK-funded project, about 300 JI returnees identified as VoTs should benefit from additional PSS and social assistance (shelter, long-term medical needs, education costs for children) worth about 3,600 EUR per person. The Expertise France project funded under the EUTF will also indirectly support these efforts, as it includes a number of grants made to NGOs supporting VoTs. As of now direct cooperation between Expertise France and the JI remains limited, however.

3.3. Counselling and job orientation

All returnees can attend a business skills training which allows for a theoretically universal access to counselling in Nigeria, a unique achievement across JI countries. However, the associated budgetary constraints mean that it is not very well tailored to returnees' specificities. About 10,000 returnees (out of 17,000) attended the five-day training (reduced to four days following the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic) as of the end of 2020. This achievement was the result of IOM efforts to provide trainings of trainers to NGOs and government staff so that they could provide the trainings themselves, reducing the reliance on JI staff. Returnees draft their reintegration plan towards the end of the training, and on the last day, they benefit from job counselling and feedback from members of the Case Management Expert Team (CMET), who are staff from different Ministries and NGOs trained by IOM. But the limited budget for the training – about 300 EUR per returnee – means that three to five CMET members are tasked with counseling in one day all returnees present at the training, the number of which could reach 100 before COVID-19. In addition, CMET members are not systematically assigned returnees specifically wanting to engage in the field of their expertise. Finally, counselling is limited by the lack of robust and systematic analysis of local job markets potentially relevant for returnees¹⁸. These limitations can make the counselling part of the training too short and insufficiently tailored to individual returnee's needs. Nevertheless, returnees seem overall satisfied with the counselling¹⁹, with satisfaction rates reported through the TPML survey almost 15 percentage points higher than for the average across all JI countries.

Despite efforts from IOM to set up referrals towards employment or Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET), they have mostly yet to bear fruit. This, combined with the preference of many returnees for income generating activities (IGAs), explains that the business skills training and job counselling continue to be oriented towards entrepreneurship microprojects. Yet, "not everyone is an entrepreneur". For example, while in other countries IOM asks returnees to draft a multi-aspect "reintegration plan", in Nigeria the "business plan" drafted during the training is actually one sheet with one line per item requested. The JI has made significant efforts to set up referrals with organizations providing job placements and TVET²⁰, but actual referrals remain few; for example, only a dozen returnees were referred to the State Employment Trust Funds²¹. Returnees interested in employment and TVET are referred to the Migrant Resource Centres (MRCs)²², as were around 200 returnees in Lagos for example, but the vast majority of them end up opting for IGAs. This can partly be explained by the lack of employment options offered through the MRCs that would be adapted to them. Indeed, the online platform used by the MRCs – NELEX – includes few offers, that are mostly targeted at a highly-educated audience, and at least in the past year the platform had frequently been out-of-service. At the same time, many stakeholders are convinced that most returnees prefer IGAs, believed to generate "quick cash". For example, it was

¹⁷ The Edo State Task Force will soon open a centre with another 300 beds for VoTs, while the Lagos State government should also open a reception and arrival facility open to all.

¹⁸ Except for community-based projects.

¹⁹ Less than 30% are "very satisfied" but over half are "satisfied".

²⁰ In particular with the Lagos and Edo State Employment Trust Fund, EdoJobs, security companies, among others.

²¹ And referrals do not necessarily mean that returnees actually managed to access (quality) employment.

²² The MRCs are structures supported by IOM (among others) hosted within the Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment, and in charge of providing employment counselling to potential and returned migrants.

reported that IOM concluded a partnership with a security company, only to have returnees back out at the end of the process because the salary did not match their expectations. Results from the beneficiary survey conducted by Altai Consulting reflect this ambiguous situation: on the one side, 80% of returnees report not being informed of reintegration opportunities offered by actors other than IOM; on the other side, only about a quarter say that they were not offered enough options that suited their interest and plans (see Figure 7 and Figure 8).

Because of the high caseload and despite efforts from IOM, follow up counselling remains limited, jeopardizing the sustainability of economic reintegration. IOM partnered with five NGOs to take on a large part of the case management (300 per NGO). This is a relevant initiative as it allows for both a quicker access to assistance for returnees and increased ownership of local actors beyond IOM. However, follow up counselling (after the drafting and review of the business plan by the CMET) by the case manager does not appear to be systematic: based on TPML survey results, over 40% of survey respondents who had benefited from counselling did not attend any follow up session.

3.4. Skills development

Compared to other JI countries, very few JI returnees benefited from TVET in Nigeria, both because of the difficulty to establish referrals and because of the lack of motivation of returnees whose training costs would be deducted from their overall reintegration grant. IOM conducted a survey to identify TVET centers in targeted areas, and signed memoranda of understanding with both TVET centres and intermediaries (e.g. State Employment Trust Funds). But actual referrals have been very few²³, for several reasons. First, options for TVET were not designed into the Nigeria JI: for example, the German-funded youth employability SKYE project did include an initial target of up to 5,000 returnees supported, but the EUTF contribution to SKYE has not yet materialized²⁴; the Ministry of Education is not involved in the JI, and its staff not part of the CMET. Second, existing TVET alternatives may not be accessible to returnees: they can be distant, or admission criteria can be unreachable to returnees. Finally, data sharing issues were also mentioned by TVET providers as an obstacle to or cause of delays for referrals. As a result, according to some stakeholders interviewed, TVET is not presented to returnees as an option in some business skills trainings²⁵. Responses from the TPML survey show that over half of those who did not benefit from TVET wish they had (N=158). But because of budget constraints, any support to attend TVET is deducted from the EUR 1,000-1,200 available for IGA equipment. Put into the situation of having to choose between the two, most returnees prioritize IGAs which at least guarantee some income in the shorter term. According to several stakeholders, including IOM, this is a missed opportunity given the potential synergies that could be created by the provision of both IGA equipment and technical training, and the potentially longer-term impact of TVET on returnees' employability and economic

Figure 7: Were you informed of reintegration opportunities offered by other actors? (N=153)





Figure 8: Were you offered enough options to suit your interests and plans? (N=153)



²³ Number not communicated to Altai Consulting.

²⁴ EUTF funds went instead to the COVID-19 response, therefore decreasing incentives for collaboration.


²⁵ This is confirmed by survey results: almost all respondents who wish they benefited from TVET say that the reason for them not benefiting is that they were not given the option.

situation²⁶. Regional TPML survey data also shows that the combination of both IGA support and TVET is correlated with more positive outcomes than the provision of either of those in isolation²⁷.

3.5. Individual, collective and community-based projects

Unexpectedly large caseloads and administrative requirements led to important delays in the delivery of IGA equipment to returnees, which IOM and its partners are addressing. So far only 7,500 migrants (out of the 10,000 who benefited from the business skills training and 17,500 returnees) received IGA support, and according to the survey conducted by Altai Consulting three quarters of returnees had to wait over six months after their return to set up their IGA – the third largest proportion across JI countries. By contrast (and though its goal is not to support reintegration in the medium term), for three quarters of returnees the pocket money given by IOM enabled them to cover their needs for less than two weeks. IOM took measures to speed up the IGA setup process, including the establishment of partnerships with newspapers, which allow returnees to officialize the correction of their names faster and for free²⁸, but the small sample of recent returnees among TPML respondents does not allow for an assessment of the effectiveness of such initiatives.

Figure 9: Waiting time between the return and the reception of IGA set up support (N=125)



In a strong example of adaptive programming, the JI expanded the eligibility criteria for accessing individual assistance in response to the various challenges experienced with collective projects. Initially, about twice as many migrants benefited from collective reintegration assistance, as opposed to individual micro-projects, which were only proposed to VoTs and returnees in remote areas. But IOM's survey data suggested that 80% of collective projects had split up 6-12 months after the delivery of equipment, mostly because of trust issues within groups, different levels of engagement, and insufficient income generated by the projects. By comparison, 70% of individual businesses were still operating. The TPML survey reports similar, though less extreme, outcomes²⁹, with differences between collective and individual projects being similar to those observed in other JI countries. As a result, the JI in Nigeria is shifting towards individual assistance. In parallel, it supports some returnees to form cooperatives. This should allow to increase the market power of returnees receiving individual assistance by enabling them to open a joint bank account (with the objective of accessing loans), to bid together on bigger projects, or to source materials from suppliers at cheaper costs.

²⁶ It can be noted almost all TPML interviewees report that the business skills training was sufficient to carry out their project, though it is probably due to the non-technical nature of the IGA they opt for (mostly small retail shops), this choice being itself partly influenced by the lack of technical training (a "chicken or egg" situation).

²⁷ In Nigeria, the sample is too small to yield representative results.

²⁸ In order for their equipment to be delivered, migrants missing an ID need to acquire one (a process which can take a month), and the many returnees who had their names misspelt during their evacuation from Libya need to publish an affidavit in a newspaper. The JI's partnerships with newspapers entail that they publish the affidavit for free as soon as they receive the request from the returnee.

²⁹ Over half of returnees interviewed part of collective projects mentioned either that the project ended (mostly because the participants did not get along) or that they had dropouts, as opposed to less than 20% of individual projects having failed. When asked to express in their own words how the economic assistance could be improved, about two thirds of answers of collective projects' beneficiaries expressed a wish to switch to individual assistance.

Community-based projects in Nigeria are unique in the SLC region for their scale and the involvement of the private sector, which IOM is seeking to further strengthen. The associated delays mean that it is too early to assess their comparative advantages and sustainability. As of December 2020, no community-based project was fully operational. This is partly because in Nigeria, in contrast to the other SLC countries, IOM commissioned preliminary studies to identify and assess the viability of the projects, and the community-based projects involve a private partner with the view of enhancing sustainability. But the partner faces several constraints limiting its potential profitability (and therefore sustainability). For example, few private sector entities would choose to employ 20-40 people right at the beginning of their operations, as per IOM's guidelines; the private partner was also not involved in the feasibility studies, which have in addition in some cases lacked in quality³⁰. Identifying appropriate private partners willing to operate under IOM's contract terms was challenging and some gave up on the partnership during COVID-19, which contributed to delays. The projects' complex institutional structure, closely involving the local communities and authorities, also required significant time to be set up. Delays affect stakeholders engagement and community cohesion – the main intended advantage of the community approach – and frustrate returnees, as there were not enough cash-for-work funds for them to earn a living in the meantime. Delays also mean that it is too early to assess the potential benefits of the community-based approach. When doing so, it will have to be kept in mind that their implementation in Nigeria entails significantly higher costs (3,500-4,000 EUR per returnee) compared to collective or individual projects (1,400 EUR per returnee).

While assisting returnees to access microfinance seems to be feasible in Nigeria, the JI has not yet managed to do so, which could limit the profitability of IGAs. TPML survey results emphasise the impact of budget limitations on the success of reintegration projects: among the two thirds of IGA recipients affected by external events, the second most reported issue after coronavirus was insufficient funding, mentioned by 40% of them (N=63). IOM has made significant efforts towards developing partnerships with microfinance institutions, but at present to no avail³¹ – no JI returnee has accessed a micro-loan as of December 2020, except as part of the cooperatives mentioned above. However, the experience of another IOM project funded by Switzerland suggests that this can be relatively successful, at least under some conditions.

Focus box 1: IOM experience with microfinance

In an IOM project funded by Switzerland and targeting both returnees from Switzerland and from the North of Africa, Switzerland provides some initial funding which allows for the loan to be provided at sub-market rates; the loan is provided in several tranches, the first one of around 500 EUR (the returnee has to reimburse previous tranches before accessing the next one); and the microfinance institution does monthly follow-up with returnees. In total, around 60% of returnees³² who applied to a loan reportedly accessed one, and after one year 70% of them had reimbursed the first tranche.

As a response to the sanitary situation, the JI is currently piloting the provision of grants to returnees (in place of in-kind assistance). Insurance mechanisms have not yet been envisioned. In the second quarter of 2020, IOM conducted a survey, which suggested that returnees had been strongly affected by COVID-19. Two thirds of IGA beneficiaries interviewed by TPML during cycle 3 (N=55) said that the COVID-19 crisis affected their job, either through a slowing down of their activity or a full stop³³. Moreover, the lockdown and the curbs on inter-state travels road made it

³⁰ A reported example was about the pineapple factory, to which was provided equipment for fresh juice – which reportedly “nobody drinks” in Nigeria (compared to juice from concentrate).

³¹ Discussions are however ongoing and IOM hopes that partnerships can be developed before the end of the JI.

³² Not only from Switzerland, but also from transit countries.

³³ Three quarters (14/20) of stopped activities had slowly resumed at the time of the survey.

difficult for IOM and its partners to procure and deliver IGA start-up equipment to beneficiaries. Replacing (part of) the in-kind assistance with direct cash transfers is currently being piloted in Nigeria (among other countries) as a possible solution, though stakeholders interviewed, including local partners, are divided on whether the cash would be used by returnees in a way consistent with the objectives of IOM and the EU. In addition to the sanitary situation, in Nigeria returnees were also affected by the “END SARS” protests³⁴, which caused the theft or destruction of several returnees’ IGA equipment. Because it was not insured, in some cases it resulted in the loss of their source of income.


3.6. Outcomes of reintegration assistance

Returned migrants are only partly satisfied with the assistance provided, with only 20% “very satisfied” and over one third neutral or dissatisfied. Satisfaction, however, increases with the provision of IGA, and is overall higher than the JI regional average – Nigeria actually ranks second in terms of satisfaction. In addition, almost all beneficiaries have experienced positive impacts from the support they received from the JI, the most frequent one being increased self-confidence, and the second one improved economic conditions³⁵. It should be noted that the beneficiary satisfaction rate as monitored by the JI is about 10 percentage points higher than that found by TPML³⁶. Apart from the satisfaction rate, and despite several requests, Altai Consulting was not provided with country-level monitoring and evaluation (M&E) results (see section 5.4 below). The below findings are therefore solely based on the data collected by TPML. It should be noted that due to the sample size, the fact that some returnees may have been interviewed several times, and that part of the survey respondents have been selected by IOM, the survey results provide an indication rather than an exact description of the situation of all returnees.

Professional situation and economic self sufficiency

The setup of IGAs with IOM support is correlated with a large improvement in the economic self-sufficiency of respondents. Two thirds of respondents who set up an IGA with support from IOM and its partners are able to cover at least “most” of their needs, as opposed to less than 20% of respondents not yet having done so (Figure 10). This is almost 20 percentage points higher than for returnees having received economic support in other countries³⁷. Having set up an IGA even seems to have brought respondents to higher levels of self-sufficiency than before they migrated³⁸. The effect also seems to be partly sustainable – there is almost no difference between beneficiaries who received IGA support over a year and a half ago

Figure 10: Ability of respondents to cover their needs (N=204)



³⁴ “End SARS” is series of mass protests against police brutality

Robbery Squad (SARS). It experienced a revitalisation in October 2020 following more revelations of the abuses of the unit.

³⁵ At the regional level, the second most often mentioned impact of reintegration assistance is professional skills, which confirms the earlier finding of the limited emphasis on TVET in Nigeria.

³⁶ According to IOM satisfaction surveys, 40% of returnees are “very satisfied” and a further 38% are “satisfied” with the reintegration assistance provided.

³⁷ Across all countries surveyed, less than half of returnees who received support mention being able to cover at least “most” of their needs.

³⁸ They are now about 15 percentage points more likely to be able to cover at least “most” of their needs, compared to before they migrated.


and those who received it more recently. And although individual and contextual factors (motivation, capacity, existence of local opportunities and support networks, among others) may also play an important role, almost three quarters of IGA beneficiaries specifically mentioned that one impact of the reintegration assistance received by IOM was an improvement in their economic situation. Correspondingly, only around 5% of IGA beneficiaries are looking for work³⁹, against half of returnees who did not yet receive IGA support. IGA beneficiaries are more likely to be working full-time and even more likely to be working full-time than before migration. Almost 90% declare that the job is aligned with their professional aspirations. Nevertheless, over a third of IGA beneficiaries have a parallel activity in order to cover their needs; the percentage is about twice as high for collective projects compared to individual projects.

Social reintegration and psycho-social well-being

Returnees report little tension with their families or communities, and such cases appear to decrease over time independently from the reintegration assistance. Reported tensions, already rather limited even upon return⁴⁰ (though higher than before departure), are divided by two at the time of the survey. This is the case both for migrants who benefited from assistance and those who did not, however.

Migrants' psycho-social well-being has also improved since return and is greater when the migrant benefited from PSS and/or IGA support, as illustrated in Figure 11. Overall, over 40% of interviewees report having had, upon return, frequent or constant negative thoughts related to difficult experiences that may have occurred during their migration. This is the case of only 15% of returnees at the time of the survey – which is less than the regional average. When asked directly how reintegration assistance impacted their psycho-social well-being, about three quarters of migrants say that it improved it. Figure 11 also shows that sole economic support is correlated with an improvement in well-being similar to the combination of both economic support and PSS, and that time alone also plays an important role: even migrants not having received any PSS nor economic support show a large improvement in their well-being between return and the time of the survey.

Figure 11: Percentage of returnees having “often” or “always” negative thoughts, based on assistance benefited (N=204)



Overall, over 40% of interviewees report having had, upon return, frequent or constant negative thoughts related to difficult experiences that may have occurred during their migration. This is the case of only 15% of returnees at the time of the survey – which is less than the regional average. When asked directly how reintegration assistance impacted their psycho-social well-being, about three quarters of migrants say that it improved it. Figure 11 also shows that sole economic support is correlated with an improvement in well-being similar to the combination of both economic support and PSS, and that time alone also plays an important role: even migrants not having received any PSS nor economic support show a large improvement in their well-being between return and the time of the survey.

Willingness to remigrate

Few returnees express a willingness to remigrate irregularly; the impact of the provision of reintegration assistance is unclear. In total, about 85% of migrants having already set up an IGA with IOM support say that the assistance they received reduced their willingness to leave again irregularly. This is almost 25 percentage points higher than in other countries. The effect does not seem to fade out over time (the percentage is the same for migrants having returned in 2017 and surveyed in 2020), and is about 10 percentage points higher for returnees with an individual IGA compared to migrants engaged in a collective IGA – in line with the results on the sustainability of


³⁹ This is about the same percentage as before migration.

⁴⁰ Less than a third of returnees expressed at least “some” tensions with their family upon return, while less than 15% reported tensions with their community. It can be noted, however, that for the quarter of migrants who did not go back to the place they lived before their departure, the lack of tensions could simply reflect a lack of interaction and does not entail that migrants would not feel stigmatized should they go back to her place of origin. By comparison, the 2020 IOM/Harvard study found that over 80% of returnees’ families were happy about their return, but that 40% experienced verbal abuse, mostly by other community members.

individual vs. collective assistance. But as illustrated in Figure 12, the self-assessed willingness to leave again irregularly is very small (and smaller than in other JI countries), even for migrants who have not yet set up an IGA (around 10% when including undecided interviewees)⁴¹, and the provision of IGA is not clearly correlated with a reduction in the willingness to migrate irregularly⁴².

The provision of IGA support is correlated with a similarly small decrease in the intentions to migrate regularly, but most returnees still report intending to try and migrate (regularly) while opportunities to do so remain limited (at least to Europe). Over a quarter of returnees with an IGA now feel better able to stay, and intend to stay longer, in Nigeria (compared to when they initially returned); and the percentage of returnees wishing to migrate (regularly) is lower (thirteen percentage points) for returnees who already set up an IGA. Nevertheless as a whole, over half of returnees say that it is likely or very likely that they will try and migrate regularly in the future (seven percentage points more than the average for all JI countries), and most of the others are uncertain⁴³. The issue is that legal pathways to Europe remain extremely limited – over the past five years, in the entire EU only 1,000 to 1,700 residence permits were granted each year to Nigerian nationals for work reasons^{xviii}. In Nigeria, EUTF contribution to creating legal opportunities to Europe was limited to less than 100 mobilities for students and staff as part of the “Erasmus plus” programme⁴⁴.

Figure 12: Willingness to try and migrate again irregularly (N=262)



3.7. Monitoring and evaluation

Compared to other SLC countries, the JI in Nigeria has strong monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems in place. It has an international staff specifically dedicated to M&E, and organizes regular meetings between the M&E team and programme teams to identify and address issues identified through field surveys. A large number of returnees (almost 1,000) have been surveyed by the M&E team as part of the reintegration monitoring. The transition to MiMOSA allowed to strengthen the reliability of data, though some hiccups occurred in the process⁴⁵.

The “Monitoring and evaluation Expert Teams” (MET) set up by IOM will more strongly engage government and civil society actors in the M&E of reintegration activities and increase the coverage of M&E field activities. Yet, IOM’s concerns related to sharing returnees’ personal data with government and field partners is an obstacle to national ownership and to a more continuous monitoring of reintegration outcomes. IOM formed and trained Monitoring and evaluation Expert Teams in charge of administering the reintegration monitoring questionnaires to returnees in parallel to IOM’s usual M&E team. The closer association of government and civil society in the monitoring of the reintegration process is welcome, and was also a recommendation of TPML.

⁴¹ In addition, this percentage may be an under-estimate as returnees who already left the country again could not be interviewed.

⁴² Expectations could also play a role: the perspective of receiving assistance may by itself reduce the willingness to migrate irregularly, explaining the small percentage of beneficiaries not yet having an IGA willing to migrate irregularly.

⁴³ This is in line with results from the IOM/Harvard study which found that about half of returnees were thinking about leaving the country again, but mostly through legal means, and a further 20% were undecided.

⁴⁴ A non-EUTF programme, the EU-funded Mobility Partnership Facility, aims at bringing 50 IT specialists from Nigeria to Lithuania.

⁴⁵ The reported number of social assistance beneficiaries was about 2,200 in the 3rd biannual report (January 2020 data), but only 1,100 in the 4th biannual report (July 2020 data).

MET members receive trainings, and some of the acquired knowledge and practice will be useful if they are in the future engaged in monitoring returnees under the mandate of the government. But the short training only covers IOM's methodologies, and MET members cannot use the data for their own purposes, meaning that METs mostly fulfil a "service provider" role for IOM. As in previous cycles, several high-level stakeholders interviewed highlighted that they did not receive sufficient information from IOM on what becomes of returnees. The creation of the MET will likely not solve this issue as long as its members do not have access to aggregated data.

3.8. Involvement of the national authorities

Overall, the JI in Nigeria managed to ensure the involvement of national authorities in return and reintegration activities to a larger extent than in most other JI countries. Its target in the logical framework of the project ("*State and non-state actors are actively involved in assistance for the reintegration of migrants, awareness-raising, and/or the collection of data and are responsible for some of these services*") was met.

The JI efforts ensure that the involvement and ownership of the government is strong upon arrival, and the government seems fully able to organise returns on its own – though not always willing to pay for them. Before return, government implication seems insufficient: a 2019 study^{xix} found that very few returnees mentioned the Nigerian embassy in the country where they were stranded as a source of information to return home. The government's capacity is stronger when it comes to returns themselves; it notably organized 2,000 returns from Libya in 2018 with no assistance from external partners, and most recently set up "migration corridors" paid for by the EUTF. Upon arrival, the SOPs, which have been operational since 2019, ensure that IOM and government institutions work hand-in-hand, and national authorities are very satisfied with the organization of the arrivals and feel the JI has empowered them in the process. For returnees from Edo, the entire process is even led and coordinated by the Edo State Task Force against Human Trafficking.

The government is also relatively active when it comes to the provision of immediate support to VoTs, including through one State actor whose efforts towards returnees are however limited by its mandate and budget. The National Agency for Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP) benefits from a government annual budget of over 10 million EUR and actively participates in the screening of victims at the airport, as well as providing shelter and PSS support. This is also provided by the Edo State Task Force against Human Trafficking, which in addition transports *all* returnees who originate from Edo State (not only VoTs) from Lagos to Edo. In the past it has even provided monthly cash assistance to returnees – the scheme was however discontinued because of lack of funds. It also offered technical trainings to some VoTs. During the COVID-19 outbreak it provided direct support to some returnees, notably food and even cash assistance for the most vulnerable. But its mandate is focused on VoTs and its budget is relatively small, which limits its capacity to provide support to all returnees. Similar task forces were established in other States, but they are insufficiently budgeted⁴⁶.

However, when it comes to economic reintegration, ownership diminishes as the reintegration process advances, and the different structures put in place by IOM (CMET, MET) still tend to fulfill more of a caseload management than a strategy co-definition and steering/oversight role. When it comes to the business skills training and follow up, government actors' involvement is one-off and mostly disconnected from the post-training reintegration process. Based on the SOPs, the Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment should be in the driving seat for economic reintegration, but though trainers from government entities do facilitate some business skills trainings and provide

⁴⁶ In the case of the Delta State Task Force for example, funding fully depends upon one individual.

job counselling and advice on the last day of the training (as members of the CMET), they are not associated in the follow up of returnees. In the absence of formal data sharing agreement with the government, the limited involvement of these actors also limit the informal referral opportunities to government services that can occur when CMET members counsel returnees. Migrant Resource Centres are only referred returnees who express an interest in employment, and regretted that they were not involved earlier in the business skills training to counsel the returnees directly. In addition, as mentioned in the M&E section, the way IOM implements its Data Protection Policy undermines government ownership and leadership, and many high-level stakeholders wished there was at least more information sharing on returnees' follow up. In terms of civil society involvement, though IOM has delegated 1,500 cases to local NGOs, their overall funding mostly comes from the JI, which raises questions about the sustainability of their activities beyond the initiative.

3.9. Recommendations and good practices from other countries

3.9.1. Recommendations

To IOM, it is recommended to:

- In the immediate term, **keep improving the provision of information before departure** to try and limit the high percentage of returnees that cannot be reached immediately after return, and consider strengthening the use of civil society and in particular returnees associations to reach out to the communities of these returnees through their networks; consider **providing basic information on the different reintegration options** either upon arrival (at the airport) or even in departure countries and suggest to returnees to think about their options ahead of the business skills training (to limit any feeling of being rushed they may experience during the training); continue to test the **peer-to-peer PSS approach** and consider scaling it up if it is shown to be effective; if possible, organize **follow up meetings between CMET members and returnees** who express interest, including by funding CMET visits to the field; consider the speedy validation of SOPs that would **make cash assistance available** to all, possibly in several instalments to ensure proper use of the funds; consider **insuring the equipment provided to returnees**; make sure **stronger follow-up support and dispute resolution mechanisms are available for the remaining collective projects**; and **disseminate more data analyses** to government stakeholders and EUDs, particularly data on the quality of the reintegration process and on the sustainability of outcomes, so as to allow for an informed collective discussion on possible improvements.
- In the short- to mid-term, **strengthen efforts to build partnerships with organizations providing TVET or further access to finance**. Several stakeholders, including GIZ, IDIA Renaissance (an NGO), the Small and Medium Enterprise Development Agency, and the Ministry of Labour, mentioned having spare capacity to provide either skills training or advice on how to access low-interest government loans, though some suggested that IOM could contribute by covering specific costs. The same modalities as the ones used for the project funded by Switzerland could be used to facilitate the access to micro-loans by JI returnees. Further involvement of the Ministry of Education could be sought.

When it comes to future programming, if future irregular flows towards Europe remain as they have been over the last three years – i.e., low but persistent (see section 2.1) –, this would plead for a programming on reintegration that would be both longer-term in perspective (prioritizing advocacy for government active funding and implementation, and connecting returnees with support systems accessible to all) and that could potentially include with a larger budget per returnee. More precisely, to IOM, it is recommended to:

- Consider **designing a transition strategy that would let the government handle at least the whole return and arrival process and, gradually, a stronger role in the various aspects of**

the reintegration process, including medical, social and mental health support, and field monitoring. This could be done through the transformation of the MRCs into a national orientation and reintegration platform⁴⁷, provided they receive significant capacity-building support in close coordination with GIZ.

- **Keep the concept of a one-week training accessible to all, but consider offering different versions of it** – returnees interested in employment would not receive entrepreneurship skills training but employment skills training instead (from the MRCs for example); returnees interested in technical fields could receive a short technical skills training instead (from established TVET centres for example).
- For community-based projects, **consider granting additional freedom to the private sector partner** (e.g. to conduct feasibility studies itself, not to have to hire a specific number of persons from the beginning, etc.) by conditioning support solely on a specific percentage of returnees hired.

And to the EU (for future programming), it is recommended to:

- **Expand the eligibility criteria related to the country where migrants were stranded;** migrants not on their way to Europe can also face tremendous difficulties and could be included in future programming, at least when it comes to VoTs;
- **Plan for referral opportunities** by 1. Aligning the timelines, geographical areas and target groups of reintegration and employment programmes 2. Facilitating coordination between reintegration and employment programmes as they unfold, both funded by the EU and by other donors;
- **Include additional funding notably to allow for cumulative assistance (TVET + IGA)** for returnees with business plans that justify it; for facilitating access to **microfinance** (for example by providing seeds funding or collateral); as well as for additional assistance for particularly **vulnerable migrants** with specific PSS and medical needs (including those dealing with substance abuse).

3.9.2. Good practices from other countries

Contact with migrants / communications and accountability mechanisms

- To avoid loss of contact, IOM The Gambia collects **up to three contact numbers upon arrival (e.g. parents and uncle)**. If those fail to reach a beneficiary, **returnees from the same charter flight can be contacted** as they often form networks (e.g. through Whatsapp group). IOM The Gambia reports that this approach has reduced the number of unreachable returnees to almost zero.
- IOM Mali introduced a '**contrat d'adhésion**' (enrolment contract) to explain the scope of reintegration assistance and inform potential beneficiaries that such support is not (only) a right but also comes with conditions and obligations. By signing it, returnees commit to giving accurate personal information and staying in touch with IOM. Some NGO partners of IOM Cote d'Ivoire introduced a similar '**letter of engagement**' which sets out rules and participants' commitments for collective and community-based projects. This approach helps trigger a conversation and common understanding among beneficiaries and give them a greater sense of responsibility.
- Beyond the SLC area, in the Horn of Africa region, **Participatory Programme Monitoring Meetings** are organised by IOM with national, local and implementing partners as well as representatives of beneficiary returnees to discuss the reintegration actions and the results of IOM beneficiary surveys, and to identify and troubleshoot issues. These annual meetings place

⁴⁷ See for example the "Tounesna" platform in Tunisia which is hosted by a government agency and coordinates the reintegration of returnees from four European countries.

returnees and the other key stakeholders at the centre, on an equal footing with IOM. Their feedback is used to inform real-time programme adaptations. IOM then organises quarterly internal reviews to follow up on corrective measures. This mechanism strengthened communication lines among IOM, beneficiaries and national stakeholders, and IOM's accountability to these key actors.

Pocket money

- In Cote d'Ivoire and Senegal, IOM significantly **increased the pocket money amount** to help returnees cope with their immediate needs while they wait for economic reintegration support and its associated financial benefits.

Job counselling, TVET

- Between 2017 and 2019, IOM Cote d'Ivoire established around **20 partnerships** with national agencies, NGO and private sector companies to offer a wide range of economic assistance opportunities to returnees including TVET, start-up support for collective microbusinesses, internships, apprenticeships and direct job placements – which match better with the diverse profiles and aspirations of returnees.
- In Guinea, ASCAD is a **civil-military training centre which provides technical training and life-skills education** for young people with emphasis placed on life skills and discipline, which are seen as lacking in the labour market and particularly sought by employers. The agreement signed with the Guinean State requires that ASCAD ensure that 70% of trainees sign a work contract with an employer within six months of the end of the training (performance-based funding). This incentivised ASCAD to periodically analyse labour markets needs, establish partnerships with potential employers, accompany trainees in their job search and monitor them every six months for three years. ASCAD created a dedicated team to conduct these activities. It reports an 80% employment rate, well beyond other Guinea TVET providers, and attracted funding from several donors.
- IOM Cameroon and Guinea (co-)organised TVET through **decentralized State structures**, which was cost-efficient and allowed for increased national ownership. In Guinea Bissau, **'mobile trainers'** were deployed to the field in the main areas of return to train returnees on site rather than transporting them to the capital city where most TVET centres are located. This approach may increase the accessibility of and demand for TVET.

Referrals

- In Guinea, IOM commissioned a **mapping ('Guide d'appui et de référencement')** of **relevant institutions to which IOM case managers and partners can refer returnees** for various types of economic, medical and psychosocial support and services. In The Gambia, EUTF-funded IPs went one step further and jointly piloted an **online referral platform** named IMAP listing services and opportunities relevant to the various needs of returnees and facilitating the referral process among them and to external actors. The platform is now being rolled out across the region.
- In Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea and Burkina Faso, IOM organised **job fairs** or **networking events** aiming to put returnees in contact with a range of actors relevant to their needs, such as youth and employment support programmes run by public institutions/funds and other projects/NGOs, with potential employers, TVET and microfinance institutions. This informal approach to referrals contributes to a more diverse, flexible and needs-responsive economic reintegration assistance, places returnees at the centre of the decisions affecting their lives and gives them a greater sense of responsibility.
- In Guinea, **the EUD organises monthly meetings** where all EUTF-funded IPs involved in reintegration programming discuss respective approaches, progress and lessons learnt, including on how to overcome obstacles to referrals.

4. MIGRATION GOVERNANCE ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED BY THE EUTF

The JI in Nigeria is unique in the region in that it is one of the only JI components with a significant and comprehensive governance aspect that goes well beyond the governance of return and reintegration⁴⁸. Other migration-related thematic areas supported by the EUTF include diaspora involvement, labour migration and border management through the JI, and trafficking in persons both through the JI and through the Expertise France project. These areas are considered in turn below.

4.1. Overall migration policy

In Nigeria, the JI built on a decade-long engagement of the EU and IOM with the Nigerian government on migration governance. Key outcomes of this sustained effort are the clarification of roles between Ministries, significant capacity strengthening as well as the institution of several policy frameworks for migration. The 21 million EUR project “Promoting Better Management of Migration in Nigeria” (2011-2018) funded under 10th EDF, allowed for the adoption of key policies (National Migration Policy, National Policy on Labour Migration) and the capacity building of key institutions working on migration and related issues (NAPTIP, National Immigration Service, Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment, National Bureau of Statistics, National Population Commission, etc.)⁴⁹. The governance component of the JI is a continuation of these efforts, as illustrated in Figure 13 below. This has particularly resulted in increased coordination between government agencies and effective collaboration in the implementation of migration activities at the national level. The coordination role is now more firmly in the hands of the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally displaced persons (NCFRMI). Yet, NCFRMI's coordination role is constrained by its staffing (only 30 staff members for South West zone for example), and geographical spread (six main offices in the country, no representation in Edo State). And in some cases, the clarification of responsibilities between institutions could be further strengthened. For example, Nigeria has both a draft diaspora policy and a national labour migration policy, each led by a different Ministry (and both supported with JI funding), but their scopes partially overlap⁵⁰.

The 2015 National Migration Policy was adopted with support from the EU and IOM. But as a result of the lack of budget allocated by the government to its implementation, only its return and reintegration component materialised, thanks to EU funding⁵¹. The National Policy covers the various facets of migration, well beyond return and reintegration: internal migration, forced displacement, labour migration, diaspora, etc. All stakeholders interviewed were satisfied both with the way it was developed and with the policy itself. However, the strong role played by the EU and IOM reportedly had an adverse effect on government ownership, which may explain the subsequent lack of budget allocation. The planned Trust Fund on migration was not established. Under the JI, the action plan was reviewed for 2019-2023, and limited support (120,000 EUR) was provided for

⁴⁸ About 15% of the budget excluding the top-up is dedicated to governance aspects not related to return and reintegration.


⁴⁹ The programme also supported the establishment of job centres in the six geo-political zones of the country to provide information to migrants on job placements and employment opportunities, and of Migrant Resource Centres in Abuja and Lagos State to provide overall information on migration.

⁵⁰ One policy is led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the other by the Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment. One can expect many overlaps since the labour migration notably focuses on Nigerian workers abroad, and the vast majority of the diaspora are Nigerian workers abroad.

⁵¹ The EUTF also allocated significant budget to the response to the displacement crisis in the North East, without targeting directly the governance/coordination aspects of it.

selected pilot projects⁵². Increased financial commitment from the government will be critical to translating the policy document into meaningful and sustainable actions.

Figure 13: From EDF to EUTF



4.2. Return and reintegration of migrants

The governance structures on return & reintegration supported by the JI are fully operational *within the scope of the project*. The main limitations are their sustainability in case of discontinuation of EU funding, and their focus on voluntary returns. The JI benefited from the fact that the key governance structures for return and reintegration (SOPs, and working group) were planned for in the National Migration Policy. But the SOPs do not specify who should be responsible for the (coordination of the) provision of economic assistance: the Ministry of Labour, NCFRMI, “its partners”, the working group on return and reintegration, IOM and donors are all mentioned in various sections of the SOPs. This makes it uncertain whether the SOPs can still be applied once the JI ends. Moreover, the SOPs focus on voluntary returns⁵³, leaving aside forced returns which already constitute significant numbers as mentioned previously, and could increase should readmission agreements with EU countries be signed. As for the working group on return and reintegration, it is now regularly meeting with IOM support. The challenge is to transition to a situation where its functioning is funded by the government and its meetings are convened independently from IOM – to date, it was suggested that the group would not meet upon the government’s request.

4.3. Trafficking in persons (TiP)

The many projects targeting TiP, including the JI, lack coordination and are geographically concentrated on Edo State, while support for victims and prosecution of traffickers remains wanting. Nigeria was one of the first African countries to enact specific legislation criminalizing TiP and setting up an anti-TiP agency (NAPTIP). Government’s funding on the issue, though insufficient^{xx}, is significant compared to other migration-related thematic areas: NAPTIP’s budget in 2018 was about 10 million EUR. In parallel, the above-mentioned 2020 report identified 19 capacity-building projects benefitting law enforcement agencies working on TiP in Nigeria^{xxi}. Donor-funded programmes building

⁵² The funding covers four projects (EUR 30,000 each) on awareness raising, border management, migration data, and migration journalism.

⁵³ One of the “underlying principles of returns” stated in the SOPs is that it must be voluntary.

the capacity of NAPTIP for example, include at least four project worth over 20 million EUR⁵⁴ – and coordination across these projects remains limited, with some exceptions for example between Expertise France and UNODC⁵⁵. In addition, support for victims remains mostly donor-funded – the trust fund for VoTs planned by the National Migration Policy has not been set up^{xxii}. Though IOM has supported NAPTIP to establish Task Forces on TiP in 12 States, most support remains geographically focused on Edo State while many other States are affected notably by issues related to internal trafficking.

The Expertise France project identified very specific gaps in the Nigerian response to TiP which should allow its action to efficiently complement that of other actors including IOM. It will in particular support State Task Forces against Human Trafficking in two States receiving at present little support from other donors. While IOM has focused on trainings, Expertise France will bring IT and communications support to NAPTIP. It will also support the drafting of NAPTIP's Strategic Plan, with tripartite communication between UNODC, NAPTIP and Expertise France⁵⁶. In addition, the regional dimension of the project is likely to create a ripple effect on the other, less advanced countries involved in the project which may benefit from Nigeria's experience in TiP: project teams in other countries have already turned to Nigeria for examples of institutional documents and templates.

4.4. Diaspora and labour migration

On labour migration, the JI brings a limited, but very relevant support to the implementation of migration frameworks. The National Policy on Labour Migration was developed with the support from the national 10th EDF project, but as with the National Migration Policy, little in its action plan has been implemented. To fill in this gap, the JI provided funding for four pilot projects including some aimed at supporting labour migrants in the country, for example by building the capacity of labour inspectors in Nigeria and strengthening the protection of the rights of migrant workers in Nigeria. This is particularly relevant because the focus of Nigerian politics is on Nigerian workers abroad, as opposed to immigrant workers⁵⁷. The amounts dedicated to the projects is however low (30,000 EUR per project), and ILO is not involved in these projects despite its mandate and expertise.

The JI also supports the development and adoption process of the National Diaspora Policy, which could encourage the government to focus on non-monetary benefits of diaspora involvement. At first sight, the adoption of the National Diaspora Policy supported by the JI could appear to be unnecessary since the government is already very active in diaspora matters; for example, the Central Bank of Nigeria issued “diaspora bonds” which raised 250 million EUR in 2017 and is aiming at setting up a government-owned money transfer system for the diaspora with the view of reducing remittances transfer costs. Although the government shows a clear commitment to engage with the diaspora, the focus on the potential *social and political* benefits of the diaspora is less strong^{58,xxiii}, and there are key challenges impeding the engagement of the diaspora for national development which the policy upon adoption will address, notably by identifying areas of diaspora needs.

⁵⁴ They include an 8 million EUR project funded by the UK, a 10 million EUR project coordinated by FIIAPP under the 11th EDF, a project funded by Switzerland and the EUTF-funded Expertise France project.

⁵⁵ The two partners organized a common training for the Ondo and Ekiti State Task Forces.

⁵⁶ In particular to discuss how the parallel process of drafting the National Action Plan, supported by UNODC with Swiss funding, could benefit the development of the NAPTIP Strategic Plan.

⁵⁷ Immigrant workers are for example barely mentioned in the National Labour Migration Policy while they exceed one million; Nigeria has also not yet signed major ILO conventions on migrant workers (n°143, n°189).

⁵⁸ For example, diaspora members are not allowed to vote if they do not travel back to Nigeria, and there is no attempt made to retain highly qualified Nigerians in the country

4.5. Border management

A national border management strategy was adopted with support from the JI, and implementation can be expected to move forward. The JI supported the Nigeria Immigration Service in developing a five-year strategy on border management, approved in 2019. Because border management is a priority for the government, implementation can be expected to go forward without much hurdles. The relevance of this support from the JI is less clear than with other migration-related thematic areas, however, as the National Immigration Service has an annual budget of over 100 million EUR^{xxiv} and is already supported by other programmes (e.g. FIIAPP).

4.6. Migration-related data

The efforts of the JI and of the Expertise France project will contribute to strengthening the Nigerian government migration-related data management systems. The JI conducted trainings of trainers on migration data for key national statistics agency. Expertise France will in particular assist in the inter-connexion of TiP databases at the national level (NAPTIP) and State level (State Task Forces), which is key as currently each State has a separate database, making it easier for traffickers to escape charges.

The JI also funded a flow monitoring system whose relevance and impact should be further assessed. The JI funded part of the Nigerian component of the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), which, like in other countries in the region, collects flow monitoring data at specific “flow monitoring points” positioned to capture (in particular but not only) flows of migrants heading north. But the objective of this data collection effort, which was not designed with the government nor with other actors collecting similar data (e.g. the Mixed Migration Centre), seems to have been ill-defined from the start⁵⁹, and in the end it is unclear who ended up using the data and how.

4.7. Overall conclusions and recommendations on governance

On migration governance overall, it is suggested (to the EU and IOM) to:

- **Advocate for the Nigerian government to mainstream migration issues into the annual budgets of the relevant Ministries.** Nigeria now has a rather sophisticated governance framework, well ahead compared to other countries in the region, and the focus could be on implementation. Apart from return and reintegration, which will probably remain a European (as opposed to Nigerian) priority, the country could probably find the necessary funds for migration activities (e.g. on the diaspora, border management, etc.). IOM, along with other key organizations such as ILO, would still have a key role to play by offering their expertise, advice, and trainings when and where necessary.
- **Strengthen coordination with others working on migration governance in Nigeria.** GIZ, the Swiss Cooperation, FIIAPP, ICMPD, UNODC, UNDP, among others, are all supporting migration governance in Nigeria, but lack of coordination results in missed synergies and potential overlaps. For example almost all of them support NAPTIP.

Other thematic-specific recommendations to the EU and IOM include:

- **On return and reintegration: avoid creating parallel systems for returnees by continuing efforts to transition to an increased role of federal and state agencies** and aligning reintegration programming with resources and mechanisms that exist for the nation’s youth, in

⁵⁹ If the goal was to monitor flows heading towards Europe, monitoring points would have been better placed in countries such as Mali, Niger and Chad; if the goal was to identify protection incidents, points would potentially have been better placed at the border with neighboring Gulf of Guinea countries, rather than in Nigeria’s North.

particular by building and disseminating knowledge on some of IOM key initiatives in this regard (community-based projects and PSS training to primary healthcare workers for example)

- Better align EU programming with the **priorities of the Nigerian government**, notably on migration for development, which currently receives very little funding from the EU (this can be done through, for example, encouraging diaspora entrepreneurship, funding pilot labour and student mobility schemes towards Europe⁶⁰ while remaining cognizant of risks related to brain drain, and supporting the lowering of remittances cost⁶¹); as well as on internal displacement, which does receive significant funding, but perhaps could be further strengthened given the magnitude of the issue (2.6 million IDPs).
- On trafficking in persons, ensure that future programming is dedicated to the priorities identified by key actors (e.g. NAPTIP) and design properly segmented responses for TIP on the one side and for smuggling on the other (including in terms of geography).
- On migration data, reconsider funding flow monitoring points and prioritize advocating, and providing expertise, for the streamlining of migration modules into the data regularly collected by the National Bureau of Statistics and the National Population Commission, and/or for the strengthening of the data collected at border posts by the Nigerian authorities.

⁶⁰ See for example the project Digital Explorers with Lithuania funded under the Mobility Partnership Facility.

⁶¹ Costs stand currently at above 7%: lowering them to 5% would represent an annual gain for Nigerians of almost 500 million EUR. Though mostly not in the hands of EU development programming, this could be done for example, by relaxing regulations on small transfers, not mandating similar checks down the value chain, capping transfer fees, and facilitating new licenses to promote competition – again in cooperation with key destination countries such as the US and UK.

5. ANALYSIS OF THE MIGRATION-RELATED AWARENESS-RAISING ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED BY THE EUTF

5.1. Objectives and approaches

EUTF-funded awareness-raising (AR) activities focus on irregular migration and international TiP, and benefit from synergies created by IOM with activities funded by other donors. Because of IOM's international mandate and EU funding, IOM activities naturally focus on irregular migration towards Europe and cross-border (mostly European-bound) TiP. The EUTF funds community theatre, community dialogues, and AR material (posters, wristbands, and a videoclip), with 31,700 persons reportedly reached by JI AR activities as of July 2020. IOM uses different sources of funding to complement and build synergies with EUTF-funded activities: for example, market sensitization activities⁶² are funded by the Dutch *Migrants as Messengers* initiative, but the migrants involved in the messaging are those returned under the EUTF, and they use AR material funded by the EUTF; journalists have been trained with mixed funding from the EUTF and the *Migrants as Messengers* initiative; and a music concert was funded by the EUTF as well as GIZ, Italy and others.

Expertise France will focus both on internal as well as intra-regional TiP. The organization will fund AR activities covering a wide range of TiP aspects (forced labour on farms, child marriage, labour exploitation to the Middle East, etc.). As the project has not yet started designing its AR activities, the findings below will focus mainly on the JI.

5.2. Design and targeting

While the design of the JI AR activities was not based on a locally-adapted theory of change identifying the main drivers of behavior in the targeted communities, the involvement of relevant stakeholders in the design process allowed IOM to better adapt the activities to the national and local level. As part of the JI, IOM did not develop a full-fledged national- or local- level theory of change, including an analysis of assumptions and risks, and did not conduct in-depth study on pre-departure decision making and information level⁶³. The JI team however relied on good practices from the *Migrants as Messenger* and IOM X projects and two small (non-EUTF funded) surveys were conducted in two Local Government Areas in Edo State. In addition, government and civil society stakeholders interviewed gave positive feedback on the design of the JI AR campaign. Community theatre is reported as relevant for mobilizing target groups in an entertaining way in a context of a strong interest in and culture of drama. Furthermore, the scripts are adaptable to the local context of each location visited. Community dialogues were designed in close collaboration with relevant stakeholders, notably local authorities and CSOs. The *Migrant as Messengers* initiative (which relies on migrants returned with the JI) was praised by many interviewees who deemed messages from former migrants to be particularly credible.

⁶² As part of market sensitization, returnees share their migration experience to large crowds gathered in markets, using microphones.


⁶³ The Samuel Hall's socio-economic profiling of communities of return was limited to identifying the actors most trusted and the channels of communications most used.

Budget constraints mean that IOM Nigeria and its partners focus on community-based activities, potentially missing out on synergies that could be created by taking advantage of additional channels and actors. While community-based activities seem very relevant, IOM Nigeria implements relatively few activities in institutional settings (in schools, universities, high-level political or religious meetings, etc.) or using radio, TV, and social media. According to the TPML survey, more respondents get their information on migration from social media, TV, radio and internet than from friends and family in the country; and perhaps more surprisingly, they also trust more these channels of information (notably TV). In addition, IOM studies have shown that social media can be used at relatively lower cost⁶⁴. But using them would require a team dedicated to social media which the JI did not fund.

The targeting of the JI AR activities could be further improved. At the community level, the JI has increased its coverage to better match zones of departure, though AR activities would have benefited from more prospective analysis of migration flows. At the individual level, there is some discrepancy between the typical profile of potential migrants and that of AR activities attendees. The JI extended its AR activities to Lagos in the course of 2020, as a significant proportion of migrants come from or transit via Lagos before migrating⁶⁵. But overall, the AR campaign could have benefitted from a more thorough mapping and prospective analysis of migration flows within the

Nigerian territory, for example using data from the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), also funded by the EUTF (see Figure 14).⁶⁶ In particular, States like Enugu and Imo⁶⁷ seem to have departure numbers that are similar to Delta and higher than Lagos⁶⁸. This effort could have been strengthened by looking for greater complementarities with other actors: a recent 2020 report identified 39 projects on migration related AR in Nigeria, including six ongoing projects, with no partner focused on Enugu⁶⁹. When it comes to targeting at the individual level, it should be noted that over half of community theatre and dialogue attendees interviewed by Altai Consulting deem it unlikely that they would have attempted to migrate irregularly before they participated in the activity, and some basic demographics suggest that attendees indeed do not match the typical profile of irregular migrants. For example, the average age of community theatre and dialogue attendees interviewed is 34, which is about four years older than the average of all interviews for AR activities across JI countries, and eight years older than the average age of Nigerian AVRR and VHR returnees assisted by IOM^{xv}; almost all

Figure 14: Number of migrants identified as heading North to Europe by State of origin (DTM, 2018 - 2020)



⁶⁴ A recent study conducted by the IOM regional office and focused on Facebook suggested the cost of 27 EUR per survey completed and 18 EUR per post share or comment (in Nigeria specifically).

⁶⁵ This evolution is in line with a recommendation made by TPML.

⁶⁶ Aggregated data for 2018-2020 provided by the IOM DTM team in Dakar.

⁶⁷ Imo should however be covered by a separate 25,000 EUR pilot project part of the governance component of the JI and to be implemented by NCFRMI in collaboration with youth organizations in parts of both Imo and Ogun.

⁶⁸ While being much smaller in terms of population than Lagos, therefore suggesting that AR activities may have a greater impact if implemented in Enugu and Imo rather than Lagos.

⁶⁹ Except one planning to do so. Ongoing projects in Lagos for example include the Action against TiP and smuggling of migrants in Nigeria (EU-funded); awareness raising activities funded by SDC in 18 States implemented by the CSO Migration Network; a campaign implemented by the Nigerian government; and a project implemented by the NGO Bakhita. See Sempereon, M, 'Fighting Human Trafficking in Nigeria: a Gap Analysis of recent and ongoing projects (2010-2019)' (2020) for the full list.

attendees declare having a secondary school education or more, while this is the case for less than a quarter of irregular migrants arriving in Italy^{xxvi}. AR activities can still be useful for preventing irregular migration even if individual targeting is not perfectly adapted, as long as community/family pressures to migrate are an important decision factor: though both the TPML survey and the 2019 IOM/Harvard study show that close to three quarters of returnees made the decision to migrate on their own, they may still be influenced by friends or family discussion⁷⁰. In any case, AR activities can be useful to reduce stigma against returnees in their community.

AR activities (from the JI, but not exclusively) are insufficiently segmented based on the different types of migrants' profile and migration flows. In particular, they tend to conflate trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants, which may undermine the effectiveness of messaging. Proper segmentation would allow to differentiate between, and design responses based on, the location (urban vs. rural, presence of smuggling network), gender, level of education, etc. In particular, though there is some level of intertwinement between smuggling of migrants (which entails voluntary migration) and trafficking in persons (which involves some level of coercion), and maybe more so in Nigeria than in other countries, the profiles involved are different. For example, VoTs are overwhelmingly female and less than 20% of them come from Edo and Delta^{xxvii}. Specific AR responses should be designed to fit their profile so as to maximize the efficiency of messaging.

The JI is trying to include more positive messages on alternatives to migrating irregularly but options accessible to young people with low qualifications are few. Both community theatre and dialogue frequently include messaging about alternatives to irregular migrations such as local job opportunities and options for regular migration. However, less than half of theatre and dialogue beneficiaries interviewed by Altai Consulting mentioned/remember this as one of the topics of the activity they attended. In any case, in Nigeria as in other countries, access to local training, job and legal migration opportunities is difficult; the website 'Waka Well' is a welcome initiative but it does not list concrete opportunities⁷¹. This limits the impact of such complementary messaging, which may even affect the credibility of the overall campaign.

Expertise France will provide a grant to an established network of NGOs to conduct its own AR activities, which should allow to ensure that the messaging is locally owned. The only component directly implemented by Expertise France will be AR workshops for recruitment agencies. The bulk of AR activities will be conducted by the Network of CSOs Against Child Trafficking, Abuse and Labour (NACTAL), which gathers 150 NGOs and CSOs. NACTAL drafted the proposal itself. Part of the activities will target people that out of ignorance assist and harbour traffickers in border areas, in order to address cross-border trafficking mainly between Nigeria and neighboring countries. Others will target universities, with the assumption that students are more likely to fall prey to trafficking-related recruitment practices.

5.3. Implementation

Community dialogues are led by locally recruited facilitators who are well placed to convey adapted and trusted messaging. Higher-level traditional and religious leaders would have a stronger influence on their communities but their involvement is a complicated endeavour. Community facilitators can meaningfully interact with the audience and allow time for interactions with attendants, which can be an important success factor for AR campaigns. However, facilitators are usually not the "highest-level" community leaders, whose more active involvement would have

⁷⁰ Even though only about a quarter of community theatre and dialogue attendees report that they get their information on migration issues mostly from friends and family in Nigeria.

⁷¹ It only lists the overall visa requirements for foreign countries, and for job opportunities, the contact details of relevant partners (e.g. MRC).

maximized outreach and impact. But IOM’s attempts to involve high-level leaders were challenged by the fact that they systematically require large “seating fees”.

Community theatre was received positively by actors across the board and recommendations to film it are being taken up by the JI. Community theatre scripts were drafted by Lancelot, a well-known Nigerian movie director; the scripts were based on real stories from returned migrants; and the plays were implemented by trained amateur actors. The drama sketches incorporate key factors known to influence knowledge, attitudes, and behaviours: humour; relatable stories; clear messages about irregular migration; contacts of stakeholders for follow-up. Key stakeholders and TPML recommended to record some of the sessions to allow for further dissemination beyond immediate attendees, and the JI is in the process of doing so⁷².

Market sensitisation can allow reaching out to more people at a lower cost but targeting and monitoring are challenging. Research conducted by IOM as part of the *Migrants as Messengers* campaign in Senegal suggests that the approach is promising. But it is unclear whether the format applied in Nigeria (migrants heading to marketplaces sharing their migration experience to large crowds using microphones) will be equally successful.

5.4. Monitoring and evaluation

IOM has taken some initiatives to capture the effectiveness of AR activities and enable the learning process but a robust M&E system is still work in progress. Since 2020 a selected number of community dialogue and theatre sessions are monitored by staff from the government National Orientation Agency (NOA), who also conduct perception surveys among a small sample of beneficiaries in collaboration with IOM. Among the last round of 31 key informants interviewed 70% said that their perception of irregular migration has changed after the event in their community. However, the absence of independent assessments based on a robust sampling strategy⁷³ weakens data reliability. Existing reporting mechanisms nevertheless allow to capture more qualitative participant feedback: for example, respondents suggested the need for more repeated activities in their communities – the main AR-related indicator set for the JI for reporting purposes to the EU, focused on the number of communities visited, may have provided a disincentive for repeat visits. This suggestion for repeated activities was actually implemented by the JI.

The M&E plan for Expertise France’s awareness raising activities is not yet finalized.

5.5. Participation and satisfaction

Altai Consulting was provided with few country-level M&E results from IOM on awareness-raising activities, therefore the findings below are mainly based on the data collected by TPML (described in the focus box below, and in further detail in annex 6.3).

Focus box 2: TPML awareness-raising survey - overview

- 213 individuals exposed to both direct and indirect sensitisation activities implemented by IOM

⁷² Though not all sessions will be recorded, and only one short film combining excerpts from community theatre and dialogues is being put together. This will not facilitate a potential dissemination through social media.

⁷³ IOM also conducted a baseline knowledge, attitude and practice (KAP) survey (with funding from Germany) and a follow-up survey is planned in order to assess the impact of specific AR activities, but it was not shared with Altai Consulting

were interviewed by Altai Consulting. Half of them attended community theatre or community dialogues – the two activities exclusively funded under the EUTF⁷⁴ and therefore the focus of the analysis below;

- Respondents identified through event organizers and snowballing;
- All results are self-reported – no objective measure on the knowledge and attitudes towards migration before the activities.


A significant proportion of JI AR beneficiaries interviewed by Altai Consulting report having received in-kind incentives to attend the community dialogue or theatre event; they are overwhelmingly positive about their participation. Almost 40% of interviewees mentioned that one of the things that motivated them to attend was food, and over 20% mentioned money – proportions that are two to three times higher than in other countries. As in the other JI countries, over 95% of community theatre and dialogue attendees are satisfied with the event, found the message easy to understand, convincing, learnt something new, and are likely to participate again in such an event.

5.6. Effectiveness

Migrants interviewed by Altai Consulting report significant changes in their perception of irregular migration and alternatives to it. 60% of community theatre and dialogue attendees report an increased perception of risks of irregular migration since their participation in the event, which is slightly higher than the regional average for participation in all AR events. 40% now believe there are legal alternatives to irregular migration while they did not before, and nearly two thirds now perceive that “*there are job opportunities in Nigeria*” while they did not before⁷⁵. These effects are not only short-term but seem to remain over time at least partially, as over half of respondents attended the event over one month before the survey.

While relatively few attendees ever considered irregular migration as an option for them, those who did reported a strong effect of participating in community theatre and dialogues on their willingness to migrate irregularly. Activities could also impact non-attendees, given that many attendees share the information they learnt with others. Although the sample is relatively small, the percentage of community dialogue and theatre attendees considering the attempt at irregular migration “likely” or “very likely” falls from over one-third before the event to less than 5% after the event (see Figure 15 on the right) – a larger fall than for activities implemented in other JI countries. In total, half of community theatre and dialogues attendees report decreased likelihood to attempt irregular migration (N=47). The overall impact is however limited by the fact that only about 10% of attendees were “very likely” to attempt irregular migration before the activity took place (as mentioned earlier, the target audience is older and more educated on average than the typical irregular migrant). Nevertheless, the vast

Figure 15: Participants considering irregular migration, before and after attending community theatre and dialogues (N=47)



⁷⁴ At the time of the survey, the videoclip funded under the EUTF had not yet been aired.

⁷⁵ Percentages in this paragraph refer only to attendees who mention that the risks of irregular migration, legal alternatives and job opportunities in Nigeria, respectively, were one of the topic of the event they attended (N=112, 41 and 50 respectively).

majority of attendees reported that they shared the information received⁷⁶, which raises the likelihood that the message will reach more “typical” profiles within the family and the community. This makes the recommendation of filming and disseminating performances even more pressing, since this would support attendees to spread the message in their families, communities and beyond through WhatsApp and other social media.

5.7. Ownership and sustainability

Community dialogues and community theatre rely on volunteers, which presents both opportunities and risks. IOM has taken steps to build their capacities and foster longer-term engagement. NAPTIP, IOM’s main AR partner, was initially working with community facilitators selected by the local governments, which led to political affiliation issues and inefficiencies. IOM then also involved the National Orientation Agency (NOA) who now selects facilitators and has a larger geographic reach, with offices in all local government areas. Relying on volunteers ensures that local capacities exist to keep going at lower costs once the JI ends. But it also entails frequent dropouts, meaning volunteers have to be re-trained by IOM. The time between the training of volunteers and the start of field activities can be long, causing some facilitators to lose interest in the project. In response, IOM organized refresher trainings. Community dialogues now stretch over 12 months in the same selected LGA for longer-term engagement and greater impact – activities are not necessarily repeated in the same localities/villages, however. To reinforce the sustainability of community theatre activities, IOM also supported the theatre groups to register as cooperatives, though not all have done so.

The JI works closely with the relevant government agencies both in terms of design and implementation and is trying to increase involvement of local leaders. Meanwhile Expertise France’s activities will entirely rely on existing civil society structures, which bodes well in terms of sustainability. The JI actively involved NOA and NAPTIP in the development of the community dialogue manuals and community theatre scripts and manual (the Edo State Task Force against human trafficking as well as CSOs also provided feedback), and staff from the two agencies have displayed high level of engagement. In addition, the JI is increasingly trying to engage with traditional and religious leaders at higher levels with the view to influence social norms and foster ownership and sustainability. On the other side, Expertise France will entirely rely on existing civil society structures (NACTAL and individuals NGOs) to craft and disseminate the relevant messages, which suggests that (provided funding is made available) they would be able to maintain efforts even when the JI comes to an end.

Under JI funding, IOM created a coordination group which allowed to improve coordination and the quality of messaging, and drafted a national migration AR strategy for the country. However, its membership is focused on IOM’s core partners and does not include some other relevant players. The coordination group, which includes IOM main partners – NAPTIP, the National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and IDPs (NCFRMI), NOA as well as NGOs and CSOs – meets on a quarterly basis to inform each other on respective on-going and planned activities in at least three states (Edo, Delta and Lagos), which allows to avoid overlaps. Members received trainings on communications for development, social media and M&E for AR, which reportedly improved the overall quality of messaging. The coordination group also initiated a country-wide migration AR strategy. However, only some non-JI actors are active within the group⁷⁷, and some were not aware of the national AR strategy, even though they are planning to conduct or are funding AR activities. This suggests that multistakeholder coordination beyond the JI actors themselves is still work in progress.

⁷⁶ In particular, 96 of out 112 respondents shared some of the information received on risks related to irregular migration.

⁷⁷ For example, FIIAPP is regularly attending the meetings of the group, but Expertise France and the Swiss Embassy are not.

5.8. Recommendations and good practices from other countries

5.8.1. Recommendations

To IOM, it is recommended that:

- In the short-term, community mobilizers should be guided/incentivized to have attendees **better match the typical profile of potential migrants** (in particular by making additional efforts to have young people attend the events); **relations should be established with other actors working on awareness raising not currently included in PACTIM**, to better coordinate activities and avoid overlaps but also to gain their inputs on the awareness raising national strategy; **further engagement with TV and radio channels as well as on social media** could be sought, in particular by filming and disseminating more community theatre and dialogue sessions; and IOM **efforts to more engage traditional and religious leaders as well as returnees' associations should be pursued**.
- For future programming, it is suggested to:
 - **Strengthen M&E systems for AR** in particular by 1. having an M&E team ideally fully independent from IOM field partners, and 2. conducting both baseline and endline surveys;
 - Design activities **better tailored to the different target groups** (in particular for potential VoTs vs. profiles less likely to be trafficked), to be based on formative research; Nigerian PhD students and research institutes could be included in this effort;
 - Experiment with AR messages **focusing on what migrants typically lose** when they engage in the journey (an “opportunity cost” approach: close relations with family and friends, support of the community, attachment to the country and feelings of being “at home”, safe and free – feelings which may be different in destination countries) rather than on the potential risks (which are often already well-known) or on the local job opportunities (which are often not many and may become more difficult to find in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis).

To the EU (for future programming), it is recommended to:

- **Include additional and longer-term funding, and an appropriate time dedicated to an inception phase, to conduct formative research** on the specific migration drivers in specific communities.
- **Limit visibility requirements** (e.g. EU logo, etc.) which can affect the credibility of messaging and be counter-productive.

5.8.2. Good practices from other countries

- In Guinea, IOM conducted **numerous formative studies and evaluations in order to better profile target groups, and investigate their access to information and the impact of past awareness raising activities**. These have been particularly useful to deconstruct stereotypes on Guinean migrants, and better understand how migration decisions are made – notably the fact that the decision to migrate is usually personal, with little influence and support from the family in the country.
- In Mauritania, Save the Children **collaborated with the Ministry of Islamic Affairs** to develop a sensitization guide around child protection based on the Islamic jurisprudence, so that sensitization messages gain legitimacy and reach the most traditional groups across the country.
- In Senegal and Guinea, the EU funded a **television and web series on youth and migration**. Branded as ‘Tekki-Fii’ in Senegal (common branding for all EUTF IP awareness raising activities in the country), it was aired both on the number 1 national TV channel and social media.

- In Ghana, the campaign mobilised the famous singer Kofi Kinaata as a **goodwill ambassador**; he performed songs such as “No Place Like Home” to discourage irregular migration, and “Behind The Scenes” on the reality faced by migrants in Europe (resp. 444,000 and 2.4 millions views on YouTube). Similarly, in Guinea, IOM supported the production of a videoclip by Degg J force 3, a group of highly popular among the youth (more than 1.2 million views on YouTube).

6. ANNEXES

6.1. List of key informants

Type of stakeholder	Organization	Position	Date (most recent meeting)
NGO	CSO Migration Network	Director	December 14th, 2021
IP	Concern for women and Youth Empowerment (COWOYEM)	Founder / Executive Director	December 8th, 2020
Government	Delta State Task Force against human trafficking	Acting Secretary	December 15 th , 2020
Government	Edo State Task Force against human trafficking	Head of Administration and Training	December 9 th , 2020
EUD	European Union Delegation	Cooperation Officer Migration, Drugs and Organised Crime	January 18 th , 2021
IP	Expertise France	Nigeria Project Manager	January 18 th , 2021
Other	FIIAPP	A-TIPSOM Project Leader	March 3 rd , 2021
NGO	Girl Power Initiative	Asaba Coordinator	December 17 th , 2020
Other	GIZ	PMD Nigeria Team Leader	December 7 th , 2020
Other	Human Mobility for Development Initiative	Executive secretary	January 28 th , 2021
NGO	Idia Renaissance	President	December 15 th , 2020
IP	IOM	Awareness Raising Officer	December 9 th , 2020
IP	IOM	National Programme Officer, Governance and Policy	December 9 th , 2020
IP	IOM	MHPSS focal point	December 10 th , 2020
IP	IOM	Senior Project Assistant	December 14 th , 2020
IP	IOM	Head of Migrant Protection and Assistance Unit	December 14th, 2020

IP	IOM	Counter-Trafficking Project Officer	December 15 th , 2020
IP	IOM	Programme support officer (M&E)	December 16 th , 2020
IP	IOM	Senior Database Analyst	December 18 th , 2020
IP	IOM	Head of sub-office Lagos	January 6 th , 2021
IP	IOM	Head of sub-office Benin	January 7 th , 2021
Government	Migrant Resource Centre	Responsible for MRC Lagos State	January 6 th , 2021
Government	Migrant Resource Centre	Responsible for MRC Benin State	December 2 nd , 2020
Government	Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management	Principal Social Welfare Officer	December 11 th , 2020
Government	NAPTIP	Zonal Commander	December 17 th , 2020
Government	NCFRMI	South West Zonal Director	December 14 th , 2020
Other	Network of Migration Research on Africa	Founder	January 13 th , 2021
NGO	Patriotic Citizen Initiative (PCI)	Executive Director	December 17 th , 2020
Other	Policy Consult	Director	January 26 th , 2021
Government	Small and Medium Scale Enterprise Development Agency (SMEDAN)	Director General	December 18 th , 2020
NGO	Society for the Empowerment of Young Persons (SEYP)	Executive Director	December 15 th , 2020
Other	Swiss Embassy to Nigeria	Migration attaché	March 2 nd , 2021

6.2. List of collected documents

Organization/author	Date	Title
Arhin-Sam, K.	2019	The political economy of migration governance in Nigeria
Carling, J.	2005	Trafficking in Women from Nigeria to Europe
COWOYEM	-	COWOYEM profile
Digidiki, V., Bhabha, J. /IOM	2019	Returning home: the reintegration challenges facing child and youth returnees from Libya to Nigeria
Edo State	2018	Edo State trafficking in persons prohibition law
Edo State Task Force Against Human Trafficking	2019	Perception of Edo people on international and irregular migration

Edo State Task Force Against Human Trafficking	2019	Annual report August 2018 – August 2019
Edo State Task Force Against Human Trafficking	2018	Conference report – Examining the root causes of human trafficking in Edo State
European Union	2018	Data collection on trafficking in human beings in the EU
Expertise France	2020	Appui à la lutte contre la traite des personnes dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée - Rapport semestriel - 1er semestre 2020
Expertise France	2020	NAPTIP capacity building gap assessment
Expertise France	2020	Concept note for the provision of CRM call application, training, provision of hardware and refurbishment of NAPTIP Call Centre
Expertise France	2020	Concept note for the upgrade and maintenance of NAPTIP system software
Expertise France	2020	Report of the sensitization workshop on the trafficking in persons regulation 2019 for labour recruiters and travel and tour operators
Expertise France & UNODC	2020	Training for Ondo and Ekiti State Task Forces against human trafficking on identifying, preventing and combating human trafficking - Training report
Federal Government of Nigeria	2015	National Migration Policy
Federal Government of Nigeria	2014	National Labour Migration Policy
Haarman, E., J. Tjaden and G. López (IOM)	2020	Assessing the effectiveness of online facebook campaigns targeting potential irregular migrants: a pilot study in three West African countries
IOM	2021	Biannual reintegration report – October 2020 (and previous)
IOM	2020	EU – IOM Joint Initiative for migrant protection and reintegration - lessons learnt and recommendations for future programming
IOM	2020	Evaluation of reintegration activities in the Sahel and Lake Chad region
IOM	2020	EU-IOM Joint Initiative (Sahel and Lake Chad): protection and reintegration in the time of COVID-19
IOM	2020	Assistance to Voluntary and Humanitarian Returns 2017-2020
IOM	2020	Assessing the effectiveness of online facebook campaigns targeting potential irregular migrants: a pilot study in three West African countries
IOM	2020	Community dialogue & community theatre
IOM	2020	Presentation on mental health and migration (10-13 Novembre 2020)
IOM	2019	Migration in Nigeria - A country profile 2019
IOM	2019	The standard operating procedures for the conduct of return, readmission and reintegration of migrants in Nigeria
IOM	2019	Nigeria - second interim narrative report
IOM	2018	Nigeria - first interim narrative report
IOM	2018	IOM Nigeria awareness raising activities

IOM	2016	Migration in Nigeria – a country profile 2014
IOM	-	Registration form
IOM	-	Rapid psychosocial distress screening tool
IOM DTM	2020	Aggregated flow monitoring data 2018-2019
IOM DTM	2018	Enabling a better understanding of migration flows (and its root causes) from Nigeria towards Europe
Lagos MRC NELEX Centre	2020	Report of activities for the period 2019-2020
NACTAL	2020	NACTAL proposal for Expertise France - Combating human trafficking through awareness creation and community mobilization
NAPTIP	2020	Organizational Strategic Plan 2020-2025
OECD	2018	Identifying the factors driving west African migration
Samuel Hall / University of Sussex	2020	Mentoring returnees: study on reintegration outcomes through a comparative lens - executive summary
Samuel Hall	2018	Community profiling of return areas in Nigeria
Semprebon, M	2020	Fighting Human Trafficking in Nigeria: a Gap Analysis of recent and ongoing projects (2010-2019)
UK Home Office	2019	Country Policy and Information Note Nigeria: Trafficking of women
United States Department of State	2020	Trafficking in persons report: Nigeria

6.3. Selection and characteristics of the interviewed beneficiaries

RETURN AND REINTEGRATION SURVEY - METHODOLOGY

Return and reintegration surveys involved the interviews of **260 returned migrants** (cycle 1 through 3) who benefited from a return and/or reintegration assistance funded under the JI.


- ✓ **Quantitative targets:** 100 interviews in each cycle (cycle 1 target was not reached).
- ✓ **States covered:** Edo, Delta, Ondo and Lagos.
- ✓ **Survey eligibility criteria:**
 - Nigerian citizens;
 - 18 years old and over;
 - Living in an area logistically accessible;
 - Beneficiary from a return and/or reintegration assistance funded under the JI.
- ✓ **Beneficiaries' selection:**
 - Cycle 1: IOM provided Altai Consulting with a list of 115 beneficiaries who agreed to be interviewed by our team, though when called again by Altai Consulting, many respondents were either unreachable or not interested in participating in our survey (therefore only 56 interviews could be conducted).





- Cycle 2: About 40% of the sample was drawn from the list of beneficiaries provided for in cycle 1; the remaining beneficiaries were found using snowballing.
- Cycle 3: About 50% of the sample was drawn from two lists provided by IOM ahead of the survey (50 new beneficiaries to be interviewed, 40 recently returned returnees not yet having benefited from reintegration assistance), while the other half was drawn from the list of beneficiaries already interviewed in cycle 1 or 2.

✓ **Possible biases:**

- **Methodological bias.** **No systematic sampling was possible, and as such the collected data are indicative of the situation of Nigerian returnees but cannot be considered to be statistically representative** (in particular, interviewees were still in the country, reachable and willing to conduct the interview). As a mitigation measure, enumerators were asked to select respondents so as to represent a variety of experiences (avoid interviewing too many people in the same location, in the same group of friends, etc.). In addition, in Nigeria a significant proportion of the sample of cycle 2 and 3 is constituted of migrants who were already interviewed, but due to ethical issues (see below “*Consent and data protection*” section), data from the different interviews are not linked and data from the second interview is therefore considered as data from a new individual (such individuals are as a result over-represented in the sample).
- **Bias related to the nature of the survey.** It is possible that respondents exaggerated their dissatisfaction in the hope of receiving additional assistance in the future. As a mitigation measure, the survey introduction clarifies the independent status of enumerators and the fact that no answer can influence future assistance received.
- **Social-desirability bias.** It is possible that respondents would choose their answer as a way to be viewed positively, for example by emphasizing good behavior. As a mitigation measure, enumerators were trained to ensure the anonymity and confidentiality of answers.

RETURN AND REINTEGRATION SURVEY – RESPONDENTS’ PROFILE





SENSITIZATION SURVEY - METHODOLOGY

Surveys involved interviews of 213 beneficiaries (cycle 2 and 3) of an awareness raising activity implemented by IOM in Nigeria.


- ✓ **Quantitative targets:** 100 interviews in each cycle.
- ✓ **States covered:** Edo, Delta, Ondo and Lagos.
- ✓ **Survey eligibility criteria:**
 - Nigerian citizens;
 - 18 years old and over;
 - Living in an area logistically accessible;
 - Having participated in a sensitisation activity implemented by IOM Nigeria and/or having been exposed to a mass communication campaign implemented by IOM Nigeria.
- ✓ **Beneficiaries' selection:**

- IOM provided Altai Consulting with a list of sensitization activities to take place during the time of the survey, as well as a list of focal points in charge of organizing future and past activities. Respondents were interviewed either right after the conduct of the activity, or after focal points provided the team with information allowing enumerators to identify them. Snowballing was also used to reach the target.

✓ **Possible bias:**

- Methodological bias: **No systematic sampling was possible, and as such the collected data are indicative of the situation of beneficiaries of JI AR activities in Nigeria but cannot be considered to be statistically representative.** As a mitigation measure, enumerators were asked to select respondents so as to represent a variety of experiences (avoid interviewing too many people in the same location, in the same family or group of friends, etc.).
- Social-desirability bias: It is possible that respondents would choose their answer as a way to be viewed positively, for example by emphasizing good behavior. As a mitigation measure, enumerators were trained to ensure the anonymity and confidentiality of answers.

AWARENESS-RAISING SURVEY – RESPONDENTS’ PROFILE



CONSENT AND DATA PROTECTION (BOTH SURVEYS)

- Enumerators were trained on key ethical principles to be followed during the data collection.
- Data is collected through the ODK collect software on tablets or smartphones protected by a password. Once submitted, the data is stored on a secure server with restricted access (only the Altai Consulting TPML team has access to it).
- Respondents are informed about the anonymity and confidentiality with which their data will be treated, both at the beginning and at the end of the interview. Their consent is requested before the interview starts.
- In order to protect the identity of persons interviewed, their full name is not collected. Their phone number is collected if they consent to it for a potential future contact. All other collected information is treated with confidentiality.

6.4. Analytical table of the programs/projects

	EU-IOM Joint Initiative	Appui à la Lutte contre la Traite des Personnes dans les pays du Golfe de Guinée (Expertise France) <i>Regional data – no data available solely for Nigeria</i>
Budget	15.5 million EUR (100% EUTF funded) + top-up (total 100 million)	18 million EUR (including 17,4 million from EUTF)
Objectives and target group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ 11,300 returning migrants reintegrated (3 800 original target + 7 500 top up target) ✓ 20 000 potential, stranded and transit migrants sensitised 200 communities of high emigration sensitised 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ 92,00 victims of trafficking identified and assisted ✓ 120,000 migrants or potential migrants sensitised ✓ 10,000 potential employers sensitised ✓ 1,200 judiciary staff trained ✓ 450 staff from internal security institutions trained ✓ 120 state and non-state stakeholders beneficiaries from regional exchanges
Project period	✓ April 2017 - March 2021	✓ November 2019 - January 2023
Primary return and reintegration activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Return assistance ✓ Reception, registration, vulnerability screening, pocket money and return assistance to final destination ✓ Reintegration assistance: Psychosocial support / Business skills training / Elaboration of business plans for material support to set up individual, collective or community-based projects / Cash for Work activities (community-based projects) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Grants to NGOs supporting victims of trafficking

Primary sensitization activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ <u>In-person activities</u>: community dialogue, community theatre ✓ <u>Activities through mass media</u>: production of a video clip 	<p>(in Nigeria)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ <u>In-person activities</u>: campus outreach (in universities) ✓ <u>Activities through mass media</u>: television and radio jingles focused on border community
Main partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Five NGOs for case management ✓ National authorities: National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally Displaced persons (NCFRMI), National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP), Ministry of Employment (including Migrant Resource Centers), National Orientation Agency (NOA) ✓ State level structures: Edo State Task Force Against Human Trafficking 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ NAPTIP ✓ Ondo and Ekiti State Task Force Against Human Trafficking ✓ Network Against Child Trafficking, Abuse and Labour (NACTAL) ✓ NGOs (grants) yet to be selected

6.5. Acronyms

Abbreviation	Full name
AR	Awareness-raising
CMET	Case Management Expert Team
DTM	Displacement Tracking Matrix
EUTF	European Union Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa
FMLE	Federal Ministry of Labour and Employment
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German development cooperation agency)
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy Development
IDP	Internally displaced person
IGA	Income-generating activity
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IP	Implementing Partner
JI	(EU-IOM) Joint Initiative
M&E	Monitoring & evaluation
MET	Monitoring Expert Team
MRC	Migrant Resource Centre

NACTAL	Network of CSOs Against Child Trafficking, Abuse and Labour
NAPTIP	National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons
NCFRMI	National Commission for Refugees, Migrants and Internally displaced persons
NELEX	National Electronic Labour Exchange
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NOA	National Orientation Agency
PSS	Psycho-social support
SDC	Swiss Development Cooperation
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
TiP	Trafficking in persons
TPML	Third-Party Monitoring and Learning
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UK	United Kingdom
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
VoTs	Victims of trafficking

6.6. End notes

ⁱ IDMC, 31 Dec 2019

ⁱⁱ UNHCR database, 31 Dec 2019

ⁱⁱⁱ World Bank, 2019

^{iv} African Union and JLMP, 'Report on labour migration statistics in Africa – second edition (2017)' (2020)

^v UNHCR Mediterranean data compiled from national authorities (Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Greece).

^{vi} OECD, 'Identifying the factors driving west African migration' (2018)

^{vii} Carling, J., 'Trafficking in Women from Nigeria to Europe' (2005)

^{viii} IOM, 'Assistance to Voluntary and Humanitarian Returns 2017-2020' (2021)

^{ix} Eurostat, Asylum and managed migration database: Third country nationals returned following an order to leave

^x IOM, Fourth bi-annual reintegration report (2020)

^{xi} European Union, 'Data collection on trafficking in human beings in the EU' (2018)

^{xii} Expertise France and UNODC, 'Training for Ondo and Ekiti State Task Forces against human trafficking on identifying, preventing and combating human trafficking – training report' (2020)

^{xiii} NAPTIP Strategic Plan 2020-2025

^{xiv} Digidiki, V., Bhabha, J. /IOM, 'Returning home: the reintegration challenges facing child and youth returnees from Libya to Nigeria' (2019)

^{xv} Samuel Hall, 'Community profiling of return areas in Nigeria' (2018)

^{xvi} IOM, 'Mental health and migration – Nigeria, 10-13 November 2020'

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- xvii Samuel Hall / University of Sussex, 'Mentoring returnees: study on reintegration outcomes through a comparative lens' (2020)
- xviii Eurostat, Asylum and managed migration database
- xix Digidiki, V., Bhabha, J. /IOM, 'Returning Home: The reintegration challenges facing child and youth returnees from Libya to Nigeria' (2019)
- xx OHCHR, 'End of visit statement, Nigeria (3-10 September) by Maria Grazia Giammarinaro, UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children'
- xxi Semprebon, M, 'Fighting Human Trafficking in Nigeria: a Gap Analysis of recent and ongoing projects (2010-2019)' (2020)
- xxii UK Home Office, 'Country Policy and Information Note Nigeria: Trafficking of women' (2019)
- xxiii Arhin-Sam, K., 'The political economy of migration governance in Nigeria' (2019)
- xxiv Federal Government of Nigeria '2017 Appropriation bill – Federal Ministry of Interior'
- xxv IOM, 'Assistance to Voluntary and Humanitarian Returns 2017-2019' (2020)
- xxvi IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, 'Enabling a better understanding of migration flows and its root causes, from Nigeria towards Europe' (2017)
- xxvii NAPTIP, '2019 Data analysis by the research and programme development department'.