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Resilience in Action
Local practices and development/humanitarian policies

A review of resilience in the drylands of Turkana

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1 Introduction

This rapid review investigates the adoption of ideas of resilience by the development and humanitarian sector. It compares practices of resilience, emerging from fieldwork with Turkana herders in northern Kenya, with an analysis of resilience policies and shows how resilience is understood programmatically and translated into design, implementation and evaluation phases by development and humanitarian actors.

Resilience thinking is pervasive in scholarly and policy circles (Korosteleva, 2019; Xu & Marinova, 2013). Its etymological origin lies in the Latin verb *resilio* – to jump back (Klein et al, 2003) – but its meaning has since expanded widely across several disciplines and fields of enquiry. Despite, or perhaps because of, its popularity, there is little agreement in the vast resilience scholarship about its meaning in practice: what makes an entity resilient (and resilient to what?), how resilience can be promoted and sustained, and how it can be operationalised remain contested questions. One of the few shared acknowledgments is that resilience is not a new concept (Davoudi et al, 2012), but it is rooted in scientific research mainly attributed to the fields of ecology (Holling, 1961) and psychology (Masten et al, 1990).[1] Another common feature in the resilience scholarship, besides its long history, is its extension beyond academia. With its promise of positive adaptation, resilience has become a "key political category of our time" (Neocleous, 2013), endorsed by policy makers and the aid industry as principal driver of much recent policy and programming. Nonetheless, resilience, as a theoretical and operational concept, remains somehow nascent and 'immature', poorly defined and conceptualised, having become mainstream before it could thoroughly be understood (Brown, 2015).

This paper aims to contribute to these debates by bringing forward the perspectives of local communities and beneficiaries of the rising resilience agenda in the Horn of Africa. It starts with an overview of the situation in the Horn of Africa (section 2). It continues by presenting some insights and reflections about practices of resilience based on the author's experience with Turkana herders in the northern Kenyan drylands (section 3). It then reviews a selection of resilience policies implemented in Kenya, with a focus on Turkana County (section 4). The final section examines how far resilience programmes differ from local practices and provides some recommendations on how development and humanitarian actors can adapt their work to ensure that it better serves to improve the lives of beneficiaries.

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[1] A review of the use of resilience in scientific scholarship is beyond the scope of this study. Suggested reading includes Alexander (2013) de Bruijne et al (2010), Manyena (2006) and Martin-Breen and Anderies (2011).

2 Resilience in action: what is happening in the Horn of Africa?

The 2010–11 period was a benchmark in the humanitarian history of the Horn of Africa (HoA), launching what may be considered the 'resilience agenda' in the region. A review of programmes and policies designed as part of this agenda suggests that the idea of resilience in East Africa is largely used in the context of drylands and associated with droughts. Attention to drought in the region is not new, but in 2011 it was rather different: African governments dictated a paradigm shift, combining preventive (rather than reactive), regional (rather than national) and holistic (rather than emergency) approaches, ie 'building resilience'.

Many observers, governments and members of the international community referred to the 2010–11 crisis as 'the Drought' (Maxwell & Majid, 2014), emerging from the failure of several rainy seasons. However, in this region drought is neither unexpected nor unusual; only looking at the past 20 years, drought-related food crises occurred in 2002, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011–12, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 (Grünewald et al, 2019). In 2011 the effects of the drought were exacerbated by several other factors in the region, which led to a rapid deterioration in the situation, including: high fuel prices, high and volatile food prices, poor governance, conflict, and lack of political commitment (Maxwell et al, 2014). Across the Horn, an estimated 13 million people were affected, and overall economic costs were enormous. As a result, African governments rushed to change their programming around disasters – specifically addressed at ending drought emergencies – to fully embrace the resilience thinking.

On 9 September 2011, Heads of State and Governments in the HoA met at the Nairobi Summit with the goal to "plan, harmonise, and mobilise resources to ensure the next drought would not result in another humanitarian crisis" (IGAD, 2013). They defined a regional 'resilience agenda' for the Horn, through the IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience Sustainability Initiative (IDDRSI), to which several donors (most notably the EU, the UK and the US) tied their programming. Key themes of these efforts were the promotion of longer-term strategies, building on existing knowledge and practices; coordination and effectiveness of interventions, also through longer-term and more flexible funding; and preparedness through early-warning information systems. As Grünewald and colleagues (2019) have argued, there is little literature yet about the impacts of these programmes, and most final evaluations are still pending.

Meanwhile, in 2016–17 another drought occurred. Most programmes launched as part of the resilience agenda in the HoA were reaffirmed and commitments were extended. A significant improvement in the reaction to the latest drought, according to Grünewald and colleagues (2019), was observed in terms of alertness and a quicker triggering of responses; however, mobilisation of funds, bureaucratic processes and willingness to react remained generally poor or slow.

One notable addition to the policy-scape of the Horn in these years is the European Union Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) for Africa, established in 2015 to deliver an "integrated and coordinated response to the diverse causes of instability, irregular migration and forced displacement in the region".[2] One of its four strategic objectives being "strengthening the resilience of communities" (see box below); thus to be considered part of the overall efforts to build resilience in the HoA.

EUTF strategic lines of action

1. Greater economic and employment opportunities;
2. Strengthening resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable, including refugees and other displaced people;
3. Improved migration management in countries of origin, transit and destination;
4. Improved governance and conflict prevention and reduction of forced displacement and irregular migration.

In the years since 2011, most agencies and donors have worked on the preparation of policy papers to present their position on resilience, setting new commitments, objectives and principles (see, for example, DFID, 2011b; EU, 2012; USAID, 2012). They have defined key organisational changes and new approaches to programming, including design, implementation and evaluation phases of their interventions. While these are all specific to each agency and characterised by great variation, there are some commonalities. First, resilience is generally used in reference to the qualities of a 'system' at different levels of aggregation: individuals, households, communities, states, etc (Hoddinott, 2014). Programmes are developed around the identification of a set of characteristics (system qualities) which are deemed to *build* or *increase* the resilience of the targeted system (Brown, 2015; Chandler & Coaffee, 2015; Levine et al, 2012), see an example below.

**Features and qualities of resilient systems (households, communities, states)
– an example from the literature**

"The resilience renaissance? Unpacking of resilience for tackling climate change and disasters"
(Bahadur et al, 2013)

This working paper reviews 16 overlapping conceptualisations of resilience from the literature. The authors then propose 10 key characteristics of resilience systems based on the major areas of convergence:

1. A high level of diversity in groups performing different functions in an ecosystem.
2. Effective governance and institutions, which may enhance community cohesion.
3. Acceptance of the inevitable existence of uncertainty and change.
4. Community involvement and the appropriation of local knowledge.
5. Preparedness activities – not resisting change but preparing to live with it.
6. A high degree of social and economic equity in systems.
7. Importance of social values.
8. Acknowledgement of non-equilibrium dynamics of a system.
9. Importance of continual and effective learning.
10. A cross-scalar perspective of events and occurrences.

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[2] https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/about_en.

Second, resilience reflects a shift from outcome-oriented approaches towards process-oriented ones, focusing on abilities and capacities to respond to, recover from, or adapt to impending shocks (Béné et al, 2012; Manyena, 2006; Mitchell & Harris, 2012). In this way, programmes are said to be more 'people-centred' and connected with the 'local', aiming to empower communities to face recurrent crises through their skills and knowledge.

Finally, resilience is about a shock or a stressor, and organisations are systematically analysing and including risk in their programming (EC, 2015). The rise of a new disaster culture in the development and aid sector occurred progressively through a series of important policy initiatives. First, the Yokohama Strategy (1994) marked a shift from reaction (disaster management) to prevention (disaster risk management (DRM); disaster risk reduction (DRR)) (Manyena et al, 2011). Second, in 2005 the World Conference on Disaster Reduction launched the *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015*: *Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters* (HFA, 2005), which highlighted the need to change the framework of intervention in disaster programming to something other than vulnerability, ie resilience (Manyena, 2006). HFA's goal was to "substantially reduce disaster losses by 2015 by building the resilience of nations and communities to disaster". Programmatically this meant reducing "loss in lives, and in the social, economic and environmental assets" when hazard-prone events struck (Tozier de La Poterie & Baudoin, 2015), a goal which was re-launched in the post-2015 agenda at the World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction through the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (SFDRR). Following these guidelines, similar objectives can be found in the disparate literature developed around disaster resilience, which proposes several models,[3] for several contexts,[4] and most shocks.[5]

Based on these commonalities (qualities of systems, focus on capacities, shock/crisis framework), the programmes that have been implemented vary. The following sections of this paper will present some of the programmes implemented as part of the resilience agenda in the Horn, with the goal of showing how resilience is applied practically in the development and humanitarian sector, beyond goals and principles framed in the respective policy papers. I will first introduce my experience among Turkana herders in northern Kenya, before showing how national and county frameworks of resilience actions respond to local specificities. The aim is to unravel potential gaps in communication between beneficiaries and development agents (seen through the eyes of locals as 'outsiders' to the regional context) and set the basis for a revaluation of resilience policies in the Horn.

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[3] Networks (Norris et al, 2008); set of distinct capitals (Mayunga, 2007); place-based models (Cutter et al, 2008).
[4] Cities (Pelling, 2003), coastal regions (Adger, 2005), rural areas (McManus et al, 2012), among others.
[5] Earthquakes (Bruneau et al, 2003), bushfires (Paton & Tedim, 2012), and hurricanes (Frazier et al, 2013).

3 Practices of resilience: insights from fieldwork

Turkana County lies wholly in the eastern branch of the East African Rift Valley, and it is one of the 23 Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs) counties in Kenya. Covering an area of 77,000 km^2, including water bodies, it is the most northwestern county, bordered by Uganda to the west, South Sudan and Ethiopia to the north and northeast, and Lake Turkana to the east (see Figure 1). Despite a varied landscape, Turkana is mostly known for its remoteness, ecological instability and scarcity of resources. It has a low population density, with around one million people living in the territory, of which roughly 60% are classified as pastoralists, 20% agro-pastoralists, 12% fisherfolks, with the remaining 8% employed in urban areas (King, 2012). Turkana is considered underdeveloped because of very poor infrastructure, lack of basic services and a limited number of natural resources (Boulton, 2012). According to the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), Turkana presents the highest poverty rate in Kenya (95% of the population live below the poverty line, while the national average is 53%). In addition, conflicts caused by ineffective governance, raids, competition over pasture and water, land fragmentation, and climate change are considered further barriers to security and development. Against this contextual background, Turkana has long been a place for humanitarian interventions (Eriksen & Lind, 2009; Lind, 2005; Unicef, 2012). As reconstructed by Reidy (2012), this process started with paupers' camps in the 1930s, moved to mission-based famine camps (a permanent feature by the 1960s), expanded into large-scale emergency-relief operations in the 1980s (when about half the population was receiving food aid and was settled in camps or within their proximity), and gradually evolved into the multilateral international cooperation approaches of today.

I spent a total of 14 months in Turkana between October 2015 and April 2017. I was doing research on local meanings of resilience based on the everyday stories and practices of my host families. I believed that there is a great deal to be learnt from the ways people negotiate their daily lives in the midst of overlapping challenges and recurrent shocks. Based on the above general depiction of Turkana, I unwittingly started fieldwork with three main preconceptions about life over there. First, I imagined a rather empty and homogeneous landscape, suffering from extreme ecological instability. Second, I assumed pastoralism to be close to an end, or no longer viable in the face of climate change and the increased frequency of droughts. Third, I expected people to be vulnerable to food insecurity and recurrent shocks, living at the edge of subsistence. And yet these preconceptions hardly reflected my experience with Turkana herders.

I now present the ways my initial preconceptions proved misleading, in the hope of illustrating the possibilities for more tailored development and humanitarian interventions which often cannot rely on prolonged experience in the field at direct contact with beneficiaries. The following reflections also serve to make the reader more familiar with the Turkana context, in order to better locate the next sections of the paper. The objective is to assess whether resilience interventions put in place by humanitarian and development agencies are responding to local specificities and needs.

Figure 1: Turkana County

3.1 Drylands: degraded or ecologically alive?

I arrived in Turkana with an idea of drylands as degraded lands, perhaps beautiful at sunset but not offering much more in terms of growth potential. Places where life is objectively difficult. To the contrary, far from being a surface where nothing happens, my hosts showed me a landscape which is alive. They taught me to see how earth and sky moved along with drifting clouds. They taught me how to find water flowing underground, and to see the seeds sailing into the wind and growing into new plants elsewhere. They taught me to observe livestock's and wild animals' footprints forming a complex labyrinth of hidden pathways. "The world continuously came into being" (Ingold, 2000, p 153). The liveliness of the landscape became fully evident to my eyes when we started moving around beyond homesteads and villages where my host families lived. I followed them as they split to herd livestock, or to attend weddings and other ceremonies, or to go to 'town' (bigger villages or Lodwar, the capital town of Turkana), or to visit distant relatives and friends. While crossing the territory I was able to observe the "coexistence heterogeneity" (Massey, 2005) of Turkana land, made of many intersected ecosystems, including plains and mountains, hills, piedmonts, sand dunes, flood plains, riverine sediments, drainage areas, lake shores, bushland, grasslands, forests, etc (Anderson & Johnson, 1988; Herlocker et al, 1994). That is, seen from an aerial photograph, Turkana County may look like a dull spot of desert, an arid savannah that welcomes only thorns and dust (Figure 2). Yet, by looking at the region from within, moving through it, far from being a flat homogeneous land, Turkana does not appear ecologically uniform.

Figure 2: Thorns and dust

Source: ©Greta Semplici.

Rather, Turkana is characterised by great variability, namely fast and unpredictable changes in vegetation structure, ground cover and precipitation, among other elements of the socio-ecological behaviour of

drylands. In this context, vegetation resources are not 'scarce', as commonly conceived, but they are unevenly distributed across a vast territory and mobile as they grow, wither and flower again in different places at different times, just as water does. Such variability has been proved to be extremely valuable when employed productively (Krätli, 2015), through, for example, herd flexibility, diversity and mobility (Fratkin, 1997), or more generally through a 'large-scale approach' to ecology, broadening the scale of analysis (and consequently also development intervention) beyond micro-niches to observe dynamics taking place at a larger regional level. By moving with Turkana herders, one sees signs that reveal the existence of connections among coexisting micro-zones. Tracks of birds, animals, people. The steps of excessively loaded donkeys. Printed trails of motorbikes. The criss-crossing spoors of hunted animals. The landscape is webbed with paths and footways. Development or humanitarian approaches to land and society which ignore such connectedness and heterogeneity of the landscape – for example by confining resource management within small-scale projects such as, borehole drilling, land demarcation mechanisation and irrigation schemes – risk not only being costly, but also counter-effective.[6] As argued by Emery Roe (2013, p 7): "The more mess [ie variability] there is, the more reliability decision makers want; but the more reliable we try to be, the more mess is produced".

Figure 3: Wells

Source: ©Greta Semplici.

In this context, the way time is experienced plays a crucial role in social dynamics and decision making. As I will show in the following sections, very often development and humanitarian interventions are designed around the notion of an 'event' and a timeline around which a staged series of risk management measures are deployed (see also Scoones & Nori, 2020). This is sometimes implicit in early warning

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[6] See discussion in Krätli (2015).

systems (EWS), disaster risk management (DRM), or livestock insurance mechanisms. In these approaches, time progresses linearly through stages marked by clocks,calendars, and subsequent lines of actions/events. My hosts instead taught me that the importance of time does not lie in its sequentiality; rather, the importance of time lies in its relationship with the territory and the landscape. Their understanding of time does not necessarily follow a linear progression of months/years; and therefore there is never a fixed 'November' identical to every other November in every other year and across the whole region. Rather, there is a moment in time when somewhere "*dry pods fall from trees, there is no rain, but a strong wind blows and most of trees remain without leaves*".[7]

Figure 4: Drifting clouds

Source: ©Greta Semplici.

This view of time implies that Turkana herders have a strong real-time experience of the landscape. Decision making is based on constant observations of the way land evolves and events occur, including precipitation and grass growth, food distribution, borehole drillings, or compensated focus groups. These are all elements which, like pasture, water and rain, offer additional opportunities. Households plan their days in order to gain the most from these unpredictable situations, depending on their internal family structure, needs and capacities (Semplici, 2020). Therefore, as suggested by Scoones and Nori (2020), the ordered and sequential time of crisis management favoured by development and humanitarian organisations could instead be articulated around a more complex flows of lived-with time in everyday life that is not so obviously punctuated by distinct events.

Observations about events in the territory and society are developed from within the landscape. Among

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[7] Focus Group Discussion, Lorengelup, Turkana Central, 11 November 2015.

Turkana herders, knowledge about their landscape is formed while trekking, when the environment is perceived along a path of observations. When knowledge is embodied in the place-to-place movement, it enables it to be triangulated and it is always subject to change. In navigating their landscape, Turkana herders engage with multiple sources of knowledge, which include experts' advice on pasture conditions or weather forecasts (appropriately provided by government or development agencies), but also involve referring to local knowledge (seers and elders), and to informally shared and locally rooted practical knowledge from friends, relatives and neighbours. In this way, knowledge is never monolithic, and it is never static, but perpetually reorganising around observations of an ever-changing and alive landscape. The type of knowledge which is fundamental for living in these environments is quickly adapting and quickly responding to changes in the surroundings.

How some progammes may miss the mark… (Part I)

Often development and humanitarian programmes treat drylands as degraded lands, inhospitable, and a source of vulnerability in terms of ecological instability. By spending time with people who inhabit these lands in the everyday, one learns that this is not always the case. Drylands are living lands, with resources and opportunities moving variably across vast surfaces and flourish when kept free to move. There is a danger for programmes that:

- hinder mobility across the landscape
- tie their actions to micro-scaled interventions ignoring processes and connections occurring at larger-scales
- are too inflexible in the face of the complex interplay of events taking place real-time
- limit the sources of knowledge to key representatives or external technical expertise

Such programmes risk attracting and confining people within circumscribed locations, progressively reducing their knowledge of the territory, and therefore the capacity to quickly observe and respond to what happens in the surrounding.

Figure 5: Observations

Source: ©Greta Semplici.

3.2 The end of pastoralism?

My second preconception at the beginning of fieldwork was that pastoralism was close to an end, and new sustainable livelihoods needed to be promoted and supported. This logic is implicit in resilience programmes, which have fully endorsed a livelihood language. It is nowadays widely accepted that, during crises (the domain of resilience programmes), livelihood-based strategies are important for both recovery and development (Lautze & Raven-Roberts, 2006). In these contexts, development and humanitarian agencies tend to sustain livelihoods in three main ways: adaptation (maintenance but modification of a core livelihood), diversification (activities added to a core livelihood), or alternative livelihoods (shift towards different livelihoods) (see also Catley, 2017). One implication and potential danger of these approaches is to think of people's lives in dichotomic terms according to an either/or logic: pastoralist or farmer,[8] pastoralist or salaried worker, pastoralist or fisherfolks, etc. While living with my host families, I learnt that their livelihoods hardly remain enclosed within the 'boxes' of their well specified categories: pastoralists, fisherfolks, urban dwellers, etc. Indeed, during fieldwork I saw fisherfolks with cows and pastoralists with shops; everybody had a small farm and did farming any time they could as long as there was some rain. These images are missing in some policy discourses, which represent livelihoods in isolation – in the case of pastoralists, as young men living in pristine wilderness in symbiosis with their animals, or destitute and vulnerable to the lack of rain and pasture. It is difficult to find representations of herders with fishing nets, or a hoe in their hands.

Observing the ways Turkana herders appropriate scattered resources, including cash and food transfers, tells an interesting story of active agency and constant rearticulation of one's own chief livelihood. This is sometimes identified as a symptom of underlying problems. Changing one's livelihood can be seen as a forced response to the stresses and failures of the existing ways of life: an act of coping, defined as a "temporary response to declining entitlements" (Davies, 1993). However, this logic does not consider positive forces that can drive change. First, there are broad factors such as rising aspirations, peer pressure or changing societal values (Carling & Schewel, 2018). There are also adaptations to local opportunities as they arise. For example, during my time with Turkana herders their migrations with livestock were not pushed by deteriorating local conditions but fostered by positive environmental changes somewhere else (land flourishing, increased precipitation, peaking nutrition values). Their mobility was a positive response to traits of their lived landscape (variability), and not merely coping. The same applies to movements in and out of other various forms of livelihood, which do not thus exist in isolation but rather operate as a 'mesh'.

How some progammes may miss the mark… (Part II)
Often development and humanitarian programmes treat livelihoods in isolation, with the goal to sustain, diversify, or transform them. The daily lives of my hosts showed instead the thick mesh of connections and relationships, moving back and forth, continuously navigating rising opportunities and costraints. There is a danger for programmes that: • fail to consider other, non-livestock, activities shaping pastoral livelihoods; • miss the connections and relationships between various livelihoods. Such programmes risk generating problems of representation (of a much more complex reality); and increase fragmentation by breaking connections which could emerge from adopting a larger-scale relational approach to livelihoods.

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[8] The category 'agro-pastoralism' also reproduces the dichotomy farmer–pastoralist and takes a 'boxy' view of people's lives.

Figure 6: A livelihood mesh

Source: ©Greta Semplici.

3.3 Vulnerability: who is vulnerable and to what?

My third preconception about Turkana was that I would meet vulnerable people, living at the edge of subsistence. To the contrary, during my time in Turkana I was exposed to a flipped narrative of vulnerability which attracted my attention. A great part of the vulnerability narrative in Turkana is linked to food insecurity (especially among herders). Indeed, many of the resilience programmes taking place in the region include a food component in their programming, either in the form of transfers, meal programmes or training in nutrition (see below). Food security is often used as a proxy for resilience, generally measured through standard indicators of nutritional values (caloric intake), dietary diversity and consumption scores (Barrett, 2010; Coates, 2013; De Haen et al; Qaim, 2011), while for Turkana herders, food means more than calorie intake: it is a construct of their identity.

Figure 7: Herding

Source: ©Greta Semplici.

The image of food-insecure herders was, in my eyes, replaced by one of endurance and the capacity to 'stay without'. From this perspective, it is town dwellers who are seen as vulnerable to the lack of food because they were incapable of 'staying without' it. The way Turkana people presented themselves through both narratives and everyday practices – including dietary, fashion and other convivial habits – led to the construction of local identities built around the feeling of belonging, as opposed to that of not belonging. Among rural herders in Turkana, one of the main elements of belonging is food, or better, 'no-food' (lack of, absence of food). Turkana herders have turned their vulnerability into a group survival-strategy (de Bruijn et al, 2001), on the basis of a sense of community. Through their hunger, they perform a distinctive collective Turkana (rural) identity of toughness and ecological situatedness that marks them apart from those they identify as the "lazy and weak town people", spoilt and vulnerable, always complaining, incapable of walking long distances, and only thinking about food. The rural Turkana dismiss "things of town", such as schools and "those modern ways to earn shillings … For us, it is all about animals and making *ng'akibuk* [sour milk] in *etwo* [gourd]".[9] These constructed identities remain nonetheless malleable and fluid in response to changes in society and opportunities. Turkana herders have acquired the skills to navigate the social world of their urban counterparts, by means of imitation, appropriation and adaptation through, for example, the incorporation of 'modern' cooking utensils (pots and cutlery), certain adornments (clocks and bracelets/earrings), or technologies (such as mobile phones) which do not strictly belong to the representation of Turkana (rural) identity. These adaptations and shifting identities are an important but subtle indicator of what is happening on the ground. They show changes in society and social dynamics. They demonstrate the acute capacities of locals to opportunistically engage with what is considered important and could hence become great informers about needs, wants, and aspirations.

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[9] Field note, conversation with old man, Turkana Central, 18 November 2016.

Figure 8: A radio in the homestead

Source: ©Greta Semplici.

In the resilience scholarship there is a growing emphasis on the integration of human and natural components in people's lives. Nonetheless, resilience accounts in development programmes often neglect the former, especially when it comes to the cultural traits of belonging and identity. Indeed, these are difficult elements to observe, requiring a shift of perspective which, as recommended at the end of this paper, needs time and freedom for exploration of the territory, ideally unconstrained by the immediate demands of development or humanitarian programming. Yet these are a fundamental part of people's resilience. While approaches that protect capitals and material assets during crises remain important, the realm of the immaterial – feelings of belonging/identity, relationships and cultural changes, adaptations and imitations – is also an important element for navigating the messiness of daily life, and could be more strongly integrated into development and humanitarian programmes.

Figure 9: Dancing in preparation for a wedding

Source: ©Greta Semplici.

An excessive attention to the crisis bypasses elements of everyday experience and ordinariness that provide insights for nuanced action. For example, the increasing distance between homesteads and water sources at times of drought is the result of a local algorithm measuring the water and grazing needs of livestock (and people) and increasing levels of insecurity around wells. Huts situated closer to water sources are more exposed to the danger of raids and attacks from the enemy. Thus, the usual kilometre distance to water, used as proxy for increasing vulnerability, is flipped on its head, reflecting a thorough knowledge of the territory built from within. Humanitarian policies can fail to account for the strain and fear of digging deeper and deeper wells around which families ally, share duties and information, and find conviviality. Investments in boreholes and mechanical pumps risk disrupting all of this, introducing new power dynamics around wells and translating into a form of emplacement which encloses people and livestock, as well as freezing the mobility and fluidity of the inhabited landscape.

My experience with Turkana herders ultimately turned over most of the notions and ideas I had arrived with prior to doing fieldwork. Many questions emerged: is resilience something about the qualities of some entities or systems? Is it about the *quid* (a question of what), or it is more about the *modus* (a question of how: how to design, intervene, deliver, manage assistance)? Should it always be associated with an emergency? And, since problems are 'local', should solutions come from the 'outside'? Should resilience promote emplaced development for a better controlled and steady growth, or should it let the environment, livelihoods, and identities remain mobile? These questions, brought me to believe that resilience, despite its long history, is still too nascent for a full application; or in the words of Korosteleva: "Are we sure we understand the concept of resilience well enough, to make full use of its arresting potential?" (2019:2).

How some progammes may miss the mark…Part III

Often development and humanitarian programmes treat rural livelihoods as vulnerable and precarious. However, my time with Turkana herders showed that another narrative is possible. By changing the vantage point, being in proximity to life in the drylands, perspectives change. Those identified as vulnerable are those who cannot sustain life in the drylands, those who suffer from the lack of food and water, those who are afraid of the sun. Town people are those who are vulnerable. It is a matter of perspective, but nonetheless it is important to keep it in mind. Otherwise the risk is overimposing needs and wants based on one own feeling when being 'out of place', out of the known territory. The construction of wells as the basis of any further development initiative may risk reflecting the thirst of the humanitarian agents, more than a felt need for permanent water. As I will describe later, the ecological and social (power dynamics) the implications of permanent water can reach far beyond the current need of water. Studying the local relation with water should be the necessary first step in order to understand whether it is an urgent need or not, or how it is best addressed (for instance, through temporary rather than permanent sources of water).

Figure 10: Back towards the kraal

Source: ©Greta Semplici.

In the following sections, I explore how resilience is applied programmatically by humanitarian and development agencies, in terms of programme design, implementation and evaluation. The goal is to try to understand how these agencies make sense of resilience in practice as part of their operations. I first give

an overview of the national context, before digging deeper into selected programmes implemented in Turkana.

4 Resilience policies

4.1 National resilience framework in Kenya

In common with other countries in the HoA, Kenya was severely affected by drought in 2010–11. An estimated 3.8 million people needed food, water and basic sanitation, and overall economic impacts were estimated at around US$12.1 billion; they included destruction of physical and durable assets, and losses in the flows of the economy across all sectors (Government of Kenya, 2012).

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) responded by strengthening the coordination and harmonisation of interventions in the HoA through the 15-year IDDRSI strategy, which was endorsed in February 2013 (see section 2). Following the Nairobi Summit held in September 2011, member states started developing Country Programming Papers (CPPs) for ending drought emergencies. These were used, in a subsequent phase, to formulate the Regional Programming Paper (RPP) for coordinated action.

Among all the member states, Kenya shifted towards the resilience agenda at the fastest pace (Carabine et al, 2015), focusing primarily on the ASALs in the northern counties. Indeed, in Kenya the process was facilitated by the adoption of a new Constitution and the initiation of devolution in 2010, which gave renewed powers to county governments, who could start mobilising resources for their development plans. Moreover, in addition to CPPs, various other acts pertaining to land, resources and national development funds were formulated to speed the process and strengthen commitments (including, Kenya Vision 2030; the Development Strategy for Northern Kenya and ASALs, also known as the ASALs' policy 2012; and the National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Northern Kenya 2012, also known as 'Sessional Paper n.8 2012').

In this policy framework, the main resilience investment in Kenya was the establishment of a National Safety Net Programme (NSNP), which consists of four cash transfer programmes: the Hunger and Safety Net Programme (HSNP), the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children Programme (CT-OVC), the Older Person Cash Transfer Programme (OPCT), and the Cash Transfer Programme for People with Severe Disability (CT-PWSD). The latter three programmes function at the national scale, while HSNP focuses on four counties in the ASALs. Overall, the identification of these programmes as part of the resilience agenda in Kenya shows how resilience is programmatically associated with social protection measures, a link which is intuitive; however, Levine and Mosel (2014) explain that it is not entirely simple. Social protection measures are in fact interchangeably promoted as 'components' of, or 'vehicles' for, resilience, which create a sort of 'dependent-resilience' (sustained by transfers) or 'independent-resilience' (eventually freeing people from dependency on aid by accumulating assets). It thus remains unclear what the ultimate objective of resilience interventions actually is when presented through social protection interventions. Additionally, in either view, resilience is in this way linked with the capacity to build assets back after a crisis. In the case of cash transfers, these work as virtual assets which can be saved or replaced with material needs at occurance. Thus, through this approach resilience is confined to its most tangible forms –

substitute assets.

A second major investment in resilience was directed toward the creation of a National Drought Management Authority (NDMA), which replaced a previous EU/World Bank-funded project, the Arid Land Resource Management Project. NDMA currently plays a crucial role in the management of drought related response and drought preparedness. It administers HSNP, county-level Early-Warning Systems (EWS), and the National Drought Contingency Fund (EU-funded) to quickly respond to emergencies in accordance with EWS recommendations. Work on resilience is in this way embedded within disaster planning, giving prominence to risk-informed monitoring and analysis, and institutional capacity building.

Finally, the more direct reference to resilience is through the national Ending Drought Emergency (EDE) strategy (2012–22), which integrates the guidelines set through IDDRSI and focuses on the 23 most drought-prone counties in Kenya. It is implemented through the CPP and designed around six pillars: peace and security, climate-proof infrastructure, human capital, sustainable development, drought-risk management, and institutional development and knowledge management. Many agencies and donors have tied their programming to EDE, such as Support Horn of Africa Resilience (EU), the Partnership for Resilience and Economic Growth (PREG/USAID) and Building Resilience in Northern Kenya (DFID). Some of these are discussed in more detail in the next section, which focuses on resilience programming in Turkana County.

4.2 County resilience framework: Turkana

When the 2010–11 crisis hit the HoA region and the resilience agenda was defined for the nation, Turkana County received the largest share of the EDE funds, with over $220 million-worth of projects invested in the region since 2011. However, operations in the field did not significantly change from the past. As I will show, resilience may have brought changes at policy and organisational level, in terms of the adoption of a new language, emergence of a more holistic vision, mission, and composite principles. Additionally, as discussed in the sections that follow, resilience has also contributed to adjustments in organisational structures, through the creation of departments, specialised teams and new mechanisms for fund mobilisation. Nevertheless, the following pages will demonstrate that resilience is not yet being translated into new practices in the field nor, more broadly, into new mechanisms of governance.

Below I present some of the programmes implemented in Turkana as part of the resilience agenda. After a short introduction on the resilience commitments of each agency, I provide the reader with a concise record of resilience-related interventions in the region. For each agency, I then select one of their programmes and describe in more detail its underlying rationale and goals, spelling out the main activities supported, and the evaluation method chosen to assess the resilience components. While doing so, I discuss the emerging underlying logic of resilience thinking highlighted by the programmes selected. I make no attempt to evaluate these programmes, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, this review serves to assess how agencies and donors understand resilience programmatically and to what extent we can observe changes in the ways the international community is responding to the paradigm shift invoked by the resilience agenda.

The selection of the agencies discussed in the following sections concentrates on the largest donors contributing to the resilience agenda in Turkana (EU, USAID, DFID), which reflect, as per Figures 11 and 12, the general trend in investments at national level.

Figure 11: Major donors in Turkana (2016)

Source: Author's elaboration with data from the Resilience Tracking Tool.[10]

Figure 12: Major donors in Kenya (2017)

Source: EUFT Annual report 2018.

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[10] A platform implemented through the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to map all resilience-labelled interventions in Kenya. It remained operational until 2017, but has since been closed.

The European Union

The use of resilience within the EU's strategy was brought to policy prominence by the European Commission through the Communication Paper 'Learning from Food Security Crises' (EU, 2012), which indicated principles and priorities for the EU's resilience agenda. The goal of the Communication Paper was to enhance the effectiveness of the EU's interventions by making resilience a central pillar of assistance in situations of recurrent crises through the alignment of humanitarian and development teams. The Communication Paper made recommendations to embed resilience into policies addressing food security, climate change adaptation and DRR, and it identified "anticipation, prevention and preparedness, and enhancing crises response" as key policy principles for the resilience strategy. The EU approach to resilience was further elaborated in the EU Global Strategy (EU, 2016), which identified strengthening state and societal resilience as part of a transformational agenda for facing a rapidly changing global environment. As a result, the resilience language became fully governmentalised, prioritising security and aiming to make "predictable unpredictability" (Korosteleva, 2019, p 2).

Resilience as Defined by the EU

Ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, to adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks (EU 2012, p 5)

A broad concept encompassing all individuals and the whole of society that features democracy, trust in institutions and sustainable development, and the capacity to reform (EU 2016:24)

The way forward in both policy papers (the Communication Paper and the Global Strategy) was guided by the corresponding Action Plan (EU, 2013) and the Strategic Approach 2017 (EU, 2017). The Action Plan directed the EU's resilience action towards three main areas: supporting the development and implementation of national resilience approaches (consolidation of existing sectoral or thematic EU resilience programmes); innovation, learning and advocacy (understanding what works and why, also with strong monitoring and evaluation systems and selection-appropriate indicators); and creating methodologies and tools to support resilience (tools for joint humanitarian/development planning, methods of risk assessment, flexible financial mechanisms, and approaches to resilience measurement). These recommendations were expanded in the Strategic Approach 2017 to also address state, societal and community resilience, and to place greater emphasis on addressing protracted crises, risks of violent conflict and other structural pressures like environmental degradation, climate change, migration and forced displacement (EU, 2017, p 4).

What does this mean in practice? The EU committed to short-term responses as the first recovery steps after a crisis, including joint humanitarian/development analytical frameworks (greater collaboration between the Commission's Diectorate-General for International Cooperation and Development, DEVCO, and the Directorate-General for European Civili Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, ECHO), life-saving activities (provision of seeds and tools, improved water management and restocking of herds), and short-term funding to support agricultural and livestock production, nutrition, livestock health, water supplies and natural resource management. In addition, the EU increased efforts to create longer-term responses by reinforcing its partnership with regional and national actors. In the HoA, this meant endorsing IGAD's resilience strategy by, for example, allying with other bilateral donors in the Global Alliance for Resilience and Growth committed to better coordinating, harmonising and aligning programmes. The EU's largest contribution within this framework is the programme Support Horn of Africa Resilience (SHARE), a €270 million package aimed at improving the ability of people, communities and countries to face recurrent

emergencies. It includes a number of initiatives, ranging from the treatment of severe malnutrition to improved management of natural resources, to livestock health and trade, agriculture (small-scale irrigation), alternative income- generating activities and basic services (water, sanitation).

In addition, following its creation in 2015, the EUTF was commissioned to undertake comprehensive initiatives in support of stability, security and resilience in the region. Filtering the EUTF's action for resilience-labelled interventions (strategic goal 2) implemented in Turkana, its resilience efforts have translated into the following programmes (for full details, see Annex 1):

- Delivering durable solutions to forced displacement in the IGAD region through the implementation of the global compact on refugees;
- Enhancing self-reliance for refugees and host communities;
- Piloting Private Sector Solutions for Refugees and Host Communities in Northwest Kenya;
- the Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) in Kenya: Support to the Kalobeyei Development Programme;
- Strengthening the ability of IGAD to promote resilience in the Horn of Africa;
- Moving Towards Free Movement and Transhumance in the IGAD region;
- Collaboration in Cross-border Areas of the Horn of Africa.

What stands out from this list of programmes is its stronger focus on displacement and refugees, perhaps mainly because of the greater mission of the Trust Fund to understand and provide assistance to (forced) migrants. Nevertheless, this is not the most obvious setting to support community resilience. Some of these programmes do include a host community component which however has been shown as a contested and fragile concept requiring more scrutiny (Rodgers 2020).

Regional Development and Protection Programme in Kenya: Support to the Kalobeyei Development Programme (RDPP - Kalobeyei Development Programme)

Because of its recent completion at the time of writing this paper, I outline the RDPP – Kalobeyei Development programme. Contracted in July 2016, the programme has recently concluded its implementation phase (36 months). Funded by the EUTF for a total budget of €15 million and indirectly managed by UNHCR in co-operation with the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP), as well as a number of NGOs as implementing parties, it was part of an ongoing longer-term multi-agency plan (14 years) to develop the local economy and service delivery of an integrated settlement area for refugees and host communities in Kalobeyei (Kalobeyei Integrated Social and Economic Development Plan (KISEDP). Designed around four key components (education and child protection, health, livelihoods and resilience, coordination and outreach), it contributes to the EUTF's overall work in the HoA, particularly for the strategic objectives 1, 2, and 4.[11]

Following the principles of government ownership, community participation, and evidence-based design,

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[11] (1) Greater economic and employment opportunities; (2) Strengthening resilience of communities and in particular the most vulnerable including refugees and other displaced people;; (4) Improved governance and conflict prevention and reduction of forced displacement and irregular migration.

the following activities have been supported by the project (Table 1).

Table 1: Activities supported by RDPP – Kalobeyei Development Programme

Code	Activity
1.1	Establishment of a 'super'-health centre which will incorporate infant and maternal health care services
1.2	Full integration of Kalobeyei health services into the Turkana country health service
1.3	Capacity building for health staff
2.1	Assessment of viability of large scale in-situ agricultural production
2.2	Development and implementation of farmer/pastoralist and junior field school activities
2.3	Improvements to three irrigation infrastructures
2.4	Training of farmers in efficient management of irrigation schemes, conservation agriculture, trade and markets
2.5	Rehabilitation of land and development of water-harvesting structures
2.6	Development of a sustainable fuel wood and fodder value chain
3.1	Support for national and county-level systems to provide sustainable education services
3.2	Renovation and construction of schools and enhancement of the learning infrastructure
3.3	Targeted recruitment and training of teachers
3.4	Government-owned Home-Grown School Meals Programme (HGSMP)
4.1	Development and implementation of a Child Protection Information Management System
4.2	Provision of child-centred livelihood support initiatives
5.1	Establishment of a local supply chain to the school meals programme
5.2	Development of a retailer engagement strategy
5.3	Provision of (vocational) training and apprenticeships in business, entrepreneurship and skills development
6.1	Implementation plan for Phase 2 of the KISEDP
6.2	Ongoing conflict resolution and community outreach
6.3	Development and implementation of a community outreach and advocacy strategy
6.4	Participatory mechanism for the design, monitoring and management of the settlement programme

Evaluation of the programme is part of the single monitoring and evaluation model used for all EUTF-funded projects to ensure consistency within its broad action (EUTF result framework). The choice of specific indicators provides some further indication of how resilience is understood in practice. Indeed, it shows how resilience is translated programmatically beyond overarching goals. For the RDPP Kalobeyei Development Programme, while its final evaluation is forthcoming, Table 2 shows the indicators listed in the Action Fiche for the sub-objective (SO) with more direct reference to resilience (EUTF, 2016).

Table 2: RDPP – Kalobeyei Development Programme, Monitoring and Evaluation Indicators (SO5)

Code	Objective	Indicator
SO5	Economic resilience and wellbeing are improved in the target area	• % increased food sales by local small-scale traders and farmers • Change in sales for actors along the value chain (%) • Change in profit margins for actors along the value chain (%) • Change in market integration in the refugee camps and surrounding communities • Multiplier effects of the cash transfer programmes (school meals and cash transfers) • Proportion of targeted traders employing additional staff in their businesses • Proportion of food supplied by local producer to schools and refugee camps • Change in number of producers ranked medium-high or high marketing capacity • Change in prices (and price volatility) of key food commodities • Change in the proportion of retailers with business licences and health inspections • # of persons of concern (PoC) provided with guidance on business market opportunities • # of PoC provided with entrepreneurship/business training • # of small business associations formed/supported • # of persons provided with financial literacy training for livelihood purposes • # of persons enrolled in apprenticeships/on-the-job training • # of businesses registered • # of persons enrolled in vocational institutions receiving certified skills training • # of persons or business associations provided with grants or loans

The 'proxy' approach to the measurement of resilience (namely the identification of observable, and therefore measurable, outputs taken as signifiers for people's resilience), reveals the EUTF's underlying logic of resilience-thinking. As it emerges, resilience is programmatically associated with *economic and livelihood opportunities* (income-generating activities, including business activities but also cash transfers and financial loans, alternative livelihoods and behavioural changes towards sedentary activities) and it is further linked with reduced dependence on humanitarian assistance to gain *self-reliance*. A strong link has also emerged between resilience and *nutrition practices*, to be improved thanks to junior farming schools, irrigation infrastructure and localised marketing systems. Finally, there is also a significant *education component* associated with 'building resilience', through literacy, training and certification.

USAID

Resilience for USAID

The ability of people, households, countries and systems to mitigate, adapt to, and recover from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates growth (USAID, 2012, p 5)

Drawing from experience in the Horn and IGAD's response to the HoA crisis in 2010–11, USAID launched its first policy and programme guidance on 'Building Resilience to Crisis' in 2012. With this policy paper, USAID committed to resilience, emphasising the need for closer collaboration between humanitarian and development teams by "layering, integrating, and sequencing" the two types of assistance (humanitarian and development). Focusing on places where chronic poverty and exposure to shocks and stresses intersect, USAID has not mainstreamed resilience across its global action, but preferred to concentrate on

geographical areas of intervention, namely in the HoA, the Sahel, and South and Southeast Asia, through Country Development Cooperation Strategies (see, for example, USAID, 2014 for the Kenyan case). Additionally, to coordinate resilience efforts, USAID established a senior-level Resilience Leadership Council, a Centre for Resilience, the position of Resilience Coordinator and a network of Resilience Focal Points.

USAID has also led efforts towards measuring impacts of resilience interventions, such as those of the Food and Nutrition Security Resilience Measurement Technical Working Group. For its own programming, USAID presented a set of topline indicators in its policy guidance paper; these include diversity of livelihood strategies, assets and social networks; propensity for household savings; financial opportunities; and a reduction in humanitarian assistance needs. These indicators are added to "more traditional development ones", as referred to in the policy paper, such as those related to income, food security and nutrition (depth of poverty, moderate to severe hunger, and global acute malnutrition).

The programmes and projects under USAID's resilience agenda follow the guidelines set in the policy papers. In Kenya, USAID's programmes were anchored to Ending Drought Emergency (EDE), and include:

- Constitution of the 'Technical Consortium for Building Resilience to Drought in the HoA' ($2 million grant), hosted by the International Livestock Research Institute, which was heavily involved in the preparation of the CPP and RPP, bringing together relevant research and academic organisations to strengthen the knowledge base for resilience programming.

- Establishment of the Horn of Africa Resilience Network (HoRN), formerly known as the Joint Planning Cell (JPC), where integrated teams of humanitarian and development experts began working together. The overall goal of these cells, piloted in Kenya, Ethiopia and East African Missions, was to directly benefit ten million people and reduce the region's emergency caseload by one million people within five years (2012–17), with around 45 projects funded in the whole region.[12] In Kenya, it operates under the Partnership for Resilience and Economic Growth (PREG), which, with over $360 million in investments, includes programmes like:

    o Resilience and Economic Growth in the Arid Lands-Improving resilience (REGAL-IR);

    o Resilience and Economic Growth in the Arid Lands-Accelerated Growth (REGAL-AG);

    o World Food Programme Cash and Food for Assets Programmes;

    o AIDS, Population and Health Integrated Assistance (APHIAplus) Integrated Marginal Arid Land Regions Innovative Socialized Health Approach;

    o Kenya Arid Lands Disaster Risk Reduction – WASH Programme;

    o Support for the Northern Rangeland Trust.

- Foundation of the Global Resilience Partnership (a $150 million initiative, supported together with the Rockefeller Foundation and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)) to coordinate both resilience investments and knowledge creation in focus regions (HoA, Sahel, South and Southeast Asia).

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[12] Interview with USAID representative, Nairobi, October 2016.

Resilience and Economic Growth in the Arid Lands–Improving Resilience programme (REGAL-IR)

I will now outline the (REGAL–IR) programme, chosen because of its extensive reach in Turkana, in terms of geographical coverage and number of beneficiaries involved. REGAL–IR was contracted in August 2012, for a duration of five years (2012–17). It brings togetherthe Government of Kenya, county governments and NDMA, Kenya Agriculturale Research Institute (KARI) and is implemented by African Development Solutions, ADESO, and its five consortium partners (Community Owned Financial Institutions, COFI, Gloval Alliance for Improved Nutrition, GAIN, Sidai Africa Ltd, Finn Church Aid, and VSF-Suisse). With a budget of $45.5 million, REGAL–IR aims to improve the business capacities of individual and community enterprises; support access to livestock sector inclusiveness through market linkages; support community structures that improve management of natural resources; strengthen community capacity to resolve conflicts; strengthen community capacity to cope with drought and other ecological shocks; and improve consumption of nutritious foods. The programme takes place in five target counties (Garissa, Isiolo, Marsabit, Turkana and Wajir), selected because they were most severely affected by the HoA crisis in 2011.

Activities were designed through a strategic planning process known as Participatory Learning, Planning and Action (PLPA) which includes mapping local resources, identifying opportunities and challenges, and prioritising development needs. This process led to the formulation of Community Development Action Plans (CDAP), which defined actions in the target areas. In the case of Turkana, the programme's activities were implemented in 11 wards, reaching a total of 39,259 households. Activities included:

- creation of self-help groups which were supported with training courses on business and financial management and given credit through a Community Resilience Empowerment Fund (CREF);
- training for agro-pastoralists on new technologies for irrigation infrastructure (cemented canals);
- vocational training for individuals (in particular boat making, tailoring and hairdressing);
- training on fodder management, selection, use and preservation;
- construction of poultry houses, starter stocks and poultry feed;
- sale of vetinary drugs and vaccines;
- community mapping of grazing lands and land use plans (demarcation of wet and dry season grazing);
- development of drought contingency plans (schools clubs on drought responses, spreading of EWS, livestock insurance).

The programme's activities also included:
- comprehensive focused ethnographic surveys and *Optifood* research to identify gaps and opportunities for nutritious diets for pastoralists' families;
- conflict assessments for each county.

The evaluation of activities under REGAL–IR was merged with the impact evaluation of another USAID-funded programme (Feed the Future FEEDBACK). It relied on baseline, interim and end-line population surveys which included five resilience measures: households' perceived recovery from last drought; livelihood outcome indicators; social capital; adaptive capacity; asset sales and recovery (Table 3).

Table 3: REGAL–IR resilience indicators

Households' perceived recovery: % household affected; did not recover; recovered but worse than before; recovered to same level; recovered and better than before.

Livelihood outcomes: Mean number of livelihood activities; livestock production; sale of livestock; relief; wages; borrowing; self-employment; crop sale; crop production; wld product trade; salaried work; wild food consumption; gifts; remittances; fishing; hunting, mining; barter trade, raiding; inheritance.

Social capital: Household able to rely on others during the last drought.

Adaptive capacity: Household ability to cope with and manage through future drought or stress; unable to cope; able to cope but with less money or food; able to cope without difficulties; household view of destiny; each person responsible for their successes.

Asset sale and recovery: Household sold large part of productive assets because of shock; household sold small productive assets because of shock. |

As it emerges from the selection of indicators, as well as from the list of specific activities funded, USAID's underlying logic of resilience-thinking concentrates around the *role of communities* in consultation (PLPA, CADP, availability of resources) and delivery of assistance. Resilience is further linked with a *reduction in dependency* on external aid while promoting *economic growth and livelihood diversification*, especially through incentives to abandon herding for other businesses, farming and poultry raising. There also emerges a conceptualisation of resilience in terms of *resource management* and demarcation of grazing lands. In addition, resilience is strongly associated with *disaster planning*, *information systems and insurance mechanisms*, through training courses on early warning, response plans and compensation. A final programmatic takeaway from USAID's understanding of resilience is its direct connection with the consumption of *nutritious food* and households' diet, and *conflict management*.

DFID

Resilience for DFID
Ability of countries, communities and households to manage change, by maintaining or transforming living standards in the face of shocks or stresses – such as earthquakes, drought or violent conflict – without compromising their long-term prospects (DFID, 2012b, p 6)

DFID's resilience framework of action is extensive. DFID turned towards resilience thinking in 2011 in light of the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR) (DFID, 2011a), which recommended that resilience should be placed at the centre of DFID's planning around disasters. DFID responded by defining its approach to resilience in several consecutive policy papers. The Approach Paper ('Defining Disaster Resilience') was developed to inform the next operational phases after the review (DFID, 2012b). It presents DFID's views on resilience, defining the focus areas for resilience

interventions (DRR, climate change and social protection), principles of resilience and examples of resilience programmes underway. The DFID Business Plan (DFID, 2012a) set minimum standards for resilience operations and committed DFID to embedding resilience first in eight countries (by 2013) and then in all Country Offices (by 2015). Three Disaster Resilience Advisers (DRAs) were appointed to support County Offices in this process and each County Office designated an2 Office Champion for disaster resilience as part of the embedding process. Finally, the Humanitarian Policy ('Saving Lives, Preventing Suffering and Building Resilience') (DFID, 2011b) outlines how the UK will help build resilience through a combination of humanitarian, development and political action. It gives priority to seven goals, the second one being: "to build the resilience of individuals, communities, and countries to withstand shocks and recover from them". Beyond the tautology of 'building resilience *by building resilience'*, the Humanitarian Policy explains that this implies investments in social, economic, environmental, political and physical planning (infrastructure, human capacities, support to communities and governments, anticipation); reinforcement of linkages between humanitarian and development teams; and coordination with all partners, including NGOs, the UN and governments.

The programmes under DFID's resilience framework are tied to these guidelines. DFID refers to the "asset pentagon" from the Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF) to classify resilience-enhancing activities, thus promoting activities that provide social, human, financial–economic, technological– physical, political, and environmental and natural assets. To increase the effectiveness of interventions, DFID places emphasis on building links between the delivery of social services, DRR, social protection and emergency response, and on creating the conditions for economic growth. In Turkana, DFID's Building Resilient Livelihoods in North Kenya programme is a good example of an integrated package based on those synergies. It was anchored to the national EDE strategy, and included the following key initiatives and projects, among others:

- Hunger and Safety Net Program (HSNP);
- Arid Lands Support Programme (ASP);
- Market Access for Poor Populations (MAP);
- Kenya Nutrition Support Transition Programme.

Arid Lands Support Programme (ASP)

Because of the available grey literature about the programme, for this rapid review I outline the ASP. ASP was implemented between 2012 and 2016, for a total budget of £14.3 million. It reunited several partners, including a number of NGOs as implementers (BOMA[13], Concern, Oxfam, Save the Children, Solidarités International, Trocaire, World Vision). The programme aimed to make vulnerable communities resilient to drought and other climatic shocks. In particular, it wanted to improve coping strategies for over 500,000 of the poorest people in northern Kenya (Turkana, Wajir, Mandera and Marsabit counties) to help them adapt to climate change and improve their livelihoods.

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[13] The Boma Project, non-profit organisation

Activities were designed to complement HSNP, developing sustainable livelihoods next to safety nets and emergency cash transfers for the most vulnerable. Activities broadly included:
- expansion of the Index Based Livestock Insurance mechanism for poor pastoralists;
- support for livestock destocking in advance of drought;
- improve fodder management and storage;
- support for veterinary services;
- building community assets (water storage).

Evaluation of activities under ASP fed into a common monitoring and evaluation framework used for both ASP and HSNP. Three distinct types of data were collected as the basis for analysing the impacts of the ASP projects, namely on qualitative benefits, quantitative benefits and quantitative costs, overall defining a community-based cost–benefit analysis (CBCBA) methodology. Benefit–cost ratios were generated using quantitative benefits data and costs data. Key costs are those associated with the intervention being examined, including both costs incurred by the organisation implementing the intervention and any in-kind costs incurred by the target communities. Benefits were identified during focus-group discussions with targeted communities to ensure these were significant to them. Subjective rankings, developed by the consultant contracted for the evaluation, were also specified for each prioritised project activity, based on the range of quantitative and qualitative evidence gathered, in order to convey a sense of the overall impact of the activity. The key focus of CBCBA was assessing the efficacy of interventions aiming to build community resilience to these shocks. The choice of variables of interest for the evaluation remained specific to each project or resilience activity implemented. Ultimately, however, most of the activities analysed can be categorised as income-generating activities, since they delivered tangible quantifiable benefits to communities (easier to measure) – in turn limiting resilience assessment to *income factors* and *economic growth*.

Overall, the key programmatic aspects of resilience actions in Turkana by DFID and its implementer partners can be summarised as:
- raising incomes of vulnerable communities (pastoralists);
- natural resource management;
- livestock production and value-addition;
- livelihood diversification.

4.3 Emerging key messages on resilience policies

From this rapid review of resilience programmes in the HoA, and in Turkana County more particularly, there emerge some key messages about how resilience is understood and applied in practice by the aid/development industry.

First, some changes have occurred as part of the resilience agenda, mainly for what concerns design and evaluation phases of programming (as well as the internal structure of the organisation and funding mechanisms). Both design and evaluation seem to have turned more strongly towards quantification. Design, for instance in the case of PLPA or for RDPP, privileges evidence-based approaches and is based on community participation in the identification of vulnerabilities and/or local needs. Evaluation tends to be adjusted to a selection of indicators, which are not markedly

different from previously adopted survey indicators but are more closely associated with resilience values. The actions and projects proposed are instead similar to what was designed and implemented before the mastery of the resilience agenda (training, transfers, services and infrastructure). By tweaking language and by relabelling, past interventions are brought under the resilience umbrella. On the one hand, changes at institutional level, or as part of design and evaluation phases, may lead to think that the way resilience is understood by the aid sector is in terms of *governance of aid/development programmes*, rather than of the actual content of interventions. This is potentially an interesting approach to resilience. Indeed, as proposed by some, resilience could work as a tool to make governance more adaptive, flexible and embracing of complexity (see, for example, Korostoleva, 2019). However, this is not the case yet. In the programmes reviewed, general governance ultimately remained anchored to sequential views of development through linear phasing and externalisation of interventions, as discussed below, limiting the potential of resilience as governance thinking. Let me explain this idea further through the second and third key message.

A second key message about resilience programming is that its dominant operationalisation lies in the field of *disaster planning*. The new resilience agenda largely operates as a risk-management exercise, in which the 'local' (individuals, households, communities, institutions) is often framed as vulnerable to incoming shocks. Resilience is thus associated with establishing anticipatory mechanisms in preparation for the next approaching crises. This gives prominence to *information*, *monitoring and insurance systems*, modelling a crisis response system which is linear, ordered, sequential. This approach tends to treat disasters as isolated episodes and refers to 'the crisis' as the main conceptual framework to explain people's behaviour. The event or shock takes central stage in most of the programmes reviewed (ie displacement for RDPP, conflict and drought for REGAL-IR, or climatic shocks for ASP), in which local behaviour and theories of change are discussed in the "shadows of the crisis" (Bakewell & Bonfiglio, 2013). As a result, resilience operates as a "discourse of survival" (Jasanoff, 2008), yet under a self-reliance agenda. The centrality of the crisis in resilience interventions reflects equilibrium thinking rooted in engineering and classical ecology traditions, from which 'bouncing' is framed as ideal. In the programmes reviewed, the emphasis moves from maintaining the status quo, returning to normal (I refer to this as a reductive approach) – 'bouncing back', to managing change and thriving from crises (which I refer to as a transformative approach) – 'bouncing forward'. Both the reductive and transformative approaches imply an idea of progress as a linear path. The rationale behind is that, once normality has recovered from the disturbing element of the crisis, by bouncing back or bouncing forward, a steady progress will unfold while poverty ends (Levine, 2012). The underlying problem of this approach to development is to be based on lienear planning , while the world we inhabit is largely 'messy' (Roe, 2013; Scoones, 2019), and hence governance should become messy too (as similiraly discussed by Law, 2004, 2007 about social science research methodology in a messy world).

A third key message lies in a *threefold programmatic approach* to disaster, which is recognisable in the programmes put in place as part of the resilience agenda in the HoA. These approaches share the view that shocks and stressors fundamentally threaten three basic aspects of people's lives: the *environment*, *livelihoods* and *personal or societal safety*. Consequently, these become typical areas

of resilience operationalisation, as follows:

1. protection of the environment, ecosystem rehabilitation, provision of environmental services, natural resources management, land use and infrastructure development;
2. promotion of sustainable livelihoods, training, livelihood diversification, DRR/DRM and provision of productive assets;
3. social protection services like emergency cash/food/asset transfers, and security nets.

Under this threefold programmatic approach, some interventions are characterised by what has been defined as "externalisation of resilience" (Korosteleva, 2019, p 6), namely an *outsider/insider duality*: outsiders (governments, development agencies, etc) propose solutions to solve local (insider) problems, such as limited capacities and skills, lack of knowledge, dysfunctional institutions, stagnant markets, etc. For example, capacity building activities, rehabilitation of water harvesting or of irrigation infrastructure part of RDPP, training for agro-pastoralists part of REGAL-IR, or improving fodder storage part of ASP without full participation of users and beneficiaries risks missing a grounded inisight over the issue at stake and reproduce top down approaches to development with goals and objectives set from afar instead of rising from within. Inverting the direction of development starting from local conditions (rather then towards specific goals) may contribute to bringing up and louder the voices and perspectives of those who are to be helped. Moreover, proposed solutions, because of time and resources constraints, tend to favour *single*, *simplified and technological knowledge* (sophisticated forecasting systems or satellite monitoring, with user-friendly online mobile interfaces) (Scoones & Nori, 2020); for example EWS, finger print distributions, livestock insurances, GPS land demarcations.

Conversely, as shown in section 3, knowledge production among Turkana herders is the result of a complex process, constituted of many actors and made up of numerous sources of observations. Interventions proposed, in addition, tend to be characterised by the *tangibility and measurability of interventions*. The reference to the asset pentagon by DFID makes this most clear, but it is equally implicit in otherr programmes revised, as indeed most interventions focus on things or assets or their associated values (including virtual assets in the case of cash transfers). In contradistinction, in section 3, we spoke of the importance of relationships, identities and socio-cultural adaptation to changes in society – which constitute immaterial elements that greatly help forge the communities we aim to support. Finally, most interventions assume and aim to achieve a certain level of *stability and uniformity*. Linked to equilibrium thinking, mentioned above, the project activities reviewed are aiming to achieve stable conditions of growth and development (experienced equally by all members of targeted 'communities') to allow people to stay put, by providing a predictable, safe and continuous supply of various resources (water, cash, food, fodder, etc) and by building fixed/permanent infrastructure.

This approach to development presents two main problems. First, as discussed above, it is at odds with the fundamental variable and 'messy' world we inhabit, which makes forecasting and measures of control almost impossible, costly and counter-effective (Krätli, 2015; Law, 2007).[14] Second, it

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[14] See discussion in section 3.

tends to assume that communities (sometimes labelled as host communities) are pre-existing homogeneous entities, while they are often very heterogeneous, fragmented, and fragile collectivities (Rodgers, 2020). In some cases, they may have only coalesced into an identifiable group in order to receive aid or development, to then quickly disperse when this ends. This happened during my sojourn in a village close to the border with Uganda. More than once different development agency sent representatives for consulatations with the community or for the delivery of specific assets/goods to community members. As commonly seen in rural areas, information about their arrival spread rapidly and the agencies' representatives were welcomed by larger groups than those normally living in the specific site. The demographics and shapes of the village and the 'host community' were perfomatively transformed and remodelled. They were making themselves legible for the incoming aid by forming a 'provisional or transitory community'.

I now conclude this paper by highlighting clashes and emerging gaps in communication between the resilience practices and policies discussed in this rapid review, as a first step towards a possible reconciliation – for which I provide some recommendations. However, bridging outsiders' and insiders' views of resilience remains the major task ahead of us, if we care that the resilience agenda should truly bring some changes in the humanitarian and development architecture.

5 Conclusions and recommendations: how to reconcile policies and local practices, and why?

This rapid review has shed light on some shared elements of resilience interventions in the humanitarian and development landscape of the Horn of Africa, particularly looking at programmes implemented in Turkana County, and how these are subject to possibly different interpretations if one changes the vantage point and adopts a local perspective. I have summarised these divergent opinions in Table 4.

Bridging these viewpoints is, to be sure, not an easy task, especially considering the legacies of the aid industry. It is nonetheless of paramount importance to make this effort. Without adopting a critical understanding of resilience in practical terms, the status quo in development operations will be maintained. Operationally, this implies turning resilience into a risk-management exercise, characterised by a strong duality between the 'insider' (whose problems need to be solved) and the 'outsider' (proposing external solutions) and risking to deny local agency, thereby negating the very meaning of resilience. Under these circumstances, the obvious question is: why resilience? Why setting up a whole new language, without initiating substantive changes in the architecture of the development sector?

Indeed, resilience has been strongly criticised (Brand & Jax, 2007; Chandler & Coaffee, 2015; Pugh, 2014; Scott-Smith, 2018). Nonetheless, it occurs to me that a 'post-resilience' era is still far ahead of us, as resilience continues to dominate policy discourses. This gives us the opportunity to reconceptualise resilience as something more significant to the lives of the people we are studying and working with.

Table 4: Elements of resilience - a twofold perspective

Shared element of resilience	Emerging development approach	Local view and response
Governance of aid programmes	Changes in organisational structures, institutional bodies, design and evaluation phases of programming. Notion of an 'event' and a timeline around which a staged series of risk management measures is designed. These measures typically operate according to linear phasing and sequential stages of interventions, monitoring/evaluation, and rolling-out of a programme or its completion.	Real-time management strategies and decision making based on articulated knowledge and continuous observation/shared information at large scale to benefit the most from variability. Complex flows of lived-with time.
Emergency planning/disaster management	Information, monitoring and insurance systems dominate. The local is framed as vulnerable and subject to recurrent disasters seen as isolated events. The crisis is the main conceptual framework for explaining people's behaviour and resilience operates as a 'discourse of survival'. Progress is described linearly through stages to bounce forwards or back.	Embeddedness of crisis. Life is not confined to an exercise of crisis management (building relationships, trading, hosting visitors…). The future is embedded into the variability and messiness of daily life. Hence progress implies being able to forage, incorporate and adapt to what is perceived as an opportunity, remaining attentive to what else is happening and always ready to re-adapt.
Externalisation	External solution proposed to internal problems, favouring sophisticated, single and often scientific knowledge.	Diverse, real-time, rooted knowledge (awareness from within). Heterogeneity of responses based on diverse aspirations and rising contingencies (corresponding to socioeconomic variability).
Tangibility/output- and asset-oriented interventions	Preference towards things and assets or their associated values (including virtual assets in the case of cash transfers).	Importance of cultural dimensions of identities, solidarity and relationships at large geographical and economic scale.
Stability and uniformity	Achieve stable conditions of growth and emplacement by predictable, safe and continuous supply of various resources (water, cash, food, fodder, etc) and by fixed/permanent infrastructure at large and small scale. Communities as homogeneous entities to confront with and deliver aid.	Achieve reliability of services and outputs by mobility and embracing variability. Households pursuing their own goals based on internal structure, needs and capacities.

The lessons learned from this review of resilience programming in Turkana give rise to five broad recommendations and reflections for those involved in the formulation, design and implementation of development and aid programmes, especially those framed around the agenda of building resilience.

1. Governance of aid and development programmes should embrace complexity, moving away from linear thinking towards mobility thinking. The idea of '*mobile governance*', which

operates like a control room that juggles multiple changing factors in an ever-shifting environment to ensure that critical services (as defined by local people) are sustained (Roe, 2020), would be useful in this regard. This would require an approach that is inherently real-time, flexible and multi-vocal, never favouring a single interlocutor (chiefs, seers, representatives of communities) but hearing the many voices that inhabit a territory, respecting a diversity of viewpoints, needs and aspirations, and being flexibile enough to accommodate a different understanding of time, not merely as an economic factor, but as an expression of disequilibrium thinking and complexity (real-time information system). Mobile governance would make it possible to capture the messiness of real life and, in turn, to enable fluid responses able to quickly respond to contingencies, making the best out of uncertainty.

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1. In practice it is recommended to…

1.1 Increase dialogue and coordination between various actors involved in different phases of the elaboration and implementation of development programmes (including beneficiaries, programme designers, enumerators, officers, distributors, evaluators, etc.) respecting the *multiplicity* of competencies and viewpoints

1.2 Increase support for *coordination* at county level among the various development actors

1.3 Incorporate a *rapid* system of recording, communicating and analysing real-time information (beyond EWS) and data on delays, changes or unexpected events

1.4 Develop adaptive management tools to break the sequentiality of planned interventions in favour of quick and *flexible* responses to observed changes

1.5 Define a longer timeline of programme governance beyond the yearly budget to ensure a programme's *sustainability* beyond the end of the project

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2. Resilience policies need to be designed and implemented in closer dialogue with local communities and better speak to their needs and interests. Currently the aid industry tends to work towards objectives defined externally – 'development *to*'. This framework should be flipped to change the way problems are presented and interventions designed by 'seeing from within' – building a 'development model *from*', working out from local conditions.[15] This implies rethinking expertise (making locals the experts), being receptive to diverse and situated knowledge, and working within (not from a distance). This entails proximity: freedom of movement for agencies' representatives to access populations, being there, being closer to people and places. In turn, resilience would stop existing as a 'category for outsiders', as a view from above and separated from the ground, but rather exist in the experiences of people in their everyday lives, at eye level – it would not be aimed at "making a view of the world, but taking a view in it" (Ingold, 2000, p 42).

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[15] Thanks to Saverio Krätli for these reflections.

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2. In practice it is recommended to…

2.1 Relocate headquarters for programme implementation to field locations (*proximity*), leaving in capital cities only diplomatic offices and those units in charge of the communication and relationship with governments and other development agencies for coordination at national level

2.2 Work in close collaboration with local people (beyond classical representatives such as chiefs, seers or other community spokespersons), who are not to be merely seen as vulnerable or recurrently exposed to shocks but rather as '*experts*' whose grounded and varied knowledge of the territory is crucial for the success of the programme

2.3 Establish channels to *share* and disseminate knowledge and evidence with internal and external stakeholders

2.4 In respect of security conditions, allow officers to *freely* move to visit beneficiaries (including for prolonged sojourns) to better align their viewpoints

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3. Long term development should be based on a *self-definition of good life* beyond the 'shadows of the crisis', making it possible to *understand resilience in the everyday*. The exclusive focus on the crisis prevents the understanding of daily practices and their socio-spatial and temporal extension beyond the crisis. It risks disrupting relationships when it confines people within localised interventions. It blinds us to the skills, knowledge and responses developed locally. Finally, it obscures other priorities, needs and aspirations rooted within societal values and power imbalances. Opening up to the everyday, perhaps with specialised teams that work over the long run within the territory and in proximity to households and communities, would give to the humanitarian and development sector a broader insight into societal dynamics, opportunities and constraints and, in turn, inform policy making.

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3. In practice it is recommended to…

3.1 Invest in *research* by creating specialised teams which bring together multiple competences (ie anthropologists, ecologists, vets, economists, geographers, etc) who would work in the territory over the long run, establishing trust relationships with beneficiaries and developing a broad understanding of the everyday life, needs and aspirations of local communities

3.2 Dis-align programmatic timelines with research timelines; the specialised teams should operate *independently*, beyond the scope and the timeframe of funded programmes and constantly feeding information about societal dynamics and changes over the long run.

3.3 Ensure community *participation* in design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation

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4. Aid should not be limited to providing for material needs, but must also be able to learn from historical processes and their cultural dimension during the process of transferring capital and know-how. The recognition of the value of local cultures and practices would safeguard the diversity of viewpoints and reduce the risk of imposing interventions that are costly and ineffective. There is an urgent need to recognise the process of creation of identity as a strong quest for respect, dignity and self-existence (not in subtractive terms), while it is often confused with traditionality or worse: begging for what is perceived, by outsiders, as lacking (food, infrastructure, services). The lack of understanding of rural identities in Turkana – as built around the shared pride in being able to 'stay without' (water, for example) as opposed to town dwellers, obscures the reality that permanent water sources (like boreholes or mechanical wells) are not always needed, being neither efficient nor ecologically sustainable. These approaches treat water as a necessary starting point for development, reiterating a "sedentarist bias" (Bakewell, 2008) and frequently failing to recognise that herders have learnt to 'stay without' and migrate according to the variability of hydrological landscapes. By moving they save the environment from degradation and overuse, and guarantee the reproducibility of resources (Salza, 1997). The supply of water in any one place, in other words, must sometimes be avoided.

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4. In practice it is recommended to…

4.1 Tighten the *link* between research and the definition of a programme's outputs

4.2 Develop a *systemic* approach to development interventions and their impacts on multiple dimensions of life (social, ecological, economic, cultural, political) at a larger scale

4.3 Present programme outputs for local validation

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5. Finally, the humanitarian and development sector, while promoting resilience approaches, should endorse the use of mobility in two principal ways: (1) by making mobility the outcome of development programmes, something to promote and protect in the lives and places of beneficiaries, and, in so doing, challenging centralised planning, mega and fixed infrastructure, and invasive interventions which characterise the 'sedentarist bias' of the architecture of the development sector (Bakewell ,2008); and (2) by making mobility the vector of distribution and the core axiom of development interventions by moving along beneficiaries and by avoiding incentives that privilege fixity over movement, forecasting over real-time management and equilibrium over variability.

5. In practice it is recommended to…
5.1 Revise development strategies and priorities at the macro level in favour of initiatives which sustain *mobility* (for example, placing services along migratory routes)
5.2 Develop tools for large-scale analysis and monitoring beyond micro-zonal interventions to favour *connections* at regional, national and international levels
5.3 Define *mobile services*, including schooling, health, markets, water, etc
5.4 Facilitate *border-crossings*

These recommendations do not lay out a menu of immediate changes to be simply incorporated into development programmes so much as some new directions that can help reshape thinking around resilience programming to ensure it serves to improve the lives of those it touches. Rather than international cooperation and development seeking to build resilience by looking for changes in 'local partners' and 'beneficiaries', it requires that all parties change. From my positionality during fieldwork I learnt the critical lesson that either we change together, or we do not change at all. The same applies to the development sector, to the fight against stereotypes and ideas that the western world is superior, still so much imbued in development practices (Cereghini and Nardelli 2008).

Annex 1

This list of projects contracted under the Strategic Objective number 4 and implemented in Turkana is taken from the EUTF website (https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/thematic/strengthening-resilience) and is summarised in the table below.

Title	Project budget (EUR)	Implementing partners	Country	Location	Thematic	Adoption date
Collaboration in Cross-border Areas of the Horn of Africa Region	63,500,000	GIZ[16], United Nations Development Programme, Intergovernmental Authority on Development	Kenya, Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia	Num of counties in all targeted countries– all Turkana	Strenghtening resilience	15/12/2016
Deliversing durable solutions to forced displacement in the IGAD region through the implementation of the global compact on refugees (GCR)	3,000,000	Intergovernmental Authority on Development	Uganda, South Sudan, Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia		Strenghtening resilience	31/10/2019
Enhancing self-reliance and host communities in Kenya	25,400,000		Kenya		Strenghtening resilience	12/12/2018
Monitoring and Learning System for the EUTF Horn of Africa	4,000,000	Altai Consulting	Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somaila, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda		Strenghtening resilience	15/12/2016
Piloting Private Sector Solutions for Refugees and Host Communities in Nort-West Kenya	5,000,000		Kenya		Strenghtening resilience	29/05/2018
Regional Development and Protection Programme in Kenya: Support to the Kalobeyei Development Programmme	15,000,000	Agriculture Organization, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	Kenya		Strenghtening resilience	28/04/2016
Strengthening the ability of IGAD to promot resilience in the Horn of Africa	5,000,000	Intergovernmental Authority on Development, GIZ	Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somaila, South, Uganda, South Sudan		Strenghtening resilience	28/04/2016
Towards Free Movement and Transhumance in the IGAD region	10,000,000	Intergovernmental Authority on Development, OIT – ILO – Organization Internationale du Travail – International Labour Organization	Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somaila, South, Uganda, South Sudan		Strenghtening resilience	28/04/2016

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[16] English: German Corporation for International Cooperation

Acronyms

ADESO	African Development Solutions
ASALs	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
ASP	Arid Lands Support Programme
CBCBA	Community-Based Cost Benefit Analysis
CBS	Central Bureau of Statistics
CDAP	Community Development Action Plans
COFI	Community Owned Financial Institutions
CPP	Country Program Papers
CT-OVC	Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children Programme
CT-PWSD	Cash Transfer Programme for People with Severe Disability
DFID	Department for International Development
DRA	Disaster Resilience Advisers
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EC	European Commission
EDE	Ending Drought Emergency
EU	European Union
EUTF	European Trust Fund
EWS	Early-Warning Systems
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
GAIN	Gloval Alliance for Improved Nutrition
KARI	Kenya Agriculturale Research Institute
HERR	Humanitarian Emergency Response Review
HFA	Hyogo Framework for Action.
HoRN	Horn of Africa Resilience Network
HSNP	Hunger and Safety Net Programme
IDDRSI	Drought Disaster Resilience Sustainability Initiative
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ILRI	International Livestock Research Institute
JPC	Joint Planning Cell
KISEDP	Kalobeyei Integrated Social and Economic Development Plan
NDMA	National Drought Management Authority
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSNP	National Safety Net Programme
OPCT	Older Person Cash Transfer Programme
PLPA	Participatory Learning, Planning and Action
PREG	Partnership for Resilience and Economic Growth
RDPP	Regional Development and Protection Programme
REGAL-IR	Resilience and Economic Growth in the Arid Lands-Improving resilience
RPP	Regional Program Framework or Paper
SFDRR	Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030
SHARE	Support Horn of Africa Resilience
SLF	Sustainable Livelihood Framework
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme

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